SMT. INDRAWATI SAHU vs SOUTH EASTERN COALFIELDS LIMITED

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NIRMALA
RAO

CGHC010231752022 2026:CGHC:38218
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 4911 of 2022
1 - Smt. Indrawati Sahu D/o Late Dwarika Prasad Sahu Aged About 40 Years R/o
Village Govindpur, P.S. Bishrampur, Tahsil And District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - South Eastern Coalfields Limited Through The Chairman-Cum-Managing
Director, Seepat Road, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
2 - The General Manager Kumda Sub Area, Secl Bishrampur, District Surajpur
Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Manager (Personnel) Secl Sub Area Kumda Colliery Bishrampur Area,
District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
4 - The Area Manager Secl Bishrampur Area District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
5 - The Sub Area Manager Secl Kumda Sub Area Bishrampur Area, District Surajpur
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioners : Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla,
Advocate alongwith Shri Harsh
Sahu, Advocate.
For Respondents : Shri Pankaj Singh, Advocate.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey
Order on Board

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25/08/2026
1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following reliefs:
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to
issue a writ of mandamus/certiorari or of like nature to quash
the impugned order dated 24/06/2022 (Annexure P/1) with
further direction to consider/extend the claim of the petitioner
for employment within stipulated period strictly in accordance
with law and by speaking order with all consequential benefits
whatsoever.
10.2 That, a command/direction may kindly be issued to the
respondents to consider and extend the dependent
employment to the petitioner looking to her dependency on the
deceased father and the present hardship calling the entire
records pertaining to the case.
10.3 Any other relief which is deemed fit and proper by this
Hon'ble Court may also be awarded to the petitioner along with
the cost of the petition.”
2. The facts, in brief, are that the father of the petitioner, namely,
Dwarika Prasad Sahu, who was serving as a General Mazdoor,
Category-I, died in harness on 13.5.1998. The petitioner applied
for compassionate appointment on 24.1.2012. When no action
was taken on her application, WPS No.468 of 2013 was filed,
which was disposed of vide order dated 13.3.2013 with a direction
to the respondent authorities to consider the claim of the petitioner
for dependent employment. The respondent authorities rejected
the claim of the petitioner vide order dated 12.7.2013 on the
ground that married daughters were not entitled to claim
dependent employment.
3. The petitioner challenged the said order by filing WPS No.3429 of
2013, which was dismissed vide order dated 11.12.2013.

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However, at the same time, liberty was granted to the petitioner to
pursue her remedy on the administrative side. The rejection of the
application of the petitioner was affirmed, whereas the son-in-law
of the deceased employee was permitted to move an application
in terms of the amended provisions of the National Coal Wage
Agreement (NCWA).
4. The husband of the petitioner approached the respondent
authorities, claiming dependent employment, but his claim was
rejected vide order dated 28.2.2015 on the ground that he was not
dependent upon his father-in-law. Against the said order, WPS
No.6405 of 2017 was preferred, which was dismissed vide order
dated 7.12.2017.
5. The petitioner moved a fresh application for grant of dependent
employment on 23.9.2020 on the basis of the judgment passed in
the matter of Asha Pandey vs. SECL and Ors. in WPS No.4994
of 2015 , decided on 15.3.2016 . When no decision was taken,
WPS No.4322 of 2021 was filed, wherein the Coordinate Bench
declined to grant the reliefs sought by the petitioner. At the same
time, liberty was granted to the petitioner to pursue her right on the
administrative side in view of the changed circumstances.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that, in the matter
of Asha Pandey (supra), the Coordinate Bench has held that a
married daughter of a deceased employee would be entitled to
claim dependent employment and, accordingly, an amendment
has been incorporated in the NCWA. He would contend that a
direction may be issued to the respondent authorities to consider

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the claim of the petitioner. He has placed reliance on the judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj
Parihar and Ors. vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors.,
(2022) 14 SCC 72 .
7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
would oppose the submissions made by learned counsel for the
petitioner. He would contend that the claim of the petitioner had
attained finality prior to the decision in the matter of Asha Pandey
(supra), and the right of the petitioner stood settled; therefore, the
matter could not be reopened subsequently on account of a
change in law. He has placed reliance on the judgments passed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Union of India vs.
Madras Telephone SC & ST Social Welfare Assn., (2006) 8
SCC 662; Pradeep Kumar Maskara vs. State of W.B., (2015) 2
SCC 653; Daryao vs. State of U.P., (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961
SC 1457; and Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of
Gujarat, (1965) 2 SCR 547 : AIR 1965 SC 1153 , and the
judgment passed by this Court in the matter of Steel Authority of
India Ltd. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh in W.P. No.2203 of
2000 .
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
9. In the earlier three rounds of litigation, the claim of the petitioner
was declined by the High Court. In the last round, in WPS No.4322
of 2021, the Coordinate Bench observed that the claim of the
petitioner had already been decided in two writ petitions, i.e., WPS

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No.3429 of 2013 and WPS No.6405 of 2017, and, therefore, it
would not be proper to entertain the third writ petition. Thus, the
claim of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that it was the
third round of litigation. However, liberty was reserved in favour of
the petitioner to approach the respondent authorities on the
administrative side in view of the changed circumstances and the
legal position as it stood at that time.
10. The order in WPS No.4322 of 2021 was passed on 23.8.2021,
whereas, in the matter of Asha Pandey (supra), the order was
passed on 15.3.2016.
11. In the matter of Asha Pandey (supra), it was held that a married
daughter of a deceased employee of the SECL has the right to
claim dependent employment and that the terms of the NCWA
should be fair and reasonable and should not be opposed to law. It
is an admitted fact that the father of the petitioner died in harness
on 13.5.1998.
12. The first application of the petitioner for grant of dependent
employment was rejected vide order dated 12.7.2013.
Subsequently, the application moved by the son-in-law of the
deceased employee was rejected vide order dated 18.11.2014.
The petitioner again approached the respondent authorities on
account of a change in law, as a favourable order had been
passed in the matter of Smt. Asha Pandey (supra).
13. It is a well-settled principle of law that a change in law cannot
reopen a matter which has already attained finality, so as to
enable reconsideration of the issue in light of a contrary view taken

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in subsequent judicial proceedings.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Madras Telephone
SC & ST Social Welfare Assn. (supra), while dealing with a
similar issue, held in paragraphs 18, 19 and 21 as under:
“18. The question then arises as to whether the applicants
can claim the protection of their seniority and consequent
promotion on the basis of observations and the clarification
contained in the judgment of this Court reported in (2000)
9 SCC 71. Having considered all aspects of the matter we
are satisfied that those whose cases stand on the same
footing as that of Parmanand Lal cannot now be adversely
affected by re-determination of their seniority to their
disadvantage relying on the later judgment of this Court in
Madras Telephones as affirmed by this Court in C.A. No.
4339 of 1995 reported in (1997) 10 SCC 226 (supra) as
affirmed by this Court in its judgment reported in (2000) 9
SCC 71 (supra).”
19. We, therefore, direct that such of the applicants whose
seniority had been determined by the competent authority,
and who had been given benefit of seniority and promotion
pursuant to the orders passed by Courts or Tribunals
following the principles laid down by the Allahabad High
Court and approved by this Court, which orders have since
attained finality, cannot be reverted with retrospective
effect. The determination of their seniority and the
consequent promotion having attained finality, the
principles laid down in later judgments will not adversely
affect their cases.
21. Having regard to the above observations and
clarification we have no doubt that such of the applicants
whose claim to seniority and consequent promotion on the
basis of the principles laid down in the Allahabad High
Court's judgment in Parmanand Lal's case have been

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upheld or recognized by Court or Tribunal by judgment and
order which have attained finality will not be adversely
affected by the contrary view now taken in the judgment
reported in 1997 (10) SCC 226. Since the rights of such
applicants were determined in a duly constituted
proceeding, which determination has attained finality, a
subsequent judgment of a Court or Tribunal taking a
contrary view will not adversely affect the applicants in
whose cases the orders have attained finality. We order
accordingly.”
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Pradeep Kumar
Maskara (supra), held that even if a question of law has been
reversed or modified by a subsequent decision of a superior court
in any other case, the same shall not be a ground for review of
such judgment. The relevant paragraph is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“27. It is well settled that even if the decision on a question
of law has been reversed or modified by subsequent
decision of a superior court in any other case it shall not be
a ground for review of such judgment merely because a
subsequent judgment of the single judge has taken
contrary view. That does not confer jurisdiction upon the
tribunal to ignore the judgment and direction of the High
Court given in the case of the appellants.”
16. In the matter of Daryao (supra), it was held that the decision so
pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it was
otherwise modified or reversed. In the matter of Gulabchand
Chhotalal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
principle of res judicata applies to writ proceedings under Article
226 of the Constitution of India as well.

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17. It is also not in dispute that the orders passed in the writ petitions
filed by the petitioner attained finality, as those orders were not
challenged by the petitioner.
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the
judgment in the matter of Manoj Parihar (supra), wherein it has
been held that the law declared by a court will have retrospective
effect unless it is specifically stated otherwise.
19. In the present case, upon going through the judgments passed in
the above-cited matters, it can be held that the factual aspect of
the petitioner’s case had attained finality prior to the judgment in
the matter of Smt. Asha Pandey (supra). Therefore, the law laid
down by the Coordinate Bench of this Court subsequently cannot
be applied retrospectively to reopen a matter which had already
attained finality. Thus, the facts of the present case are
distinguishable.
20. Having considered the facts of the present case and the law laid
down in the above-referred matters, no case is made out for
interference. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby
dismissed .
Sd/-
(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)
Judge
Nimmi