Mr. Irfan Khan Director Of Suspended Board Of Directors Of M/S Western Energetics Pvt Ltd vs Rakesh Kumar Goswami Proprietor Of Lamsyn Enterprises & Anr & Ors.

Court
National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
Case type
Company Appeal(AT)(Ins)
Decided on
24-02-2026
<div> <br /> <b>NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL </b><br /> <b>PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1392 of 2023 &amp; I.A. No. 4976 of 2023 </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>(Arising out of the Order dated 19.09.2023 passed by the National Company </b><br /> <b>Law Tribunal, Jaipur Bench in CP No. (IB)- l8/9/JPR/2021) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>IN THE MATTER OF: </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>Irfan Khan Suspended Director of </b><br /> <b>M/s Western Energetics Pvt. Ltd. </b><br /> R/O Sabu Ka Paar, BUKAR, <br /> Ramsar, Barmer-344502 (Rajasthan) <b>…Appellant</b> <br /> <b> Versus </b><br /> <b>1.</b> <b> </b> <b>Rakesh Kumar Goswami </b><br /> <b>Proprietor of Lamsyn Enterprises &amp; Anr. </b><br /> EF-27, Ashiana Garden, Bhiwadi-301019 <b>…Respondent No.1</b> <br /> <br /> <b>2.</b> <b> </b> <b>M/s Western Energetics Pvt Ltd. </b><br /> <b>Through Mr. Satyendra Prasad Khorania, </b><br /> <b>Interim Resolution Professional </b><br /> G-1, 958, Phase-III RIICO Industrial Area, <br /> Bhiwadi, Alwar-301019 <b>…Respondent No.2 </b><br /> <b>Present: </b><br /> <b>For Appellant</b> <b> </b> Mr. Manu Beri, Mr. Prateek Kasliwal, Mr. Raunak <br /> Raheja &amp; Ms. Kudrat Mann, Advocates. <br /> <br /> <b>For Respondents</b> <b> </b> Mr. Amol Vyas, Advocate for R-1 Mr. Eshaan Sanghi <br /> &amp; Mr. Prashant Sharma, Advocates for R-2 <br /> <b> </b><br /> Page <b>1</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <b>J U D G E M E N T </b><br /> <b>(24 .02.2026) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>NARESH SALECHA, MEMBER (TECHNICAL) </b><br /> <b>1.</b> <b> </b> The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant i.e., Mr. Irfan Khan, <br /> who is the suspended Director of M/s Western Energetics Pvt. Ltd. under Section <br /> 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘ <b>Code</b> ’) against the Impugned <br /> Order dated 19.09.2023 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Jaipur <br /> Bench, (&quot; <b>Adjudicating Authority</b> &quot;) in CP No. (IB)- l8/9/JPR/2021. <br /> Rakesh Kumar Goswami, who is the Proprietor of Lamsyn Enterprises is the <br /> Respondent No.1 herein. <br /> M/s Western Energetics Pvt. Ltd., the Corporate Debtor, through Mr. Satyendra <br /> Prasad Khorania the Resolution Professional is the Respondent No.2 herein. <br /> <b>2.</b> <b> </b> We note that the appeal has been filed by the Appellant against the order <br /> dated 19.09.2023 passed by the Adjudicating Authority, in CP No. (IB)-<br /> 18/9/JPR/2021, whereby the Adjudicating Authority initiated Corporate <br /> Insolvency Resolution Professional (CIRP) under Section 9 of the Code. It is the <br /> case of the Appellant that the alleged default relates to the Section 10A suspension <br /> period (defaults on or after 25.03.2020 up to 24.03.2021), which falls within the <br /> statutory suspension period prescribed under Section 10A of the Code. <br /> <b>3.</b> <b> </b> We note that the Respondent No. 1 (Operational Creditor) has been <br /> engaged in business transactions with the Corporate Debtor over a period. It is <br /> the case of the Appellant that running account has been maintained between the <br /> Page <b>2</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> parties. The Appellant submitted that, in the case of a running account, the date <br /> of default cannot be determined by reference to the dates mentioned in individual <br /> invoices; rather, it need be reckoned from the date of the last payment effected by <br /> the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant pleaded that in the present case, the date of <br /> default is 29.01.2021, being the date of dishonour of cheques issued by the <br /> Corporate Debtor to the Respondent No.1 which falls squarely within the period <br /> of suspension, and accordingly, the Application under Section 9 of the Code <br /> should have been dismissed. The Appellant submitted that existence of a running <br /> account is substantiated by the fact that lump-sum payments were made to the <br /> Respondent No. 1, as opposed to payments precisely matching the value of <br /> specific invoices. The Appellant referred to the Certificate issued by the banker, <br /> evidencing lump-sum payments since 18.08.2018. The Appellant contended that <br /> the Respondent No. I/Operational Creditor misled the Adjudicating Authority by <br /> asserting in the Section 9 application that material was supplied only since August <br /> 2019, whereas the ledger maintained in the books of the Operational Creditor <br /> clearly establishes the existence of a running account and continuous payments <br /> since 2018. <br /> <b>4.</b> <b> </b> The Appellant emphasized that the Respondent No.1 did not state and the <br /> date of default in Part -IV which is a mandatory statutory requirement under Rule <br /> 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) <br /> Rules, 2016, rendering the Application non maintainable ab initio. <br /> Page <b>3</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <b>5.</b> <b> </b> It is the case of the Appellant that the date of default cannot be reckoned <br /> from the date(s) mentioned in the invoices but must be taken from the date of the <br /> last payment made by the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant pleaded that the date <br /> of default in the present case (29.01.2021) falls squarely within the period of <br /> suspension, the Adjudicating Authority has erred in allowing the application <br /> under Section 9 of the Code. <br /> <b>6.</b> <b> </b> The Appellant further pleaded that the Corporate Debtor has regularly <br /> made payments to the Operational Creditor since 18.08.2018 onwards, including <br /> during the COVID-19 suspension period, with specific payments effected on <br /> 17.07.2020, 24.07.2020, and 13.11.2020. The last payment was made by the <br /> Corporate Debtor on 27.01.2021 through cheque(s), which were subsequently <br /> dishonoured on 29.01.2021. The making of payments even during the suspension <br /> period demonstrates the clear intent of the Appellant to honour and settle its <br /> obligations. It was owing to the severe financial stress occasioned by the COVID-<br /> 19 pandemic that the Appellant&#x27;s cheques came to be dishonoured. The Corporate <br /> Debtor effected its last payments to the Operational Creditor on 22.01.2021 and <br /> 27.01.2021 vide two cheques amounting to Rs. 50,00,000/- and Rs. 25,00,000/- <br /> respectively, which were dishonoured on 29.01.2021, pursuant to which a legal <br /> notice was issued by the Operational Creditor/Respondent No. 1 against the <br /> Corporate Debtor <br /> <b>7.</b> <b> </b> The Appellant tried to impress upon us that, since the cheques were <br /> dishonoured on 29.01.2021, the default is deemed to have occurred during the <br /> Page <b>4</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> period of suspension as provided under Section 10A of the Code (i.e., on or after <br /> 25.03.2020 up to 24.03.2021), as Section 10A provides a condition that in case <br /> the date of default is post 25.03.2020, then in that case an Operational Creditor <br /> cannot file an application under Section 9 of the Code. <br /> <b>8.</b> <b> </b> At this stage, we note Section 10A, which reads as under: <br /> <i>“</i> <b><i>Section 10A. Suspension of Initiation of corporate </i></b><br /> <b><i>insolvency resolution process</i></b> <i>.- </i><br /> <i> Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, 9 and 10, </i><br /> <i>no application for initiation of corporate insolvency </i><br /> <i>resolution process of a corporate debtor shall be filed, for </i><br /> <i>any default arising on or after 25th March, 2020 for a </i><br /> <i>period of six months or such farther period, not exceeding </i><br /> <i>one year from such date, as may be notified in this behalf: </i><br /> <i>Provided that no application shall ever be filed for initiation </i><br /> <i>of corporate insolvency resolution process of a corporate </i><br /> <i>debtor for the said default occurring during the said period. </i><br /> <i> Explanation. --For the removal of doubts, it is hereby </i><br /> <b><i>clarified that the provisions of this section shall not apply </i></b><br /> <b><i>to any default committed under the said sections before </i></b><br /> <b><i>25th March,2020” </i></b> <i> </i> <br /> (Emphasis supplied) <i> </i><br /> Page <b>5</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <b>9.</b> <b> </b> The Respondent No. 1/the operational creditor submitted that it supplied <br /> the material to the corporate debtor through various invoices starting from <br /> 20.04.2019 to 19.09.2019 and every invoice contained condition that interest <br /> @24% will be charged, if the payment is not made within 30 days of the bill date. <br /> The Respondent No. 1 argued that each invoice became due and payable 30 days <br /> after the date of the invoice. Since the last invoice is dated 19.09.2019, therefore, <br /> all the invoices became due and payable on or before 19.10.2019. The <br /> Respondent No. 1 submitted that the date of default is relevant only for the <br /> purpose of determining the limitation period (3 years under Article 137 of the <br /> Limitation Act) and the Adjudicating Authority is required to satisfy itself only <br /> events that proves the occurrence of a debt and default. The Respondent No. 1 <br /> stated that in the present case, all the invoice is of 2019 and the insolvency <br /> application came to be filed by the Operational Creditor in the year 2021 and <br /> therefore the issue of limitation does not arise at all. The Respondent No. 1 stated <br /> that in its application, it had mentioned that the date of default is 30 days from <br /> the date of the invoice. <br /> <b>10.</b> <b> </b> The Respondent No. 1 pleaded that in terms of section 3(12) of the code, <br /> the default is non-payment of debt, when whole or any part or instalment of the <br /> amount of debt become due and payable and is not paid by the debtor or corporate <br /> debtor, as the case may be. Thus, the amount mentioned in the invoices became <br /> due &amp; payable after the expiry of the 30 days of the invoice date and all the said <br /> Page <b>6</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> dates falls prior to 25th Mach-2020, therefore, there is a clear default within the <br /> meaning of the aforesaid provision by the Corporate Debtor. <br /> <b>11.</b> <b> </b> We note that no record has either been placed by the parties that there was <br /> any settlement between the Operational Creditor and the Corporate Debtor. We <br /> note that cheques were issued by the Corporate Debtor to discharge its <br /> outstanding liabilities which happened prior to 19.09.2019 (which is not covered <br /> by Section 10A period) and the same were dishonoured as the same do not shift <br /> the due date of payment. <br /> <b>12.</b> <b> </b> Thus find that section 10A of the Code is not applicable in the present case <br /> as the section 10A mandate moratorium in filing of the insolvency application u/s <br /> 7, 9 &amp; 10 for any default arising on or after 25th March 2020, where in the present <br /> th<br /> case, all the defaults relating to the respective invoices has fallen prior to 25 <br /> March 2020, as noted earlier. <br /> <b>13.</b> <b> </b> We also observe that the Corporate Debtor has not disputed the existence <br /> of debt and only objection raised by the corporate debtor is regarding the <br /> applicability of 10A of the Code. <br /> <b>14.</b> <b> </b> We observe that Section 10A of the Code is not applicable in the present <br /> appeal as Section 10A is not applicable to the defaults which have been <br /> committed prior to 25.03.2020. The debt in respect of which the present appeal is <br /> for period from 20.04.2019 to 19.09.2019. We also note that the amount was to <br /> be paid within a period of30 days from the date of receipt of the invoice, thus the <br /> debt fell due 30 days after the date of the invoice and therefore, the date of default <br /> Page <b>7</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> is 19.10.2019, which can be considered the date of default. Hence, Section 10A <br /> has no applicability, in the present case and the Corporate Debtor clearly <br /> committed default prior to the Sector 10A period of the Code. <br /> <b>15.</b> <b> </b> We further observe that the Respondent No. 1 filed Section 9 application <br /> on the basis of the default committed by the Corporate Debtor on 19.10.2019 and <br /> not on the basis of the dishonour of cheques issued by the Corporate Debtor to <br /> the Operational Creditor. Thus, we reject argument of the Appellant on this issue. <br /> <b>16.</b> <b> </b> We also observe that the Respondent No. 1 supplied the material to the <br /> Corporate Debtor through various invoices which dated 20.04.2019 to <br /> 19.09.2019 and each invoice contains a condition that interest @ 24% will be <br /> charged, if the payment is not made within 30 clays of the date of invoice. Further, <br /> each invoice became due and payable 30 days after the date of the invoice. Since <br /> the last invoice is dated 19.09.2019, therefore all the invoices became due and <br /> payable on or before 19.10.2019, thus the amount mentioned in the invoices <br /> became clue &amp; payable after the expiry of 30 days of the invoice date and all the <br /> said dates fall prior to 25.03.2020. In view of this, we also negate the pleading of <br /> the Appellant regarding running account status between Corporate Debtor and <br /> Operational Creditor. <br /> <b>17.</b> <b> </b> We also find that judgment of this Appellate Tribunal passed in <b><i>Vishal </i></b><br /> <b><i>Agarwal Erstwhile Director of Gagan I-Land Township Pvt. Ltd. vs. ICICI </i></b><br /> <b><i>Prudential Real Estate AIF-1 &amp; Anr. </i></b> [(2023) ibclaw.in 68] and judgment of the <br /> Hon&#x27;ble Supreme Court of India in <b><i>Mobilox Innovations Pvt. Ltd. vis Kirusa </i></b><br /> Page <b>8</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <b><i>Software Pvt. Ltd.,</i></b> MANU/SC/1196/2017, supports the case of the Respondent <br /> No. 1. <br /> <b>18.</b> <b> </b> Now we will deal another issue raised by the Appellant that the Corporate <br /> Debtor by issuance of cheques which were dishonoured thus the date of default <br /> is the date when the cheques were dishonoured which falls in 10 A period. We <br /> are of the view that it was not the intent of the parliament to disqualify any <br /> applicant from filing any application under Section 7 &amp; 9 of the Code for the <br /> default arising before 25.03.2020 under Section 10A of the Code. We note that <br /> any application filed for any default arising on or after 25.03.2020 for a period of <br /> six months as such other period, not exceeding one year were barred only. Thus, <br /> we do not agree with the view of the Appellant on this issue. <br /> <b>19.</b> <b> </b> In view of above discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The <br /> appeal fails and stand rejected. I.A., if any, are closed. No Cost. <br /> <br /> <br /> <b> [Justice Mohammad Faiz Alam Khan] </b><br /> <b>Member (Judicial) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>[Naresh Salecha] </b><br /> <b>Member (Technical </b><br /> Sim <br /> Page <b>9</b> of <b>9</b> <br /> </div>