Chaturbhuj Pradhan vs Amar Pradhan

2026 INSC 600
NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. __ _____ OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4016 of 2026)




CHATURBHUJ PRADHAN ... APPELLANT (S)

Versus

AMAR PRADHAN & ANR. ... RESPONDENT (S)


J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Leave Granted.
1
2. The appellant-Chaturbhuj Pradhan is aggrieved by the
fact that he has been ordered, concurrently, by the Courts below
2
i.e., the First Additional Civil Judge, Class -II, Basna and the
Signature Not Verified

1
For ease ‘CP’
2 st
In Civil Suit No. 13A/2019, by Order dated 21 September 2019
Digitally signed by
SOURAV PAL
Date: 2026.05.29
18:15:41 IST
Reason:
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 1 of 9

learned Single Judge of the High Court of Chattisgarh at
3
Bilaspur , to undergo DNA test to determine the paternity of the
4
first respondent , and has challenged the same before us in these
proceedings.
3. The sequence of events triggering this appeal is that Amar
is the son of the second respondent. The former claims to be the
th
son of CP born on 10 September 1999 as a result of consensual
relations between his mother and CP that took place in January
5
1999. The latter, while denying this, relies on his acquittal in a
case registered by the second respondent under Section 376 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Beginning in 2003 and continuing
until sometime in 2010, there were several instances of litigation
inter se the parties concerning maintenance. However, it is not
necessary to refer to those in detail as they do not form part of
the present dispute, except to note that in Misc.Crl.CaseNo.113
of 2005 CP’s appeal before the High Court against grant of
maintenance, an observation is made that Amar and the second
respondent had failed to establish any relationship of CP, with
6
them. This order was challenged before this Court and came to
be disposed of in Lok Adalat with the observation that at the time
of filing, Amar was a minor and as on the date of hearing before
the Lok Adalat, he was 24 years old and as such nothing survives

3 th
In WP227 No. 540 of 2021, by Order dated 16 June 2025
4
For ease, ‘Amar’
5
Sessions Case No. 268/1999 by judgement dated 31st December 1999
6 st
Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2011 disposed of on 31 July 2024
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 2 of 9

in the matter. During the pendency of the appeal before this
Court, having attained majority, Amar filed a suit seeking
declaration that he is the son of CP and that, accordingly, he is
rd
entitled to1/3 share in his property. The Civil Court, particulars
of which have been noted in para-2, passed necessary orders.
CP’s appeal before the High Court was also dismissed observing
that no other kind of evidence would be sufficient to clearly
establish the paternity of Amar.
4. Before us it is contended by CP that he cannot be
compelled to give DNA sample nor is there an eminent need for
the DNA test. Further, there cannot be any adverse inference
against him under Section 114(h) of the Indian Evidence Act,
7
1872 at this stage. It is submitted that Amar’s civil suit is barred
by res-judicata. Per contra, it is submitted on behalf of Amar that
in view of the continuous denial of paternity by CP, there is no
other recourse available to determine the question of paternity
and therefore it is in the interest of justice. When the balance of
interest between CP and Amar is examined, the same is in favour
of the latter since there is no application of presumption under
Section 112 of IEA. The right of privacy in as much as it is
available to CP is not an absolute right. Regarding the question
of res judicata , the same is submitted to be not applicable since
the previous proceedings under Section 125CrPC were instituted

7
IEA
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 3 of 9

by the second respondent, though was also for the benefit of
Amar, and further that these proceedings are summary in nature
and do not amount to a proper finding.
5. We now examine these competing claims. In doing so, we
must take notice of the controlling judgments:
8
5.1 Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B. ,
“26. From the above discussion it
emerges—
(1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as a
matter of course;
(2) wherever applications are made for such
prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer
for blood test cannot be entertained.
(3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that
the husband must establish non-access in order to
dispel the presumption arising under Section 112
of the Evidence Act.
(4) The court must carefully examine as to what
would be the consequence of ordering the blood
test; whether it will have the effect of branding a
child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste
woman.
(5) No one can be compelled to give sample of
blood for analysis.”

9
5.2 Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy :
“16. It is borne from the decisions rendered by
this Court in Bhabani Prasad Jena [ Bhabani
Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for
Women , (2010) 8 SCC 633 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ)
501 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1053] and Nandlal
Wasudeo Badwaik [ Nandlal Wasudeo
Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik , (2014) 2 SCC
576 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 145 : (2014) 4 SCC

8
(1993) 3 SCC 418
9
(2015) 1 SCC 365
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 4 of 9

(Cri) 65] that depending on the facts and
circumstances of the case, it would be
permissible for a court to direct the holding of a
DNA examination to determine the veracity of
the allegation(s) which constitute one of the
grounds, on which the party concerned would
either succeed or lose. There can be no dispute,
that if the direction to hold such a test can be
avoided, it should be so avoided. The reason, as
already recorded in various judgments by this
Court, is that the legitimacy of a child should not
be put to peril.”
(emphasis supplied)

5.3 Having considered extensively the previous
judgments, the following principles were enunciated in
10
Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia :
“43. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion,
the following principles could be culled out as to
the circumstances under which a DNA test of a
minor child may be directed to be conducted:
43.1. That a DNA test of a minor child is not to
be ordered routinely, in matrimonial disputes.
Proof by way of DNA profiling is to be directed
in matrimonial disputes involving allegations of
infidelity, only in matters where there is no other
mode of proving such assertions.
43.2. DNA tests of children born during the
subsistence of a valid marriage may be directed,
only when there is sufficient prima facie material
to dislodge the presumption under Section 112 of
the Evidence Act. Further, if no plea has been
raised as to non-access, in order to rebut the
presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence
Act, a DNA test may not be directed.
43.3. A court would not be justified in
mechanically directing a DNA test of a child, in
a case where the paternity of a child is not

10
(2024) 7 SCC 773
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 5 of 9

directly in issue, but is merely collateral to the
proceeding.
43.4. Merely because either of the parties have
disputed a factum of paternity, it does not mean
that the court should direct DNA test or such
other test to resolve the controversy. The parties
should be directed to lead evidence to prove or
disprove the factum of paternity and only if the
court finds it impossible to draw an inference
based on such evidence, or the controversy in
issue cannot be resolved without DNA test, it
may direct DNA test and not otherwise. In other
words, only in exceptional and deserving cases,
where such a test becomes indispensable to
resolve the controversy the court can direct such
test.
43.5. While directing DNA tests as a means to
prove adultery, the court is to be mindful of the
consequences thereof on the children born out of
adultery, including inheritance-related
consequences, social stigma, etc.”

11
5.4 Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph ,
“35. In the peculiar circumstances of this case,
this Court must undertake an exercise to ‘balance
the interests’ of the parties involved and decide
whether there is an ‘eminent need’ for a DNA
test. This pertains not simply to the interests of
the child, i.e. the Respondent, but also to the
interests of the Appellant.
36. On one hand, courts must protect the parties'
rights to privacy and dignity by evaluating
whether the social stigma from one of them being
declared ‘illegitimate’ would cause them
disproportionate harm. On the other hand, courts
must assess the child's legitimate interest in
knowing his biological father and whether there
is an eminent need for a DNA test.
…
46. When dealing with the eminent need for a
DNA test to prove paternity, this Court balances

11
2025 SCC OnLine SC 175
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 6 of 9

the interests of those involved and must consider
whether it is possible to reach the truth without
the use of such a test.
47. First and foremost, the courts must, therefore,
consider the existing evidence to assess the
presumption of legitimacy. If that evidence is
insufficient to come to a finding, only then
should the court consider ordering a DNA test.
Once the insufficiency of evidence is established,
the court must consider whether ordering a DNA
test is in the best interests of the parties involved
and must ensure that it does not cause undue
harm to the parties. There are thus, two blockades
to ordering a DNA test : ( i ) insufficiency of
evidence; and ( ii ) a positive finding regarding the
balance of interests.”

(emphasis supplied)

5.5 All of the judgments referred to above were
recently followed by this bench in Nikhat Parveen v.
12
Rafique .
6. It is clear from the above judgments that when the Court is
confronted with the question whether or not to order a DNA test,
the only test to be satisfied is whether the result of the DNA test
is directly in issue and whether any other evidence-on-record can
substitute for the answer that may be arrived at through this
scientific process. Also, whether it is in the best interest of the
parties and/or justice.
6.1 In the present case, the alleged relationship
between CP and the second respondent was in January

12
2026 SCC OnLine SC 652
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 7 of 9

1999 and Amar was born in September 1999. CP has
consistently denied paternity and there is no other
evidence that can provide a categorical answer. It is
nobody’s case that the second respondent had ever had
an intimate relationship with someone else.
6.2 Although there have been findings that state that
the second respondent has been unable to establish any
link between CP and Amar, those findings were not as
a consequence of the full-dress trial. The civil suit filed
by Amar is for this very purpose and as such, the
question of paternity is directly in issue. On this count
as well, we find in favour of the respondent.
6.3 In view of the above observation, the question of
res judicata also is closed. As far as the right of privacy
is concerned, we are balancing, in this case CP’s
privacy with Amar’s desire for closure on a question
that has loomed large on his life throughout. He has
seen, right from childhood, his mother assert that CP is
the father but the authorities, consistently found
otherwise. If no positive answer is ever found out to
the question, it is quite possible that Amar would
forever be denied the rights he may otherwise be
entitled to by virtue of being CP’s son.
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 8 of 9

7. The balance of interests definitely lies in favour of Amar.
As such, no error can be found in the impugned judgment. The
appeal is dismissed. Let the matter be taken up by the concerned
Civil Court for fixing a date to conduct a DNA test and proceed
further in the civil suit pending before it as per the result received
subsequently.
Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of. No
order as to cost.

……………………………………………..J.
(SANJAY KAROL)


……………………………………………...J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;
May 29, 2026
C.A.No…/2026 @SLP(C) No.4016 of 2026 Page 9 of 9