SRI SHRI SIDAGOUDA MODAGI vs JAI KISAN WHOLESALE VEGETABLE MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION

Court
Karnataka High Court

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WA No. 100483 of 2026
C/W WA No. 100434 of 2026
WA No. 100479 of 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

DATED THIS THE 16th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
R

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT APPEAL NO. 100483 OF 2026 (APMC)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100434 OF 2026
WRIT APPEAL NO. 100479 OF 2026

IN WA No. 100483/2026
BETWEEN:

SHRI. SIDAGOUDA MODAGI,
AGE: 49 YEARS, OCC: SOCIAL ACTIVIST
AND STATE PRESIDENT,
BHARATIYA KRISHI SAMAJ,
ND
R/O: 1B, 4059/4D, 2 FLOOR,
PATIL BUILDING, OPPOSITE SARDAR
HIGH SCHOOL GROUND, BELAGAVI – 590 016.
…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ANANT MANDGI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN B. RAMALU, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATION /
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING,
VIDHANA SOUDHA, BENGALURU – 560 001.

2. THE DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING,
ND
NO.16, 2 RAJ BHAVAN ROAD,
P.B. NO.5309, BENGALURU – 560 001.

3. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING,
BELAGAVI DISTRICT,
NEAR POLICE HEADQUARTERS,













Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

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SHIVAJI NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

4. THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET
COMMITTEE, BELAGAVI,
R/BY ITS SECRETARY,
APMC YARD, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

5. JAI KISAN WHOLESALE VEGETABLE
MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION,
R/BY ITS PRESIDENT / SECRETARY,
GANDHINAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

6. THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,
R/BY ITS REGISTRAR, KANDAYA BHAVAN,
BENGALURU – 560 009.

7. CHANNAPPA PUJARI,
MAJOR, AGRICULTURIST AND PRESIDENT,
KARNATAKA RAJYA RAITHA
SANGHA - HASIRU SENE,
R/O: UDAPPA, MAVINMURI THOTA,
RAJAPUR, TALUK GOKAK,
DIST: BELAGAVI – 591 224.

8. BELAGAVI DISTRICT WHOLESALE
VEGETABLE MERCHANTS WELFARE
SANGHA, APMC MARKET YARD,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SRI. RAKESH M. BILKI, GA FOR R1 TO R3;
SRI. PRAMOD N. KHATAVI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. RAMACHANDRA MALI, ADVOCATE FOR C/R5)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS WRIT APPEAL
AND SET ASIDE THE COMMON ORDER DATED 14.07.2026
PASSED IN 105156/2026 HAS BEEN DISMISSED AND INSOFAR
AS THE FINDINGS AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS AFFECT CO-
OPERATIVE APPEAL NO.341/2025. TO ALLOW W.P.
NO.105156/2026 AND QUASH THE FINDING RECORDED ON
POINT NO.1 IN THE ORDER DATED 29.04.2026 PASSED BY THE
KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN CO-OPERATIVE APPEAL
NO.341/2025. TO DECLARE THAT REGULATION 61(B) OF THE

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KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL REGULATIONS, 1979,
CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS CONFERRING JURISDICTION
UPON THE TRIBUNAL TO CONDONE DELAY UNDER SECTION 5
OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963, IN AN APPEAL UNDER SECTION
72-E OF THE KARNATAKA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE
MARKETING (REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT) ACT, 1966, IN
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH POWER UNDER THE SPECIAL
ENACTMENT AND ETC.

IN WA NO. 100434/2026
BETWEEN:

SRI. SHRI. SIDAGOUDA MODAGI,
AGE: 49 YEARS,
OCC: SOCIAL ACTIVIST AND STATE PRESIDENT BKS,
ND
R/O: 1B, 4059/4D, 2 FLOOR,
PATIL BUILDING,
OPP TO SADAR HIGHSCHOOL GROUND,
DIST: BELAGAVI, PIN CODE: 590 016.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. ANANTH MANDAGI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN BOLABANDI , ADVOCATE)

AND:
1. JAI KISAN WHOLESALE VEGETABLE MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT/SECRETARY,
GANDHINAGAR, BELAGAVI.

2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF CO OPERATION/AGRICULTURAL MARKETING,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

3. THE DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETING,
ND
NO. 16, 2 RAJ BHAVAN ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

4. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE MARKETING BELAGAVI DISTRICT.
NEAR POLICE HQ, SHIVAJI NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

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5. THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE,
BELAGAVI, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
APMC YARD, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

6. THE BELAGAVI DISTRICT WHOLE SALE
VEGETABLE MERCHANTS WELFAR SANGHA,
APMC MARKET YARD, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

7. SRI, CHANNAPPA PUJARI,
AGED MAJOR, OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURIST
AND PRESIDENT OF KARNATAKA RAJYA RAITHA
SANGHA - HASIRU SENE
R/O: UDDAPPA, MAVINMURI THOTA
RAJAPUR, TALUK: GOKAK,
RAJAPUR, DIST: BELAGAVI – 591 224.

8. NEGIL YOGI RAYAT SEVA SANGHA,
REG. (KARNATAKA) GANESPUR GALLI,
SHAHAPUR, BELAGAVI,
REP. BY PRESIDENT,
SRI. RAVI PATIL,
AGE: MAJOR,
R/O: BELAGAVI – 590 001.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SRI. RAKESH M. BILKI, GA FOR R2 TO R4;
SRI. PRAMOD N. KHATAVI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. RAMACHANDRA MALI, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. C.V. ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR R5;
R6 & R8 - DEFERRED)


THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS WRIT APPEAL AND
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 14.07.2026
PASSED IN 104603/2026 AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS
W.P.NO.104603 OF 2026 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1
HEREIN AND CONFIRM AND RESTORE THE ORDER DATED
29.04.2026 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL,
BENGALURU IN CO-OPERATIVE APPEAL NO.341/2025, WHEREBY
I.A.NO.1 FILED UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT
SEEKING CONDONATION OF DELAY WAS REJECTED AND
CONSEQUENTLY THE APPEAL WAS DISMISSED AS BARRED BY

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LIMITATION.

IN WA NO. 100479/2026
BETWEEN:

SRI. CHANNAPPA PUJARI.
AGED MAJOR,
OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURIST AND PRESIDENT OF
KARNATAKA RAJYA RAITHA SANGHA - HASIRU SENE
R/O: UDDAPPA, MAVINMURI THOTA RAJAPUR
TALUK: GOKAK, RAJAPUR,
DISTRICT: BELAGAVI- 591 224.
...APPELLANT
(BY SMT. SHOBHA H., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. ANANDGOUDA RUDRAGOUDA PATIL,
S/O. RUDRAGOUDA PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
CHANDRAMARUTI COLONY,
KANABARGI ROAD,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

2. DAYANAND MUTAGEKAR,
S/O. BABU MUTAGEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
MARUTI GALLI, JATFARWADI,
BELAGAVI – 591 143.

3. SURYAKANT BASALINGAPPA BHAVI,
S/O. BASALINGAPPA BHAVI,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
H.NO.192, GURU BASAVA PLAZA,
TAHSILDAR GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

4. ZAHEER SIKANDAR ASANGI,
S/O. SIKANDAR ASANGI,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
BEHIND LADIES SAINIK HOSTEL,
PLOT NO. 35 SADASHIVANAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

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5. MONAPPA GAVADU PATIL,
S/O. GAVADU PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS,
NO.55 MARUTI GALLI,
BENAKANHALLI, HUKKERI TALUK,
BELAGAVI DISTRICT – 591 108.

6. PUNDALIK LAXMAN PATIL,
S/O. LAXMAN PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
AT POST HONAGA,
HUKKERI TALUK,
BELAGAVI DISTRICT- 591 156.

7. SHIVANAND SHANKAR SHIRGAONKAR
S/O. SHANKAR SHIRGAONKAR,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R/O.NO.167/2 HOLI GALLI,
KAKATI, BELGAVI-591 113.

8. JOTIBA BHAURAO ANGOLKAR,
S/O. BHAURAO,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.5x`5, SECTOR 9,
ANJANEYA NAGAR,
MALMARUTI EXTENSION,
BELAGAVI- 590 016.

9. GAJANAN RAMACHANDRA PATIL,
S/O. RAMACHANDRA PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 10, 11,
SAMBRA ROAD CROSS NO.6,
MARUTI NAGAR,
SHIVAJI NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

10. SANJOG A. RAMANNAVAR,
S/O. APPAYYA RAMANNAVAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
H. NO. 2245, MAHANTESH NAGAR,
BELAGAVI-590016.

11. APPAYYA RAMANNAVAR,

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S/O. CHANDRAKANT,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
R/O. H. NO. 2245, SECTOR NO.11,
M.M. EXTENSION,
MAHANTESH NAGAR, BELAGAVI-590016.

12. VISHWANATH M. RAMANNAVAR,
S/O. MALLIKARJUN,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/O. NO. 2498 MAHANTESH NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

13. ARVIND M. KANOJI,
S/O. MALLAPPA KANOJI,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/O. NO.2393
NEAR T & T QUARTERS MAHANTESH NAGAR,
BELAGAVI-590016.

14. DEEPAK VITTHAL NAWAR,
S/O. VITTHAL NAWAR,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/O. H. NO. 555, MARUTI GALLI,
UCHAGAON, BELAGAVI-591128.

15. ASHOK PATIL,
S/O. YALLAPPA PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/O. H. NO.42, MENASI GALLI,
SULAGE, UCHAGAON,
BELAGAVI – 591 108.

16. SALIM HABIB MUNSHI,
S/O. HABIB MUNSHI,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
R/O. H. NO. 1374
SADASHIV NAGAR,
BELAGAVI-590001.

17. GAJANAN APPAYYA PATIL,
S/O. APPAYYA PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
H. NO. 12/1, OLD GANDHI NAGAR,
BELAGAVI-590016.

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18. RAVI BALAPPA KARENNAVAR,
S/O. BALAPPA KARENNAVAR,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/O. BASAVA PLOT NO. 213,
SCHEME NO. 13, T.V. CENTRE,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

19. AHMAD ALI CHOUDHARI,
S/O. MOHAMMAD ALI,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/O. H. NO. 3770, BAGAWAN GALLI,
BELAGAVI-590001.

20. RAJARAM SHANKAR PATIL,
S/O. SHANKAR PATIL
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 412/10,
TH
5 CROSS, SAMARTH NAGAR,
P.B. ROAD BELAGAVI-590001.

21. SRIDHAR R. RAMANNAVAR,
S/O. RAMESH RAMANNAVAR,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
R/O. NO. 2792 NEAR LOVE DALE SCHOOL,
MAHANTESH NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

22. KULDEEP KISAN TASHILDAR,
S/O. KISAN TASHLIDAR,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
R/O. NO. 2586, MALLI GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

23. SANJAY R. TOLAGI, S/O. RAMA TOLAGI,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R/O. 2214 SECTOR NO.11
M.M. EXTENSION, MAHANTESH NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

24. MOHAMMAD YUNUS HUKKERI,
S/O. NOOR AHMED HUKKERI,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/O. NO. 3780/A,

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DARBAR GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

25. ASHOK RAMA KALAJI,
S/O. RAMA KALAJI,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
R/O. ANGOL GALLI,
UCHAGOAN,
BELAGAVI – 591 120.

26. SHIVAJI GANGARAM RAJGOLKAR,
S/O. GANGARAM RAJGOLKAR,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
H. NO. 76, BRAHMALINGA GALLI,
OLD GANDHI NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

27. FAIROZ NOORAHAMED PALLALI,
S/O. NOORAHMED PANNALI,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 40,
SECTOR NO. 12 M.M. EXTENSION,
MAHANTESHNAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

28. DEVAPPA HONAGEKAR,
S/O. RUKAMAPPA HONAGEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
R/O. NO. 555/11,
PETH GALLI, KADOLI,
HUKERI, BELAGAVI – 591 143.

29. VINAYAK DESAI,
S/O. MALLAPPA DESAI,
AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 322 SECTOR NO.2,
SHIVA BASAVA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 010.

30. SACHIN MALLAPPA GUDAS,
S/O. MALLAPPA GUDAS,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO.70 CTS NO.520,
RANI CHENNAMMA SOCIETY,

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SHREE NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

31. SIDHARTH LAXMAN AMBOJI,
S/O. LAXMAN AMBOJI
AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS,
R/O. NO.676 GANESH MANDIR,
BHARAT GALLI, MUCHANDI
BELAGAVI - 590 016.

32. NADIM M. VANTMURI,
S/O. LATE MOHSIN VANTMURI,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
R/O. NO.2333, AZAD GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

33. ABHISHEK SURESH HAVAL,
S/O. SURESH HAVAL,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/O. TULAJA BHAVANI APARTMENTS,
CTS NO.5277,
NEW GOODSHED ROAD,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

34. VILAS J. YALAGURKAR,
S/O. JAYAWANT YALAGURKAR,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 36,
SAMBAJI NAGAR, VADGOAN,
BELAGAVI – 590 005.

35. VINAYAK TUKARAM PATIL,
S/O. TUKARAM PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
ND
R/O. NO.110, 2 MAIN,
SADASHIVA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

36. SOMNATH R. HALAGEKAR,
S/O. RAJARAM HALAGEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
R/O. NO.2445 KAVATKAR GALLI,
BELAGAVI-590001.

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37. SURESH BASTWAD,
S/O. TAVANAPPA BASTWAD,
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS,
R/O. VENKATESH NAGAR,
MUTGA, HUKKERI,
BELAGAVI – 591 124.

38. VINAYAK K. PATIL,
S/O. KONERI PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/O. 4691 KOLI GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

39. SURESH HONAGEKAR,
S/O. MAHADEV HONAGEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
R/O. NO.43/32,
MAHADWAR ROAD
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

40. SHIVAMURTHY SIDDAYYA HUDALIMATH,
S/O. SIDDAYYA HUDALIMATH,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 944, SECTOR NO.6,
VANTAMURI COLONY,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

41. YUNUS AMIRSAB BAGBAN,
S/O. AMIRSAB BAGBAN,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 27 H.NO.45
RD
3 CROSS, AZAM NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 010.

42. SANJAY SAHADEV TARALE,
S/O. SAHADEV TARALE,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/O. 424, NAVI GALLI,
HUKERI, BELAGAVI – 591 108.

43. MUSTAK AHMED MIRAJKAR,
S/O. MOHAMMADALI MIRAJKAR,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO. 26,

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TH
6 CROSS, AZAM NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 010.

44. MOHAMMAD UMAR BADEGHAR,
S/O. ABBAS BADEGHAR,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO.8, SAFA COLONY,
UJWAL NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

45. GANAPATI DHONDIBA SADEKAR,
S/O. DHONDIBA SADEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
H.NO.10/1 RUSHI GALLI,
OLD GANDHI BAZAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

46. SIDDANAGOUDA CHINNAPPAGOUDAR,
S/O. KARIBASAPPA CHINNAPPAGOUDAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/O. H.NO.782, SECTOR NO.5,
SHREE NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

47. ARCHANA V. GENJI,
W/O. VINAYAK GENJI,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/O. NO.171 TAHASILDAR GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

48. MAHESH BHIMARAO PATIL,
S/O. BHIMARAO PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
TH
4 CROSS BASAVA COLONY,
SHANTI NIVAS, NEHRU NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 010.

49. SHANTARAM HARI PATIL,
S/O. HARI PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
R/O. NO.353/2,
MAHADWAR ROAD
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

50. DEELIP NAKADI,

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S/O. DNYANADEV NAKADI,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/O. H.NO.757/444
ND TH
2 MAIN, 5 CROSS,
SADASHIVA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

51. BASHIR AHMED DONI,
S/O. NIJAMUDDIN DONI,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/O. H.NO.3741,
BAGWAN GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

52. AKHTAR SANADI,
S/O. KASHIM SAB,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/O. PLOT NO.92,
UJWAL NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

53. SHANKAR BAGEWADI,
S/O. MAHAT BAGEWADI,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/O. H.NO.260/287,
RUKMINI NIVAS, HINDWADI,
BELAGAVI – 590 011.

54. SANJAY B. BHAVI,
S/O. BASALINGAPPA BHAVI,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/O. H.NO.192, GURU BASAVA PLAZA,
TAHASILDAR GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

55. MEHABOOB BAGBAN,
S/O. ABDULRAZAK BAGBAN,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
TH
R/O. H.NO.42, 7 CROSS
NEW VEERBHADRA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

56. MUMAMMED YASIN,
S/O. MOHAMMED IQBAL DONI,

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AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.3737, BAGWAN GALLI,
BELAGAVI - 590 001.

57. NARAYAN AVACHARI S/O. RAMU AVACHARI,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.96, HOSUR,
BASAVANGALLI, SHAHPUR,
BELAGAVI - 590 003.

58. ZISHAN IRSHAD AHMED HANCHINMANI,
S/O. IRSHAD HANCHINMANI.
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.582, SECTOR 5,
TH
5 CROSS, SRINAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

59. DEVAPPA KRISHNA KHANDEKAR,
S/O. KRISHNA KHANDEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/AT. GANAPATI GALLI,
SHIGLIKHURD, KOLHAPUR DISTRICT,
MAHARASTRA - 416 507.

60. RAVALU NARAYAN MOORE,
S/O. NARAYAN MOORE,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.24/98, LAKSHMINAGAR,
HINDALGA, GANESHPUR ROAD,
BELAGAVI – 591 108.

61. AMIT PUNDLIK SHAPPURKAR,
S/O. PUNDLIK SHAHPPURKAR,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.12,
ANNAPURNA BUILDING,
JHADHAV NAGAR, BELAGAVI- 590 001.

62. BASAVANNI RAMAPPA KILARGI,
S/O. RAMAPPA KILARGI,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO.69, SECTOR 9,
M.M. EXTENSION, ANJANEYA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI - 590 016.

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63. BHARAT JAYAWANT KURANE,
S/O. JAYAWANT KURANE,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO.348/2,
SAMBHAJI GALLI, MAHADWAR ROAD,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

64. BABURAO DUNDAPPA DESAI,
S/O. DUNDAPPA DESAI,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
ST
R/AT. NO.758, 1 CROSS,
RAMNAGAR, KANGRALI KH,
BELAGAVI- 590010

65. SRIKANT GANAPATI SAMBHAJI,
S/O. GANAPATI SAMBHAJI.
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.145, MUTT GALLI,
KEDANOOR, BELAGAVI- 591143.

66. RIYAZ AHMED. A. HANCHINMANI,
S/O. AHMED SAB,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
ND
R/AT. CBD. NO.45/2, 2 CROSS,
AZAM NAGAR, BELAGAVI - 590 010.

67. MOHAMMED GHOUSE BAGBAN,
S/O. BABU SAHAB BAGBAN,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
TH
R/AT. PLOT NO.1, 7 CROSS,
NEW VEERABHADRA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI - 590 016.

68. MALIK JAAN JAMADAR,
S/O. ABDUL RAZAK JAMADAR,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.17/B, SR. NO.1000/2,
5TH CROSS, VEERABHADRA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI - 590 016.

69. ABDUL KHADER BAGBAN,
S/O. BABU SAHAB BAGBAN,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.15, RS. NO.1014/12,

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VEERABHADRA NAGAR,
BELAGAVI - 590 016.

70. MARUTI BABU SANTAJI,
S/O. BABU SANTAJI,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.155/A, MARAGAL GALLI,
HALAGA, BELAGAVI - 590 003.

71. UMESH SHYAMRAO KHANDEKAR,
S/O. SHYAMRAO KHANDEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.1271, KADAM COLONY,
KOWAD ROAD, UCHAGAON,
HUKKERI, BELAGAVI – 591 128.

72. CHIDANAND GURUBASAPPA INDI,
S/O. GURUBASAPPA INDI,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.2291, HATTIHOLI GALLI,
SHAHPUR, BELAGAVI – 590 003.

73. VISHAL TAHSILDAR, S/O. TUKARAM,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
R/AT. TENGINAKERI GALLI,
BELAGAVI - 590 001.
74. MAHADEV A. ANANDACHE,
S/O. ARJUN ANANDACHE,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.244/113, 2ND CROSS,
FULBAG GALLI, BELAGAVI - 590 001.

75. RAJU TAHSILDAR S/O. TUKARAM TAHSILDAR,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.2794/3, TENGINAKERI GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

76. SATYAPPA LAKSHMAN KHAJAGONATTI,
S/O. LAKSHMAN KHAJAGONATTI,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT. LAKSHMI GALLI, MANNIKERI,
BELAGAVI- 591143

77. SUBHASH SHIVAJI PATIL S/O. SHIVAJI PATIL,

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AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 369/1,
TH
5 CROSS, KAPILESHWAR GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

78. ANIRUDH DIVAKAR PATIL,
S/O. DIVAKAR PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.365,
3RD STAGE, HANUMAN NAGAR,
BELAGAVI- 590001.

79. VEERAPPA BASAVANTAPPA KATTI,
S/O. BASAVANTAPPA KATTI,
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.56, SRUTI PARK,
KANABARGI ROAD, NEAR LITTLE SCHOLARS
SCHOOL, BELAGAVI- 590016.

80. IMRAN BAGWAN, S/O. MEHABOOB BAGWAN,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO.1594,
NAVI GALLI, SHAHPUR, BELAGAVI- 590 003.

81. MUSHTAQ AHMED K. BAGWAN,
S/O. KANSAB. K. BAGWAN,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/AT: PLOT NO. 7737/7A,
SECTOR NO.12, M.M. EXTENSION,
ANJANEYA NAGAR, BELAGAVI - 590 016.
82. RAMACHANDRASA MERAWADA,
S/O. YANKOSA,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 6012B KALBURGI ONI,
BETAGERI, GADAG- 582 102.

83. IRFAN BAGWAN, S/O. BASHIR,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.55, RAM NAGAR,
BELAGAVI- 590 001.

84. NASIRUDDIN ABDULKHADAR LANDUR,
S/O. ABDUL KHADAR,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,

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R/AT. NO,16, SANGAMESHWAR NAGAR,
NEHRU NAGAR,
BELAGAVI- 590 010.

85. ASHRAF ALI MAQTUM HUSSAIN HANCHINMANI,
S/O. MAQTUM HUSSAIN,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO. 276, SECTOR 2,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, BELAGAVI- 590 016.

86. SHIVAJI PUNDLIK MANDOLKAR,
S/O. PUNDLIK MARUTI MANDOLKAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 21/1, RTO CIRCLE,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, HUKKERI,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

87. PRASHANT. B. CHOPADE,
S/O. BHAURAO CHOPADE
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.244/106, 2ND CROSS,
FULBAG GALLI, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

88. SANDEEP PIRAJI MANNOLKAR,
S/O. PIRAJI, AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.348/2, SAMBHAJI GALLI,
ST
1 CROSS, MAHADWAR ROAD,
HUKKERI, BELAGAVI - 590 001.

89. VINAYAK IRANNA ITAGI, S/O. IRANNA,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.1982/B. KORE GALLI,
SHAHPUR, HUKKERI, BELAGAVI - 590 003.

90. SUHAS APPAJI PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT. DHEKOLIWADI, SURUTE,
KOLHAPUR, MAHARASHTRA - 416507.

91. LAXMAN BABURAO HIROJI,
S/O. BABURAO HIROJI,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.284, RAGHUNATH ROAD,
KRANTINAGAR, BELAGAVI MAIN,

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GANESHPUR, ENRION HALL,
BELAGAVI - 591 108.

92. NARAYAN. B. DONGARE, S/O. BABURAO,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT. NO.2163/B, PANGUL GALLI,
BELAGAVI - 590 001.

93. MANOJ RAMCHANDRA CHOUGALE,
S/O. RAMCHANDRA,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
R/AT. CHAVADI GALLI, MUTAGA,
BELAGAVI - 590 001.

94. IRFAN IBRAHIM SHAIKH
S/O. IBRAHIM SHAIKH,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO. 17, K.G.N GALLI,
NEW GANDHI NAGAR, BELAGAVI - 590 016.

95. RANJIT DEVAPPA PATIL, S/O. DEVAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO. 244/B, KADOLI,
HUKKERI, BELAGAVI – 591 143.

96. MITHIL MOHAN BANDEKAR,
S/O. MOHAN BANDEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
R/AT. SHREE VALLABHA PRATISHTA,
A-WING 105, 5TH CROSS,
OPP TO SHANBAG HIGH SCHOOL,
BHAGYA NAGAR, BELAGAVI - 590 006.

97. SANJAY P. NAIK, S/O. NIRMALA P. NAIK,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 244/185, GANESH APARTMENT,
FULBAG GALLI, BELAGAVI - 590 001.

98. MUSTAQAHMED RASULSAB BAVAKHANVAR,
S/O. RASULSAB BAVAKHANVAR,
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO. 999,
TH
9 CROSS, NIZAMUDDIN GALLI,
NEW GANDHI NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

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99. MOHAMMED SHARIF HUSENSAB KAZI,
S/O. HUSENSAB KAZI,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/AT: PLOT NO.4, R.S. NO.1075/1A,
RD
3 CROSS, UJWAL NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

100. PRAKASH RAYAPPA CHOPADE,
S/O. RAYAPPA CHOPADE,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
ND
R/AT. NO.54, 2 CROSS, SUBHASH NAGAR,
BELAGAVI- 590016.

101. KUTUBUSAB ALLASAB DABADI,
S/O. ALLASAB DABADI,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO.27, R.S. NO.1080/5,
7TH CROSS, LEFT SIDE, UJWAL NAGAR,
BELAGAVI- 590016.

102. RIYAZ AHMED HASANSAB MULLA,
S/O. HASANSAB MULLA,
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
R/AT. BLOCK NO.31, 1ST CROSS B,
AZAD NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

103. SACHIN PUNDALIK JADHAV,
S/O. PUNDALIK,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 177/A, KAVALEWADI ROAD,
BIJAGARNI, HUKKERI, BELAGAVI – 591 108.

104. SATHISH VISHNU LOHAR,
S/O. VISHNU LOHAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO. 154, SUBHASH GALLI,
1ST CROSS, GANDHI NAGAR,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

105. SHRIRANG KADOLKAR S/O. BASAWANI,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
TH
R/AT. NO. 1015, 5 CROSS,
LAXMI NAGAR, KAKATI,
BELAGAVI - 591 113.

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106. JANARDHAN MANOHAR HAVAL,
S/O. MANOHAR HAVAL,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO. 7253, SECTOR NO. 10,
ANJANEYA NAGAR, M.M. EXTENSION,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, BELAGAVI - 590016.

107. IBADULLA KHAN MALLUR, S/O. IMAM KHAN MALLUR,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO. 58, R.S. NO. 998/3,
5TH CROSS, ASADKHAN HOUSING SOCIETY,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, HUKKERI,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

108. KISHAN SUNIL HAVAL, S/O. SUNIL,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
RD
R/AT. NO. 4803/156, 3 CROSS,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, BELAGAVI- 590016.

109. SACHIN MANOHAR HAVAL, S/O. MANOHAR HAVAL,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
ST
R/AT. PLOT NO. 18, 1 CROSS,
RUKMINI NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

110. SHANKAR SIVARAI NAIK S/O. SHIVARAI,
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
TH TH
R/AT. NO. 992, 5 LANE, 5 CROSS,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

111. JOTIBA RAMACHANDRA PATIL,
S/O. RAMACHANDRA PATIL,
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
ND TH
R/AT. PLOT NO.21, 2 MAIN, 7 CROSS,
SADASHIV NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

112. MAHESH CHAVAN, S/O. RAMESH CHAVAN,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 598, MAHADEV ROAD,
KANGRALI. K.H, BELAGAVI – 590 010.

113. RAMA HOLEPPA NANDI,
S/O. HOLEPPA NANDI,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,

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R/AT. NO. 240, BHARAT GALLI,
MUCHANDI, BELAGAVI - 590016.

114. ANWARSAB GANISAB AMARAVATI,
S/O. GANISAB AMARAVATI,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. PLOT NO.61, SHREE NAGAR,
SHIVAJI NAGAR, BELAGAVI - 590016.

115. MEHBOOB HUSSAINSAB BAGWAN,
S/O. HUSEINSAAB BAGWAN.
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO. 76/16,
FREITAS VADDO, VERLA CANCA,
BARDEZ, PARRA, NORTH GOA,
GOA- 403 510.

116. SADANAD LAXMAN SAYANE S/O. LAXMAN,
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 4495, CHAVAT GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

117. NAGESH B. NIRMALKAR,
S/O. BHARMA V. NIRMALKAR,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 4066, KANGRAL GALLI,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

118. DASHARATH VISHNU BONGALE,
S/O. VISHNU BONGALE,
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS,
R/AT. NEAR S.C. MOTORS,
MARUTI NAGAR,
ND
2 CROSS, BELAGAVI – 590 001.

119. VAIJU PATIL S/O. GAWADU,
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
R/AT. C.C.B. NO.47, MAHADWAR ROAD,
BELAGAVI – 590 001.

120. RAJU VITTAL GOUDAPPANAVAR,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
R/AT. MADNALLI, DUSAGI,
UTTARA KANNADA DISTRICT,

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KARNATAKA – 581 356.

121. THE DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING,
ND
NO.16, 2 RAJ BHAVAN ROAD,
BENGALURU.

122. THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR
OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING DISTRICT,
BELAGAVI.

123. JAI KISAN WHOLESALE VEGETABLE MERCHANTS
ASSOCIATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT / SECRETARY,
GANDHINAGAR, BELAGAVI

124. SRI. TAJUDDIN. M. HANCHINMANI,
S/O. SAYARABANUHANCHINMANI,
VEGETABLE MERCHANT, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
RD
R/AT. PLOT NO. 1111, 3 CROSS,
MADINA GALLI, NEW GANDHI NAGAR,
BELAGAVI - 590 016.

125. L.G. MENASE S/O. GANU MENASE,
VEGETABLE MERCHANT,
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS,
R/AT. NO. 5476/8, SHASTRI NAGAR,
TH
5 CROSS, BELAGAVI- 590001.

126. SRI. SHIVAJI A. TUKKAR S/O. APPAYA,
VEGETABLE MERCHANT, AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO. 57, SECTOR NO.12,
INCOME TAX COLONY.
MAHANTESH NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

127. SACHIN TANAJI KILLEKAR,
S/O. TANAJIRANOJIKILLEKAR,
VEGETABLE MERCHANT,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT. HOUSE NO. 1186,
SHIVAJI ROAD, LAKSHMI NAGAR,
HINDALAGA, BELAGAVI- 591108.

128. SRI. JAVED DADAPEER HOSMANI,
S/O. DADAPEERHOSMANI,

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VEGETABLE MERCHANT,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/AT. PLOT NO. 3/4, WARD NO.52,
AZAD NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.

129. SRI. GAJANAN GASTI, VEGETABLE MERCHANT,
HAVING SHOP AT JAI KISAN
WHOLESALE VEGETABLE MARKET,
R.S. NO. 697/2, NATIONAL HIGHWAY NO.4,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.

130. SRI. SIDAGOUD MODAGI,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
OCC: SOCIAL ACTIVIST AND STATE PRESIDENT BKS,
ND
R/O: 1B, 4059/4D, 2 FLOOR,
PATIL BUILDING, OPP. TO SADAR
HIGH SCHOOL GROUND, TALUK,
AND DISTRICT- BELAGAVI – 590 001.

131. THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE,
BELAGAVI, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
APMC YARD, BELAGAVI.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. GANGADHAR J.M., AAG A/W
SRI. RAKESH M. BILKI, GA FOR R121 & R122;
SRI. GOPAL KRISHNA KURANDWAD,
ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R120;
SRI. PRAMOD N. KHATAVI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. RAMACHANDRA MALI, ADVOCATE FOR R123;
SRI. ANATH MANDAGI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN BOLABANDI, ADVOCATE FOR R130;
NOTICE TO R124 & R129 DISPENSED WITH;
SRI. C.V. ANGADI, ADVOCATE FOR 131)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS WRIT APPEAL
AND SET ASIDE THE COMMON ORDER DATED 14.07.2026
PASSED IN W.P.NO.104886/2026 CONNECTED WITH W.P. NOS.
104603/2026, 105156/2026 AND 105517/2026, INSOFAR AS
W.P. NO.104886/2026 HAS BEEN PARTLY ALLOWED AND
INSOFAR AS THE FINDINGS AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
AFFECT CO-OPERATIVE APPEAL NO.317/2025. TO DISMISS
W.P. NO.104886/2026 AND RESTORE THE ORDER DATED

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29.04.2026 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
IN CO-OPERATIVE APPEAL NO.317/2025, REJECTING I.A. NO.1
AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL AS BARRED BY LIMITATION AND
ETC.

THESE WRIT APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED ON 09.09.2026 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, M.NAGAPRASANNA J. DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:


CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

Batch of these appeals call in question a solitary order dated
14-07-2026 passed by a learned single Judge in writ petition
W.P.Nos.104603/2026, 105156/2026 and
No.104886 of 2026 c/w
105517/2026, permitting the petitioners to avail the remedy of filing
an appeal before the Tribunal.
2. Facts adumbrated are as follows:
2.1. On 14-11-2021, a private market license is granted to
one Jai Kisan Wholesale Vegetable Merchants Association
(‘Association’ for short) under the provisions of the Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and Development) Act,
1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘APMC Act’ for short). After about 4

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years, on 15-09-2025, the Director of Agricultural Marketing
cancels the private market license issued in favour of the said
Association, exercising his power under Section 72D of the APMC
Act. This leads the said Association to this Court in W.P.No.107119
of 2025. This comes to be dismissed on the score that an
alternative remedy of filing an appeal before the Tribunal was
available. The Association preferred a writ appeal in Writ Appeal
No.100752 of 2025 against the said order, contending that the
order ought to have been on its merit. The Writ Appeal comes to be
disposed by the Division Bench, affirming the order of the learned
Single Judge, again granting liberty to avail of the statutory appeal
before the appellate tribunal within a particular time permitted by
the Division Bench.
2.2. It is thereafter an appeal is preferred in Co-operative
Appeal No. 341 of 2025 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal
(‘Tribunal’ for short) along with an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘the Limitation Act’ for short) seeking
condonation of delay. The Tribunal dismisses I.A.No.1 answering
point No.1 in the affirmative and point Nos.2 and 3 in the negative,
which resulted in dismissal of the Co-operative Appeal No. 341 of
2025 on the score that it was barred by limitation. Against the said
dismissal of the appeals, which were four in number, four writ

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petitions are preferred, challenging different portions of the order
of the Tribunal.
2.3. The learned Single Judge disposes all the 4 petitions by
restoring the Co-operative Appeal No.341 of 2025 and connected
cases on the file of the Tribunal and directed the Tribunal to take
the issue to its logical conclusion on its merit. The respondent
therein who are said to be the State President of the Bharatiya
Krishi Samaj and the President of the Karnataka Rajya Raitha
Sangha Hasiru Sene, are before us in these appeals, challenging
the common order passed by the learned Single Judge, restoring
the appeals before the Tribunal.
3. Heard the learned senior counsel Sri. Anant Mandgi,
learned senior counsel appearing for appellant in W.A.Nos.100483
of 2026 and 100434 of 2026; Smt Shobha H, learned counsel
appearing for appellants in W.A.No.100479 of 2026 and
Sri Gangadhar J.M., learned Additional Advocate General appearing
for the State, Sri Pramod N Khatavi, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Association; Sri C V Angadi, learned counsel
appearing for APMC and Sri. Gopal Krishna Kurandwad, learned
counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 120 and Sri Nitin

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Bolabandi, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.130 in
W.A.No.100479 of 2026.
SUBMISSIONS:
APPELLANTS:
4. The learned senior counsel Sri Anant Mandgi, appearing for
the appellant in two of the appeals, would vehemently contend that
the learned Single Judge of this Court permitted availing of the
remedy of filing an appeal. The Division Bench also reiterated of
filing an appeal within a particular period. The appeal was preferred
after 58 days delay of the passage of the order by the learned
Single Judge. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay
contrary to the statute. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in its
place in rejecting the appeals before it on the ground of delay of
the said 58 days. It is his submission that no Court can confer
jurisdiction, much less jurisdiction qua limitation, when the statute
prescribes a particular period of limitation and the Limitation Act is
not specifically included in the statute to file an appeal. Therefore,
the learned senior counsel submits that the rejection of the appeals
on the ground of limitation was correct in law and the learned
Single Judge has misdirected himself on facts and law in allowing
the petitions and restoring the appeals on the file of the Tribunal

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and a direction to hear it on its merit. He would seek the order of
the Tribunal to be restored and the order of the learned Single
Judge to be set aside.
RESPONDENTS:
5.1. Contrariwise , the learned senior counsel, Sri Pramod N
Khatavi, appearing for the respondent-Association, would
vehemently contend by taking this Court through the statutory
provisions, the procedure stipulated under the Karnataka Appellate
Tribunal Act, 1976 (Appellate Tribunal Act) and the Limitation Act,
that if the appeals had been preferred beyond the time limit
prescribed by the Division Bench of this Court, it would have been a
circumstance altogether different. The appeals are preferred within
the time limit that was granted by the Division Bench. Therefore,
the Tribunal could not have sat over the order passed by the
Division Bench to hold that the appeal filed was beyond limitation.
The issue of delay in filing the appeals, had become final inter-
parties when the Division Bench after hearing the parties, had
relegated the parties to the Tribunal affirming the order of the
learned single Judge on the first occasion.
5.2. The learned Single Judge on the next occasion has only
followed what the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge had

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earlier held and found fault with the act of the Tribunal in rejecting
the appeals on the ground of delay of 58 days in filing the appeals.
He would submit that the procedure stipulated under the Appellate
Tribunal Act would clearly indicate that the Tribunal is entitled to
follow its own procedure to condone the delay, as the Limitation Act
is made applicable under the Appellate Tribunal Act. He would seek
dismissal of the appeals so filed and the appeals before the Tribunal
to be considered on its merit and the issue to be taken to its logical
conclusion.
CONSIDERATION:
6. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned senior counsel and
have perused the material on record. In the light of the submission
and contra-submission of the respective learned senior counsels,
one unmistakable fact is that none of the submissions have been
made on the merit of the matter; it is only on the question of
entertainment of the appeals before the Tribunal. Therefore, what
is required by us to do is to notice the statutory provisions and to
analyze as to whether the order of the learned Single Judge suffers
from want of tenability in law.

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7. Two dates assume significance. On 14-11-2021, the
license is granted to the Association under the APMC Act by the
office Bearers. It is cancelled by the Director of Agricultural
Marketing on 15-09-2025. This cancellation comes to be challenged
before the learned single judge in W.P.No.107119 of 2025 and
connected case. The learned Single Judge disposes the petition by
the order dated 27-10-2025. It reads as follows:
“…. …. ….
12. ANSWER TO POINTS NO.1 AND 2: Whether
the present writ petition is maintainable in
view of Section 72E of the Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation
and Development) Act, 1966? AND
Whether the Order passed by the Director,
Agriculture Marketing comes within the
purview of Section 72D of the Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation
and Development) Act, 1966, i.e., within the
jurisdiction of the direct agriculture
marketing?
…. …. ….
12.12. Insofar an appeal is concerned, Section 72E
provides for any person aggrieved by an order of
the director of agriculture marketing or authorised
officer passed under Section 72C and Section 72D
to prefer an appeal. Having come to a conclusion
that the Order passed by the Director of
Agriculture Marketing is within the ambit and
jurisdiction of Section 72D, I am of the considered
opinion that the petitioner Jai Kisan and the
others have an alternative efficacious remedy in
terms of Clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section
72E of an appeal to be filed before the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal.

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12.13. When such an alternative efficacious remedy is
available, this court would normally not entertain
any proceeding by way of a writ petition, more so
when there are disputed questions of fact. The
respondents alleging that there are defaults and
breaches committed by the petitioner, the
petitioner contends that there is no such breach or
default committed.

12.14. There being several documents on record, both
parties would have to have an opportunity to
defend their respective position. In that view of
the matter, there being disputed questions of
facts, a remedy of an appeal before the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal would be the proper and
effective remedy instead of a summary
proceedings before this court.
12.15. Hence, I answer point No.1 by holding that the
Order passed by the Director of Agriculture
Marketing is within the purview of the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal in view of Section 72D of the
Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing
(Regulation and Development) Act, 1966.
12.16. I answer point No.2 by holding that the Petitioners
have an alternative efficacious remedy in terms of
appeal under Section 72E of the Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and
Development) Act, 1966.
13. ANSWER TO POINT NO.3: Whether a writ petition
is maintainable?
13.1. In View of my answers to point Nos 1 and 2, I am
of the considered opinion that it would not be
proper for this court to examine the veracity and
validity of the Order of the Director Agriculture
Marketing. All these aspects would have to be
determined by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal if
an appeal is so filed. As indicated supra, this court
cannot determine the validity of the allegations in
a summary proceedings.
13.2. In that View of the matter, I answer point No.3 by
holding that the veracity and validity of the Order
passed by the Director of Agriculture Marketing is

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left open to be decided by the Karnataka Appellate
Tribunal.
14. ANSWER TO POINT NO.4. What Order?
14.1. In View of my answers to point Nos. 1, 2 and 3,
the petitioner having an alternative, efficacious
remedy, both the above petitions are dismissed .”

This is called in question by the Association before the Division
Bench in W.A.100752 of 2025. The Division Bench, after hearing
the parties, passes the following order on 08-12-2025:
“…. …. ….
7. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties
and on perusal of the entire writ appeal papers, we do not
find any error in the direction issued by the learned Single
Judge relegating the appellant to avail the remedy of appeal
provided under Section 72E of the 1966 Act. However, while
relegating the appellant to avail alternate remedy of appeal,
the learned Single Judge ought not to have made
observation at paragraph 12.11 of the impugned order
which reads as follows:
“12.11. In furtherance of the complaints which
have been received, inspections have
been carried out on various dates as
indicated supra, more so in March, April,
May, June, 2025. It is not a stray
inspection on part of the official
respondents but the facts and documents
on record establish a consistent default
on part of Jai Kisan. When such defaults
are committed, the same would come
both under Clause (b) and Clause (c) of
Subsection (1) of Section 72D inasmuch
as firstly there is a breach, secondly on
account of the actions on part of Jai
Kisan, the operation of the private
market yard has been obstructed.”
The above observation may influence the appellate
authority while considering the appeal independently. While
relegating a party to avail alternative remedy of appeal, an
observation, which would adversely affect such person,

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normally, could not be made by the Courts. While
remanding the matter, it would be open for the higher
Courts to make observation/s depending on the nature of
remand. While relegating the party to avail the alternative
remedy before the appellate authority, the appellate
authority shall be given a free hand to examine the appeal
on merits and any adverse observation while relegation
would prejudice the case of such person.
8. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
would submit that the appellant would file an appeal within
ten days.
9. In the above circumstances, we pass the
following:
ORDER
(i) The appellant shall avail the alternative
remedy of appeal provided under Section 72E
of the 1966 Act, as observed by the learned
Single Judge.
(ii) The appellate authority, while considering the
appeal, shall not look into the observations
made at paragraph 12.11 of the impugned
order or any other observation which would
have an adverse impact on the appellant, and
the appeal shall be considered independently
on its own merit.
(iii) If an appeal is filed within ten days, from the
date of uploading of this order, before the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, the appellate
Authority as far as possible consider the same
expeditiously and pass an order within six
months from the date of filing the appeal.”

The Division Bench affirms the finding of the learned Single Judge
and permits availment of an alternative remedy of filing an appeal
under Section 72E of the APMC Act and if the appeal could be filed
within 10 days from the date of uploading of the Division Bench's

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order, the Tribunal shall expeditiously pass an order within 6
months from the date of filing the appeal.
8. The Association prefers Co-operative Appeals 317 and 341
of 2025 before the Tribunal within 10 days after the order was
uploaded as directed by the Division Bench along with an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking the
benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by filing an affidavit
which reads as follows:
“ A F F I D A V I T
I, Sri. Karimsab K. Bagwan, aged about 69 years,
Secretary, Jai Kisan Wholesale Vegetable Merchant
Association, Belagavi, R/o. Belagavi today at Dharwad do
hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as follows :-
1. I am the secretary of appellant association and I
know the facts of the case. I say that the averments made
in main appeal may please be read as part of this affidavit.
I say that I have filed the above appeal challenging the
nd
Impugned order dtd. 15-9-2025 passed by the 2
respondent herein thereby cancelling the Private Market
License granted to the appellant under Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and
Development) Act 1966.
2. I say that the appellant being aggrieved by the
nd
impugned order passed by the 2 respondent Authority had
approached the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka Dharwad
Bench in W.P. No. 107119/2025 (GM-APMC) though the Act
of 1966 provided an appeal U/Sec. 72-E of the Act against
an order passed by the Director Agricultural Marketing
passed inter-alia U/Sec. 72(D) to this Hon'ble Tribunal,
under the bona fide belief that the Impugned order doesn't
satisfy the requirements of Sec. 72(D) and was prosecuting
the said writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court
diligently. The Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka heard the
said writ petition in detail on 25-9-2025 and reserved the

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petition for passing judgment/order and ultimately the final
order was pronounced dismissing the writ petition vide
order dtd. 27-10-2025 on the ground that the appellant has
alternative efficacious remedy of appeal before this Hon'ble
Tribunal and relegated the appellant to the appeal remedy.
However, the appellant being aggrieved by the order passed
by the Learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 107119/2025
(APMC) had preferred an appeal before the Hon'ble Division
Bench of High Court in W.A. No. 100752/2025 (APMC)
challenging the order passed by the Learned Single Judge
on TAR legal grounds. The said appeal was finally heard by
the Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court on 8-7-2025 and
disposed of the same with a direction to the appellant to
present the appeal within 10 days and with further direction
to this Hon'ble Tribunal to dispose of the appeal within 6
months without being influenced and without looking into
the observations made by the Learned Single Judge in its
order.
3. Under these circumstances, I state that the appellant
was diligently prosecuting the writ proceedings before the
Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in good faith and under the
bona fide belief. Ultimately the Hon'ble High Court declined
to entertain the said writ proceedings for defect of
jurisdiction and directed the appellant to approach this
Hon'ble Tribunal. Accordingly, the appellant has now
presented the appeal before this Hon'ble Tribunal
challenging the order dtd. 15-9-2025 passed by the
respondent authority. Therefore, in view of diligent and
bona fide pursuing the writ petition and writ appeal in good
faith before the Hon'ble High Court, the appellant could not
file the above appeal immediately before this Hon'ble
Tribunal within the limitation. Further the period spent in
bona fide pursue of legal proceedings before the court or
authority are excluded from counting of the period of
limitation and as such the time spent by the appellant in
bona fide pursuing the writ petition before the Hon'ble High
Court requires and deserves to be excluded by extending
the benefit of the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act
and the delay if any occurred in filing of the above appeal
requires to be condoned and the appeal deserves to be
entertained on its merits in the Interest of the justice and
equity.
4. I state that the appellant has a very good case on
merits and it is likely to succeed in the case. However, if
this Hon'ble Tribunal is not pleased to condone the delay, if
any caused in filing of the appeal, the appellant will suffer

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irreparable loss, damage and justice will also suffer in view
of the forcible and illegal closure of the market. Wherefore it
is most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased
to allow the accompanying application as prayed for therein
in the interest of the justice and equity.”

The Tribunal frames the following issues:
“…. …. ….
12. The points that arise for our consideration are: -
1. Whether the KAT Regulations confer
any vested or discretionary power to the
instant Tribunal to extend time or
condone delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 in respect of appeals
filed in realms of Section 72-E of allied
A.P.M.C. Act?
2. Whether this Tribunal is empowered to
invoke Section 14 of the Limitation Act
and enure relief under the KAT
Regulations?
3. Whether the Appellant proves that the
application in IA No. I filed under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act
deserves to be allowed?
4. What Order? ”

Answering the issues, the Tribunal orders as follows:
“…. …. ….
REASONS
14. POINT NO.1 : It is evident from records that the
instant Appeal is filed by invoking provisions under Section
72-E(1)(b) of the allied A.P.M.C. Act challenging the
impugned order dated 15.09.2025 passed by Respondent
No.2 authority. It is also pertinent to state primordially that
the mandate time line set under Section 72-E(1)(b) to

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prefer an appeal before instant Forum is within 30 days or
the receipt of the order, which is reproduced hereunder for
easy reference:
72-E. Appeal - (1) Any person aggrieved
by an order of the Director of Agricultural
Marketing or authorised officer, be passed under
sections 72-C and 72-D, as the case may be,
prefer an appeal,-
(a) to the Director of Agricultural Marketing,
where such order is passed by the authorised
officer within thirty days of receipt of the
order, and
(b) to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, where
such order is passed by the Director of
Agricultural Marketing within thirty days of
receipt of the order, in such manner, as may
be prescribed.
(2) The Appellate Authority, if it considers it
necessary so to do, grant a stay of the order
appealed against for such period as it may deem
fit.
(3) The order passed by the Director of
Agricultural Marketing or the authorised officer
shall, subject to the order in the appeal under this
section, be final.
15. In this context the relevant Rule 87-J of the
Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation and
Development) Rules, 1968 is also examined, which is
extracted for reference
87-J. Manner of Preferring Appeals :
A person aggrieved by the orders of the
Director of Agricultural Marketing may appeal
under Section 72-E(1)(b) of the Act, by
complying with the following requirements. -
(i) The appeal memo should be in writing
and duly signed and verified by the
appellant;
(ii) The certified copy of the decision or order
should be accompanied with the appeal
memo;

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(iii) The appeal should be properly stamped;
(iv) The appellant shall, when so required by
the appellate authority deposit a sum of
money as may be directed by the
appellate authority;
(v) The appeal may be filed personally or
through an advocate of the appellant.
16. It is crystal from careful perusal of the materials
on record that the instant Appeal is filed beyond the time
line with delay of 58 days. That, the Appellant and the
seriously contesting Respondents have placed marathon
pleadings and objections, added to this have enlightened
this Forum with mammoth arguments placing reliance on
celebrated dictums of Hon'ble Apex Court, which are taken
note of and asserted and assailed in superior paragraphs for
useful and profitable consideration. At this juncture it
becomes impeccable to state that without touching on
merits and demerits of case, the excerpts of application and
memorandum of objections are juxtaposed, the pivotal
point which arise for consideration is as to whether the
Appellant is entitled for the relief arrayed in the
Interlocutory Application by condoning the delay pleaded by
Appellant. When the said point is deciphered on the
backdrop of the salubrious decisions relied on by the
Appellant and the Respondents the given set of
circumstances, it becomes emphatic to state that in the
landmark dictums of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Ganesan (supra) and The Property Company (supra) , on
back drop of well settled ratio decidendii , has held that the
applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act is not
applicable to quasi-judicial authorities/Tribunals unless it is
expressly provided or by necessary implication of the
provisions in a the special law or local law. However, as
contended by the counsel for the Respondents, with regard
to the applicability of the Limitation Act the A.P.M.C Act and
the A.P.M.C. Rules is absolutely silent on the aspect of
limitation and its and its applicability in respect of appeals
before instant Forum.
17. At the risk of repetition, having due regards to
the facts, circumstances and arguments buttressed by
either sides designated Senior Counsel, it is pertinent to
note that the Appellant has relied on the dictum of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Sewing Thread
Company Ltd. Vs James Chadwick and Brothers Ltd.-(1953)
1 SCC 794 to lay emphasis on the applicability of the

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provisions of KAT Regulations in regulating the conduct of
appeal proceedings before this Tribunal and on the said
backdrop relying on the ratio laid down in the said
judgment, the forceful arguments is that Section 72-E or
any other provisions of the allied A.P.M.C. Act do not entail
any procedure for the future conduct of the appeals before
instant Forum, added to this the A.P.M.C. Act is silent on
the aspect of the applicability/no applicability of the
Limitation Act to appeals preferred under Section 72-E.
Wherefore, it becomes crystal after catching glimpse of the
appeal under Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C Act which has
landed in instant Forum for consideration, it has to be
determined according to the provisions of primordial KAT
Act under which the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal is
constituted and which confers the instant Forum the
authority in respect to the method and manner of exercising
that jurisdiction. Therefore, the appeals before this Tribunal
shall be regulated by the practice and procedures governed
under the provisions of KAT Regulations, added to this there
is no whisper in the provisions of the allied A.P.M.C. Act,
which prohibits the instant Forum from hearing appeals
arising under Section 72-E according to the KAT Act/Rules/
Regulations under which the other appeals are heard by the
Bench, but only couches statutory timeline. Section 72-E of
allied A.P.M.C. Act confers a right of appeal under said Act
and says nothing more about it as stated supra. When
situation stood so, instant Forum couched with the appellate
jurisdiction conferred by Section 72-E has to exercise that
jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other
appellate jurisdiction i.e. under the procedures and
provisions adumbrated under KAT Regulations. It is further
submitted that the allied A.P.M.C. Act is not a complete
code by itself and the proceedings of the appeal before
instant Forum is therefore governed by the provisions
emulating the KAT Act, Rules and Regulations.
18. That, the Learned senior counsel has
emphasized on the provisions of Regulation 4(b) and
Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations and has buttressed
his argument by relying on the decision of the Hon'ble High
Court of Karnataka in the case of Smt. Sudhatai and
Another vs the Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies and
others .
19. At this juncture, after giving anxious
consideration regarding the submissions made by the
Learned Senior counsel for the Appellant, it becomes

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necessary to extract the provisions contemplated under of
Section 15 of the KAT Act, which reads thus: -
15. Power to make regulations . The
Tribunal shall, with the previous sanction of the
State Government, by notification, make regulations
consistent with the provisions of this Act and the
rules made thereunder for regulating generally the
practice and procedure of the Tribunal and the
disposal of its business including regulations as to
the time within which, in the absence of any express
provision in the relevant enactment, appeals or
applications to the Tribunal may be filed and as to
the costs of or incidental to any proceedings before
the Tribunal.
20. That, from the plain reading of Section 15 of
said Act it is apparently clear that the Legislature has
conferred the authority on Karnataka Appellate Tribunal to
coin regulations regarding the practice and procedure of the
Tribunal. Wherein it is not in dispute that the Appeal in
question is covered by the provisions contained in the KAT
Act/ Rules and the relevant KAT Regulations. According to
Clause (vi) of Regulation 4, the memorandum of appeal
should state how the appeal or petition is in time.
Regulation 4(b) specifies that other than statutes/ special
law specified under Regulation 4(a), if the appeal or petition
is filed after expiry of period of limitation, it shall be
accompanied by an application for condonation of delay
supported by an affidavit. The provisions of Regulation 4
are extracted for reference at para 7 above.
21. In furtherance to this, clause 9(e) of the KAT
Regulations provides that, on presentation of appeal
petition as above, the Registrar shall examine or cause to
be examined to see if it is filed within the time prescribed
under the statute, rules or regulations and any other law for
the time being in force applicable to such appeal or petition.
How an appeal filed beyond time is to be considered is set
out in Regulation 9(f). Clause (f) of Regulation 9 which is
relevant, reads as under:
"If the appeal or petition is made after the
expiry of the period of limitation, the Registrar shall
place the same before a Member or Bench. The
Member or Bench if satisfied prima facie, that the
Appellant or petitioner was prevented by sufficient
cause from presenting the same within the period
prescribed by law, keep the question of limitation
open and admit the appeal or petition."

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22. Though in a different context of the case, the
Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Smt. Sudhatai (supra)
has held that the aforesaid regulation provides for
admission of appeals filed beyond time keeping open the
question of limitation. The Hon'ble High Court further held
that when a specific regulation is made providing for
admission of the appeal in the aforesaid manner, the
general principles which are applicable either under the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or under any other
law cannot be pressed into service to decide the rights of
the appellants in an appeal filed before this Tribunal. The
maintainability of the appeal or petition and its admission,
have to be decided strictly in accordance with the KAT
Regulations. It is pertinent to note here that the case
referred supra pertained to an appeal filed under the
provisions of Section 46 of the Karnataka Souharda
Sahakari Act, 1997 and at this juncture the recitation of
Section 46 assumes importance to draw a comparison with
the provisions of appeal under Section 72-E of the allied
A.P.M.C. Act.
Section 46. Appeal -An appeal against the decision
or award made under Section 41, or an order made
under section 37A shall lie to the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka
Appellate Tribunal Act 1976 (Karnataka Act No. 10
of 1976) within sixty days from the date of the
decision or award or order.
Provided that no appeal against an order, decision
or award for payment of money shall be considered
by the Appellate Authority unless it is accompanied
by satisfactory proof for having deposited with the
concerned cooperative twenty-five percent of the
amount due in terms of the order, decision or
award. After the disposal of the appeal, the amount
so deposited shall be adjusted towards the amount
of payable by the Appellant and in case no amount
is required to be paid by the Appellant, the amount
so deposited shall be refunded to him by the
cooperative.
23. From the plain reading of the aforesaid provision
it is seen that Section 46 of the Karnataka Souharda
Sahakari Act only provides for an appeal before this
Tribunal within 60 days from the date of the decision or
award or order made under Section 41, or an order made
under section 37-A without any reference to the
applicability of the Limitation Act which is akin to the
provision of Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C. Act.

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24. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
the Property Company (supra) has held that the provisions
of the Limitation Act, (provisions that lay down a prescribed
period of limitation as well as Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act respectively) would only apply to suits,
applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are
made under any law to ‘Courts' and not to those made
before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-
judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in
that regard; and further, the general rule as regards any
appeal or application filed before a 'Court' is that the
provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply, unless
indicated otherwise. Further, the Hon'ble Court observed
that the reverse is the general rule insofar as quasi-judicial
bodies or tribunals are concerned i.e., that the provision of
the Limitation Act, do not apply, unless indicated otherwise.
Therefore, in respect of quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals the
focus would shift to whether there is any "express inclusion"
rather than an “express exclusion".
25. That, at this juncture it is emphatic to impress
and stress on the provisions of Regulation 61 of Chapter
XII- Limitation of the KAT Regulations, which is extracted as
under:
61 (a) Whenever any law, under which the Tribunal
exercises jurisdiction, provides for filing of
an appeal, revision or review, but does not
specify the period of limitation therefor, the
following periods of limitation are
prescribed: -
1 First Appeal Sixty days
2 Second Appeal Ninety
Days

3 Revision One
hundred
and
twenty
days
4 Review Ninety
Days
5. For setting aside exparte order Thirty
Days

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(b) The provisions of Section 4, 5 and 12 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act No.36 of
1963) shall apply mutatis mutandis to all
appeals and petitions.

26. Therefore, from the above discussions, the
relevant provisions of the KAT Act and KAT Regulations, and
in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
The Property Company (supra) and the decision of the
Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in Sudhatai (supra) , it is
apparently evident that under the authority vested by the
Legislature to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal under
Section 15 of the KAT Act, the appeals under Section 72-E
of the A.P.M.C. Act before this Tribunal are governed and
regulated by the provisions of the KAT Regulations.
Consequently, by virtue of the provisions of clause 4(b),
9(e) and express inclusion of provisions of Section 4, 5 and
12 of Limitation Act in Regulation 61(b) of the KAT
Regulations, it is apparently clear that the Bench hearing an
appeal under Section 72-E of the A.P.M.C. Act is conferred
with authority to operate the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act in respect of appeals filed beyond the
prescribed period of 30 days. Hence, without hesitation we
proceed to answer Point No.1 in the Affirmative.
27. POINT NO.2 : It is the submission of the
learned senior counsel for the Appellant that, at the cost of
repetition, as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central
Excise and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal
Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others the time spent
by the Appellant in prosecuting the writ petition and the
writ appeal before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka is
obligated to be excluded for the purpose of calculation of
the limitation period under Section 72-E of the allied
A.P.M.C. Act. Further the learned senior counsel has relied
on the ratio of the judgement in P. Şarathy Vs State Bank of
India wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Section
14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of "Civil Court" but
only speaks only of a "Court". Any authority or Tribunal
having the trappings of a Court would be a "Court" within
the meaning of this section. That as per Section 11 of the
KAT Act, the proceedings before this Tribunal shall be
deemed to be a judicial proceeding and hence this Tribunal
is having the trappings of a Court. The learned senior
counsel relied upon Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act
which makes provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) of the Limitation Act applicable to special or local

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laws unless these provisions are not expressly excluded by
such special or local law. The senior counsel has also placed
heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
M.P. Steel (supra) wherein it was held that the principles of
the Limitation Act as contained in Section 14 would apply to
applications or appeals made before a quasi-judicial
body/tribunal, unless there is any express indication to the
contrary in the wording and scheme of the said provision.
Further, the senior counsel has relied on the decision in
Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,
Irrigation Department and Others wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court indicated that the principles underlying Sections 5
and 14 of the Limitation Act, stand on a different footing. It
was emphasized that while the power to excuse delay and
grant extension of time under Section 5 is discretionary, the
power to exclude time under Section 14 is mandatory when
the necessary ingredients are fulfilled. Since the case of the
Appellant fulfilled the necessary ingredients of Section 14,
the time spent by the Appellant in pursuing the abortive
proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court is to be excluded
for the computation of limitation.
28. Per contra the learned senior counsel for the
Respondent No.7 relying on the judgment of The Property
Company (supra) has vehemently argued that the Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that the statutory Appellate
authorities/Tribunals are merely administrative
forums/Tribunals and not "Courts" and Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, therefore per se does not, in terms apply to
proceedings before such Tribunals unless it is expressly
provided under the special or local law i.e. A.P.M.C. Act or
the KAT Regulations in the instant case. The learned senior
counsel has buttressed his arguments that M.P. Steel
(supra) had also indicated, which was subsequently laid
down in Ganesan (supra) , that it has been settled the
savings provision in the Limitation Act, i.e. Section 29(2), is
of no relevance when the special or local law deals with a
suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, which is to
be filed before a quasi-judicial body. The counsel has
further relied on the Property Company (supra) to stress
that the general rule insofar as quasi-judicial bodies or
tribunals are concerned is that the provisions of the
Limitation Act, do not apply, unless indicated otherwise.
Therefore, in terms of the principles laid down in The
Property Company (supra) judgement, the focus now would
shift to whether there is any "express inclusion" rather than
an “express exclusion" in the relevant Act i.e. A.P.M.C. Act
or the KAT Regulations and thereby has contended that in

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the absence of express inclusion of applicability of Section
14, either in the A.P.M.C. Act or the KAT Regulations, the
principles of Section 14 cannot be imported in the instant
case for exclusion of time spent in the course of the
abortive proceedings.
29. From the aforesaid discussion now, the question
of law for determination in the instant Appeal is whether
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in terms, or, in principle,
can be invoked by this Tribunal for excluding the time spent
by the Appellant in prosecuting the writ petition and writ
appeal before the Hon'ble High Court challenging the
impugned order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing
passed under Section 72-D under the A.P.M.C. Act, for
computation of the period of limitation for filing an Appeal.
under Section 72-E before instant Forum.
30. That, there is no room for argument that in the
judgments relied on by the Respondents and also the
Appellant herein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the
statutory Appellate authorities/ Tribunals are merely
administrative forums/Tribunals and not "Courts" and
Section 14 of the Limitation Act, therefore per se does not,
in terms apply to proceedings before such Tribunals unless
it is expressly provided under the special or local law. or
statute. Thus, where the Legislature prescribed a special
limitation of 30 days for the purpose of the appeal under
Section 72-E of the allied A.P.M.C. Act and the period of
limitation is to be computed after taking the aid of only
Section 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act provided under
Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations, wherein which the
specific inclusion of these sections meant that only limited
to the extent of Section 4, 5 and 12 the provisions of the
Limitation Act stood extended to appeals and petitions
before this Tribunal and the applicability of the other
provisions, including Section 14 by express exclusion/
necessary implication stood excluded.
31. The anathema question that remains is as to
whether the general principle underlying Section 14 is
applicable on grounds of justice, equity and good
conscience for excluding the time spent in prosecuting the
abortive proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court for
computing limitation for the purpose of appeal before
instant Forum. The senior counsel for the Respondents
maintains that the answer to this question, also, must be in
the negative because definite indications are available in the
scheme and language of the allied A.P.M.C. Act, which does

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not expressly or even by necessary implication conclude
that the provisions of Limitation Act apply to appeals under
the allied A.P.M.C. Act to the Tribunal. The senior counsel
for the Respondent enlightened that even for a moment if
the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant on the point that the allied A.P.M.C. Act is not a
complete code by itself and the appeals before KAT are
governed by the KAT Regulations i.e. Regulation 4(b) and
61(b) is acceded to by this Tribunal, however Regulation
61(b) excludes the application and operation of Section 14
of the Limitation Act even in principle or by analogy by this
Tribunal. Therefore, the delay condonation application of
the Appellant for exclusion of the time spent before the
Hon'ble High Court pursuing the writ proceedings is
outrightly liable to be dismissed since this Tribunal lacks the
jurisdiction to even consider such an application which is
founded on the strength of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
32. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior
counsel Sri.Ananth Mandagi, Regulation 61(b) has expressly
excluded the application of the principles underlying Section
14 of the Limitation Act and does not couch the jurisdiction
to the instant Tribunal to operate Section 14 and thereby
exclude such period for the computation of limitation.
Therefore, it is apparently evident that provisions of the
Limitation Act except to the extent and in the truncated
form embodied in Regulation 61(b) of KAT. Regulations is
only applicable for operation by this Tribunal i.e. only the
provisions of Section 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation Act shall be
applicable to the instant appeal.
33. Thus the principle that emerges from the
discussions and the judgments relied on by the contesting
parties in the instant Appeal is that, if the provisions in the
special statute i.e. Section 72-E of the allied A.P.M.C. Act in
the instant case, prescribes a certain period of limitation for
filing an appeal thereunder i.e. within 30 days of receipt of
the order and further, Regulation 61(b) of the KAT
Regulations provides in clear terms the applicability of only
Section 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, then this Tribunal
has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application
filed before it for excluding the time spent in prosecuting in
good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the
analogy of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
34. That, on the said foothold we are of the opinion
that the object, the scheme and language of the allied
A.P.M.C. Act and Rules read with Regulation 61(b) of the

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KAT Regulations does not permit the operation of Section
14 of the Limitation Act by this Tribunal, either, in terms,
or, in principle, for excluding the time spent by the
Appellant in prosecuting proceedings before the Hon'ble
High Court, for computation of the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 72-E of the
A.P.M.C. Act before the instant Forum. Accordingly, we
answer the Point No.2 coined by this Tribunal in the
Negative .
35. POINT NO.3 : From the foregoing discussions it
is imminent that the governing statute i.e. allied A.P.M.C.
Act prescribes limitation of 30 days for preferring an appeal
under Section 72-E before this Tribunal, but is silent on the
condonation power. But under the aegis of Section 15 of the
KAT Act, Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations confers
the instant Forum for the condonation power under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, but operation of Section 14 is
expressly and explicitly excluded. Now, the examination of
the instant application filed by the Appellant reveals that
the said application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act wherein it is prayed that for the reasons in the
accompanying Affidavit, this Tribunal be pleased to condone
the delay of 27 days in filing of the instant Appeal by
extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in
the interest of justice and equity.
36. That, in light of the detailed deliberations made
on Point No.1 and 2, the provisions of A.P.M.C. Act and
Rules read with KAT Regulations do not authorize instant
Forum for operation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,
either, in terms, or, in principle and whereby it is humbly
opined that there is no scope for instant Forum to consider
the exclusion of time spent by the Appellant in prosecuting
proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court, in computation
of the period of limitation prescribed under the allied
A.P.M.C. Act under Section 14.

37. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant has
relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy to advance the
arguments that the object of fixing the time limit to prefer
an appeal is not meant to destroy the rights of litigants, but
is founded on the public policy fixing a life span for the legal
remedy for the general welfare and the words "sufficient
cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive
a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, if

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the explanation does not smack of malafides or it is not put
forth as part of a dilatory strategy. Also, the senior counsel
has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Superintending Engineer & Anr. Vs.
Excise and taxation officer, Sunder Nagar/Assessing
Authority to take home the proposition that the provision of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to appeals filed
before this Tribunal which we have agreed to as discussed
in Point No.1. Further, that Regulation 61(b) expressly
incorporates Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thereby
conferring jurisdiction upon this Tribunal to condone delay
upon demonstration of sufficient cause.
38. Now, the examination of the affidavit
accompanying the instant application reveals that the
reasons for the delay assigned in the present case is solely
on account of the Appellant prosecuting the writ
proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court. The senior
counsel for the Appellant has explicated that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Steel (Supra) and
Consolidated Engineering (Supra) has referred to the
observations made in Parson Tools that the pendency of
proceedings of the nature contemplated under Section
14(2) of the Limitation Act may amount to "sufficient cause"
for condoning the delay and extending the limitation. It is
true that while Section 14 may not be expressly included for
operation under the KAT Regulations, however its
underlying equitable principles remain relevant. The
exclusion of Section 14 under Regulation 61(b) only bars
automatic exclusion of time, but does not bar consideration
of the same facts under Section 5 for extension of
limitation. Further, the provision of Section 5 operates on
broad equitable considerations and is the discretion of the
instant forum. The issue that crops for determination before
us is that the instant application having been filed under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, (i) whether the Appellant
has "satisfactorily explained" the delay of 58 days caused in
preferring the instant appeal and (ii) whether the Appellant
has made out "sufficient cause" for the purpose of
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
39. The facts of the case are that the Respondent
No.2 authority has passed the impugned order under
Section 72-D by the cancelling the private market license of
the Appellant by impugned order dated 15.09.2025. The
statutory remedy of appeal to this Tribunal against the
order of cancellation made by the Director of Agricultural
Marketing is provided under Section 72-E(1)(b) of the

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A.P.M.C. Act and the limitation prescribed is within 30 days
from the date of receipt of the order. As contended by the
counsel for Respondent No.5, that the Appellant's own
pleadings in the Affidavit demonstrates that the Appellant
approached the Hon'ble High Court notwithstanding the
availability of a statutory appeal under Section 72-E and
hence we specially make a note here that the Appellant
approaching the Hon'ble High Court is not a case of
bonafide confusion as to Forum.
40. Further, it is the contention of the Appellant that
the Hon'ble High Court proceedings were prosecuted in
good faith and under the bonafide belief, but the proceeding
failed for defect of jurisdiction. It is not the case of the
Appellant that it was genuinely unable to pursue the
statutory appeal due to a good faith mistake but
approached the Hon'ble High Court inspite of the same.
Therefore, the said argument of the Appellant is unfounded
particularly when the Appellant had full knowledge of the
statutory appeal route before this Tribunal under Section
72-E of the allied Act. When the statutory appeal under
Section 72-E seized before this Tribunal was within the
knowledge of the Appellant, now the contention of the
Appellant that the writ petition and writ appeal came to be
dismissed by the Hon'ble High Court for defect of
jurisdiction is not justified.
41. The Appellant was all along aware of the
statutory appeal remedy to this Tribunal and yet chose to
invoke writ jurisdiction by filing the writ petition
No.107119/2025 on 22.09.2025. Even after the writ
petition was dismissed on 27.10.2025 on the ground of
availability of alternative efficacious remedy before this
Tribunal, the Appellant chose to pursue writ appeal and
continued to keep the statutory remedy in abeyance. It is
pertinent to note here that after the dismissal of the writ
petition the Appellant has not preferred the writ appeal
before the Hon'ble High Court immediately or at least within
a reasonable time and it is seen that the writ appeal
No.100752/2025 against the order of the learned Hon'ble
Single Judge came to be filed only on 25.11.2025. There is
no explanation whatsoever as to why there was a
considerable delay in preferring the writ appeal. The said
writ appeal came to be dismissed on 08.12.2025 with a
direction to approach this Forum within a period of 10 days
from the date of uploading of the order and the instant
Appeal came to be filed on 12.12.2025. However, filing of
the Appeal within the time frame directed by the Hon'ble

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High Court, does not by itself, save the instant Appeal from
limitation and the statutory limitation period under the
provisions of Section 72-E(1)(b) of the A.P.M.C. Act
continues to govern the instant Appeal.
42. The Hon'ble Apex Court during the discussion in
the case of The Property Company (supra) has clarified that
when the Court extends time under Section 5, what
essentially occurs is that the applicant is required to satisfy
the Court about the existence of a sufficient cause starting
from the date on which limitation began till the actual date
of filing. Upon being satisfied about the existence of
sufficient cause, the Court then extends the prescribed
period of limitation itself till the date of filing of the appeal
or application, as the case may be, such that the appeal or
application is deemed to have been filed within limitation,
Now, with this background we have examined the delay
condonation application filed under Section 5 and the
accompanying affidavit. The impugned order is dated
15.09.2025 and the instant Appeal is preferred before this
Tribunal on 12.12.2025 i.e. after a span of 88 days from the
passing of the impugned order. The period of limitation
prescribed to prefer an appeal under Section 72-E(1)(b) of
the allied A.P.M.C. Act is within 30 days and thereby, the
limitation in the instant case began on 15.10.2025.
Therefore, there is an overall delay of 58 days in preferring
the instant Appeal. However, the perusal of the application
reveals that the Appellant has sought for condonation of
delay of only 27 days in preferring the Appeal under Section
5 of the Limitation Act by extending the benefit of Section
14 of the Limitation Act. It is seen that challenging the
impugned order dated 15.09.2025 the writ petition No.
107119/2025 was filed on 22.09.2025, which came to be
dismissed by order dated 27.10.2025, wherein the
Appellant was relegated to avail the statutory remedy of
appeal before this Tribunal. The Appellant has proceeded to
file the writ appeal on 25.11.2025, which was disposed by
order dated 08.12.2025. As contended by the Respondents,
the Appellant has not provided any arithmetic calculation or
made any efforts to demonstrate as to how the delay of 27
days is arrived at in the instant application, which is sought
for condonation by this Tribunal. It appears that the
Appellant has excluded the time period from 15.09.2025 to
27.10.2025 and 25.11.2025 to 11.12.2025 for the purpose
of computation of limitation under the pretext of Section 14
and has sought to condone the delay of the remaining
period from 28.10.2025 to 24.11.2025 for the purpose of
limitation.

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43. As rightly contended by the Respondents No.5
and 7, the Appellant has not disclosed the date of receipt of
the order, the date on which certified copies were applied
for/ copies were obtained nor the date of filing the writ
petition and the writ appeal, the date of presentation of the
appeal before this Tribunal, in the affidavit filed by the
Secretary of the Appellant Association. The burden entirely
vests on the Appellant to plead and prove the exact delay in
strict sense the exact dates, and the precise period sought
to be excluded. The Appellant has failed to provide the
breakup of days allegedly spent in the writ petition and the
writ appeal and in the first place, how the delay of 27 days
is arrived at and these legal lacunae does not come to the
aid of Appellant as there is no supporting documentary trail.
The affidavit is silent regarding the intervening gap of 28
days between the disposal of the writ petition and the
preferring of writ Appeal before the Hon'ble High Court i.e.
from 27.10.2025 to 25.11.2025.
44. It is also the submission of the counsel for the
Respondents, which is admitted by the counsel for the
Appellant, that in the proceedings before the Hon'ble
Division Bench, the counsel for the Appellant had sought an
indulgence in relation to the delay in approaching this
Tribunal, and the Hon'ble High Court expressly disapproved
such a submission and directed the Appellant to move this
Tribunal by filing such application as is permissible in law
before this Tribunal itself. It is axiomatic that condonation
of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of
the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be
exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of
delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the
only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may
be non-condonable due to want of acceptable explanation
whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can
be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory.
45. Now, with regard to the condonation of delay, in
Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
Ors. , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Court cannot
grant an exemption from limitation on equitable
consideration or on the ground of hardship and when
mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not
properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought
not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
Further, In Lanka Venkateswarłu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
the liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for

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delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of
limitation and the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the
concepts such as ‘liberal approach', justice-oriented
approach' and 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation. It has also been
settled in State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar
Chokhani & Ors. , that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for
condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Also, in Basawaraj
and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. The expression 'sufficient
cause' as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot
be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even
though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties
but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the Courts have no choice but to apply
the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the
delay on equitable grounds.
46. With this backdrop we proceed to examine the
instant application. As discussed in Point No.1 and 2 above,
since the benefit of Section 14 cannot be extended by this
Tribunal to the case of the Appellant for exclusion of the
time spent in pursuing the abortive writ proceedings before
the Hon'ble High Court, this Tribunal is now required to
examine whether the Appellant has provided satisfactory
explanation for the entire period of delay of 58 days to
establish "sufficient cause" for delay condonation. Even
going by the own pleadings of the Appellant in the instant
application under Section 5 for condonation of delay, the
Appellant has prayed to condone the delay of only 27 days
however, from the examination of the accompanying
Affidavit it is seen that the Affidavit is absolutely silent and
that there is no explanation whatsoever explaining the
delay of 28 days from 27.10.2025 to 25.11.2025 in the
Affidavit. It is crystal clear that when the instant application
is for condonation of delay of 27 days, the Appellant is
bound to necessarily explain with calculation of the
limitation period to show what was the time period spent
before the Hon'ble High Court in prosecuting the abortive
writ proceedings and also explain the reasons which
prevented the Appellant from approaching the instant
Forum during the intervening period of 28 days regarding
which a single line of explanation is not forthcoming in the
Affidavit.

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47. Further, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Kolanjiammal (D) (supra) relied on by
Respondents No.5 and 7, the failure of the Appellant to
avail of the specific appeal remedy cannot be ignored
merely because parallel proceedings were pending before
the Hon'ble High Court. The filing of writ petition for
whatsoever reasons did not suspend the statutory
obligation to seek redress under the A.P.M.C. Act. It is the
contention of the learned senior counsel of the Appellant
that though it was within the knowledge of the Appellant
that the appeal provision against the order of the Director
of Agricultural Marketing under Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C.
Act seized only before this Tribunal under Section 72-E,
however, the Appellant had approached the Hon'ble High
Court because of the disputation that the impugned order
passed by the Respondent No.2 did not come within the
purview of Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act i.e. within the
jurisdiction of Respondent No.2. The said contention of the
Appellant is also unsubstantiated as it can be seen that the
Hon'ble Single Judge while disposing the writ petition has
answered both these issues in the affirmative and relegated
the Appellant to avail statutory remedy of appeal before the
instant Forum. Also, if the facts are viewed independently, it
is not in dispute that the order impugned cancelling the
license of the Appellant Association is an order made under
Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act and the said order was
passed by the Director of Agricultural Marketing. The three
ingredients of the impugned order i.e. cancelling of the
private market license, under Section 72-D and the
authority who passed the order i.e. Director of Agricultural
Marketing, beyond doubt established that appeal under
Section 72-E(1)(b) against the said impugned order only
lies before the instant Forum. In view of the same the
disputation of the Appellant that they had approached the
Hon'ble High Court because the impugned order did not
come within the purview of Section 72-D of the A.P.M.C. Act
i.e. within the jurisdiction of Respondent No.2 does not find
substance since the issues of defects in the impugned order
could be agitated by the Appellant before the
appellate authority.
48. That, after detailed deliberations we are of the
opinion that if the Appellant has disabled itself from availing
the statutory remedy of appeal at its own will by not
evincing diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Tribunal
by taking appropriate steps within the prescribed time, the
Appellant cannot certainly be permitted to urge their lapse/
inaction as a ground before this Tribunal to exercise its

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discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in favour of
the Appellant. The delay or inaction of the Appellant in
pursuing statutory remedy of appeal before this Tribunal,
inspite of having full knowledge in this regard, in our
opinion does not meet the requirements to be a sufficient
cause for condonation of delay under Section 5. That
subsequent to the dismissal of the writ petition on
27.10.2025, the writ appeal came to be filed on
25.11.2025. There is a gap of 28 days during this
interregnum, which is considerably large taking into
consideration the time required to file a writ appeal under
the normal circumstances. But, now, the self-created
disability by the Appellant in not showing the calculation of
the exact number of days of delay and satisfactorily
explaining the entire period of delay of 58 days, in
particular the interregnum of 28 days, does not attract the
discretion of this Tribunal. Therefore, the only reasons
assigned by the Appellant that it did not approach this
Tribunal because it was pursuing writ proceedings before
the Hon'ble High Court in good faith and diligence, in our
considered opinion does not amount to be a "sufficient
cause" for condonation of delay of the entire period of 58
days in preferring the Appeal over the prescribed period of
30 days because of the pertinent fact that the Appellant
having the knowledge that the statutory remedy of appeal
against an order of cancellation of license by the Director of
Agricultural Marketing was only before this Tribunal, had
refrained from availing the remedial measure of appeal.
Also, the Appellant has miserably failed to explain the delay
for the entire period of 58 days and in the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation the delay cannot
mechanically condoned. The Hon'ble Apex Court in several
decisions has observed that in a matter of condonation of
delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be
adopted to advance substantial justice. However, the
instant application thoroughly fails on these aspects since
deliberate inaction to prefer an appeal before this Tribunal
within 30 days from the receipt of the impugned is writ
large, and gross negligence in not explaining the period of
delay of 27 days in their own application, is evidently
forthcoming in the instant application. Apparently, the
Appellant has not shown that it was prevented by sufficient
cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed period.
On the facts and in the circumstances, we are of the opinion
that there is apparently no due diligence on the part of the
Appellant in availing the remedy of appeal within the
prescribed period under the allied Act. The averments

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made in the application seeking condonation of delay in
filing the instant Appeal do not show any acceptable cause
much less sufficient cause to exercise the discretion to
condone the delay for a period of 58 days in favour of the
Appellant. Also, solely on the pleadings of the Appellant that
hardship was caused due to closure of the market cannot be
a ground to be considered for the condonation of the delay.
Hence, we proceed to answer Point No.3 in the Negative .
49. POINT NO.4 : In view of the above said
discussions on Point No.1, 2 and 3 and for the reasons
stated therein, we proceed to pass the following:
::ORDER::
The interim application No.1 filed by
the Appellant under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act seeking condonation of
delay in filing the instant Appeal is hereby
rejected.
Consequently, the instant Appeal is
dismissed as barred by limitation.
In the facts and circumstances of
the case, no order to costs.”

It is this action of the Tribunal in rejecting the appeals on the
ground of limitation, the Association along with others again knock
at the doors of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
Nos. 104886 of 2026 c/w W.P.Nos.104603/2026, 105156/2026
and 105517/2026. The learned Single Judge answering the
contentions disposes the writ petitions by the following order:
“…. …. ….
11. It is pertinent to notice Section 72-E of the
APMC Act, which stipulates the appeal remedy as under:
“ 72-E. Appeal. – (1) Any person aggrieved by an
order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing or

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authorized officer, be passed under Sections 72-C
and 72-D, as the case may be, prefer an appeal,-
(a) to the Director of Agricultural Marketing, where
such order is passed by the authorised officer within
thirty days of receipt of the order; and
(b) to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, where such
order is passed by the Director of Agricultural
Marketing within thirty days of receipt of the order,
in such manner, as may be prescribed.
(2) The Appellate Authority, if it considers it
necessary so to do, grant a stay of the order
appealed against for such period as it may deem fit.
(3) The order passed by the Director of Agricultural
Marketing or the authorised officer shall, subject to
the order in the appeal under this section, be final.”
12. A plain reading of Section 72-E(1)(b) of the
APMC Act indicates that any person aggrieved by an order
of the Director of Agricultural Marketing may prefer an
appeal to the Tribunal within 30 days of receipt of the copy
of the order.
13. The Tribunal has been constituted under the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Act, 1976 [Hereinafter
referred to as the ‘KAT Act’]. Section 15 of the KAT Act
enables framing of regulations. Regulation 61 of the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Regulations, 1979 [Hereinafter
referred to as the ‘KAT Regulations’], reads as under:
“61. (a) Whenever any law, under which the
Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, provides for filing of
an appeal, revision or review, but does not specify
the period of limitation therefor, the following
periods of limitation are prescribed:-

1. First appeal .. .. Sixty days
2. Second appeal .. .. Ninety days
3. Revision .. .. One hundred and
twenty days
4. Review .. .. Ninety days
5. For setting aside .. .. Thirty days
ex-parte order
(b) The provisions of Sections 4, 5 and
12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act No.
36 of 1963) shall apply mutatis mutandis to all
appeals and petitions.”

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14. It is clear from a plain reading of Section 72-E
of the APMC Act that an appeal would lie being aggrieved by
the order dated 15.09.2025 to the KAT. It is in view of the
said provision that this Court in the earlier round of
litigation did not entertain the writ petitions filed by the
Association and the Traders. A bare perusal of Rule 61 of
the KAT Regulations indicates that in the absence of any
other law stipulating a period of limitation, a first appeal
before the Tribunal ought to be filed within 60 days.
Further, Regulation 61(b) specifically stipulates that the
provisions, inter alia , Section 5 of the Limitation Act would
apply mutatis mutandis to all appeals and petitions.
15. It is clear from the aforementioned that Section
72€ of the APMC Act provides for filing of the Appeal to the
Tribunal, within 30 days, being aggrieved by an Order
passed by the respondent No.1-Director of Agricultural
Marketing. Regulation 61(b) of the KAT Regulations,
specifically stipulates that the provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act would apply to appeals filed before the
Tribunal.
16. In view of the clear stipulations, as noticed
above, the conclusion of the Tribunal in considering the
application for limitation cannot be faulted.
17. Although it is the vehement contention of the
learned counsel for the APMC in support of
W.P.No.105517/2026 that the finding of the Tribunal on
Question No.5 is erroneous having regard to the fact that
the Parent Act, i.e., 1966 Act, does not contain a stipulation
regarding the applicability of the provisions of Limitation
Act, 1963 [Hereinafter referred to as the ‘1963 Act’] and the
recourse of the Tribunal in considering the application for
condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the 1963 Act
is erroneous, the said submission is ex facie untenable and
liable to be rejected having regard to the appeal remedy as
provided under the APMC Act as well as the provisions of
KAT regulations as noticed above.
18. With regard to the order of the Tribunal
refusing to condone the delay of 01 month and 10 days in
filing the appeal, the Tribunal has undertaken a detailed
examination of the relevant fact situation as well as noticed
various judgments that were cited between the parties.
However, the Tribunal has held that pursuing of the writ
petitions by the Association would not suspend the statutory
obligation of the individual trader in seeking redressal under
the provisions of the APMC Act. In this context, as already

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noticed above, the individual traders had also filed
W.P.No.107123/2025 before the Court.
19. A perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the
application for condonation of delay by the Tribunal clearly
discloses that the reason for the condonation of delay was
that the appellant before the Tribunal awaited the outcome
of the writ petitions that were filed before this Court. It is
further pertinent to note that the writ petition was disposed
of on 27.10.2025 and the appeals were filed on 25.11.2025,
i.e., within 30 days of the disposal of the writ petitions. This
is notwithstanding the fact that the writ appeal
(W.A.No.100752/2025) was disposed of on 08.12.2025.
20. It is further relevant to notice that the order
dated 15.09.2025 passed by respondent No.1/Director of
APMC, is sought to be impugned in the appeals filed before
the Tribunal. The said order cancels the license that was
issued under Section 72-E of the APMC Act, under which a
private market yard was established. The said order dated
15.09.2025 adjudicates upon valuable rights of traders.
Hence, it is expedient that the statutory right of appeal
vavailable to an aggrieved party ought not to be ordinarily
denied.
21. Although it is the vehement contention of the
learned counsel for the APMC that the said private market
yard was not functional, the said aspect is required to be
decided when the merits of the order dated 15.09.2025 are
adjudicated upon.
22. At this juncture, this Court is constrained to
place on record the conduct of the APMC, which is a body
created by a statute, in agitating the present issue.
23. Notwithstanding the fact that the application
for condonation of delay was vehemently opposed before
the Tribunal, both by the APMC as well as by the original
complainant, which aspect is forthcoming from a bare
perusal of the impugned Orders dated 29.04.2026, the
APMC has also resorted to filing an independent writ
petition (W.P.No.105517/2026) impugning the findings in
the impugned order with regard to question No.1. Even the
present writ petitions were sought to be vigorously pursued
by putting forth various contentions. The said exercise has
been done with the sole purpose of delaying/defeating the
aggrieved parties from availing their statutory remedy of an
appeal vis-à-vis the order dated 15.09.2025 passed by
respondent No.1.

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24. It is also relevant to notice here that in the
earlier round of litigation, the writ petitions filed by the
traders as well as the association were contested on the
ground of availability of alternate remedy of an Appeal
before the Tribunal; and when the association and the
traders filed the appeal, the same was contested on the
ground that the said appeals are filed belatedly.
25. This aspect of the matter is required to be
viewed from the fact that it is the persistent request made
on behalf of the association and traders for grant of an
interim relief vis-à-vis the order dated 15.09.2025.
However, since the interim relief was not considered by the
Tribunal, having regard to the pendency of the applications
for condonation of delay, it is expedient that the aspect of
interim relief is not considered for the first time in the
present petitions.
26. In view of the discussions made above, the
Tribunal was justified in answering question No.1 in the
‘affirmative’, that the provisions of the Limitation Act could
be resorted for the purpose of considering the application
for condonation of delay. Further, the finding of the Tribunal
on question No.2 in refusing to condone the delay is exfacie
erroneous and is to be set aside.
27. Hence, the following:
ORDER
i. W.P.No.104886/2026 and W.P.No.
104603/2026 are partly allowed.


ii. W.P.No.105517/2026 is dismissed with
₹
cost of 25,000/-payable by the APMC to
the Karnataka State Legal Services
Authority within two weeks from date.


iii. W.P.No.105156/2026 is dismissed.


iv. The Orders dated 29.04.2026 passed in Co-
Operative Appeal No.317/2025 and Appeal
No.341/2025 dismissing I.A.No.1 filed in
the said appeals under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act are set aside.


v. I.A.No.1 filed in Co-Operative Appeal
No.317/2025 and Appeal No.341/2025

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seeking condonation of delay are hereby
allowed.


vi. The parties shall appear before the Tribunal
on 27.07.2026 at 11.00 a.m., without the
requirement of any further notice in this
regard.


vii. Consequent to the appearance of the
parties, the Tribunal shall adjudicate upon
the Appeals on merits in accordance with
law.


viii. It shall be open for the petitioners herein to
seek consideration of any interim
applications that have been filed in the
above appeals.


ix. Having regard to the directions passed by
the Division Bench of this Court in Writ
Appeal No.100752/2025, the Tribunal shall
adjudicate upon the appeals within four
months from 27.07.2026.”

9. The issue now would be, whether the Tribunal was right in
rejecting the appeals on the ground of delay. Certain statutory
provisions are necessary to be noticed. Filing an appeal under the
APMC Act is dealt with under Section 72E of the APMC Act. It reads
as follows:
“ 72-E. Appeal .—(1) Any person aggrieved by an
order of the Director of Agricultural Marketing or authorised
officer, be passed under Sections 72-C and 72-D, as the
case may be, prefer an appeal,—
( a ) to the Director of Agricultural Marketing, where
such order is passed by the authorised officer
within thirty days of receipt of the order; and
( b ) to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, where such
order is passed by the Director of Agricultural

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Marketing within thirty days of receipt of the
order, in such manner, as may be prescribed.
(2) The Appellate Authority, if it considers it
necessary so to do, grant a stay of the order appealed
against for such period as it may deem fit.
(3) The order passed by the Director of Agricultural
Marketing or the authorised officer shall, subject to the
order in the appeal under this section, be final.”

The Tribunal regulates its procedure under the Appellate Tribunal
Act. Certain provisions of the Appellate Tribunal Act are necessary
to be noticed. Section 6(2) of the Appellate Tribunal Act reads as
follows:
“ 6. Conduct of business of the Tribunal .—(1) The
powers of the Tribunal in all matters relating to appeals,
revisions and other proceedings shall subject to the
provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) be exercised by a
Bench of two members, of whom one shall be a District
Judge, constituted by the Chairman.

(2) A single member of the Tribunal may,
subject to any special or general orders made in this
behalf by the Chairman, exercise the powers of the
Tribunal in respect of,—
( i ) admission of an appeal or revision
petition;
( ii ) admission of an appeal or revision
petition presented after the expiry of
the period allowed by law;
( iii ) stay orders pending disposal of an appeal,
revision, reference or other proceedings;
( iv ) any matter of an interlocutory character in
appeals, revisions, references or other
proceedings;
( v ) such other matters and subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed.

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(3) The Bench hearing any matter relating to,—

( a ) the Department of Co-operation, shall
consist of,—
( i ) a District Judge; and
( ii ) a Co-operation Member;
( b ) the Department of Commercial Taxes, shall
consist of,—
( i ) a District Judge; and
( ii ) a Commercial Taxes Member;

(4) *

(5) Where an appeal, revision, reference or
application is heard by a Bench, the appeal, revision,
reference or application shall be decided in accordance with
the opinion of the majority;

Provided that where the Bench hearing the appeal or
application is composed of two members and those
members differ in opinion, they shall place the papers of the
case before the Chairman for the constitution of a full Bench
under Section 7.
…. …. ….

15. Power to make regulations.—The Tribunal
shall, with the previous sanction of the State
Government, by notification, make regulations
consistent with the provisions of this Act and the
rules made thereunder for regulating generally the
practice and procedure of the Tribunal and the
disposal of its business including regulations as to the
time within which, in the absence of any express
provision in the relevant enactment, appeals or
applications to the Tribunal may be filed and as to the
costs of or incidental to any proceedings before the
Tribunal. ”

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Section 6(2) deals with admission of appeal or revision petition.
Section 15 empowers the Tribunal to make regulations for the
purpose of its functioning. It also becomes apposite to notice the
Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Regulations, 1979. Regulation 61
assumes significance, it reads as follows:
“…. …. ….
CHAPTER XII
Limitation
61. (a) Whenever any law, under which the
Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, provides for filing of
an appeal, revision or review, but does not specify
the period of limitation therefore, the following
periods of limitation are prescribed:-
1. First appeal : Sixty days
2. Second : Ninety days
appeal
3. Revision : One hundred and twenty days
4. Review : Ninety days
5. For setting aside :
ex parte order
Thirty days

(b) The provisions of Sections 4,5 and 12 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (Central Act No.36 of
1963) shall apply mutatis mutandis to all
appeals and petitions. ”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)

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Regulation 61(a) mandates that whenever any law under which the
Tribunal exercise jurisdiction, the period stipulated for filing an
appeal, first appeal is 60 days, second appeal is 90 days, so on and
so forth. Regulation 61(b) is indicative of the fact that the
provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act shall apply
mutatis mutandis to all appeals and petitions.
10. The submission of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant that the Limitation Act is not applicable to the statute,
i.e., the APMC Act, may in the first blush become acceptable, but a
deeper delving would lead to the submission getting tumbled down
on the ground that the Division Bench had clearly permitted 10
days. The Tribunal ought not to have overreached the time
stipulated by the Division Bench and dismissed the appeal on the
ground of limitation. The Tribunal appears to have blissfully ignored
the procedure stipulated for its functioning under the regulation,
which clearly makes the Limitation Act, mutatis mutandis,
applicable to its procedure.
11. Insofar as the judgments relied on by the respective
learned senior counsels, there can be no qualm about the principles
laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments relied on by the
appellants and the respondents, but they are inapplicable to the

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fact situation, as the fact situation is completely covered by the
orders passed by this Court, both by the learned single Judge and
that of the Division Bench, which have become final inter-parties.
12. Therefore, finding no merit in these appeals, the appeals

must fail and they accordingly stand rejected.



Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE


bkp
CT: ASC