Luminous Infra Projects Llp Through Its Authorized Partner Mr. Mehul vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh
- Court
- Madhya Pradesh High Court
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
WRIT PETITION NO. 28309 of 2026
LUMINOUS INFRA PROJECTS LLP
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS
&
WRIT PETITION NO. 28329 of 2026
LUMINOUS INFRA PROJECTS LLP
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & OTHERS
Appearance:-
Shri Vishal Baheti senior advocate with Shri Abhimanyu Sanap advocate for the
petitioner.
Ms. Drishti Rawal Government Advocate for State.
Reserved on : 1.09.2026
Delivered on : 8.09.2026
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ORDER
This order will govern the disposal of WP No. 28309 of 2026 and WP No. 28329
of 2026 since it is jointly submitted by learned counsel for parties that both these writ
petitions involve similar issues on the same fact situation. These writ petitions have
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DATT
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 3.7.2026 whereby the
petitioners' application for grant of development permission has been rejected. For
convenience, the facts have been noted from WP No. 28309/2026.
2 . By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:
A. Petition may kindly be allowed by issuing appropriate writ order or
direction by setting aside the impugned order dated 3.7.2026 (Annex.P/6) issued by
respondent No.2.
B. Petition may kindly be allowed by issuing appropriate writ, order or
direction by directing respondent No.2 to issue the development permission for the
development of colony namely “Luminous Corridor-II” within a stipulated period
of time.
C. Any other relief which this Hon'ble court deems fit in the facts and
circumstances of the case may be awarded alongwith the cost of the petition.
3. The facts in brief is that vide order dated 3.7.2026 the application of petitioner
for grant of development permission in respect of a residential colony project has been
rejected, which he has acquired by registered sale deeds and thereafter obtained all
requisite statutory permissions including mutation, diversion and layout sanction from
the competent authorities. However, while considering the petitioner's application for
development permission, respondent No.2 had relied upon certain old revenue entries
relating to 2006 to 2010 reflecting proceedings under the Agricultural Ceiling and
rejected the application on the ground that an order allegedly passed by the Sub
Divisional Officer in the year 2010, pursuant to which private ownership stood
recorded in the revenue record, could not be traced from the government record.
Therefore, petitioner's application has been rejected merely on account of non
availability of old government record. Hence this petition is filed.
4 . Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that initially by order dated
30.6.2004, the Board of Revenue in review case no. 779-1/2004 has set aside the earlier
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DATT
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
ceiling proceedings with respect to subject land and directed initiation of fresh
proceedings against the legal representatives of the then landowners. The State
authority has never filed an appeal nor it had initiated further proceedings with
reference to ceiling for the said lands. He has further submitted that the petitioner
purchased the lands comprising Luminous Corridor-II through various registered sale
deeds during year 2023-26 and name of petitioner was duly mutated in revenue records.
He has submitted that by order dated 29.9.2024, the Sub Divisional Officer Hatod
diverted the land use of the lands from agricultural use to residential use. He has also
submitted that the Department of Town and Country Planning has granted permission
and approved layout to the petitioner by order dated 5.9.2024. In this background he
has submitted that respondent State has never filed an appeal against the order dated
th
30 June, 2004 passed by Board of Revenue and this order attained finality as it
remained unchallenged for period of more than 20 years. He has submitted that
subsequent to passing of said order, the State also never initiated any ceiling
proceedings against the legal representatives of the then landowner. He has submitted
that the land ceiling proceedings were dropped after passing of the order dated
30.6.2004 by the board of Revenue. Thereafter, the concerned SDO passed an order
dated 8.12.2010 removing the description in the relevant revenue entries showing
previous ceiling proceedings even after lapse of more than 6 years from the date of
passing of order. He has drawn attention towards the mutation order passed by
Tehsildar which mentions that the said land is not a government land. By drawing
attention to para 4 of the order, he has contended that the said aspect is also material for
consideration in the present matter. He has further submitted that the present petitioner
purchased the land in year 2025 through various registered sale deeds and petitioner is
the subsequent buyer from the previous land owners. The mutation and demarcation
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
proceedings were duly conducted and concluded by the relevant revenue authorities in
favour of petitioner and no objection whatsoever was ever raised with regard to lands
being affected under the Land Ceiling Law. He has further submitted that the order
dated 8.12.2010 was passed by SDO Hatod as there was no fresh proceedings ever
initiated against the legal representatives of the original holder and pursuant to the order
dated 8.12.2010 the private ownership continued to be reflected in the revenue records.
He has further submitted that the impugned order is based on an alleged fact that the
records of order dated 8.12.2010 is not available with the concerned department is
absolutely misconceived and on the basis alone the impugned order deserves to be
dismissed. He has submitted that the impugned order gives the effect that the lands are
still affected by the ceiling law, whereas the fact remains that the State never initiated
any fresh ceiling proceedings against the legal representatives of the original holder and
since then the land became privately owned. He has further submitted that the
respondent No.2 while passing the impugned order has also misinterpreted the opinion
of the Additional Advocate General as it clearly states that “Non opinion as to
permission in concern be reached.” The said opinion does not mention that the said land
is affected by the laws of ceiling and also does not mention about rejection of the
application seeking development permission. He has further submitted that it is settled
principle of relevant laws that any modification in any revenue entry cannot be
undertaken without any written order of a competent authority. The petitioner cannot be
punished for non availability of government record which can never be controlled by
the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. He has further submitted that merely on the
basis of an old revenue entry and an alleged order of 2010 the petitioner's development
permission has been rejected. He has further submitted that the approach is legally
impermissible and revenue entry cannot become a substitute for a vesting order. He has
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
further submitted that if the State asserts ownership, it must establish the statutory
source of that ownership as this is particularly significant because the petitioner has
registered sale deeds and has already obtained mutation, diversion and planning
permission and layout sanction. None of those permissions has been shown to have
been cancelled. He has also submitted that the authority had to determine the present
legal status of the land. Instead, it has relied upon historical material and has effectively
adjudicated title collaterally while exercising jurisdiction over development permission.
The recent judgment of this Hon'ble Court in Devaswar Trading is directly helpful to
the case of petitioner and by referring that judgment the counsel has submitted that the
petitions are required to be allowed. He has further submitted that at the very least, the
impugned order deserves to be quashed for non application of mind, failure to consider
relevant documents and reliance upon an inconclusive historical revenue entry. The
authority may be directed to reconsider the application determining the present legal
status of the land in accordance with law. He therefore, prays to allow both the writ
petitions.
5. Counsel for the State has opposed the same by giving the chronology as under:-
Initially the land was in the name of one Hindu Singh but vide order dated 9.6.176, the
proceedings were initiated against Hindu Singh. The competent authority found 156.04
acres of land to be excess land. He has submitted that the said order was assailed in
revision and the said revision was dismissed. On 21.7.1982 final order was passed
holding that Hindu Singh was entitled to hold 81 acres of land only. He has submitted
that revenue appeal No. 48/1982-83 before the Additional Collector was dismissed and
thereafter revision was also dismissed. He has submitted that by order dated 25.4.2003,
the appeal before the Board of Revenue was finally decided against Hindu Singh. He
submitted that Hindu Singh died on 21.6.1999, thereafter, a review petition was filed by
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
his legal heirs before the Board of Revenue which was allowed by order dated
30.6.2004. Thereafter till 2006 to 2010, the land continued to be recorded in the
revenue record as land included in ceiling proceedings. He has also submitted that
revenue entries were changed to reflect private ownership allegedly in compliance with
order dated 8.12.2010 passed by SDO Hatod. The petitioner purchased the lands from
the alleged landowners by registered sale deeds and thereafter got its name mutated in
revenue records. In the year 2026, the petitioner obtained layout sanction and thereafter
applied for development permission. He has further submitted that on enquiry the SDO
(Revenue) Hatod informed that no case bearing case No. 0009/B/121/2010-11 and no
order dated 8.12.2010 could be traced in the relevant register. He has submitted that
respondent No.2 has rightly rejected the petitioner’s application for development
permission by the order dated 3.7.2026 which is under challenge in both the writ
petitions. He has further submitted that the petitioner cannot claim an enforceable
right to development permission on the basis of a disputed revenue entry. He has further
submitted that the writ court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
Constitution of India cannot issue a positive direction which would have the effect of
recognizing or validating a disputed and apparently unsupported revenue transaction.
He has submitted that the earlier ceiling proceedings cannot be ignored in the facts of
present case. He has submitted that the competent authority determined the excess
holding of Hindu Singh by order dated 9.6.1976, which was subsequently challenged
before the Additional Collector and was affirmed by order dated 15.10.1976. This order
was never challenged. He has submitted that thereafter the competent authority vide
order dated 21.7.1982 held that Hindu Singh is entitled for 81 acres of land only. The
order dated 21.7.1982 was challenged on limited grounds that Hindu Singh was entitled
for 90 acres of land instead of 81 acres. This appeal was dismissed by Additional
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
Collector by order dated 20.10.1984. The order dated 20.10.1984 was challenged before
Additional Commissioner by filing revision. The revision was dismissed by order dated
28.12.1988. Subsequently the appeal before the revenue Board was also decided against
Hindu Singh on 25.4.2003. He has submitted that thereafter by order dated 30.6.2004,
passed in review by the Board of Revenue, the orders dated 20.10.1984 and 28.12.1988
were set aside. Thus, even if the orders dated 20.10.1984 and 28.12.1988 were set
aside then they do not declare the complete holding of Hindu Singh free from ceiling, it
merely have effect on the order dated 21.7.1982 whereby he was held entitled for 81
acres of land only. He has further submitted that the petitioner cannot simply rely upon
the subsequent revenue entry. He has further submitted that the impugned order does
not warrant interference under Article 226 of Constitution of India where the present
case does not involve a simple case of refusal to perform a statutory duty. The petitioner
seeks a positive mandamus which would necessarily requires the Court to proceed on
the assumption that the alleged 2010 order existed and was legally valid. He has also
submitted that alternative remedy is also available and therefore, the petitions are not
maintainable. Lastly he has submitted that petitioner cannot claim to be bonafide
purchaser as the petitioner who has transacted directly from heirs of Hindu Singh was
under a clear obligation to conduct due diligence regarding the title of the sellers and
the past revenue history of the lands. A simple examination of the revenue records
would have revealed that the lands continued to be recorded as lands included in ceiling
proceedings. He has submitted that both the writ petitions being meritless deserve to be
dismissed.
6 . I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar. I have also gone through
the material available on record.
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
7. It is also fruitful to refer to follownig judgments to consider scope of exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India in facts of the present case.
A. T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers , (2025) 4 SCC 1, paras 54 to
63 are reproduced as under:-
54. The access to High Courts by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, is not just a constitutional right but also a part of the basic structure. It is available to
every citizen whenever there is a violation of their constitutional rights or even statutory rights.
This is an inalienable right and the rule of availability of alternative remedy is not an omnibus
rule of exclusion of the writ jurisdiction, but a principle applied by the High Courts as a form
of judicial restraint and refrain in exercising the jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative
writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and the same is not limited by
any provision of the Constitution and cannot be restricted or circumscribed by a statute.
[ Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks , (1998) 8 SCC 1. See also, L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India , (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577 : (1997) 228 ITR 725; S.N.
Mukherjee v. Union of India , (1990) 4 SCC 594 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 669 : 1991 SCC (L&S)
242; Union of India v. Parashotam Dass , (2025) 5 SCC 786.
55. It has been well-settled through a legion of judicial pronouncements of this Court that the
writ courts, despite the availability of alternative remedies, may exercise writ jurisdiction at
least in three contingencies — ( i ) where there is a violation of principles of natural justice or
fundamental rights; ( ii ) where an order in a proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction; or ( iii )
where the vires of an Act is challenged. Noticeably, M SEFC as a statutory authority performs a
statutory role and functions within the four corners of the law.
56. Following the aforesaid dictum, this Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd. [ Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. , (2003) 2 SCC 107] , had taken notice of the
fact that the High Court had referred to the arbitration clause which the writ petitioner could
take recourse to, to hold that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction is a rule of discretion and
not of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of alternative remedy, the writ
courts can exercise its jurisdiction at least in three contingencies, as referred to above. In the
facts of the said case, this Court interfered observing that there were peculiar circumstances as
the dealership had been terminated on an irrelevant and non-existence cause. Therefore, there
was no need to drive the parties to initiate arbitration proceedings.
57. Following the judgments in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks [ Whirlpool
Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks , (1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia [ Harbanslal
Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. , (2003) 2 SCC 107] , this Court in Radha Krishan
Industries v. State of H.P. [ Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. , (2021) 6 SCC 771 :
(2021) 88 GSTR 228] laid down the following principles : ( Radha Krishan Industries
case [ Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. , (2021) 6 SCC 771 : (2021) 88 GSTR 228] ,
SCC p. 795, para 27)
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58. Thus, it would be true to say that the existence of the statutory remedy does not affect the
jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ. Nevertheless, the writ jurisdiction being
discretionary by policy, the writ courts generally insist that the parties adhere to alternative
statutory remedies, as this reinforces the rule of law. However, in exceptional cases, writ
jurisdiction can still be exercised as a power to access the court for justice and relief.
59. It is in this context, that a Constitution Bench of five Judges way back in 1954
in Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of M.P. [ Himmatlal Harilal Mehta v. State of M.P. , (1954)
1 SCC 405 : (1954) 5 STC 115] had observed that the principle that the High Court should not
issue a prerogative writ when an alternative remedy is available may not apply when the
remedy under the statutes is onerous and burdensome in character, such as when the party has
to deposit the whole amount of the tax before filing an appeal. An alternative remedy must be
equally efficacious and adequate.
60. While examining the scope of the right to file a writ petition when the statute requires a
pre-deposit of tax—an obligation argued as imposing an onerous condition on the right to
appeal—this Court in Shyam Kishore v. MCD [ Shyam Kishore v. MCD , (1993) 1 SCC 22] ,
after relying upon several other decisions, observed that the validity of rigid provisions banning
entertainment of appeal when taxes are not paid have been upheld so long as the conditions are
not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restriction. In the alternative, the right is almost
illusory. Diluting the requirement to pay the disputed tax, this Court observed : ( Shyam Kishore
case [ Shyam Kishore v. MCD , (1993) 1 SCC 22] , SCC pp. 45-46, para 44)
“ 44 . … Sometimes, to compel the assessee to pay up the demanded tax for several years in
succession might very well cripple him altogether. This apart, an assessee may not be able to
deposit the tax while filing the appeal but may be able to pay it up within a short time, or at any
rate, before the appeal comes on for hearing in the normal course. There is no reason to
construe the provision so rigidly as to disable him from doing this. Again, when an appeal
comes on for hearing, the appellate Judge, in appropriate cases, where he feels there is some
great hardship or injustice involved, may be inclined to adjourn the appeal for some time to
enable the assessee to pay up the tax. Though it will not be expedient or proper to encourage
adjournment of an appeal, where it is ripe for hearing otherwise, only on this ground and as a
matter of course, an interpretation which leaves some room for the exercise of a judicial
discretion in this regard, where the equities of the case deserve it, may not be inappropriate.
The appellate Judge's incidental and ancillary powers should not be curtailed except to the
extent specifically precluded by the statute. We see nothing wrong in interpreting the provision
as permitting the appellate authority to adjourn the hearing of the appeal thus giving time to the
assessee to pay the tax or even specifically granting time or instalments to enable the assessee
to deposit the disputed tax where the case merits it, so long as it does not unduly interfere with
the appellate court's calendar of hearings. His powers, however, should stop short of staying
the recovery of the tax till the disposal of the appeal. We say this because it is one thing for the
Judge to adjourn the hearing leaving it to the assessee to pay up the tax before the adjourned
date or permitting the assessee to pay up the tax, if he can, in accordance with his directions
before the appeal is heard. In doing so, he does not and cannot injunct the department from
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
recovering the tax, if they wish to do so. He is only giving a chance to the assessee to pay up
the tax if he wants the appeal to be heard. It is, however, a totally different thing for the Judge
to stay the recovery till the disposal of the appeal; that would result in modifying the language
of the proviso to read:“no appeal shall be disposed of until the tax is paid”. Short of this,
however, there is no reason to restrict the powers unduly; all he has to do is to ensure that the
entire tax in dispute is paid up by the time the appeal is actually heard on its merits. We would,
therefore, read clause ( b ) of Section 170 only as a bar to the hearing of the appeal and its
disposal on merits and not as a bar to the entertainment of the appeal itself.”
61. Equally important are the observations with reference to the right to file a writ petition
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in certain situations. In this regard, this Court
in Shyam Kishore [ Shyam Kishore v. MCD , (1993) 1 SCC 22] has observed : (SCC pp. 46-47,
para 45)
“ 45 . If the provision is interpreted in the manner above suggested, one can steer clear of all
problems of constitutional validity. The contention on behalf of the Corporation to read the
provision rigidly and seek to soften the rigour by reference to the availability of recourse to the
High Courts by way of a petition under Articles 226 and 227 in certain situations and the
departmental instructions referred to earlier does not appear to be a satisfactory solution. The
departmental instructions may not always be followed and the resort to Articles 226 and 227
should be discouraged when there is an alternative remedy. A more satisfactory solution is
available on the terms of the statute itself. The construction of the section approved by us
above vests in the appellate authority a power to deal with the appeal otherwise than by way of
final disposal even if the disputed tax is not paid. It enables the authority to exercise a judicial
discretion to allow the payment of the disputed tax even after the appeal is filed but, no doubt,
before the appeal is taken up for actual hearing. The interpretation will greatly ameliorate the
genuine grievances of, and hardships faced by, the assessee in the payment of the tax as
determined. Though an assessee may not be able to acquire an absolute stay of the recovery of
the tax until the dispute is resolved, he will certainly be able to get breathing time to pay up the
same where his case deserves it. If this interpretation is placed on the provision, no question of
unconstitutionality can at all arise.”
62. In Govind Parameswar Nair v. Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay [ Govind Parameswar
Nair v. Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay , (2001) 9 SCC 166] , a Constitution Bench of five
Judges agreed with the interpretation given by the three-Judge Bench in Shyam
Kishore [ Shyam Kishore v. MCD , (1993) 1 SCC 22] .
63. Recently, in Tecnimont (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab [ Tecnimont (P) Ltd. v. State of Punjab ,
(2021) 12 SCC 477 : (2019) 69 GSTR 193] , in regard to the question relating to alternative
remedy where the disputed amount is required to be deposited to avail the statutory remedy,
this Court observed that there is some divergence of opinion, albeit several cases like Shyam
Kishore [ Shyam Kishore v. MCD , (1993) 1 SCC 22] have attempted to find a solution to
provide some support in cases involving extreme hardship where the writ petition would not be
dismissed on the ground of equally efficacious alternative remedy.
B . In the matter of S tate of U.P. v. Ehsan , (2024) 14 SCC 269 , in para 28 it has
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been held as under:
28. We are conscious of the law that existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute
bar on exercise of writ jurisdiction. More so, when a writ petition has been entertained,
parties have exchanged their pleadings/affidavits and the matter has remained pending for
long. In such a situation there must be a sincere effort to decide the matter on merits and not
relegate the writ petitioner to the alternative remedy, unless there are compelling reasons for
doing so. One such compelling reason may arise where there is a serious dispute between
the parties on a question of fact and materials/evidence(s) available on record are
insufficient/inconclusive to enable the Court to come to a definite conclusion.
C . Army Welfare Education Society New Delhi Vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma
reported in (2024) 16 SCC 598.
8 . It transpires from the record that in the year 2004, the Board of Revenue has
allowed the review petition filed by legal representatives of Hindu Singh by considering
its own merit as also set aside the earlier ceiling proceedings. It also transpires that from
year 2006 to 2008, the land continued to be recorded as land included in ceiling
proceedings. However, it transpires that in year 2010, the revenue entries were changed
to reflect private ownership allegedly in compliance with the order dated 8.12.2010
passed by SDO. It also transpires that petitioner purchased the lands from the alleged
landowners through registered sale deeds and thereafter got its name mutated in the
revenue records also. It also transpires that in year 2026 the petitioner obtained layout
sanction and thereafter applied for development permission. On 29.4.2026, the SDO
Hatod informed that no case bearing Case No. 0009/B/121-2010-11 and no order dated
8.12.2010 could be traced in the relevant Dayra Panji/register and therefore, it seems
that the respondent No.2 has rejected the petitioner’s application for development
permission by order dated 3.7.2026 by considering the provisions of Ceiling Act.The
fact remains that the order dated 30.6.2004 passed in review was never challenged by
the respondent authority whereby the revenue court purportedly allowed the review
petition and set aside the earlier ceiling proceedings. It also transpires that in year 2010-
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11 revenue entries were changed to reflect private ownership allegedly in compliance
with order dated 8.12.2010 and considering the fact that petitioner has purchased the
land from the landowners in the year 2023-25 and layout was also sanctioned in year
2026, none of the authority has raised objection regarding such entries or has scared to
challenge the order passed in 2004 or the order passed in 2010. It cannot be said that the
order which is not traceable of case No. 0009/B/121-2010-11 ipso facto requires to be
presumed that there is no order existing or there may be possibility that such order may
be passed by playing fraud but the fact remains that the order passed in 2004 was never
challenged. The revenue entries are reflecting the name of private persons since year
2010-11 till the petitioner has purchased land in question by various registered sale
deeds. Thereafter also petitioner’s name was also mutated in revenue record and no
objection has been raised by any authority that the said land was under the Ceiling Act.
When the petitioner has applied for development permission after investing huge
amount, the authority on the basis of some report from the revenue officers has refused
to grant development permission which is under challenge in these writ petitions clearly
indicates that the authorities are acting in high handed manner. There is no material
available on record which indicates that the respondents have taken any action against
any erring officers who have passed order in year 2004 in revenue proceedings or in
year 2010-11. It is also relevent to note that neither order passed in year 2004 in review
is challenged by the authority for years together, nor authority has taken action at any
point of time earlier to purchase of land by the present petitioner against erstwhile
owner, who sold land to the petitioner by way of registered sale deeds. Even the
authorities have acted further in pursuance to the order passed in 2004 and thereafter
mutation in year 2010 and thereafter further by mutating the name of petitioner in
revenue record and further permission is also granted and none of the orders are
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
challenged by the authority by taking proper recourse. This aspect also indicates that
petitioner who seems as bonafdie purchaser by paying huge sale consideration is now
facing undue hardships due to such impugned action taken by the authority.
9 . At this stage, it would be relevant to note para 4 of the order dated 22.9.2025
passed by Tehsildar which reads as under:-
4
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दन प प त य गय पटव र द र अपन
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10 . A bare reading of the order clearly transpires that nowhere it is mentioned that the
land in question is government land. In absence of any positive material to indicate that
fraud is played by the concerned authority and pursuant to such fraud detected by the
authority any action was taken against erring officers, merely because on the basis of
some report received later, when the petitioner has sought development permission after
making huge investment and after getting all necessary permission including
registration of sale deeds, mutation of his entry, diversion of land it seems that the act of
respondents is arbitrary, based on erroneous material and on baseless assumption and
presumption and more particularly in absence of any challenge to the order passed in
the year 2004 or 2010-11 before the competent court. The respondent authority cannot
take the stand that the revenue entry mutated in the year 2010-11 are erroneous. It might
be true that at the relevant point of time the entire 81 acres of land was given and
thereafter from the order passed in review the entire proceedings of ceiling are quashed
and in absence of any challenge to that order before the competent Court for more than
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 08-09-2026
17:45:09
14
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:25071
22 years it cannot be now possible for the respondents to raise contention that the
ceiling land is not private land and therefore, permission for development cannot be
granted. That can be considered as an arbitrary action and also in violation of Article
300A of Constitution of India who holds the right of property and also Article 19 to
enjoy the property.
11 . Considering the fact that the order is exfacie illegal, improper and also not in
consonance with the material available on record, I find that its a fit case wherein the
Court should exercise power by issuing writ of mandamus under Article 226 of
Constitution of India by considering prayers in the present petitions. The petitions are
required to be allowed in terms of prayers made in prayer clause 7 of the petitions. The
writ petitions are allowed accordingly. Signed order be kept in WP No. 28309/2026 and
a copy whereof be kept in connected WP No. 28329/2026.
No order as to costs.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
BDJ
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 08-09-2026
17:45:09