STATE OF UTTARAKHAND THROUGH SECRETARY vs NEERU GARG
- Court
- Uttarakhand High Court
2026:UHC:4183-DB
Approved For Reporting
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA
AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHASH UPADHYAY
DATED: 26.05.2026
WRIT PETITION (S/B) No. 305 OF 2026
State of Uttarakhand and another …….Petitioners
Versus
Neeru Garg and another. …Respondents
&
WRIT PETITION (S/B) No. 306 OF 2026
State of Uttarakhand and another. …….Petitioners
Versus
Arun Mohan Joshi and another. …Respondents
Counsel for the petitioners/State
: Sri S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate
General for the State of Uttarakhand,
Sri Sukumar Pattijohsi, Senior
Advocate (through V.C.), , Sri
Amrendra Pratap Singh, learned
Additional Advocate General, Sri Anil
Kaushik, learned Senior Counsel, Sri
Kaushal Pati Gautam, learned AAG,
Sri Rajeev Singh Bisht, learned
Deputy Advocate General, Sri P.S.
Bisht, Sri B.P.S. Mer and Sri Gajendra
Tripathi, learned Standing Counsels,
Ms. Vanshika Singh, Sri Mrinal
Sharma, Sri Harsh Dahiya and Ms.
Snehpreet Kaur, Advocate.
Counsel for the respondents
: Sri Kapil Sibbal, learned Senior
Advocate assisted by Sri Nikhil
Singhvi (through V.C.), Ms. Sumedha
Ray Sarkar, Sri Vipul Sharma and Ms.
Khushboo Tiwari Sharma, learned
counsel for the caveator.
Sri Anil Kaushik, learned Additional
Solicitor General (through V.C.) with
Mr. Lalit Sharma, learned Deputy
Solicitor General, Sri Pankaj
Chaturvedi and Sri Manoj Kumar,
learned Standing Counsels for the
Union of India.
JUDGMENT : (Per Sri Manoj Kumar Gupta, C.J.)
1. These writ petitions arise out of the same set of facts
and challenge a common order, therefore, were heard together and
are being decided by this common order.
1
2026:UHC:4183-DB
2. Respondent No.1, Neeru Garg in WPSB No. 305 of 2026
is an officer of the Indian Police Service of the 2005 Batch of the
Uttarakhand Cadre. Pursuant to a request made by the Union of
India for nomination of IPS officer for central deputation, the State
of Uttarakhand nominated Neeru Garg vide letter dated
16.02.2026. Thereafter, the Ministry of Home Affairs, with the
approval of the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet, appointed
Neeru Garg as Deputy Inspector General in Indo-Tibetan Boarder
Police (ITBP) vide appointment letter dated 05.03.2026.
Consequent thereto, she was relieved by the petitioner-State vide
order No. 376722 dated 06.03.2026. Neeru Garg assailed the
order of her deputation in ITBP vide appointment letter dated
05.03.2026 and the relieving order dated 06.03.2026 by filing
WPMS No. 139 of 2026 before this Court. The said writ petition
was, however, withdrawn on 23.03.2026 with liberty to approach
the Central Administrative Tribunal. Thereafter, she challenged the
order of her deputation in ITBP dated 05.03.2026 and the relieving
order dated 06.03.2026 by filing O.A. No. 1181 of 2026 titled
‘ Neeru Garg vs. Union of India and others ’ before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi.
3. Similarly, respondent No. 1, Sri Arun Mohan Joshi in
WPSB No. 306 of 2026 is also an IPS officer of the Uttarakhand
Cadre of the Batch-2006. On the request of the Union of India for
nomination of IPS officers for central deputation, the State of
Uttarakhand nominated him vide its letter dated 16.02.2026. In
2
2026:UHC:4183-DB
his case also, the Ministry of Home Affairs, with the approval of the
Appointment Committee of the Cabinet, appointed him as Deputy
Inspector General in the Boarder Security Force vide appointment
letter dated 05.03.2026 and in consequence of which, he was
relieved by the State of Uttarakhand for joining the new
assignment vide relieving order dated 06.03.2026. He, initially,
challenged his appointment in BSF vide appointment letter dated
05.03.2026 and the relieving order dated 06.03.2026 by filing
WPSB No. 138 of 2026 titled ‘ Arun Mohan Joshi vs. Union of India ’
before this Court. Subsequently, the writ petition was got
withdrawn on 23.03.2026 with liberty to approach the Central
Administrative Tribunal. He, thereafter, filed O.A. No. 1180 of
2026 titled ‘ Arun Mohan Joshi vs. Union of India and others ’ before
the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi
assailing the order of his appointment dated 05.03.2026 and the
relieving order dated 06.03.2026.
4. In both the Original Applications, filed before the
Tribunal, a common interim order was passed by the Tribunal on
07.04.2026 in favour of the original applicants and, thereby, the
operation and implementation of the appointment orders dated
05.03.2026 and the relieving orders dated 06.03.2026 and all
consequential actions pursuant thereto were stayed till the next
date of hearing. While passing the interim order, the Tribunal
directed the State of Uttarakhand to file a detailed counter-affidavit
and place on record all relevant documents to enable it to examine
3
2026:UHC:4183-DB
its contentions. Relevant portion of the order of the Tribunal dated
07.04.2026 is extracted below:-
“22. Accordingly, in order to enable this Tribunal to
effectively adjudicate upon these aspects, a comprehensive
and detailed counter affidavit is required to be filed by the
State of Uttarakhand, addressing the applicability and
interpretation of Rule 6(2) and its proviso, the relevant
provisions of the Tenure Policy, and the rules relating to pay
protection, along with all supporting records and
justifications for the impugned action.
23. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the
applicant has been able to make out a prima facie case for
grant of interim relief. The balance of convenience also lies in
favour of the applicant, as any irreparable prejudice caused
to her in terms of loss of status and service position may not
be adequately compensated at a later stage, whereas no
serious prejudice would be caused to the respondents if the
operation of the impugned orders is kept in abeyance for the
time being.
24. Accordingly, as an interim measure, it is directed that the
operation and implementation of the impugned order/letter
dated 05.03.2026, the relieving/discharge order dated
06.03.2026, and all consequential actions pursuant thereto
shall remain stayed till the next date of hearing.
25. The respondent State of Uttarakhand is directed to file a
detailed counter affidavit/reply, placing on record all relevant
documents, including those pertaining to the alleged
revocation of debarment, empanelment considerations, and
applicable policy provisions, within a period of four weeks.
Rejoinder, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter.
26. List the matter for further consideration after completion
of pleadings on 07.05.2026. ”
5. It seems that the Union of India, aggrieved by the
interim order passed by the Tribunal, approached the High Court of
Delhi by filing two separate writ petitions being WP(c) Nos. 6182 of
2026 and 6183 of 2026. However, the said writ petitions were
withdrawn on 06.05.2026, with liberty to apply for vacation of the
4
2026:UHC:4183-DB
interim order by moving appropriate application before the
Tribunal.
6. On 07.05.2026, the very next day, the matter again
came-up before the Tribunal, but by that time, stay vacation
application was not filed. However, counter-affidavit was already
on record. The Tribunal, therefore, considering the request of the
original applicants, granted three weeks’ time to them to file
rejoinder-affidavit(s) and extended the interim order till further
orders. Thereafter, in pursuance of the liberty obtained from the
High Court to apply for vacation of the interim order, the Union of
India as well as the State of Uttarakhand filed separate applications
for vacation of the interim order, or, in the alternative, to hear the
Original Applications finally. It appears that during the
interregnum, the applicants initiated contempt proceedings before
the Tribunal against the officials of the State of Uttarakhand
alleging non-compliance of the interim order passed by the
Tribunal. On 22.05.2026, the Tribunal passed the impugned order,
whereby it granted two weeks’ time to the applicants to file reply
to the Misc. Applications filed by the petitioners and the Union of
India seeking vacation of the interim order. On the same date, by
same common order passed on the contempt petition, the Tribunal
directed the officials of the State of Uttarakhand to report
compliance of the interim order passed by it within two days,
failing which the Tribunal would be constrained to draw
proceedings against them under the provisions of the Contempt of
5
2026:UHC:4183-DB
Courts Act, 1971. Accordingly, the contempt petitions were
directed to be listed on 26.05.2026 at 03:00 P.M. Aggrieved by
the said part of the order, the present writ petitions have been filed
by the State of Uttarakhand and the Director General of Police,
State of Uttarakhand, Dehradun.
7. Sri S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General for the
State of Uttarakhand and Sri Sukumar Pattijohsi, Senior Advocate
(through V.C.) submit that the interim order was passed by the
Tribunal on 07.04.2026 on basis of the ex parte version of the
original applicants. By the same order, the State of Uttarakhand
was directed to file detailed counter-affidavit annexing therewith all
relevant documents regarding revocation of the debarment of the
Original Applications, empanelment considerations, and applicable
policy provisions, and the matter was fixed for 07.05.2026 for
further consideration. On 07.05.2026, when the matter was taken-
up by the Tribunal, the counter-affidavit, on behalf of the
petitioners, was already on record. On the said date, the Tribunal
granted time to the applicants to file rejoinder-affidavit and
extended the interim order till further orders. Thereafter, separate
applications were filed for vacation of the interim order being Misc.
Application Nos. 2597 / 2026 and 2566 / 2026 by the State of
Uttarakhand and Misc. Application Nos. 2681/2026 and 2682 by
the Union of India. However, on the next date, i.e. 22.05.2026,
the Tribunal, instead of deciding the Stay Vacation Applications,
has proceeded to grant two weeks’ time to the applicants to reply
6
2026:UHC:4183-DB
to the Stay Vacation Application. At the same time, it also directed
the petitioners to report compliance of its interim order within two
days under threat of initiation of contempt proceedings. It is urged
that once the petitioners have applied for vacation of the stay
order and the Tribunal had granted time to the applicants to reply
to the same, it erred in directing the petitioners to ensure
compliance of the interim order within two days, i.e. even before
the Stay Vacation Application is taken-up for consideration and,
thereby, rendering the same infructuous. Reliance has been placed
on the judgments of State of J And K vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan
and others , (1992) 4 SCC 167 ; Modern Food Industries
(India) Ltd and another vs. Sachidanand Dass and another ,
1995 Supp (4) SCC 465 and; Vinay Kumar Pandey vs.
Committee of Management Shri Gandhi Inter College &
another (Civil Appeal No. 4007-4008 of 2020 , decided on
08.12.2020) in support of the contention that the Stay Vacation
Application should have been disposed of first before insisting upon
compliance of the interim order.
8. In rebuttal, Sri Kapil Sibbal, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Sri Nikhil Singhvi (through V.C.), Ms. Sumedha Ray
Sarkar, Sri Vipul Sharma and Ms. Khushboo Tiwari Sharma,
learned counsel for the original applicants, submitted that the
Union of India had approached the Delhi High Court assailing the
interim order passed by the Tribunal, but it could not succeed in
getting any relief and, thereafter, the petitions were withdrawn.
7
2026:UHC:4183-DB
Learned Senior Counsel has invited our attention towards the order
of the Tribunal dated 07.05.2026, whereby the Tribunal, while
granting three weeks’ time to the original applicants to file
rejoinder-affidavit, also noted in its order passed on the contempt
petition that the State of Uttarakhand and the Union of India have
sought time to report compliance of the interim order. He submits
that once the respondents have sought time before the Tribunal to
comply with the interim order, they cannot challenge the order. He
has also placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of the
Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and
others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 , and another judgment in Union of
India vs. Alapan Bandyopadhyay , (2022) 3 SCC 133, in
contending that the order passed by the Principal Bench, Central
Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi cannot be assailed before this
Court. The contention is that the impugned order could be
subjected to scrutiny only before the Division Bench of the Delhi
High Court, as the Tribunal, which has passed the order falls within
its territorial jurisdiction.
9. Sri S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General for the
State of Uttarakhand and Sri Sukumar Pattijohsi, Senior Advocate
(through V.C.) countering the submissions relating to lack of
jurisdiction on part of this Court to examine the validity of the
order passed by the Principal Bench, Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi, submitted that the major part of cause of
action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
8
2026:UHC:4183-DB
The original applicants are IPS officers of Uttarakhand cadre and
their names for central deputation was nominated by the State of
Uttarakhand and based on that only, the original applicants were
given central deputation. It is submitted that the interim order
passed by the Tribunal would also have the functional operation in
the State of Uttarakhand, where, if the interim order is
implemented, the original applicants would have to be posted. It is
further submitted that the original applicants had approached the
Principal Bench, Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi only
because the said Bench also exercises the jurisdiction over the
cases arising out or from any place within the State of Uttarakhand
by virtue of the Notification dated 18.07.2023 under Section 18 of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The observations made by
the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), have to be
construed accordingly, otherwise, it would lead to incongruous
consequences. Learned counsel have also tried to distinguish the
case of Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) by contending that it
arose out of an order passed under Section 25 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act (for short ‘the Act’)-the power of
Chairman to transfer cases from one Bench to another, which was
an issue distinct from the cause of action, or part thereof, for
determining territorial jurisdiction. It is submitted that the
Supreme Court, in SLP No. 530 of 2022 Union of India vs. Sanjiv
Chaturvedi and others doubted the correctness of Alapan
Bandyopadhyay (supra) and has referred the issue relating to
9
2026:UHC:4183-DB
territorial jurisdiction for consideration by a Larger Bench.
Although the reference is still pending, but judgment of the Court
dated 23.10.2021 has not been stayed.
10. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the case, as
the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition has been
questioned, it would be appropriate to first consider the said issue.
11. For the said purpose, it would be necessary to examine
some of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Section 4 of the Act empowers the Central Government to
establish, by notification, an Administrative Tribunal to be known
as the Central Administrative Tribunal to exercise the jurisdiction,
powers and authority conferred on the Central Administrative
Tribunal by or under this Act. Sub-section (2) empowers the
Central Government, on receipt of a request from the State
Government to establish, by notification, an Administrative
Tribunal for that particular State. Under sub-section (3), two or
more States may enter into an agreement that the same
Administrative Tribunal shall be the Administrative Tribunal for
each of the States participating in the agreement. Section 5
provides for composition of Tribunals and Benches thereof and it
specifically provides that the Benches of the Tribunal shall have the
same jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal. Section 18
of the Act provides for the manner in which the distribution of
business is to be done amongst the various benches. It reads
thus:-
10
2026:UHC:4183-DB
18. Distribution of business amongst the Benches.—(1)
“
Where [any Benches of a Tribunal are constituted], the
appropriate Government may, from time to time, by
notification, make provisions as to the distribution of the
business of the Tribunal amongst the [] Benches and *
specify the matters which may be dealt with by each Bench.
(2) If any question arises as to whether any matter falls
within the purview of the business allocated to a Bench of a
Tribunal, the decision of the Chairman thereon shall be final.
Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
declared that the expression “matters” includes applications
under section 19. ”
12. In exercise of the aforesaid power, the Ministry of
Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, by Notification dated
18.07.2023, extended the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal
Bench, Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi to the State of
Uttarakhand. It is pertinent to note that before the said
arrangement was made, the matter arising out of the State of
Uttarakhand were being entertained by the Circuit Bench of the
Allahabad Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Thus, it is
by virtue of the Notification dated 18.07.2023, the Principal Bench,
Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi came to be vested with
the jurisdiction over matters arising from the State of
Uttarakhand. Consequently, the original applications came to be
filed before the Principal Bench, Central Administrative Tribunal,
New Delhi.
13. In Alchemist Ltd. and another vs. State Bank of
Sikkim and others, (2007) 11 SCC 335 , the territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of powers conferred upon
them under Article 226 of the Constitution fell for consideration.
11
2026:UHC:4183-DB
The Supreme Court, after tracing out the legislative history of the
constitutional provisions and the amendments made in Article 226,
observed as follows:-
16. It may be stated that by the Constitution (Forty-
“
second Amendment) Act, 1976, Clause (1-A) was
renumbered as Clause (2). The underlying object of
amendment was expressed in the following words:
"Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the
only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to
the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This
involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant
places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226
so that when any relief is sought against any
Government, authority or person for any action taken,
the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of
action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue
appropriate directions, orders or writs".
(emphasis supplied)
The effect of the amendment was that the accrual of cause of
action was made an additional ground to confer jurisdiction
on a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
17. As Joint Committee observed:
"This clause would enable the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the cause of action arises to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person, notwithstanding that the seat of
such Government or authority or the residence of such
person is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High
Court. The Committee feels that the High Court within
whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises in part
only should also be vested with such jurisdiction".
18. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions,
therefore, makes it clear that after 1963, cause of action is
relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in
a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause
of action in whole or in part arises. ”
14. It is well settled that after the 1963 amendment
introducing Article 226(2), a High Court can exercise writ
jurisdiction if the cause of action arises wholly or partly within its
territorial limits. However, the question, which confronts the
12
2026:UHC:4183-DB
Court, is whether the observations of the Supreme Court in L.
Chandra Kumar (supra) that “ All decisions of these Tribunals will,
however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High
Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls ” would
oust the jurisdiction of this Court, though undisputedly, if not
whole, major part of the cause of action had arisen within the
territorial limits of this High Court.
15. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar (supra)
was dealing with the power of judicial review of the High Courts
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and whether these
powers could be excluded by any other constitutional or statutory
provisions. It held that the power of judicial review of the High
Courts and the Supreme Court is part of basic structure of the
Constitution and cannot be whittled down. Accordingly, clause 2(d)
of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B of the Constitution
to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and
the Supreme Court have been held to be unconstitutional being
against the basic structure of the Constitution. While so holding,
the Constitution Bench stated that all decisions of the Tribunal
would be subject to scrutiny before the Division Bench of the High
Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. There
was no issue relating to territorial jurisdiction of the High Court
and, therefore, the aforesaid observations have to be understood
13
2026:UHC:4183-DB
accordingly. Paragraph-99 of the said judgment, where the
aforestated proposition of law has been stated, is as follows:-
“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that
Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B,
to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts
and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and
the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations
enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to
the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction
conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and
upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution
is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution.
While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and
Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the
powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article
323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of
the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory
provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will,
however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of
the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned
Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to
act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law
for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore,
be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts
even in cases where they question the vires of statutory
legislations (except where the legislation which creates the
particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act
is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the
manner we have indicated.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. In Union of India vs. Alapan Bandyopadhyay
(supra), the Supreme Court re-affirmed the aforesaid proposition
of law enunciated by the Constitution Bench. The said case related
to the order passed by the Principal Bench, Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi under Section 25 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, which confers power in favour of Chairman to
transfer cases from one Bench to another. Section 25 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is as follows:-
14
2026:UHC:4183-DB
“ [25. Power of Chairman to transfer cases from
one Bench to another- On the application of any of
the parties and after notice to the parties, and after
hearing such of them as he may desire to be heard, or
on his own motion without such notice, the Chairman
may transfer any case pending before one Bench, for
disposal, to any other Bench.] ”
17. The High Court of Calcutta had exercised power of
judicial review in respect of the order passed by the Chairman
sitting on the Principal Bench, Central Administrative Tribunal, New
Delhi transferring the case from the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Calcutta to Principal Bench, Central Administrative
Tribunal, New Delhi. Before the Supreme Court, the question
arose whether the High Court of Calcutta would have jurisdiction to
examine the validity of the order passed by the Chairman sitting at
Principal Bench, New Delhi transferring the case to another Bench
in exercise of power under Section 25 of the Act. The Supreme
Court noted that in respect of the order passed by the Chairman
sitting at the Principal Bench, New Delhi under Section 25 of the
Act, the jurisdictional High Court would be the High Court of Delhi
and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had wrongly entertained
the writ petition.
18. The power conferred on the Chairman to transfer cases
from one Bench to another under Section 25 of the Act is more in
the nature of administrative power. In case of exercise of such
power altogether different considerations weigh in transferring the
cases and not merits of the case.
15
2026:UHC:4183-DB
19. The Supreme Court was conscious of the fact that in a
case arising out of the order passed under Section 25 of the Act,
there could be instances where the parties may be residing within
the territorial jurisdiction of different High Courts and thus, in case
any other High Court is held to be the jurisdictional High Court, it
would lead to uncertainty and confusion. The observations made in
this regard in Paragraph-40 are as follows:
“40. The law thus declared by the Constitution Bench cannot
be revisited by a Bench of lesser quorum or for that matter
by the High Courts by looking into the bundle of facts to
ascertain whether they would confer territorial jurisdiction to
the High Court within the ambit of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution. We are of the considered view that taking
another view would undoubtedly result in indefiniteness and
multiplicity in the matter of jurisdiction in situations when a
decision passed under Section 25 of the Act is to be called in
question especially in cases involving multiple parties
residing within the jurisdiction of different High Courts albeit
aggrieved by one common order passed by the Chairman at
the Principal Bench at New Delhi. ”
20. The final lines in Paragraph 39- “ This unambiguous
exposition of law has to be followed scrupulously while deciding the
jurisdictional High Court for the purpose of bringing in challenge
against an order of transfer of an original application from one
Bench of Tribunal to another Bench in the invocation of Section 25
of the Act ” are crucial. The invocation of power under Section 25
of the Act and its actual exercise, is based on entirely different
considerations, independent of the cause of action which led to the
filing of the original applications before any particular Bench of the
Tribunal. Therefore, in our opinion, the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) should be read in the
16
2026:UHC:4183-DB
factual matrix of that case and in relation to cases arising out of
exercise of powers under Section 25 of the Act. It is noteworthy
that in SLP No. 530/2022 arising out of the proceedings under
Section 25 of the Act, where the High Court other than Delhi High
Court had exercised the power of review, the Supreme Court has
referred to question relating to the issue of territorial jurisdiction of
the concerned High Court to decide a challenge to an order passed
by the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench,
New Delhi to a Larger Bench.
21. In the present case, it is not disputed that initially, the
original applicants have themselves approached this Court by
means of separate writ petitions as the cause of action had arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Subsequently, when
they were permitted to approach the Tribunal, they had to file the
original applications before the Principal Bench, Central
Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi as the Principal Bench, Central
Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi also exercises the jurisdiction in
respect of cases arising out of the territories of Uttarakhand by
virtue of Notification dated 18.07.2023.
22. In view of the above discussion, we overrule the
objection relating to jurisdiction.
23. We now proceed to examine the submissions made on
merits.
24. In State of J And K vs. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and
others, (1992) 4 SCC 167 , the Supreme Court held that where
17
2026:UHC:4183-DB
the stay vacation application remains undisposed of, the Court
ought not to compel a party to ensure compliance of its interim
order. The relevant observations are as follows:-
“6. We do not agree. The scope of a contempt proceeding
is very different from that of the pending main case yet to be
heard and disposed of (in future). Besides, the respondents
in a pending case are at a disadvantage if they are called
upon to meet the merits of the claim in a contempt
proceeding at the risk of being punished. It is, therefore, not
right to suggest that it should be assumed that the initial
order of stay got confirmed by the subsequent orders passed
in the contempt matter.
7. We, therefore, hold that the High Court should have first
taken up the stay matter without any threat to the
respondents in the writ case of being punished for contempt.
Only after disposing it of, the other case should have been
taken up.
”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Similarly, in Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd.
and another vs. Sachidanand Dass and another , 1995 Supp
(4) SCC 465 , where an appeal was preferred before the Division
Bench against the order of the Single Judge and the High Court
sought to proceed with the contempt first, without disposing of the
appeal and the stay application filed in appeal, the Supreme Court
has observed as follows:-
“ 4. Before the High Court, appellants urged that before any
contempt proceedings could be initiated, it was necessary
and appropriate for the Division Bench to examine the prayer
for stay, or else, the appeal itself might become infructuous.
This did not commend itself to the High Court which sought
to proceed with the contempt first. We are afraid, the course
adopted by the High Court does not commend itself as
proper. If, without considering the prayer for stay, obedience
to the Single Judge's order was insisted upon at the pain of
committal for contempt, the appellants may find, as has now
happened, the very purpose of appeal and the prayer for
interlocutory stay infructuous. It is true that a mere filing of
an appeal and an application for stay do not by themselves
absolve the appellants from obeying the order under appeal
and that any compliance with the learned Single Judge's
18
2026:UHC:4183-DB
order would be subject to the final result of the appeal. But
then the changes brought about in the interregnum in
obedience of the order under appeal might themselves be a
cause and source of prejudice. Wherever the order whose
disobedience is complained about is appealed against and
stay of its operation is pending before the Court, it will be
appropriate to take up for consideration the prayer for stay
either earlier or at least simultaneously with the complaint
for contempt. To keep the prayer for stay stand-by and to
insist upon proceeding with the complaint for contempt might
in many conceivable cases, as here, cause serious prejudice.
This is the view taken in State of J & K v. Mohd. Yaqoob
Khan.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. The same proposition of law has been reiterated in
Vinay Kumar Pandey (supra) by the Supreme Court in its order
dated 08.12.2020, which is as follows:-
“ Without going into the issue of maintainability of the appeal
before the Division Bench of the High Court, the basic facts which
emerge from the record are that the contempt alleged is of non-
compliance of the order dated 15.07.2019 which itself was an ad-
interim order and appropriate application seeking vacation of that
order is still pending consideration before the High Court.
In the circumstances, unless and until the submission raised
in that application seeking vacation is adequately addressed and
rejected, no case for initiation of contempt proceedings was made
out. ”
(emphasis supplied)
27. In the present case also, the petitioners had already
filed their counter-affidavit. On 07.05.2026, the Tribunal granted
time to the applicants to file rejoinder-affidavit and extended the
interim order. Since interim order was being extended, the State
and the Union sought further time to report compliance. The said
fact, in itself, cannot be held to debar the petitioners to seek
adjudication of their Stay Vacation Applications before being
compelled to comply with the interim order.
19
2026:UHC:4183-DB
28. As already noticed, while passing the interim order, the
Tribunal considered it necessary to call for a detailed counter-
affidavit along with relevant records from the State to enable it to
examine various contentions raised on its behalf. By the next
date, i.e. 07.05.2026, the State had already filed its counter-
affidavit and its version was on record. However, on the said date,
i.e. 07.05.2026, the Tribunal granted time to the original applicants
to file rejoinder-affidavit. On the next date, i.e. 22.05.2026,
although stay vacation application was also on record, time was
granted to the original applicants to file reply to the stay vacation
application and complete the pleadings. At the same time,
direction was issued to the State to report compliance of the
interim order within two days. Once the State’s version was on
record and request was pending for vacation of the interim order,
in our opinion, there was no justification on the part of the Tribunal
to adjourn the matter to a future date while simultaneously
directing compliance of its interim order within two days, thereby,
virtually rendering the Stay Vacation Application infructuous.
29. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered
opinion that the course adopted by the Tribunal is legally
unsustainable. The Tribunal ought to have decided the stay
vacation application first before directing the petitioners to comply
with the interim order. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal dated
22.05.2026, to the extent it directs the petitioners to report
compliance within two days failing which contempt proceedings
20
2026:UHC:4183-DB
would be initiated, is hereby quashed. The proceedings of the
contempt petitions shall remain adjourned until the Stay Vacation
Applications filed by the petitioners are considered and decided.
30. Accordingly, the writ petitions stand disposed of.
31. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of
accordingly.
_____________________
MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, C.J.
___________________
SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.
th
Dt: 26 May, 2026
Rathour
Digitally signed by PRAVINDRA SINGH RATHOUR
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=23699ccc2fd40ad81b6fd13323779d9e3aeb1
097d17dbb53d481cabd25946eed,
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=1F65499E931DF71CDAF92A40CC6179B
8E010331BA695239171F906FD5C45C4E8,
cn=PRAVINDRA SINGH RATHOUR
Date: 2026.05.27 15:19:23 +05'30'
PRAVINDRA
SINGH RATHOUR
21