SRI.V. SREENIVASAIAH vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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WA No. 791 of 2025
®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 14 DAY OF JULY 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
WRIT APPEAL NO. 791 OF 2025 (LA-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI V SREENIVASAIAH
S/O LATE VENKATAPPA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
R/AT HOSAHALLI VILLAGE
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU-560 109
…APPELLANT
(BY SMT. MAHALAKSHMI PAVANI, SENIOR ADVOCATE
AND SMT. ANITHA SHENOY, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI SRIKANTH M, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP BY CHIEF SECRETARY
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001
2. THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
REVENUE SECRETARIAT
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
TH
5 FLOOR, M S BUILDING
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
Digitally
signed by
VASANTHA
KUMARY B
K
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
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WA No. 791 of 2025
3. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU DISTRICT
KANDAYA BHAVANA
K G ROAD
BENGALURU-560 009
4. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
BENGALURU SOUTH SUB-DIVISION
RD
3 FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK
VISVESWARAIAH TOWER
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU-560 001
5. THE PRESIDENT
EX-SERVICEMEN HOUSE BUILDING
CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.,
ND
NO.652/B, 2 FLOOR
ND
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD, 2 STAGE
RAJAJINAGAR
BENGALURU-560 010
6. SRI B R LAKSHMIKANTH
S/O RANGASHETTY
AGED MAJOR
REAL ESTATE AGENT
M/S BANGALORE ENGINEERING
CONTRACTOR
C/O DOSHI INDUSTRIES
NO.17, VISWA GANDHI COMPLEX
GUNDOPANTH STREET
BENGALURU-560 002
7. THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE
SOCIETIES IN KARNATAKA
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
NO.1, ALI ASKAR ROAD
BENGALURU-560 052
8. THE COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
KUMARA PARK WEST
BENGALURU-560 020
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WA No. 791 of 2025
9. THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF REGISTRATION AND
COMMISSIONER OF STAMPS
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
CAUVERY BHAVAN
BENGALURU-560 009
10. THE TAHSILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
KANDAYA BHAVANA
K G ROAD
BENGALURU-560 009
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M N SUDEV HEGDE, AGA FOR R-1 TO 4, R-7, R-9
AND R10;
SRI S S NAGANAND, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI K R KRISHNA MURTHY, ADVOCATE FOR R-5;
SRI MURUGESH V CHARATI, ADVOCATE FOR R-8)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
25.02.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P.
NO.2228/2022 AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE WRIT
PETITION.
THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 04.06.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
D K SINGH PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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WA No. 791 of 2025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)
PREFACE:-
1. The present intra Court appeal has been filed impugning
the judgment and order dated 25.02.2025 passed by the writ
Court in W.P.No.2228/2022 (LA-RES) filed by the appellant.
The appellant has challenged the land acquisition proceedings
in respect of the land measuring 5 acres 30 guntas in
Sy.No.1/1A and land measuring 4 acres 31 guntas in Sy.
No.1/3 both situated at Hosahalli Village, Uttarahalli Hobli,
Bengaluru South Taluk.
2. The learned Single Judge vide impugned order has
dismissed the writ petition with cost of Rs.1,50,000/- payable
to the High Court Legal Services Committee as in the opinion of
the learned Single Judge, the writ petition filed by the
petitioner was on superfluous and vexatious grounds.
FACTS:
3. It would be apt to note the brief facts relevant for the
purpose of decision in this appeal. The Government had issued
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Preliminary Notification dated 23.09.1988 under Section 4 (1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
'the LA Act', for brevity) to acquire 41 acres 7 guntas of land in
the said village, including the lands in Sy.No.1/1A measuring 5
acres 30 guntas and Sy.No.1/3 measuring 4 acres 31 guntas of
the appellant's father for allotment of sites to the members of
the Ex-serviceman House Building Co-operative Society,
Bengauluru (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society'). The Final
Notification under Section 6(1) of the LA Act was issued on
11.10.1989 in respect of the said lands.
4. The appellant's father Sri. Venkatappa passed away on
05.03.1989 due to old age ailments and the appellant was at
Mysuru, K.R.pet on service and the appellant was away from
Bengaluru. According to the appellant neither he nor his father
or brother were aware of the land acquisition proceedings and
passing of the draft award dated 26.03.1990. As soon as the
appellant came to know about the land acquisition proceedings
in respect of the aforesaid land, the appellant along with his
brother Sri V.Mohan Kumar challenged the land acquisition
proceedings by filing the writ petition Nos.35685-35686/1995.
The said writ petitions came to be dismissed by this Court vide
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WA No. 791 of 2025
order dated 28/31.01.1997 on the ground of inordinate delay
and laches.
5. During the pendency of the W.P.Nos.35685-35686/1995,
the Assistant Commissioner has initiated suo moto proceedings
under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act,
1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PTCL Act')/Land Reforms
Act, 1961 in case No.6/96-97 in respect of the land in question
for violation of the provisions of the PTCL Act. The Assistant
Commissioner dismissed the case. On appeal, the case was
remanded back to the Assistant Commissioner, however, once
again the Assistant Commissioner dropped the proceedings and
the appeal preferred before the Deputy Commissioner by the
appellant came to be dismissed. The order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner was challenged before this Court in
W.P.No.27298/2004 declaring the transactions of land between
the respondent No.5-Society and respondent No.6-Real Estate
agent as void under the provisions of the PTCL Act. However,
the said petition came to be dismissed on 01.12.2008 and
subsequently W.A.No.369/2009 was also dismissed. The
SLP(Civil) No.10641/2011 filed against the order passed in the
writ appeal was also dismissed by the order dated 25.04.2011.
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WA No. 791 of 2025
These suo motu proceedings, the writ petitions, writ appeals
and SLP were in respect of the proceedings pertaining to the
provisions of the PTCL Act and Land Reforms Act and in those
proceedings, the land acquisition proceedings were not the
subject matter.
6. The petitioner thereafter filed another writ petition in
W.P.No.36564/2012 seeking a direction to consider his
representations and not to proceed further in any manner in
terms of the acquisition proceedings. The said writ petition
came to be dismissed by the order dated 20.05.2014 on the
ground of res judicata . Against this, appeal was preferred in
W.A.No.1517/2014, which also came to be dismissed on
17.02.2020 on the ground of res judicata with cost of
Rs.1,00,000/-. It may be noted that no counter/response was
filed by the State Government and the respondent No.4-Special
Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) in the aforesaid proceedings.
The orders passed by the writ Court and the Division Bench
were challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP
No.8792/2020, which also came to be dismissed in limine vide
order dated 26.10.2020. A review petition in R.P.No.297/2020
seeking review of the order passed in W.A.No.1517/2014 was
also dismissed.
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WA No. 791 of 2025
7. The petitioner thereafter had filed W.P. No.2228/2022 on
the ground that in view of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act 2013) the Land acquisition
proceedings in respect of the land in question had lapsed, in
view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in INDORE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. MOHANLAL AND OTHERS
[(2020) 8 SCC 129] . The said writ petition has been
dismissed as stated above with cost of Rs.1,50,000/-.
SALIENT FEATURES:
8. One Lakshmikanth S/o B. Rangashetty, proprietor of M/s
Bengaluru Engineering Contractor was the promoter of the
Society. He gave an undertaking before the SLAO that he had
got the agreements for the purchase of the lands which were
the subject matter of acquisition proceedings including the
appellant's land. It was further stated that in pursuance to the
agreements to the landlords and GPA handed over in respect of
the land's subject matter of the acquisition proceedings, he
assured the SLAO, Bangalore Sub-Division to protect the land
handed over to the Society. This undertaking was given by said
B. R. Lakshmikanth on 23.02.1991. The said Lakshmikanth is
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WA No. 791 of 2025
absconding even today. The whole land acquisition proceedings
were initiated on behest of the said Lakshmikanth for the
respondent No.5-Society. The said Lakshmikanth has
withdrawn the award amount in respect of the lands in question
and no compensation has been paid to the appellant in respect
of the lands of the appellant. It is evident from the intimation
letter dated 09.02.2023 (Annexure-Y2) of the SLAO that there
is no record available indicating that the land owner had
consented to the land compensation amount in respect of the
lands in Sy No.1/1A and 1/3 of Hosahalli Village, Uttarahalli
Hobli, Bengaluru South. It is specifically stated that there is no
information available on the files regarding the consent given
by the landowners to receive the land compensation by
B.R.Lakshmikanth or respondent no. 6 or the payment made to
the landowners or deposit made in the Court.
9. As per the affidavit filed by the SLAO dated 29.01.2025 in
W.P.No.2228/2022 (LA), it is stated that the land in question is
a gated area covered with sheet scaffolding around the entire
extent on its periphery and no layout, housing sites have been
formed thereon nor any development has been made by the
Ex-Servicemen's Housing Building Cooperative Society. It has
been further stated that the appellant/landowners have
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WA No. 791 of 2025
constructed a few houses in one portion of the lands and they
are in occupation and physical possession of the said lands. The
lands have not been utilized for the purpose for which same
was required i.e., for the benefit of the society for formation of
the house sites. In the remaining vacant area, trees and plants
have grown on the said lands.
10. Thus, the physical possession of the land in question has
always been with the appellant and the physical possession has
not been taken from the appellant. But another interesting
feature is that the compensation so determined in the alleged
consent award was not paid by the State Exchequer but by the
Society itself and the promoter of the society had withdrawn
the said compensation from the society itself i.e., the Society
has paid compensation to itself inasmuch as the award amount
has been withdrawn by its promoter himself on the basis of the
alleged non-existent power of attorney or consent letter which
is evident from the letter of intimation dated 09.02.2023.
11. The G. V. K. Rao Committee was constituted by the
Government for the purposes of examining the genuineness of
the housing societies who have applied for allotment of the
lands and the legality of the allotment made in favour of such
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WA No. 791 of 2025
societies. In respect of respondent No.5- Society, the important
findings of the committee were:-
a. The Society was registered in the year 1973 which has
a total membership of 1,823. The ex-servicemen in this society
are not more than 50.
b. The Society has admitted large number of persons
residing outside the jurisdiction of the Society. Even the
members of the Committee of Management are not from the
jurisdiction of the Society.
c. The society had entered into an agreement in the
year 1983 with Sri. B R Lakshmikanth for acquiring about 106
acres of land situated at Harohalli Village at the rate of
Rs.44.50 per square yard of the sital area. The Society had
already paid about Rs.39.5 lakhs to the agent. Though the
Notification under Section 4(1) was not yet issued in respect of
any land, the Society had paid full consideration for 30 acres
allegedly to the landlords and obtained General Power of
Attorney on the names of the different directors of the Society.
The Society had already collected 2 installments of Rs.14,000/-
each for a site of 50x80 from the persons applied for allotment
of the site even before initiation of acquisition proceedings. The
land proposed to be acquired by the Society was situated
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WA No. 791 of 2025
outside the jurisdiction and the acquisition would be in violation
of the law and Society cannot acquire the land and form the
layout. This would be a violation of the byelaws.
12. The Special District Officer (Revenue), Bangalore District,
Bangalore vide letter dated 07.01.2008 informed the Principal
Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Karnataka in
respect of the land in question that no sites were formed,
currently the trees and plants had grown in the barren land and
the land owners were cultivating crops on some part. The
society has not utilized the land for the intended purpose of
acquisition and was selling plots to non-ex-servicemen for
higher prices.
13. Again vide letter dated 07.08.2021 (Annexure-J) the
SLAO had stated that the lands in Sy No.1/1A measuring 5
acres 30 guntas and in Sy No. 1/3 measuring 4 acres 31 guntas
in Hosahalli Village, Uttarahalli, Bangalore South Taluk, were in
possession of the appellant-V. Sreenivasaiah and crops have
been grown in many parts of the land and there are plants and
trees which have come upon the said land and there is house
and sheds of labours to the East of Sy No.1/1A which are
constructed by the appellant and the land owner had developed
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WA No. 791 of 2025
3 acres of the said land. It was further stated that the Ex-
Servicemen House Building Cooperative Society had not done
any developmental work nor formed any site on the said land of
the petitioner.
14. A FIR came to be registered on 23.11.2023 on the
complaint of the appellant alleging that the office-bearers of the
respondent No.5-Society, by falsely projecting it as an Ex-
Servicemen Housing Society, procured acquisition of his lands
without issuing notice or conducting any enquiry, fabricated a
consent award, and failed to pay or deposit compensation in
accordance with law. He further alleged that he continued to
remain in possession of the property, which was confirmed
during the spot inspection conducted on 04.08.2021, and that
the report dated 09.02.2023 disclosed that no compensation
had been paid, thereby seeking criminal action against the
office-bearers of the Society for fraud and fabrication of
records.
15. Another FIR dated 06.08.2024 came to be registered on
the complaint of Mr. Sanjeevarayappa T., Police Inspector, STF
& Vigilance, Bangalore Development Authority, alleging that the
respondent No.5-Society had fraudulently obtained acquisition
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WA No. 791 of 2025
of approximately 41 acres 07 guntas of land by falsely
representing itself as an Ex-servicemen House Building Co-
operative Society, though only a negligible number of its
members were ex-servicemen. It was further alleged that the
Society formed and allotted sites without obtaining the
requisite layout approval or work order from the Bangalore
Development Authority, violated the directions of the Registrar
of Co-operative Societies, fabricated documents, allotted sites
to ineligible persons and non-members, and thereby caused
substantial loss to the State exchequer, warranting criminal
action against the office-bearers of the respondent No.5-
Society.
FINDINGS OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE:
16. The learned Single Judge, upon considering the
submissions and the material placed on record, held that the
acquisition proceedings had attained finality long ago and,
therefore, could not be reopened by invoking Section 24(2) of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Right to Fair Compensation
Act'). Placing reliance upon paragraph 366.9 of the Constitution
Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal
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WA No. 791 of 2025
( supra ), it was held that Section 24(2) does not confer a fresh
cause of action to reopen concluded acquisition proceedings or
revive stale and time-barred claims.
17. The learned Single Judge further held that the appellant
and his predecessor-in-interest had unsuccessfully challenged
the acquisition in several earlier proceedings before this Court
as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It was accordingly held
that the validity of the acquisition had already attained finality
and the appellant was precluded from reopening the same by
placing reliance upon Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation Act.
18. The learned Single Judge took note of the endorsement
dated 09.02.2023 issued by the SLAO stating that the records
pertaining to the consent award, payment of compensation and
deposit of compensation before the jurisdictional Court were
not available. The learned Single Judge also took note of the
affidavit filed by the SLAO pursuant to the order dated
13.12.2024, wherein it was stated that no layout had been
formed on the acquired land; that the lands continued to
remain enclosed by a compound wall; and that the appellant
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WA No. 791 of 2025
and certain other landowners had put up residential
constructions over portions of the acquired land.
19. The learned Single Judge held that the affidavit filed by
the SLAO was inconsistent with the stand taken by the State in
the earlier rounds of litigation and was contrary to the official
records relied upon during those proceedings. Taking serious
note of the contradictory stand adopted by the concerned
officer, the learned Single Judge directed the Chief Secretary to
the Government of Karnataka to initiate a departmental enquiry
against the officer concerned.
20. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid observations, the
learned Single Judge held that the subsequent developments
could not dilute the effect of the earlier judicial
pronouncements upholding the acquisition. Consequently, the
writ petition came to be dismissed with costs of ₹1,50,000/-
payable to the Karnataka High Court Legal Services Committee.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
21. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant
assailed the impugned judgment and order passed by the
learned Single Judge contending that the writ petition has been
dismissed by treating the appellant's claim as one founded
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WA No. 791 of 2025
exclusively under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair
Compensation Act, without appreciating the true nature of the
challenge. It was submitted that the foundation of the writ
petition was not merely the plea of lapse under Section 24(2)
of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, but the subsequent
material which has come to light and which, according to the
appellant, casts serious doubt on the very legitimacy of the
acquisition proceedings.
22. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the appellant
has not sought to reopen the acquisition merely because
considerable time has elapsed, but on the grounds of
subsequent developments which were neither available nor
considered during the earlier rounds of litigation. It was
contended that the endorsement dated 09.02.2023 issued by
the SLAO, stating that the records pertaining to the consent
award, payment of compensation and deposit of compensation
before the jurisdictional Court were not available,
fundamentally alters the factual foundation on which the
acquisition had been defended in the previous proceedings. The
learned Senior Counsel further submitted that once the
acquiring authority itself expressed its inability to produce the
records forming the basis of the acquisition, the learned Single
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WA No. 791 of 2025
Judge ought to have examined the consequences flowing
therefrom instead of dismissing the writ petition solely on the
ground of finality.
23. It was further submitted that the affidavit filed by the
SLAO pursuant to the order dated 13.12.2024 disclosed that no
layout had been formed on the acquired lands, no sites had
been allotted by the beneficiary Society and that substantial
portions of the land continued to remain in the occupation of
the landowners, who had put up residential constructions.
These statements were wholly inconsistent with the stand
adopted by the respondents in the earlier proceedings, wherein
it was repeatedly asserted that possession had been taken, the
acquisition had attained finality and the lands had been handed
over to the beneficiary Society. It was contended that the
learned Single Judge, having noticed these inconsistencies and
having directed initiation of departmental enquiry against the
concerned officer, could not have simultaneously declined to
examine the effect of such material while adjudicating the writ
petition.
24. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the
report submitted by the GVK Rao Committee, constituted by
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WA No. 791 of 2025
the State Government to enquire into the affairs of House
Building Co-operative Societies was submitted after conducting
a detailed enquiry and serious irregularities in the functioning
of the respondent No.5-Society were recorded. The Committee
found that a large number of ineligible persons had been
enrolled as members; the bye-laws of the Society were
inconsistent with its stated object; exorbitant amounts had
been collected from members even before the acquisition
proceedings had substantially progressed; and lands situated
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Society had been
identified for acquisition. The Committee ultimately
recommended that the proposed acquisition in favor of the
Society be dropped. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted
that these findings strike at the very foundation of the public
purpose for which the acquisition was undertaken and could not
have been ignored by the learned Single Judge.
25. It was further contended that the subsequent material
placed on record, the endorsement dated 09.02.2023 and the
affidavit of the SLAO constitute circumstances which were not
available during the earlier rounds of litigation. Consequently,
the principles of res judicata and finality of litigation would have
no application to issues arising from facts that surfaced only
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subsequently. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge
failed to appreciate that the appellant was not seeking to re-
agitate issues already concluded by earlier judgments, but was
inviting judicial scrutiny of subsequent events having a direct
bearing on the legality of the acquisition proceedings.
26. Placing reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath
(dead) by LRs and Others [(1994) 1 SCC 1], A.V. Papayya
Sastry and Others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and
Others [(2007) 4 SCC 221] and Meghmala and Others v. G.
Narasimha Reddy and Others [(2010) 8 SCC 383], learned
Senior Counsel submitted that where the foundation of an
action is alleged to be tainted by fraud, suppression of material
facts or misrepresentation, the Court is duty-bound to examine
the surrounding circumstances before declining relief on the
ground of finality.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:
27. The learned AGA appearing for the State supported the
judgment and order dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned
Single Judge and submitted that the acquisition proceedings
initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
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had attained finality long ago and, therefore, the appellant
could not be permitted to reopen the same by invoking Section
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation Act. It was submitted
that the validity of the acquisition had been upheld in
successive rounds of litigation before this Court as well as the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and the controversy, having attained
finality, could not be reagitated under the guise of subsequent
developments.
28. The learned AGA submitted that the learned Single Judge
has rightly placed reliance upon paragraph 366.9 of the
Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority
v. Manoharlal ( supra) to hold that Section 24(2) of the Right to
Fair Compensation Act does not create a fresh cause of action
to reopen concluded acquisition proceedings. It was contended
that the appellant, having unsuccessfully challenged the
acquisition on several earlier occasions, is precluded from
questioning the validity of the acquisition once again by merely
changing the nature of the relief sought.
29. With regard to the affidavit filed pursuant to the order
dated 13.12.2024, learned AGA submitted that due to
inadvertence, the concerned officer has stated the status of the
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land instead of stating whether possession has been taken or
not. He further submitted that the observations made by the
learned Single Judge concerning the conduct of the concerned
officer and the consequential directions for initiation of
departmental enquiry were independent of the adjudication of
the writ petition and had no bearing on the legality of the
acquisition proceedings. It was contended that the learned
Single Judge, notwithstanding the said directions, rightly held
that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed in view of the
binding principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Indore
Development Authority ( supra ).
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.5 –
SOCIETY:
30. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent
No.5–Society adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of
the State and further submitted that the acquisition
proceedings had been concluded more than three decades ago.
It was contended that pursuant to the preliminary notification
dated 23.09.1988 and the final declaration dated 11.10.1989, a
consent award was passed on 23.03.1990, possession was
taken and the acquired lands were handed over to the
beneficiary Society on 23.01.1991. Consequently, the land
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stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances and no
right survived in favor of the appellant.
31. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the legality of
the acquisition had been examined in several rounds of
litigation initiated by the appellant and his predecessor-in-
interest before this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. Each of the challenges culminated in dismissal, thereby
affirming the acquisition proceedings. It was contended that the
appellant cannot be permitted to circumvent the binding effect
of those judgments by relying upon subsequent events which,
according to the Society, do not in any manner affect the
validity of the acquisition.
32. With regard to the GVK Rao Committee Report, learned
Senior Counsel submitted that the report merely contains
certain recommendations concerning the administration and
functioning of the Society and does not determine the legality
of the acquisition proceedings undertaken by the State. It was
contended that the recommendations contained in the report
were never accepted by the Government so as to invalidate the
acquisition and, therefore, the appellant cannot derive any
benefit therefrom.
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33. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
endorsement dated 09.02.2023 issued by the SLAO merely
records the present status of the office records and cannot be
construed as evidence that the acquisition proceedings were
not completed in accordance with law.
34. It was further submitted that the allegations of fraud are
wholly unfounded and unsupported by any cogent material. The
learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the appellant seeks
to infer fraud merely from subsequent developments without
establishing any deliberate suppression, fabrication or
deception in the acquisition proceedings. It was contended that
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence, the settled
rights flowing from concluded acquisition proceedings cannot be
unsettled. Learned Senior Counsel, therefore, prayed for
dismissal of the appeal.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:
35. The following points arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether the material placed on record discloses sufficient
circumstances to warrant judicial scrutiny on the ground of
fraud, suppression of material facts and manipulation of official
records?
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(ii) Whether the present appeal is barred by the principles of
res judicata and finality of litigation in view of the earlier
rounds of proceedings?
(iii) Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others [(2020)
8 SCC 129] bars the present proceedings?
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION :
36. Re. Point No.1: The dispute in the present appeal does
not arise merely because the appellant seeks to reopen
acquisition proceedings which have been the subject matter for
several decades. The foundation of the present case rests upon
subsequent material which admittedly surfaced long after the
earlier rounds of litigation had concluded. The appellant relies
upon the report of the GVK Rao Committee, the endorsement
dated 09.02.2023 issued by the SLAO, the affidavit filed
pursuant to the order of the learned Single Judge and the
consequential directions issued by the learned Single Judge for
initiation of departmental enquiry and consideration of
contempt proceedings. The issue, therefore, is whether these
materials, viewed cumulatively, disclose circumstances
requiring judicial scrutiny.
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WA No. 791 of 2025
37. The acquisition proceedings were initiated by issuance of
the preliminary notification dated 23.09.1988 followed by the
final declaration dated 11.10.1989. According to the
respondents, a consent award was passed on 26.03.1990,
notification under Section 16(2) of the Land Acquisition Act was
issued on 26.02.1991, and possession was thereafter handed
over to the beneficiary Society. The legality of the acquisition
was examined in several earlier proceedings and ultimately
attained finality. It is equally true that none of those
proceedings proceeded on the basis of the material which has
subsequently come on record and forms the basis of the
present appeal.
38. The first circumstance which assumes significance is the
report submitted by the GVK Rao Committee constituted by the
State Government to enquire into the functioning of House
Building Co-operative Societies. Insofar as the respondent
No.5-Society is concerned, the Committee recorded serious
irregularities relating to its constitution and functioning. The
Committee found that a substantial number of persons
admitted as members were ineligible under the bye-laws; that
the bye-laws themselves were inconsistent with the avowed
object of the Society; that substantial amounts had been
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WA No. 791 of 2025
collected from members even before acquisition proceedings
had substantially progressed; and that the lands proposed for
acquisition were situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the Society. The Committee ultimately recommended that the
proposed acquisition in favour of the Society be dropped and
that the Society either identify lands falling within its
jurisdiction or refund the amounts collected from its members.
39. It is no doubt true that the GVK Rao Committee Report
does not, by itself, invalidate the acquisition proceedings.
However, it cannot be brushed aside as being wholly irrelevant.
The report was prepared by a Committee constituted by the
State Government itself to examine the functioning of House
Building Co-operative Societies. The findings recorded therein
constitute an important piece of contemporaneous material
regarding the manner in which the beneficiary Society
conducted its affairs. The report, therefore, assumes relevance
while appreciating the material placed before the Court.
40. The second circumstance is the endorsement dated
09.02.2023 issued by the SLAO. The endorsement states that
the records relating to the consent award, payment of
compensation and deposit of compensation before the
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WA No. 791 of 2025
jurisdictional Court were not available. These are not peripheral
documents. They constitute the very foundation of the
respondents' case that the acquisition proceedings had
culminated in accordance with law. The inability of the
acquiring authority to trace or produce such records does not,
by itself, establish that the acquisition is vitiated. Nevertheless,
where the existence and completion of statutory proceedings
are asserted on the basis of official records, the subsequent
disclosure that such records are unavailable is undoubtedly a
circumstance which cannot be ignored. It warranted a careful
examination of its implications rather than summary rejection.
41. The third circumstance is that the compensation so
determined in the alleged consent award was paid by the
society and not by the State and it was withdrawn by its
promoter himself, who is absconding, on the basis of an alleged
power of attorney which does not exist. Thus, Society paid
compensation to itself, if any, and not to the owner of the land.
Even where the land/property is acquired in exercise of power
of eminent domain by the State, the compensation has to be
paid by the State otherwise the acquisition would be illegal,
unconstitutional and get vitiated. The payment of compensation
must be real and not illusionary. Section 31 of the Land
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WA No. 791 of 2025
Acquisition Act, 1894 specifically provides that on making an
award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of
compensation awarded by him to persons interested. In PUNE
MUNCIPAL CORPORATION AND ANOTHER vs
HARAKCHAND MISIRIMAL SOLANKI AND OTHERS
[(2014) 3 SCC 183] the Supreme Court held that the
Collector must tender payment to the persons entitled as soon
as the award is made, unless prevented by contingency. The
relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:
“14 . Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act
enjoins upon the Collector, on making an
award under Section 11, to tender
payment of compensation to persons
interested entitled thereto according to
award. It further mandates the Collector
to make payment of compensation to
them unless prevented by one of the
contingencies contemplated in sub-
section (2). The contingencies
contemplated in Section 31(2) are: (i)
the persons interested entitled to
compensation do not consent to receive
it, (ii) there is no person competent to
alienate the land, and (iii) there is dispute
as to the title to receive compensation or
as to the apportionment of it. If due to
any of the contingencies contemplated in
Section 31(2), the Collector is prevented
from making payment of compensation to
the persons interested who are entitled to
compensation, then the Collector is
required to deposit the compensation in
the court to which reference under
Section 18 may be made.
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WA No. 791 of 2025
15 . Simply put, Section 31 of the 1894
Act makes provision for payment of
compensation or deposit of the same in
the court. This provision requires that the
Collector should tender payment of
compensation as awarded by him to the
persons interested who are entitled to
compensation. If due to happening of any
contingency as contemplated in Section
31(2), the compensation has not been
paid, the Collector should deposit the
amount of compensation in the court to
which reference can be made under
Section 18.
18 . The 1894 Act being an expropriatory
legislation has to be strictly followed. The
procedure, mode and manner for
payment of compensation are prescribed
in Part V (Sections 31-34) of the 1894
Act. The Collector, with regard to the
payment of compensation, can only act in
the manner so provided. It is settled
proposition of law (classic statement of
Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad [Nazir
Ahmad v. King Emperor, (1935-36) 63 IA
372 : (1936) 44 LW 583 : AIR 1936 PC
253 (2)] ) that where a power is given to
do a certain thing in a certain way, the
thing must be done in that way or not at
all. Other methods of performance are
necessarily forbidden.”
42. In this case, the compensation was not deposited with
the State for making payment by the Collector to the land
losers. Mr. M.N. Sudev Hegde, learned AGA fairly conceaded
that the amount of compensation was not deposited with State
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WA No. 791 of 2025
for making payment by the Collector/Deputy Commissioner to
the land losers whose land was purportedly acquired.
43. The significance of the endorsement becomes strong
when viewed alongside the affidavit filed by the SLAO pursuant
to the order dated 13.12.2024. In the said affidavit, it was
stated that no layout had been formed on the acquired lands,
no sites had been allotted by the beneficiary Society and that
portions of the land continued to remain under the occupation
of the appellant and other landowners, who had raised
residential constructions. These statements presented a factual
position which was contrary to the premise on which the
acquisition had been defended in the earlier proceedings.
Whether such contradiction could ultimately displace the legal
consequences of vesting is a matter requiring adjudication.
However, the existence of such inconsistencies could not have
been disregarded while examining the challenge laid by the
appellant.
44. The learned Single Judge also found the explanation
offered by the concerned officer to be unsatisfactory. The order
directing initiation of departmental enquiry and directing the
Registry to place the matter before the appropriate Bench for
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WA No. 791 of 2025
consideration of contempt proceedings is itself indicative of the
seriousness. These directions were not issued in vacuum. They
were founded upon the inconsistencies noticed in the material
placed before the Court. Once the learned Single Judge found
the official explanation to be sufficiently doubtful to warrant
departmental action, the legal effect of the very same material
required closer examination while deciding the writ petition.
45. The respondents have contended that the earlier rounds
of litigation conclude the matter and that the subsequent
material cannot be permitted to unsettle rights which have
attained finality. The submission, in our considered opinion,
overlooks the cumulative effect of the material available on
record. The GVK Rao Committee Report exposing serious
irregularities in the affairs of the respondent No.5-Society, the
endorsement dated 09.02.2023 issued by the SLAO
acknowledging the non-availability of the records relating to the
consent award, non-payment of compensation and non-deposit
before the jurisdictional Court, the contradictory stand
thereafter taken by the very same authority before the learned
Single Judge, and the findings recorded in the impugned
judgment leading to the direction for initiation of departmental
enquiry against the concerned officer, when read together,
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WA No. 791 of 2025
cannot be dismissed as isolated discrepancies or administrative
lapses. They disclose a consistent pattern of suppression,
concealment and manipulation of official records.
46. The Supreme Court in case of SATLUJ JAL VIDYUT
NIGAM vs RAJ KUMAR RAJINDER SINGH [(2019) 14 SCC
449] categorically held as under:
"68. Fraud vitiates every solemn
proceeding and no right can be claimed by
a fraudster on the ground of technicalities.
On behalf of the appellants, reliance has
been placed on the definition of "fraud" as
defined in Black's Law Dictionary, which is
as under:
"Fraud: (1) A knowing misrepresentation of
the truth or concealment of a material fact
to induce another to act to his or her
detriment. Fraud is usually a tort, but in
some cases (esp. when the conduct is
wilful) it may be a crime.
(2) A misrepresentation made recklessly
without belief in its truth to induce another
person to act. (3) A tort arising from a
knowing misrepresentation, concealment of
material fact, or reckless misrepresentation
made to induce another to act to his or her
detriment. (4) in contract law, the
Unconscionable dealing; esp.,
unconscientious use of the power arising
out of the parties' relative positions and
resulting in an unconscionable bargain."
47. In case of SRI KRISHNA REDDY AND OTHERS vs
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS [W.A.99/2013] , the
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WA No. 791 of 2025
Division Bench of this Court held that where the power of
acquisition is exercised for a collateral purpose, or where the
professed public purpose is merely a device to transfer land to
private hands, such exercise would amount to a colourable
exercise of power and a fraud on the statute, warranting
interference by the Court. The relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereunder:
“ 50 . It is no longer res integra that if the
fraud is the basis for the decision of the
authority and even the matter had attained
finality by the decision of the Competent
Court, if the fraud is detected later, such a
decision of the Government authority is to
be declared as void because fraud vitiates
every judicial act and finality of litigation
cannot be invoked to permit ongoing or
irrevocable wrongful consequences. The
core principle is that the fraud defeats the
validity of judicial acts and once fraud is
established, the decision can be recalled or
set aside notwithstanding prior finality.
52 . The Courts and Tribunals have inherent
power to recall their own orders or
judgments if those orders were obtained by
fraud, even when statutory review is not
available or has been exhausted
(MEGHMALA vs NARASIMHA REDDY ([2010]
8 SCC 383); HAMZA HAJI vs STATE OF
KERALA ([2006] 7 SCC 416); INDIAN BANK
vs SATYAM FIBRES (INDIA) PRIVATE
LIMITED ([1996] 5 SCC 550).
55 . The finality does not immunize fraud.
Even where a Competent Court has
rendered a final decision, fraud discovered
later can invalidate that decision and permit
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WA No. 791 of 2025
recall or correction. The finality of judicial
proceedings cannot cure fraud and the
fraud, if discovered later, is a ground to
reopen or declare a final decision as void .”
48. In case of RAM CHANDRA SINGH V. SAVITRI DEVI
[(2003) 8 SCC 319 ], it was observed that fraud vitiates every
solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together and it
cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any
equitable doctrine including res judicata. The Supreme Court
held as under:
" 33. Once it is held that a judgment and
decree has been obtained by practising
fraud on the court, it is trite that the
principles of res judicata shall not apply.
The High Court, therefore, in our opinion
committed a serious error in referring to the
earlier orders passed by it so as to shut the
doors of justice on the face of the appellant
for all times to come. We, therefore, are of
the opinion that the impugned judgment
dated 10-12-1998 cannot be sustained."
49. Similarly, in the case of A.V. PAPAYYA SASTRY vs
GOVERNMENT OF A.P . [(2007) 4 SCC 221] the Supreme
Court held that:
" 22. It is thus settled proposition of law that
a judgment, decree or order obtained by
playing fraud on the court, tribunal or
authority is a nullity and non est in the eye
of the law. Such a judgment, decree or
order-by the first court or by the final court-
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WA No. 791 of 2025
has to be treated as nullity by every court,
superior or inferior. It can be challenged in
any court, at any time, in appeal, revision,
writ or even in collateral proceedings."
50. What prompted us to go in deep and examine the records
minutely is that the appellant is approaching this Court even
when he has suffered adverse judgment with costs on earlier
two occasions. He has run the risk of coming before this Court
in the aforesaid writ petition which got dismissed with cost of
Rs. 1,50,000/-. No person takes the risk of getting severe costs
imposed, unless he is seriously aggrieved for some grave
wrong and non-consideration of his grievance of the alleged
fraud.
51. Fraud, suppression of material facts and manipulation of
official records rarely admit to direct evidence. The existence of
such circumstances is ordinarily discerned from the cumulative
effect of the documentary material and the conduct of the
parties. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the
material placed on record does not merely warrant judicial
scrutiny but affirmatively establishes that the acquisition
proceedings stood vitiated by fraud, suppression of material
facts and manipulation of official records. Since fraud strikes at
the very root of every judicial and administrative action, the
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WA No. 791 of 2025
respondents cannot derive any advantage from the earlier
proceedings founded upon such tainted material.
52. Re. Point No.2 : At the outset, it is necessary to consider
the respondents' preliminary objection that the present appeal
is barred by the principles of res judicata and finality of
litigation, as the appellant has unsuccessfully challenged the
acquisition proceedings on earlier occasions. However, equally
well-settled is the principle that fraud constitutes an exception
to every rule of finality.
53. The factual matrix of the present case would indeed
disclose that the acquisition proceedings were initiated in the
year 1988 and have been the subject matter of repeated
litigation. The respondents have consistently relied upon the
alleged consent award dated 26.03.1990, the taking of
possession on 23.01.1991, the issuance of notification under
Section 16(2) on 26.02.1991, and the delivery of possession to
the beneficiary Society to contend that the acquisition
proceedings stood concluded decades ago. It is also true that
the appellant had approached this Court in earlier proceedings,
including W.P. Nos. 35685-35686/1995, which came to be
dismissed on 28/31.01.1997 on the ground of delay and laches
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WA No. 791 of 2025
without adjudicating upon the allegations of fraud. Significantly,
the order passed while speaking to the minutes on 11.01.1995
expressly clarified that no opinion had been expressed on the
allegation of fraud. Thereafter, the appellant unsuccessfully
prosecuted further proceedings culminating in dismissal of the
writ appeals, the Special Leave Petition and the Review
Petition.
54. However, the dispute in the present appeal cannot be
viewed merely through the prism of repeated litigation. The
appellant does not seek a mere reconsideration of issues which
stood concluded in the earlier proceedings. The foundation of
the present appeal rests upon subsequent events which,
according to the appellant, fundamentally undermine the
factual basis on which the earlier judgments proceeded. The
endorsement dated 09.02.2023 issued by the SLAO stating that
no records relating to the consent award, payment of
compensation or deposit before the jurisdictional Court were
available, the contradictory stand thereafter taken by the very
same authority before the learned Single Judge, and the order
dated 13.12.2024 directing the concerned officer to file an
affidavit regarding the taking of possession, culminated in the
learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment dated
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WA No. 791 of 2025
25.02.2025, directing a departmental enquiry against the SLAO
and calling upon the Registry to examine initiation of
proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. These
developments were admittedly not the subject matter of the
earlier rounds of litigation.
55. The doctrine of res judicata proceeds on the premise that
the earlier adjudication was rendered on a truthful and
complete factual foundation. Where subsequent material
emanating from the acquiring authority itself casts serious
doubt upon the authenticity of the very records forming the
basis of the earlier adjudication, the Court cannot mechanically
invoke the doctrine of finality to shut out judicial scrutiny.
Fraud, suppression of material facts and fabrication of official
records stand on a different footing from a mere challenge to
the correctness of an earlier judgment. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that fraud vitiates every solemn act and that
no judicial order, however final, can be permitted to stand if it’s
very foundation is shown to have been procured by fraud. In
the case of S.P. CHENGALVARAYA NAIDU (DEAD) BY LRS
VS JAGANNATH (DEAD) BY LRS AND OTHERS [(1994) 1
SCC 1] the Supreme Court has held that a litigant must
disclose all the material documents relevant to the case and
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WA No. 791 of 2025
that deliberately suppressing a vital document to obtain an
advantage amounts to fraud on the Court. A decree obtained
by fraud is non est and may be challenged even in collateral
proceedings. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:
“ 1. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts,
ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief
Justice Edward Coke of England about
three centuries ago. It is the settled
proposition of law that a judgment or
decree obtained by playing fraud on the
court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of
law. Such a judgment/decree — by the first
court or by the highest court — has to be
treated as a nullity by every court, whether
superior or inferior. It can be challenged in
any court even in collateral proceedings.
5. The High Court, in our view, fell into
patent error. The short question before the
High Court was whether in the facts and
circumstances of this
case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary
decree by playing fraud on the court. The
High Court, however, went haywire and
made observations which are wholly
perverse. We do not agree with the High
Court that “there is no legal duty cast upon
the plaintiff to come to court with a true
case and prove it by true evidence”. The
principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be
pressed to the extent of such an absurdity
that it becomes an engine of fraud in the
hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of
law are meant for imparting justice
between the parties. One who comes to the
court, must come with clean hands. We are
constrained to say that more often than
not, process of the court is being abused.
Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-
dodgers and other unscrupulous persons
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WA No. 791 of 2025
from all walks of life find the court-process
a convenient lever to retain the illegal
gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to
say that a person, who's case is based on
falsehood, has no right to approach the
court. He can be summarily thrown out at
any stage of the litigation.”
56. The principles of res judicata and finality are intended to
advance justice and cannot be invoked to perpetuate an
illegality or protect a fraudulent transaction from judicial
examination.
57. The Supreme Court, in the recent landmark 3-Judge
Bench decision in VISHNU VARDHAN @ VISHNU PRADHAN
vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1501] has unequivocally carved out a broad fraud
exception to the "doctrine of merger and finality”. The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereunder:
" 5 . The principle of 'finality of litigation'
cannot be pressed to the extent of such an
absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud
in the hands of dishonest litigants.... fraud
and justice cannot dwell together, the
legislature never intends to guard fraud, the
question of limitation to exercise power
does not arise, if fraud is proved, and even
finality of litigation cannot be pressed into
service to absurd limits when a fraud is
unravelled." ..."Nothing... nothing... and
nothing, obtained by fraud, can be
sustained, as fraud unravels everything."
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WA No. 791 of 2025
58. This principle is further reinforced by the Supreme Court
in VIPIN KUMAR V. JAYDEEP & OTHERS , (2025) 6 SCC
465 which held:
"36.... Even the most solemn proceedings
stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud.
Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act
which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in
rem or in personam. A judgment, decree or
order obtained by playing fraud on the
court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and
non-est in the eye of the law.... It can be
challenged in any court, at any time, in
appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral
proceedings."
59. In the present case, the subsequent official endorsement
dated 09.02.2023, the contradictory pleadings of the acquiring
authority, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge
regarding the conduct of the SLAO, and the direction for
departmental enquiry collectively constitute fresh material
giving rise to a distinct cause for judicial scrutiny. These
circumstances prima facie indicate that the appellant is not
seeking to reagitate issues already adjudicated upon, but is
questioning the very factual substratum on which those
adjudications rested. Consequently, we are of the considered
opinion that the present appeal cannot be rejected on the
ground of res judicata or finality of litigation.
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WA No. 791 of 2025
60. Re. Point No.3 : The learned Single Judge has primarily
rested the impugned judgment upon paragraph 366.9 of the
Constitution Bench decision in Indore Development Authority v.
Manoharlal ( supra) , holding that Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013 cannot be invoked to reopen concluded acquisition
proceedings. The proposition laid down by the Constitution
Bench is unexceptionable and continues to hold the field.
Section 24(2) cannot be treated as a fresh cause of action for
reopening acquisition proceedings which have attained finality.
61. However, the dispute in the present appeal stands on a
different footing. The appellant does not merely invoke Section
24(2) as an independent source of relief. The principal
allegation is that the very records evidencing the passing of the
award, payment of compensation and taking of possession are
tainted by fraud and that the earlier judicial proceedings
proceeded on a factual foundation which itself is under serious
cloud. The Constitution Bench was not concerned with a
situation where the validity of the underlying acquisition
records themselves was questioned on allegations of fraud.
Paragraph 366.9 cannot therefore be read as conferring
immunity upon proceedings which are alleged to have been
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WA No. 791 of 2025
procured by practicing fraud upon statutory authorities or the
Court.
62. The law consistently recognises that fraud vitiates every
solemn act and no judgment, however final, can be permitted
to survive if its foundation is shown to have been procured by
fraud. Consequently, before invoking the embargo contained in
paragraph 366.9, the Court must first satisfy itself that the
acquisition proceedings are free from allegations of fraud
warranting judicial examination. The learned Single Judge, in
our considered view, committed an error in applying paragraph
366.9 without first adjudicating this foundational issue.
CONCLUSION :
63. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the material placed on record and the
inconsistencies emerging therefrom clearly establishes that the
acquisition proceedings were vitiated by fraud, suppression of
material facts and manipulation of official records. The learned
Single Judge, while noticing these subsequent developments,
has committed an error in declining to examine their legal
effect by invoking the principles of finality and paragraph 366.9
of the judgment in the case INDORE DEVELOPMENT
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WA No. 791 of 2025
AUTHORITY ( supra ). The present proceedings are founded
upon subsequent material which fundamentally undermines the
factual basis of the earlier adjudications and, therefore, are not
barred by the principles of res judicata or finality of litigation.
64. In view of the aforesaid, we allow this writ appeal
granting the prayer sought for and set aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned
Single Judge.
In view of disposal of the appeal, pending IAs, if any, do
not survive for consideration and accordingly, they stand
disposed of.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(T.M.NADAF)
JUDGE
RKA
CT:SN