Chhotto Devi & Ors. vs Financial Commissioner & Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court

$~75
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of Decision: 09 September, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010267912009
+ W.P.(C) 6855/2009 & CM APPL. 40709/2018
CHHOTTO DEVI & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Prateek Gupta, Mr. Himanshu
Bodwal & Mr. Pulkit Agarwal,
Advocates. (M: 8587831043)
versus

FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Harshita Nathrani, Advocate for
Mr. Sameer Vashisht, Standing
Counsel (Civil) GNCTD for R-1 & R-
2.
Mr. Vikram Nandajog, Mr. Sheetesh
Khanna & Mr. Kartik Wadhwa,
Advocates for R-6 to 11.
Mr. Praveen K. Chauhan, Ms. Anita,
Mr. Imran Khan and Ms. Garvita
Verma, Advocates for R-4, 5, 12.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
1. This dispute traces its origins to 1979. It has engaged this Court, in
one form or another, since 2000 and has remained pending in the present
petition since 2009. In the meantime, it has outlived Petitioner No. 1, Smt.
Chhotto Devi, who stood at its centre. She was the widow of late Sardar
Singh and, during the consolidation proceedings in Village Bamnoli, was
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allotted a residential plot and a factory plot. Both allotments were withdrawn
in 2002. What followed was a succession of proceedings: a judgment
defining the extent of Chhotto Devi’s interest, a private compromise
founded on the possibility that the plots might be restored, and later
transactions through which the present Petitioners claim rights in the
property. Chhotto Devi died in 2011, while this petition remained pending.
The controversy must therefore be decided not simply by asking whether she
once had a grievance, but whether any Petitioner now before the Court has
an enforceable right to the plots.
2. The present challenge is to the Financial Commissioner’s order dated
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28 November, 2008 under Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, as extended to
Delhi. Insofar as the two plots are concerned, that order has left undisturbed
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the Consolidation Officer’s decision dated 1 April, 2002 withdrawing
residential Plot No. 132 min. and factory Plot No. 79-F from Chhotto Devi.
The Petitioners seek to have both orders quashed and the plots restored after
withdrawing them from the private Respondents. That relief, however,
depends on an antecedent question that must first be addressed: what
interest, if any, survived the intervening judgment, the subsequent private
arrangements and transactions, and Chhotto Devi’s death, and whether any
such interest is enforceable in the present proceedings?
From Allotment to Withdrawal: The Consolidation Dispute
3. Late Sardar Singh was the recorded bhumidhar of agricultural land in
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Village Bamnoli. On his death in 1979, mutation dated 19 October, 1979
came to be sanctioned in favour of his three sons, Balwan Singh, Khem
Chand and Rambir Singh, and his widow Chhotto Devi, each having a one-
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fourth share.
4. Consolidation proceedings were initiated in Village Bamnoli in 1993.
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A scheme was prepared on 29 November, 1996 and confirmed on 11
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April, 1997. During repartition under Section 21(1), on 1 December, 1997,
Chhotto Devi, who was then reflected as a recorded right-holder, was
allotted agricultural land as well as residential Plot No. 132 and factory Plot
No. 79-F. No objection under Section 21(2) was filed against these
allotments. The repartition thus attained finality within the statutory
hierarchy under Section 21, though it remained amenable to the separate
revisional jurisdiction under Section 42.
5. By then, however, the sons of Sardar Singh had challenged the 1979
mutation. The challenge was founded, inter alia , on the registered Will
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relied upon by the sons. The Deputy Commissioner, by order dated 27
August, 1999, set aside the mutation, and Chhotto Devi’s appeal before the
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Financial Commissioner was dismissed on 11 October, 1999. She then
filed CWP No. 65/2000 before this Court.
6. While CWP No. 65/2000 was pending, Khem Chand moved an
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application dated 30 January, 2002 before the Consolidation Officer. The
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Consolidation Officer thereafter passed a composite order dated 1 April,
2002 dealing with Kami-Beshi adjustments in the relevant Khatas. In
relation to Khata No. 144, the order withdrew residential Plot No. 132 min,
measuring 2 bigha 2 biswa, and Factory Plot No. 79-F, measuring 0 bigha 6
biswa. Against the deficiency thereby arising, agricultural parcels measuring
in aggregate 5 bigha 10 biswa were shown against Khata No. 144. The
parties are, however, at variance as to the legal and factual effect of this
adjustment and as to the manner in which the agricultural land was
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subsequently reflected in the revenue records.
7. There is no separate discussion in the order explaining why the two
plots allotted to Chhotto Devi in 1997 were being withdrawn. Nor is any
reason for the withdrawal recorded against Khata No. 144; the entry merely
records the withdrawal of the two plots and the allotment of agricultural land
in their place.
8. Chhotto Devi’s case is that she was never put to notice before this was
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done and learnt of the withdrawal only on 5 October, 2002. She thereafter
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invoked Section 42 of the Act by filing a revision on 11 December, 2002.
In her revision, she pointed out that no objection under Section 21(2) had
ever been filed against the allotments made to her in 1997 and that, several
years later, the two plots had been withdrawn without notice or reasons.
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The statutory scheme and the order dated 1 April, 2002
9. The first question concerns the manner in which Chhotto Devi’s
allotment was withdrawn. Section 21 provides the statutory framework for
repartition. A person aggrieved by the repartition may object under Section
21(2), followed by the remedies contemplated in the succeeding sub-
sections. It is not in dispute that no objection under Section 21(2) was filed
against the residential and factory plots allotted to Chhotto Devi in 1997.
10. The significance of that fact is limited, but important. The withdrawal
of her plots in 2002 was not the result of an objection directed against her
allotment. The explanation subsequently furnished by the Consolidation
Officer was that the mutation on the strength of which she had participated
in the repartition had been set aside in 1999 and that she had therefore
ceased to be entitled to the plots. What was acted upon was thus a
subsequent development affecting the very basis of her entitlement.
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11. The Act permits corrections in appropriate cases, including correction
of accidental slips under Section 43-A. The 2002 order, however, was a
wider, composite Kami-Beshi exercise covering objections, deficiencies,
excess allotments and mutation-related adjustments. It is unnecessary to
determine the precise source or limits of the Consolidation Officer’s
authority for every adjustment in that village-wide order.
12. Chhotto Devi’s case nevertheless presents a clear difficulty of its own.
Her allotment was altered because the very basis of her eligibility was
considered to have disappeared. She was not heard before that conclusion
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was acted upon. The order dated 1 April, 2002 contains no separate
discussion of her case and records no reason against Khata No. 144 for
withdrawing the two plots.
13. Section 42 then assumes importance. It confers a revisional power to
examine the legality or propriety of an order or repartition and requires
notice and an opportunity of hearing to an interested party before a
repartition is varied or reversed. Chhotto Devi’s complaint that an existing
allotment had been substantively reconsidered without hearing her was, in
these circumstances, not without force.
14. The Court need not carry the statutory question any further. Even if
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the procedural challenge to the order dated 1 April, 2002 is accepted in
Chhotto Devi’s favour, restoration of the plots does not follow as a matter of
course. That relief depends upon the nature of the interest which Chhotto
Devi could assert, what became of that interest thereafter, and the basis on
which the other Petitioners now claim. It is at this stage that the judgment
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dated 31 March, 2003 and the transactions which followed assume
significance.
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The 2003 Judgment and the Rights That Followed
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15. CWP No. 65/2000 was decided on 31 March, 2003. The judgment
determined the nature of Chhotto Devi’s interest in Sardar Singh’s holding.
This Court held that she did not inherit an independent share, whether
succession was considered under Section 50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
1
1954 or on the basis of the registered Will relied upon by the sons. It also
examined whether the 1979 mutation reflected a broader family settlement.
The statement recorded at the time showed that Chhotto Devi was to hold
one-fourth during her lifetime, after which it would pass to the three sons.
The Court accordingly held:
“Thus the clear intention even in making such a settlement was that the
Petitioner be given life interest in the property with clear understanding that
after her death said share shall devolve upon the three sons. Therefore, even
if proceedings before the Tehsildar are to be treated as family settlement
this family settlement give only life interest to the Petitioner. The Petitioner,
who would not have got any share in the suit land either under section 50 or
under section 48 because of will, got only life interest by virtue of settlement
of Respondents 3 to 6 before the Tehsildar.”

The operative direction left no ambiguity:

“…the suit land would remain mutated in Petitioner's favour during her life
time i.e. she would have only life interest in the suit land. As a sequitur, the
Petitioner shall remain in possession of the suit land during her life time
and would not be dispossessed by Respondents 3 to 6. However, she will
have no right to sell the suit land which would revert back to the
Respondents 3 to 6 after her death.”

16. By the time this judgment was delivered, the Consolidation Officer
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had already withdrawn Plot Nos. 132 and 79-F by order dated 1 April,
2002, and the consolidation record had been altered. Yet neither the
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judgment dated 31 March, 2003 nor the proceedings leading to it addressed

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“DLR Act”
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that order. The private Respondents have consistently maintained that the
consolidation proceedings and the repartition were not disclosed to the
Court, and that CWP No. 65/2000 therefore proceeded on the footing that
the dispute still concerned Sardar Singh’s original agricultural holding.
17. Nothing turns on whether this omission amounted to fraud or
misrepresentation, as some of the Respondents contend. The judgment dated
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31 March, 2003 conclusively settled, as between Chhotto Devi and
respondents No. 3 to 6 in CWP No. 65/2000, the nature and extent of her
interest in the holding which was the subject of the mutation dispute. It did
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not examine the legality of the Consolidation Officer’s order dated 1 April,
2002 or determine the rights claimed by the persons to whom the plots had
meanwhile been allotted. Chhotto Devi herself proceeded on that distinction;
her revision under Section 42 against the consolidation order was already
pending when the judgment was delivered. She therefore accepted the
judgment as determination of her rights.
The Compromise and the Derivative Claims
18. The present claim is shaped by what the parties did immediately after
that judgment.
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19. On 26 May, 2003, Chhotto Devi entered into a Deed of Compromise
with Balwan Singh, Khem Chand, the heirs of Rambir Singh, and Raj Singh
and Preet Singh, now Petitioners No. 2 and 3. The deed acknowledged both
sides of the existing position: the judgment had confined Chhotto Devi to a
life interest and restrained her from transferring it, while Plot Nos. 132 and
79-F had already been withdrawn and the challenge to that withdrawal
remained pending before the Financial Commissioner.
20. The transaction with Raj Singh and Preet Singh was therefore not a
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sale of an undisputed plot standing in Chhotto Devi’s name. The bargain
was expressly made subject to the pending dispute. The compromise
contemplated that Raj Singh and Preet Singh would purchase Plot No. 132
for Rs.26,35,000/-, of which Rs.11,35,000/- was to go to Chhotto Devi and
Rs.15,00,000/- to Balwan Singh and the other members of that branch. It
further provided that Plot No. 132 would be sold if it was restored to
Chhotto Devi; if it was not restored, the arrangement would operate in
relation to agricultural land which had been allotted in lieu thereof.
21. The deed also gives three bighas and three biswas of specified
agricultural land to Balwan Singh and the other members of the second
party, and explains their participation by saying that they were “parting with
their right” and receiving consideration in respect of the proposed sale of
Plot No. 132 or the alternative land. Plot No. 79-F, on the other hand, was
stated to remain with Chhotto Devi.
22. The deed must therefore be read for what it was. Chhotto Devi held
one part of the asserted interest; the persons in whose favour the 2003
judgment recognised the ultimate interest held another; Raj Singh and Preet
Singh were the proposed purchasers. Their arrangement could create
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obligations among them. By itself, it could neither undo the order dated 1
April, 2002 nor bind those to whom portions of the plots had meanwhile
been allotted.
23. The parties themselves evidently understood that difficulty. They
approached this Court by CM No. 6653/2003 seeking recording of the
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compromise and modification of the judgment dated 31 March, 2003 so
that the changed arrangement could receive judicial recognition.
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24. The application was not allowed in that form. The order dated 30
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May, 2003 recorded as follows:
“The writ petition was disposed of by order dated 31.3.2003. This
application has now been filed after the disposal of the writ petition for
recording of compromise in accordance with the Deed of Compromise
arrived at between the parties and duly signed by them. After the disposal of
the petition, in my opinion, the application for recording of compromise is
not maintainable. If the parties have arrived at a settlement they can enter
into the same without, in any manner, approaching the Court and the order
dated 31.3.2003 will not come in the way of the parties in arriving at a
settlement. The application stands disposed of.”

25. The Petitioners describe the compromise as having been “affirmed”
by the Court and, from that premise, contend that Chhotto Devi became
absolute owner. The order does not say so. It declined to record the
compromise because the writ petition had already been disposed of. It
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neither modified the judgment dated 31 March, 2003, nor declared Chhotto
Devi absolute owner, nor validated a transfer. It said only that the earlier
judgment did not prevent the parties from settling their disputes privately.
26. The compromise therefore remained an arrangement inter se . Its legal
effect had to depend upon the rights which its parties possessed and were
capable of dealing with. It did not acquire the character of a judgment or
decree merely because it had been placed before the Court.
27. This distinction becomes important because, in June 2006, Chhotto
Devi and Petitioners No. 2 and 3 executed a registered Memorandum of
Understanding. The MOU asserts that the life interest recognised by the
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judgment dated 31 March, 2003 stood “automatically removed” by reason
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of the order dated 30 May, 2003 and the compromise. That assertion in the
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document cannot determine its own legal effect. The order dated 30 May,
2003 did not remove the life interest.
28. The MOU also cannot, merely because it was registered, be treated as
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having conveyed a title which its executant did not possess. Section 54 of
2
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 distinguishes an agreement for sale from
a conveyance. The Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v.
3
State of Haryana , reiterated that an agreement to sell or an SA/GPA/Will
arrangement does not by itself convey title to immovable property; a lawful
conveyance requires the appropriate registered instrument. No registered
sale deed conveying Plot No. 132 from all persons whose rights are relied
upon has been shown to this Court.
29. There is another point. The 2006 MOU is between Chhotto Devi on
one side and Raj Singh and Preet Singh on the other. Balwan Singh, Khem
Chand and the Rambir branch, whose participation in the May 2003
arrangement is relied upon to overcome Chhotto Devi’s limited estate, are
not shown as executants of that MOU. The MOU could therefore take
Petitioners No. 2 and 3 no further than the rights which Chhotto Devi herself
could convey, subject of course to whatever independent contractual
remedies may arise against the parties to the earlier compromise. Those
questions do not fall for adjudication in this writ petition.
30. The proceedings before the Financial Commissioner thereafter took
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their own course. An earlier order dated 16 February, 2006 had dismissed
the revision on a technical issue arising from the death of Hira Lal, one of
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the allottees, who had died even before the order dated 1 April, 2002. In
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W.P.(C) No. 3280/2006, this Court held on 3 August, 2007 that an
allotment could not validly have been made in favour of a dead person
without his legal representatives being brought on record. It nevertheless

2
“TPA”
3
(2012) 1 SCC 656
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expressly declined to examine the merits, brought the legal representatives
on record and remanded the revision for a fresh decision.
31. Raj Singh and Preet Singh were thereafter permitted, under Order
XXII Rule 10 CPC, to prosecute the revision qua residential Plot No. 132.
Their participation in the proceedings cannot therefore be rejected on the
simple ground that they have no locus at all. A transferee pendente lite may
be heard to protect the interest which he claims through his transferor. Amit
4
Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon recognises that position. But such a
transferee represents the interest which he has acquired; he does not obtain a
better one merely by being impleaded.
32. A right to be heard is not, by itself, a right to relief.
33. Petitioners No. 2 and 3 knew, when they entered the transaction, that
Plot No. 132 had already been withdrawn. Their own compromise says so.
Their bargain was that they would obtain Plot No. 132 if it came back, and
the alternative agricultural land if it did not. Their claim to the residential
plot was thus built upon the success of Chhotto Devi’s pending challenge
and upon the private obligations undertaken by Balwan Singh and the other
family members. It was never an independent statutory allotment in their
favour.
What Rights Survive?
34. The question, then, is what remains enforceable today.
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35. The judgment dated 31 March, 2003 has never been set aside. It
fixed the nature and limits of Chhotto Devi’s interest: she could remain in
possession during her lifetime, but could not sell, and the interest would
revert to Respondents No. 3 to 6 on her death.
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36. Chhotto Devi died on 10 May, 2011. The life interest recognised in
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her favour by the judgment dated 31 March, 2003 came to an end with her
death and the property remitted to the Respondents. Substitution of a legal
representative enables the estate of a deceased litigant to be represented in
pending proceedings; it does not enlarge the substantive interest which
devolves upon the estate. It is unnecessary here to decide the full extent to
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which the challenge to the order dated 1 April, 2002 may survive for any
other purpose. What is clear is that the life interest itself did not survive
Chhotto Devi and could not pass to her legal representative.
37. Petitioners 2 and 3 stand on a different footing, but not on stronger
ground. Their claim is wholly derivative. Order XXII Rule 10 CPC entitled
them to continue the pending proceeding as persons upon whom an interest
was said to have devolved; it did not adjudicate the validity of that
devolution or enlarge the interest transferred. As explained in Amit Kumar
Shaw a transferee pendente lite is brought in only to protect the interest
acquired from the transferor and remains bound by the result of the pending
proceedings. Section 52 of TPA rests on the same premise: a transfer during
litigation cannot prejudice the rights being adjudicated. Petitioners No. 2 and
3 may therefore enforce the May 2003 bargain against its signatories,
subject to its validity and the remedies available in law; but they cannot
convert it into a statutory allotment or use it to defeat persons claiming
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under the consolidation record. The order dated 30 May, 2003 did not
approve the compromise, and the 2006 MOU could not confer by private
assertion what neither the judgment nor the statute had granted.
38. The Petitioners’ case brings together two legally distinct streams: the

4
(2005) 11 SCC 403
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statutory proceedings culminating in the order dated 1 April, 2002, and the
private arrangement subsequently entered into between Chhotto Devi,
Respondents No. 3 to 6 and Petitioners No. 2 and 3, followed by the later
MOU. The two cannot be treated as interchangeable. In Kale v. Deputy
5
Director of Consolidation , the Supreme Court recognised that a bona fide
family settlement, acted upon by its parties, is binding inter se and cannot
lightly be resiled from. That principle supports the efficacy of the
arrangement between those who entered into it, but carries the Petitioners no
further. Whatever rights the settlement may have created amongst its parties,
it could not, by its own force, restore Plot Nos. 132 and 79-F or displace
allotments made in the consolidation proceedings. Those consequences had
to follow, if at all, from the statutory process itself.
39. The same limitation is reflected in Sayunkta Sangarsh Samiti v. State
6
of Maharashtra . There, the Supreme Court declined to permit consent
terms and an MOU between private parties to supplant the allotment
mechanism prescribed under a statutory slum-rehabilitation scheme. The
decision is relevant here only to that extent: private consent cannot take the
place of the statutory process by which an allotment is made or altered.
40. Section 54 of the TPA supplies the statutory answer to the character
of the May 2003 bargain. A contract for sale does not, of itself, create any
interest in or charge upon the property. As explained in Narandas
7
Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam , an agreement for sale creates no interest in the
immovable property; title passes only upon conveyance. The compromise
could therefore create contractual obligations between its parties, but could

5
(1976) 3 SCC 119
6
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1684
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not itself effect restoration of Plot No. 132 or vest title in it.
41. That distinction matters at the stage of relief. Even if the order dated
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1 April, 2002 is treated as procedurally defective for want of notice,
quashing it would not, by itself, establish a present right in any Petitioner to
Plot Nos. 132 or 79-F. The interest recognised in Chhotto Devi by the
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judgment dated 31 March, 2003 was confined to her lifetime. Petitioners
No. 2 and 3 base their claim on the private arrangements which followed,
while the plots have meanwhile been allotted to, and are claimed by, others
in the consolidation proceedings. Those competing claims cannot be
resolved merely by setting aside the 2002 order. Nor would a remand
confined to the procedure then adopted answer the question of present
entitlement. In the absence of a subsisting right to restoration, neither
mandamus nor a remand would serve any effective purpose.
42. Plot No. 79-F presents an additional difficulty for Petitioners No. 2
and 3. The May 2003 compromise itself states that Chhotto Devi would
remain owner of Plot No. 79-F. Petitioners No. 2 and 3 were permitted by
the Financial Commissioner to prosecute the revision qua the residential
plot. Their transaction was principally directed to Plot No. 132. Whatever
derivative claim they may assert in relation to Plot No. 132, there is no
comparable foundation for an independent claim by them to Plot No. 79-F.
43. There is also a contention under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 which requires brief notice. Although not argued, Ground U of the
writ petition asserts that Chhotto Devi became absolute owner under Section
14 because she had obtained and possessed one-fourth pursuant to the 1979
mutation. Since the point concerns the very nature of the interest now

7
(1977) 3 SCC 247
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asserted, it is appropriate to deal with it.
44. Section 14(1) undoubtedly has a wide remedial purpose. But it does
not convert every restricted estate held by a Hindu woman into an absolute
one regardless of the source from which the interest arose. Section 14(2)
expressly deals, among other things, with property acquired under an
instrument, decree or order which itself prescribes a restricted estate. The
8
distinction drawn in V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy and reiterated in
9
Ranvir Dewan v. Rashmi Khanna , is between an instrument which merely
recognises a pre-existing right of the woman and one which creates a new
and restricted right for the first time. A restricted estate given in recognition
of a pre-existing right such as maintenance stands on a different footing
from a fresh grant carrying its own limitation.
45. The writ petition also invokes Section 14 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 to contend that the interest held by Chhotto Devi had enlarged
into absolute ownership. It is unnecessary to enter upon the wider question
concerning the operation of Section 14 in cases of restricted estates. The
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judgment dated 31 March, 2003 had itself examined the source and extent
of Chhotto Devi's interest. It held that she would not otherwise have
inherited the share either under Section 50 of the DLR Act or under the Will,
and that the one-fourth interest available to her arose from the arrangement
made by Respondents No. 3 to 6 at the time of mutation. The Court then
expressly confined that interest to her lifetime and prohibited its sale.
46. If Chhotto Devi’s case is that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act
had already enlarged her interest into absolute ownership, that position

8
(1977) 3 SCC 99
9
(2018) 12 SCC 1
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cannot be reconciled with the final directions in the judgment dated 31
March, 2003. The Court expressly confined her to a life interest, prohibited
its sale and directed that the property would revert after her death. That
judgment was never modified. After the May 2003 compromise, the parties
did seek to have the changed arrangement recognised by this Court, but the
disposed writ was not reopened and they were left to their private settlement.
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The present challenge to the consolidation order dated 1 April, 2002 cannot
now be used to recast the nature of Chhotto Devi’s interest as finally
declared in 2003.
47. There is some further context. Sardar Singh’s succession opened in
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1979. In Har Naraini Devi v. Union of India , the Supreme Court has
since confirmed that, in relation to agricultural holdings governed by the
DLR Act, succession which opened prior to the 2005 amendment of the
Hindu Succession Act stood governed by the special regime under the DLR
Act and rights which had crystallised earlier were not displaced
retrospectively. This is not by itself the answer to the Section 14 issue, but it
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reinforces the statutory setting in which the judgment dated 31 March,
2003 determined the succession.
48. Much was also said about the allotment made to Hira Lal despite his
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having died on 27 April, 2001. That was undoubtedly an irregularity.
Indeed, this Court said so while remanding the matter in 2007. But the
consequence of that irregularity cannot be enlarged beyond what the earlier
judgment itself held. The legal representatives were brought on record and
the revision was remanded for adjudication on merits. The defect concerning
one allottee does not, by itself, confer title to the entirety of Plot Nos. 132
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and 79-F upon the present Petitioners or invalidate every adjustment
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contained in the village-wide order dated 1 April, 2002.
The Financial Commissioner’s Order
49. The impugned order is problematic on two counts. Its observations on
the private compromise travel beyond the consolidation dispute; more
fundamentally, the finding in paragraph 9 rests on a factual premise that the
record does not support.
50. The Financial Commissioner held that the purported sale of the
residential plot, and the sharing of its proceeds between Chhotto Devi and
Sardar Singh’s sons, was impermissible. He then reasoned that the sons,
having received “monetary compensation” under that transaction, could not
also retain agricultural land allotted in lieu of the residential and factory
plots. On that basis, he set aside what he understood to be an allotment of
agricultural land to the sons. In context, “monetary compensation” meant
consideration under the private transaction, not compensation from land
acquisition. The later MOU records payment of Rs.15 lakhs to Balwan
Singh and the others, and Rs.11.35 lakhs to Chhotto Devi.
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51. The record shows otherwise. The order dated 1 April, 2002 did not
allot the substitute agricultural land to Sardar Singh’s sons. It withdrew Plot
Nos. 79-F and 132 min. from Khata No. 144, standing in Chhotto Devi’s
name, and entered the substitute agricultural parcels against the same khata.
The later Khatoni Pamaish for 2002-03 does reflect the agricultural holding
in the names of Balwan Singh, Khem Chand, Vicky and Rohit. That may
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explain the error, but it cannot alter the order actually made on 1 April,
2002.

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2022 SCC OnLine SC 1265
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52. The reasoning based on the private payment also overlooks the
structure of the compromise. The parties knew that Plot No. 132 had already
been withdrawn and provided for two outcomes. If restored, it would be sold
to Petitioners No. 2 and 3. If not, land measuring 5 bighas 3 biswas out of
the specified agricultural land would take its place, without refund of the
amount already paid. The sons joined the arrangement and agreed to part
with whatever rights they asserted in the plot or the substitute land. The later
MOU carried the same arrangement forward.
53. The consideration paid under that bargain may have consequences
between its parties. It did not, however, supply a statutory ground to cancel
the agricultural allotment made in the consolidation proceedings. Nor did the
arrangement itself contemplate that the sons would retain both the
consideration and the substitute land: if Plot No. 132 was not restored, the
substitute land was to pass to Petitioners No. 2 and 3. Whether that
arrangement was ultimately acted upon is a different matter. The Financial
Commissioner was required to examine the agricultural allotment under the
Act and the consolidation scheme, not treat the private bargain as a
substitute for that inquiry.
54. Paragraph 9 of the impugned order therefore cannot stand insofar as it
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sets aside the agricultural allotment made under the order dated 1 April,
2002. Chhotto Devi expressly challenged that finding in this petition,
pointing out that the land had been allotted against her khata, not to the sons
as the Financial Commissioner assumed. To that limited extent, the order
must be set aside.
55. This limited conclusion does not decide present entitlement to the
agricultural land or to compensation from its later acquisition. The revenue
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entries changed; Chhotto Devi’s interest was defined by the judgment dated
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31 March, 2003; and the parties later executed the compromise and the
MOU. The acquisition award also records Chhotto Devi against several of
the substitute parcels. These matters may bear on entitlement to
compensation, but that issue neither arises for decision nor requires
determination in this writ.
The Relief That Can Now Be Granted
56. Setting aside paragraph 9 of the impugned order does not entitle the
Petitioners to the principal relief sought: restoration of Plot Nos. 132 and 79-
F. That question must be considered separately.
57. Chhotto Devi’s interest cannot now sustain the relief sought. The
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binding judgment dated 31 March, 2003 confined that interest to her
lifetime; it therefore ended with her death.
58. Nor do Petitioners No. 2 and 3 acquire a present statutory entitlement
from the May 2003 compromise or the later MOU. They could enter the
pending proceedings and be heard in support of the interest which they
claimed to have acquired under those transactions. But they contracted after
Plot No. 132 had been withdrawn, with knowledge that its restoration was
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disputed. The order dated 30 May, 2003 neither converted the compromise
into a decree nor enlarged Chhotto Devi’s life interest into absolute
ownership.
59. The rights asserted through Balwan Singh, Khem Chand and Rambir
Singh’s branch stand no differently. Their agreement to part with their
interests could bind the parties to that arrangement. It could not, without
action under the statutory scheme, allot Plot No. 132 to Petitioners No. 2 and
3 or displace those claiming under the consolidation record.
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60. The present state of the land adds a further difficulty. Khasra No. 132
is divided into several sub-parts recorded in different names, while Khasra
No. 79 is shown in another person’s name. These entries are not proof of
title. They do, however, show that restoration of the entire plots would
require adjudication of rights far beyond the procedural defect in the order
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dated 1 April, 2002.
61. Chhotto Devi was justified in complaining that an existing allotment
had been altered without notice. Yet acceptance of that procedural challenge
does not establish a present right in any Petitioner to Plot Nos. 132 or 79-F.
A remand confined to the procedure followed in 2002 would not resolve the
present entitlement either. That question cannot be answered without
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accounting for the judgment dated 31 March, 2003, the later private
arrangements, Chhotto Devi’s death and the rights now asserted by others.
62. The petition is accordingly allowed only to this limited extent:
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paragraph 9 of the Financial Commissioner’s order dated 28 November,
2008 is quashed insofar as it sets aside the agricultural allotment made under
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the Consolidation Officer’s order dated 1 April, 2002. The prayer to set
aside the withdrawal of Plot Nos. 132 and 79-F and to direct their restoration
is declined. This Court does not, however, endorse every reason given by the
Financial Commissioner for refusing that relief.
63. Nothing in this judgment determines the existence, enforceability or
extent of any contractual right arising from the Deed of Compromise dated
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26 May, 2003 or the subsequent MOU. Nor does it decide entitlement to
compensation for acquisition of the substitute agricultural land, whether
claimed by Chhotto Devi’s estate, Sardar Singh’s branch, Petitioners No. 2
and 3, or any other person. It is for the concerned parties to decide whether,
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and in what manner, they wish to pursue those claims before the appropriate
forum in accordance with law. All rights and contentions in that regard are
left open.


SANJEEV NARULA, J
SEPTEMBER 9, 2026
Ni

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