STATE OF UTTARAKHAND vs POONAM BAHUGUNA

Court
Uttarakhand High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL

Special Appeal No. 403 of 2026


State of Uttarakhand and another …… Appellants
Vs.
Poonam Bahuguna ……Respondent


Presence:
Mr. Rahul Verma, learned Additional Advocate General for the
State.
Mr. M. C. Pant, Mr. D.N. Sharma, learned counsel along with Ms.
Manju Bahuguna, learned counsel for the respondent.

Reserved on : 29.10.2026
Delivered on : 17.11.2026

Coram: Hon’ble Ravindra Maithani, J.
Hon’ble Siddhartha Sah, J.

(Per: Hon’ble Siddhartha Sah, J.)

The present Special Appeal has been preferred against the
judgment and order dated 24.08.2026 passed by the learned Single
Judge in Writ Petition No. 2121 (S/S) of 2023, Poonam Bahuguna
Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr. , whereby the writ petition was
allowed and respondent no. 2, i.e., appellant no. 2 herein, was
further directed to consider the case of the petitioner for
Regularisation as a Junior Assistant in the Library or in any Class-
III post in the office of the Advocate General.
2. Before adverting to the respective submissions of learned
counsel for the parties, the facts of the case are being narrated
briefly in order to appreciate the case of the respective parties.

2

3. The writ petition was filed by the petitioner/respondent
herein against the State and the Advocate General with the
averments that petitioner was engaged as a contractual employee
with respondent no.2 in the year 2007, and since then, she has
been regularly working as such without any break in the library of
respondent no.2. Petitioner was paid the minimum of pay scale, as
admissible to a regular Class-III employee with effect from the year
2010. However, suddenly, vide order dated 16.10.2023, respondents
tried to change the condition and nature of service of petitioner and
asked her to continue as an outsource employee through an
outsourcing agency. The said order was challenged by petitioner in
the writ petition on the ground that she has been working with
respondent no.2 since 2007, and is also getting minimum of pay
scale w.e.f. 2010, therefore, the impugned order is illegal, arbitrary
and the same may be quashed. Petitioner further prayed for her
Regularisation on the post of Assistant Librarian since 2007.
4. Respondent No. 2 has filed its counter-affidavit,
contending inter-alia that the petitioner had moved an application
on 08.12.2009, on the basis of which, she was engaged as a
contractual employee. However, it is not denied that petitioner is
working regularly and is being paid minimum of scale of the post of
regular Junior Assistant. It is further stated in the counter affidavit
that Regularisation of the service of petitioner is under process, as
informed by Law Secretary vide its order dated 07.07.2023.
5. The State of Uttarakhand has filed its counter-affidavit,
inter-alia contending that though 122 posts in different cadres is
sanctioned in the office of respondent no.2 in which there is no post
of Assistant Librarian. It is further clarified that even under the
Rules known as ‘the Uttarakhand Advocate General Office

3

Establishment (Service of Employees) Rules, 2013’ (hereinafter
referred to as “the Establishment Rules, 2013”), there is no post of
Assistant Librarian sanctioned in the office of respondent no.2.
6. The petitioner/respondent herein filed a rejoinder affidavit,
reiterating the averments made in the writ petition and further
contended that petitioner is working in the office of respondent no.2
in Library as Junior Assistant (Contract) since July, 2007, as is
reflected from the noting sheet by the Advocate General, which is
part of Annexure No.RA1 to the rejoinder affidavit.
7. The matter was thereafter heard by the learned Single
Judge who came to the conclusion that since the petitioner has been
working with respondent no.2 in the library on the post of Junior
Assistant as admitted by respondent no.2 himself since July 2007,
the petitioner deserves to be regularized on the said post under
Uttarakhand Regularisation of Daily Wages, Work charged,
Contract, Fixed Pay, Part Time, Adhoc Employees Appointment
Rules, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Regularisation Rules of
2013”) which were subsequently amended in 2025. The Ld. Single
Judge also inferred that the Petitioner has already completed 10
years required service on 04.12.2018 on the cut-off date as per
Regularisation Rules, 2013, as amended in 2025. Petitioner has
been continuously working in the office of respondent no.2 and is
also getting minimum of pay scale of Junior Assistant for the last 16
years. Petitioner has spent all her life and youth in the service of
respondent no.2, and at present, relief of Regularisation cannot be
denied to her. The respondents cannot be permitted to exploit the
youth and education of petitioner in such a manner by keeping her
on contract for a long period of time without any reason. The work

4

discharged by petitioner is perennial in nature as reflected from her
long engagement and her services are required too.
8. The Ld. Single Judge also observed that the argument
advanced by respondents (Appellants herein) that the Advocate
General is not empowered to make order of Regularisation does not
hold any water as under the Rules known as ‘the Establishment
Rules, 2013’, the Advocate General is the appointing authority so far
as the post of Junior Assistant is concerned. The petitioner deserves
to be regularized under the Regularisation Rules of 2013 as
amended in the year 2025 in which the petitioner falls under the
bracket of cut-off date i.e. 04.12.2018 and on the said premise
proceeded to allow the petition vide impugned judgment and order
dated 24th August 2026, and thereby quashed the impugned order
dated 16.10.2023 along with notice dated 31.10.2023 qua
petitioner. Respondent no.2 was directed to consider the case of
petitioner for Regularisation as Junior Assistant in Library or any
Class-III post in office of Advocate General, within two months from
the date of production of a certified copy of the order.
9. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order dated
24.08.2026 passed in the writ petition, the present special appeal
has been filed by the appellants.
10. Assailing the aforesaid judgment and order dated
24.08.2026, learned Additional Advocate General for the State would
submit that the Advocate General has no power to regularize Group-
C posts. The Uttarakhand Subordinate Service Selection
Commission (UKSSSC) is the authority competent to conduct
recruitment examinations, and the role of the Advocate General is
limited to granting approval for appointments. It is further

5

submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General, that, by
virtue of a Government Order dated 25th April 2025, the State
Government has banned further recruitments.
11. It is the further canvassed by the learned Additional
Advocate General, that the petitioner/respondent herein has herself
admitted that she has been serving in the Advocate General's office
since 2009. It is submitted that it is difficult for the Advocate
General to comply with the order dated 24th August 2026. It is
further submitted that the Advocate General has been wrongly
impleaded as a party, whereas the State alone ought to have been
impleaded as a party.
12. Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance
on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Umadevi (3) & Ors.,
reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1, concerning Regularisation, and has
referred to paragraphs 43 and 45, thereof, which are extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference.
“43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public
employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of
law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled
from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering
the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14
read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the
scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law,
has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the
relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons,
the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a
contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of
the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or
casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued.
Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent
on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that
merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is
continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not
be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely
on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not
made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the
relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment
at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment
has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of

6

their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting
under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue
directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance
unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the
constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued
under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as
“litigious employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not
be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the
service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in
issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee
approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to
mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be
caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment
would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State
the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts
must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the
economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities
or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the
constitutional and statutory mandates.
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be
regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that
the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a
considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an
engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the
nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes.
It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arm's
length—since he might have been searching for some employment so as
to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that
ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional
scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has
temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued
permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public
appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a
contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties
were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the
court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such
casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of
administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who
at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would
not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment
brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of
our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled
to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go
in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed
on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the
nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even
while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the
nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real
sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is
temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered
to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure
established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the
services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for
some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though
he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up,
is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established
by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the
touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution.”

7

and stressed merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage
worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment,
he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made
permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance.
13. Learned Additional Advocate General would further
submit that the subsequent judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Jaggo v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3826, and Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr.,
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735, cannot be said to be good
law in view of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3). Further
reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 673, to
submit that the Constitution Bench has ruled that a decision of a
Constitution Bench of this Court binds a Bench of two learned
Judges of this Court and that judicial discipline obliges them to
follow it, regardless of their doubts about its correctness. At the
most, they could have ordered that the matter be heard by a Bench
of three learned Judges following the view of the law, what has been
declared by this Court in Pradip Chandra Parija & Ors. case [(2002)
1 SCC 1] clinches the issue.
14. It is further submitted that the post for which the
petitioner is seeking Regularisation falls within the purview of
UKSSSC and that the petitioner has not been appointed against any
substantive vacancy. The petitioner first applied for engagement as a
contractual employee in the year 2009. In the year 2024, the
Advocate General forwarded her representation seeking

8

Regularisation of her services; however, the State Government
denied her request for Regularisation.
15. It is submitted that even if certain grounds were not raised
before the Writ Court, the same may be raised in a Special Appeal.
In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bongaigaon Refinery &
Petrochemicals Ltd. & Ors. vs. Girish Chandra Sarma, reported in
(2007) 7 SCC 206, with particular reference to paragraph 22, which
is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:
“22. The learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that since
learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner has already
abandoned the plea of perversity i.e. that the finding is perverse, the
same is not open for learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner
to press again before the Division Bench of the High Court. Since the
writ appeal is in continuation of the original order passed in the writ
jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge, it cannot operate as an
estoppel against learned counsel for the respondent to press the same.
If the finding recorded by the inquiring officer is not sound and it relates
to perversity then the appellate court in writ appeal cannot estop the
counsel from raising the same. More so, the Division Bench after
considering the matter has found that the whole approach was perverse
because the respondent alone has been made a scapegoat. When the
decision of all the three Committees was unanimous, then to take one
and put the entire blame on him is definitely perverse approach and the
court cannot stand to the technicalities so as to defeat the ends of
justice. Thus, the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General
has no merit.”
16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/writ
petitioner submits that the argument of the appellants that the
Advocate General is the appointing authority is bereft of any force.
He has referred to the Establishment Rules, 2013, specifically Rules
3(a), 14, 15, and 18 of the said Rules, which are being extracted for
ready reference:-
“
Definitions
Rule 3 - In these rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or content -
(a) Appointing Authority' means the Advocate General of the State of the
Uttarakhand;

Determination of vacancies

9

Rule 14 - The Appointing Authority shall determine the number of
vacancies to be filled during the course of the year as also the number
of vacancies to be reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other categories to the State of
Uttarakhand under- rule 6.

Constitution of Departmental Selection Committee
Rule 15- (1) There shall be constituted a Selection Committee for the
purpose of recruitment to the posts of Stenographer, Junior Assistant,
Typist/Ruteen Grade clerk and Assistant Accountant comprises as
follows :--
(a) Appointing Authority - Chairman:
(b) An officer nominated by the Appointing Authority -Member;
and
(c) An officer nominated by the Head of the Department – Member.
(2) If the Chairman is not from Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, if
the Chairman is from Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, than the
Chairman shall nominate any officer other than Scheduled Castes.
Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes.
(3) If the Chairman is not from Other Backward Classes than any
Officer form Other Backward Classes nominated by the Chairman. if the
Chairman is from Other Backward Classes, then the Chairman shall
nominate any officer other than Scheduled Caste. Schedule Tribes or
Other Backward Classes.

Procedure of direct recruitment through the Commission
Rule 18. Recruitment for the posts of Librarian, Addition Private
Secretary. Review Officers, Assistant Review Officers and Translator
shall be made as follows through Public Service Commission.
(1) Application for permission to appear in the competitive examination
shall be called by the Commission in the prescribed form.
(2) No candidate shall be admitted to the examination unless he holds a
certificate of admission, issued by the Commission.
(3) After the results of the written examination has been received and
tabulated, the Commission shall, having regard to the need for securing
due representation of the candidates belonging to the Scheduled castes,
Scheduled Tribes and others under Rule 6. The Commission shall
prepare in list of candidates in order of their proficiency as disclosed by
the aggregate of marks obtained by each candidate at the written
examination and recommend such number of candidates as they
considered fit for appointment. If two or more candidates obtain equal
marks, the name of the candidate who is senior in age shall be placed
higher in the list. The Commission shall forward a list to the Appointing
Authority.”

17. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that
the Advocate General is the appointing authority for the
establishment of the Advocate General's office. He placed reliance on
an Office Memorandum dated 22nd February 2007, which contains
a list of employees whose services were regularized by the office of
the Advocate General, Uttarakhand.
18. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the Establishment
Rules, 2013, specifically Rules 2, 4, 5 and 8 thereof, which are
extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:-

10

(2) Status of the Service The Uttarakhand Advocate General Office
Establishment Service comprising group "A", "B", "C"
and "D" posts.
(4) Cadre of Service

(1) The strength of the service and of each category

of posts therein shall be such as may be
determined by the Government from time to
time

(2) The strength of the service and of each category
of posts therein shall, until orders varying the
same are passed under sub-rule (1), be as
given in the Appendix 'A`:

Provide that –
(a) the Appointing Authority may leave unfilled or
the Governor may hold in abeyance any vacant
posts, without thereby entitling any person to
compensation;

(b) the Governor may create such additional
permanent or temporary posts as he may
consider proper.

PART – III
RECRUITMENT

(5) Source of Recruitment Recruitment to the service shall be made from the
following sources:
(1) Librarian - By direct recruitment

(2) Senior Suit Superintendent - By promotion
subject to the rejection of unfit on the basis of
seniority through selection committee amongst
from the substantively appointed Suit
Superintendent who have completed at least
three years service as such on the first of the
year day recruitment.

(3) Suit Superintendent - By promotion subject to
the rejection of unfit on the basis of seniority
through selection committee amongst from the
substantively appointed Section Officers who
have completed at least five years service as
such on the first day of the recruitment.

(4) Section Officers - By promotion subject to the
rejection of unfit on the basis of seniority
through selection committee amongst from the
substantively appointed Reviewing Officers
who have completed at least five years
service as such on the first day of the year
recruitment.

(5) Private Secretary- By promotion subject to the
rejection of unfit on the basis of seniority
through selection committee amongst from the
substantively appointed Additional Private
Secretary who have completed at least five
years service as such on the first day of the
year of recruitment.

(6) Additional Private Secretary- By promotion
subject to the rejection of unfit on the basis of
seniority through selection committee amongst
from the substantively appointed
Stenographer who have completed at least
five years service as such on the first day of
the year recruitment.

(7) Reviewing Officers- (1) 50% direct recruitment
through Commission. (2) 50% by promotion
subject to the rejection of unfit on the basis of
seniority through selection committee amongst
from the substantively appointed Assistant
Reviewing Officers who have completed at
least five years service as such on the first
day of the year recruitment.

(8) Assistant Reviewing Officers- (1) 50% direct
recruitment through Commission. (2) 50% by

11

promotion subject to the rejection of the unfit
on the basis of seniority through selection
committee amongst from substantively
appointed Junior Assistant/Typist /Ruteen
Grade Clerk who have completed at least five
years service as such on the first day of the
year of recruitment.

(9) Accountant - By promotion subject to the
rejection of unfit on the basis of seniority
through selection committee amongst from the
substantively appointed Assistant Accountant
who have completed at least three years
service as such on passed departmental
examination.

(10) Assistant Accountant- By direct recruitment
through departmental selection committee.

(11) Stenographer- By direct recruitment through
departmental selection committee.

(12) Junior Assistant- (1) 70% by direct
recruitment through departmental selection
committee. (2)15% by promotion amongst from
the substantively appointed group 'D' posts
holders, who have passed High School
examination and who have five years service
as such by selection, which a objective type
examination of 50 marks to be held. (3) 10%
by promotion amongst from the substantively
appointed group 'D' posts holders, who have
passed Intermediate examination and who
have five years service as such by selection,
which a objective type examination of 50
marks to be held. (4) 5% vacancies by
promotion amongst such Vehicle Drivers who
have passed High School and higher
examination by the Appointing Authority.

(13) Typist/Ruteen Grade clerk-. (A) 1-70% by
direct recruitment 2- 25% amongst group "D"
employees in which 15% for high school
examination passed and 10% for Intermediate
examination passed, such employees which
have complete five years service as such,
through selection, a objective types
examination to be conducted, comprises 50
marks,

Provided that against the identified posts
for high school passed candidates, in case
non- avaibility of the candidates than the said
posts shall be field by promotion amongst
higher examination candidates. (B) 5%
vacancies shall be field by promotion amongst
such drivers from the high school examination
passed or higher examination passed by
Appointing Authority.

Note:- Group 'D' and driver who have
completed five years regular service shall be
come into the field of the legibility. For
promotion of the group 'D' and driver, the
selection on the posts of reserve vacancies.
the recruitment shall be made by a
examination on the basis of merit. The
examination have only one paper which shall
be comprises objective type question in Hindi,
General Knowledge, General Studies. The
written examination shall be held with 40
marks and 10 marks for character roll of
legible employee. In this way the total
examination marks shall be of 100. In case
where the recruitment to be in the cadre of
typist than in addition of above a typing
examination of 50 marks shall also be
conducted and below the typing speed of
4000 key depression per hour in Hindi shall
not be legible. The selection examination shall
be comprises total 100 marks.

12


(14) Translator- By direct recruitment through
Commission.

(8)Academic Qualification
8.
A candidate must have following qualifications for
appointment on the various posts in the service :-

Post Qualifications

(1) Librarian - Bachelor Degree from any University establish by
Law. Post graduation degree in library science from
any University establish by Law. Diploma of one
year in computer operation should be necessary.
(2) Reviewing Officers - Bachelor Degree from any University establish by
Law or any qualification recognized by the
Government equivalent there to.
(3) Assistant Reviewing Officers - Bachelor Degree from any University establish
by Law or any qualification recognized by the
Government equivalent there to. Minimum 4000 key
depression per hour speed in Hindi typing on
computer be necessary. Such candidate who can
type in English on computer to be given preference.
(4) Additional Private Secretary - Bachelor Degree from any University establish
by Law or any qualification recognized by the
Government equivalent there to. The speed must be
100 words in English shorthand and 6000 Key
depression in English typing. Minimum 80 words
per minute in shorthand in Hindi and 4000 key
depression per hour speed in Hindi typing on
computer be necessary.
(5) Assistant Accountant - B.com or post graduate diploma in accountancy
and 'O' level computer operation which the speed
5000 key depression per hour should be necessary
in the computer.
(6) Translator bilingual (Hindi and English) - Bachelor Degree from any
University establish by Law. English and Hindi, to
be in the level of Intermediate and Graduation.
Such candidates who is Law Graduated to be given
preference. The knowledge computer operation
should be must
(7) Stenographer - For the direct recruitment to the posts it is the
necessary that the candidate passed Intermediate
examination from Uttarakhand secondary
education council or examination passed from the
recognized by State Government equivalent there to
and kept knowledge of computer operation and
minimum 4000 key depression per hour speed and
100 words per minute in English shorthand and 80
words per minute in Hindi shorthand.
(8) Junior Assistant - For the direct recruitment to the posts it is
necessary that the candidate passed Intermediate
examination from the Uttarakhand secondary
education council or examination passed from the
recognized by State Government equivalent there to.
Minimum 4000 key depression per hour speed or
English/Hindi typing on computer must be
necessary.
(9) Typist/Ruteen Grade clerk - For the direct recruitment/promotion to the posts
of the typist/Ruteen Grade clerk it is necessary that
the candidate passed Intermediate examination
from the Uttarakhand secondary education council
or examination passed from the recognized by State
Government equivalent there to. Minimum 4000 key
depression per hour speed or English/Hindi typing
on computer must be necessary.
Compulsory Qualification- (2) Regarding the said posts of direct recruitment
the candidate must be registered in the any
employment office of the Uttarakhand State.

19. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the
Regularisation Rules of 2013 have also been forwarded to the
Advocate General's office. The contention raised by learned counsel

13

for the appellants that the Government has banned recruitment to
Group-C posts was countered by submitting that the Establishment
Rules, 2013 were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of
India and would override the Government Order dated 25th April
2025.
20. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on
the judgment dated 22nd February 2024 passed by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Writ Petition (S/B) No. 616 of 2018 (Narendra
Singh and Another v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.), wherein it was
held that the amendments to the Establishment Rules, 2013 would
not come into play, inasmuch as an employee would be entitled to
Regularisation upon completing 10 years of service as on 22nd
February 2024. Reliance has been placed on paragraphs 6 and 7 of
the said judgment, which are extracted hereinbelow for ready
reference:-
“6. In the present case, there was an interim order of stay dated
04.12.2018, that no orders of Regularisation will be passed by the State
Government, under the 2013 Rules. Hence, since 04.12.2018 no
Regularisation orders have been passed. All those persons, who have
been regularized as per the 2013 Rules before 04.12.2018, have
worked for more than 13-14 years now. With respect to other
candidates, who have to be regularized now, they can be regularized,
as per the 2013 Rules, by taking into consideration 10 years’ service,
instead of 05 years, as of now.
7. Accordingly, the 2013 Rules are being modified that, after
04.12.2018, 10 years’ period will be taken into consideration for
Regularisation.”
21. Further reliance has been placed on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhendu Bhattacharjee & Others v.
State of Assam & Others, reported in (2026) SCC OnLine SC 909,
with particular reference to paragraphs 67, 70, 71, 73, and 74
thereof, which are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:
67. The conduct of the State must also be examined in light of its status
as a model employer. The State is under a higher constitutional
obligation to ensure that its actions are just, reasonable and non-
arbitrary. Recently, this Court in Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand13

14

reiterated that the State, as a model employer, bears a heightened
constitutional obligation in the discharge of its functions. It must act
with probity, fairness and candour, and cannot cloud the disputes
involving its employees under narrow technical grounds divorced from
their broader constitutional context. A model employer is expected to
uphold the dignity of its employees more so who are at the lowest
pedestal of the hierarchy and to avoid exploiting their vulnerability or
precarious position. This obligation flows directly from the Constitution
and is not discretionary. Constantly giving undertakings before a
constitutional Court and thereafter resiling from them does not comport
with the standards expected of a model employer. An undertaking
recorded by a Court is not a casual statement, but is a solemn
representation on the basis of which judicial orders are passed. The
State cannot approbate and reprobate. It cannot, on the one hand,
secure time and indulgence from the Court on the assurance that a
policy will be implemented and, on the other, avoid implementation by
citing precedents that were already in existence at the time the
undertakings were furnished.

70. The principle laid down in the aforesaid decision applies to the
present case as well. The State's own policy decision and subsequent
undertakings before the High Court constituted clear representations
that the cases of the left-out workers would be duly considered. The
State could not thereafter retract from its earlier position in a selective or
inconsistent manner.

71. Even otherwise, as correctly observed by the learned Single Judge,
there was no requirement for the State to seek permission of the Court to
implement its own policy decision. The Full Bench in Jitendra Kalita
(supra) had itself observed that any solution to the issue of
Regularisation must be undertaken by the State as a policy measure.
Regularisation, where permissible in law, is an executive function. It
falls within the domain of policy and administration. Courts do not grant
prior approval to executive decisions. The role of the Court is confined to
judicial review, that is, to examine whether a policy or action is
constitutionally valid, fair and reasonable. It is not for the Court to
authorise the executive to exercise powers which already vest in it.

73. As regards the contention of Shri Gupta that after the decision in
Umadevi (supra) no Regularisation can be effected in respect of
employees who were not appointed against duly sanctioned posts, we
are unable to accept such a sweeping proposition in the facts of the
present case. The submission proceeds on the premise that Umadevi
(supra) lays down an absolute and inflexible embargo against all forms
of Regularisation irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. Such an
interpretation, in our considered view, does not reflect the true scope
and ratio of the decision.

74. This Court in Jaggo (supra), deprecated the tendency of the State to
take mechanical shelter under Umadevi (supra) to deny relief to
employees who had been performing work of a permanent and essential
nature for long years. This Court observed as follows:—
“12. Despite being labelled as “part-time workers,” the appellants
performed these essential tasks on a daily and continuous basis over
extensive periods, ranging from over a decade to nearly two decades. Their
engagement was not sporadic or temporary in nature; instead, it was
recurrent, regular, and akin to the responsibilities typically associated
with sanctioned posts. Moreover, the respondents did not engage any
other personnel for these tasks during the appellants' tenure,
underscoring the indispensable nature of their work.

15

13. The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts
lacks merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was
perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The
recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification as
regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements were labelled.
It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these same tasks to
private agencies after the appellants' termination demonstrates the inherent
need for these services. This act of outsourcing, which effectively replaced one
set of workers with another, further underscores that the work in question
was neither temporary nor occasional.
19. It is evident from the foregoing that the appellants' roles were
not only essential but also indistinguishable from those of regular
employees. Their sustained contributions over extended periods, coupled
with absence of any adverse record, warrant equitable treatment and
Regularisation of their services. Denial of this benefit, followed by their
arbitrary termination, amounts to manifest injustice and must be rectified.
20. It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi (supra)
does not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State or its
instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries
and illegal appointments that circumvent constitutional requirements.
However, where appointments were not illegal but possibly “irregular,”
and where employees had served continuously against the backdrop of
sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need for a fair and
humane resolution becomes paramount. Prolonged, continuous, and
unblemished service performing tasks inherently required on a regular
basis can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or
temporary into a scenario demanding fair Regularisation . In a recent
judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India , it was held that held
that procedural formalities cannot be used to deny Regularisation of service to
an employee whose appointment was termed “temporary” but has performed
the same duties as performed by the regular employee over a considerable
period in the capacity of the regular employee.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as
exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely
affects workers' rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the
gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements,
often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such
practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour
standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles
of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such
exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in
misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental
trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent
that can erode public trust in governmental operations.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly
in government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While
the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address
short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to
evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in
several ways:
• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels : Employees engaged for work that is
essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often
labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles mirror those of

16

regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity,
security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite
performing identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently
dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice
undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of
constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression : Temporary employees often find
themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions, or
incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a
systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their
contributions being equally significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to
outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one
set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates
exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation
to offer regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits : Temporary employees are
often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health
insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of
social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially
in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the
practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are often
misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long- serving
employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish between “illegal” and
“irregular” appointments. It categorically held that employees in
irregular appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned posts and
had served continuously for more than ten years, should be considered
for Regularisation as a one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of
the judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to
indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases where
their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack adherence to
procedural formalities. Government departments often cite the judgment
Uma Devi
in (supra) to argue that no vested right to Regularisation exists
for temporary employees, overlooking the judgment's explicit
acknowledgment of cases where Regularisation is appropriate. This
selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose,
effectively weaponizing it against employees who have rendered
indispensable services over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for
government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable
employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods,
especially when their roles are integral to the organization's functioning,
not only contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the
organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By
ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce
the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold
the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody.
This approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive
precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the
overall betterment of labour practices in the country. ”

17

22. It is also submitted in the counter-affidavit filed by the
State that there is no contention that the post of Junior Assistant
was not vacant on the relevant date.
23. Lastly, learned Additional Advocate General for the State
submits that, if this Court is not inclined to interfere with the
impugned judgment, the judgment should, at the very least, be
modified to the extent that directions be issued to the State
Government instead of the Advocate General, and the State should
be treated as the appointing authority rather than the Advocate
General.
24. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and going
through the record the questions that fall for determination in this
Special Appeal are (1) Whether the learned Advocate General is the
appointing authority under the Establishment Rules, 2013? (2)
Whether the petitioner (respondent herein) had been working in the
office of learned Advocate General since 2007 or 2009? and (3)
Whether the petitioner (respondent herein) is entitled for the benefit
of Regularisation Rules of 2013?
25. The first question for determination is that whether the
learned Advocate General is the appointing authority of the writ
petitioner/respondent herein. On this issue on one hand the learned
Additional Advocate General would very vehemently argue that the
State Government is the appointing authority of the writ petitioner
and it is only the State Government which can regularize the
services of the writ petitioner. On the other hand the learned
counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent herein would submit that
Rule 3 (a) of the Establishment Rules, 2013 clearly state that
appointing Authority means the Advocate General of the State of

18

Uttarakhand. He would further submit that as per Rule 14 it is
Appointing Authority (Advocate General) who shall determine the
number of vacancies to be filled and as per Rule 15. Inter-alia
Junior Assistant has to be appointed through a Departmental
Selection Committee. The Learned AAG could not point out any
other Rule which would show that the Advocate General is not the
appointing authority of the writ petitioner/respondent herein. Thus
we come to the conclusion that the Advocate General is the
appointing authority for the post of junior assistant under the
Establishment Rules, 2013. Also Office Memorandum dated
22/02/2007 clearly reveals Advocate General to be the Appointing
Authority.
26. So far as the question as to since when the petitioner had
been working in the office of Advocate General is concerned it needs
to be noted that while on one hand it is the petitioner’s case that she
has been working in the office of Advocate General since the year
2007, whereas on the other hand it is the case of the appellants that
the petitioner had been working in the office of the Advocate General
since the year 2009. The learned Additional Advocate General would
make reference to applications of petitioner (respondent herein)
dated 26/07/2017 and 09/10/2017 wherein it is stated she has
been working in the Advocate’s General office since 2009. While
learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent herein would
refer to the file noting of the learned Advocate General himself dated
20/07/2018 which categorically refers to the writ petitioner working
since 2007. The file noting of the learned Advocate General is part of
Annexure No. 1 of the rejoinder affidavit. Learned counsel for the
writ petitioner/respondent herein had also drawn the attention of
the Court to other documents annexed as Annexure No. RA1 to the
rejoinder affidavit of the writ petitioner, wherein writ petitioner has

19

signed Library Register since the year 2007. Learned AAG could not
deny that the Library Register contains signature of writ
petitioner/respondent herein since the year 2007. The submissions
as made by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent
herein that the writ petitioner/respondent herein had been working
in the office of the Advocate General since the year 2007 are thus
clearly proved and established from the file noting of the Advocate
General as also further corroborated from the Library Register of the
Advocate General. Therefore, the view taken by the learned Single
Judge that the writ petitioner/respondent has been working since
the year 2007 is based on record and we concur with the same.
27. The last crucial question which falls for determination is
whether the writ petitioner/respondent herein is entitled for the
benefit of Regularisation Rules of 2013? On this issue learned
Additional Advocate General has argued that writ
petitioner/respondent is not entitled to Regularisation. Learned
Additional Advocate General has firstly relied upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) while
referring to para No. 43 and 45 thereof and would submit that a
temporary or casual employee cannot be absorbed or made
permanent, merely on the strength of long continuous service. He
would further submit that the State Government has banned fresh
recruitments in the year 2025 vide G.O. dated 25/04/2025. It is
further submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that
recent judgments of two Hon’ble Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Jaggo, etc cannot be relied upon in view of judgment
in the case of Dawordi Bohra Community (supra). It was further
submitted that the petitioner has not been appointed against any
substantive vacancy. On the other hand learned counsel for the writ
petitioner would submit that Regularisation Rules of 2013 have

20

been forwarded inter-alia to the Advocate General’s office. It is also
contended that since Regularisation Rules of 2013 having been
framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India they would
override the Government Order dated 25/04/2025. Reliance has
further been placed on the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court dated 22/02/2024 rendered in the case of Narendra Singh vs.
State of Uttarakhand to contend that an employee would be entitled
to Regularisation upon completing 10 years of service as on
22/02/2024. Reliance has also been placed on the recent judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhendu
Bhattacharjee (supra) to contend that Hon’ble Supreme Court has
been unable to accept a sweeping proposition that after the decision
in Umadevi case no Regularisation can be effected in respect of
employees who were not appointed against duly sanctioned posts. It
was also submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner/respondent
herein that in the counter affidavit of the State it is not their
contention that post of Junior Assistant was not vacant on the
relevant date. From the rival submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties it is clear that the Regularisation Rules of 2013 are
applicable in the office of the Advocate General Uttarakhand. The
submission of learned Additional Advocate General that long
continuous service on adhoc/temporary service is not ground for
Regularisation is itself contradicted by para 53 of the judgment in
the case of Umadevi (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
provided for steps to regularize services of irregular appointed
employees who had worked for ten years or more but without the
intervention of the orders of Courts or Tribunals. Thus the other
judgments cited by learned Additional Advocate General do not
come to the rescue of the appellants. In the present case the State
Government has framed the Regularisation Rules of 2013 in

21

consonance with Umadevi case and the writ petitioner/ respondent
herein is thus eligible for Regularisation under said Regularisation
Rules of 2013 and has also rendered more than 10 years services in
the year 2024 as per judgment of co-ordinate Bench in the case of
Narendra Singh and also in view of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in case of Sukhendu Bhatacharjee (supra). Thus we come to
the conclusion that the writ petitioner/respondent herein is entitled
to the benefit of Regularisation under the Regularisation Rules of
2013. Therefore the learned Single Judge did not err by granting
benefit of Regularisation Rules of 2013 to the writ
petitioner/respondent.
28. Since all the three points for determination are answered
against the appellants hence we do not find any ground to interfere
with the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Special
Appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed.
29. The Special Appeal is hereby dismissed.

(Siddhartha Sah, J.) (Ravindra Maithani, J.)
17.11.2026 17.11.2026

BS