THAKOR JADIBEN CHATURJI vs LEGAL HEIRS OF LATE THAKOR KUNVARJI LAXMANJI

C/SCA/4495/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 19/10/2026
(GJHC240029762026)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4495 of 2026

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

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Approved for Reporting Yes No
√
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THAKOR JADIBEN CHATURJI & ORS.
Versus
LEGAL HEIRS OF LATE THAKOR KUNVARJI LAXMANJI & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR.AMIT R JOSHI(6682) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6
MR P B VELANI(7465) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

Date : 19/10/2026
JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr.Amit Joshi, learned advocate for the
petitioners.
2. This petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India, seeking the following reliefs:
“(A) Be pleased to admit and allow this petition;
(B) Be pleased to quash and set aside the order dated
13.10.2025 passed by the Ld. 4th Additional District
Judge, Patan in Civil Misc. Application No.48/2022 for
condonation of delay in preferring Regular Civil Appeal
(Annexure-A), in the interest of justice;
(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of
this petition, be pleased to stay the execution,
implementation and operation of the order dated
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13.10.2025 passed by the Ld. 4th Additional District
Judge, Patan in Civil Misc. Application No.48/2022 for
condonation of delay in preferring Regular Civil Appeal
(Annexure-A), in the interest of justice;”
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS :
3. Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for the petitioners, would
submit that the appellate court ought to have condoned the
delay of 712 days in filing the regular civil appeal by the
petitioners by imposing reasonable costs and having not done
so, it caused great prejudice to the interests of the petitioners.
It is submitted that there was no intentional and mala fide
delay on the part of the petitioners in filing the appeal after a
delay of around 712 days.
3.1 It is further submitted that initially the petitioners were
not made aware about the passing of the judgment and decree
by trial court against them by their lawyer and they came to
know about such judgment and decree of the trial court for
first time somewhere in February, 2020, but thereafter due to
the COVID-19 situation, the petitioners could not apply and
receive the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed
by the trial court.
3.2 It is further submitted that upon receipt of the certified
copy of the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in
the month of September 2022, they preferred the appeal in
September 2022 itself.
3.3 Making the above submissions, Mr.Joshi, learned
advocate would request this Court to entertain this petition.
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ANALYSIS :
4. Having heard Mr.Joshi, learned advocate for the
petitioner and upon perusal of the impugned delay
application, prima facie , it appears that the judgment and
decree was passed by the trial court on 10/7/2019. The
petitioners herein came to know about such judgment and
order of the trial court in the month of February 2020. If such
would be the case, the petitioners could have easily applied
for the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed by
the trial court in the month of February, 2020 itself. One
cannot dispute that in the month of February, 2020, there was
no COVID-19 situation prevailing. Even after the first phase of
the COVID-19 situation got over, there was sufficient time
available to the petitioners to apply and to get the certified
copy of the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and
thereafter, they could have filed the appeal at the earliest.
5. The judicial notice can be taken that even after the first
phase of COVID-19 got over, the Courts started its functioning
through virtual mode and thereafter through the physical
mode. If the petitioners were seriously thinking of challenging
the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, they could
have filed the appeal much prior to its filing. Having not done
so, according to my view, there was a sheer negligence on the
part of the petitioner which resulted in a delay of 712 days in
filing the appeal before the appellate court.
6. At this stage, it is apt to refer to and rely upon the
decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of
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Rajneesh Kumar & Anr V/S Ved Prakash reported in
2024 (14) SCALE 406 wherein held as under :
“[10] It appears that the entire blame has been
thrown on the head of the advocate who was
appearing for the petitioners in the trial court.
We have noticed over a period of time a
tendency on the part of the litigants to blame
their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in
attending the proceedings before the court .
Even if we assume for a moment that the
concerned lawyer was careless or negligent,
this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone
long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a
duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is
expected to be equally vigilant about the
judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore,
should not be permitted to throw the entire
blame on the head of the advocate and thereby
disown him at any time and seek relief .
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to
the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum
MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance
Corporation, 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held
as under:-
"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation
is to ensure that actions are commenced within a
particular period, firstly to assure the availability
of evidence documentary as well as oral to
enable the defendant to contest the claim against
him; secondly to give effect to the principle that
law does not assist a person who is inactive
and sleeps over his rights by allowing them
when challenged or disputed to remain
dormant without asserting them in a Court
of law . The principle which forms the basis of
this rule is expressed in the maximum
vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt
( the laws give help to those who are
watchful and not to those who sleep ).
Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations
is to compel a person to exercise his right of
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action within a reasonable time as also to
discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent
claims."
(Emphasis supplied)
6.1 It is apposite to refer to and rely upon a recent decision
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal
(Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors.,
reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759 , wherein, after revisiting the
law on the aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held as under:
“10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the
discretionary power of a court to condone delay must
be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in
cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of
due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji
Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors.
(2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not
supposed to be exercised in the absence of any
reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for
the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala
and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent
that the words ‘sufficient cause' in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal
construction, when no negligence, nor inaction,
nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The
principles which are to be kept in mind for
condonation of delay were succinctly
summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee
v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649 , and are
reproduced as under:
“21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while
dealing with an application for condonation of
delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise
injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
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21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and
it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for
to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That
apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice
in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted,
or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
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the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6.2 Last but not least, it is also profitable to refer to and rely
upon ratio laid down by recent past decision of Honourable
Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy
(Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy Collector (LA)
reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4)
Scale 846 wherein after referring to its previous decisions,
summarized the case law on the issue of limitation vis-a-vis
condonation of delay in context of "sufficient cause". It has
been so observed and held as under :
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions
of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this
Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public
policy that there should be an end to
litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must come to
an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have
to be construed differently, such as Section 3
has to be construed in a strict sense whereas
Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice may
be kept in mind but the same cannot be used
to defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise
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discretion to condone the delay if sufficient
cause had been explained, but that exercise
of power is discretionary in nature and may
not be exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want
of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar
matter, it does not mean that others are also
entitled to the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing
the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for condoning
the delay and condoning the delay for the reason
that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory
provision."
(emphasis supplied)
6.3 Even in another the decision of the Hon’ble Supeme
Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and Another
v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 (14)
SCC 81 wherein it is held as under: -
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which
means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation.
In case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bonafide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning
such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this
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court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation
of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Having considered the aforesaid facts and circumstances
of the case and the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court, I am of the considered view that no sufficient cause is
made out by the petitioners in filing the appeal with a delay of
712 days; rather, as observed above, it is a case of sheer
negligence on the part of the petitioners who despite came to
know about the judgment and decree of the trial court in the
month of February, 2020 applied for its certified copy in
month of September, 2022. There was lackadaisical approach
on the part of the petitioners in filing regular appeal, which
cannot be condoned.
8. Apart from the aforesaid, it can be noticed from the
order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the appellate court
whereby the original respondent No.1.3 came to be deleted as
died. It has been observed that the appeal would stand abated
against him. Prima facie, original respondent No.1.3 and other
respondent Nos.1.1 to 1.8 are having common interest in the
subject matter of the suit being legal heirs and
representatives of one Mr.Kunvarji Lakshmanji Thakore
(original defendant No.1). In that view of the matter, as per
settled position of law, the entire appeal stands abated against
all the respondents.
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9. Since this Court found that there were a gross and
inordinate delay and negligence on the part of the petitioners
in filing the appeal, as per the aforesaid position of law, even
by imposing the condition, including cost, such delay cannot
be condoned. Accordingly, no error much less any gross error
of law noticed by this Court in the impugned order.
10. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons, I do not
find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed in
limine. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
GAURAV J THAKER
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