STATE OF KARNATAKA vs SHASHIKIRAN G

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WA No. 909 of 2026


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

®
TH
DATED THIS THE 28 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026


PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN

WRIT APPEAL NO. 909 OF 2026 (LA-RES)

BETWEEN:


1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY
VIDHANA SOUDHA
DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560001

2. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M S BUILDING
DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560001

3. UNDER SECRETARY
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M S BUILDING
DR. B R AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560001

4. SPECIAL LAND ACQISITION OFFICER
III FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK, V.V. TOWER
DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560001

5. ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
AND INSPECTOR GENERAL OF PRISONS
NO.4, SESHADRI ROAD
BENGALURU - 560001

6. CHIEF JAIL SUPERINTENDENT
PARAPPANA AGRAHARA CENTRAL PRISON










Digitally
signed by
VASANTHA
KUMARY B K
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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WA No. 909 of 2026


PARAPPANA AGRAHARA, HOSA ROAD
ELECTRONIC CITY
BENGALURU - 560100

7. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT
BEHIND KANDAYA BHAVANA
KEMPE GOWDA ROAD
BENGALURU - 560009

8. REVENUE INSPECTOR
SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
NO.14, III FLOOR, PODIUM BLOCK
V V TOWER, DR. B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 560001

9. TAHSILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
KANDAYA BHAVAN
KEMPE GOWDA ROAD
BENGALURU - 560009

10. STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY TO
HOME DEPARTMENT AND PRISONS
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU - 560001

11. THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER
PARAPPANA AGRAHARA POLICE STATION
BENGALURU - 560109
…APPELLANTS

(BY SRI M.N. SUDEV HEGDE, AGA)

AND:

1. SRI SHASHIKIRAN G
S/O K G GOVINDAPPA
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
SITE NO.43 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

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WA No. 909 of 2026



2. SRI M DASHARATHA REDDY
S/O CHIKKA MUNISWAMY REDDY
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS
SITE NO. 19 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

3. SRI K G GOVINDAPPA
S/O GOPAL
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
SITE NO. 44 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

4. SRI HARISH G. NAIK
S/O GANGA NAIK
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
SITE NO.31 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

5. SMT. KAMALA G NAIK
W/O GANGA NAIK
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
SITE NO.32 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

6. SRI K. NAGESH
S/O KARIYANNA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
SITE NO. 14 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

7. SMT. K.M. SHAKUNTHALA
W/O G.A. KRISHNA
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS

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WA No. 909 of 2026


SITE NO.53 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

8. SRI K. RAVINDRANATH
S/O K. RAMA RAJU
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
SITE NO.74 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

9. SRI IMMANUEL MORAIS
S/O SUSAI LOUIS MORAIS
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
SITE NO.33 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

10. SRI AMEER SHAFIULLA KHAN
S/O LATE ALHAMED ULLA KHAN
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS
SITE NO.4 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

11. SRI V SUBRAMANYA
S/O V RAJAIAH
AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS
SITE NO.26 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP, WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

12. SMT. PARVATHAMMA
W/O LATE VENKATESH
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
SITE NO.13 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP, WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

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WA No. 909 of 2026



13. SRI C M KEMPAIAH
SINCE DEAD BY LR

13.1 SMT. K. RATHNA,
W/O LATE C.M.KEMPAIAH
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS
R/AT NO.27, JAIL ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

(AMENDED V/O
DATED 07.09.2026)

14. SRI K SOMASUNDRAPPA
S/O LATE REVANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS
SITE NO. 51 OF SY NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

15. SRI H N MOHAN KUMAR
S/O H M NAGARAJ SETTY
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
SITE NO. 12 OF SY NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

16. SMT. B PANKAJAKSHAMMA
SINCE DEAD BY LR

16.1 SRI B. SUDHAKAR
S/O LATE B. PANKAJAKSHAMMA
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/AT NO.11, JAIL ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

(AMENDED V/O
DATED 07.09.2026)

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WA No. 909 of 2026


17. SMT. B L CHETANA
W/O B V LAVAKUMAR
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
SITE NO. 9 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

18. SMT. M B VIJAYA RAGHU
W/O M B RAGHAVENDRA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
SITE NO. 8 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

19. SMT C NIRMALA
W/O K RAJU
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
SITE NO. 59 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

20. SRI K PRASARADHI
S/O LATE A KOTHANDA MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 78 YEARS
SITE NO.63 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

21. SMT E AMIRTHAVALLI
W/O K PARTHASARADHI
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS
SITE NO. 63 OF SY NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

22. SMT. RATHNAMMA
W/O K RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS,
SITE NO. 3 OF SY.NO. 65/1

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WA No. 909 of 2026


JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
BBMP WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

23. SRI RAVI RAJENDRA KUMAR J
S/O JOSEPH C R
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
SITE NO.46 AND SITE NO 47
OF SY.NO 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

24. SRI K NANJUNDAPPA
S/O KALAPPA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
SITE NO.20 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

25. SMT. MAHADEVAMMA W/O RAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
SITE NO.35 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

26. SRI G PICHAI
S/O S GANAPATHY SUBRAMANIAN
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS
SITE NO.6 AND SITE NO.7
OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

27. SRI T G ARUN KUMAR
S/O A V THANDAVARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
SITE NO.19 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

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WA No. 909 of 2026


28. SRI K RAGHU
S/O BHASKAR UDUPA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
SITE NO. 66 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

29. SMT. VANITHA
W/O C KRISHNA MURTHY
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
KATHA NO.786
(SITE NO.69 OF SY.NO.65/1)
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

30. SRI C KRISHNA MURTHY
S/O CHIKKA HONNAPPA
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
KATHA NO. 780
(SITE NO. 68 OF SY.NO. 65/1)
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO. 191
BENGALURU

31. SMT. SWARAN KAUR
W/O AMARJIT SINGH
AGED ABOUT 81 YEARS
SITE NO.7 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

32. SRI KOMARRAJU BABU RAO
S/O K PRASADA RAO
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
SITE NO.34 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

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WA No. 909 of 2026


33. SMT. BENEDICT MARY W/O MATHEW
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
SITE NO.67 OF SY.NO.65/1
KATHA NO.125/65
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

34. SMT. PREMA KUMARI
W/O P N UTHAPPA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
SITE NO.62 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

35. SHRI K P NARASIMHA RAJ
S/O LATE KADIRAPPA
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
SITE NO.50 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

36. SMT. S USHA
W/O S V SATHYANARAYANA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
SITE NO.48 OF SY.NO. 65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

37. SHRI JOY STEPHEN
S/O P J STEPHEN
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
SITE NO. 60, SITE NO. 61 &
SITE NO. 41 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

38. SHRI S RAMACHANDRA
S/O K SURYANARAYANAPPA
(DELETED V/O DATED 07.09.2026)

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WA No. 909 of 2026



39. SHRI V H CHANNAPPA
S/O VEERAPPA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
SITE NO.73 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

40. SHRI N V NAVEEN
S/O N VEERABHADRAIAH
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
SITE NO.65-2 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

41. SHRI K SRINIVAS RAJU
S/O K KANNAIAH RAJU
AGED ABOUT 54 EYARS
SITE NO.75 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

42. SMT. USHA RAJA
W/O M.V.A. RAJA
AGED ABOUT 87 YEARS
SITE NO.8 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

43. H JAYAMMA
D/O HANUMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS
SITE NO.9 AND SITE NO.10
OF SY.NO.65/1, JAIL ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

44. SHRI GOPAL
S/O LATE ERAPPA

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WA No. 909 of 2026


AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
SITE NO.1 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

45. SHRI RAMESH T
S/O THANGAVELU
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
SITE NO.35 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

46. SHRI L H JANARDHAN RAO
AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS
SITE NO.24 AND
SITE NO.25 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

47. KANNAN ANNAMALAI
S/O LATE ANNAMALAI
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
SITE NO.5 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

48. ANAND ANNAMALAI
S/O LATE ANNAMALAI
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
SITE NO.6 OF SY.NO.65/1
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

49. B L SRINIVASA SETTY
SITE NO.17 AND SITE NO.35(A)
JAIL ROAD, NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P WARD NO.191
BENGALURU

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WA No. 909 of 2026


50. SRI BELLUR S. RAVISHANKAR
S/O LATE B.M. SUBANNA
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS
CURRENTLY R/AT 18012
BLACK GOLD WAY BOYD'S
MARYLAND - 20841

BEING REPRESENTED
BY HIS GPA HOLDERS
SRI B.S. ARUN KUMAR
S/O LATE B.M. SUBANNA
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
R/AT NO.2906/1, POTOMAC HILL
APARTMENT -A2
GOKULAM MAIN ROAD
V.V. MOHALLA
MYSURU-570 002

51. LATE PRAMILA SINCE DECEASED
BEING REPRESENTED BY HER LRS

51(a) A V ANANTH RAM
S/O. LATE PRAMILA AND
LATE A.V. VISWANATH
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
SY. NO.66, JAIL MAIN ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P. WARD NO.191, B B M P
SINGHASANDRA WARD
BENGALURU-560 100

51(b) ANITHA A.V
D/O LATE PRAMILA AND
LATE A.V. VISWANATH
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
SY.NO.66, JAIL MAIN ROAD
NAGANATHAPURA
B.B.M.P. WARD NO.191, B.B.M.P
SINGHASANDRA WARD
BENGALURU-560 100

52. SRI KARIYANNA
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS
S/O LATE VEERANAGAPPA

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WA No. 909 of 2026


R/OF BHAKTHARAHALLI
KASABA HOBLI
MADHUGIRI TALUK
TUMKURU DISTRICT
PIN CODE-572 102

53. P.M. SRINIVASA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS
S/O LATE MUNIYAPPA
R/AT NO.306, 1ST FLOOR
14TH CROSS, 8TH MAIN
SECTOR-6, HSR LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 102

54. SMT. UMA DEVI
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS
W/O LATE KRISHNA REDDY
R/AT AT NO. 306
I FLOOR, 14TH CROSS
8TH MAIN, SECTOR-6
HSR LAYOUT
BENGALURU -560 102

55. SRI NARAINDAS BODARAM
S/O LATE BODARAM AHUJA
SINCE DEAD BY LRS

55(a) SHRI ABHISHEK AHUJA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
S/O LATE NARAINDAS BODARAM
R/AT PHOENIX KESSAKU MIZU
24 AND 25
DR. RAJKUMAR ROAD
RAJAJINAGAR
1ST BLOCK
BENGALURU-560010

55(b) SHRI GAURAV AHUJA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
S/O LATE NARAINDAS BODARAM
OFFICE AT NO.33, 3RD FLOOR
SNS CHAMBERS, NO.239
SANKEY ROAD

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WA No. 909 of 2026


SADASHIVANAGAR
BANGALORE-560080
(AMENDED V/O
DATED 07.09.2026)

56. SRI M DEVENDRA
S/O LATE U MANI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS
NO. 2453, 17TH E CROSS
9TH MAIN, BSK 2ND STAGE
BENGALURU-560070

57. SRI K SWARUP KUMAR REDDY
S/O LATE K RAMALINGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
R/AT NO. 1113, 3RD FLOOR
'HSG PEARL', 3RD CROSS
25TH MAIN, 1ST PHASE
J P NAGAR, BENGALURU-560078

58. SRI SADASIVA REDDY
S/O LATE B P NARAYANA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
NO. 1, SOURABHA
NAVARATHAN GARDENS ROAD
MUNI REDDY LAYOUT
1ST BLOCK, NARAYANA NAGAR
BENGALURU-560062

59. SMT. P MANGALESHWARI
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS
W/O M S PALANICHAMI
R/AT NO. 3054, 8TH MAIN
BANASHANKARI II STAGE
BENGALURU-560070

60. M VASANTHA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
W/O M S PRABHAKAR GUPTA
R/AT NO. 25, SUNKENAHALLI
BULL TEMPLE ROAD
BENGALURU

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WA No. 909 of 2026


61. SMT. K RUKMINI
SINCE DEAD REP BY HER LRS

61(a) K. VEERESHAM
H/O LATE K. RUKMINI
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS
R/AT NO.31, SUNKENAHALLI
BULL TEMPLE ROAD
BENGALURU

61(b) K SUMITH KUMAR
S/O LATE K. RUKMINI
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
R/AT NO.31, SUNKENAHALLI
BULL TEMPLE ROAD
BENGALURU

61(c) K. SHASHI KIRAN
S/O LATE K. RUKMINI
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
R/AT NO.31, SUNKENAHALLI
BULL TEMPLE ROAD
BENGALURU

62. SMT. REDDY KANTHAMMA
W/O LATE NAGABASI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS

63. SMT. KAVITHA
D/O LATE NAGABASI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS

64. SRI NARESH KUMAR
S/O LATE NAGABASI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS

65. SRI SURESH KUMAR SADIPIRALLA
S/O LATE NAGABASI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS

ALL ARE R/AT FLAT NO.302
"BON VIVEUR HEIGHTS"
1ST CROSS
8TH B' MAIN

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WA No. 909 of 2026


VIJAYA BANK COLONY
BENGALURU-560 076

66. SRI S PRABAKAR
SON OF L V SRINIVASAN
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.17
MIG KHB COLONY,
MANGALA KALYANA MANTAPA
KORAMANGALA, VI BLOCK
BENGALURU-560 095

67. SRI B.C. KUMAR
S/O LATE B C CHIKKEGOWDA
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.666
10TH 'A' CROSS ROAD
4TH MAIN ROAD, SRINAGAR
BENGALURU-560 050

68. SMT. RADHA SITARAM
AGED ABOUT 92 YEARS
W/O LATE RAMA IYER SITARAM
R/AT NO. 96, "SANTHRUPTHI"
OPP. PARK, III MAIN
(OLD 17TH CROSS)
ITI LAYOUT
CHANDRA LAYOUT, I STAGE
BENGALURU-560 039

BY HER ATTORNEY
SRI NAGARAJU
S/O LATE VENKATARAVANAPPA
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
R/AT NO. 96, SANTHRUPTHI
OPP. PARK, III MAIN
(OLD 17TH ROSS)
ITI LAYOUT
CHANDRA LAYOUT I STAGE
BENGALURU-560 039
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI KIRAN KUMAR K, ADVOCATE FOR R1 TO R12, R13(a),
R14, R15, R16(a), R17 TO R21, R23 TO R25, R29 TO R36, R39

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WA No. 909 of 2026


TO R43, R44 TO R46, R47 TO R50, R51.1, R51.2, R66, R67,
R22, R26, R27, R28, R37 & R44 TO R46;
SRI RAMU SREEKANTAIAH, ADVOCATE FOR R62 TO R65;
SRI MANMOHAN P.N. FOR SRI VINAY .N, ADVOCATES FOR R59,
R60, R61.1, R61.2 AND R61.3;
SRI G.V. CHANDRASHEKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H.C. SUNDARESH AND SRI SUHAS .S, ADVOCATES FOR
R53 & R54;
SRI CHANDRAIAH, ADVOCATE FOR R68;
SRI BHUVAN B M FOR SRI B.C. SEETHARAMA RAO,
ADVOCATES FOR R52;
SRI ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI ABHINAY Y.T., ADVOCATE FOR R56 TO R58;
SRI G. SRIDHAR, ADVOCATE FOR R55(a) & R55(b);
SRI MAHESH H.S., ADVOCATE FOR R55;
SRI BYREGOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R56 TO R58)


THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE FINAL ORDER
DATED 02/05/2025 PASSED IN W.P.NOS.51697/2013,
51672/2013, 57465/2013, 1114/2014, 4611/2014, 4456/2017,
47110/2017, 21618/2022, 2438/2023, 14658/2024 AND
35725/2024 BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE AND ALLOWED
THE SAID WRIT PETITIONS IN PART.

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 10.09.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
D K SINGH PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

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WA No. 909 of 2026



CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN


CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)

At the heart of the present controversy lies a question
that must be examined in the broader context of the
evolving needs of society, the administration of criminal
justice, and the State’s constitutional obligation to
maintain an effective and humane custodial system. As
society grows and the nature and incidence of crime
present ever-evolving challenges, the need for adequate
custodial facilities, capable of accommodating persons
committed to judicial custody while ensuring security,
discipline and dignity, assumes increasing significance.
The establishment and expansion of prisons must,
therefore, be viewed not merely as an administrative
response to the demands of confinement, but as an
essential component of the criminal justice system.
Modern penology recognises that imprisonment is not
confined to retribution alone – it must also create
conditions conducive to reformation, rehabilitation and

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WA No. 909 of 2026


the eventual reintegration of prisoners into society.
These objectives cannot be achieved without adequate
space and infrastructure for secure accommodation,
segregation, healthcare, education, vocational training,
psychological support and other rehabilitative measures.
The Central Prison at Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru,
being a vital institution in the custodial framework of the
State, must be equipped to meet these expanding
requirements. The acquisition of additional land for its
expansion must accordingly be assessed in the light of
the growing needs of society, the imperatives of public
safety, and the larger public interest in maintaining a
prison system that balances the legitimate demands of
custody with the enduring objectives of correction and
reformation.

I PREFACE:
The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant-State,
aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated
02.05.2025 passed in W.P.No.51697/2013 and connected
matters, wherein the writ petitions filed by the
Respondent-landowners were partly allowed.

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WA No. 909 of 2026


II BRIEF FACTS:
The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as
follows:
1. The Respondents are the respective landowners of
lands situated in Sy.Nos. 65, 66, 67/2, 68/1, 69, and 71,
in total measuring 19 acres 18 guntas situated in
Naganathapura Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South
Taluk (hereinafter referred to as ‘subject lands’).

st
1 Set of Notifications
2. The Appellant – State issued a notification dated
19.02.1980, proposing to acquire the lands in Sy.No. 65
for the purpose of Central Jail, Bengaluru. The Appellant
– State utilised the said notified land for the purpose of
providing a road to the new central jail.

3. Thereafter, a notification dated 09.03.1989 was
issued by the Appellant-State, proposing to acquire the
remaining extent of lands in the subject lands. This was
followed by a Final Declaration dated 24.05.1990 being
issued u/s 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as ‘1894 Act’). This was

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WA No. 909 of 2026


challenged by the Respondent-landowners in
W.P.No.6153/1990 and connected matter. Subsequently,
the Respondent-State withdrew the Final Declaration
dated 24.05.1990, and vide order dated 26.08.1992, the
writ Court disposed of the Writ Petitions as having
become infructuous.

nd
2 Set of Notifications
4. The Appellant – State issued another Preliminary
Notification dated 22.12.1998 u/s 4(1) of the 1894 Act
notifying the remaining extent of land for the purpose of
construction of new Central Jail, Bangalore. Vide order
dated 10.06.2001 passed by the Appellant – State under
Section 17 of the 1894 Act, the Appellant – State
permitted the acquisition of the remaining lands. The said
order was challenged in W.P.No.10883/2012, and vide
order dated 12.04.2012, a Coordinate Bench of this Court
allowed the writ petition, quashed the order dated
20.06.2001, and granted liberty to the State to take
action in accordance with law by issuing a notification
under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act and granting an

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WA No. 909 of 2026


opportunity of being heard to the Respondent-
landowners.
rd
3 Set of Notifications
5. Thereafter, the Appellant – State issued a
Preliminary Notification dated 19.07.2012 under Section
4(1) of the 1894 Act, proposing to acquire the very same
remaining subject lands. The Respondent-landowners
filed their objections before the Appellant No.4-Special
Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) on 23.08.2012, and the
Appellant No.2 – SLAO passed an order on
25/26.03.2013, explaining the existing condition of the
land and requesting to take appropriate decision in the
matter. Thereafter, the Appellant – State issued Final
Declaration dated 07.08.2013 under Section 6(1) of the
1894 Act.

6. Aggrieved by the Preliminary Notification dated
19.07.2012 and Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013, the
Respondent-landowners filed W.P.No.51697/2013 and
connected matters praying for quashing of the said
Notification and Declaration. Vide impugned order dated
02.05.2025, the learned Single Judge partly allowed the

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WA No. 909 of 2026


batch of writ petitions, quashed the Final Declaration
dated 07.08.2013 and directed the Appellant – State to
take an appropriate decision afresh after taking into
consideration the report of the Appellant No.2 – SLAO
issued under Section 5A(2) along with the objections filed
by the Respondent-landowners under Section 5A(1) as
well as the version of the Additional Director General of
Police and Inspector General of Prisons as expeditiously
as possible.
7. Being aggrieved by the impugned order dated
02.05.2025, the present writ appeal has been filed by the
Appellant-State. On 29.07.2026, this Court passed the
following interim order with a direction to maintain status
quo over the possession, construction, and development
over the lands in question:
“Sri K. Kiran Kumar, learned counsel
undertakes to file vakalath for respondent
Nos.1 to 50.
I.A.No.1/2026 is filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, by the learned AGA seeking
to condone the delay of 259 days in filing
the appeal.
Till date no objection has been filed by
respondents to I.A.No.1/2026.

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WA No. 909 of 2026


Considering the reasons assigned in the
affidavit accompanying the application,
delay of 259 days is condoned.
I.A.No.1/2026 is allowed.
The parties are directed to maintain status
quo in respect of possession, construction
and development in respect of the lands in
question, until further orders.
Learned AGA appearing for the appellants
submits that hand notice has been served
on the respondents, hence there is no
requirement for paying the process fee.
Post this appeal on 12.08.2026.”


III SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
8. Sri M N Sudev Hegde, learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for the Appellants has submitted that the
subject notified lands are all required for buffer zone and
construction of Prison as required by Rule 876(IV) of Chapter
45 of Prisons Correctional Services Manual, 2021 for the safety
and security of the Prisons. There shall be no building or
construction upto 200 meters of main wall of Central Prison. It
has been further submitted that since the notified lands come
within the area of buffer zone and are located within 200
meters of the mail wall, they are inevitably necessary and find
their place for acquisition.

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WA No. 909 of 2026


8.1 It has been further submitted that the Final Declaration
herein dated 07.08.2013 was in consonance with the 1894 Act
after hearing the objections of the Respondent-landowners and
thus, there was no failure on part of the State in not complying
with Section 5A of the 1894 Act.

8.2 It has been further submitted that in order to reduce the
overcrowding of Prison, high security Prison is required to be
built on the premises. If the land is de-notified, there is
possibility of unauthorised, irregular constructions coming up in
the buffer zone. Since the Prison is a very sensitive area, there
poses a security risk that when there is construction of multi-
storied building and high-rise apartments in the buffer zone,
there is a possibility of entry of mobiles, Ganja, etc. which will
affect the administration and safety of the Prison.

8.3 It has been submitted that more than a thousand officers
and staff sanction are to be near the Prison for Emergency
duty. Therefore, it is necessary to acquire the notified lands not
only for construction of Prison, but also to construct Staff
Quarters.

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WA No. 909 of 2026


8.4 It is further submitted that there is no alternate land
available for construction of the Jail for overcrowding prisoners,
presently exceeding 5000 in the existing Central Jail. The
learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned order, noted
that the extent of 113 acres of land at Devanahalli is for an
authorised capacity of 600 Prisoners only for the Devanahalli
Taluk, Bengaluru Rural District. Therefore, the objections filed
by the Respondent-landowners before the Appellant No.2 –
SLAO under Section 5A of the 1894 Act, which came to be
relied upon by the learned Single Judge, are not sustainable
and ought to be rejected. Further, since the compensation
amount is already quantified in respect of the Notified Lands
during the acquisition proceedings, the acquisition ought to be
upheld.

IV SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:
9. Learned Counsels appearing for the respondent-
landowners has submitted that the report prepared under
Section 5A of the Appellant No.2 – SLAO dated 25/26.03.2013
is against the proposed acquisition of the lands. The said report
records the objections raised by the Respondent-landowners

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WA No. 909 of 2026


and also sets out the observations of the Appellant No.2 –
SLAO.

9.1 It has been submitted that the Final Declaration dated
07.08.2013 passed under Section 6(1) of the 1894 Act by the
Appellant – State in respect of the proposed acquisition is
vitiated by the absence of any prior decision of the appropriate
Government to acquire the subject lands. The formation of such
a decision by the appropriate Government is a condition
precedent to the lawful exercise of power under Section 6(1)
and in absence of the same, the impugned Final Declaration is
without jurisdiction and ultra vires the provisions of the 1894
Act, and is, therefore, liable to be quashed and set aside.

9.2 It has been further submitted that since the acquisition
proceedings have been initiated, and the Final Declaration
dated 07.08.2013 has been issued, without compliance with the
statutory precondition and without lawful authority, the
deprivation of the Respondent-landowners’ properties is
contrary to Article 300A of the Constitution of India.

9.3 It has been submitted that the correspondence dated
14.06.2012 issued by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO to the

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WA No. 909 of 2026


Appellant NO.7 – Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban
District, records the observations and views of the Appellant
No.2 – SLAO opposing the proposed acquisition of lands.

9.4 Reliance has been placed on the following decisions to
support the abovementioned contentions:
1. NARENDRA & CO. (P) LTD. v. WORKMEN, (2016) 3
SCC 340
2. USHA STUD & AGRICULTURAL FARMS (P) LTD. v.
STATE OF HARYANA, (2013) 4 SCC 210
3. HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. v. DARIUS
SHAPUR CHENAI, (2005) 7 SCC 627
4. WOMEN'S EDUCATION TRUST v. STATE OF
HARYANA, (2013) 8 SCC 99
5. KAMAL TRADING (P) LTD. v. STATE OF W.B., (2012)
2 SCC 25

9.5 It is submitted that the report of the Appellant No.2 –
SLAO dated 25.03.2013 recommends that it is not possible to
keep the said buffer zone on all sides, and since the cost of
acquisition is high and unbearable for the Government and

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WA No. 909 of 2026


specifically, the Home and Economic Department was to
examine and decide the purpose of acquisition of lands.

9.6 It is further submitted that prior to 2017, no landlord had
challenged the acquisition. The writ petitions were filed by the
purchasers of the notified lands prior to the issuance of the
Preliminary Notification under Section 4(1) dated 19.07.2012.
These writ petitions were filed on the ground that despite the
purchasers of subject lands submitting their objections before
the Appellant No.2 – SLAO during the Section 5A proceedings,
their names were not recorded as landowners in the Final
Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the
1894 Act.

9.7 Learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 53 and
54, submitted that the Report dated 25.03.2013 issued by
Appellant No.2 – SLAO under Section 5A of the 1894 Act noted
that the Appellant No.5 - Additional Director general of Police,
along with the Inspector General of Karnataka Prisons,
Bangalore – being the land acquisition agencies – did not
appear during the inquiry proceedings and hence, cannot assail
the said Section 5A Report. Thus, the issuance of the Final

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WA No. 909 of 2026


Declaration dated 07.08.2013 under Section 6(1) of the 1894
Act without considering the statutory report stood vitiated.

9.8 It is further submitted that the State has not maintained
any buffer zone towards the Western Side of the Central Prison.
It is to be noted that houses have been constructed at a
distance of 4 meters from the compound wall. Further, the
lands in Sy.No.49/1 measuring 2 acres 10 guntas were acquired
by the Appellant – State vide Preliminary Notification dated
23.04.1992 and Final Declaration dated 10.03.1994. The said
notification and declaration were challenged by the landowners
in W.P.No.46244/2001 before this Court. Vide order dated
04.06.2007, this Court quashed the said final declaration.
Thereafter, no steps were taken by the State to acquire the said
lands. It is also to be noted that the lands in Sy.No.49/1 is
attached to the existing Central Jail, and the same has not been
notified for acquisition in the impugned notifications.

9.9 It has been submitted that the writ Court, in its order
dated 04.06.2007, noted that the total unused land that is
available with the Department of Prisons is 34 acres. Apart
from the 34 acres of unused land, new constructions are
coming up in an extent of 16.23 acres and 4 acres to

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WA No. 909 of 2026


accommodate 1000 male prisoners and 500 female prisoners
respectively. It can be inferred that the request of beneficiary of
the lands – Department of Prisons – as projected vide the
acquisition proceedings has been met. According to the
Appellant – State, there is unutilised land to an extent of 138
acres in Devanahalli Taluk itself.

9.10 Learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.68 has
submitted that as per the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation,
once the earlier acquisition proceedings have been withdrawn,
the Respondent-landowners legitimately believed that their
properties stood released permanently. Due to inordinate delay
and laches, the Preliminary Notification is of 2012, and even
after lapse of more than a decade, the award amount has not
been deposited, and no lawful possession has been taken over
the notified lands.

9.11 It has been submitted that the proceedings under Section
5A before the Appellant – SLAO were empty and vague. The
objections filed by the Respondent-landowners were not
objectively considered by the Appellant – SLAO before
preparing the report under Section 5A(2). The SLAO himself
reported existence of RCC buildings, residential layouts,

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WA No. 909 of 2026


engineering workshops, and developed sites existing on the
subject notified lands. Since the Final Declaration dated
07.08.2013 does not consider the said report of the SLAO, it
suffers from non-application of mind.

9.12 It has been contended that the scope of jurisdiction of the
High Court in a writ appeal does not include re-appreciation of
evidence, and that findings based on records cannot be
substituted merely because another view is possible. A
complete re-hearing of the writ petitions, as sought for by the
Appellants, is impermissible under law.

V ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
10. In the light of the pleadings on record, the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, and the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, the
following issues arise for our consideration:
i. Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
quashing the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013
and directing the State to take a fresh decision
after considering the report of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer, the objections of the

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WA No. 909 of 2026


landowners, and the views of the Additional
Director General of Police and the Inspector General
of Prisons, or whether the impugned order warrants
interference in the present writ appeal?
ii. Whether the procedure for acquisition of lands as
stipulated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has
been duly followed by the State Authorities,
particularly in the light of the report of the Special
Land Acquisition Officer and that of the views of the
Additional Director General of Police and the
Inspector General of Prisons?
iii. Whether the proposed acquisition of the subject
lands for the expansion and security of the Central
Prison at Parappana Agrahara, including the
provision of a buffer zone and staff quarters,
constitutes a sufficient ‘public purpose’ to sustain
the acquisition, having regard to the objections
concerning the existing prison infrastructure,
alternative lands, and the availability of unutilised
land at Devanahalli?

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WA No. 909 of 2026



VI ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
11. We have heard the contentions of the learned Counsels
appearing for the parties. Since the issues are inter-linked, our
discussion will consider the aforementioned issues together.

12. Before we go into the averments of the parties with
respect to the issues for consideration, it is necessary to take
note of the provisions of Sections 5A and 6 of the 1894 Act,
which are extracted as hereunder:
"5A. Hearing of objections.
(1) Any person interested in any land which
has been notified under section 4, sub-
section (1), as being needed or likely to be
needed for a public purpose or for a
Company may, [within thirty days from the
date of the publication of the notification],
object to the acquisition of the land or of
any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1)
shall be made to the Collector in writing,
and the Collector shall give the objector an
opportunity of being heard [in person or by
any person authorized by him in this behalf]
or by pleader and shall, after hearing all
such objections and after making such
further inquiry, if any, as he thinks
necessary, [either make a report in respect
of the land which has been notified under
section 4, sub-section (1), or make different
reports in respect of different parcels of
such land, to the appropriate Government,
containing his recommendations on the

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WA No. 909 of 2026


objections, together with the record of the
proceedings held by him, for the decision of
that Government]. The decision of the
[appropriate Government] on the objections
shall be final.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a person
shall be deemed to be interested in land
who would be entitled to claim an interest in
compensation if the land were acquired
under this Act.]

6. Declaration that land is required for
a public purpose.
(1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of
this Act, [appropriate Government] is
satisfied, after considering the report, if any,
made under section 5A, sub-section (2)],
that any particular land is needed for a
public purpose, or for a Company, a
declaration shall be made to that effect
under the signature of a Secretary to such
Government or of some officer duly
authorized to certify its orders [and different
declarations may be made from time to time
in respect of different parcels of any land
covered by the same notification under
section 4, sub-section (I) irrespective of
whether one report or different reports has
or have been made (wherever required)
under section 5A, sub-section (2)];
[Provided that no declaration in respect of
any particular land covered by a notification
under section 4, sub-section (1)-
(i) published after the commencement of
the Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but
before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of
1984), shall be made after the expiry of

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WA No. 909 of 2026


three years from the date of the publication
of the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,
1984 (68 of 1984), shall be made after the
expiry of one year from the date of the
publication of the notification:]
[Provided further that] no such declaration
shall be made unless the compensation to
be awarded for such property is to be paid
by a Company, or wholly or partly out of
public revenues or some fund controlled or
managed by a local authority.
[Explanation 1. - In computing any of the
periods referred to in the first proviso, the
period during which any action or
proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the
notification issued under section 4, sub-
section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court
shall be excluded.
Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to
be awarded for such property is to be paid
out of the funds of a corporation owned or
controlled by the State, such compensation
shall be deemed to be compensation paid
out of public revenues.]
(2) [Every declaration] shall be published in
the Official Gazette [and in two daily
newspapers circulating in the locality in
which the land is situated of which at least
one shall be in the regional language, and
the Collector shall cause public notice of the
substance of such declaration to be given at
convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the dates of such publication and the
giving of such public notice, being
hereinafter referred to as the date of the
publication of the declaration), and such
declaration shall state] the district or other
territorial division in which the land is

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WA No. 909 of 2026


situate, the purpose for which It is needed,
its approximate area, and, where a plan
shall have been made of the land, the place
where such plan may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive
evidence that the land is needed for a public
purpose or for a company, as the case may
be; and, after making such declaration, the
[appropriate Government] may acquire the
land in manner hereinafter appearing."

Consideration of the Availability of Alternative Lands by
the SLAO under Section 5A(2) of the 1894 Act Renders
the Finding of the Learned Single Judge to the Contrary
Unsustainable
13. It is the contention of the Appellant – State that the
procedure as laid down in Section 5A of the 1894 Act was duly
followed by considering the objections of the Respondent-
landowners. However, it is the contention of the Respondent-
landowners that the objections filed before the Appellant No.2 –
SLAO during the 5A inquiry proceedings were not objectively
considered. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned order,
has observed that the Appellant No.2 – SLAO, in his report
dated 25.03.2013, has not considered the objection of
availability of alternate lands in Devanahalli Taluk as raised by
the Respondent-landowners. The question that arises for our
consideration is whether the Appellant No.2 – SLAO’s non-
consideration of the objection of alternate lands being available,

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WA No. 909 of 2026


as raised by the Respondent-landowners, would render the
report of the SLAO under Section 5A(2) and the subsequent
Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 void.

14. A perusal of the report dated 25.03.2013 prepared under
Section 5A(2) of the Act would indicate that the objections were
duly considered by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO before making
the recommendations. It is also to be noted that the SLAO has
considered the objection of the availability of alternate land and
has recommended discussions at a high level over the
utilisation of the same. Relevant extract of the said order is as
follows:
“Even if I fix the price of the land today, it is
likely to be hundreds of crores of rupees in
the above context. It should be noted here
that the government has to spend hundreds
of crores of rupees to build a prison. As a
solution to this, as mentioned in the
objection, it is necessary to discuss at a
high level why a small portion of the
113 acres of land in Devanahalli taluk,
Vijayapura hobli, Koramangala village
belonging to the Prison Department
should not be used. If this is done, the
government will not be able to pay for
the land to build the prison. The
government will save hundreds of
crores of rupees.
A 220 kilowatt high-voltage power line
passes through the lands subject to land
acquisition. It is against the law to build a

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WA No. 909 of 2026


building inside this power line and on its
side. Crores of rupees may be spent to
replace the high-tension line, this matter
also needs to be discussed at a high level.
The Bangalore Development Authority
prepared the 2015 Comprehensive Intensive
Development Plan in 2007. In this, the lands
subject to land acquisition have been
earmarked for agricultural and
commercial/industrial purposes. These lands
are not reserved for public purposes. This is
also an important factor to be examined in
the land acquisition process.
It is not possible to keep a 75-meter buffer
zone on all four sides around the new
building for the prison.
The above points are facts. Since the cost
of this land acquisition is high and
unbearable for the government, the
government is free to take an
appropriate decision after a thorough
examination in the backdrop of this
difficult reality .”

15. The objection of availability of alternate lands was not
only considered by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO but also
suggested for discussions at a high level before proceeding with
the acquisition of the subject lands since the cost of such
acquisition would be saved by utilising the alternate lands.
Thus, we find that the observation of the writ Court that there
has been no whisper with regard to consideration of the
alternative lands is unsustainable and contrary to the material
available on record.

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WA No. 909 of 2026



Objective Consideration of Objections under Section
5A(2) of the 1894 Act Does Not Require Elaborate
Discussion of Each Objection, and the Absence Thereof
Does Not, by Itself, Render the SLAO’s Report or the
Subsequent Final Declaration Invalid
16. It is well settled that the Report of the SLAO prepared
under Section 5A(2) is to be made after not only giving an
opportunity of being heard to the landowners but also
considering the objections with due application of mind.
However, it is further well settled that the exercise undertaken
by the SLAO while considering objections under Section 5-A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is essentially administrative in
nature and does not require an adjudication akin to that
rendered by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. The statutory
requirement is that the objections raised by the persons
interested must receive due, fair and objective consideration
before the SLAO forms an opinion and submits the report to the
appropriate Government. The law does not mandate that each
objection must be dealt with separately or answered in an
elaborate manner, nor does it require the SLAO to record
detailed reasons in the form of a judgment. What is material is
that the consideration undertaken is real and substantive, and
not merely mechanical or perfunctory. The report, when read as

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WA No. 909 of 2026


a whole and in the context of the material available on record,
must reflect due application of mind to the objections raised
and the issues arising therefrom.

17. The adequacy of consideration by the SLAO, therefore,
cannot be judged merely by the length of the report or the
extent of discussion devoted to each objection. Brief reasons
and concise recommendations would satisfy the requirement of
law where they sufficiently indicate that the objections have
been considered objectively and that the report has been
prepared upon due application of mind. The absence of an
elaborate discussion on a particular objection would not, by
itself, lead to an inference that such objection was not
considered, particularly where the report or the
contemporaneous record demonstrates otherwise. At the same
time, the requirement of objective consideration cannot be
reduced to a mere formality, and a report reflecting a
mechanical rejection of objections without due consideration
would not meet the statutory mandate. The test, therefore, is
whether the report, read as a whole and in the light of the
relevant record, demonstrates genuine consideration of the
objections and a reasoned formation of opinion, and not

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WA No. 909 of 2026


whether every objection has been dealt with in exhaustive
detail.

18. In HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.
ABHISHEK GUPTA (2024 SCC ONLINE SC 2991) , the
Supreme Court held that Section 5A mandates a procedure and
not a particular outcome, and laid down the procedure as
follows:
“13. It would be pertinent to understand the
object that Section 5A of the 1894 Act seeks
to fulfil. A plain reading of the provision
indicates that it codifies the fundamental
safeguard of audi altrem partem.
Landowners have the opportunity to
demonstrate that the acquisition is against
public purpose or marred by mala fides. In
the event the landowner presents a cogent
case, the appropriate government may
exempt such land from acquisition. By
enabling landowners to put forward their
perspective and elucidate their
remonstrances, Section 5A envisions a
modus of deliberation and consultation,
which must therefore be construed to be
mandatory, akin to a right. (Women's
Education Trust v. State of Haryana, (2013)
8 SCC 99)
14. Objections under Section 5A of the 1894
Act most often proceed in four distinct
stages:
i. The filing stage : Landowners can file
objections within thirty days of the
notification issued under Section 4 of the
1894 Act;

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WA No. 909 of 2026


ii. The hearing stage : The Collector must
provide an oral hearing to the objecting
landowners, either in person or through a
pleader/authorized representative; ( NOIDA
v. Darshan Lal Bora, 2024 INS 508)
iii. The recommendation stage : The
Collector—after hearing objections and upon
further inquiry—makes a report to the
appropriate government containing their
recommendations; and
iv. The decision stage : The appropriate
government considers the Collector's report
and takes a final decision on the objections.”

19. The learned Single Judge has relied on the decision in
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF HARYANA
[(2012) 1 SCC 792] to observe that the report of the SLAO
dated 25.03.2013 does not reflect objective consideration of
the objections raised. We find the said observation to be
unsustainable, inasmuch as it has been already observed that
the objections have been duly considered by the SLAO in the
report dated 25.03.2013. The relevant paragraphs of the said
decision are as follows:
“39. In this context, it is necessary to
remember that the rules of natural justice
have been ingrained in the scheme of
Section 5-A with a view to ensure that
before any person is deprived of his land by
way of compulsory acquisition, he must get
an opportunity to oppose the decision of the
State Government and/or its

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WA No. 909 of 2026


agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the
particular parcel of land. At the hearing, the
objector can make an effort to convince the
Land Acquisition Collector to make
recommendation against the acquisition of
his land. He can also point out that the land
proposed to be acquired is not suitable for
the purpose specified in the notification
issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he
can produce evidence to show that another
piece of land is available and the same can
be utilised for execution of the particular
project or scheme.
40. Though it is neither possible nor
desirable to make a list of the grounds
on which the landowner can persuade
the Collector to make recommendations
against the proposed acquisition of
land, but what is important is that the
Collector should give a fair opportunity
of hearing to the objector and
objectively consider his plea against
the acquisition of land. Only thereafter,
he should make recommendations
supported by brief reasons as to why
the particular piece of land should or
should not be acquired and whether or
not the plea put forward by the
objector merits acceptance. In other
words, the recommendations made by
the Collector must reflect objective
application of mind to the objections
filed by the landowners and other
interested persons .”

20. In UNION OF INDIA v. SHIV RAJ [(2014) 6 SCC
564] , the Supreme Court held as follows:
“13. Section 5-A(2) of the 1894 Act, which
represents statutory embodiment of the rule
of audi alteram partem, gives an

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opportunity to the objector to make an
endeavour to convince the Collector that his
land is not required for the public purpose
specified in the notification issued under
Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act or that there
are other valid reasons for not acquiring the
same. Thus, Section 5-A of the 1894 Act
embodies a very just and wholesome
principle that a person whose property is
being or is intended to be acquired should
have a proper and reasonable opportunity of
persuading the authorities concerned that
acquisition of the property belonging to that
person should not be made.
14. On the consideration of the said
objection, the Collector is required to make
a report. The State Government is then
required to apply its mind to the report of
the Collector and take final decision on the
objections filed by the landowners and other
interested persons. Then and then only, a
declaration can be made under Section 6(1)
of the 1894 Act.
15. Therefore, Section 5-A of the 1894 Act
confers a valuable right in favour of a
person whose lands are sought to be
acquired. It is trite that hearing given to a
person must be an effective one and not a
mere formality. Formation of opinion as
regard the public purpose as also suitability
thereof must be preceded by application of
mind having due regard to the relevant
factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The
State in its decision-making process must
not commit any misdirection in law. It is
also not in dispute that Section 5-A of the
1894 Act confers a valuable important right
and having regard to the provisions,
contained in Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India has been held to be
akin to a fundamental right. Thus, the
limited right given to an owner/person

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interested under Section 5-A of the 1894
Act to object to the acquisition proceedings
is not an empty formality and is a
substantive right, which can be taken away
only for good and valid reason and within
the limitations prescribed under Section
17(4) of the 1894 Act.
16. The Land Acquisition Collector is
duty-bound to objectively consider the
arguments advanced by the objector
and make recommendations, duly
supported by brief reasons, as to why
the particular piece of land should or
should not be acquired and whether the
plea put forward by the objector merits
acceptance. In other words, the
recommendations made by the Land
Acquisition Collector should reflect
objective application of mind to the
entire record including the objections
filed by the interested persons. [See
Munshi Singh v. Union of India [(1973)
2 SCC 337] , Union of India v. Mukesh
Hans [(2004) 8 SCC 14] , Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur
Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627 : AIR 2005
SC 3520] , Anand Singh v. State of U.P.
[(2010) 11 SCC 242 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Civ) 423] , Dev Sharan v. State of U.P.
[(2011) 4 SCC 769 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ)
483] , Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State
of Haryana [(2012) 1 SCC 792 : (2012)
1 SCC (Civ) 402] , Usha Stud and
Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. State of
Haryana [(2013) 4 SCC 210 : (2013) 2
SCC (Civ) 556] and Women's Education
Trust v. State of Haryana [(2013) 8 SCC
99 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 721] .]”
(emphasis supplied)

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21. In the present case, the report dated 25.03.2013
demonstrates that the objections raised by the Respondent-
landowners were considered by the SLAO in the context of the
public purpose underlying the proposed acquisition. In
particular, the objection regarding the availability of alternative
lands at Devanahalli was expressly adverted to, and the SLAO
recommended that the feasibility of utilising such lands, having
regard to the substantial expenditure involved in the proposed
acquisition, be examined at a higher level. The report also
referred to the existing constructions on the notified lands, the
high-tension power line passing through the same, the land-use
classification under the development plan, and the feasibility of
maintaining the proposed buffer zone. These observations
indicate that the SLAO did not merely record the objections but
identified the relevant issues requiring consideration before a
final decision was taken by the appropriate Government. In the
circumstances, we are unable to sustain the finding of the
learned Single Judge that the objections were not objectively
considered by the SLAO. The report, when read as a whole and
in the context of the material available on record, reflects
consideration of the objections raised by the Respondent-
landowners.

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22. In WOMEN'S EDUCATION TRUST v. STATE OF
HARYANA [(2013) 8 SCC 99] , the Supreme Court, while
referring to a catena of decisions, articulated the essential
principles governing an objective hearing under Section 5-A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court emphasized that
Section 5-A embodies the rule of audi alteram partem , ensuring
landowners are afforded an effective opportunity to contest
compulsory land acquisition before being deprived of their
property. It affirmed that an interested person may challenge
the acquisition on grounds such as lack of genuine public
purpose, mala fides, arbitrariness, or the availability of more
suitable alternative lands. In essence, the Supreme Court laid
down that the Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to
objectively consider all objections, apply an independent mind
to the record, and submit a reasoned report to the
Government. A final declaration under Section 6(1) can only be
validly issued if the appropriate Government, upon an objective
application of mind to both the objections and the Collector's
recommendations, remains satisfied that the acquisition is
necessary. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as
hereunder:

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“5. The principles which can be culled out
from the abovenoted judgments are as
under:
5.1. The rule of audi alteram partem
engrained in the scheme of Section 5-A of
the Act ensures that before depriving any
person of his land by compulsory
acquisition, an effective opportunity must be
given to him to contest the decision taken
by the State Government/competent
authority to acquire the particular parcel of
land.
5.2. Any person interested in the land,
which has been notified under Section 4(1)
of the Act, can file objections under Section
5-A(1) and show that the purpose specified
in the notification is really not a public
purpose or that in the guise of acquiring the
land for a public purpose the appropriate
Government wants to confer benefit upon
private persons or that the decision of the
appropriate Government is arbitrary or is
vitiated due to mala fides.
5.3. In response to the notice issued by the
Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5-
A(2) of the Act, the objector can make all
possible endeavours to convince the Land
Acquisition Collector that the acquisition is
not for a public purpose specified in the
notification issued under Section 4(1); that
his land is not suitable for the particular
purpose; that other more suitable parcels of
land are available, which can be utilised for
execution of the particular project or
scheme.
5.4. The Land Acquisition Collector is
duty-bound to objectively consider the
arguments advanced by the objector
and make recommendations, duly
supported by brief reasons, as to why
the particular piece of land should or

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should not be acquired and whether the
plea put forward by the objector merits
acceptance. In other words, the
recommendations made by the Land
Acquisition Collector should reflect
objective application of mind to the
entire record including the objections
filed by the interested persons.
5.5. The Land Acquisition Collector is
required to submit his report and the
recommendations to the State Government
along with the record of proceedings to
enable the latter to take final call on the
desirability, propriety and justification for
the acquisition of the particular parcel(s) of
land.
5.6. The declaration under Section 6(1) of
the Act can be issued only if the appropriate
Government, on an objective application of
mind to the objections filed by the
interested persons including the landowners
and the report of the Land Acquisition
Collector, is satisfied that the land is needed
for the particular purpose specified in the
notification issued under Section 4(1) of the
Act.”
(emphasis supplied)

23. The Supreme Court in SAM HIRING CO v. A.R.
BHUJBAL [(1996) 8 SCC 18] held as follows:
“6. The Land Acquisition Officer is not a
judicial authority or a quasi-judicial
authority. He exercised the power under
Section 5-A, as an administrative
authority. But the Act requires that he
should consider the objections and, if
asked, to give an opportunity of
hearing. In this case, opportunity of

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hearing was given and the objections
raised were considered. The principle of
natural justice has been complied with.
He was not required to elaborately deal
with each of the objections and submit
the report. Considered from this
perspective, we do not think that there
is any error of law warranting
interference .”
(emphasis supplied)

24. The Supreme Court in NHAI V. MADHUKAR KUMAR,
(2022) 14 SCC 661 , relying on numerous decisions, held as
follows:
“69. We would hold that as noticed by
the Bench of three Judges in Mahabir
Jute Mills Ltd. [Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd.
v. Shibban Lal Saxena, (1975) 2 SCC
818 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 460] , there is no
general duty, when an administrative
decision is taken, to give reasons. A
statute may, however, explicitly
provide that the executive authority
must provide reasons and it must be
recorded in writing. A case in point is the
first proviso to Rule 8 of the Rules itself. The
desirability of a general duty, in the case of
administrative action to support decisions
with reason, is open to question. One of the
most important reason is, the burden it
would put on the administration.
70. It is apposite, at this juncture, to notice
that administrative decisions are made in a
wide spectrum of situations and contexts.
The executive power of the Union and
States are provided in Articles 73 and 162 of
the Constitution of India, respectively.
Undoubtedly, in India, every State action

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must be fair, failing which, it will fall foul of
the mandate of Article 14. It is, at this
juncture, we may also notice that the
duty to give reasons, would arise even
in the case of administrative action,
where legal rights are at stake and the
administrative action adversely affects
legal rights. There may be something in
the nature or the context, under which,
the administrative action is taken,
which may necessitate the authority
being forthcoming with rational
reasons. There are other decisions,
which essentially belong more to the
realm of executive policy-making,
which ordinarily may not require the
furnishing of reasons.
73. The Constitution does not contemplate
any public authority, exercising power with
caprice or without any rationale. But here
again, in the absence of the duty to
record reasons, the Court is not to be
clothed with power to strike down
administrative action for the mere
reason that no reasons are to be found
recorded. In certain situations, the
reason for a particular decision, may be
gleaned from the pleadings of the
authority, when the matter is tested in
a court. From the materials, including
the file notings, which are made
available, the court may conclude that
there were reasons and the action was
not illegal or arbitrary. From admitted
facts, the court may conclude that there
was sufficient justification, and the
mere absence of reasons, would not be
sufficient to invalidate the action of the
public authority. Thus, reasons may, in
certain situations, have to be recorded
in the order. In other contexts, it would
suffice that the reasons are to be found
in the files. The court may, when there

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is no duty to record reasons, support an
administrative decision, with reference
to the pleadings aided by materials .”
(emphasis supplied)

25. Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, provides a
statutory safeguard to the persons interested by affording them
an opportunity to raise objections against the proposed
acquisition and by requiring such objections to be considered
before further steps are taken in the acquisition proceedings.
The object of the provision is to ensure that the objections
receive due and objective consideration and that the decision to
proceed with the acquisition is taken after following the
prescribed procedure. The provision does not, however,
contemplate that every objection raised must necessarily be
accepted or that the proceedings must culminate in a decision
favourable to the objectors. The procedure laid down in Section
5A does not contemplate for elaborate discussion on each
objection to the extent that the objections become the outcome
of the inquiry proceedings. All that is required is for the
procedure to be duly followed with due application of mind. The
right conferred is one of meaningful consideration of the
objections in accordance with law, and not a right to secure a

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particular outcome. Therefore, where the objections have been
duly heard and considered, and the report has been prepared
upon application of mind to the issues raised, the mere fact
that the objections have not been accepted, or that the report
does not contain an elaborate discussion of each objection,
would not, by itself, constitute a ground to invalidate the
acquisition proceedings. What is required to be examined is
whether the prescribed procedure has been followed and
whether the consideration of the objections is genuine and
objective, rather than whether the conclusion reached is one
that accords with the preference of the objectors.

26. In NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY V. DARSHAN LAL BOHRA (2024 SCC ONLINE
SC 1690) , the Supreme Court considered the effect of the
absence of a formal order dealing with certain objections and
emphasised that such an omission must be examined in the
context of the applicable statutory provisions and the nature
and legal effect of the objection concerned. The decision
reinforces the principle that the validity of acquisition
proceedings cannot be determined solely by reference to a
formal deficiency, without examining whether the statutory

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WA No. 909 of 2026


requirements have been substantially complied with and
whether the omission has a material bearing on the legality of
the acquisition. This, however, does not dilute the mandatory
obligation to consider objections where the statute so requires.
The determinative consideration remains whether the
objections have received genuine and objective consideration
and whether the decision-making process satisfies the statutory
mandate.

27. The aforesaid principle has also been considered by the
Supreme Court in ALOK KOTAHWALA v. JAIPUR METRO
RAIL CORPN. LTD., 2026 SCC ONLINE SC 1324 as follows:
“38. The principles emerging from the
aforesaid precedents may now be
crystallised, with expression of our opinion
wherever divergent. Irrefragably, the
provision in Section 5A of the LA Act
engrafts a very valuable right for every
landowner, who is faced with the immediate
prospect of acquisition of his land. The
provision is a mandatory safeguard, not only
on its own terms, but because of the object
and purpose that it seeks to achieve. Since
a landowner is sought to be deprived of his
property, the legislature in its wisdom
thought it fit to afford to such landowner the
only opportunity in the entire process to
object to the necessity of the acquisition as
well as the suitability of the land proposed
to be acquired. By raising a valid defence,
the landowner can show cause why his land

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WA No. 909 of 2026


should not be acquired and the proposal
dropped. While filing of an objection in
writing is enabled by Section 5A(1), the
landowner is assured of a hearing pertaining
to his said objection under Section 5A(2).
He need not ask for it; it is the duty of the
Collector to give notice of hearing. Though
in Sam Hiring Co. (supra) this Court has
held that it is for the landowner to ask for a
hearing, we respectfully disagree with such
a view not only based on the terms of
Section 5A but also in light of the dictum of
the 3-Judge Bench in Farid Ahmed Abdul
Samad (supra). The settled legal position is
that once objections under Section 5A(1)
are filed, it is for the Collector to fix a date
of hearing and intimate the landowner.
Absent conclusive proof of service of notice
of hearing, the Court in New Okhla
Industrial Development Authority (supra)
presumed service. That is, however, a
debatable proposition and has to cautiously
applied having regard to the facts of each
case. The Collector, though does not act
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
but as an administrative authority, is
bound to consider the objections upon
granting an opportunity of hearing
before embarking on a further inquiry,
if need be; and bearing in mind all the
relevant factors, he is required to
furnish his recommendation, for or
against the proposal, to the
Government for its consideration. In
furnishing the recommendation, the
Collector is neither required to give a
decision nor write a detailed order. All
that is required of him is a
consideration of each objection
followed by brief reasons in support of
its acceptability/non-acceptability and
a recommendation as to the desirability
of dropping the proceedings/
proceeding for issuance of a declaration

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under Section 6. Though not bound by the
recommendation of the Collector, the
Government has to consider the records,
apply its mind and, thereafter, form an
opinion as to the imperative for issuing a
declaration under Section 6. Since
affectation of a landowner's property right is
involved and the LA Act being an
expropriatory legislation, the Courts are
cautioned to strictly construe the provisions
thereof.
39. A landowner's right to object is,
however, neither unqualified nor unlimited.
The right is subject to the overarching
principle that the State's power of eminent
domain for public purpose should prevail. It
is circumscribed by the purpose of the
provision itself, which is to enable the
Collector to consider the objections and
opine whether the acquisition should
proceed. The objection(s) of the landowner
must, therefore, be germane to the purpose
of acquisition. He cannot dictate which land
the State should acquire. Land acquisition
can be resisted only on grounds such as no
real public purpose is involved, or that the
land is not suitable for the purpose for which
it is intended to be acquired, or that the
proceedings smack of legal and/or factual
malice (attracting colourable exercise of
power, excessive acquisition, etc.) or that
the acquisition is likely to cause
disproportionate hardship. Beyond this, the
right does not seem to extend.
64. The next argument advanced by Mr.
Rohatgi was that there are no reasons in the
order/report of the LAO evincing minimal
consideration of each and every objection.
While it is true that the reasoning of
the LAO is brief and each objection has
not been dealt with individually, we do
not consider the argument worthy of

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acceptance. Reference to the contents
of the report has been made
hereinbefore. While the report of the
LAO could have been more elaborate, it
must be remembered that a report
under Section 5A need not be a
speaking order in the judicial sense.
The requirement is to form an opinion
and recommend. Brevity of reasons is
not synonymous with absence of
reasons. Read as a whole, it cannot be
said that the LAO failed to advert to the
objections or that it failed or omitted to
record the requisite opinion. The
brevity of the report does not vitiate it.
The purpose of Section 5A, which is to
aid the State Government in taking a
final decision, stands fulfilled in this
case. ”
(emphasis supplied)

28. The legal position emerging from the aforesaid decisions
is that the report prepared under Section 5A(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, is not required to contain an elaborate or
exhaustive discussion of every objection raised by the
landowners, nor is the SLAO expected to record a separate or
detailed finding on each contention as though adjudicating a lis
in the strict sense. The statutory requirement, however, is not
satisfied by a mere recital of the objections or a mechanical
recommendation in favour of acquisition. It requires the SLAO
to undertake a fair, independent and objective consideration of

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the objections, having due regard to their nature, substance
and relevance to the proposed acquisition, and to indicate,
through brief reasons and recommendations, that the material
issues raised have received genuine consideration. The report
must, therefore, disclose a rational connection between the
objections considered, the material available on record and the
recommendation ultimately made. Where an objection concerns
the very necessity for acquisition, the suitability of the
identified lands or the availability of alternative land, the report
must demonstrate that the substance of such objection has
been examined, even if the SLAO does not accept the
landowner’s contention. The adequacy of the report must
consequently be assessed on a substantive basis, having regard
to its contents and the contemporaneous record, rather than
merely by reference to the length or form of the reasons
recorded. While brevity, by itself, does not render the report
defective, the absence of elaborate reasoning cannot be used to
excuse a failure to consider the objections in a meaningful
manner. The essential test is whether the report, read as a
whole, reflects due application of mind to the objections and
furnishes a rational basis for the recommendation made under
Section 5A(2) of the Act.

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The Report of the SLAO made under Section 5A(2) of the
Act is not binding on the State Government in order to
issue Final Declaration under Section 6
29. It is the contention of the learned counsels appearing for
the Respondent-landowners that the Final Declaration dated
07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act is
unsustainable in law inasmuch as there was no prior decision
taken by the State to acquire the subject lands, which is a pre-
condition for the exercise of power under Section 6(1). The
learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, has observed that
the recommendations made by the SLAO in the 5A(2) Report
dated 25.03.2013 were not considered by the State before
issuing the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013.

30. From a plain reading of the language of Section 5A(2) of
the 1894 Act, it is clear that the language of the Section
stipulates the Collector/SLAO to, upon considering the
objections of the landowners, make a report in respect of the
notified lands, containing the recommendations on the
objections along with the record of proceedings, for the
ultimate decision of the Government. The recommendations
made by the SLAO are not binding on the State and are neither

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WA No. 909 of 2026


decisive of the subsequent acquisition proceedings nor on the
decision of the State as per the Final Declaration under
Section 6.

31. The proposition of law that recommendations made by
administrative bodies are not binding on the Courts or on the
State, unless the language of the provision says otherwise, is
beyond dispute. The decision of the Special Land Acquisition
Officer (SLAO) or Collector, which is that of a quasi-judicial
authority arrived at by quasi-judicial methods, may turn out to
be final unless the appropriate government chooses to interfere
suo motu or on application. (See SHYAM NANDAN PRASAD
v. STATE OF BIHAR [(1993) 4 SCC 255] ) . Although the
report submitted after a Section 5A inquiry cannot be left out of
consideration and must be actively reviewed by the appropriate
government before making a public purpose declaration under
Section 6, the final findings contained therein ultimately remain
strictly non-binding on the government. (See UNION OF
INDIA v. MUKESH HANS [(2004) 8 SCC 14] ) . Though not
bound by the recommendation of the Collector, the Government
has to consider the records, apply its mind and, thereafter,
form an opinion as to the imperative for issuing a declaration

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under Section 6. Since affectation of a landowner's property
right is involved and the LA Act being an expropriatory
legislation, the Courts are cautioned to strictly construe the
provisions thereof. (See ALOK KOTAHWALA (Supra)). In
HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (Supra) , the
Supreme Court elaborately discussed the same as follows:
“17. The choice of different terminologies for
the role of the Collector and the role of the
Government makes it evident that the
Legislature intended different roles for each
of them. The Collector has no power to
“decide” the case and can only give
“recommendations” to the Government.
It is the Government which is the
ultimate arbiter for determining
whether the land is to be released or
not. No other authority can dictate the
outcome of Section 5A proceedings—
neither the Collector nor the landowner
(Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor
of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 298). While the
Collector's report can form the “basis”
of such decision, the Government is
free to independently evaluate and take
a final decision, of course, based on
relevant and lawful considerations.
18. It is therefore patently clear that
the State Government possessed the
ability to disagree with the Collector's
report and decide a different course.
This is not to say that the Government's
decision cannot be challenged or is
beyond judicial review . Indeed, had the
Respondents demonstrated that the decision
was arbitrary or passed without due
application of mind, then they could have

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been victorious in their challenge. However,
the Respondents have not placed any
evidence on record to lay such foundation…"
(emphasis supplied)

32. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, the mere circumstance that the SLAO, in the
report dated 25.03.2013, made certain recommendations or
expressed reservations regarding the proposed acquisition
would not, by itself, render the Final Declaration dated
07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Act invalid. The
report under Section 5A(2) is recommendatory in nature, and
the ultimate decision as to whether the acquisition should
proceed rests with the State Government, which is required to
independently examine the report, the objections raised by the
landowners and the relevant material on record, and thereafter
form its own opinion regarding the necessity of the acquisition
for the public purpose in question. The State Government is,
therefore, not bound to accept the recommendations of the
SLAO in their entirety, nor does a recommendation warranting
further examination or high-level consideration necessarily
operate as a bar to the issuance of the Final Declaration. What
the law mandates is that the State Government must apply its
independent mind to the relevant material and arrive at a

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decision on lawful and relevant considerations. In the present
case, the proposed acquisition is intended for the expansion of
the Central Prison at Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru, a
purpose involving significant considerations of custodial
security, prison administration and public safety. The
importance of such a public purpose does not dispense with the
requirement of independent consideration by the State
Government.

33. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the report
submitted by the SLAO under Section 5A(2) of the Act, though
an essential component of the statutory scheme and a material
consideration for the State Government, is not binding upon the
Government in determining whether a declaration under
Section 6(1) should be issued. The State Government may
differ from the recommendations contained therein, provided
such departure is founded upon an independent application of
mind to the relevant record and a bona fide assessment of the
public purpose sought to be achieved. The absence of
concurrence with the SLAO's recommendations does not, in
itself, vitiate the acquisition.

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The Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under
Section 6 of the Act is not required to contain reasons or
be preceded by a separate formal governmental decision
34. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for
the respondent-landowners that the Final Declaration dated
07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, is unsustainable in law, as the State Government
had neither taken a prior decision to acquire the subject lands
nor recorded reasons demonstrating its independent
consideration of the report submitted by the SLAO under
Section 5A(2) of the Act. The contention, in substance, is that
the absence of a separate governmental decision preceding the
issuance of the Final Declaration, coupled with the absence of
reasons expressly set out in the declaration itself, renders the
acquisition proceedings invalid.

35. A plain reading of Section 6 of the Act, particularly
Section 6(1), indicates that the statutory requirement is that
the appropriate Government must, after considering the report,
if any, made under Section 5A(2), form the requisite opinion
that the particular land is needed for a public purpose and
make a declaration to that effect. The provision does not
prescribe that such opinion must necessarily be embodied in a

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separate, antecedent order or formal resolution distinct from
the declaration itself. Nor does it require that the reasons
forming the basis of the Government's satisfaction must be
reproduced in the text of the Final Declaration. The statutory
emphasis is on the formation of the requisite opinion by the
appropriate Government, upon consideration of the relevant
material, and the issuance of a declaration in the manner
prescribed by law. The absence of a separately documented
prior decision or of an elaborate statement of reasons in the
declaration cannot, by itself, be equated with the absence of
the requisite governmental satisfaction.

36. The aforesaid position finds support in HINDUSTAN
PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD. v. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI
[(2005) 7 SCC 627] , wherein the Supreme Court clarified
that a declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act need not,
on its face, contain the reasons forming the basis of the
Government’s satisfaction. The Court, however, underscored
that the consideration of the landowner’s objections and the
Government’s decision thereupon must precede the issuance of
the declaration. The absence of reasons in the declaration itself
is, therefore, distinct from the absence of application of mind

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by the State Government. While the former does not, by itself,
invalidate the declaration, the latter may render the decision-
making process vulnerable to judicial review. The relevant
records must consequently disclose that the State Government
considered the report submitted under Section 5A(2), together
with the objections and the material accompanying it, and
independently formed the requisite opinion that the land was
needed for a public purpose. The Court observed as under:
“15. Section 5-A of the Act is in two parts.
Upon receipt of objections, the Collector is
required to make such further enquiry as he
may think necessary whereupon he must
submit a report to the appropriate
Government in respect of the land which is
the subject-matter of notification under
Section 4(1) of the Act. The said report
would also contain recommendations on the
objections filed by the owner of the land. He
is required to forward the records of the
proceedings held by him together with the
report. On receipt of such a report together
with the records of the case, the
Government is to render a decision
thereupon. It is now well settled in view
of a catena of decisions that the
declaration made under Section 6 of the
Act need not contain any reason. (See
Kalumiya Karimmiya v. State of Gujarat
[(1977) 1 SCC 715] and Delhi Admn. v.
Gurdip Singh Uban [(2000) 7 SCC 296]
.)
20. In Gurdip Singh Uban [(2000) 7 SCC
296] whereupon Mr Ramamoorthy placed

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strong reliance, this Court observed : (SCC
p. 318, para 50)
“50. No reasons or other facts
need be mentioned in the Section
6 declaration on its face. If the
satisfaction is challenged in the
court, the Government can show
the record upon which the
Government acted and justify the
satisfaction expressed in the
Section 6 declaration. ”
It was, thus, for the State to justify its
action by production of record or otherwise.
28. Although assignment of reasons is
the part of principles of natural justice,
necessity thereof may be taken away
by a statute either expressly or by
necessary implication. A declaration
contained in a notification issued under
Section 6 of the Act need not contain
any reason but such a notification must
precede the decision of the appropriate
Government. When a decision is required
to be taken after giving an opportunity of
hearing to a person who may suffer civil or
evil consequences by reason thereof, the
same would mean an effective hearing.”
(emphasis supplied)

The principle emerging from the decision, read in the
context of the judgment as a whole, is that the declaration
need not recite the reasons for the Government’s satisfaction,
but the requisite governmental decision must precede its
issuance.

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37. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the contention of
the respondent-landowners requires to be examined by
distinguishing between the absence of a separate formal order
and the absence of a prior decision by the State Government.
Section 6 of the Act does not prescribe that the Government’s
decision must necessarily take the form of a separately
published order or resolution preceding the Final Declaration.
Nevertheless, the statutory requirement that the Government
consider the report and form the requisite opinion before
issuing the declaration cannot be dispensed with. Thus, the
mere fact that the Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 does not
itself disclose the reasons for the decision, or that no separate
formal order has been produced, would not, by itself, establish
illegality. The decisive consideration is whether the
contemporaneous official record demonstrates that the State
Government duly considered the relevant material and arrived
at the requisite satisfaction before issuing the declaration. If
such prior consideration and decision are borne out by the
record, the declaration cannot be invalidated merely for want of
an express recital of reasons or a separate formal order.
Conversely, if the record establishes that the declaration was
issued without the requisite prior governmental consideration,

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the defect would go to the root of the statutory process and
cannot be cured merely by relying upon the existence of a
public purpose.

The Interests of the Landowners Must Subserve to The
Broader Public Purpose
38. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that the ultimate
goal of acquisition of lands, which implies deprivation of
individuals’ right to their property under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India, must be for a broader public purpose.
While the definition of ‘public purpose’ includes construction of
a jail, such acquisition can be made only by strictly following
the mandate of the said Act (See DEV SHARAN & OTHERS v.
STATE OF U.P. [(2011) 4 SCC 769]) . Since we are of the
view that the procedure as laid down in the 1894 Act has been
duly followed by the State Authorities, we now turn towards the
primacy of interests of the landowners over the genuine public
purpose of expansion of Prison or vice-versa.

39. The principle of eminent domain recognises the sovereign
power of the State to acquire private property for a legitimate
public purpose with just compensation paid and subject to the
constitutional and statutory limitations governing the exercise

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of such power. Though the right to property is constitutionally
protected under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, it
does not confer an absolute immunity against compulsory
acquisition authorised by law. The doctrine rests on the premise
that, in an appropriate case, the interests of an individual may
have to yield to the larger interests of the community. Such
power, however, is not absolute or arbitrary. Its exercise must
be founded upon a genuine public purpose, supported by the
authority of law, and in conformity with the procedure
prescribed by the applicable statute. The principle of eminent
domain thus seeks to reconcile the protection of individual
proprietary rights with the legitimate requirements of society,
ensuring that neither public interest is frustrated by an
inflexible insistence on private ownership nor private rights are
sacrificed to an arbitrary or unlawful exercise of State power in
a colourable manner.

40. It is equally well settled that where the acquisition of
private property is supported by a genuine public purpose and
is undertaken in accordance with the authority of law, the
interests of individual landowners cannot ordinarily prevail
merely by virtue of their proprietary rights over the larger

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interests of the public. The determination of public purpose
necessarily involves consideration of the collective needs of
society, which may, in appropriate circumstances, assume
primacy over individual claims. The State, in exercising its
power of compulsory acquisition, is therefore required to
maintain a fair balance between the rights of landowners and
the demands of public interest. While the right to property
cannot be rendered illusory, neither can it be construed as an
absolute right to resist every lawful acquisition.

41. The governing principle is that individual rights must be
respected and protected within the framework of law but may
yield where their exercise conflicts with a legitimate public
purpose pursued through a lawful and constitutionally
permissible process. Land acquired for development are
intended to subserve a wider public interest, and the narrow
interest of the individual landowner must yield to the larger
public interest. (See DILIPSINGH NARAYANRAO
BORAWAKE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & OTHERS,
W.P.NO.2295/2012 DECIDED BY THE BOMBAY HIGH
COURT ON 05.07.2019) . The Supreme Court has consistently
emphasised that, while exercising judicial discretion in matters

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concerning land acquisition, constitutional courts must
undertake a careful balancing of public interest against private
interest, bearing in mind the consequences that may ensue
from the interruption or annulment of projects undertaken for
the larger benefit of society. Projects serving an important
public purpose ought not to be frustrated or brought to a
standstill on account of individual claims, particularly where
substantial progress has already been achieved and the
consequences of setting aside the acquisition would adversely
affect the larger public interest. The mere fact that an
individual landowner may have an interest in a relatively small
portion of the acquired land would not, by itself, justify
invalidating the acquisition of the land required for the project
as a whole. Where the acquisition is otherwise lawful and the
project serves a genuine public purpose, the interests of the
individual landowner must be weighed against the wider public
consequences of interfering with its implementation. Further,
every procedural irregularity or minor discrepancy in the
acquisition process does not necessarily warrant the annulment
of the entire acquisition. The nature, gravity and legal effect of
the alleged irregularity must be examined in the context of the
statutory scheme and the prejudice, if any, caused thereby. The

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governing principle is that judicial intervention must be
informed by the demands of justice and the larger public
interest, without compromising mandatory statutory safeguards
or permitting unlawful deprivation of private property. (See
RAMNIKLAL N. BHUTTA AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (AIR 1997 SC 1236) and
PRATIBHA NEMA AND OTHERS v. STATE OF M.P. AND
OTHERS (AIR 2003 SC 3140)

42. The right of a landowner to object to the proposed
acquisition of his property, though an important statutory
safeguard, is neither absolute nor unlimited. It must be
understood in the context of the larger constitutional principle
that the exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain, when
founded upon a genuine public purpose and exercised in
accordance with law, may prevail over individual proprietary
interests. The object of the provision is to afford the landowner
a meaningful opportunity to place his objections before the
competent authority and to enable the latter to objectively
consider whether the proposed acquisition ought to proceed. It
is not to confer upon the landowner a right to veto the
acquisition or to dictate the choice of land to be acquired by the

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State. The objections must, therefore, bear a rational nexus to
the proposed acquisition and address legally relevant
considerations, such as the absence of a genuine public
purpose, the unsuitability of the land for the intended purpose,
the availability of a legally relevant alternative, excessive or
disproportionate acquisition, colourable exercise of power, mala
fides, or the infliction of disproportionate hardship. While such
objections must receive fair and objective consideration, the
mere assertion of an individual preference or proprietary claim
cannot, by itself, override the legitimate requirements of the
community. The governing principle is that private interests
must be duly considered and protected within the framework of
law, but must ultimately subserve the larger public purpose
where the acquisition is lawful, necessary and justified.
Conversely, the invocation of public interest cannot dispense
with the State’s obligation to comply with mandatory statutory
safeguards [See STATE OF HARYANA v. VINOD OIL &
GENERAL MILLS [(2014) 15 SCC 410], ALOK
KOTAHWALA (Supra) and HARYANA URBAN
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (Supra)] .

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43. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, we
are of the considered view that the public purpose underlying
the proposed acquisition, namely, the expansion of the Central
Prison at Parappana Agrahara, Bengaluru, warrants due weight
in determining the competing claims of public and private
interest. The establishment and expansion of prison
infrastructure constitute an important responsibility of the
State, extending beyond the mere provision of accommodation
for inmates to encompass custodial security, effective prison
administration, segregation of inmates, adequate supporting
facilities and the maintenance of a secure environment. The
requirement of additional land for these purposes must be
assessed in the context of the overall functional requirements
of the institution and its long-term operational needs, rather
than being confined to the existing structures within the prison
premises. In such matters, the State is required to be afforded
due latitude in assessing the land and infrastructure necessary
to discharge its public obligations, provided that the decision is
founded upon a genuine public purpose and is not vitiated by
arbitrariness or illegality. The objections of the landowners,
though entitled to fair and objective consideration, cannot be
elevated into an absolute right to prevent an acquisition that is

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otherwise justified by the legitimate requirements of prison
administration and public safety. The right to property under
Article 300A of the Constitution of India protects the individual
against deprivation except by authority of law. It does not
confer an unqualified right to resist every acquisition
undertaken in accordance with law.

44. The principle of eminent domain, therefore, requires that
the individual interests of landowners be balanced against the
larger public interest sought to be achieved through the
acquisition. Where the acquisition is directed towards a genuine
public purpose of considerable importance, and the prescribed
statutory procedure has been duly followed, the balance must
ordinarily tilt in favour of facilitating the public purpose rather
than frustrating it on the basis of individual proprietary claims
alone. The objections concerning the suitability of the land, the
availability of alternatives or the hardship occasioned by
acquisition must undoubtedly be examined. However, unless
such objections establish a legally sustainable ground for
interference, they cannot displace the State's decision to
acquire land required for a legitimate public purpose. The law
does not require the State to abandon a necessary public

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project merely because its implementation entails the
deprivation of private property, provided such deprivation is
authorised by law and the safeguards available to the
landowners are respected.

45. Before we conclude, we would like to cite the decision of
a Coordinate Bench of this Court in UNION OF INDIA,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ESTATE MANAGEMENT UNIT
(DRDO) V. STATE OF KARNATAKA & OTHERS (W.A. NO.
2121 OF 2015 & CONNECTED MATTERS, DECIDED ON
21.09.2026) wherein this Court elaborately discussed on the
issues of law concerned in this appeal as follows:
“In the present case, the material on record
discloses that notices were issued to the
landowners, objections were filed and an
enquiry under Section 5-A was conducted.
The objections were thereafter considered
by the competent authority and the same
were rejected, followed by the issuance of
the declaration under Section 6(1) of the
Act. The fact that the objections did not
find acceptance cannot, by itself, lead
to the conclusion that they were not
considered. The law does not prescribe
any particular form or fixed formula in
which an enquiry under Section 5-A is
required to be conducted. What is
required is due application of mind and
a fair consideration of the objections.
The appellate record indicates that the
acquiring authority had adverted to the

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objections and had taken decision thereon.
The mere absence of a detailed
discussion of each and every
submission cannot, in the facts of the
present case, be treated as sufficient to
invalidate the entire acquisition
proceedings.
45. It is also significant that the petitioners
have not demonstrated any specific or
substantial prejudice caused to them by the
manner in which the enquiry was conducted.
The objections raised by them
essentially relate to the availability of
alternative lands, the alleged non-
consideration of their objections and
the request for further opportunity.
These matters were within the domain
of the acquiring authority, which had to
consider the suitability of the land, the
continuity of the project, the security
requirements and the necessity of
acquiring the particular parcels. The
petitioners cannot claim that the
existence of an alternative suggestion
made by them would, by itself, deprive
the State of its power to acquire the
lands selected for a public purpose.
47. Further, the extent and location of
land required for a public purpose are
matters primarily for the acquiring and
requisitioning authorities to determine.
Unless the decision is shown to be
arbitrary, mala fide or wholly unrelated
to the stated public purpose, this Court
cannot substitute its own assessment
for that of the competent authority. The
choice of land for a public project is
primarily an administrative and
technical decision, and judicial review
is warranted only where the decision is
shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, wholly

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irrelevant or vitiated by a clear breach
of the statutory procedure.
49. The report of the Special Land
Acquisition Officer under Section 5-A is
recommendatory in nature. The
ultimate decision rests with the
appropriate Government. Therefore, the
recommendation of the Land
Acquisition Officer could not have been
treated as binding upon the
Government or as creating an absolute
bar against proceeding with the
acquisition. The Government was
legally entitled to take its own decision
on the basis of the material placed
before it.
51. The power of judicial review in
acquisition matters is directed towards
examining the legality of the
decisionmaking process and not
substituting the Court’s view for the
decision of the Government or the
acquiring authority on matters of
policy, technical necessity and public
administration. In the present case, the
learned Single Judge, while noticing the
importance of the right under Section 5-A,
has, in our considered opinion, given undue
weight to procedural aspects without
adequately considering the larger public
purpose, the previous history of the
acquisition, the progress of the Defence
project and the absence of demonstrable
prejudice to the petitioners.
54. The fact that a portion of the
acquired land was vacant or had not
been immediately utilised could not, by
itself, invalidate the acquisition. The
legality of the acquisition is required to
be examined with reference to the
purpose for which the land was
acquired and the circumstances

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prevailing when the acquisition
proceedings were initiated. Subsequent
non-utilisation, by itself, does not
establish that the original public
purpose was absent or illusory.
56. Even assuming that there was some
deficiency in the consideration of the
objections or that a more elaborate
order ought to have been passed, the
appropriate course, in the facts of the
case, would have been to direct
reconsideration of the objections in
accordance with law, rather than to
annul the entire acquisition
proceedings. Quashing the acquisition
in its entirety has the effect of
frustrating a project of national
importance, notwithstanding the fact
that the acquisition was initiated for a
public purpose and that substantial
steps had already been taken for
implementation of the project. The relief
granted by the learned Single Judge,
therefore, does not appear to be
commensurate with the nature of the
alleged procedural lapse.
57. We are conscious that the rights of
private landowners cannot be
disregarded merely because the
acquisition is for a public purpose. At
the same time, the rights of the
landowners have to be harmonised with
the larger constitutional obligation of
the State to protect the nation and to
provide the infrastructure necessary for
national defence and security. The
principle that a citizen’s property rights
are entitled to protection does not
mean that such rights are absolute or
immune from acquisition in accordance
with law. Where the acquisition is for a
genuine public purpose, the statutory

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procedure is substantially followed and
the landowners are afforded an
opportunity to place their objections,
the proceedings cannot be invalidated
on technical or hyper-technical
grounds .”
(emphasis supplied)

46. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the
Final Declaration dated 07.08.2013 issued under Section 6(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, cannot be held to be invalid
merely because it does not disclose the reasons underlying the
Government’s satisfaction or because a separate formal order
recording the decision to proceed with the acquisition has not
been issued. The requirement of law is that the appropriate
Government, after considering the report submitted under
Section 5A(2) of the Act, must form its opinion that the lands
are needed for a public purpose before issuing the declaration.
As held by the Supreme Court in HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM
CORPORATION LTD. V. DARIUS SHAPUR CHENAI [(2005)
7 SCC 627] , the declaration under Section 6 need not itself
contain the reasons for such satisfaction. However, the absence
of reasons in the declaration cannot be equated with the
absence of the requisite decision by the Government, which
must precede the issuance of the declaration.

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47. Applying the aforesaid principle, the contention of the
respondent-landowners that the Final Declaration dated
07.08.2013 is unsustainable for want of a separate prior
governmental decision or for failure to record reasons in the
declaration itself cannot be accepted on those grounds alone.
The report dated 25.03.2013 submitted by the SLAO, the
objections raised by the landowners and the relevant material
concerning the proposed acquisition were required to be
considered by the State Government before arriving at its
decision. The recommendations of the SLAO, being
recommendatory in nature, did not bind the Government, which
was competent to take an independent view on the necessity of
the acquisition. The Government could, therefore, differ from
the recommendations made in the report, provided that it had
considered the relevant material and formed the requisite
opinion on lawful grounds. The absence of a separate formal
order or an express recital of reasons in the Final Declaration
does not, by itself, establish that the State Government failed
to apply its mind to the matter.

48. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the
acquisition of the notified lands for the expansion of the

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existing Central Prison serves a bona fide public purpose and
cannot be set aside merely on account of hyper-technicalities in
the procedure, in the absence of any established violation of a
mandatory statutory requirement.

49. In view of the aforesaid, the writ appeal is allowed. The
impugned order dated 02.05.2025 passed by the learned Single
Judge in W.P.No.51697/2013 and connected matters is hereby
set aside. The State and the concerned authorities shall take
necessary steps to address the existence of RCC buildings,
residential layouts, engineering workshops and developed sites
on the subject notified lands, as referred to by Appellant No. 2–
SLAO in the report dated 25.03.2013, in accordance with law.

50. Pending IAs, if any, do not survive for consideration and,
accordingly, they stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
JUDGE

BKV
CT:SN