Norvic Shipping Asia Pte Ltd vs Zigma International

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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION

COMM ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO.15734 OF 2026
Norvic Shipping Asia PTE Limited … Petitioner
V/s.
Zigma International … Respondent
Mr. Kunal Vaishnav with Mr. Vinay V. Vishwanathan
i/by Renata Partners LLP for the petitioner.
Mr. Ashwin Shanker with Mr. Santosh Koli, and Ms.
Diksha Brahma for the respondent.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : JUNE 19, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : JULY 2, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. The present petition is filed under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act. It is filed to seek interim protection in support of
arbitration proceedings which are going on before the LMAA at
London. The dispute between the parties has arisen from the
Repayment Schedule Agreement dated 9 January 2025.
2. According to the petitioner, there is no dispute about the
liability. It is pointed out that under Clause 2 of the Repayment
Schedule Agreement, the respondent accepted that an amount of
USD 215,310.01 was payable towards demurrage. The respondent
accepted that the said amount was due and required to be paid. It
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was agreed that payment would be made according to the
schedule fixed by both parties. It was further agreed that if any
one installment was not paid, then the entire balance amount
would become payable.
3. The petitioner has stated that the first installment became
due on 15 January 2025. However, according to the petitioner, the
respondent did not make the payment though several reminders
and emails were sent. It is further stated that till today no amount
has been paid under the agreement. The petitioner has also relied
upon emails to contend that the respondent had admitted liability.
4. The petitioner has submitted that after arbitration was
invoked by email dated 27 March 2026, the respondent for the
first time raised a case that the dispute had been settled.
Thereafter, the respondent also claimed that there was a pledge
through brokers namely Bulk Commodities (Bulkcom). According
to the petitioner, these stands were denied by its English solicitors,
who also called upon the respondent to produce documents in
support of such claims.
5. The petitioner has further relied upon a notice dated 28 April
2026 issued by Bulkcom. According to the petitioner, the said
notice shows that the stand taken by the respondent is not correct.
The petitioner contends that the notice indicates that the
respondent may try to make payment to a person claiming to be a
creditor of the petitioner, only to avoid payment of the petitioner's
claim. The petitioner has stated that the contents of the said notice
have been denied.
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6. The petitioner thereafter filed its statement of claim before
the Sole Arbitrator. Subsequently, Bulkcom issued a notice asking
the respondent not to release any amount to the petitioner and
instead to pay USD 235,728.26 to Bulkcom on the basis of its
alleged claim against the petitioner.
7. On the basis of these facts, the petitioner has claimed the
principal outstanding amount of USD 215,310.01 together with
contractual interest calculated at the agreed rate and rests. The
petitioner has also claimed the costs already incurred and likely to
be incurred in the present proceedings as well as in the arbitration
before the LMAA.
8. On these facts, the petitioner seeks an interim protection
under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. The petitioner submits that
the amount claimed is admitted and, therefore, requires protection
till the arbitration is decided. It is also argued that though the
principles of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
may guide the Court, the powers under Section 9 are wider and
can be exercised so that the arbitral award does not become
ineffective. The petitioner has submitted that it has made out a
strong prima facie case. According to it, there is a acknowledgment
of debt, there is a contractual clause making the balance payable
on default, there are repeated assurances given by the respondent
for making payment and there is an admission of liability. It is also
argued that the balance of convenience is in favour of granting
protection. The petitioner submits that there has been default in
making payment, the conduct of the respondent has not been fair
and there is an attempt to defeat the petitioner's claim. Therefore,
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according to the petitioner, it is necessary to secure the
respondent's assets so that the award which may be passed by the
London Arbitral Tribunal does not become a paper decree.
9. The petitioner has also submitted that the requirement of
Section 9(3) is satisfied. According to the petitioner, even if the
LMAA Tribunal has power to grant interim relief, such an order
cannot be enforced against the respondent's assets situated in
India. It is therefore contended that this Court can pass interim
order in respect of the respondent's assets in India.
10. On the above facts, the petitioner has prayed for following
interim reliefs from this Court.
“a) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order of
injunction restraining the Respondent, its servants
and / or agents and / or assigns from dealing,
transferring, utilizing, operating, removing,
encumbering the funds lying in its bank accounts to
the extent of USD 262,837.98 plus GBP 9,400 (United
States Dollars Two Hundred and Sixty Two Thousand
Eight Hundred and Thirty Seven and Ninety Eight
Cents Only plus Great Britain Pounds Nine Thousand
Four Hundred Only), along with interest at the rate of
7.5% p.a. on a compound basis, with three-monthly
rests, on USD 215,310.01 from the date of the filing of
the present Petition till deposit or realisation;
b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order of
injunction restraining the Respondent, its servants
and / or agents and / or assigns from dealing, selling,
disposing, alienating, encumbering, or creating any
third-party interests in relation to the moveable and
immovable property owned by the Respondent;
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c) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct and order
the Respondent to disclose on affidavit to the present
Petition, within one week of or such time as this
Hon'ble Court deems fit a detailed list of the
Respondent's assets, including (i) all its Bank Accounts;
(i) all the Assets of the Respondent; (iii) Assets sold by
the Respondent in the last two years and the
documents / deeds of sale; (iv) Detailed list of all
creditors and debtors of the Respondent as on the date
of hearing or such other date as this Hon ble Court
deems fit; (v) Detailed list of all legal proceedings
including winding-up/ insolvency/ bankruptcy
proceedings pending against the Respondent; (vi)
Identity of all assets that are encumbered with full
details of encumbrance including list of the mortgage /
charge lenders;
d) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order
appointing a Receiver to take possession of and attach
the assets and properties owned by the Respondent,
with all powers under Order XL Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908;
e) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order
directing the Respondent to deposit in this Hon'ble
Court a sum of USD 262,837.98 plus GBP 9,400
(United States Dollars Two Hundred and Sixty Two
Thousand Eight Hundred and Thirty Seven and Ninety
Eight Cents Only plus Great Britain Pounds Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Only), along with interest at
the rate of 7.5% p.a. on a compound basis, with three-
monthly rests, on USD 215,310.01 from the date of the
filing of the present Petition till deposit or realisation
or furnish a bank guarantee for the said sums to the
satisfaction of the Prothonotary & Senior Master, High
Court, Bombay;
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f) Alternatively, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to
pass an order of attachment of the funds lying in the
Respondent's bank accounts and/or the moveable
and/or the immovable property of the Respondent;”
11. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent opposed the petition. By inviting my attention to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Essar House (P) Ltd. v. Arcellor
Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd., (2022) 20 SCC 178, he submitted
that the present petition does not contain any allegation that the
respondent is trying to remove or dissipate its assets. According to
him, unless such material is placed before the Court, no order
directing deposit of money or attachment of bank accounts or
other properties can be passed. Learned counsel further invited my
attention to the list of creditors of the respondent. He submitted
that the respondent has several creditors whose dues are required
to be paid. Therefore, according to him, the petitioner cannot
claim any preferential right over the assets of the respondent in
preference to the other creditors. It is also submitted that the
respondent has raised a case of oral set off in respect of part of the
amount claimed by the petitioner. According to the respondent, the
liability is therefore not as simple as sought to be projected by the
petitioner. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent
is passing through financial difficulties and is not in a position to
make payment of the amount claimed. According to him, the
respondent's financial condition is not sound, and the default has
occurred because of its poor economic position. On these
submissions, it was prayed that the present petition deserves to be
dismissed.
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12. I have carefully considered the rival submissions advanced
on behalf of both sides. I have also gone through the pleadings, the
documents placed on record, the correspondence exchanged
between the parties, the Repayment Schedule Agreement, the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the
authorities relied upon by both parties. The question before this
Court is whether the petitioner has made out a case for grant of
interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
13. There is no dispute that the parties executed the Repayment
Schedule Agreement dated 9 January 2025. A plain reading of the
agreement shows that the respondent acknowledged that a sum of
USD 215,310.01 was payable towards demurrage. Clause 2
records such acknowledgment. Clause 1 prescribes the schedule of
repayment. Clause 3 further provides that upon default in payment
of any instalment, the entire outstanding amount would become
due and payable. At this stage, there is nothing on record to
indicate that the execution of the agreement is disputed.
14. The material placed on record shows that the first instalment
became payable on 15 January 2025. It is not disputed that the
said instalment was not paid. The correspondence exchanged also
assumes importance. In the emails relied upon by the petitioner,
the respondent requested further time, referred to its financial
difficulties and delay in inward remittances. Significantly, in none
of these communications did the respondent dispute the existence
of the liability under the Repayment Schedule Agreement. On the
contrary, the respondent assured that payment would shortly be
made. Prima facie, these communications support the petitioner's
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contention that the liability under the agreement was
acknowledged.
15. It is true that after arbitration was invoked, the respondent
raised a defence that there had been a settlement through
Bulkcom and thereafter raised a case of pledge or adjustment. At
this stage no document evidencing such settlement or pledge has
been produced. The petitioner's solicitors called upon the
respondent to substantiate these assertions. The record placed
before the Court does not disclose any document from which such
defence can prima facie be accepted. Whether any such
arrangement existed is a matter which would fall for consideration
before the Arbitral Tribunal. At this stage, the said defence remains
a disputed plea.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
respondent has raised an oral set-off in respect of part of the
amount. This contention also cannot be examined in these
proceedings. Whether such oral arrangement existed and what
effect it has upon the liability are matters requiring evidence
before the Tribunal. At this interlocutory stage, the Court is not
expected to record findings upon such disputed questions.
17. The respondent has further contended that the petitioner has
not pleaded or proved attempt on the part of the respondent to
dissipate its assets and therefore no order securing the amount can
be passed. Reliance has been placed upon the principles
underlying Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This submission deserves consideration because an order securing
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the amount in dispute cannot be granted mechanically.
18. In Essar House (P) Ltd. v. Arcellor Mittal Nippon Steel
(India) Ltd., (2022) 20 SCC 178, the Supreme Court has explained
the scope of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. The Court has
observed that while considering an application under Section 9, it
is not necessary to strictly apply all the requirements which are
applicable while passing an order of attachment before judgment
under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
powers under Section 9 are wider. The object behind conferring
such power is to ensure that the arbitral award does not remain on
paper because assets are no longer available.
19. While exercising jurisdiction under Section 9, the Court is
concerned with preserving the effectiveness of the arbitral
proceedings. Therefore, while examining such an application, the
Court is required to consider the surrounding circumstances placed
before it. It is not expected to reject the application because
technical requirement of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 has not been
pleaded. If the facts justify grant of interim protection, relief
should not be denied because the pleadings are not drafted in the
same manner as an application for attachment before judgment.
20. The expression "a strong possibility of diminution of assets
would suffice" does not mean that the applicant must prove that
the respondent has dishonestly transferred or concealed its assets.
At the same time, every apprehension expressed by the claimant
cannot be accepted. What is required is that the surrounding facts
should indicate that the respondent's assets are likely to become
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less in value or may not remain available by the time the arbitral
award is to be enforced. If such circumstances are shown, the
Court may exercise powers under Section 9 even before the assets
are transferred.
21. In commercial matters, assets may become unavailable for
different reasons. A business may suffer losses. Valuable properties
may become charged in favour of financial institutions. Amounts
receivable from customers may be transferred to somebody. Fresh
liabilities may be created over existing assets. Although these
circumstances may not by itself establish any dishonest conduct,
they may still reduce the assets which would otherwise remain
available for satisfaction of the arbitral award.
22. The expression "diminution of assets" includes reduction in
the value of assets, creation encumbrances, increase in secured
liabilities, transfer of valuable receivables or any other
circumstance because of which the assets available for execution of
the arbitral award may substantially become less.
23. Section 9 is preventive in its object. The Court is expected to
intervene before the situation becomes irreversible. If the Court
waits until the respondent has disposed of all its assets, then the
purpose behind granting interim protection may fail. Since
dishonest intention is difficult to establish by direct evidence, the
Court is entitled to examine the surrounding circumstances and
arrive at a conclusion whether there exists a real likelihood that
the respondent's assets may diminish before the arbitral award
becomes capable of enforcement.
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24. The expression "strong possibility" something more than a
mere suspicion or an unsupported apprehension. At the same time,
it does not require absolute proof. The Court must be satisfied
from the objective material placed before it that there exists a
reasonable possibility that the respondent's asset base may
materially reduce before the arbitral award can be enforced. Such
satisfaction must arise from the material available on record and
cannot rest merely upon assumption.
25. At the same time, Section 9 cannot be invoked because
arbitration proceedings are pending. If the respondent is
financially sound, possesses sufficient assets and there is no
material showing any reduction of asset, interim protection should
not be granted. A mere denial of liability by the respondent or an
sale of a small asset during the course of business cannot justify an
order securing the claim.
26. The principle relating to diminution of assets is connected
with the test of balance of convenience. The Court is required to
consider whether refusal of interim protection may result in the
claimant obtaining an arbitral award which cannot be enforced
because assets are no longer available. At the same time, the Court
is also required to consider the prejudice likely to be caused to the
respondent if interim protection is granted and the claim fails. If
the hardship likely to be suffered by the claimant is greater than
the inconvenience likely to be caused to the respondent, the
balance of convenience would justify grant of interim protection.
Thus, Section 9 has been enacted to preserve the effectiveness of
the arbitral process.
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27. Therefore, the respondent's submission that there is no
pleading regarding dissipation of assets cannot be accepted. The
Court is required to examine the factual background and
determine whether the material placed before it indicates that the
respondent's asset may materially deteriorate before the arbitral
proceedings conclude.
28. In the present case, the respondent has represented that it is
facing severe financial difficulties. It has stated that its cash flow
has been affected, that it is awaiting banking sanctions, that
payments from customers have been delayed and that it is
presently unable to honour commitments. Even before this Court,
learned counsel submitted that the respondent is unable to make
payment because its financial condition is not sound. These
statements are explanations repeatedly furnished by the
respondent.
29. The respondent has also relied upon the existence of several
other creditors and submitted that the petitioner cannot claim
priority over them. As a proposition of law, there can be no dispute
that merely because a claimant approaches the Court under
Section 9, it does not obtain priority over existing creditors.
However, the existence of several creditors claiming payment from
a respondent is one of the circumstances relevant for examining
whether there exists a possibility that the respondent's assets may
become insufficient by the time the arbitral award is enforced.
Therefore, this submission cannot assist the respondent.
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30. The respondent has further submitted that its inability to pay
arises because of poor financial condition and not because of
dishonest intention. Financial distress by itself does not establish
any attempt to defeat an arbitral award. Parties may face
temporary financial hardship. Courts must therefore avoid
granting drastic interim orders merely because a respondent is
experiencing financial difficulty.
31. At the same time, diminution of assets may occur because of
continuous losses and encumbrances over assets may create a
likelihood that assets may not remain available for enforcement of
the award. Thus, absence of fraud does not exclude the jurisdiction
of the Court under Section 9.
32. In the facts of the present case, the respondent has failed to
honour even the first instalment under the Repayment Schedule
Agreement. No payment has thereafter been made. Despite
assurances over several months, the liability continues to remain
unpaid. Simultaneously, the respondent has projected financial
difficulties as the reason for such non-payment. The respondent
has taken inconsistent defences after commencement of arbitration
by referring to settlement, pledge and adjustment through
Bulkcom, none of which appears to be supported by documentary
material. These circumstances cannot be ignored while assessing
the likelihood of preservation of assets.
33. The petitioner has also relied upon the notice issued by
Bulkcom. Whether the contents of that notice are correct or
incorrect will be decided in appropriate proceedings. However, the
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existence of rival claims over the amount payable hows that
competing claims are being asserted against the same liability. This
circumstance therefore becomes relevant for grant of relief in the
present petition.
34. The next point is the objection regarding maintainability of
the present petition after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. I
have also gone through the provisions of Sections 9 and 17 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In my view, this objection is
required to be examined by considering whether the remedy
available before the Tribunal is capable of giving effective
protection to the petitioner.
35. Before considering the rival submissions, it would be useful
to notice the scheme of Sections 9 and 17 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. Both the provisions provide for the same kinds of
interim protection. Under both Sections, interim measures may be
granted for preservation of property, securing the amount in
dispute, appointment of a receiver, grant of injunction and such
other protection as may be found just and convenient. Thus, the
nature of relief which can be granted under Section 17 by the
Arbitral Tribunal is similar to the relief which can be granted by
the Court under Section 9.
36. There is, however, one difference between the two
provisions. Section 9 confers jurisdiction upon the Court to grant
interim protection before commencement of the arbitration
proceedings, during the pendency of the arbitration and after the
arbitral award is made until the award is enforced. Section 17
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empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to grant interim protection during
the pendency of the arbitral proceedings.
37. Section 17(2) provides that every interim order passed by an
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 shall be deemed to be an order
of the Court and shall be enforceable in the same manner as an
order of the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. The object
behind this provision is to make the remedy before the Arbitral
Tribunal capable of enforcement.
38. At the same time, Section 9(3) places a restriction upon the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court after the Arbitral Tribunal has
been constituted. Once the Tribunal comes into existence,
ordinarily the Court should not entertain an application under
Section 9. However, this restriction is not absolute. The Court may
still exercise jurisdiction if it finds that the remedy available under
Section 17 may not be efficacious.
39. Therefore, while considering the maintainability of a petition
under Section 9 after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, the
Court is required to examine whether the order, if passed by the
Tribunal, would provide an effective remedy to the applicant. If
such remedy is found to be ineffective or incapable of
enforcement, the bar contained in Section 9(3) would not operate.
Thus, the scheme of the Act indicates that Sections 9 and 17 are
intended to supplement each other.
40. It is true that after the amendment of the Arbitration Act,
Section 17 has been given wider scope. The Arbitral Tribunal now
enjoys the same powers as the Court for granting interim
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protection. Section 17(2) provides that an order passed by the
Tribunal is to be treated as an order of the Court and is
enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, once the
Tribunal is constituted, parties should ordinarily approach the
Tribunal for interim protection.
41. Section 9(3) itself creates an exception. The legislature has
not taken away the jurisdiction of the Court after constitution of
the Tribunal. The Court may entertain the petition if it is satisfied
that the remedy under Section 17 may not be efficacious.
Therefore, the question is whether the relief granted by the
Tribunal would be effective and capable of protecting the rights of
the applicant.
42. In the present matter, the arbitration is not seated in India. It
is an international arbitration seated in London under the LMAA
Terms. Though an arbitral tribunal may have power to pass interim
orders under the law governing the arbitration, the petitioner has
contended that any such interim order cannot be executed against
the respondent's assets situated in India. The petitioner has also
relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Shanghai
Electric Group Co. Ltd . wherein, after considering Section 9(3), it
has been held that where the assets are situated in India and the
interim order of the foreign tribunal is not enforceable in India, the
remedy under Section 17 cannot be treated as efficacious. The
Division Bench observed that though the foreign tribunal may
possess jurisdiction to grant interim protection, such protection
may remain ineffective if it cannot be enforced against the assets
located within India.
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43. The respondent has not been able to show that an interim
order passed by the London seated Tribunal would have the
enforceability against the respondent's assets situated in India as
an order passed by this Court under Section 9. In absence of such
material, it becomes difficult to hold that the petitioner has an
effective remedy before the Arbitral Tribunal.
44. The submission of the respondent that the petitioner should
be relegated to the Tribunal because the Tribunal has been
constituted cannot be accepted. Such an interpretation would
ignore the exception incorporated by the legislature in Section
9(3). The Court is required to examine the efficacy and not merely
the existence of the remedy. I therefore hold that the preliminary
objection regarding maintainability of the present petition cannot
be accepted.
45. The next question is whether the petitioner has established a
prima facie case. Having regard to the acknowledgment of liability
contained in the Repayment Schedule Agreement, the default in
payment of the first installment, the assurances contained in the
respondent's own emails and the absence of any material
supporting the defence of settlement or pledge, I am of the prima
facie opinion that the petitioner has established a strong prima
facie case for protection under Section 9.
46. The balance of convenience also deserves consideration. If
interim protection is refused and the petitioner succeeds in
arbitration, there exists a possibility that enforcement of the award
may become difficult having regard to the respondent's statements
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regarding its financial condition and inability to make payment.
On the other hand, grant of a protective order does not determine
the rights of either party. It preserves the subject matter so that the
arbitral proceedings remain meaningful. The prejudice likely to be
caused to the petitioner by refusal of relief appears greater than
the inconvenience likely to be caused to the respondent by grant of
protective order.
47. The requirement of irreparable prejudice is also satisfied.
Once assets become unavailable or diminish during pendency of
arbitration, the successful party may be left with an award
incapable of enforcement. Such prejudice cannot be compensated
after conclusion of arbitration.
48. At the same time, every relief claimed by the petitioner
cannot be granted merely because a prima facie case exists. Relief
under Section 9 must remain proportionate to the facts of the case.
Appointment of a Receiver over assets of the respondent or a
attachment of all movable and immovable properties may interfere
with the respondent's commercial activities. Such drastic orders
require stronger circumstances than those placed before the Court.
Similarly, a direction requiring disclosure of assets may be justified
only to the extent necessary for securing the claim.
49. Upon an overall assessment of the record, the principles laid
down by the Supreme Court in Essar House and the Delhi High
Court in Shanghai Electric , I am satisfied that the petitioner has
succeeded in demonstrating a strong prima facie case, the balance
of convenience lies in its favour and irreparable loss. Record
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discloses objective material indicating a possibility of diminution in
the respondent's available assets so as to justify exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.
50. In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon overall
assessment of the material submissions, evidence on record, and
the findings arrived at hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The Arbitration Petition is partly allowed;
(ii) Pending the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings and
till enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with law,
the respondent is directed to secure the petitioner's claim by
either:
(a) depositing before this Court a sum of USD
262,837.98 together with GBP 9,400; or
(b) furnishing an unconditional and irrevocable Bank
Guarantee issued by a Nationalised Bank or a
Scheduled Commercial Bank for the said amount, to
the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master
of this Court;
The above exercise shall be completed within a period of
four weeks from today;
(iii) Till compliance with clause (ii) above, the respondent,
its servants, agents or any person claiming through or under
it, are restrained from transferring, alienating, creating third
party rights, mortgaging, encumbering or otherwise dealing
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with its movable or immovable assets to the extent of the
petitioner's claim of USD 262,837.98 together with GBP
9,400;
(iv) The respondent shall, within three weeks from today,
file an affidavit disclosing:
(a) all bank accounts maintained by it together with
the present balances;
(b) complete particulars of its movable and
immovable assets;
(c) particulars of all mortgages, charges and other
encumbrances created over such assets;
(d) particulars of all assets transferred, sold or
otherwise disposed of during the preceding two years
together with supporting documents; and
(e) particulars of all pending insolvency, bankruptcy,
winding up or similar proceedings, if any;
(v) If the respondent fails to comply with clause (ii) above
within the stipulated period, the petitioner shall be at liberty
to apply for attachment of the respondent's disclosed bank
accounts and such movable and immovable assets as may be
necessary for securing the petitioner's claim;
(vi) The respondent shall be entitled to carry on its
business activities and make payments in the ordinary course
of business. However, it shall not create fresh encumbrances
over its substantial assets or dispose of assets outside the
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ordinary course of business so as to prejudice enforcement of
the arbitral award, without prior leave of this Court;
(vii) The prayer seeking appointment of a Receiver is
rejected at this stage. Liberty is reserved to the petitioner to
seek appointment of a Receiver if subsequent events disclose
violation of this order or further diminution of the
respondent's assets;
(viii) All observations contained in this order are prima facie
and confined only to the adjudication of the present petition
under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the disputes
between the parties independently and without being
influenced by any observation made herein.
(ix) There shall be no order as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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