Kishore Avarsekar vs Assets Care And Reconstruction Enterprises Ltd.

Court
Supreme Court

2026 INSC 1217
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No. 20619 OF 2026
KISHORE AVARSEKAR AND ORS. … PETITIONERS

VERSUS
ASSETS CARE AND RECONSTRUCTION
ENTERPRISES LTD. AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS

O R D E R
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1
1. Petitioners, who figure as accused in a complaint alleging offence
2
punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act , impugn a judgment and
rd 3 4
order dated 3 August, 2026 of a Single Judge of the High Court
5
dismissing their writ petition .
2. The question that arose for decision in the writ petition before the High
Court and arising in this special leave petition is one and the same. It is
well-captured in the first paragraph of the impugned judgment, reading
as follows:
“1. The short question raised in the present petition is whether an
Signature Not Verified
1 C.C. No.2800021/SS/2017
2 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
3 impugned judgment
4 High Court of Judicature at Bombay
5 Criminal Writ Petition No. 2776 of 2023
Digitally signed by
SAPNA BISHT
Date: 2026.11.18
10:16:17 IST
Reason:
1

Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC), which acquires a bank’s
financial assets, including cheques taken as security under a
Deed of Assignment executed pursuant to Section 5 of the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), can be
substituted as the complainant in a pending prosecution under
Section 138 read with Sections 141 and 142 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act), in place of the bank that originally
instituted the complaint as payee of the dishonoured cheque.”
3.
According to Mr. Dave, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, there is
no authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the said
question of law although there are two decisions of the Delhi High Court
[ Man Singh Tusaria v. JM Financial Asset Reconstruction
6
Company Private Limited and Anr. and Paam Pharmaceuticals (I)
7
(P) Limited v. India SME Asset Reconstruction Company Limited ]
and one decision of the High Court [ Harikrishnan Selvakumar v. L&T
8
Infrastructure Finance Co. Ltd. ] which were noticed by the Single
Judge in following the course of action that was ultimately adopted.
However, referring to the decisions of the High Court in Indorama
9
Synthetics (India) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Tayal Cotton
10
Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , which respectively considered
11 12
Section 446 of the Companies Act and Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC , Mr.
Dave contends that the provisions of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section
13
5 of the SARFAESI Act should be so read so as to exclude the right of an
assignee to substitute itself as a complainant in the pending proceedings
6 2014 SCC OnLine Del.3469
7 2012 (132) DRJ 82
th
8 Criminal Application No.329 of 2015 decided on 07 March, 2016
9 2016 (4) Mh. L.J. 249
10 MANU/MH/2352/2018
11 Companies Act, 1956
12 Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
13 Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
2

under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
4.
Mr. Dave was further heard to contend that the first respondent, which is
14
an ARC , is not the “payee” of the subject cheques and that the High
Court erroneously proceeded to hold that it has become a “holder in due
course” by virtue of the deeming fiction in sub-section (2) of Section 5 of
the SARFAESI Act, overlooking the three cumulative statutory conditions
of Section 9 of the N.I. Act which it did not satisfy; hence, the first
respondent does not qualify to step into the shoes of the original lender.
5.
Finally, Mr. Dave, also refers to the expression “other proceeding of
whatever nature” in Section 5(4) of the SARFAESI Act to contend that the
same ought to be read ejusdem generis the words “suit” and “appeal”
preceding it; and, if the impugned judgment is left uncorrected, it will (i)
convert every criminal prosecution under Chapter XVII of the N.I. Act into
a transferable “financial asset” tradeable amongst ARCs; (ii) permit
strangers to the negotiable instrument to prosecute drawers for a
personal, penal offence; and (iii) render Section 142(1)(a) of the N.I. Act
a strict, non-obstante embargo, on cognizance, a dead letter.
6.
Resting on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Dave submits that the question
calls for an authoritative pronouncement by this Court.
7.
Having heard Mr. Dave, and on perusal of the impugned judgment, we
see no reason to take a view different from that of the High Court; hence,
the same deserves to be upheld. However, we propose to briefly assign
our reasons in support thereof.
15 th
8. For context, it is noted that the trial magistrate by her order dated 5
14 Asset Reconstruction Company
th
15 Metropolitan Magistrate, 28 Court, Esplanade, Mumbai
3

September, 2018 allowed an application for substitution of the first
respondent upon consideration of the decisions of the Delhi High Court,
16
referred to above. The said order was carried in a revision by the
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petitioners before the Sessions Court . The revision having been
th
dismissed by an order of 11 February, 2021 was followed by invocation
of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
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read with Section 482 of the Cr. PC by the petitioners, albeit
unsuccessfully.
9.
At the outset, we have no hesitation to record that the decisions in
Indorama Synthetics (India) Ltd. (supra) and Tayal Cotton Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) cannot be called in aid to support the contention advanced
by Mr. Dave. Those decisions arose in the context of Section 446 of the
Companies Act and Section 14 of the IBC, respectively. The statutory
provisions falling for consideration therein operate in different milieu
whereas Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act is intended to achieve a distinct
object. The reasoning in those decisions, therefore, cannot govern the
interpretation of the specific provisions falling for consideration in the
present case. We record that the High Court was right in not being
guided thereby in arriving at its conclusions.
10.
In the present case, there exists an assignment agreement between the
19
original lender and the first respondent which, inter alia, refers to and
includes the three post-dated cheques issued by the petitioners to the
original lender, since dishonoured, the cheque return memos, and the
16 Criminal Revision Application No.1062 of 2018
17 Court of Sessions for Greater Mumbai at Mumbai
18 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
19 Axis Bank Ltd.
4

demand notice under Section 138, N.I. Act, along with conferment of the
right to institute, continue and enforce legal proceedings including the
pending complaints.
11.
An informed decision on the question of law arising for decision would
20
necessarily require us to read with appropriate care Section 5 of the
SARFAESI Act in the light of the scheme of such enactment, with
particular emphasis on sub-sections (4) and (5) thereof.
20 5. Acquisition of rights or interest in financial assets .—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement
or any other law for the time being in force, any asset reconstruction company may acquire financial assets of any bank
or financial institution,—
( a ) by issuing a debenture or bond or any other security in the nature of debenture, for consideration agreed
upon between such company and the bank or financial institution, incorporating therein such terms and conditions as
may be agreed upon between them; or
( b ) by entering into an agreement with such bank or financial institution for the transfer of such financial assets
to such company on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between them.
(1-A) Any document executed by any bank or financial institution under sub-section (1) in favour of the asset
reconstruction company acquiring financial assets for the purposes of asset reconstruction or securitisation shall be
exempted from stamp duty in accordance with the provisions of Section 8-F of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2 of 1899):
Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply where the acquisition of the financial assets by
the asset reconstruction company is for the purposes other than asset reconstruction or securitisation.
(2) If the bank or financial institution is a lender in relation to any financial assets acquired under sub-section
(1) by the asset reconstruction company, such asset reconstruction company shall, on such acquisition, be deemed to be
the lender and all the rights of such bank or financial institution shall vest in such company in relation to such financial
assets.
(2-A) If the bank or financial institution is holding any right, title or interest upon any tangible asset or
intangible asset to secure payment of any unpaid portion of the purchase price of such asset or an obligation incurred or
credit otherwise provided to enable the borrower to acquire the tangible asset or assignment or licence of intangible
asset, such right, title or interest shall vest in the asset reconstruction company on acquisition of such assets under sub-
section (1).
(3) Unless otherwise expressly provided by this Act, all contracts, deeds, bonds, agreements, powers-of-
attorney, grants of legal representation, permissions, approvals, consents or no-objections under any law or otherwise and
other instruments of whatever nature which relate to the said financial asset and which are subsisting or having effect
immediately before the acquisition of financial asset under sub-section (1) and to which the concerned bank or financial
institution is a party or which are in favour of such bank or financial institution shall, after the acquisition of the financial
assets, be of as full force and effect against or in favour of the asset reconstruction company, as the case may be, and may
be enforced or acted upon as fully and effectually as if, in the place of the said bank or financial institution, asset
reconstruction company, as the case may be, had been a party thereto or as if they had been issued in favour of asset
reconstruction company, as the case may be.
(4) If, on the date of acquisition of financial asset under sub-section (1), any suit, appeal or other proceeding of
whatever nature relating to the said financial asset is pending by or against the bank or financial institution, save as
provided in the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,
1985 (1 of 1986) the same shall not abate, or be discontinued or be, in any way, prejudicially affected by reason of the
acquisition of financial asset by the asset reconstruction company, as the case may be, but the suit, appeal or other
proceeding may be continued, prosecuted and enforced by or against the asset reconstruction company, as the case may
be.
(5) On acquisition of financial assets under sub-section (1), the asset reconstruction company, may with the
consent of the originator, file an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal or any court or
other Authority for the purpose of substitution of its name in any pending suit, appeal or other proceedings and on receipt
of such application, such Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal or court or Authority shall pass orders for
the substitution of the asset reconstruction company in such pending suit, appeal or other proceedings.
5

21
12.
What appears on a bare reading is that Section 5 permits an ARC to
acquire the financial assets of a bank/financial institution. In terms of
sub-section (1), inter alia , it could be by entering into an agreement for
transfer, on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between
them. Sub-section (2), which serves as the foundation for sub-section (4),
provides for substantive vesting of rights. By a deeming fiction, on
acquisition of the financial assets by transfer, an ARC becomes the
lender and all rights of the bank/financial institution vest in it. Sub-
section (3) ordains that all contracts, deeds, bonds, agreements, etc.
relating to the asset continue to remain in force in favour of the ARC.
While sub-section (4) is the law providing for procedural continuity, sub-
section (5) governs the procedural aspect for the tribunals, courts and
other authority to abide by when approached by an ARC with a request
for substitution. Such substitution, however, is subject to the
requirement thereunder that the application be made with the consent of
the originator.
13.
To summarise, the scheme of Section 5 is that on acquisition of the
financial assets, the ARC is deemed to be the lender and as a sequel
thereto, all rights, title and interest of the bank/financial institution vest
in the ARC. The ARC can, subject to fulfilment of the statutory
requirements, continue pending proceedings instituted by the
bank/financial institution, as if it were the original secured creditor. By
virtue of sub-sections (4) and (5), having stepped into the shoes of the
original secured creditor, the ARC is entitled to pursue the remedies
21 asset reconstruction company
6

available to the original secured creditor in relation to the financial
assets so acquired. The right to continue proceedings would, however,
be subject to compliance with the requirements of the statute governing
that particular proceeding or remedy.
14.
Whether, sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 5, authorise the ARC to seek
substitution in a pending complaint under Section 138, N.I. Act
necessarily has to be answered by meaningfully construing the
expression “ other proceeding of whatever nature relating to the said
financial asset is pending by or against the bank or financial institution ”
in sub-section (4) and “ for the purpose of substitution of its name in any
pending suit, appeal or other proceedings ” in sub-section (5).
15.
In our considered opinion, the principle of ejusdem generis would have
no application whilst interpreting either sub-section (4) or sub-section
(5). Sub-section (4) has an in-built exception clause. When expressly
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referring to the SICA , Parliament in its wisdom provided that if a
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reference to the BIFR abates under SICA, then sub-section (4) of
Section 5 will not save it. However, this exception does not apply to all
proceedings; it applies to only one proceeding, i.e., under the SICA. The
words “suit, appeal or other proceeding” are not qualified as ‘civil’ or
‘recovery’ proceedings; on the contrary, the expression “ other
proceeding of whatever nature” is deliberately unqualified. It takes
colour from the engrafted exception – the third proviso to Section 15(1),
SICA – which relates to a proceeding before the BIFR, a proceeding that is
22
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
23 Board for Financial and Industrial Reconstruction
7

neither a suit nor an appeal. The exception, thus, shows that “other
proceeding” cannot be read ejusdem generis with the words “suit” and
“appeal” and is intended to travel beyond suits and appeals, which are
generally associated with civil proceedings, and to include proceedings
of a different nature, including a complaint under Section 138, N.I. Act
relating to a financial asset. This interpretation is also consistent with the
legislative object underlying Section 5, which is to facilitate acquisition of
financial assets and ensure continuity of the rights and remedies
attached thereto. The fact that a proceeding under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act is criminal in form would not, by itself, exclude it from the
expression “other proceeding of whatever nature” , provided that it
relates to the financial asset acquired by the ARC and was pending by or
against the bank or financial institution on the date of such acquisition.
Sub-section (4) of Section 5, for all intents and purposes, having
provided for a continuity and the words “ other proceeding of whatever
nature” used by Parliament being very wide, the same must be allowed
to operate in its full amplitude. Such width is intentional to ensure that
no proceeding relating to the financial asset is lost for want of a party to
prosecute it.
16.
However, we add a caveat here. While a pending complaint under
Section 138, N.I. Act does not abate on assignment to an ARC of the
financial asset/debt under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the SARFAESI
Act, such assignment does not, per se , make the ARC the payee or the
holder in due course. The ARC, to continue proceedings, must still prove
that (i) the cheque, since dishonoured, itself was transferred and
8

delivered to it along with the financial asset and not merely the
underlying debt; (ii) there has been an endorsement/assignment in its
favour sufficient to constitute it as a holder in due course under Sections
8 and 9 of the N.I. Act; (iii) the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act
are satisfied; and (iv) there is no attempt to improve upon the case of
the original complainant/secured creditor. Therefore, while permitting a
substitution, the ARC has to be put to strict proof that the ARC is the
“holder in due course” . Such question(s) of fact must obviously be
decided on the basis of evidence led at the trial.
17.
We, therefore, dismiss the special leave petition.
18.
However, it is clarified that apart from the points decided by the trial
magistrate while granting the prayer for substitution of the first
respondent, since confirmed by the Sessions Court and ultimately by the
High Court in the impugned judgment, all other contentions of the
accused/petitioners, available in law, are kept open for being urged
before the trial magistrate for being decided in accordance with law.
19.
Connected applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
….………..…………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)

…….……..…………………………J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 04, 2026
9

ITEM NO.29 COURT NO.7 SECTION II-A
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).20619/2026
[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03-08-2026
in CRLWP No.2776/2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay]
KISHORE AVARSEKAR & ORS. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
ASSETS CARE AND RECONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES
LTD. & ORS. Respondent(s)
(FOR ADMISSION)
(With I.A. No.330211/2026 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

Date : 04-11-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPANKAR DATTA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHEEL NAGU
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Poonam Tahilyani, Adv.
Mr. Aniruddha Deshmukh- 2483, AOR


For Respondent(s)
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
1. The special leave petition stands dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable order.
2. Connected applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
10

(SAPNA BISHT) (SUDHIR KUMAR SHARMA)
ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file)
11