The State Of Karnataka vs Prabhu Shankar

2026 INSC 766
NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.(s) ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO(s). 1522 OF 2022)


STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

PRABHU SHANKAR & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO(s). 1852 OF 2022)

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO(s). 2361 OF 2022)

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO(s). 1755 OF 2022)

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO(s). 2033 OF 2022)

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 6639 OF 2022)
Signature Not Verified

WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). ____ OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 6680 OF 2022)
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.07.30
15:36:45 IST
Reason:
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J U D G M E N T


SANJAY KAROL, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present batch of seven appeals have been preferred by the State of
Karnataka against the common judgment and orders dated 08.09.2021 passed in:
i. Criminal Petition No. 2470/2020 connected with Criminal Petition No.
1
2473/2020 and Criminal Petition No. 2485/2020 (‘first impugned order’);
ii. Criminal Petition No. 3297/2020 connected with Criminal Petition No.
2
488/2021 (‘second impugned order’);
3
iii. Criminal Petition No. 2390/2020 (‘third impugned order’); and
4
iv. Criminal Petition No. 2389/2020. (‘fourth impugned order’).

3. The brief facts giving rise to these appeals are that six FIRs were registered
5
against the respondents, including Mr. Prabhu Shankar , Assistant Commissioner of
6
Police, Central Crime Branch, Bengaluru and Mr. Niranjan Kumar C. , Police
Inspector, Central Crime Branch, Bengaluru under Sections 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with
7
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 384 read with Section
8
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 .


1
Hereinafter ‘first impugned order’.
2
Hereinafter ‘second impugned order’.
3
Hereinafter ‘third impugned order’.
4
Hereinafter ‘fourth impugned order’.
5
Hereinafter ‘respondent no. 1’.
6
Hereinafter ‘respondent no. 2’.
7
Hereinafter ‘PC Act’.
8
Hereinafter ‘IPC’.
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4. Aggrieved by these FIRs, the abovementioned accused persons filed criminal
petitions seeking quashing of the FIRs before the High Court of Karnataka under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Vide four impugned orders
dated 08.09.2021, the High Court allowed the criminal petitions and quashed the
aforementioned FIRs against these accused persons, primarily on the grounds of lack
of prima facie material, unexplained delay, and allegations of malafides.
5. For ease of reference, the allegations in the FIR, along with consequent
petition numbers, are set out below:

S.No. FIR No. Allegations HC Petition SLP Number
1. Crime No.
Date of incident: 30.03.2020
Crl. P.
SLP (Crl.)
17/2020
Complainant: Dy. SP, ACB
2470/2020
1522/2022
Dt. 21.05.20
Registered u/s 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with
13(2) of the PC Act.
2. Crime No.
Date of incident: 02.04.2020 -
Crl. P. No.
SLP (Crl.) No.
15/2020
08.05.2020
2473/2020
1852/2022
Dt. 21.05.20
Complainant: Dy. SP, ACB
Registered u/s 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with
13(2) of the PC Act.
3. Crime No.
Date of incident: 25.04.2020
Crl. P. No.
SLP (Crl.) No.
16/2020
Complainant: Dy. SP, ACB
2485/2020
2361/2022
Dt. 21.05.20
Registered u/s 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with
13(2) of the PC Act.
4. Crime No.
Date of incident: 16.04.2020
Crl. P. No.
SLP (Crl.) No.
23/2020
Complainant: Anwar Mohd. Fahim
3297/2020
1755/2022
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Dt. 24.06.20 Registered u/s 7(a), 13(1)(a) read with
Crl. P. No.
SLP (Crl.) No.
13(2) of the PC Act.
488/2021
2033/2022
5. Crime No.
Date of incident: 30.03.2020 –
Crl. P. No.
SLP (Crl.) No.
63/2020
09.04.2020
2390/2020
6639/2022
Dt. 12.05.20
Complainant: Shaji George Thomas
Registered u/s 384 read with 34 of the
IPC.
6. Crime No.
Date of incident: 20.04.2020
Crl. P. No.
SLP (Crl.) No.
64/2020
Complainant: Adil Azeez
2389/2020
6680/2022
Dt. 12.05.20
Registered u/s 384 read with 34 of the
IPC.

6. Upon consideration of the first impugned order, we find the High Court to
have made the following observations:
a. The delay in lodging of FIR has not been properly explained.
b. There is no demand and acceptance, which is sine qua non for registration
of a case under the PC Act.
c. Moreover, the registration of FIRs in the present case (Crime No. 15, 16,
17 of 2020) amounts to second FIRs for the same offence, as earlier Crime
No. 63 and 64 of 2020 has been registered under IPC sections on the same
set of allegations.
d. The court observed that the cases appeared to be a result of malafides
intentions and infighting between officers of the same department.

7. Observations to similar effect have been made in the second impugned order.

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8. In the third impugned order, it was observed by the High Court that there is
no proof of demand, acceptance or threat to any person. Consequently, the
ingredients of Section 384 read with Section 34 of the IPC are not met. Moreover,
there was no exchange of money with respondent no. 1, but demand or acceptance
was only with respect to other police officers. Similar observations have been made
in the fourth impugned order.
9. We have heard the parties and perused the written submissions filed. While
service was completed on respondent no. 2 twice, no one entered appearance on their
behalf. Learned AAG, Mr. Prateek Chadha, appearing on behalf of the appellant
State, has submitted that each FIR discloses a cognizable offence and does not fall
9
within any one of the exceptions laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal .
Moreover, the High Court’s finding in all the four impugned orders that the FIRs
were registered maliciously, is unsupported by any material on record. The High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
10
1973 by conducting a mini-trial and evaluating the veracity of evidence at the
investigation stage, rather than restricting itself to whether the contents of the FIR
disclosed an offence.
10. Per Contra , the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has submitted that the
High Court rightly quashed the FIRs against the respondents. He contended that
there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in the various FIRs. Moreover,
on the same set of allegations, in the departmental enquiry, respondent no. 1, stands
exonerated. The counsel argued that the impugned proceedings are not a pursuit of
justice but a direct consequence of political pressure and departmental infighting,

9
1992 Sup (1) SCC 335.
10
Hereinafter ‘CrPC’.
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due to the respondent’s investigation into illegal cigarette distribution during the
lockdown period.
11. It is settled law that the power to quash an FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC
is to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of routine. Moreover, when a High
Court is entertaining a petition for quashing of FIR, it is to refrain from entering into
roving and fishing enquiry about the investigative material. What has to be seen is
whether, prima facie , the contents of the FIR disclose any commission of a
cognizable offence or not. At this initial stage, a ‘mini-trial’ cannot be conducted by
the High Court.
12. In the considered view of this Court, the High Court vide the impugned orders
has traversed beyond the contours of consideration of a petition under Section 482,
CrPC. There were two material aspects which weighed with the High Court, the
delay in lodging of the FIR and no evidence of demand/recovery of money. In our
view, there cannot be any doubt that these aspects would have to be established
through evidence in the criminal trial or may warrant consideration for discharge.
Absence of proof as to demand of illegal gratification and recovery thereof, may
become a ground for discharge and/or ultimate acquittal in the trial; however, they
cannot become grounds for quashing of the FIR.
13. For this, we advert to the recent exposition of this Court in State v. K.
11
Rangayya , wherein while setting aside the order of the High Court quashing the
FIR, it was observed:
“ 16. The power to quash an FIR vested in the High Court under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as “CrPC”) is an extraordinary and discretionary power, which must be
exercised sparingly and with great circumspection. This Court has
consistently held that at the stage of considering a petition for quashing an
FIR, the Court is not required to examine the merits of the allegations or to
evaluate the evidence that may ultimately be led at trial. The sole and
limited inquiry at this threshold stage is whether the allegations set out in

11
2026 SCC OnLine SC 963.
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the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety as true, prima
facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence against the accused.
It is not permissible for the Court to conduct what amounts to a mini-trial
by sifting through the evidence, assessing probabilities, or weighing the
credibility of witnesses, for these are functions exclusively reserved for the
court of trial.

17. In the present case, the High Court, in our considered opinion, has
traversed beyond the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Article 226
in exercising the power under Section 482 CrPC. Rather than confining
itself ascertaining as to whether any prima facie case has been made out of
commission of offence on the basis of the contents of the FIR, the High
Court proceeded to examine the outcome of the trap proceedings, the
absence of personal recovery from Respondent No. 1, the result of the
phenolphthalein test, and the findings of a departmental enquiry against
some of the accused, all of which are matters of evidence to be evaluated at
the stage of trial. By undertaking such a detailed examination, the High
Court has in effect conducted a mini-trial, which is fundamentally contrary
to the settled principles governing the exercise of the quashing jurisdiction.

… … …

27. Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a public servant may amount
to commission of an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The word
‘attempt’ is to imply no more than a mere solicitation, which, again, may be
made as effectually in implicit or in explicit terms. This Court further
observed therein that “actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential
requirement to be prosecuted under this law” and that those public servants
who do not take a bribe directly but through middlemen are equally made
liable under the provisions of the PC Act, 1988. These observations, though
rendered in the context of grant of anticipatory bail in a case involving
offence under Section 7 of the PC act, firmly reflect the legislative policy
pervading the PC Act that an attempt to obtain undue advantage whether for
oneself or for another, and whether directly or through intermediaries is
equally culpable under Section 7 read with Explanation 2 of the Act. The
Respondent No. 1's implicit yet unmistakable direction to the Complainant
to provide illegal gratification to his subordinate police officials as disclosed
in the records thus falls squarely within the scope of “attempt to obtain” an
“undue advantage” “for another person,” as contemplated by Explanation
2(i) to Section 7 of the PC Act. The fact that the Respondent No. 1 may not
personally have received or even intended to receive any part of the illegal
gratification is entirely immaterial to the establishment of the offence at the
stage of prima facie inquiry, by reason of the express statutory language of
Explanation 2 to Section 7 of the PC Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
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14. In view of the above exposition, the observation of the High Court in the third
impugned order, that the money was not paid directly to respondent no. 1, also
cannot stand at the stage of prima facie evaluation of the FIRs.
15. Similarly, on the aspect of delay in lodging of the FIR, this Court in Punit
12
Beriwala v. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. observed:
“37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences
punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis
of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance
only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether
the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only
after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda
Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021)
5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent
complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash
the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference
to precedents…..”
(emphasis supplied)

16. Another observation of the High Court in the first impugned order, which is
required to be addressed, is that the registration of certain FIRs in the instant case
amounts to second FIRs for the very same offence, as earlier Crime No. 63 and 64
of 2020 stood registered under IPC sections on the same set of allegations. Upon a
perusal of the contents of the FIRs, we are not inclined to accept this reasoning. We
refer to the exposition of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh
13
Rathore , wherein it was categorically observed that:

“10. …. The FIR prior in point of time refers to a particular incident and the
action taken therein is limited. The second FIR pertains to the larger issue
of widespread corruption in the concerned department and, therefore, is
much larger in its scope than the previous FIR.

11. Quashing of the FIR would nip the investigation into such corruption,
in the bud. The same would be against the interest of society.”

12
2025 SCC OnLine SC 983.
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 358.
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17. Before parting with these appeals, we deem it appropriate to reiterate the
14
observations made by this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh :
“ 50. Since there exists no magic wand as in fairy tales, a swish of which
could wipe out greed, the constitutional courts owe a duty to the people of
the nation to show zero tolerance to corruption and come down heavily
against the perpetrators of the crime while at the same time saving those
innocent public servants, who unfortunately get entangled by men of
dubious conduct acting from behind the screen with ulterior motives and/or
to achieve vested interests. The task, no doubt, is onerous but every effort
ought to be made to achieve it by sifting the grain from the chaff. We leave
the discussion here with the fervent hope of better times in future.

80. Having regard to what we have observed above in paras 47 to 50 ( supra )
and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that
societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently
desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a
first information report pertaining to “corruption” cases, specially at the
stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of
the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could
apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences
punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be
applicable to a PC Act offence. Majorly, the proper course for the High
Courts to follow, in cases under the PC Act, would be to permit the
investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved
party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage.
If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should
rest on the very special features of the case.

81 . Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to
depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in
exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support
even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant having intentionally
enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other
than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation.

82. We quite appreciate that there could be cases of innocent public servants
being entangled in investigations arising out of motivated complaints and
the consequent mental agony, emotional pain and social stigma that they
would have to encounter in the process, but this small price has to be paid
if there is to be a society governed by the rule of law. While we do not intend
to fetter the High Courts from intervening in appropriate cases, it is only

14
(2023) 6 SCC 559.
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just and proper to remind the courts to be careful, circumspect and cautious
in quashing first information reports resting on mala fide of the nature
alleged herein.”

18. In view of the above, in the attending facts, this Court is of the view that the
impugned orders cannot be sustained in law.
19. Therefore, the present appeals are allowed. The common judgment and orders
dated 08.09.2021, passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Petition No.
2470/2020 connected with Criminal Petition No. 2473/2020 and Criminal Petition
No. 2485/2020; Criminal Petition No. 3297/2020 connected with Criminal Petition
No. 488/2021; Criminal Petition No. 2390/2020 and Criminal Petition No.
2389/2020 are hereby set aside.
20. Needless to add, the respondents are free to exercise their remedies in
accordance with law, and the same shall be decided uninfluenced of the observations
made hereinabove.
21. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.



………………………….…………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)





………………………………..…………….J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)


New Delhi

July 30, 2026
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