Urmila Devi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Court: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Decided on: 01-04-2026

<div> 1 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR ON THE 1 OF APRIL, 2026 MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 52783 of 2024 URMILA DEVI & OTHERS Versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANOTHER Appearance: Shri Sachin Patel, advocate for the petitioners. Shri Gajendra Singh Dondiya, public prosecutor for respondent/State. Shri Virendra Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Shri Jitendra Sharma, advocate for respondent No.2 through VC. ….................................................................................................................. ORDER This petition under Section 482 of CrPC/528 of the BNSS, 2023 has been filed by petitioners for quashing of FIR pertaining to Crime No. 43 of 2024 registered at Women Police Station, Ujjain, District Ujjain for offence punishable under Sections 3, 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and subsequent proceedings thereto. 2. The exposition of facts, giving rise to present petition, is as under: a. Deepak Singh Tomar reported to the Police Station Women Cell Ujjain on 13.06.2024 that marriage of his daughter Mahima @ Pranjal was fixed with Naveen Kumar son of Kaushal Singh. An engagement ceremony was solemnized on 22.4.2024 with consent Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 2 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 of both the parties at Meghdoot Resort Indore. After engagement, Kaushal Singh communicated with him on mobile phone on 24.4.2024 and conveyed his unhappiness over engagement function. Praveen Kumar elder son of Kaushal Singh objected to inadequate gifts as dowry on 26.4.2024. The discussion on marriage resumed after intervention of other family members. Naveen and Mona demanded Rs. 25 Lacs, 20 Tola gold and car for marriage. Thus, Naveen, Praveen, Kaushal Singh and Urmila Devi are demanding dowry of Rs. 25-30 Lacs, gold of 25 Tola and a car for marriage of Mahima @ Pranjal with Naveen. On such allegations, the Police Station Women Cell, Ujjain registered FIR for offence punishable under Sections 498-A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The statements of witnesses have been recorded. Mobile transcript of communication was seized. The final report was submitted on completion of investigation for offence punishable under Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in addition to the facts and grounds mentioned in the petition, submits that the petitioners are falsely implicated in the alleged offence. The petitioner No. 1 is not a relative of husband. There is no allegation of demand by the petitioners. It is a case of discord between the parties over marriage ceremony. Learned counsel further submitted that solemnization of marriage is condition precedent for constitution of offence punishable under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 3 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 Court in the case of P. Sivakumar and others Vs. State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police etc. reported in 2023 SCC Online SC st 1737 ; and order dated 21 June, 2023 passed by the Coordinate Bench in Criminal Revision No. 2217/2023 in the matter of Ramanuj Tripathi Vs. State of MP to buttress his submissions. 4. Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent/State opposed the petition and submitted that the FIR and material on case diary clearly makes out the demand of dowry for marriage of daughter of complainant with Naveen, relative of petitioners. Therefore, the alleged offence is prima facie made out. The petition is meritless. 5 . Learned counsel for respondent No.2 referring to the object and reasons of the Dowry Prohibition Act contends that the act takes in consideration the demand of dowry made before the marriage also. The alleged offence is made out from the statements of complainant and witnesses. Therefore, petition is meritless. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7 . The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the matter and after referring to its various earlier decisions, has observed in para 108 as under:- ''108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 4 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'' 8. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre , reported in (1988) 1 SCC 692 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482CrPC as follows : Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 5 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 ‘ 7 . The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.’ 9. A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in matter of L.V. Jadhav v. Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar , reported in (1983) 4 SCC 231 observed as under- 7. According to the appellant's complaint, when the marriage of his daughter Anita and the second respondent, the son of the first respondent, was in progress on June 19, 1979, both the respondents demanded from him cash of Rs 50,000 in the presence of respectable persons under the pretext that the amount was required for the passage or transport of Anita and the second respondent to the United States where the second respondent was employed at that time and they told him that if he did not comply with their demand by way of dowry further ceremonies in the marriage would not be completed. It is further alleged that some respectable persons who were present at that time persuaded the respondents to complete the marriage ceremonies and formalities and thereafter the marriage ceremonies were completed and that subsequently the second respondent went to the United States in July 1979 alone because the passport and visa of Anita had to be arranged which was done some time later while Anita was staying in the house of the first respondent, and the respondents continued to persist in their demand for the money when Anita was staying in the house of the first respondent without being sent to the United States. Mr V.S. Desai, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondents invited our attention to the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Inder Sain v. State [1981 Cri LJ 1116 : 1981 Chand Cri C 90 : (1981) 20 Del LT 309 : 1981 MLR 238] and also of another Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Kashi Prasad v. State of Bihar [1980 BBCJ 612] and submitted that the demand for Rs 50,000 alleged in the complaint would not constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Act as there is no Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 6 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 allegation in the complaint that the appellant consented to pay the amount and that without consent to the payment the sum of Rs 50,000 alleged to have been demanded does not become dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act which defines “dowry” as meaning “any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly— “( a ) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or ( b ) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.” Section 2 contains two explanations with which we are not concerned in this case. In the Delhi High Court's decision the question for consideration was what constituted “consideration” for marriage within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act, and Luthra, J. has observed: “Thus the definition of the word ‘consideration’ as given in the Contract Act also leads to the conclusion that the property or valuable security should be demanded or given whether in the past, present or future for bringing about solemnization of marriage. After the marriage giving of property or valuable security by the parents of the bride cannot constitute a ‘consideration’ for marriage unless it was agreed at the time of or before the marriage that such property or valuable security would be given in future.” The complaint in that case did out spell out that the articles mentioned in the same were given after the marriage as a result of some agreement for the purpose of the marriage. The allegations in the complaint indicated that those articles were given after the marriage with a view to have smooth sailing and continuance of good marital relations. The learned Judge, therefore, held that the articles given in those circumstances did not constitute dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. We think that the learned Judge is right in holding so, and that it is desirable that even such a demand should be prohibited and made punishable in law. 8. We are concerned in the present case with a complaint in which it has been alleged that the demand for the sum of Rs 50,000 as dowry was made when the marriage ceremonies between the appellant's daughter Anita and the second respondent were in progress, by both the respondents, under the pretext that it was required for the passage of the parties to the marriage to the United States with a threat that if the amount was not paid the marriage ceremonies would not be completed and that there was demand for payment of the amount even after the marriage ceremonies were over when Anita was staying in the house of the first respondent after the second respondent went away alone to the United States because the passport and visa for Anita had not been obtained by then. The decision of even the Patna High Court relied upon by Mr Desai relates only to what constitutes “consideration” for the marriage within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. On the other hand, Dr Y.S. Chitale, Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 7 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 Senior Advocate, appearing for the appellant invited our attention to a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Daulat Mansingh Aher v. C.R. Bansi [1980 Cri LJ 1171 : (1980) 2 Mah LR 304 : 1980 Cri LR (Mah) 459] and submitted that a mere demand for money as dowry for completing the marriage ceremonies on pain of not completing the ceremonies if the money was not given is sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Act even though there was no consent on the part of the appellant to comply with that demand. What appeared from the record of the case out of which the decision of the Bombay High Court arose, was that the accused- petitioner filed an application on October 6, 1978 raising a contention that the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Bombay had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the case because the accused and the complainant were residing outside the jurisdiction of that Court. A contention was also raised that the complaint was barred by limitation and was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. However, during the arguments in the High Court it was conceded by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner that the complaint was filed within the period prescribed. Therefore, the only question that arose for consideration by the learned Judges of the Division Bench was the one relating to the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Bombay to entertain and inquire into the complaint. However, the learned Judges have observed in the judgment after extracting Section 4 of the Act that “what is made punishable under that provision is the demand itself, whether direct or indirect, from the parents of a bride or bridegroom”. The learned Judges have further observed thus: “On the averments made in the complaint the demand is made by the accused by writing a letter from Wadala, Bombay-31. This demand was made through his elder brother who is the son-in-law of the complainant and resides at Agartala. From Agartala the said letter of demand was forwarded by the son-in-law of the complainant to Andheri, Bombay where the complainant is residing. Therefore, the demand by accused was not made at Agartala. He had only used the good offices of his elder brother to forward the letter. Instead of writing a direct letter to complainant demanding dowry the demand was made through the elder brother, who is residing at Agartala. Still the demand is by accused and is made from Wadala at Bombay. The demand became complete when the complainant received letter at Andheri, Bombay. Hence the dowry was demanded at Bombay. The offence was partly committed at Wadala, Bombay, from where dowry was demanded. It was also partly committed at Andheri, Bombay, where the complainant received the demand letter. It is further alleged by the complainant in the complaint that the marriage of Alka which was almost settled, could not take place due to the demand of dowry made by the accused. This consequential result or consequence of the demand also took place at Bombay. Wadala is within the local jurisdiction of Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar. Letter of demand was actually sent from Wadala, Bombay. Hence in any case it can safely be Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 8 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 said that offence as alleged is partly committed at Wadala also. Though a contention was raised before the trial court that neither accused nor complainant are residing within the jurisdiction of Dadar Court, now it is an admitted position that accused resides at Wadala. Even if it is held that offence became complete when complainant received letter at Andheri, Bombay, still it will be triable by Bombay Court. Whether it is Dadar or Andheri Court will not make any difference. On the other hand we are told that Dadar Court is nearer to the residence of accused. The point raised is too technical and no prejudice will be caused to the accused nor on that count it could be said that trial is vitiated; or will result in failure of justice. Hence there is no substance in this contention.” 9. It appears from a reading of this judgment that it was either not disputed before the learned Judges or that it was presumed that a mere demand for property as consideration for the marriage taking place would constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Act. 10. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 is intended to prohibit the giving or taking of dowry, and Parliament has made every offence under the Act non- compoundable by Section 8 of the Act. By Section 5 it has been enacted that any agreement for the giving or taking of dowry shall be void. Section 3 makes abetment of the giving or taking of dowry an offence. No doubt, according to Section 2 of the Act “dowry” is any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage but does not include dowar or mahr in the case of person to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. It would appear from Section 2 that consent to comply with the demand for any property as consideration for the marriage would alone make the property or valuable security given or agreed to be given directly or indirectly, “dowry” within the meaning of the Act. But having regard to the dominant object of the Act which is to stamp out the practice of demanding dowry in any shape or form either before or after the marriage, we are of the opinion that the entire definition of the word “dowry” should not be imported into Section 4 which lays down that “if any person after the commencement of this Act, demands, directly or indirectly from the parents or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both”. According to Webster's New World Dictionary , 1962 Edn., bride means a woman who has just been married or is about to be married, and bridegroom means a man who has just been married or is about to be married. If we give this strict meaning of a bride or a bridegroom to the word bride or bridegroom used in Section 4 of the Act property or valuable security demanded and consented to be given prior to the time when the woman had become a bride or the man had become a bridegroom, may not be “dowry” within the meaning of the Act. We are of the opinion that having regard to the object of the Act a liberal construction has to be given to the word “dowry” used in Section 4 of the Act to mean that any property or Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 9 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 valuable security which if consented to be given on the demand being made would become dowry within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act. We are also of the opinion that the object of Section 4 of the Act is to discourage the very demand for property or valuable security as consideration for a marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4 prohibits the demand for ‘giving’ property or valuable security which demand, if satisfied, would constitute an offence under Section 3 read with Section 2 of the Act. There is no warrant for taking the view that the initial demand for giving of property or valuable security would not constitute an offence and that an offence would take place only when the demand was made again after the party on whom the demand was made agreed to comply with it. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, right in proceeding on the basis that the allegations in the complaint prima facie constitute an offence under Section 4 of the Act and issuing processes to the respondents. The High Court, we cannot refrain from observing, might well have refused to invoke its inherent powers at the very threshold in order to quash the proceedings, for these powers are meant to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection when there is reason to believe that the process of law is being misused to harass a citizen. The present was not such a case. We find that the complaint had been filed after obtaining the previous sanction of the State Government or of such officer as the State Government may by general or special order specify in this behalf as required by the proviso to Section 4 of the Act. Mr P.G. Gokhale who appeared for the second respondent, State of Maharashtra, was not in a position to tell us about what the exact stand of the State Government in this appeal is as to whether it supports or opposes the contention of the appellant that the allegation made in the complaint constitutes an offence under Section 4 of the Act. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and direct the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class to take further proceedings on the complaint and dispose of the case according to law. 10. The material on record is examined in the light of aforestated propositions of law. 11. The contents of impugned FIR clearly show allegation regarding demand of Rs. 25 Lacs, 20 Tola gold and car for marriage of Mahima with Naveen. There are specific allegations with details of incidents. The veracity of prosecution and the material submitted alongwith the final report will be considered at the trial. This Court while considering quashing of FIR cannot indulge into threadbare analysis of the material Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53 10 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:8532 on record or evaluation of the evidence submitted before the trial Court. The FIR and the material submitted alongwith the final report prima facie show complicity of the petitioner in the alleged offence. The Judgement in case of P. Sivakumar v. State 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1737 has no relevance to the matter in hand. 12 . Considering aforestated facts and circumstances, the quashing of impugned FIR and subsequent proceedings against the petitioner would itself be an abuse of the process of court. There is no ground for invoking the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC./528 of the BNSS., 2023. Consequently, the present petition, being meritless, is hereby dismissed. C.C. as per rules. ( SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR) JUDGE BDJ Signature Not Verified Signed by: BHUNESHWAR DATT Signing time: 01-04-2026 18:44:53</div>