REDACTED vs The State Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr.

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 25.08.2026
Pronounced on : 03.09.2026
Uploaded on: 03.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010132792026
+ CRL.A. 320/2026 & CRL.M.A. 10175/2026
KXXXXX .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Jitendra Kumar Tiwari and Mr.
Abhishek Chaudhary, Advs.
versus
THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ajay Vikram Singh, APP with SI
Abhishek Rane, PS Dwarka North.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
JUDGMENT
MADHU JAIN, J.
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2. The present appeal has been filed by the prosecutrix under Section
419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred
to as, ‘ BNSS’ ) , against the judgment of acquittal dated 07.10.2024 passed
by the learned ASJ , Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in SC No. 151/2022,
arising out of FIR No. 138/2021, registered at Police Station Dwarka North,
under Sections 328/376(2)(n)/377/506/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as, ‘IPC’ ), whereby Respondent No. 2 (Anoop) was
acquitted of all charges.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. Briefly stated, the case of the prosecution is that the prosecutrix was
residing with her husband and their adopted child. Her husband had
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sustained a fall from a roof in 2007, resulting in 75% disability, and was
unable to father a biological child. Consequently, the couple adopted a child
in the year 2014.
4. It is alleged that Respondent No. 2, who was known to the family of
the prosecutrix, used to visit their house and, from the year 2017 onwards,
established physical relations with the prosecutrix against her wishes by
extending threats and inducements. It is further alleged that on one occasion
she was administered an intoxicating substance, following which physical
relations were established with her. According to the prosecutrix, the
alleged acts continued thereafter and included repeated sexual acts,
including unnatural intercourse, accompanied by threats and coercion.
5. The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth to a child on
20.06.2019. During the course of investigation, DNA samples of the
prosecutrix, the accused and the child were obtained and sent to the
Forensic Science Laboratory, Rohini. The DNA examination report stated
that Respondent No. 2 was the biological father of the child.
6. The prosecutrix subsequently disclosed the alleged incidents to her
husband and family members. On the basis of her complaint, FIR No.
138/2021 came to be registered at Police Station Dwarka North on
17.03.2021 under Sections 376/377/506 IPC. Her statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 18.03.2021.
7. During investigation, the prosecutrix was medically examined and
the requisite biological samples were collected. The DNA report was
thereafter received from the FSL. The police filed the charge-sheet against
Respondent No. 2 for offences under Sections 376/377/506/509 IPC,
followed by a supplementary charge-sheet placing the DNA report on
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record. Cognizance was taken on 07.09.2021, whereafter the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions and registered as SC No. 151/2022.
8. Vide order dated 23.02.2024, the learned Trial Court framed charges
against the accused Anoop for offences punishable under Sections 328,
376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial.
9. During trial, the prosecution examined four witnesses, namely, the
prosecutrix as PW-1, her husband as PW-2 and the two Investigating
Officers as PW-3 and PW-4. The prosecutrix deposed regarding the alleged
repeated sexual acts and the threats allegedly extended by the accused. Her
husband deposed regarding the circumstances in which he came to know of
the alleged relationship and the pregnancy, as well as the DNA test.
10. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as , ‘Cr.P.C.’ ) was
recorded on 07.09.2024. In his statement, the accused admitted that he had
physical relations with the prosecutrix, but stated that the relationship was
consensual and was within the knowledge of her husband. The accused did
not lead any evidence in defence.
11. Vide impugned judgment dated 07.10.2024, the learned Trial Court
acquitted Respondent No. 2 of all the charges. While considering the
evidence on record, the learned Trial Court, inter alia, considered the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutrix, the delay in
disclosure/reporting of the alleged incidents and the defence taken by the
accused that the relationship was consensual.
The relevant extracts of the impugned judgment dated 07.10.2024 are
reproduced hereinbelow:
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"40. It is pertinent to note, that there is also a delay
in registration of the FIR in the instant matter. As
per PW-1, the first alleged incident of rape occurred
on 10.03.2017. A child was born to the prosecutrix
on 20.06.2019. Complaint was filed on
17.03.2021.”
“42. The FIR in the present matter is highly belated.
There is a lack of clarity as to the stand of the
prosecutrix. She has stated that her husband had
objected to the pregnancy and that a DNA test was
not possible during pregnancy. Why then had PW-2
entered the child's name in his service books. Why
had the prosecutrix not come to the police after the
birth, after her husband despite having some doubt
not taken any further action to this knowledge. The
delay is the present matter further discredits the
version of the prosecution.
43. Though the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is
sufficient to base the conviction of the accused,
however, that testimony must be consistent and
unblemished. It should be of such high standard that
it infers no other conclusion except the guilt of the
accused, leaving no doubt in the mind of the Court.
44. In the instant matter, considering the
improvements, inconsistencies and lack of
coherence in the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2, the
Court cannot rule out the possibility that the
relationship between the accused and the
prosecutrix could have been consensual. Accused
has successfully rebutted the presumption. The
accused has rebutted the presumption under Section
114A, Indian Evidence Act. Accused Anoop is
hereby acquitted in respect to offence under
Section 376(2)(n) IPC ."
"46. As noted above, there are several
inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutrix.
The version of the prosecutrix is not one which has
been found to be such that it can be relied upon
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without corroboration. In the instant matter, there
is no corroboration, either medical or otherwise, as
to whether accused had oral sex with the
prosecutrix. There are improvements in the
statement of the prosecutrix even to this regard. As
PW-1, she stated that whenever the accused came to
her house, he used to make relations with her in a
brutal way and used to have both vaginal and anal
sex with her. However, the prosecutrix had not given
such a blank statement for all acts in her earlier
statement.
47. Prosecution has failed to prove this charge
against the accused. The accused Anoop is hereby
acquitted under Section 377 IPC. ”
"52. Further as noted above, the testimony of the
prosecutrix is fraught with inconsistencies and
contradictions. The statement of the prosecutrix is
not found to be reliable. There is also a delay in the
prosecutrix registering the present FIR. Prosecution
has failed to prove this charge against the accused.
The accused Anoop is hereby acquitted under
Section 328 IPC ."
"58. In the instant matter, as stated above,
prosecution has failed to prove the alleged nude
photographs/videos on record. The photographs or
videos were never proved. In fact, the prosecutrix
could only not even confirm its existence, despite
having even claimed that such photos and videos
had been sent by the accused to her relatives by
which she was defamed.
59. Even in respect to the video calls, the fact that
the relationship between the prosecutrix and the
accused was consensual cannot be ruled out, which
would entirely change the nature of calls between
them. There are also several other contradictions as
already pointed out above. The ingredients set out
haven't been met. There are also inconsistencies and
improvements in the version of the prosecutrix
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which does not credibility to the case of the
prosecution. Prosecution has failed to prove these
charges against the accused. Accused Anoop is
hereby acquitted under Section 506 and 509 IPC .
FINAL ORDER—
60. Accordingly, accused Anoop is hereby acquitted
of the charges punishable under Sections 376(2)(n),
377, 328, 506 and 509 IPC.
61. Accused is directed to furnish bail bonds under
Section 437A CrPC, which shall remain in force for
a period of six months. Previous surety stands
discharged. Documents, if any, of the surety be
returned to the rightful owner after due
acknowledgment and endorsement, if any, made on
it be cancelled accordingly."
12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order on
sentence, the Appellant preferred the present appeal before this Court
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
13. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Ld. Trial Court
failed to appreciate that the testimony of the prosecutrix, PW-1, was cogent,
consistent, and trustworthy. Learned counsel places reliance upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in S tate of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny,
(2017) 2 SCC 51 and Phool Singh v. State of M.P., (2022) 2 SCC 74 and
submits that it is settled law that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if
credible, is sufficient for conviction.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the Ld. Trial
Court erred in discarding the testimony of PW-1 on the basis of minor
contradictions, overlooking the settled position of law that the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix, if credible, is sufficient for conviction.
Reliance is placed on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar, (2017)
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2 SCC 51 .
15. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Ld. Trial Court
gravely erred in disregarding the DNA report, which categorically
established the respondent as the biological father of the child born to the
prosecutrix on 20.06.2019. It is submitted that the Delhi High Court has
repeatedly held DNA evidence to be the most clinching form of scientific
evidence, and reliance is placed on Raju v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC
OnLine Del 2432 and Sunil v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC OnLine
Del 4505 .
16. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the respondent's plea,
taken in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., that the
relationship was consensual and with the knowledge of the prosecutrix's
husband, PW-2, is patently false, inherently improbable, and unsupported
by any defence witness or material. It is submitted that the Ld. Trial Court
failed to note that no prudent husband would consent to such conduct, and
that PW-2, in his deposition, categorically refuted the said suggestion.
17. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Ld. Trial Court
placed undue emphasis on minor contradictions in the testimony of PW-1
and on the alleged delay in disclosure of the incidents, whereas the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has consistently held that delay in lodging a complaint, or
minor discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecutrix, do not discredit an
otherwise trustworthy witness. Learned counsel places reliance upon the
judgments in Phool Singh v. State of M.P. (supra) and State of Punjab v.
Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 .
18. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the testimony of PW-
1 did not stand uncorroborated but was supported by the suspicion and
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testimony of PW-2, her husband, as also by the DNA report, and that the
Ld. Trial Court ignored this cumulative corroboration available on record
while appreciating the evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant further
submits that the respondent's partial admission of physical relations with
the prosecutrix was not given due weight by the Ld. Trial Court, and that
the impugned judgment of acquittal, in these circumstances, suffers from
grave perversity in the appreciation of evidence.
19. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
acquittal, despite overwhelming evidence on record, has resulted in a
serious miscarriage of justice to the appellant, and has emboldened the
respondent to escape liability for a heinous crime. It is further contended
that the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the prosecutrix, being a
married woman whose husband is disabled, would have had no reason to
falsely implicate the respondent and subject herself to social stigma, unless
the allegations made by her were true. Learned counsel further submits that
under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, once the prosecutrix states
that she did not consent, and the DNA report establishes that intercourse
took place, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove consent.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
20. Learned APP for the State submits that the learned Trial Court has
duly appreciated the evidence on record and has arrived at its findings after
considering the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the documentary
evidence and the defence taken by the accused.
21. It is submitted that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any
illegality, infirmity or perversity warranting interference by this Court.
According to the learned APP, the conclusions reached by the learned Trial
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Court are based on a proper appreciation of the material available on record
and, therefore, the impugned judgment acquitting the accused calls for no
interference.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
22. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone
through the material on record.
23. The principal question which arises for consideration is whether the
judgment of acquittal dated 07.10.2024 suffers from such perversity, patent
illegality or misappreciation of material evidence as would warrant
interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal.
24. It is well settled that where the view taken by the learned Trial Court
is a reasonably possible view on the evidence, the appellate Court would
not interfere merely because another view is also possible. An acquittal can
be reversed only where the appreciation of evidence by the learned Trial
Court is shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal, based on a misreading of
material evidence, or where the conclusion of guilt is the only conclusion
reasonably possible on the evidence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
reiterated that an acquittal cannot be reversed merely on account of a
difference of opinion.
25. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. ,
2026 SCC OnLine SC 89 , the Supreme Court, after considering the earlier
decisions on the scope of appellate interference with an order of acquittal,
reiterated the aforesaid principles in the following terms:
“From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb
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the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on
misreading/omission to consider the material
evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only
when there are ‘compelling and substantial
reasons’ for doing so. If the order is ‘clearly
unreasonable’, it is a compelling reason for
interference;
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by the
trial court is a possible view which could have been
taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of
the evidence on record was that the guilt of the
accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
no other conclusion was possible.”
26. In the present case, the learned Trial Court examined the prosecution
evidence not merely with reference to the factum of sexual relationship
between the prosecutrix and the accused, but also with reference to the
circumstances in which such relationship allegedly took place and whether
the prosecution had established the allegations of absence of consent,
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coercion, intoxication and threats beyond reasonable doubt.
27. There is no dispute that the DNA report, Ex. P-7, establishes that the
accused is the biological father of the child born to the prosecutrix. The said
evidence is undoubtedly significant as it establishes the fact of sexual
intercourse between the parties. However, the DNA report by itself does
not establish the circumstances in which such intercourse took place, nor
does it determine whether the relationship was consensual or non-
consensual. The question before the learned Trial Court was therefore not
merely whether the accused and the prosecutrix had sexual relations, but
whether the prosecution had established the offence punishable under
Section 376(2)(n) IPC.
28. The learned Trial Court was conscious of the statutory presumption
under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act. The provision becomes
relevant where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the woman
states in her evidence that she did not consent. The statutory presumption
is undoubtedly required to be given its due effect; however, its existence
does not render the testimony of the prosecutrix immune from judicial
scrutiny. The Court must still examine whether the foundational facts are
established and whether the evidence and circumstances relied upon by the
defence are sufficient to rebut the presumption, wherever attracted.
29. In the present case, the learned Trial Court did not reject the
testimony of PW-1 merely because it was that of the prosecutrix. It
examined her testimony in the light of her earlier statements, the testimony
of PW-2 and the other evidence on record, and found material
inconsistencies and improvements.
30. One of the material discrepancies noticed by the learned Trial Court
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relates to the allegation of administration of an intoxicant. In her statement
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., PW-1 stated that during the initial incidents the
accused used to administer an intoxicant before establishing sexual
relations with her. However, such assertion finds no corresponding mention
either in her initial complaint or in her substantive testimony before the
Trial Court. Even with regard to the first alleged incident, there is a
variation in her account. In the complaint, Ex. PW-1/A, she stated that the
accused had mixed an intoxicant in the milk which was consumed by both
her and her husband. In her deposition, however, she introduced a further
circumstance that while she was preparing the milk, her husband called her,
whereupon she left the kitchen and, on returning, saw the accused coming
out of the kitchen. Thus, the manner in which the intoxicant was allegedly
introduced into the milk is not consistently stated at the different stages.
31. There is also a material discrepancy regarding the state of
consciousness of the prosecutrix during the alleged first occurrence. In the
complaint, she stated that after consuming the milk she became drowsy,
that she could see what the accused was doing, but was unable to move her
hands and legs. In her deposition before the learned Trial Court, however,
she initially stated that after the accused took her to the other room, she
remembered nothing until she woke up the following day. It was only when
she was confronted during cross-examination by the learned APP that she
agreed to the suggestion that she was conscious at the relevant time, though
unable to move her hands and feet. This inconsistency assumes significance
since the prosecution itself attributes the alleged absence of consent during
the first incident to the administration of an intoxicating substance and the
consequent condition of the prosecutrix.
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32. The learned Trial Court also noticed material inconsistencies
concerning the pregnancy and the alleged suspicion regarding the paternity
of the child. In her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix
stated that when she informed her husband about her pregnancy in 2018, he
doubted that he was the father on account of his disability. In her deposition,
however, she placed the relevant events in 2019 and stated that her husband
objected to the pregnancy, took her to the hospital and sought a DNA
examination. This version was not supported by PW-2, who stated that he
had neither quarrelled with his wife nor questioned her regarding the
paternity of the child before its birth. The learned Trial Court was entitled
to consider this inconsistency while assessing the overall credibility of the
prosecution case, particularly as the alleged conduct of the husband was
relied upon as a significant circumstance leading to the subsequent
disclosure of the relationship.
33. Similarly, the testimony concerning the 100-number call was not
consistent. PW-1 stated that her husband had called the police after seeing
her and the accused in a compromising position, whereas PW-2 gave a
different account of the circumstances in which the 100-number call was
made. The learned Trial Court considered this contradiction along with the
other discrepancies appearing in the prosecution evidence.
34. The allegations concerning threats through nude photographs and
videos also did not receive corroboration from the electronic evidence. PW-
1 stated at different stages that the accused had taken her nude photographs
and videos and had threatened to circulate them. However, during cross-
examination, she was unable to state with certainty that such photographs
had been taken or to whom they had allegedly been sent. No such
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photographs or videos were produced on record. The mobile phone of the
accused was subjected to forensic examination, but the alleged
photographs, videos or chats were not recovered. The learned Trial Court
was therefore entitled to take into consideration the absence of such
electronic corroboration while assessing the allegations under Sections 506
and 509 IPC.
35. The learned Trial Court further considered the evidence regarding
the nature of communication between the parties. PW-1 admitted that she
and the accused used to speak to each other several times during the day,
sometimes for considerable periods, and that the accused had sent her
money for purchasing a mobile phone. She also stated that she was
disturbed when the accused stopped calling her and that she disclosed the
relationship after the accused refused to keep her. These circumstances
were considered by the learned Trial Court along with the inconsistencies
in her testimony while assessing whether the prosecution had conclusively
established a relationship maintained solely through coercion and threats.
36. This Court is conscious that the conduct of a prosecutrix in a sexual
offence cannot be judged on the basis of stereotypical notions of how a
victim ought to behave. Nor can delay in reporting a sexual offence, by
itself, be treated as sufficient to discard the prosecution case. However, the
conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are not wholly
irrelevant when the Court is required to determine the credibility of
competing versions and whether the prosecution has established the charges
beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the learned Trial Court did
not treat any one circumstance as conclusive; rather, it considered the
evidence cumulatively.
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37. The principle that the testimony of the prosecutrix can, in an
appropriate case, form the sole basis of conviction, does not dispense with
the requirement that such testimony must inspire confidence. The Supreme
Court in State (GNCT of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
78 , while dealing with material contradictions in the testimony of the
prosecutrix, has observed as under:
“Definitely the prosecutrix in her examination-in-
chief as well as in cross-examination has stuck to
the fact that she was raped by the accused but the
fact remains that she has contradicted her statement
at more than one place. Moreover she has said in
her statement under Section 164 CrPC she had hit
the accused on her head by Danda whereas in her
examination-in-chief she stated that she hit the
accused on his foot. When the accused had
surrendered on 10.10.2014 none of these injuries
were noticed on the body of the accused.
Although it is absolutely true that in the case of rape,
conviction can be made on the sole testimony of the
prosecutrix as her evidence is in the nature of an
injured witness which is given a very high value by
the Courts. But nevertheless when a person can be
convicted on the testimony of a single witness the
Courts are bound to be very careful in examining
such a witness and thus the testimony of such a
witness must inspire confidence of the Court. The
testimony of the prosecutrix in the present case thus
has failed to inspire absolute confidence of the Trial
Court, the High Court and this Court as well.”
38. The finding of the learned Trial Court with respect to Section 377
IPC also cannot be said to be perverse. The learned Trial Court noticed that
the allegations regarding oral and anal sexual acts were not stated with the
same specificity in the earlier versions and that there was no medical or
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other corroboration of the alleged oral sexual acts. The Court was entitled
to examine these improvements while determining whether the charge had
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
39. Likewise, in respect of Section 328 IPC, the learned Trial Court
correctly appreciated that the prosecution was required to establish not
merely that the prosecutrix had felt drowsy, but that the accused had
administered or caused to be administered a poison, stupefying,
intoxicating or unwholesome substance with the requisite intention or
knowledge. The alleged incident was stated to have occurred several years
prior to registration of the FIR, no substance was recovered or subjected to
scientific examination, and the testimony of PW-1 itself contained the
inconsistencies noted hereinabove. In these circumstances, the conclusion
that the charge under Section 328 IPC had not been proved cannot be
termed perverse.
40. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the accused
did not lead any defence evidence also does not warrant interference with
the acquittal. The prosecution is required to establish its case in accordance
with law, and the absence of defence evidence cannot relieve it of that
burden or convert deficiencies in the prosecution evidence into proof of
guilt. The defence version, including the assertion of a consensual
relationship, may be considered to the extent permissible in law, but the
ultimate question remains whether the prosecution evidence establishes
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
41. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the
principle that the testimony of the prosecutrix can form the sole basis of
conviction is unexceptionable as a proposition of law. However, that
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principle operates where such testimony is found to be reliable, trustworthy
and of such quality as to inspire confidence. It does not dispense with the
judicial assessment of the testimony or require the Court to ignore material
contradictions and inconsistencies. In the present case, the learned Trial
Court assessed the testimony of PW-1 in the light of her earlier statements
and the other evidence on record and gave cogent reasons for not finding it
sufficient to sustain a conviction.
42. The aforesaid discrepancies have to be appreciated cumulatively and
not in isolation. The issue is not whether every minor discrepancy in the
testimony of a prosecutrix should result in an acquittal; plainly, it should
not. The question is whether the inconsistencies noticed by the learned Trial
Court materially affect the reliability of the prosecution version. Here, the
variations concern the alleged administration of the intoxicant, the
condition of the prosecutrix during the first alleged assault, the
circumstances in which her husband allegedly came to know of the
pregnancy and questioned its paternity, and the subsequent conduct
attributed to him. These are not peripheral matters wholly disconnected
from the prosecution case, but relate to circumstances forming an integral
part of its narrative.
43. Learned counsel for the appellant has also urged that the prosecutrix
had no reason to falsely implicate the accused and that she would not have
exposed herself to social stigma unless the allegations were true. Such an
argument, however, cannot substitute proof. The Court is required to decide
the criminal charge on the evidence led before it and not on an assumption
regarding the reasons which may or may not motivate a person to lodge a
complaint.
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44. This Court may not necessarily endorse every observation made by
the learned Trial Court in precisely the same terms. However, on an
independent consideration of the material placed before this Court, it cannot
be said that the learned Trial Court ignored material evidence or arrived at
a conclusion wholly contrary to the record. The DNA evidence was duly
considered, but was correctly appreciated as establishing paternity and
sexual intercourse without, by itself, establishing absence of consent. The
learned Trial Court thereafter examined the testimony of PW-1, the
testimony of PW-2, the documentary and electronic evidence and the
surrounding circumstances.
45. The present case is therefore not one where material evidence has
been wholly ignored or where the conclusion of acquittal is demonstrably
unsustainable. The learned Trial Court has examined the evidence and
arrived at a conclusion which is reasonably possible on the material before
it. The fact that another view may also be possible is not sufficient to justify
interference in an appeal against acquittal. The strengthened presumption
of innocence in favour of the accused consequently operates in his favour.
46. This Court is also mindful that the offence alleged is grave and the
allegations made by the prosecutrix are serious. Nevertheless, the gravity
of the accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a
criminal trial. The prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, and where the evidence permits a reasonable
view consistent with innocence, the benefit must go to the accused. The
reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the aforesaid
judgments is misplaced. The said decisions, having been rendered in
materially different factual and evidentiary circumstances, are clearly
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
Signing Date:03.09.2026
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CRL.A. 320/2026 Page 18 of 19

distinguishable and, therefore, do not advance the case of the appellant.
CONCLUSION
47. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no compelling
ground to interfere with the judgment dated 07.10.2024 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi. The
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on an appreciation
of the evidence and cannot be termed perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly
unreasonable.
48. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment of
acquittal dated 07.10.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, in SC No. 151/202 2 arising out of FIR
No. 138/2021 , Police Station Dwarka North, is upheld.
49. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
50. A copy of this order shall be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary information and compliance.
MADHU JAIN
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 3, 2026/RM
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
Signing Date:03.09.2026
21:31:02
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