SUBASH CHAND AND OTHERS vs COMPETENT AUTOMOBILES CO. LTD.

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High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No. : 461 of 2026
Reserved on : 01.09.2026
Decided on : 03.09.2026
Uploaded on : 03.09.2026
Subhash Chand and others …Petitioners
Versus
M/s Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd. …Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
1 Yes.
Whether approved for reporting?
For the petitioners : Mr. Vijay Arora, Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr.
Tarun Sharma, Mr. Hitansh
Raj, Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Ms.
Avantika Bhandari and Mr.
Ankit Chauhan, Advocates.
For the respondent : Mr. Ajay Kochhar and Mr.
Yash Raj Singh Deora, Senior
Advocates, assisted by Mr.
Vivek Thakur, Advocate.

Virender Singh, Judge.
Petitioners have filed the present petition, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order,
th
dated 5 August, 2026, passed by the Court of learned
1
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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High Court of H.P.
Senior Civil Judge, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Executing Court’) in
Execution Petition No. 1774 of 2018, titled as Competent
Automobiles Co. versus Subash Chand and others.
th
2. By way of order, dated 5 August, 2026, the
learned Executing Court has dismissed the objections filed
by the petitioners, in the above-titled Execution
Application.
3. For the sake of convenience, parties to the lis ,
are hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which,
they were referred to, by the learned Executing Court.
4. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present
petition, before this Court, as borne out from the record,
may be summed up, as under:
4.1. Decree Holder-M/s Competent Automobiles Co.
Ltd. had preferred the application, under Order 21 Rules
32 and 34 (5) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’). The said
Execution Application has been filed in the background
that the Decree Holder (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
plaintiff’) filed a suit for specific performance of contract, as
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well as, for injunction, against the Judgment Debtors
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendants’), before the
Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Hamirpur,
District Hamirpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial
Court’), which was registered as Civil Suit No. 160 of 2006.
4.2. The said civil Suit was partly decreed by the
th
learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree, dated 24
April, 2012, granting the following relief to the plaintiff:
“34. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid
discussion and findings is that the plaintiff
partly succeeds in the present suit. Accordingly,
suit of the plaintiff stands decreed with costs for
the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction.
Consequently, the plaintiff cannot be
dispossessed by the defendants from the suit
land, that is, khata No. 87 min, Khatoni No. 90
min, Khasra No. 602/474 and 659/476, kita 2,
measuring 11 kanals, situate at Tika Tikkar,
Mouza Mehlta, Tehsil and District Hamirpur,
H.P. forcibly or illegally save and except in due
course of law. However, relief of specific
performance of the agreement stands declined
to the plaintiff. Decree sheet be prepared. File,
after the needful, be consigned to the Record
Room.”
4.3. Since, the suit was partly decreed, as such,
both the parties to the lis had preferred appeals before the
Court of learned Additional District Judge, Hamirpur
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the First Appellate Court’).
Defendant No. 3-Ram Piari had preferred Civil Appeal No.
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34 of 2012, titled as Ram Piari versus M/s Competent Auto
Mobiles Company Ltd. and others, whereas, the plaintiff
had preferred Civil Appeal No. 38 of 2012, titled as M/s
Competent Auto Mobiles Co. Ltd. versus Subhash Chand
and others.
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4.4. Vide judgment and decree, dated 30 October,
2014, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the
appeal preferred by defendant No. 3-Ram Piari, whereas,
the appeal preferred by the plaintiff has been allowed and
the suit of the plaintiff has been ordered to be decreed, as
prayed for, by granting the following relief:
“38. In view of the above findings on points No.
1 and 2, the civil appeal No. 34/2012 filed by
defendant No. 3 Ram Piari is dismissed
whereas civil appeal No. 38/2012 filed by
plaintiff M/s Competent Automobiles Company
Ltd. is allowed with costs whereby the decree
passed by the learned lower court is modified
to the extent that the suit of the plaintiff is also
decreed for specific performance of agreement of
lease dated 10.12.2003 with the terms
contained in agreement for compromise dated
22.3.2005 by directing the defendants to sign,
execute and get registered the lease deed with
respect to suit property comprised in khata No.
87 min, Khatoni No. 99 min, Khasra No.
602/474 and 659/476, measuring 11 kanals,
situated at Tika Tikkar, Mouza Mehlta, Tehsil
and District Hamirpur, H.P. in favour of plaintiff
within three months from today.”
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4.5. The said judgment and decree has attained
finality, as, the second appeal filed by defendant No. 3-Ram
Piari, against the judgment and decree, passed by the
learned First Appellate Court, being RSA No. 62 of 2015,
was dismissed for want of prosecution, by this Court, vide
th
order, dated 16 August, 2017.
4.6. Thereafter, the plaintiff-Decree Holder has filed
the Execution Application, with the following prayer:
“It is, therefore prayed that the J.Ds./
respondents be penalized for disobedience of
the decree as per the provision of law as well as
for appointing the Local Commissioner to get the
lease deed executed in favor of D.H./Petitioner
in respect of land comprised in Khata No. 87
Min, Khatoni No. 90 Min, Khasra No. 602/476
min, measuring 11K-00M situated in Tika
Tikkar, Mouza Mehalta, Tehsil and District
Hamirpur, H.P. as per the judgment and decree,
and decree be got executed through Local
Commissioner in favour of the petitioner in the
interest of justice.”
4.7. Alongwith the Execution Application, draft of
lease deed has also been annexed.
5. When, put to notice, defendants-Judgment
Debtors No. 1 and 2 have filed reply, opposing the prayer
made in the Execution Application, by taking the
preliminary objections that the Execution Application is
not maintainable, as, the plaintiff-Decree Holder has not
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attached the permission for transfer of land, under Section
118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, from the
competent authority; the plaintiff-Decree Holder is
estopped from filing the Execution Application, as, he
himself had not taken necessary steps for execution of the
document; that the plaintiff-Decree Holder has no locus
standi , without getting the permission from the
Government, to get the lease deed executed; and the
application is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.
5.1. On merits, admitting the factual position, it has
been asserted by defendants-Judgment Debtors No. 1 and
2 that since, the transfer is subject to the permission,
under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms
Act, as such, the plaintiff-Decree Holder has to exhaust all
the required channels.
5.2. Defendant-Judgment Debtor No. 3 has filed
separate reply to the Execution Application, by taking the
preliminary objections that the Execution Application is
not maintainable. On merits, the Execution Application
has been objected to, on the ground, that the judgment
and decree, proposed to be executed against the
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defendants-Judgment Debtors, is not possible in terms of
Rule 38 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act and the
plaintiff is not entitled for execution, as, the plaintiff-
Decree Holder is a non-agriculturist.
5.3. In addition to this, a prayer has also been made
that the plaintiff-Decree Holder has to obtain fresh
permission under Section 118 of the HP Tenancy and Land
Reforms Act.
5.4. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made by the defendants-Judgment Debtors to
dismiss the Execution Application.
6. The plaintiff-Decree Holder has filed separate
rejoinders to the replies filed by defendants-Judgment
Debtors No. 1 and 2, as well as, defendant-Judgment
Debtor No. 3, by denying the preliminary objections, as
well as, the contents of the replies, by virtue of which, the
Execution Application has been opposed.
7. Apart from the reply to the Execution
Application, the defendants-Judgment Debtors have also
filed objections to the draft of lease deed, on the ground,
that the draft lease deed, submitted by the plaintiff-Decree
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Holder is not legally acceptable and enforceable against
them, in view of Rule 38 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land
Reforms Act, since, the said Rule restricts the transfer of
land to a non-agriculturist or to an entity, which does not
fall within the definition of agriculturist.
7.1. According to the defendants-Judgment Debtors,
without first seeking the permission, under Section 118 of
the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, no proposal for
draft deed can be accepted. The proposed lease deed is
stated to be premature, as, first of all the provisions of the
H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act are to be complied
with.
7.2. The proposed draft of lease deed is also stated
to be not acceptable, as, according to the defendants-
Judgment Debtors, as the plaintiff-Decree Holder has not
paid arrears of rent, which are due against him, from the
year 2005-2006, to defendant No. 3-Ram Piari.
7.3. The next objection of the defendants-Judgment
Debtors is that in the proposed draft of lease deed, the
period of 99 years has been prescribed, which is not
tenable, in view of the notification of the Government of
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High Court of H.P.
Himachal Pradesh, which provides that the lease deed
cannot be executed for more than 30 years, in one stretch.
8. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made to allow the objections.
9. The learned Executing Court has allowed the
Execution Application and dismissed the objections to the
lease deed, as well as objections to the Execution
th
Application, vide order, dated 5 August, 2026, by
appointing Mr. Ashwani Kaushal, Advocate, as Local
Commissioner to execute the lease deed and hand over the
possession to the parties, in accordance with law.
10. The said order has been assailed by the
defendants-Judgment Debtors, before this Court, by way of
the instant petition, mainly, on the ground that the learned
Executing Court has failed to appreciate the fundamental
principles that the Executing Court is required to execute
the decree strictly, in accordance with its terms and cannot
enlarge, modify or travel beyond the decree.
11. According to the Judgment Debtors, the
direction to the Local Commissioner to prepare and
execute the proposed lease deed on behalf of the judgment
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debtors, without first ensuring compliance with the
mandatory statutory requirements, applicable to the
transaction, amounts to enlarging the scope of execution
proceedings, which is legally unsustainable.
12. The other ground for challenging the order
passed by the learned Executing Court is that the learned
Executing Court has failed to consider the objection with
regard to the requirement of permission, under Section 118
of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act,
as, it has specifically been pleaded by the Judgment
Debtors that the Decree Holder did not possess the
required permission.
13. As per the stand of the Judgment Debtors, the
permission, allegedly obtained by the Decree Holder, has
not been placed on record and in the absence of the
original/authenticated copy of the same, the learned
Executing Court could not have mechanically proceeded
towards execution of the lease deed.
14. On the basis of the grounds, as taken in the
present petition, Mr. Vijay Arora, Senior Advocate, assisted
by Mr. Tarun Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
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Judgment Debtors, has prayed that the present petition
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may kindly be allowed, by setting aside the order, dated 5
August, 2026.
15. Per contra, Mr. Ajay Kochhar and Mr. Yash Raj
Singh Deora, Senior Advocates, assisted by Mr. Vivek
Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the Decree Holder,
have prayed that the learned Executing Court has
considered the objections raised by the Judgment Debtors
to the proposed lease deed and after rejecting those
objections, the Local Commissioner was directed to execute
the document.
16. In addition to this, it has also been contended
that this Court, in limited jurisdiction, under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India, cannot re-appreciate the
findings, like an appellate Court or a trial Court. To
buttress their contention, learned senior counsel appearing
for the Decree Holder have relied upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP
(C) No. 13941 of 2021, titled M/s Garment Craft versus
Prakash Chand Goel.
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17. The Judgment Debtors are before this Court,
by way of the petition, filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, where, the scope of interference is
limited, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
K. Valarmathi & Ors. versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC
606 . Relevant para-9, of the said judgment, is reproduced,
as under:
“Essence of the power under Article 227
being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to
usurp the original jurisdiction of the court
which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be
invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy
under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For
example, existence of appellate remedy
under Section 96 of the Code operates as a
near total bar to exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227.”
Nandi Infrastructure
18. In a recent decision in
Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. versus B. Gurappa
Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434, the scope of interference,
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has again
been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant
para-35 of the said judgment, is reproduced, as under:
“35. In short, the principles laid down in the
above matters is as follows:
a) The power of superintendence under Article
227 is not to be exercised unless there has
been an (a) unwarranted assumption of
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jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or
(b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an
unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction
vested in Courts or tribunals.
b) It is also well settled that the High Court
while acting under this Article cannot exercise
its power as an appellate court or substitute its
own judgment in place of that of the
subordinate court to correct an error, which is
not apparent on the face of the record.
c) The High Court exercising supervisory
jurisdiction does not act as a court of first
appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence
or facts upon which the determination under
challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is
not to correct every error of fact or even a legal
flaw when the final finding is justified or can
be supported. The High Court is not to
substitute its own decision on facts and
conclusion, for that of the inferior court or
tribunal.”
(Self emphasis supplied)
19. The same view has been taken by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in M/s Garment Craft’s case (supra), as,
relied upon by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
Decree Holder. Relevant para-18 of the judgment, is
reproduced, as under:
“18. Having heard the counsel for the parties,
we are clearly of the view that the impugned
order is contrary to law and cannot be
sustained for several reasons, but primarily for
deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised
by the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court exercising
supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court
of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the
evidence or facts upon which the determination
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under challenge is based. Supervisory
jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or
even a legal flaw when the final finding is
justified or can be supported. The High Court is
not to substitute its own decision on facts and
conclusion, for that of the inferior court or
tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the
nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right
grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse,
violation of fundamental principles of law or
justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised
sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there
is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is
so perverse that no reasonable person can
possibly come to such a conclusion that the
court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that
such discretionary relief must be exercised to
ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article
227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass
Estate (P) Ltd.2 has observed:
"6. The scope and ambit of exercise of
power and jurisdiction by a High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is examined and explained in a
number of decisions of this Court. The
exercise of power under this article
involves a duty on the High Court to keep
inferior courts and tribunals within the
bounds of their authority and to see that
they do the duty expected or required of
them in a legal manner. The High Court is
not vested with any unlimited prerogative
to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong
decisions made within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or
tribunals. Exercise of this power and
interfering with the orders of the courts or
tribunals is restricted to cases of serious
dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice,
where if the High Court does not interfere,
a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is
also well settled that the High Court while
acting under this article cannot exercise its
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power as an appellate court or substitute
its own judgment in place of that of the
subordinate court to correct an error, which
is not apparent on the face of the record.
The High Court can set aside or ignore the
findings of facts of an inferior court or
tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to
justify or the finding is so perverse, that no
reasonable person can possibly come to
such a conclusion, which the court or
tribunal has come to."
20. Being guided by the above decisions, this Court
would now proceed to determine as to whether the
findings, so recorded by the learned Executing Court, fall
within the definition of ‘perversity’ or the learned Executing
Court has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it in passing
the order, or, has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction vested
in it.
21. The term ‘perverse’ has no where been defined,
however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arulvelu and
another versus State represented by the Public
Prosecutor and another, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme
Court Cases 206 , has discussed the term ‘perverse’.
Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment are
reproduced, as under:
“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the
trial court and the impugned judgment of the High
Court. The trial court very minutely examined the
entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on
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record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also
seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated
from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of
the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can
hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on
no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly
unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon
it and consequently the judgment of the trial court is
perverse.
23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the
discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the
trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer
from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of
being perverse and the findings rendered by the trial
court are against the weight of evidence. The law is
well settled that, in an appeal against acquittal,
unless the judgment of the trial court is perverse, the
Appellate Court would not be justified in substituting
its own view and reverse the judgment of acquittal.
24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in
number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs.
&  Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead ) through LRs. &
Others, this Court observed that the expression
`perverse' means that the findings of the subordinate
authority are not supported by the evidence brought
on record or they are against the law or suffer from
the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In  Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry &
Co. Ltd. & Others , the Court observed that `perverse
finding' means a finding which is not only against
the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence itself. In  Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.
Collector of Central Excise, Cochin , the Court
observed that this is not a case where it can be said
that the findings of the authorities are based on no
evidence or that they are so perverse that no
reasonable person would have arrived at those
findings.
26. In  M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another ,
the Court observed that any order made in conscious
violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In
Moffett v. Gough, the Court observed that a perverse
verdict may probably be defined as one that is not
only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the
Court defined `perverse' as turned the wrong way,
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not right; distorted from the right; turned away or
deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by
various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of
Current English Sixth Edition
Perverse: Showing deliberate determination
to behave in a way that most people think
is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English –
International Edition
Perverse: Deliberately departing from what
is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English -
1998 Edition
Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition)
Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted
or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or
wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words &
Phrases, Fourth Edition
Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably
be defined as one that is not only against
the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence.
28. In  Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. ,
the Court observed thus:
"8. … We are of the opinion that the trial
court was quite justified in acquitting the
appellants of the charges as the view taken
by it was reasonable one and the order of
acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is
well settled that appellate court would not
be justified in interfering with the order of
acquittal unless the same is found to be
perverse. In the present case, the High
Court has committed an error in interfering
with the order of acquittal of the appellants
recorded by the trial court as the same did
not suffer from the vice of perversity."
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29. In  Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police
& Others , the Court while dealing with the scope
of  Articles 32  and  226  of the Constitution observed
as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court
would not interfere with the findings of fact
recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the
finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it
would be a perverse finding and would be
amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be
maintained between the decisions which
are perverse and those which are not. If a
decision is arrived at on no evidence or
evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and
no reasonable person would act upon it, the
order would be perverse. But if there is
some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon,
howsoever compendious it may be, the
conclusions would not be treated as
perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined in
H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-
Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath
& Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed as
under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and the
points on which the challenge to the
assessment in judicial review was raised
and entertained was not appropriate. In our
opinion, the High Court was in error in
constituting itself into a court of appeal
against the assessment. While it was open
to the respondent to have raised and for the
High Court to have considered whether the
denial of relief under the proviso to  Section
39(5)  was proper or not, it was not open to
the High Court re-appreciate the primary or
perceptive facts which were otherwise
within the domain of the fact-finding
authority under the statute. The question
whether the transactions were or were not
sales exigible to sales tax constituted an
exercise in recording secondary or
inferential facts based on primary facts
found by the statutory authorities. But what
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was assailed in review was, in substance,
the correctness - as distinguished from the
legal permissibility - of the primary or
perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt,
true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by
ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant material
or if the finding so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse, then,
the finding is rendered infirm in law."
22. Similar view has again been taken by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari versus Union of
India and another , reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court
Cases 602 . Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is
reproduced, as under:
“30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be
held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived
at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible
material. The finding may also be said to be perverse
if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from
the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on
the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable
evidence and no reasonable person would act upon
it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some
evidence on record which is acceptable and which
could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with. (Vide:  Rajinder Kumar Kindra v.
Delhi Administration ,  Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner
of Police & Ors. ,  Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors.
v. State of Andhra Pradesh  thr. Secretary and  Babu
v. State of Kerala ).”
23. Being guided by the above decisions, now, this
Court would proceed further to ascertain the fact whether
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the learned Executing Court has wrongly allowed the
Execution Application and dismissed the objections.
24. The perusal of the record shows that alongwith
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the Execution Application, which has been filed on 25
October, 2018, draft of lease deed has been annexed by the
Decree Holder. In para-11 of the Execution Application, it
has categorically been mentioned that the Government has
granted permission to the Decree Holder, vide letter Rev. B
th
F (10)-237/2005, part-II, dated 6 February, 2015. Even,
in the draft of lease deed, reference has been made to the
fact that the permission has been accorded in favour of the
Decree Holder, under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and
Land Reforms Act.
25. In the objections, which were filed against the
draft of lease deed, objection has been raised, with regard
to the impediment of the Decree Holder, to obtain the
lease, i.e. the permission required under Section 118 of the
H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. The said objection, to
the considered opinion of this Court, after the permission
from the Government, under Section 118 of the H.P.
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Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, is not available to the
Judgment Debtors.
26. Even otherwise, when, it has specifically been
mentioned in the draft of lease deed, that the permission
under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms
Act, has already been obtained, then, after passing of the
decree, it, to the considered opinion of this Court, does not
lie in the mouth of the Judgment Debtors to contend that
the draft of lease deed is pre-mature, as, the compliance of
the provisions of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act
has been done by the Decree Holder.
27. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
Judgment Debtors could not explain as to how the
permission granted under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy
and Land Reforms Act has not been complied with, by the
Decree Holder. On the basis of the vague averments, this
Court cannot interfere with the order passed by the learned
Executing Court, more so, under the limited jurisdiction,
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
28. In this case, it has also vehemently been argued
by the learned senior counsel appearing for the Judgment
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Debtors that the order passed by the learned Executing
Court is de hors the reasoning contained therein, as, in the
order, impugned herein, till para-11, the factual position
has been re-asserted by the learned Executing Court; in
para-12, the factual position with regard to the permission
under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms
Act has been discussed and in para-13, the Execution
Application has been allowed and the objections have been
ordered to be rejected.
29. The learned Executing Court is bound to
execute the decree and its jurisdiction is confined only to
the objections, which have been filed by the Judgment
Debtors, if those objections fall within the definition of
‘execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree’.
30. In this case, the objections, which have been
filed, are regarding the permission, under Section 118 of
the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, estoppel, locus
standi, non-joinder of necessary parties. The above stand
of the Judgment Debtors, being defendants, has been
considered by the learned trial Court, as well as, the
learned First Appellate Court and the learned Executing
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has no jurisdiction to re-consider/re-decide those
averments. The relationship of the parties is governed by
the agreement of lease, upon which, the suit of the
plaintiff-decree holder has been decreed, which has
attained finality.
31. Reliance has also been placed by the learned
counsel for the parties, upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Rajbir versus Suraj Bhan and
another, reported in (2022) 14 Supreme Court Cases
609. Relevant paras-13 to 15 of the judgment, are
reproduced, as under:
“13. The present is indeed a case where the
decree in question provides for the execution of
the document. The document is the document of
sale as contemplated under the decree.
Therefore, Order 21 Rule 34 is clearly attracted.
It contemplates that if the judgment-debtor
neglects or refuses to obey the decree, the
decree-holder is to prepare a draft of the
document. In this case, the draft of the
document is the draft sale deed. The draft of the
sale deed must further be in accordance with
the terms of the decree. It is to be delivered to
the court. Thereupon, it is not required that the
decree-holder must directly deliver it to the
judgment-debtor. The procedure, therefore, is
that the decree-holder must make it available to
the Court. Under Order 21 Rule 34, it becomes
the duty of the court to thereupon cause the
draft to be served upon the judgment-debtor.
There must be a notice inviting objections and
the court may fix a time within which objections
are to be filed. The judgment-debtor may or may
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not object. Order 21 Rule 34 sub-rule (3)
contemplates a situation where the judgment-
debtor objects. This is to be contained in writing
within the time provided. The court is duty-
bound to make an order approving or altering
the draft as it thinks fit. This is of considerable
importance having regard to what may follow
subsequently on the strength of the decree. It is
also important from the point of view of the role
of the executing court which is to act in
conformity with the decree.
14. It is well settled that the executing court
cannot go beyond the decree. The decree must
be executed as it is. Though, it is indeed open to
the executing court to construe the decree; it
cannot go beyond the decree. Therefore, when
objections are filed pointing out in a given case
that the proposed draft of the sale deed is not in
conformity with the decree, it becomes the duty
of the executing court to apply its mind and to
make alterations in the draft, if needed, to make
it in conformity with the decree. It will be
thereafter that the decree-holder is to deliver it
to the court with the alterations if any made by
the court, on proper stamp paper, if required
and the execution of the document is effected by
the court or the officer appointed. There are
other formalities contemplated in regard to
registration, all of which take place only after
the procedure which is contemplated in Order
21 Rule 34 sub-rules (1) to (4) is followed.
15. In the facts of this case, we may notice the
order which is impugned by the appellant before
the High Court. We notice from the order that the
proposed sale deed is seen taken on file.
Thereafter the court refers to the application
filed for appointment of a Local Commissioner
for the execution of the sale deed. The court
refers to the decree bearing the date 4-1-2013.
Thereafter, the court says that in the light of the
present facts and circumstances the present
application was allowed. The Civil Nazar of the
Court was appointed as Local Commissioner
who was directed to carry out the formalities for
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execution of the sale deed in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the agreement after
getting the approved draft sale deed from the
court and report to this effect was to be
submitted in the court well before 6-7-2019. This
order is dated 30-5-2019. The sale deed came to
be executed on 11-6-2019. Thus. this is a case
where the court did not invite objections of the
appellant to the draft sale deed but the
application of the respondents for appointment
of the Commissioner to execute the sale deed is
allowed, no doubt, taking note of the order of the
same date, rejecting the objections of the
appellant to the execution of the decree.
32. If, the facts and circumstances of the present
case, are seen in light of the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Rajbir’s case (supra), then, the
objections, which have been filed by the Judgment
Debtors, under Section 47 of the CPC, as well as,
objections to the draft of lease deed, have rightly been
considered by the learned Executing Court. Also, when,
the document, governing the relationship of the parties,
contains the period of lease to be 99 years, then, the
objection, as contained in para-7 of the objections to the
draft of lease deed, has rightly been rejected, by the
learned Executing Court. Mere lack of reasoning does not
render the order passed by the learned Executing Court
perverse. Only the said deficiency does not justify the
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interference by this Court, in the exercise of its supervisory
jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
which is inherently limited in scope.
33. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the
opinion that there is nothing on the record to hold that the
findings, so recorded by the learned Executing Court, fall
within the definition of ‘perversity’ or the learned Executing
Court has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it in passing
the order, or, has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction vested
in it. Consequently, the petition is dismissed.
34. Any of the observations, made hereinabove,
shall not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the
merits of the case, as these observations, are confined,
only, to the disposal of the present petition.
35. Parties, through their respective counsel, are
directed to appear before the learned Executing Court, on
th
7 September, 2026, at 10.00 a.m.
36. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand
disposed of accordingly.
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37. Send down the record forthwith, through
special messenger, so as to reach the learned Executing
Court, well before the date fixed.
( Virender Singh )
Judge
September 03, 2026
( rajni )
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