Sub (B And R) Dipak Chakrabarty Jc/E 380049A vs The Union Of India And 6 Ors

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GAHC010081372022

2026:GAU-AS:15581
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/2950/2022
SUB (B AND R) DIPAK CHAKRABARTY JC/E 380049A
S/O- LATESUNILCHAKRABARTY
R/O- MAIDAM BAKARAPARA,
BYE LANE -8
(KRISHNAPUR PATH)
P.O- BASISTHA GUWAHATI
PIN-781029, DIST- KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY
OF HOME AFFAIRS, NORTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI-110011
2:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ASSAM RIFLES
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF ASSAM RIFLES
LAITKOR
SHILLONG-10
MEGHALAYA
3:THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
ASSAM
RIFLES (NORTH)
HEADQUARTERS IGAR (N)
C/O- 99 APO
PIN-932554
4:THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
ASSAM
RIFLES (EAST)
HEADQUARTERS IGAR (EAST)
C/O- 99 APO
PIN-932553

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5:COLONEL (ADMINISTRATION)
HEADQUARTERS IGAR (N)
C/O- 99 APO
PIN-932554
6:EX- OFFICIO COMMANDANT
HEADQUARTERS NAGALAND RANGE (NORTH)
C/O- 99 APO
PIN-934827
7:RECORDING OFFICER OF SOE HEADQUARTERS NAGALAND RANGE
(NORTH)
C/O 99 APO
PIN- 934827
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K N CHOUDHURY, MS. D SHARMA,MS. K
HAZARIKA,MS. C DUTTA,MS. M BAISHYA,MS G DUGAR,MS. B SARMA,MR A TEWARI
Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., MR. K GOGOI
:::BEFORE:::
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE

Date on which judgment is reserved : 01.10.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment : 14.10.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of
the operative of the judgment? : No

Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced? : Yes

JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. A.
Tewari, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K. Gogoi, learned CGC,

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for the respondents.
2. By filing the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order
dated 18.10.2021 passed by the Inspector General Assam Rifles (North),
whereby he was dismissed from service under Section 11(1) of the Assam Rifles
Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010. The petitioner has
also challenged the order dated 11.03.2022 passed by the Director General,
Assam Rifles, whereby his appeal preferred under Rule 28 of the Assam Rifles
Rules, 2010 came to be rejected.
3. The petitioner was enrolled as Naib Subedar (B&R) in the Assam Rifles on
12.10.1989 and was promoted to the rank of Subedar (B&R) on 05.07.2011.
The proceedings against the petitioner arose out of a sting operation styled as
“Operation Hilltop”, which was aired on 24.09.2014 and 25.09.2014 and
contained allegations of corruption against personnel of the Assam Rifles. The
petitioner was alleged to have accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 30,000/- from
one Mr. C.C. Mathew, a contractor of the Assam Rifles. A Court of Inquiry was
thereafter convened by order dated 29.09.2014, followed by an amendment
dated 01.10.2014 and a corrigendum dated 07.10.2014.
4. The petitioner was thereafter subjected to a Summary of Evidence in
respect of the allegations. Subsequently, a General Assam Rifles Court (GARC)
was convened for his trial. A charge-sheet dated 07.04.2017 and 21.04.2017
was issued, containing a charge under Section 55 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006
read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and an alternative
charge under Section 49 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006. A convening order dated
29.05.2017 was thereafter issued for assembling the GARC at Agartala. The
petitioner challenged the charge-sheet and the convening order before the

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Meghalaya High Court in W.P.(C) No.129/2017.
5. The proceedings before the GARC were stayed by order dated 07.06.2017
and, thereafter, by judgment and order dated 15.06.2017, the Meghalaya High
Court set aside the charge-sheet on the ground that the GARC did not have
jurisdiction to try an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The
said decision was challenged by the Assam Rifles in W.A. No.37/2017. During
the pendency of the said appeal, the question of jurisdiction of a GARC to try
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 came to be considered by
the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5136/2019 arising out of SLP(C)
No.18113/2018. By judgment dated 01.07.2019, the Supreme Court held that
the GARC had jurisdiction to try offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 against members of the Assam Rifles. Thereafter, W.A. No.37/2017
was disposed of by the Meghalaya High Court on 11.03.2020.
6. The earlier convening order dated 29.05.2017 was thereafter cancelled by
order dated 21.03.2020. The petitioner was subsequently issued a show-cause
notice dated 15.06.2021 under Section 11(1) of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read
with Rule 20 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010. The petitioner submitted his reply
to the said show-cause notice on 18.07.2021. Thereafter, by order dated
18.10.2021, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The petitioner preferred
an appeal against the said order on 09.12.2021 and also submitted a reminder
dated 12.01.2022. The appeal was rejected by order dated 11.03.2022. Being
aggrieved, this writ petition is filed.
7. Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioner submits
that the petitioner was dismissed from service without a regular trial by a GARC,
although the earlier proceedings had been initiated for the purpose of trying the

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very allegations on which the subsequent order of dismissal was founded. It is
submitted that after the earlier GARC proceedings did not proceed, the
respondents invoked Section 11(1) of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule
20 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010 and relied upon the proceedings of the Court
of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence for arriving at a conclusion against the
petitioner. Therefore, it is contended that the exercise of power under Rule 20
was not legally sustainable.
8. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the respondents proceeded on the
basis that the trial by the GARC had become barred by limitation under Section
98 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006. It is contended that such understanding of
Section 98 is erroneous, inasmuch as the GARC had already been convened by
order dated 29.05.2017 within the prescribed period and the proceedings could
not proceed thereafter on account of the proceedings before the Meghalaya
High Court. It is further submitted that, while computing the period of limitation,
the period during which the stay granted by the Meghalaya High Court remained
operative from 07.06.2017 to 11.03.2020 was required to be excluded in terms
of the proviso to Section 98.
9. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the respondents, having proceeded
on the basis that the GARC trial had become time-barred, invoked Section 11(1)
of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010
and relied upon the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and Summary of
Evidence for dismissing the petitioner from service. It is contended that the
GARC trial was never conducted and, therefore, the alleged offence was never
proved against the petitioner.
10. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Court of Inquiry and the

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Summary of Evidence could not have been relied upon in the manner in which
they have been relied upon in the impugned order. Particular emphasis is placed
upon Rule 184 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010. It is contended that the
respondents, having proceeded against the petitioner under Section 11(1) read
with Rule 20 after the GARC trial was not held, could not have relied upon the
proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence to impose the
penalty of dismissal. Learned Senior Counsel submits that Rule 184 renders the
proceedings of a Court of Inquiry inadmissible as evidence and that, in any
event, the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence were
conducted in a manner which denied the petitioner the procedural safeguards
available under the Rules, particularly the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. C.C.
Mathew.
11. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the proceedings of the Court of
Inquiry and Summary of Evidence were further vitiated by the denial of an
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. C.C. Mathew, who was the person from whom
the petitioner was alleged to have accepted the amount of Rs. 30,000/-. It is
contended that Mr. C.C. Mathew did not appear for examination and, instead, a
written manuscript attributed to him was introduced during the Summary of
Evidence. The petitioner was thereafter asked to submit a written questionnaire
in relation to the said statement. The petitioner declined to adopt that course
and sought the physical presence of Mr. C.C. Mathew so that he could cross-
examine him. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel, relies upon
Rule 49(2) of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010.
12. It is submitted that the requirements contemplated under Rule 183(8) of
the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010 was not afforded to the petitioner during the Court

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of Inquiry. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the allegations arising from the
sting operation directly concerned the petitioner’s character and service
reputation and, therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the safeguards
prescribed under Rule 183(8). It is contended that the petitioner was not
afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine Mr. C.C. Mathew,
notwithstanding his request for the physical presence of the said witness.
Learned Senior Counsel further refers to the proceedings before the Delhi High
Court concerning the appearance of Mr. C.C. Mathew and the assurance given
by the Assam Rifles authorities regarding security and other arrangements for
his appearance.
13. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the impugned order dated
18.10.2021 relies upon an allegation which was not part of the charge for which
the GARC had been convened. Particular reference is made to paragraph 18(b)
of the impugned dismissal order, wherein it has been recorded that the
petitioner had demanded Rs. 30,000/- from Mr. C.C. Mathew in connection with
construction work and had subsequently insisted that he visit Guwahati for
payment of the said amount. The said allegation was not contained in the show-
cause notice and that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to meet
the allegation before the order of dismissal was passed.
14. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the impugned order further relies
upon the call details, photographs and the alleged telephone conversation
between the petitioner and Mr. C.C. Mathew to conclude that the petitioner had
accepted Rs.30,000/- as illegal gratification. It is contended that the electronic
material was not properly authenticated and that neither the devices from which
the material was obtained nor any forensic report establishing its authenticity

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was produced. He disputes the reliance placed upon such material in the
absence of an opportunity to cross-examine the persons connected with the
same.
15. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that there was a material variation
between the charge contained in the charge-sheet pursuant to which the GARC
was convened and the charges subsequently set out in the show-cause notice
dated 15.06.2021. It is pointed out that the first charge in the show-cause
notice referred to the petitioner as having been a public servant “accepting
gratification”, whereas the corresponding charge in the charge-sheet alleged
that he had “agreed to accept gratification”. It is submitted that the alternative
charge was also differently worded. Learned Senior Counsel contends that,
notwithstanding the differences between the charge-sheet and the show-cause
notice, the respondents subsequently proceeded against the petitioner by
treating the allegation as an act of “misconduct”, although the GARC trial had
never been conducted.
16. It is submitted that there is no finding against the petitioner in any
proceeding establishing his acceptance of illegal gratification of Rs. 30,000/-.
Learned Senior Counsel submits that the respondents could not treat the
petitioner as blameworthy merely on the basis of the proceedings of the Court
of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence, particularly when the petitioner had
challenged the manner in which those proceedings were conducted and had not
been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine C.C. Mathew. It is contended
that the alleged offence was never proved in a GARC trial. He has also disputed
the sufficiency of the material relied upon by the respondents and has
contended that suspicion, presumption and surmise cannot substitute evidence

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even in a departmental proceedings.
17. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellate authority failed to
examine the aforesaid aspects while disposing of the appeal preferred by the
petitioner. It is contended that the appeal was rejected without dealing with the
objections relating to the absence of a regular trial, the violation of the
principles of natural justice and the procedural irregularities in the Court of
Inquiry and Summary of Evidence. Therefore, the appellate order dated
11.03.2022 has been passed without proper consideration of the grounds raised
in the appeal.
18. Learned Senior Counsel relies upon the judgment and order dated
03.08.2026 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Tripura in Shibu
Limbu v. Union of India & Ors., W.A. No. 116/2025 , and submits that the
Division Bench held that the power under Rule 20(2) of the Assam Rifles Rules,
2010 cannot be invoked lightly or arbitrarily to dispense with a regular trial by
the GARC. The authority must have sufficient grounds for arriving at the
satisfaction that such a trial is inexpedient or impracticable, and that the
decision remains subject to judicial review. Learned Senior Counsel submits
that, in the present case, the GARC trial was never held and the respondents
proceeded to dismiss the petitioner by relying upon the materials collected
during the Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence, despite the petitioner’s
objections to the manner in which those proceedings were conducted. It is,
therefore, submitted that the reasons assigned by the respondents for
dispensing with the GARC trial must be examined in the light of the principles
laid down in Shibu Limbu (Supra) .
19. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the power under Section 11(1) of

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the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010
was not validly exercised in the present case as the reasoning adopted for
treating the GARC trial as time-barred was misconceived, and the reliance upon
the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence was contrary
to Rule 184, and therefore, the dismissal of the petitioner is arbitrary and as
such, unsustainable.
20. On the other hand, Mr. K. Gogoi, learned CGC, appearing for the
respondents, submits that the challenge raised by the petitioner essentially
seeks a re-appreciation of the material relied upon by the competent authority
and, therefore, cannot be examined by this Court in exercise of judicial review
under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is submitted that the scope of judicial
review in matters concerning administrative action is limited to examining the
legality of the decision-making process and the Court does not sit as an
appellate authority over the decision taken by the competent authority. Reliance
is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular v. Union
of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , to contend that interference is
warranted only where there is illegality, irrationality, breach of principles of
natural justice or procedural impropriety.
21. Learned CGC submits that the proceedings against the petitioner arose
from the sting operation “Operation Hilltop”, which disclosed allegations of
corruption involving personnel of the Assam Rifles. The Court of Inquiry was
convened to investigate the allegations emerging from the sting operation and
was not initiated on the basis of any complaint made by C.C. Mathew. Learned
CGC submits that C.C. Mathew was summoned through the Judicial Magistrate
but did not appear before the Court of Inquiry. The respondents, however,

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examined other relevant witnesses, including Shyju Maruthumpilly, who had
conducted the sting operation, as well as Suresh Kumar Gupta and Sapan Saha.
On the basis of the material collected during the Court of Inquiry, the petitioner
was held blameworthy along with other personnel and disciplinary action was
directed.
22. Learned CGC further submits that the petitioner was thereafter subjected
to the Summary of Evidence and was given adequate opportunity to defend
himself. It is contended that the attendance of C.C. Mathew could not be
secured during the Summary of Evidence on account of the passage of time and
the security concerns stated by the respondents. Consequently, a written
statement duly signed by C.C. Mathew was obtained under Rule 49(6) of the
Assam Rifles Rules, 2010. The petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-
examine the said witness through a written questionnaire, but he declined to
avail of the same and insisted upon the physical presence of the witness.
Learned CGC submits that even an adjournment of 24 hours was granted to
enable the petitioner to reconsider his decision, but the petitioner continued to
decline the opportunity. It is, therefore, contended that there was no denial of
natural justice and that the requirements of Rule 49 were duly complied with.
23. Learned CGC submits that the Hearing of Charge was also conducted in
accordance with Rule 47 of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010. It is contended that
the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witness examined at that stage and was also given an opportunity to make a
statement and produce defence witnesses, which he declined. The respondents,
therefore, submit that the petitioner was given opportunities at the different
stages of the proceedings to defend himself and cannot now contend that the

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proceedings stood vitiated for want of opportunity.
24. With regard to the GARC proceedings, learned CGC submits that the
GARC had assembled in June 2017 but the trial was adjourned sine die following
the order dated 15.06.2017 passed by the Meghalaya High Court in W.P.(C)
No.129/2017. It is submitted that the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court
dated 01.07.2019 settled the question of jurisdiction of the GARC to try offences
under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and, thereafter, the Meghalaya
High Court, by order dated 11.03.2020 in W.A. No.37/2017, permitted the GARC
proceedings to proceed. However, by that stage considerable time had elapsed,
the members originally detailed for the GARC had either been posted out or had
superannuated, and the earlier convening order was consequently cancelled on
21.03.2020.
25. Learned CGC submits that although it was proposed to convene a fresh
GARC, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions imposed
during the lockdown made it impracticable to assemble the Court. It is
contended that a GARC would require the presence of the prescribed number of
members, a Law Officer, the accused, counsel, defending officers and witnesses,
including civilian witnesses from Kerala and Delhi. The respondents further
submit that considerable time had elapsed from the year 2014 and several
service witnesses had either retired or been posted elsewhere. These
circumstances, rendered the convening of a fresh GARC impracticable.
26. Learned CGC further submits that the proceedings had also become
barred by limitation under Section 98 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006. For the
purpose of computation, the limitation period commenced from 23.12.2014,
when the Directorate General Assam Rifles directed disciplinary action on the

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basis of the Court of Inquiry. The period from 15.06.2017 to 11.03.2020, during
which the proceedings before the Meghalaya High Court remained pending, was
excluded and the limitation period recommenced from 12.03.2020. It is
contended that a fresh GARC was required to be assembled before 15.09.2020,
but the same could not be assembled for the reasons already stated. Learned
CGC places reliance upon Union of India & Ors. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu ,
reported in (2001) 5 SCC 593 , to contend that expiry of the period of
limitation for trial does not ipso facto take away the power of the competent
authority to proceed administratively under the applicable statutory provisions.
27. Learned CGC submits that under these circumstances the competent
authority invoked Section 11(1) of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20
of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010. It is submitted that Rule 20 permits the
competent authority to dispense with trial by a Force Court where it is satisfied
that such trial is inexpedient or impracticable and that the further retention of
the person in service is undesirable. According to the respondents, the
competent authority recorded its satisfaction on the basis of the prolonged
litigation, cancellation of the earlier convening order, posting or retirement of
members and witnesses, the COVID-19 restrictions, the requirement of securing
civilian witnesses from different places and the limitation prescribed under
Section 98.
28. Learned CGC submits that the show-cause notice dated 15.06.2021
afforded the petitioner an opportunity to explain why his service should not be
terminated and that the petitioner submitted his reply dated 18.07.2021. The
competent authority thereafter considered the petitioner’s reply together with
the material available from the Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence

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before passing the dismissal order dated 18.10.2021. Therefore, the decision
was not based upon the mere existence of the preliminary proceedings but
upon the material which, in the opinion of the competent authority, established
the petitioner’s involvement in acceptance of Rs. 30,000/- as illegal gratification.
29. Learned CGC submits that the contention that the allegation referred to in
paragraph 18(b) of the dismissal order was a new allegation is misconceived. It
is contended that the allegation regarding the demand of Rs. 30,000/- in
connection with construction work and the subsequent demand for payment
was already reflected in the material collected during the Court of Inquiry and
Summary of Evidence, including the written statement attributed to C.C.
Mathew. It is submitted that the petitioner was given an opportunity to deal
with the said material through the written questionnaire but declined to cross-
examine C.C. Mathew in that manner. Therefore, no fresh allegation was
introduced at the stage of dismissal.
30. Learned CGC further submits that the alleged acceptance of Rs. 30,000/-
was supported by the material collected during the proceedings, including the
telephone conversation between the petitioner and C.C. Mathew, the call details
and the photographs of their meeting on 12.08.2014. The photographs depicted
the petitioner and C.C. Mathew together and included photographs in which
currency notes were visible. The telephone conversations and the surrounding
circumstances, taken together, provided sufficient material for the competent
authority to conclude that the amount had been accepted as illegal gratification.
31. Learned CGC submits that the difference in the wording of the charge-
sheet and the show-cause notice does not materially alter the allegation against
the petitioner. The particulars of the charge remained the same, namely, the

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alleged acceptance of Rs. 30,000/- from C.C. Mathew as gratification other than
legal remuneration. Therefore, no new or materially different charge was
introduced at the stage of the show-cause notice or dismissal.
32. Learned CGC further submits that the proceedings under Section 11 read
with Rule 20 are departmental in nature and are not governed by the strict rules
of evidence applicable to a criminal trial. The applicable standard is that of
preponderance of probabilities and that the Court, while exercising judicial
review, is primarily required to examine whether the petitioner was afforded
adequate opportunity and whether the decision-making process suffered from
violation of natural justice. Therefore, the petitioner’s reliance upon the
provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, including Section 65(B), is misplaced.
33. Learned CGC submits that a Court of Inquiry is a fact-finding proceeding
intended to investigate the circumstances of an incident and to identify
personnel who may be blameworthy on the basis of the material placed before
it. It is contended that the requirements of Rule 183 were complied with and
that the petitioner was afforded opportunities to remain present, cross-examine
witnesses, produce evidence and make his statement. Thus, he submits that the
Court of Inquiry or Summary of Evidence is not vitiated by procedural
irregularity.
34. Learned CGC relies upon State of Punjab v. Ram Singh Ex Constable,
reported in 1992 AIR 2188 , and M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India, reported
in (2005) 8 SCC 351 , in support of the submission that the expression
“misconduct” is not capable of a precise and exhaustive definition and takes its
meaning from the nature of the delinquency and the context in which it is used.
It is contended that acceptance of illegal gratification by a member of a

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disciplined force constitutes serious misconduct and that, having regard to the
nature and gravity of the act attributed to the petitioner, the competent
authority was justified in considering his further retention in service undesirable.
35. Learned CGC submits that the appellate authority, namely, the Director
General Assam Rifles, considered the appeals dated 09.12.2021 and 12.01.2022
and rejected the same by order dated 11.03.2022. The appellate order was
passed after due application of mind and that there is no basis to describe the
same as mechanical or predetermined. He, therefore, submits that the
competent authority had jurisdiction to invoke Section 11(1) read with Rule 20
of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010 after the GARC trial became impracticable, had
afforded the petitioner an opportunity to show cause, had considered the
material available on record and had recorded reasons for concluding that his
further retention in service was undesirable. No violation of natural justice or
procedural requirement has been established and as such, the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed.
36. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
parties and have perused the materials available on record.
37. The proceedings against the petitioner arose out of the sting operation
styled as “Operation Hilltop”, following which a Court of Inquiry and a Summary
of Evidence were conducted in relation to the allegation that the petitioner had
accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 30,000/- from one C.C. Mathew. A General
Assam Rifles Court (GARC) was thereafter convened for his trial by order dated
29.05.2017. However, the proceedings could not proceed in view of the litigation
before the Meghalaya High Court concerning the jurisdiction of the GARC to try
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After the Supreme Court

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settled the question of jurisdiction by judgment dated 01.07.2019, the writ
appeal pending before the Meghalaya High Court was disposed of on
11.03.2020. The earlier convening order was, however, cancelled by the
respondents on 21.03.2020.
38. The respondents thereafter took the view that, having regard to the
passage of time, the availability of officers and witnesses, the restrictions arising
from the COVID-19 pandemic and the limitation prescribed under Section 98 of
the Assam Rifles Act, 2006, it was not practicable to proceed with a fresh GARC.
The petitioner was accordingly issued a show-cause notice dated 15.06.2021
under Section 11 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the Assam
Rifles Rules, 2010. Upon consideration of his reply dated 18.07.2021, the
competent authority passed the order dated 18.10.2021 dismissing him from
service, relying upon the material collected during the Court of Inquiry and
Summary of Evidence. The petitioner’s appeal against the dismissal order was
rejected by the Director General, Assam Rifles, on 11.03.2022.
39. The challenge to the impugned orders raises two connected aspects. The
first concerns the circumstances in which the respondents considered it
inexpedient or impracticable to proceed with the GARC and invoked the power
under Section 11 read with Rule 20. The second concerns the reliance placed
upon the Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence for imposing the penalty of
dismissal, particularly in view of the petitioner’s objection that he was not
afforded an effective opportunity to cross-examine C.C. Mathew and to meet the
material relied upon against him. These aspects require examination in the light
of the statutory provisions governing the exercise of power and the procedure
followed in the present case.

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40. Section 11 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the Assam
Rifles Rules, 2010 confers upon the competent authority the power to terminate
the service of a person in the circumstances contemplated therein. The exercise
of such power is, however, subject to the conditions prescribed. The competent
authority must be satisfied that trial by a Force Court is inexpedient or
impracticable and that the further retention of the person in service is
undesirable. These requirements must be examined independently, as the
existence of the statutory power does not, by itself, justify dispensing with the
regular trial.
41. The difficulty with the respondents’ approach lies in Section 98 of the
Assam Rifles Act, 2006. The provision prescribes the period within which a trial
by an Assam Rifles Court may be commenced. It does not prescribe a period
within which a trial, once validly commenced, must necessarily be concluded.
The distinction assumes importance in the present case, as the GARC had
already been convened by order dated 29.05.2017, but the proceedings could
not progress on account of the judicial proceedings concerning its jurisdiction to
try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
42. The record indicates that the proceedings before the Meghalaya High
Court culminated in the judgment and order dated 11.03.2020 in W.A. No.
37/2017, following the decision of the Supreme Court dated 01.07.2019. The
original convening order was thereafter cancelled by the Inspector General
Assam Rifles (North) on 21.03.2020, with the respondents proposing to convene
a fresh GARC. Thus, the inability to proceed with the trial was not attributable
merely to an unexplained failure on the part of the petitioner to face the
proceedings. The intervening judicial proceedings concerning the jurisdiction of

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the GARC form part of the circumstances in which the original trial could not
proceed.
43. The proviso to Section 98 contemplates exclusion of the period during
which proceedings remain stayed by a Court. The period covered by the judicial
proceedings, therefore, had to be dealt with in accordance with the statutory
provision and the orders passed by the Courts. The respondents have furnished
their own calculation of limitation, under which the period from 15.06.2017 to
11.03.2020 was excluded and limitation recommenced on 12.03.2020. Even
proceeding on that calculation, it was necessary for the competent authority to
examine the legal effect of the original convening order and the subsequent
cancellation thereof before concluding that a trial by the GARC had become
incapable of being.
44. It appears that, the respondents’ calculation proceeds on the basis that a
fresh GARC was required to be assembled before 15.09.2020. However, the
mere expiry of the period calculated by the respondents does not, by itself,
establish that the regular trial had become impracticable within the meaning of
Rule 20. The question was not confined to whether a fresh convening order
could be issued within the period reckoned by the respondents. The competent
authority was required to consider the statutory position and the circumstances
which prevented the trial from proceeding, and thereafter arrive at the
satisfaction required under Rule 20(2).
45. The orders passed by the Supreme Court in Cognizance for Extension
of Limitation, In Re, reported in (2020) 19 SCC 10 , and the subsequent
order dated 10.01.2022, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 117 , arose from the
extraordinary circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic and dealt with

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exclusion of the period specified therein for the purposes covered by those
orders. The respondents’ decision to cancel the convening order on 21.03.2020
was followed by the period during which the Supreme Court had issued
directions concerning limitation in view of the pandemic. The effect and scope
of those directions, insofar as they applied to the proceedings in question,
therefore ought to have been considered before the authority proceeded on the
premise that the GARC trial had become time-barred.
46. The respondents have further relied upon the practical difficulties in
assembling a fresh GARC. It is stated that the officers originally detailed as
members had either been posted out or had superannuated; that a fresh Court
would require the assembly of at least five members, a Law Officer, the
accused, counsel and other personnel; and that several civilian witnesses were
located in Kerala and Delhi. The respondents have also referred to the passage
of time and the effect of the COVID-19 restrictions. Upon due consideration,
these circumstances, in my view, may explain the administrative difficulties
faced by the respondents in arranging a fresh trial. However, the statutory test
under Rule 20 is not whether convening a Force Court would be inconvenient or
would require considerable administrative arrangements. The authority must be
satisfied that trial by a Force Court is inexpedient or impracticable and that
further retention of the person in service is undesirable. The two requirements
are distinct and both must be addressed on the basis of the circumstances of
the particular case. Administrative difficulties, without an adequate examination
of their effect upon the possibility of holding a trial, cannot by themselves
substitute for the satisfaction contemplated by the Rule.
47. A profitable reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court

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in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel , reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 ,
wherein the Court considered the exceptional power to dispense with a regular
disciplinary inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution and explained
that such power cannot be exercised lightly or arbitrarily. The aforesaid principle
was applied in Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab , reported in (2006) 13
SCC 581 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the decision to dispense with a
regular departmental inquiry could not be sustained in the absence of material
justifying such a course. Though the aforesaid decisions arose in the context of
Article 311(2)(b), the principle underlying the exercise of such exceptional
power provides guidance in examining the scope and application of Rule 20 in
the present case.
48. Rule 20 provides a statutory course where the competent authority is
satisfied that a trial by a Force Court is inexpedient or impracticable and that the
person’s further retention in service is undesirable. The provision does not,
however, permit the regular trial to be dispensed with merely because an
allegation of misconduct has been made or because preliminary proceedings
have already been conducted. The reasons for dispensing with the trial must
bear a rational connection with the circumstances of the case and must satisfy
the conditions prescribed by the Rule.
49. The Division Bench of the High Court of Tripura in Shibu Limbu
(Supra) , judgment and order dated 03.08.2026, considered the exercise of
power under Section 11 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the
Assam Rifles Rules, 2010, in circumstances arising from the same operation and
the same general course of proceedings. The Division Bench examined the
scope of Section 98, the conditions governing recourse to Rule 20 and the

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procedure followed in relying upon the earlier proceedings against the person
concerned.
50. The reasoning of the Division Bench in Shibu Limbu (Supra) is
undoubtedly persuasive in examining the present case. The statutory conditions
governing the exercise of power under Rule 20 cannot be treated as satisfied
merely because the respondents considered it difficult to convene a fresh GARC
after the earlier proceedings had been interrupted. The material placed before
this Court does not establish that the competent authority adequately addressed
the distinction between the limitation for commencement of trial and the
circumstances which could render the trial inexpedient or impracticable. Nor do
the administrative difficulties stated in the affidavit, when considered by itself,
sufficiently demonstrate satisfaction of both conditions prescribed under Rule
20(2).
51. There is a further aspect concerning the material relied upon by the
competent authority. The petitioner was not tried by the GARC convened against
him. No verdict of the Force Court was, therefore, rendered on the charge of
accepting illegal gratification. The respondents instead relied upon the earlier
Court of Inquiry and Summary of Evidence while deciding that the petitioner
was blameworthy and that his further retention in service was undesirable. The
legality of the impugned action must accordingly be examined not only with
reference to the reasons for dispensing with a GARC trial, but also with
reference to the procedure by which the material collected in the earlier
proceedings was relied upon against the petitioner.
52. A Court of Inquiry is intended to ascertain facts concerning an incident or
allegation, while a Summary of Evidence forms part of the process

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contemplated under the applicable Rules. The fact that such proceedings have
been conducted does not, by itself, dispense with the procedural requirements
governing the use of the material collected therein. This assumes particular
importance where the regular trial does not take place and the earlier material
is thereafter relied upon as the basis for imposing the major penalty of dismissal
from service.
53. The respondents state that C.C. Mathew was summoned through judicial
process but did not appear. They further state that, during the Summary of
Evidence, his written statement was obtained under Rule 49(6), as his
attendance could not be secured owing to the passage of time and the risk to
his life. According to the respondents, the petitioner was offered an opportunity
to put questions to C.C. Mathew by way of a written questionnaire and was
given 24 hours to reconsider his refusal. The petitioner, however, continued to
insist upon the physical presence of C.C. Mathew. In view of the above, it is
required to consider the relevant provisions. Rule 49(2) provides for the
recording of evidence in the presence of the accused and recognizes the right of
the accused to cross-examine witnesses who give evidence against him. Rule
49(6) provides for the use of a written statement in the circumstances
contemplated therein and prescribes the procedure to be followed. The
availability of the procedure under Rule 49(6) does not dispense with the need
to examine whether, in the particular circumstances, the procedure adopted
afforded the person concerned a fair opportunity to meet the material relied
upon against him.
54. In the present case, the allegation of acceptance of illegal gratification
was supported, inter alia, by the statement attributed to C.C. Mathew. The

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petitioner disputed the manner in which that statement was relied upon and
insisted upon the physical presence of C.C. Mathew for cross-examination. The
respondents rely upon the offer of a written questionnaire and the petitioner’s
refusal to avail himself of that opportunity. That circumstance must be
considered; however, it does not by itself conclude the question whether the
procedure adopted was adequate in the context of the allegation, the nature of
the material relied upon and the subsequent decision to dispense with a regular
GARC trial.
55. Rule 183(8) of the Assam Rifles Rules, 2010 contemplates an opportunity,
before an opinion adverse to a person subject to the Act is given, to know what
has been stated against him, cross-examine the witness who has given evidence
against him, make a statement and call witnesses in his defence. The procedural
requirements governing the Court of Inquiry and the Summary of Evidence must
be examined in their respective contexts. In the present case, the absence of
C.C. Mathew and the reliance placed upon his written statement required careful
consideration, particularly because the allegation concerned acceptance of
illegal gratification and the statement was relied upon along with the other
material to sustain the charge against the petitioner.
56. The respondents submit that the Court of Inquiry originated from the
sting operation and not from a complaint made by C.C. Mathew. They also rely
upon the evidence of Shyju Maruthumpilly, who conducted the sting operation
and was examined as Witness No. 21, as well as the statements of Suresh
Kumar Gupta and Sapan Saha, examined as Witness Nos. 14 and 16. These
circumstances explain the other material available to the respondents. They do
not, however, remove the need to examine the procedure followed in relation to

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C.C. Mathew’s statement, particularly when the dismissal order relies upon the
alleged conversation and the circumstances surrounding the meeting between
him and the petitioner.
57. The respondents further rely upon the call details, telephone conversation
and photographs dated 12.08.2014. Their case is that the call records disclose
communication between the petitioner and C.C. Mathew, while the photographs
show them together and include images in which bundles of currency notes are
visible. The respondents contend that the material, taken as a whole,
establishes the petitioner’s acceptance of Rs. 30,000/- as illegal gratification.
The petitioner, on the other hand, has questioned the reliability and authenticity
of the electronic material and has raised objections regarding forensic
verification and the source devices.
58. This Court is conscious that departmental proceedings are not governed
in every respect by the strict rules of evidence applicable to a criminal trial. The
respondents’ contention that the standard of proof in departmental proceedings
is the preponderance of probabilities cannot be rejected merely because the
allegation involves electronic material or circumstances which might also be
relevant in a criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, the fact that the Indian
Evidence Act does not apply with the same rigour does not dispense with the
requirement of a fair procedure or relieve the competent authority of the
obligation to consider the objections bearing upon the reliability of the material
relied upon.
59. The Court is not required in the present proceedings to undertake a fresh
assessment of each call record, photograph or part of the alleged conversation
as though sitting in appeal over the decision of the competent authority. The

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relevant consideration is whether the petitioner was afforded an effective
opportunity to meet the case against him and whether the procedure followed
was consistent with the statutory requirements, particularly when the material
collected in the earlier proceedings was relied upon to impose dismissal without
a subsequent trial by the GARC.
60. The dismissal order refers to the telephone conversation, the call details
and the photographs as material which, when considered together, established
acceptance of Rs. 30,000/- by the petitioner. In that setting, the objection
concerning the absence of C.C. Mathew cannot be viewed in isolation from the
other material relied upon. The statement attributed to C.C. Mathew, the
alleged conversation and the photographs were considered cumulatively by the
competent authority. The petitioner’s objection was that he had not been
afforded an effective opportunity to test the account attributed to C.C. Mathew,
whose alleged payment formed the basis of the charge. The effect of that
objection required due consideration before the material was relied upon to
sustain the penalty.
61. The petitioner has further questioned the allegation referred to in
paragraph 18(b) of the dismissal order, contending that the same was not
disclosed in the show-cause notice and that he was not afforded an effective
opportunity to answer it. The respondents state that the allegation was not new,
as it was contained in the written statement of C.C. Mathew and was read out
to the petitioner during the Summary of Evidence. They also submit that the
petitioner was offered an opportunity to put questions to C.C. Mathew by
written questionnaire.
62. The question is not merely whether the material had appeared at some

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stage of the earlier proceedings. The relevant consideration is whether the
petitioner was sufficiently apprised of the case proposed to be relied upon for
imposing the penalty and was afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to
it. Where the final order relies upon an allegation in a manner which the
delinquent specifically contends was not disclosed in the show-cause notice, the
authority must address the objection and examine whether any prejudice was
caused. In the present case, the petitioner had raised the objection in his reply,
and the respondents’ explanation that the statement had been read out to him
does not, by itself, resolve the question of the adequacy of the opportunity
afforded.
63. The respondents have relied Harjeet Singh Sandhu (Supra), in support
of the contention that the competent authority possesses an independent
administrative power under the applicable statutory scheme. The existence of
such a power is not in dispute. However, the availability of an independent
administrative power does not dispense with compliance with the conditions
governing its exercise or render the exercise immune from judicial review where
the statutory requirements or the principles of natural justice have not been
followed.
64. The respondents’ reliance upon the aforesaid decision, therefore, does
not answer the objections arising from the manner in which Rule 20 was
invoked in the present case. The competent authority was required to be
satisfied that trial by the GARC was inexpedient or impracticable and that the
petitioner’s further retention in service was undesirable. The reasons furnished
by the respondents concerning limitation, the availability of personnel and
witnesses and the pandemic had to be assessed against those statutory

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requirements. The authority was further required to ensure that the material
relied upon for imposing the penalty had been considered through a procedure
consistent with the applicable Rules.
65. On consideration of the materials placed before this Court, the reasons
advanced by the respondents do not sufficiently establish that the statutory
conditions for dispensing with the GARC trial were met. The conclusion that the
trial had become time-barred was central to the decision to proceed under Rule
20, but the legal effect of Section 98 and the intervening circumstances were
not adequately addressed. The practical difficulties referred to by the
respondents, though capable of explaining the difficulties in assembling a fresh
GARC, do not independently establish that the trial had become impracticable as
contemplated by the Rule.
66. The manner in which the earlier proceedings were relied upon gives rise
to a further procedural concern. The petitioner disputed the reliance upon the
written statement of C.C. Mathew and sought his physical presence for cross-
examination. Although the respondents state that a written questionnaire was
offered, the petitioner’s objection had to be considered in the context of the
nature of the allegation and the reliance placed upon that statement together
with the other material. The decision to impose the penalty without a GARC trial
made it necessary to ensure that the procedure adopted in the earlier
proceedings afforded the petitioner a fair opportunity to meet the case against
him.
67. This Court is mindful of the limited scope of judicial review in matters of
disciplinary action. The Court does not sit as an appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own assessment of the photographs,

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call records or alleged conversation for that of the competent authority.
Interference in the present case is warranted not because a different view ought
to have been taken on the merits of the allegation, but because the exercise of
the power under Rule 20 has not been shown to satisfy the statutory conditions
governing the dispensing with of a regular trial, and the procedure by which the
material was relied upon raises a material concern regarding the opportunity
afforded to the petitioner.
68. The appellate authority was required to examine the petitioner’s
objections in the appeal against the dismissal order. The materials placed before
this Court do not demonstrate that the appellate decision cured the deficiencies
concerning the basis for dispensing with the GARC trial or the procedural
objections raised by the petitioner. The rejection of the appeal, therefore, does
not remove the infirmities in the original decision.
69. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the view that the
impugned order dated 18.10.2021, by which the petitioner was dismissed from
service under Section 11 of the Assam Rifles Act, 2006 read with Rule 20 of the
Assam Rifles Rules, 2010, cannot be sustained. The consequential appellate
order dated 11.03.2022 is also liable to be set aside.
70. Accordingly, the order dated 18.10.2021 passed by the Inspector General
Assam Rifles (North), dismissing the petitioner from service and the appellate
order dated 11.03.2022 passed by the Director General, Assam Rifles, are
hereby set aside.
71. The respondents shall extend to the petitioner the consequential service
benefits flowing from the setting aside of the dismissal order, in accordance with
the applicable rules. In the event that the petitioner has attained the age of

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superannuation, the respondents shall calculate and release the retiral and other
consequential benefits payable to him in accordance with law.
72. The writ petition stands allowed in the above terms. There shall be no
order as to costs.

JUDGE
Comparing Assistant