FINANCE AND 4 OTHERS vs GURU VISWARADH SEERAPU

1 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
CHENNAI BENCH
OA/310/00520/2026
AND
MA/310/00372/2026
th
Dated this the 16 day of October, Two Thousand Twenty Six
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. M. SWAMINATHAN, MEMBER (J)
AND
HON'BLE MR. M.L. SRIVASTAVA, MEMBER(A)
Shri Guru Viswaradh Seerapu,
S/o Ramachandra S P,
Superintendent of Customs House,
No.60, Rajaji Salai, Chennai. .. Applicant

By Advocate M/s. B. Sathish Sundar
Vs
1. Union of India
rep by Secretary to Govt. of India
Department of Revenue
Ministry of Finance
Government of India
New Delhi.
2. Chairman,
CBIC
Department of Revenue
Ministry of Finance
Government of India
New Delhi.
3. Directorate General of Vigilance
Rep. by its Director General
Indirect Taxes and Customs
Department of Revenue
Ministry of Finance
Government of India
New Delhi.

2 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
4. Chief Commissioner of Customs
Chennai Customs Zone
Customs House
No. 60, Rajaji Salai
Chennai.
5. The Commissioner of Customs (General)
And Disciplinary Authority
Customs House
No. 60, Rajaji Salai
Chennai, .. Respondents
By Advocate Mr. M. Kishore Kumar, SPC

3 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
ORDER
(Pronounced by Hon'ble Mr. M. Swaminathan, Judicial
Member)
In the instant OA, the applicant seeks the following
relief:
th
“a) To call for the records of the 5 respondent relating
to suspension order No.12/2026 dated 02.03.2026 in
f.No.GEN/VIG/DE/135/2025-CIU and the Charge
Memorandum dated 10.03.2026 in
F.No.GEN/VIG/DE/48/2026-CIU-C13/22/2026 issued
under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Ruels, 1965 and quash/set
aside the same with consequential benefits.
b) To direct the respondents to revoke the suspension
Order No.12/2026 dated 02.03.2026 and reinstate the
applicant into service forthwith with all consequential
service and monetary benefits.”
2. Brief facts of the case as submitted by the applicant
are:
The applicant submits that, during his tenure at the Import
Shed, he dealt with three Bills of Entry (Nos. 2004395 dated
12.05.2025, 2140750 dated 19.05.2025 and 4477690 dated
12.09.2025) filed by M/s. Wintrack Inc. and M/s. Jubilant
Innovations, covering goods declared as “Body Massagers”
under CTH 90191010. The consignments were processed
under the faceless assessment system by Assessment
Groups located outside Chennai. In respect of the first Bill of

4 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
Entry, physical examination revealed discrepancies relating
to misdeclaration, quantity mismatch and non-compliance
with Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) norms. These
were duly reported by the Shed Examiner, and the
consignment was referred to the Port Assessment Group,
which reassessed it after due adjudication and imposed the
applicable fine and penalty. The applicant issued the Out of
Charge (OOC) order only thereafter. In the second case, the
applicant acted in accordance with the examination report
and the absence of any further directions or adverse findings
from the Assessment Group. In the third case, discrepancies
relating to classification and regulatory compliance were duly
identified and reported, demonstrating his adherence to
prescribed procedures. The applicant further submits that
the inquiry was initiated against him and other officers
based on generalized allegations made by an importer on
social media regarding delays in clearance and alleged
misconduct by Customs officials. Any such delay, he
contends, cannot be attributed to him individually, as
clearance involves multiple stakeholders and levels of
scrutiny under the CBIC framework. Despite the absence of

5 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
evidence of misconduct and the material supporting his bona
fide discharge of duties, the respondents issued the
impugned Charge Memorandum. The applicant contends
that the same is arbitrary and unjustified, as his actions
were in accordance with prescribed procedures and the
examination reports and decisions of the competent
authorities. Accordingly, he seeks for the aforementioned
relief.
3. The learned counsel for the applicant assailed the
impugned Charge Memorandum primarily on the ground of
the limited role of examination officers, contending that the
assessment of the Bills of Entry had largely been undertaken
by the Faceless Assessment Group (FAG), while the officers
at the Import Shed were responsible only for physical
examination of the goods vis-à-vis the import documents and
forwarding the Bills of Entry to the competent Assessment
Group for appropriate assessment and determination of
duty. Since assessment is a quasi-judicial function, the same
could not be attributed to officers discharging examination-
related duties.

6 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
4. On the aspect of independent assessment and statutory
remedies, the learned counsel submitted that assessment
orders are subject to modification, review and appeal under
Sections 17, 28, 128 and 129 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Misclassification of goods under a particular Customs Tariff
Heading (CTH), particularly when the importer's self-
assessment had been verified by the FAG, could not, by
itself, be attributed to the applicant.
5. With regard to alleged discrepancies in valuation,
quantities and EPR compliance, it was contended that the
assessments had been made on an ad valorem basis and
that any discrepancy in quantities was required to be
examined in the assessment and adjudication proceedings
relating to the respective Bills of Entry. Further, valuation of
imported goods is governed by Section 14 of the Customs
Act, 1962, read with the applicable notification defining the
jurisdiction of the proper officer. Accordingly, the allegations
of misclassification, quantity discrepancies and non-
verification of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)

7 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
registration under the Bio-Medical Waste Management
Rules, 2022, were stated to be misconceived.
6. On the question of uncertainty regarding the correct
classification of the imported goods, the learned counsel
pointed out that even the Commissionerate at the Air Cargo
Complex had sought clarification from the Board on the
issue, which remained unanswered. In these circumstances,
the allegation that the applicant had adopted an incorrect
classification was contended to be untenable.
7. Regarding the alleged motivated complaint leading to
disciplinary proceedings, the learned counsel submitted that
the proceedings appeared to have been initiated in the wake
of a complaint posted by the importer on social media,
containing general allegations without identifying the officers
concerned or specifying any demand for illegal gratification.
The statements recorded by the Directorate General of
Valuation (DGOV) also contained no specific allegation of
such misconduct in connection with the examination of the
imported goods.

8 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
8. As regards procedural irregularities in the disciplinary
inquiry, it was contended that the proceedings initiated
under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, were vitiated
by procedural infirmities, including the absence of identified
witnesses, reliance on unauthenticated or irrelevant
documents, and non-supply of certain relied-upon
documents to the charged officers.
9. Finally, on the issue of suspension and consequential
relief, the learned counsel pointed out that some of the
charged officers had also been placed under suspension. He
contended that, in view of the prima facie infirmities
rendering the Charge Memoranda unsustainable, the
consequential continuation of suspension was also liable to
be reconsidered and set aside.
10. On the foregoing grounds and relied on the following
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned
counsel submitted that the impugned Charge Memorandum
was legally unsustainable and liable to be quashed and set

9 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
aside, together with the consequential reliefs sought by the
applicant:
(i) Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs Union of India, reported in
(1999) 7 SCC 409;
(ii) Union of India Vs K.K. Dhawan, reported in (1993) 2 SCC
56;
(iii) Roop Singh Negi Vs Punjab National Bank & Others
reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570.
11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents
vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of
the applicant and reiterated the averments made in the reply
statement. On the issue of reliance on past clearances and
similar imports, he submitted that the treatment accorded to
other consignments was wholly irrelevant to the present
proceedings, as each import transaction was required to be
examined independently in accordance with the applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions. Any action or omission
concerning other consignments could not absolve the
applicant of responsibility for the alleged lapses in the
instant case.

10 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
12. With regard to the specific allegations of omission and
failure to discharge official duties, the learned counsel
submitted that the Charge Memorandum pertained to the
applicant's alleged failure to verify compliance with
mandatory licensing requirements, identify and report goods
requiring regulatory clearance, and take appropriate action
despite examination findings warranting further scrutiny. He
contended that the validity of these charges could not be
undermined by reference to the manner in which other
imports had been dealt with.
13. On the question of classification of the imported goods
and the alleged absence of policy clarification, the learned
counsel submitted that the disciplinary proceedings were not
founded merely on a dispute regarding classification or the
absence of clarification from the competent authority.
Rather, the charges arose from specific acts of omission and
commission allegedly committed by the applicant in the
discharge of his official duties, as set out in the Articles of
Charge and the Statement of Imputations. Whether the

11 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
applicant had duly discharged his responsibilities was a
matter to be determined during the departmental inquiry on
the basis of the evidence and records available. The
contentions raised by the applicant, according to the
respondents, constituted matters of defence and did not
warrant interference with the disciplinary proceedings at the
preliminary stage.
14. Finally, on the issue of the validity and maintainability
of the Charge Memorandum, the learned counsel contended
that the same had been issued by the competent authority in
accordance with the applicable rules and on the basis of
prima facie material available on record. It was submitted
that the Charge Memorandum suffered from no legal,
procedural or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference
by this Tribunal. The applicant's contentions were stated to
be devoid of merit, particularly as the issues raised involved
disputed questions of fact that were appropriately required to
be examined in the course of the departmental inquiry.

12 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
15. He relied on the following Hon'le Apex Court
judgements in support of his contentions and prayed for
dismissal of the OA:.
(i) Union of India Vs Kunisetty Satyanarayan reported in AIR
2007 SC 906;
(ii) UOI Vs Upendra Singh reported in (1994) 2 SCC 357;
(iii) The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others Vs Prabhash
Chandra Mirdha reported in (2012) 11 SCC 565;
(iv) Chairman, LIC of India Vs A. Masilamani (2013) 6 SCC
530.
16. We have carefully considered the rival submissions
advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties
and perused the pleadings and the material available on
record.
17. The principal question that arises for consideration is
whether the impugned Charge Memorandum warrants
interference by this Tribunal at the threshold, having regard
to the nature of the duties discharged by the applicant, the
allegations levelled against him and the settled principles

13 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
governing judicial review of disciplinary proceedings at the
stage of issuance of a charge memorandum.
18. We would like to extract the Role of the Applicant,
Details of Charge memo and Article of Charge in nutshell
and the stage of disciplinary proceedings in a tabulated form:
Role of the
Details of Charge Memo
Stage of the
Disciplinary Case
Applicant
& Gist of Article of
charge
OA
No.520/2026
Guru
Viswaradh
Seerapu
(Under
suspension)
Superintendent/
Out of Charge
Officer at
Import Shed,
Air Cargo
Complex
F.No.GEN/VID/DE/48/2026-
CIU, dated 10.03.2026
1. Failure to properly
determine the CTH good
declared as ‘body massagers’,
forwarding improper
examination report to the
Appraising Group.
Inquiry Officer &
Presenting Officer
appointed and
proceedings are pending.
2. Supervisory failure
inasmuch as he failed to ensure
that the Examiners under his
charge verified all the import
documents.
3. Enabling unlawful clearance
of goods imported under Bill
of Entry dated 12.08.2025
without submission of
mandatory Extended Produced
Responsibility registration
certification under Battery
Waste Management Rules,
2022 paing way for potentical
unlawful release of
prohibited/restricted goods
from customs control.

14 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
4. Failed to supervise 100%
examination of the goods and
did not ascertain mismatch in
quantity between packing list
and bill of entry/invoice
leading to potentical loss of
revenue with respect to Bill of
Entry dated 12.09.2025.
19. The learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Zunjarrao
Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India , reported in (1999) 7 SCC
409, particularly paragraphs 42 to 44 thereof. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that disciplinary proceedings cannot be
initiated on vague or indefinite allegations or merely on the
basis of suspicion. It was further observed that an error of
law committed in the discharge of quasi-judicial functions
would not, by itself, constitute misconduct unless something
more, such as the influence of extraneous considerations, is
alleged. The underlying principle is that officers discharging
quasi-judicial functions must be allowed to perform their
duties independently, without the threat of disciplinary
action merely because a decision taken by them is
subsequently found to be erroneous. The relevant portion of
the judgment is extracted for better understanding:

15 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
“42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an
officer cannot take place on information which is
vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in
such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for
the disciplinary authority to proceed against the
delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not
imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power
directed filing of appeal against that order in the
Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed
against the appellant. There is no other instance to
show that in similar case the appellant invariably
imposed penalty.
43. If every error of law were to constitute a charge
of misconduct, it would impinge upon the
independent functioning of quasi-judicial officers
like the appellant. Since in sum and substance
misconduct is sought to be inferred by the appellant
having committed an error of law, the charge-sheet
on the face of it does not proceed on any legal
premise rendering it liable to be quashed. In other
words, to maintain any charge-sheet against a
quasi-judicial authority something more has to be
alleged than a mere mistake of law, e.g., in the
nature of some extraneous consideration influencing
the quasi-judicial order. Since nothing of the sort is
alleged herein the impugned charge-sheet is
rendered illegal. The charge-sheet, if sustained, will
thus impinge upon the confidence and independent
functioning of a quasi-judicial authority. The entire
system of administrative adjudication whereunder
quasi-judicial powers are conferred on
administrative authorities, would fall into disrepute
if officers performing such functions are inhibited in
performing their functions without fear or favour
because of the constant threat of disciplinary
proceedings.
44. Considering whole aspects of the matter, we are
of the view that it was not a case for initiation of any
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The
charge of misconduct against him was not proper. It
has to be quashed.“

20. The applicant also relied upon Roop Singh Negi v.
Punjab National Bank , reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, wherein

16 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that, although the
strict provisions of the Evidence Act may not apply to
departmental proceedings, the principles of natural justice
must be observed and findings of misconduct must be
supported by evidence. Suspicion, however strong, cannot
substitute proof, and findings founded merely on conjectures
and surmises cannot be sustained.
21. The principal contention of the applicant, therefore, is
that an erroneous interpretation or application of law
cannot, by itself, constitute misconduct, unless the alleged
error is accompanied by circumstances indicative of
deliberate wrongdoing, mala fides, extraneous influence or
other culpable conduct. In the present case, the applicant
contend that the assessment of the imported goods had been
undertaken by the competent Assessment Group, whereas
his role at the Import Shed was confined to examination-
related functions and issuance of the Out of Charge order
following clearance by the competent authority. It was
further submitted that the alleged discrepancies in

17 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
classification, quantity and regulatory compliance cannot
automatically be attributed to him when the assessment and
clearance involved the exercise of independent statutory
functions by the competent authorities.
22. At the same time, the scope of judicial review at the
stage of issuance of a charge memorandum is circumscribed
by well-settled principles of law. In Union of India v. Upendra
Singh , reported in (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that a Tribunal or Court may interfere where the
charges, read with the statement of imputations and
particulars, do not disclose any misconduct or other
irregularity, or where the charges are contrary to law.
However, at that stage, the Tribunal cannot examine the
correctness or truth of the allegations, as those matters fall
within the domain of the disciplinary authority.
23. The same principle was reiterated in Union of India v.
Kunisetty Satyanarayana , reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a charge

18 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
memorandum ordinarily does not give rise to a cause of
action warranting judicial interference, since it is not, by
itself, an adverse final order affecting the rights of the
delinquent officer. Interference at the threshold is justified
only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the charge
memorandum has been issued by an authority lacking
jurisdiction or where a recognised ground for judicial review
is otherwise established. The principles governing
interference with disciplinary proceedings were also
considered in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pramod Kumar, IPS ,
reported in (2018) 17 SCC 677.
24. It is equally relevant to note that, in Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha , reported
in (2011) 5 SCC 142, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
emphasised the importance of compliance with the
applicable legal requirements governing disciplinary action.
The initiation of disciplinary proceedings must be founded
upon due application of mind and cannot be undertaken
mechanically or as a matter of routine.

19 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
25. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, we find that the applicant has raised
substantial questions concerning the precise nature of his
duties, the allocation of assessment responsibilities between
the officers at the Import Shed and the competent
Assessment Group, and the extent to which the alleged
discrepancies could be attributed to him. The contention
that the final clearance was granted by the competent
Assessment Group is a relevant circumstance for
consideration. However, it does not, by itself, conclusively
absolve the applicant of responsibility for any independent
examination-related or supervisory lapses specifically
attributable to him. The issue is whether the Articles of
Charge and the accompanying Statement of Imputations
disclose identifiable acts of omission or commission falling
within the scope of the applicant's official duties, and
whether those allegations are supported by a prima facie
factual foundation.

20 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
26. The distinction between an erroneous decision and
misconduct must, therefore, be maintained. A mere error of
judgment, an arguable question of classification, or a
technical irregularity would not, without more, necessarily
warrant disciplinary action. Conversely, where specific
dereliction of duty, failure to comply with mandatory
requirements, or disregard of material examination findings
is alleged, the matter may legitimately be examined in
disciplinary proceedings, provided the charges are founded
on relevant material and are not merely speculative or
unsupported by any discernible factual basis.
27. In the present case, the respondents maintain that the
Charge Memorandum is founded upon specific allegations
concerning failure to verify mandatory licensing
requirements, failure to identify and report goods requiring
regulatory clearance, and failure to take appropriate action
despite examination findings warranting further scrutiny.
These allegations, if borne out by the record, would require
consideration independently of the question whether the

21 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
final assessment or classification was undertaken by another
competent authority. At this stage, however, it would be
inappropriate for this Tribunal to record a definitive finding
on the truth or otherwise of those allegations, as doing so
would amount to prejudging the issues entrusted to the
disciplinary authority.
28. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the
sustainability of the disciplinary proceedings must be
examined within the limited parameters of judicial review
applicable to a challenge against a charge memorandum.
Unless it is demonstrated that the Charge Memorandum
suffers from want of jurisdiction, mala fides, violation of
statutory provisions, or that the allegations, even if accepted
at face value, do not disclose any misconduct or irregularity,
the Tribunal ought not to substitute its assessment for that
of the Disciplinary Authority. Equally, the Disciplinary
Authority must ensure that the proceedings are not founded
merely upon suspicion, an alleged error of law, or the
outcome of an assessment undertaken by another competent

22 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
authority, without identifying the applicant's own acts or
omissions constituting misconduct.
29. As regards the procedural objections raised by the
applicant, including the alleged non-supply of relied-upon
documents and the absence of authenticated material, we
observe that the applicant must be afforded a meaningful
and effective opportunity to defend themselves in accordance
with the applicable rules and the principles of natural
justice. All relied-upon documents necessary for the defence
must be made available, subject to the applicable rules, and
the charges must be examined on the basis of relevant and
legally sustainable material. Any specific procedural infirmity
established during the inquiry must be addressed in
accordance with law.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
opinion that the applicant must be permitted to raise all his
factual and legal defences before the Disciplinary Authority,
which shall consider the same objectively and independently,

23 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
without being influenced by any observations made herein
on the merits of the allegations. The Disciplinary Authority
shall also ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly,
in accordance with the applicable rules, and within a
reasonable period.
31. With regard to the suspension of the applicant, the
Bench posed a query to the learned counsel for the
respondents as to why the applicant had been suspended,
when no such action had been taken against the other
applicants in O.A. Nos. 475, 477, 490, 491 and 553 of 2026,
despite identical charge memos having been issued in their
respective cases. The Bench observed that the differential
treatment meted out to the applicant appeared
discriminatory. The learned counsel for the respondents was
unable to offer any satisfactory justification for the
suspension of the applicant, and no reasons were adduced in
support of the same at the time of hearing.

24 OA/310/00520/2026 & MA 372/2026
32. In the above circumstances, and in the interest of justice,
we are of the considered view that the suspension of the applicant
warrants revocation. Accordingly, the suspension order is hereby
revoked, and the respondents are directed to post the applicant to
a non-sensitive post, in accordance with the applicable rules and
law.
33. In the result, the Original Application is disposed of with a
direction to the respondents to ensure that the disciplinary
proceedings, if continued, are conducted strictly in accordance
with the applicable rules and the principles of natural justice and
are concluded, as far as practicable, within a period of six months
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The applicant shall
cooperate with the inquiry, and the respondents shall afford him
a full and fair opportunity to defend his case. Consequently,
pending MA No.372 of 2026 filed by the respondents for deletion
st nd
of 1 and 2 respondent stands dismissed. In the
circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs
(M.L. SRIVASTAVA) (M. SWAMINATHAN)
MEMBER(A) MEMBER(J)
16.10.2026
mas
Digitally signed by M A SUNDAR
Date: 2026.11.02 16:16:23
+05'30'
M A SUNDAR