Janvee Contracts Pvt Ltd (Jcpl) vs Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd. (Acil)

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 30.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 19.11.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 19.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010485542026
+ ARB.P. 1811/2026
JANVEE CONTRACTS PVT LTD (JCPL) .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gaurav Kumar Singh,
Advocate

versus

AHLUWALIA CONTRACTS (INDIA)
LTD. (ACIL) .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sunil Mund, Mr.
Mritunjay Singh, Mr. Jagjeet
Singh and Mr. Vedant Mund,
Advocates

CORAM:
HON‟BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT

DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1. The petitioner has approached this Court by instituting this
petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 [hereafter ‗ A&C Act ‘], for seeking appointment of an
independent sole arbitrator for adjudicating its dispute with the
respondent.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case, as discernible from the
petition, are that the respondent, Ahluwalia Contracts (India) Ltd.,
had issued a Work Order bearing No. ACIL/RKMCH/WO/2021/20
dated 01.05.2021 [hereafter ‗ Work Order ‘] in favour of the
petitioner, Janvee Contracts Pvt. Ltd., in respect of the project — Dr.
Radha Krishnan Medical College & Hospital, Hamirpur. The nature
of work was ‗Concrete Mixing, Transportation & Pumping‘, i.e.
batching, mixing, transportation and pumping of concrete of desired
grade as per the instructions of the Engineer-in-Charge at site, by
providing plants and equipment as detailed in Annexure-I to the
Work Order. The estimated quantity of work was 48,000 cubic
metres at the rate of Rs. 415/- per cubic metre, and the value of the
work was Rs. 1,99,20,000/-.

3. The Work Order was accompanied by five annexures setting
out the special terms and conditions, the scope of work of the
respective parties, and the financial conditions. Annexure-III thereto,
under the heading ―ARBITRATION AND RESOLUTION OF
DISPUTE‖, contains Clauses 18 and 19, which form the bone of
contention between the parties. These clauses are set out below:
― ARBITRATION AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTE:
18. In case of any difference or dispute between the parties
which may arise on context of this contrat and its performance,
the same will be resolved amicably in consultation with
Chairman-ACIL and his decision shall be final and binding on
both the parties.
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19. The court of Delhi alone shall have exclusive jurisdiction in
all matters arising out of this contract.‖

4. As per the petitioner, an amount of Rs. 9,25,186/- was found
due and payable to it as per its ledger account, besides an amount of
Rs. 4,61,254/- withheld by the respondent as security deposit,
totalling Rs. 13,86,440/-, which had become payable on 20.12.2022.
The petitioner has computed interest thereon at the rate of 15% per
annum for a period of 954 days till 31.07.2025, amounting to Rs.
5,43,560/-, and thus claims a total sum of Rs. 19,30,000/- from the
respondent.
5. It is stated that on 20.03.2024, the petitioner had addressed a
letter through email to the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the
respondent, requesting release of its pending dues in respect of all the
projects/sites executed by it. In response thereto, by way of email
dated 21.03.2024, the Chairman of the respondent stated that all the
payments due for the various sites had been paid and nothing was due
as per the records of the respondent. Thereafter, vide communication
dated 15.04.2025 bearing Ref. No. JCPL/LTR/2024-25/01, the
petitioner again raised its claims in respect of the present work as
well as other projects executed by it for the respondent.
6. Subsequently, the petitioner issued a notice dated 28.07.2025
under Section 21 of the A&C Act, invoking Clause 18 of the Work
Order and calling upon the respondent to clear the outstanding
amount of Rs. 19,30,000/- within fifteen days, failing which it would
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approach the Court under Section 11 of the A&C Act. The
respondent, through its counsel, replied to the said notice vide reply
dated 23.08.2025, denying the claims of the petitioner in their
entirety, and specifically disputing the existence of any arbitration
agreement between the parties. It was stated therein that Clause 18
―merely provides for an internal dispute resolution mechanism and
cannot be equated to an agreement to arbitrate‖.
7. It is further stated in the petition that the parties had exchanged
details of the work orders and the amounts claimed under various
projects, including the present one, during the pre-institution
mediation (Reference No. 1577/Pre-inst./DHCLSC/2025) held in
respect of another project of the parties, i.e. Prateek Grand City at
Siddhartha Vihar, Ghaziabad, which did not yield any result; and that
the respondent, vide letter dated 01.04.2026, had sought confirmation
of the outstanding balance as on 31.03.2026 for audit purposes.
8. In this background, the petitioner has approached this Court.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner drew the
attention of this Court to Clause 18 of the Work Order, and argued
that the petitioner and the respondent are two companies which had
undertaken to work under the Work Order, which itself contains a
clause titled ―Arbitration and Resolution of Dispute‖. It was argued
that as per Clause 18, any difference or dispute between the parties
arising in the context of the contract and its performance was to go to
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the Chairman of the respondent, whose decision was to be final and
binding on both the parties, and that the clause, therefore, reflects the
intention of the parties to have their disputes resolved through a
binding decision. It was contended that a dispute between two
independent contracting companies cannot be brushed aside as being
subject merely to an ‗internal dispute resolution mechanism‘, as
submitted by the respondent. It is further argued that since the
Chairman of the respondent, being the head of the opposite party,
cannot himself act as the arbitrator, this Court may appoint an
independent sole arbitrator in his place. The learned counsel also
argued that the respondent, with mala fide intent, had failed to release
even the security deposit of Rs. 4,61,254/-, and therefore, an
independent sole arbitrator be appointed under the aegis of Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) for adjudication of the
disputes between the parties.
10. Conversely , the learned counsel appearing for the respondent
also drew the attention of this Court to Clause 18 of the Work Order,
and argued that there is no provision for arbitration in the Work
Order. It was argued that Clause 18 merely contemplates that the
differences between the parties would be resolved amicably in
consultation with the Chairman of the respondent, and that arbitration
was never intended by the parties. The learned counsel further placed
reliance on Clause 19 of the Work Order, which provides that the
courts of Delhi alone shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters
arising out of the contract, to contend that the parties had consciously
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agreed that their disputes would be adjudicated by the courts. It was
also pointed out that the respondent, in its reply dated 23.08.2025 to
the notice invoking arbitration, had categorically denied the existence
of any arbitration agreement between the parties, besides denying the
claims of the petitioner. It was, therefore, prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
11. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of both
the parties and has perused the material available on record.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
12. The principal issue which arises for consideration before this
Court is whether Clause 18 of the Work Order dated 01.05.2021
constitutes an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 7
of the A&C Act, so as to enable this Court to appoint an arbitrator
under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act.
Scope of examination under Section 11 of the A&C Act
13. At the outset, this Court notes that the scope of examination by
a referral court under Section 11 of the A&C Act is a limited one. In
SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning: (2024) 12 SCC
1 , the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, after taking note of the decision of the
seven-Judge Bench in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899 ,
In re: (2024) 6 SCC 1 , held as under:
―116. Referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
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Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, it was
observed in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under
the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re that the
High Court and the Supreme Court at the stage of appointment
of arbitrator shall examine the existence of a prima facie
arbitration agreement and not any other issues. The relevant
observations are extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 104, para 220)
―220. The above extract indicates that the Supreme
Court or High Court at the stage of the appointment of
an arbitrator shall "examine the existence of a prima
facie arbitration agreement and not other issues".
These other issues not only pertain to the validity of the
arbitration agreement, but also include any other issues
which are a consequence of unnecessary judicial
interference in the arbitration proceedings.
Accordingly, the "other issues" also include
examination and impounding of an unstamped
instrument by the Referral Court at the Section 8 or
Section 11 stage. The process of examination,
impounding, and dealing with an un-stamped
instrument under the Stamp Act is not a time-bound
process, and therefore does not align with the stated
goal of the Arbitration Act to ensure expeditious and
time-bound appointment of arbitrators.‖
(emphasis supplied)
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in
Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6
SCC 1, it is clear that the scope of enquiry at the stage of
appointment of arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of
prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, and
nothing else …‖
(Emphasis added)

14. It is, therefore, evident that while the referral court is not to
embark upon an examination of the merits of the disputes or other
contentious issues, the existence of an arbitration agreement is the
very foundation of the jurisdiction exercised under Section 11 of the
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A&C Act. The power to appoint an arbitrator is conferred upon the
Court so as to give effect to an agreement of the parties to arbitrate,
and it does not extend to creating such an agreement where none
exists. In the present case, the objection raised by the respondent
relates to the very existence of an arbitration agreement.
15. The execution of the Work Order and the text of Clauses 18
and 19 are not in dispute, and the question involved in the present
petition is purely one of construction of the said clauses, which falls
squarely within the limited examination permissible to this Court at
this stage.
What constitutes an arbitration agreement?

16. Section 7 of the A&C Act defines an arbitration agreement
and, insofar as relevant, it reads as under:
― 7. Arbitration agreement. — (1) In this Part, ―arbitration
agreement‖ means an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate
agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing…‖
(Emphasis added)

17. The
attribute
s which
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must be
present
for an
agreeme
nt to be
consider
ed as an
arbitrati
on
agreeme
nt were
discusse
d by the
Hon‘ble
Suprem
e Court
in K.K.
Modi v.
K.N.
Modi:
(1998) 3
SCC
573 , in
the
followin
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g
words:
―17. Among the attributes which must be present for an
agreement to be considered as an arbitration agreement are:
(1) The arbitration agreement must contemplate that the
decision of the tribunal will be binding on the parties to the
agreement,
(2) that the jurisdiction of the tribunal to decide the rights
of parties must derive either from the consent of the parties
or from an order of the court or from a statute, the terms of
which make it clear that the process is to be an arbitration,
(3) the agreement must contemplate that substantive rights
of parties will be determined by the agreed tribunal,
(4) that the tribunal will determine the rights of the parties
in an impartial and judicial manner with the tribunal owing
an equal obligation of fairness towards both sides,
(5) that the agreement of the parties to refer their disputes
to the decision of the tribunal must be intended to be
enforceable in law and lastly,
(6) the agreement must contemplate that the tribunal will
make a decision upon a dispute which is already formulated
at the time when a reference is made to the tribunal.
18. The other factors which are relevant include, whether the
agreement contemplates that the tribunal will receive evidence
from both sides and hear their contentions or at least give the
parties an opportunity to put them forward; whether the
wording of the agreement is consistent or inconsistent with the
view that the process was intended to be an arbitration, and
whether the agreement requires the tribunal to decide the
dispute according to law.‖

18. The principles with respect to what constitutes an arbitration
agreement were also summarised by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in
Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander: (2007) 5 SCC 719 , as under:
―8. This Court had occasion to refer to the attributes or
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essential elements of an arbitration agreement in K.K. Modi v.
K.N. Modi [(1998) 3 SCC 573] , Bharat Bhushan Bansal v.
U.P. Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. [(1999) 2 SCC 166] and
Bihar State Mineral Development Corpn. v. Encon Builders (I)
(P) Ltd. [(2003) 7 SCC 418] In State of Orissa v. Damodar Das
[(1996) 2 SCC 216] this Court held that a clause in a contract
can be construed as an ―arbitration agreement‖ only if an
agreement to refer disputes or differences to arbitration is
expressly or impliedly spelt out from the clause. We may at
this juncture set out the well-settled principles in regard to what
constitutes an arbitration agreement:
(i) The intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration
agreement shall have to be gathered from the terms of the
agreement. If the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an
intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to refer
their disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a
willingness to be bound by the decision of such tribunal on
such disputes, it is arbitration agreement. While there is no
specific form of an arbitration agreement, the words used
should disclose a determination and obligation to go to
arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility
of going for arbitration . Where there is merely a
possibility of the parties agreeing to arbitration in future, as
contrasted from an obligation to refer disputes to
arbitration, there is no valid and binding arbitration
agreement.
(ii) Even if the words ―arbitration‖ and ―Arbitral Tribunal
(or arbitrator)‖ are not used with reference to the process of
settlement or with reference to the private tribunal which
has to adjudicate upon the disputes, in a clause relating to
settlement of disputes, it does not detract from the clause
being an arbitration agreement if it has the attributes or
elements of an arbitration agreement. They are : (a) The
agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties should have
agreed to refer any disputes (present or future) between
them to the decision of a private tribunal. (c) The private
tribunal should be empowered to adjudicate upon the
disputes in an impartial manner, giving due opportunity to
the parties to put forth their case before it. (d) The parties
should have agreed that the decision of the private tribunal
in respect of the disputes will be binding on them.
(iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes
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arising between the parties, the disputes shall be referred to
arbitration, it is an arbitration agreement. Where there is a
specific and direct expression of intent to have the disputes
settled by arbitration, it is not necessary to set out the
attributes of an arbitration agreement to make it an
arbitration agreement. But where the clause relating to
settlement of disputes, contains words which specifically
exclude any of the attributes of an arbitration
agreement or contains anything that detracts from an
arbitration agreement, it will not be an arbitration
agreement. For example, where an agreement requires or
permits an authority to decide a claim or dispute without
hearing, or requires the authority to act in the interests of
only one of the parties, or provides that the decision of the
authority will not be final and binding on the parties, or that
if either party is not satisfied with the decision of the
authority, he may file a civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be
termed as an arbitration agreement.
(iv) But mere use of the word “arbitration” or
“arbitrator” in a clause will not make it an arbitration
agreement, if it requires or contemplates a further or fresh
consent of the parties for reference to arbitration. …‖
(Emphasis added)

19. In Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture:
(2022) 20 SCC 636 , the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, applying the above
principles, held that a clause titled ―Settlement of
Disputes/Arbitration‖, which provided for an effort to settle the
disputes at the company level and thereafter for redressal of disputes
in a court of law, did not constitute an arbitration agreement. The
relevant observations are as under:
―10. In the present case, clause 15 of the Contract Agreement is
titled ―Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration‖. However, the
substantive part of the provision makes it abundantly clear
that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties
agreeing to refer either present or future disputes to
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arbitration.
xxx
13. The above extract makes it abundantly clear that clause 15
of the Contract Agreement is a dispute resolution
mechanism at the company level, rather than an arbitration
agreement. Consequently, in case of a dispute, the respondent
was supposed to write to the Engineer-in-charge for resolving
the dispute. Clause 15 does not comport with the essential
attributes of an arbitration agreement in terms of section 7 of
the 1996 Act as well as the principles laid down under Jagdish
Chander (supra). A plain reading of the above clause leaves no
manner of doubt about its import. There is no written
agreement to refer either present or future disputes to
arbitration. Neither does the substantive part of the clause refer
to arbitration as the mode of settlement, nor does it provide for
a reference of disputes between the parties to arbitration. It
does not disclose any intention of either party to make the
Engineer-in-Charge, or any other person for that matter,
an arbitrator in respect of disputes that may arise between
the parties …‖
(Emphasis added)

20. In Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v. South
Delhi Municipal Corporation: 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3607 , the
Coordinate Bench of this Court was concerned with dispute
resolution clauses which required disputes to be referred to the
Commissioner, MCD. The clause in question, i.e. Article 20 was
titled as ‗Disputes‘ and within the said clause, Section 20.1 was titled
as ‗Mediation by Commissioner‘. It was held that though the word
used in the clause was ‗mediation‘ and not ‗arbitration‘, the contents
of the clause clearly envisaged an arbitration agreement, inasmuch as
it was an agreement in writing, either party could refer dispute to the
Commissioner, either party could lead evidence, and the decision was
to be final and binding upon them. While reversing the said decision,
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the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in South Delhi Municipal Corporation
of Delhi v. SMS Limited: (2026) 1 SCC 545 set out the necessary
ingredients of an arbitration agreement, which includes clear intent to
arbitrate, binding adjudicatory process and compliance with
arbitration norms. The Supreme Court held that in this case, there
was no intent to arbitrate since the word ‗arbitration‘ was used
nowhere in the clause, and even a reading of the contents did not lead
to a conclusion that it was in the nature of an arbitration agreement
and rather, it appeared to be an internal dispute resolution
mechanism. It was further held that even the words ‗shall be final and
binding upon the parties‘ could not transform the said clause into an
arbitration agreement since other forms of decision-making, such as
expert determinations, departmental adjudications and administrative
reviews, even when final and binding, do not ipso facto constitute
arbitration. It was also observed that a reference of disputes to an
officer of one of the parties, rather than to an arbitral tribunal or an
independent third-party adjudicator, is suggestive of an internal
dispute resolution mechanism rather than an external arbitration
forum. The relevant observations of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court are
extracted hereunder:
― 46 . Considering the global position on the validity of
arbitration agreements in tandem with the settled law that holds
the field in India, we find that the existence of an arbitration
agreement necessarily postulates the presence of the following
ingredients:
(i) Clear intent to arbitrate
The agreement must reflect a definitive and mutual intention to
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refer disputes to arbitration, excluding the jurisdiction of civil
courts in respect of such matters. Consensus ad idem or
―meeting of the minds‖ of the respective parties towards
settling any disputes that may arise between them through the
process of arbitration must be made out from the form and
substance of the legal agreement or contract. This ideally
entails the parties reducing their intention of entering into an
arbitration agreement into some tangible medium.
(ii) Binding adjudicatory process
The arbitration agreement must contemplate a binding and
enforceable resolution of disputes. The process must culminate
in a final and conclusive award, not a non-binding
recommendation or mediation outcome. In essence, the result
of the arbitral process should be final and binding on both the
parties.
(iii) Compliance with arbitration norms
While the statutory minimums do not universally require
specification of seat, venue, or applicable procedural rules, best
practices and several foreign jurisdictions encourage clarity in
these respects to ensure legal certainty. The agreement should
allow for party autonomy in the appointment of arbitrators and
procedural conduct, subject to statutory safeguards. The
adversarial process, which inheres in the institution of
arbitration, must also be given due credence via provision for
an impartial adjudicatory body, whose decisions involve
deference to the principles of natural justice.
47 . We may, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned
elemental test is a conjunctive one, and not a disjunctive one.
In other words, all the elements identified hereinabove must
co-exist, apart from being duly proven by the party which seeks
to assert that an arbitration agreement subsists.
48 . Consequently, it stands clarified that a dispute resolution
clause may only rise to the level of a valid arbitration clause or
agreement when it signifies a clear intent to arbitrate, entails a
binding adjudicatory process, and contemplates compliance
with general arbitral norms.
D.2. Does Article 20 of the subject-Concession Agreements
constitute an arbitration agreement?
49 . The second limb of this issue, concerns the consideration of
the facts and circumstances of these appeals amidst the legal
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backdrop we have previously set out. We may, at this stage,
revert back to paras 23 to 26 where the dispute resolution
clauses contained in all the three Concession Agreements are
extracted and reproduced.
50 . At the very outset, it may be seen that Articles 20 in the
cases of DSC Ltd. and CCC Ltd. are identical for all intents
and purposes while the same clause in the case of SMS Ltd. is
faintly different. For the sake of completeness, we may note
these minute differences before proceeding with the analysis.
51 . Firstly, the cases of DSC Ltd. and CCC Ltd. add certain
specific sub-provisions regarding the ‗mediation‘ process itself,
while only summary procedure is prescribed in the case of
SMS Ltd. Secondly, the stipulation that an officer may be
appointed ‗from within or without MCD‘ features solely in the
SMS Ltd. agreement, and is conspicuously absent in the
clauses pertaining to DSC Ltd. and CCC Ltd. Thirdly, the latter
two agreements introduce an express declaration that the
officer‘s decision shall be ‗final and binding‘, a formulation
that is absent in the SMS Ltd. version.
52 . Having equipped ourselves with the requisite recitals, we
now turn to appraising the same on the anvil of the law
elucidated hereinabove pertaining to valid arbitration
agreements.
D.2.1. Intent to Arbitrate
53 . The first and foremost requirement of an arbitration
agreement, when it is in writing, is that the parties must have
consciously and unambiguously agreed to submit their disputes
to arbitration. This intent must be evident from the language of
the contract and the surrounding contractual framework.
54 . A plain reading of Article 20 across all three Concession
Agreements does not reveal any express intent to arbitrate. We
say so for the following reasons:
54.1. It may be noted that the subject-clause itself is titled as
‗Mediation by Commissioner‘, which immediately raises a
conundrum as to the mode of dispute resolution. We are well
aware of the judicial precedents that waive the need for express
reference to arbitration or an excessive focus on nomenclature.
However, such principles cannot be stretched so far so as to
make them wholly unworkable. It is inconceivable to us as to
why two parties, who are ad idem in wanting to settle their
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disputes through arbitration, would label the dispute resolution
clause in such a befuddling manner. The title of the clause
(Section 20.1 of Article 20) unequivocally indicates a non-
adjudicatory and conciliatory process rather than an arbitration
mechanism.
54.2. What adds fuel to the fire is the conspicuous absence of
the words ‗arbitration‘ or ‗arbitrator‘ from the dispute
resolution clauses. Even the expression ‗Arbitration Act‘ is
itself entirely missing. These terms are generally included in
arbitration agreements to reflect the parties‘ true intention.
54.3. Moreover, the reference is to the ‗Commissioner, MCD,‘
rather than to an arbitral tribunal or an independent third-party
adjudicator. This suggests an internal dispute resolution
mechanism rather than an external arbitration forum.
54.4. The DSC Ltd. and CCC Ltd. agreements introduce further
procedural details, such as the officer calling for additional
documents and conducting interviews. However, none of these
procedural steps alter the fundamental nature of the process,
which at best is an elaborate administrative fact-finding
exercise, rather than an arbitral adjudication.
54.5. Additionally, the appointment of the decision-maker is
entirely within the control of MCD, with no role for the other
contracting party in selecting or influencing the selection of the
officer. This further undermines the claim that the clause was
intended to establish an arbitration framework.
D.2.2. Final and Binding Nature
55 . A key argument advanced by the private contractors is that
the decision rendered under Article 20 is ‗final and binding‘,
thereby making it akin to an arbitral award. While it is true that
an arbitration clause must result in a conclusive determination,
finality alone does not equate it to arbitration.
56 . We may note at the outset that in SMS Ltd. the phrase used
is ‗final‘, not ‗final and binding‘ which instead finds mention in
the cases of DSC Ltd. and CCC Ltd. On a textual and surface-
level analysis, Article 20 across all cases thus prima facie
seems to satisfy the subject- ingredient; however, it does not
impact the outcome of these cases.
57 . We say so because other forms of decision-making—such
as expert determinations, departmental adjudications, and
administrative reviews—even when found to be final and
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binding, do not ipso facto constitute arbitration. The arduous
task of ascertaining and identifying the category to which these
cases fall is beyond the scope of these appeals.
D.2.3. Compliance with Arbitral Norms
58 . Finally, we turn to analyzing Article 20 under the lens of its
alliance with the norms of arbitration. This particular
characteristic is quite important for a valid arbitration
agreement. If a clause does not sufficiently align with the
accepted best practices of contemporary arbitration, it will
generally be unworkable and essentially dead letter. What is
also envisaged under this element is the compliance with the
Arbitration Act and its subsequent Amendments.
59 . It may be clarified here that there is no straitjacket formula
for listing arbitral norms exhaustively, as these norms may vary
from time to time. While we cannot delineate arbitral norms
from stem to stern, we have short-listed some of these norms
for the purposes of these appeals, which unfortunately do not
find any explicit or implicit mention in the subject-dispute
resolution clauses.
xxx
D.2.3.3. Neutrality and Independence of the Arbitrator
63 . The principles of natural justice, of course, must inhere in
any judicial process, even if that process is pseudo-judicial.
That is precisely why it is necessary for the Arbitrator to be an
impartial functionary in any supposed arbitration agreement.
When such a requirement is unmet, that mode of dispute
resolution may not have the benefit of being termed as
‗arbitration‘. In Tollways , this Court expressly held that a
dispute resolution mechanism controlled by one party lacks the
independence required for arbitration.
64 . Under Article 20, the decision-maker is an officer of MCD,
making the process inherently biased in favour of the
Municipal Corporation(s). It does not even provide for the
officer to be a legally qualified adjudicator, further calling into
question the nature of the decision-making process. Moreover,
while Article 20 in the case of SMS Ltd. at the very least
specifies that the appointed officer may be from ‗within or
without MCD‘ , the latter two cases—DSC Ltd. and CCC
Ltd.—completely dispense with even this limited semblance of
impartiality. The absence of any requirement for an external
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appointee in these cases further entrenches the one-sided nature
of the appointment process, allowing MCD to unilaterally
select a decision-maker from within its own ranks, thereby
compromising the neutrality essential to any adjudicatory
mechanism.
65 . In conclusion, a holistic analysis of Article 20 across the
subject Concession Agreements leads us to the inescapable
conclusion that it does not satisfy the requirements of an
arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Arbitration
Act. While certain textual elements—such as the use of the
phrase „final and binding‟ in the cases of DSC Ltd. and
CCC Ltd.—may superficially resemble arbitration, a
deeper examination reveals that the clause is procedurally
and structurally deficient in ways that render it incapable
of operating as an arbitration clause in law .‖
(Emphasis added)

21. This Court is also conscious that there is another line of
decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, such as Rukmanibai Gupta
v. Collector, Jabalpur: (1980) 4 SCC 556 and Punjab State v. Dina
Nath: (2007) 5 SCC 28 , wherein clauses providing that disputes
―shall be referred‖ to a named officer or authority ―for orders‖, or
―shall be decided‖ by such authority, whose decision would be final,
were construed as arbitration agreements, even though the words
‗arbitration‘ or ‗arbitrator‘ were not used therein. Relying upon the
said decisions, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Jhankar
Banquets v. Delhi Development Authority: 2025 SCC OnLine Del,
has held clauses providing that, in case of any dispute between the
parties, the decision of the Vice-Chairman, DDA thereon shall be
final and binding, to be arbitration agreements; and has distinguished
SMS Limited ( supra ) on the ground that the clause considered
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therein was titled ‗Mediation by Commissioner‘, which indicated a
non-adjudicatory and conciliatory process rather than an arbitration
mechanism.
22. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions makes it clear that no
particular form or words are required to constitute an arbitration
agreement, and the absence of the words ‗arbitration‘ or ‗arbitrator‘ is
not fatal, if the clause otherwise discloses a clear intention of the
parties to refer their disputes to a private forum for adjudication and
to be bound by its decision. Conversely , the mere use of the word
‗arbitration‘ does not make a clause an arbitration agreement, if its
substance does not reflect such an intention. The decisive test,
therefore, is whether the words used by the parties, read as a whole
and in the context of the contract, disclose a determination and
obligation to submit their disputes to an adjudicatory process – in
which the dispute is decided by a forum acting judicially, after
affording both sides an opportunity to put forth their case – as
distinguished from a mechanism which is aimed only at an amicable
or consensual settlement of differences. It is in this light that Clause
18 of the Work Order in the present case has to be examined.
Whether Clause 18 of the Work Order constitutes an arbitration
agreement?
23. A careful reading of Clause 18 of the Work Order reveals that
its operative part provides that in case of any difference or dispute
between the parties arising in the context of the contract and its
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performance, ― the same will be resolved amicably in consultation
with Chairman-ACIL ‖. Thus, the clause first contemplates the
existence of a difference or dispute between the parties and then
provides for its resolution amicably, in consultation with the
Chairman of the respondent. Significantly, the clause does not
provide that such dispute shall be ―referred‖ to the Chairman for his
adjudication, decision or orders. It also does not describe the
Chairman as an arbitrator or constitute him as an arbitral tribunal.
There is no provision for submission of the respective claims or
defence of the parties, or for any adjudication of the dispute. The
clause, therefore, in its operative terms, contemplates an amicable
resolution of the differences between the parties, in consultation with
the Chairman of the respondent.
24. The expression ―resolved amicably‖ denotes a resolution
arrived at in a friendly manner, by mutual accord between the parties.
Similarly, the expression ―in consultation with‖ connotes a process of
deliberation and exchange of views, and not a process of
adjudication. An amicable resolution, by its very nature, is
consensual. Arbitration, on the other hand, is an adjudicatory process,
wherein the arbitral tribunal determines a formulated dispute after
considering the respective cases of the parties, and its decision binds
the parties irrespective of whether they agree with the outcome. The
two processes are, thus, conceptually distinct. Parties may, of course,
agree that they would first attempt to resolve their differences
amicably and, if such attempt fails, the dispute shall thereafter be
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referred to arbitration. In such a case, the amicable resolution is only
a pre-condition or first step before arbitration. However, in the
present case, Clause 18 does not provide for any such subsequent
reference to arbitration. The clause provides only for amicable
resolution in consultation with the Chairman-ACIL and ends there.
The A&C Act itself treats conciliation under Part III as a process
separate and distinct from arbitration under Part I. Clause 18,
therefore, in its substance, contemplates an amicable and consultative
settlement of differences, and not adjudication through arbitration.
25. This Court is conscious that, unlike the clause considered by
the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in Mahanadi Coalfields ( supra ), Clause
18 of the Work Order in the present case also states that the decision
of the Chairman ―shall be final and binding on both the parties‖, and
it is this phrase which forms the foundation of the petitioner‘s case.
However, these words cannot be read in isolation and must be read
along with the words which precede them. In this context, the
decision in SMS Limited ( supra ) is noteworthy, wherein the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court has specifically held that finality alone does not
equate a dispute resolution clause with arbitration, and that other
forms of decision-making, even when final and binding, do not ipso
facto constitute arbitration.
26. Read as a whole, the ―decision‖ contemplated under Clause 18
is one which emerges out of an amicable resolution in consultation
with the Chairman of the respondent, and not a determination of a
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formulated dispute upon adjudication of the rival claims. Finality
attaches to the outcome of the process, but it does not by itself
determine whether that process is arbitral, administrative or
conciliatory. The decisive consideration remains whether the parties
intended the designated authority to adjudicate upon their formulated
disputes by exercising a judicial function, or whether the authority
was contemplated as part of a mechanism for facilitating an amicable
resolution of their differences. In the present case, the language of
Clause 18 points towards the latter.
27. Further, Clause 18 does not provide for any of the usual
incidents of an adjudicatory process. It does not contemplate an
opportunity of hearing to the parties, the reception of evidence from
both sides, or a decision in accordance with law. In SMS Limited
( supra ), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court underlined that the tribunal must
determine the rights of the parties ―in an impartial and judicial
manner with the tribunal owing an equal obligation of fairness
towards both sides‖, and that a relevant consideration is whether the
agreement contemplates that the tribunal will receive evidence from
both sides and hear their contentions. In Jagdish Chander ( supra ), it
was held that where a clause permits an authority to decide a claim or
dispute without hearing, or contains anything that detracts from an
arbitration agreement, it will not be an arbitration agreement. In the
present case, Clause 18 speaks only of consultation for an amicable
resolution and contains no indication of any adjudicatory process.
This also supports the conclusion that the clause was not intended to
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constitute an arbitration mechanism.
28. This Court further notes that the person with whom
consultation was to take place under Clause 18 is the Chairman of the
respondent company itself, i.e., the head of one of the two contracting
parties, and not any independent third person. The mechanism under
Clause 18 is thus in the nature of a company-level mechanism for
settlement of differences, akin to the one considered by the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court in Mahanadi Coalfields ( supra ), rather than a
reference of disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication. As
observed in SMS Limited ( supra ), the reference of disputes to an
officer of one of the parties, rather than to an arbitral tribunal or an
independent third-party adjudicator, suggests that the parties
contemplated an internal mechanism for resolution of differences and
not the constitution of a private adjudicatory forum.
29. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the heading of the
clause, i.e. ―Arbitration and Resolution of Dispute‖, also does not
advance its case. It is the substance of the clause, and not its heading,
which determines whether it is an arbitration agreement.
30. In Mahanadi Coalfields ( supra ), the clause in question was
titled ―Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration‖, and yet the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court held that its substantive part made it abundantly clear
that there was no agreement to refer disputes to arbitration.
31. In M/s Alchemist Hospitals Limited v. M/s ICT Health
Technology Services India Private Limited: 2025 INSC 1289 also,
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the clause in question was titled as ―Arbitration‖ and the contents of
it also used the words ―arbitrators‖ or ―arbitration‖ at least three
times. However, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, upon an overall reading
of the clause, held that it amounted to an internal dispute resolution
mechanism and not an arbitration agreement, and upheld the decision
of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissing the petition under
Section 11(6) of the A&C Act.
32. In the present case as well, though the heading uses the word
―arbitration‖, the operative part of Clause 18 neither refers to
arbitration, nor provides for reference of disputes to any arbitrator or
arbitral tribunal, nor lays down any procedure in that regard. Notably,
the said heading governs both Clauses 18 and 19 of Annexure-III,
and Clause 19, placed under the same heading, deals with the
jurisdiction of courts. The heading, therefore, appears to be a general
caption for the dispute resolution clauses, and cannot by itself supply
an intention to arbitrate which the operative words of Clause 18 do
not reflect.
33. As regards Clause 19 of the Work Order, which provides that
― the court of Delhi alone shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all
matters arising out of this contract ‖, this Court is conscious that an
exclusive jurisdiction clause is not, by itself, inconsistent with an
arbitration agreement, since such clauses often co-exist with
arbitration clauses. However, in the present case, when Clauses 18
and 19 are read together, and in the absence of any words of
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reference to arbitration in Clause 18, the scheme which emerges is
that the parties would first attempt to resolve their differences
amicably in consultation with the Chairman of the respondent, while
all matters arising out of the contract would be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at Delhi. As held in SMS Limited
( supra ), an arbitration agreement must reflect a definitive and mutual
intention to refer disputes to arbitration, with the consequence that
the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of such disputes is excluded.
Clause 19, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts at Delhi
―in all matters arising out of this contract‖, is consistent with the
conclusion that the parties did not intend to provide for arbitration as
the adjudicatory mechanism for their disputes.
34. This Court has also considered the decisions of the Hon‘ble
Supreme Court in Rukmanibai Gupta ( supra ) and Dina Nath ( supra )
and this Court in Jhankar Banquets ( supra ). In each of these cases,
the clause in question contemplated a reference of the dispute to the
named authority for a decision. In Rukmanibai Gupta ( supra ), the
disputes were to be referred to the named authority ―for orders‖; in
Dina Nath ( supra ), the disputes were to be decided by the
Superintending Engineer; and in Jhankar Banquets ( supra ), the
decision of the Vice-Chairman, DDA on the dispute was to be final
and binding. It was from such language, providing for the dispute to
be placed before the named authority for decision, that an
adjudicatory function was inferred. In Dina Nath ( supra ), the
Hon‘ble Supreme Court observed in paragraph 19 that ― as the
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Superintending Engineer will decide the matter on reference, there
cannot be any doubt that he has to act judicially and decide the
dispute after hearing both the parties and permitting them to state
their claim by adducing materials in support ‖. However, Clause 18
of the Work Order in the present case is materially different. It does
not provide for any reference of the dispute to the Chairman of the
respondent for his decision. Instead, it provides that the dispute ―will
be resolved amicably in consultation with‖ him. The operative words
of the clause thus contemplate a process of amicable resolution and
consultation, and not adjudication of the dispute by the named
authority. In the present case, the non-adjudicatory nature of the
mechanism emerges from the operative part of the clause itself and
not merely from its heading. The aforesaid decisions, therefore, do
not advance the case of the petitioner.
35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view
that Clause 18 of the Work Order does not constitute an arbitration
agreement under Section 7 of the Act, for the reasons which can be
summarised as under:
(a) Clause 18 contemplates only an amicable resolution of the
dispute in consultation with Chairman-ACIL. It does not
provide for reference of the dispute to the Chairman or any
other person for adjudication, nor does it contemplate
constitution of an arbitral tribunal or an adjudicatory
process.
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(b) Though the decision of the Chairman is stated to be ―final
and binding‖, such finality cannot, by itself, convert a non-
arbitral dispute resolution mechanism into an arbitration
agreement. The nature of the process contemplated by the
clause has to be considered, and the process here is one of
amicable resolution and consultation, rather than
adjudication.
(c) The Chairman-ACIL is an officer of the respondent itself,
and the mechanism contemplated is thus reflective of an
internal dispute resolution mechanism rather than reference
of the dispute to an independent arbitral forum.

(d) The heading ―Arbitration and Resolution of Dispute‖
cannot prevail over the substantive language of Clause 18,
which does not contain any agreement to submit disputes
to arbitration. The substance of the clause, and not its
heading, has to determine the intention of the parties.
(e) Clause 19, when read with Clause 18, is also consistent
with the conclusion that the parties contemplated amicable
resolution of disputes, with the courts at Delhi having
exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising out of the
contract, and did not agree to arbitration.
36. Accordingly, in the absence of an arbitration agreement, this
Court cannot appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act.
37. The present petition is, therefore, dismissed. Pending
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application, if any, also stands disposed of.
38. However, it is clarified that the petitioner shall be at liberty to
avail of such remedies as may be available to it in accordance with
law for redressal of its grievances. Nothing expressed hereinabove
shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the
claims of the petitioner or the defence of the respondent. The
observations made herein are confined to the question of existence of
an arbitration agreement between the parties.
39. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.


DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
NOVEMBER 19, 2026/zp
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