The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Rajendra Kumar

Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Decided on: 08-04-2026

<div> NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 1 SA-2242-2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA th ON THE 8 OF APRIL, 2026 SECOND APPEAL No. 2242 of 2023 THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS Versus RAJENDRA KUMAR AND OTHERS Appearance: Shri Pramod Panday - Government Advocate for appellants/State. Shri Om Prakash Namdeo - Advocate for respondents. ORDER Heard on I.A.No.14987 of 2023 an application for condonation of delay in filing the present second appeal. 2. There is a delay of 2331 days in filing the present appeal. The reasons which are assigned in the application for condonation of delay are that the First Appellate Court passed the judgment and decree on 27.01.2017 and thereafter the plaintiffs filed an application before the Sub Divisional Officer, in which, vide order dated 16.02.2021 the application filed by the plaintiffs was dismissed with the observation that against the order dated 27.01.2017 passed by the First Appellate Court, an appeal should be preferred by the State Government. As the proceedings were pending before the Revenue authorities, the appellants could not take steps to file an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. Revenue proceedings continued up to 09.05.2022. Thereafter a writ petition was filed before this Court being W.P.No.16472 of 2022 by the plaintiffs seeking direction to implement the judgment and decree dated 27.01.2017 passed by the First Appellate Court. The said writ petition was Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 2 SA-2242-2023 disposed off vide order dated 24.08.2023. Thereafter, the authorities have initiated the proceedings to challenge the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. An opinion was sought from the Government Advocate on 14.09.2023 and immediately thereafter the OIC was appointed on 14.09.2023 and steps were taken to file the present appeal. The appeal was got drafted and was filed before this Court on 16.09.2023. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the State submits that the officers were negligent in taking appropriate steps to file appeal within time, therefore, action has been initiated against the officers of the State Government. However, it is orally argued before this Court, there are no documents filed along with this application nor any averment has been made in the application for condonation of delay. It is an afterthought to get the delay condoned. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has filed a reply to the application for condonation of delay pointing out the fact that incorrect facts are placed before this Court in the application for condonation of delay. He has drawn attention of this Court to the letter dated 01.10.2020 written by P.N. Singh Rajput, Government Advocate/Prosecutor. The letter shows that permission was granted by the order 21.12.2018 by the Law Department to prefer an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. Thereafter, again vide letter dated 02.01.2021, the same was reconsidered by the Government Pleader. However, the said documents were suppressed by the State and are not placed on record along with the application for condonation of delay. It appears that the said documents are suppressed from this Court just to get the delay of 2331 days of filing this appeal to be condoned. The application suffers from suppression of material information. Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 3 SA-2242-2023 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 5. On one hand, there is a substantial delay which has not been explained in the application for condonation of delay and on the other hand, there is a material suppression of fact by the State authorities while filing such application before this Court. 6. The law with respect to condonation of delay is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, one being reported in the case of State of M.P. vs Bherulal reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 wherein it is held as under : 3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] ]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] wherein the Court observed as under: (Postmaster General case [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] , SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-30) “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 4 SA-2242-2023 several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.” 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs Ramkumar Choudhary reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 has held as under : 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir6, wherein, one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 5 SA-2242-2023 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. ... 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 6 SA-2242-2023 was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See : Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 : AIR 1981 SC 733). 8. Accordingly, we dismiss this Special Leave Petition with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof. If the said amount, as directed, is not deposited by the State, the Registry shall take necessary steps for recovery of the same, in accordance with law. 8. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs Jalgaon Medium Project reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, the question was whether the respondent Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project had shown sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1724 days in filing appeals before the High Court. In para 17, it is held : “17. … The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and ‘do not slumber over their rights’.” From the perusal of the aforesaid judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is apparently clear that the State Government cannot be have a leverage of filing cases with delay. They cannot be differentiated from the private litigants. In the present case, there is no day to day explanation for condonation of delay. 9. After passing of judgment by the first appellate Court on 27.01.2017, legal opinion was granted by the Government Pleader on 21.12.2018 which is clear from the letter dated 01.10.2020. A reminder was also sent by the Government Pleader on 02.01.2021, but the authorities failed to file a Second Appeal. The appellants have not disclosed the aforesaid information in the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 7 SA-2242-2023 application. The authorities were well aware of the judgment passed by the first appellate Court. There was continuous litigation before the revenue authorities as the respondents herein were requesting for implementation of the judgment and decree. Even a writ petition was filed before this Court seeking a direction to the revenue authorities for implementation of the judgment and decree passed by the civil Courts. Opinion given by the Government Pleader is suppressed by the appellants. Thus, there is a material suppression of facts on part of the appellants. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Arunima Baruah vs Union of India reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that suppression must be of 'material' fact. It was observed as under : "10. On the one hand, judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, on the other, it provides for a discretionary remedy. Access to justice is a human right. (See Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D. Agarwal [(2003) 6 SCC 230] and Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi v. State of Gujarat [(2007) 4 SCC 241 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 260 : (2007) 5 Scale 357].) A person who has a grievance against a State, a forum must be provided for redressal thereof. (See Hatton v. United Kingdom [15 BHRC 259]. For reference see also Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India [(2005) 4 SCC 649].) 11. The court's jurisdiction to determine the lis between the parties, therefore, may be viewed from the human rights concept of access to justice. The same, however, would not mean that the court will have no jurisdiction to deny equitable relief when the complainant does not approach the court with a pair of clean hands; but to what extent such relief should be denied is the question. 12. It is trite law that so as to enable the court to refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction suppression must be of material fact. What would be a material fact, suppression whereof would disentitle the appellant to obtain a discretionary relief, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Material fact would mean material for the purpose of determination of the lis, the logical corollary whereof would be that whether the same was material for grant or denial of the relief. If the fact suppressed is not material for determination of the lis between the parties, the court may not refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. It is also trite that a person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 8 SA-2242-2023 approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the said dirt is removed and the hands become clean, whether the relief would still be denied is the question." 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 has held as under: "1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice delivery system which was in vogue in the pre- Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. 2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. 3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations: (AIR p.1558) “It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterises as Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 9 SA-2242-2023 misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked.” 4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case. 5. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka [(1991) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1991 SC 1726] the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed: (SCC p. 263, para 2) “2. … Curiously enough, there is no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter-affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non- disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the special leave petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petitions.” 6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1] the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation. 7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [(2007) 8 SCC 449] it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 KB 486 (CA)] , and observed: (Prestige Lights Ltd. case Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 10 SA-2242-2023 [(2007) 8 SCC 449] , SCC p. 462, para 35). In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible." 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri K. Jayaram and others Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and others decided on 08.12.2021 in Civil Appeal No.7550-7553 of 2021 has held as under: "15. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481, it was held thus:- “34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. 35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs.- (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA) in the following words: (KB p. 514) “…… it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts—it says facts, not law. Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 11 SA-2242-2023 He must not misstate the law if he can help it—the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.” (emphasis supplied) 36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done.” The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. 37. In Kensington Income Tax Commrs.(supra), Viscount Reading, C.J. observed: (KB pp. 495-96) “ … Where an ex parte application has been made to his Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, he Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant’s affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 12 SA-2242-2023 misleading affidavit.” (emphasis supplied) 38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because “the court knows law but not facts”. 39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. (supra) is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.” 16. It is necessary for us to state here that in order to check multiplicity of proceedings pertaining to the same subject-matter and more importantly to stop the menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through different judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by remaining silent or by making misleading statements in the pleadings in Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 13 SA-2242-2023 order to escape the liability of making a false statement, we are of the view that the parties have to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either past or present concerning any part of the subjec tmatter of dispute which is within their knowledge. In case, according to the parties to the dispute, no legal proceedings or court litigations was or is pending, they have to mandatorily state so in their pleadings in order to resolve the dispute between the parties in accordance with law." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and others v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 531 has held as under:- “44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision-making to the court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2-5-2003 in the order dated 24-7-2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2-5-2003 was passed or that it has attained finality. 45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558] stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows: (AIR p. 1560, para 9)" 9. … It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 14 SA-2242-2023 of the respondent.” 46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [(2010) 14 SCC 38] the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said: (SCC p. 51, para 21) “21. The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case.” 47. A mere reference to the order dated 2-5-2003, en passant, in the order dated 24-7-2006 does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the court to look into every word of the pleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. It is for the litigant to come upfront and clean with all material facts and then, on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel, leave it to the court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. Unfortunately, the petitioners have not done this and must suffer the consequence thereof." If the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts of the present case, then there is a non-disclosure of grant of legal opinion by the Government Pleader way back in the year 2018. 14. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the State has produced a document dated 02.04.2026 in open Court which shows that the said letter has been issued in pursuance to the observation made by this Court on 18.12.2025. It is argued before this Court that in pursuance to the direction given by this Court, Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 15 SA-2242-2023 the authorities have issued the letters to the various authorities of the State Government seeking their explanations regarding delay in filing the appeal before this Court. However, the fact remains that vide order dated 18.12.2025, this Court had observed that "as the learned counsel for the appellants is not in a position to show as to what strict action has been taken against the erring Officers, except issuance of show cause notice, therefore, he prays for and is granted time of four weeks". There was no such direction given by the Court. It was only on the submission made by the counsel for the appellants, time was granted to produce documents to show that strict action has been taken. Even after passing of such order on 18.12.2025, only a letter has been issued 02.04.2026. That cannot be said to be a reason for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before this Court. It is an afterthought just to get the delay in filing the appeal condoned. 15. It is a settled legal proposition of law that delay has to be explained on day to day basis. There is no explanation after 27.01.2017 initiating action for filing a second appeal up to 14.09.2023. The authorities were well aware of the fact that the plaintiffs have initiated proceedings to get the judgment and decree passed by the First Appeal Court is complied with. The plaintiffs have also initiated proceedings before the revenue authorities, which were contested by the State authorities and thereafter a direction was issued in the writ petition to get the judgment and decree dated 27.01.2017 passed by the First Appellate Court complied with. Under these circumstances, as on one hand the delay is not satisfactorily explained and as on the other hand, there is material suppression of facts i.e. granting of legal opinion by the Government Pleader way back in the year 2018, which was subsequently reiterated by him in its letters dated 01.10.2020 and 02.01.2021, this Court does not deem it appropriate to allow the application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the application for condonation of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:27432 16 SA-2242-2023 delay stands rejected. 16. For making suppression of material information from this Court and not producing the legal opinion granted by the Government Pleader along with the application for condonation of delay, coupled with the fact that there are no averments to this effect in the application for condonation of delay and as the application suffers from suppression of material information, this Court deem it appropriate to impose a cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) to be deposited in the Account of M.P. High Court Bar Association (SB A/C No.519302010000549, IFS CODE:UBIN0551937, Union Bank of India, State Bar Council, High Court Branch, Jabalpur) within a period of 7 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and to be borne by the OIC of the matter and the same will not be refunded back from the public exchequer. A compliance report be submitted for perusal of this Court. Liberty is extended to the State Government to recover the losses from the responsible officers. 17. As the application for condonation of delay is rejected by this Court, consequently the second appeal filed by the State Government stands dismissed being barred by limitation. (VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE sj Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 09-04-2026 17:58:26</div>