PUNEET AGRAWAL vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
- Court
- Uttarakhand High Court
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Reserved on 08.10.2026
Delivered on 16.10.2026
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Criminal No. 1602 of 2026
Hem Shikha …………..Petitioner
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand and Another …..……….Respondent
With
Writ Petition Criminal No. 1912 of 2026
Puneet Agarwal …….….Petitioner
Versus
State Of Uttarakhand and Another ……….Respondent
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Presence:-
Mr. Akshay Pradhan, learned counsel for the petitioner WPCRL NO.1602 of
2026.
Mr. N.S. Kanyal, learned A.G.A. for the State.
Mr. Arvind Vasishtha, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Narayan Har
Gupta, learned counsel for respondent no.2 in WPCRL NO.1602 of 2026.
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Per: Hon’ble Mr. Alok Mahra, J.
The present criminal writ petitions have been
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
challenging the judgment and order dated 18.07.2026
passed by the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Region,
Camp Dehradun, in proceedings under Section 6 of the
Uttar Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter
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referred to as “the Act, 1970”). In Criminal Writ Petition
No.1602 of 2026, the petitioner seeks issuance of a writ,
order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the
impugned judgment and order dated 18.07.2026. The
petitioner further seeks a writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus commanding respondent no.1 to
give effect to and enforce the order dated 14.05.2026
passed by the learned District Magistrate, Dehradun,
whereby respondent no.2 was declared a ‘Goonda’ under
Section 3(3) of the Act, 1970, and was directed to remove
himself from the territorial limits of District Dehradun for
the period specified in the said order.
2. In Criminal Writ Petition No.1912 of 2026, the
petitioner has also challenged the judgment and order
dated 18.07.2026, but to the limited extent that the
learned Commissioner remanded the matter to the
learned District Magistrate for reconsideration and
passing of a fresh order.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner appearing in
Criminal Writ Petition No.1602 of 2026 would submit
that the petitioner and her husband are Scientists
working with the Institute of Defence Research and
Development Organisation (IRDE), Defence Research and
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Development Organisation (DRDO), Government of India.
He would further submit that respondent no.2 has been
continuously indulging in criminal, violent and anti-
social activities, including repeated acts of assault,
criminal intimidation, molestation and attempts to
commit serious offences against the petitioner, her family
members and other residents of the locality. It is
submitted that, in view of the aforesaid conduct of
respondent no.2, the petitioner submitted a detailed
complaint dated 25.04.2026 before the learned District
Magistrate, Dehradun, seeking initiation of proceedings
against respondent no.2 under the provisions of the Act,
1970; that, upon receipt of the complaint, the learned
District Magistrate initiated proceedings under Section
3(2) of the Act, 1970 and directed an enquiry through the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mussoorie; that, the enquiry
report recorded that respondent no.2 had been
threatening the residents of the locality, particularly
women, senior citizens and children, and had created an
atmosphere of fear and insecurity; that, the report
further indicated that respondent no.2 was involved in
several criminal cases and that his activities were
prejudicial to the maintenance of public peace and
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tranquility; that, five First Information Reports had been
registered against respondent no.2 in the State of
Uttarakhand, copies whereof were available on the record
before the learned District Magistrate; that, in addition,
several First Information Reports had allegedly been
lodged against him in District Bijnor.
4. Learned counsel would further submit that,
upon consideration of the enquiry report and the
material collected during the enquiry, the learned District
Magistrate formed a prima facie opinion that respondent
no.2 habitually terrorised the residents of the locality,
particularly women, children and senior citizens, and
that his continued presence within the district was
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order; that,
consequently, a notice under Section 3(1) of the Act,
1970, was issued to respondent no.2, calling upon him to
show cause as to why appropriate action should not be
taken against him under the said Act; that, respondent
no.2 appeared before the learned District Magistrate and
submitted his written objections, denying the allegations
levelled against him. He would further submit that on
13.05.2026, the petitioner filed an additional application
before the learned District Magistrate, bringing
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subsequent events to his notice, including the alleged
admission made by respondent no.2 before the
Uttarakhand State Commission for Women regarding his
aggressive behaviour, his alleged physical assault upon
the petitioner's husband, and his threat to raise an illegal
construction over the land of Golden Forest.
5. In support of her allegations, the petitioner
also produced a pen drive containing video recordings
purportedly depicting the violent and unlawful conduct of
respondent no.2; that, the electronic material
demonstrated the threatening behaviour of respondent
no.2 and was duly placed before the learned District
Magistrate for consideration. He would furthers submit
that after affording an opportunity of hearing to both
parties and considering the material available on record,
including the enquiry report, documentary material,
electronic evidence and submissions advanced on behalf
of the parties, the learned District Magistrate passed a
reasoned order dated 14.05.2026; that, by the aforesaid
order, the learned District Magistrate confirmed the
proceedings initiated under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1970,
declared respondent no.2 to be a ‘Goonda’ within the
meaning of the Act, 1970, under Section 3(3) thereof, and
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directed his externment from the territorial limits of
District Dehradun for the prescribed period. He would
further submit that aggrieved by the aforesaid order,
respondent no.2 preferred Appeal No.03 of 2026, titled
Puneet Agarwal v. State of Uttarakhand and Another,
under Section 6 of the Act, 1970, before the learned
Commissioner, Garhwal Region, Camp Dehradun; that,
by the impugned judgment and order dated 18.07.2026,
the learned Commissioner exceeded the scope of the
statutory appellate jurisdiction by remanding the matter
to the learned District Magistrate with directions to
reconsider the final reports submitted in certain criminal
cases, judicial orders passed therein, pending civil
proceedings and cross-cases.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would
further submit that respondent no.2 had earlier
challenged the show-cause notice dated 25.04.2026
before this Court by instituting Criminal Writ Petition
No.762 of 2026, which was subsequently dismissed as
infructuous vide order dated 24.08.2026, after the
learned District Magistrate had passed the final order
dated 14.05.2026. It is further submitted that, while
entertaining the aforesaid writ petition, a coordinate
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Bench of this Court, vide order dated 30.04.2026,
observed in paragraph 5 thereof that statements of
approximately forty residents had been recorded, alleging
that respondent no.2 had threatened them by displaying
firearms and had misbehaved with minor girls; that, the
observations made by the Coordinate Bench prima facie
indicated the seriousness of the allegations and the
necessity of appropriate action in accordance with law;
that, vide order dated 17.06.2026, the Coordinate Bench
directed that no coercive action be taken against
respondent no.2 on the date fixed before the learned
Commissioner for hearing of the statutory appeal. It is
further contended that respondent no.2 lodged a First
Information Report against the petitioner, in which
investigation was stayed by this Court vide order dated
20.05.2026.
7. Learned counsel would contend that several
residents had approached the competent authorities by
submitting complaints against respondent no.2, but no
effective action had been taken to address their
grievances. He would further submit that the impugned
appellate order is without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
power to remand the proceedings for fresh consideration
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is not expressly conferred upon the appellate authority
under Section 6 of the Act, 1970; that, the jurisdiction of
a statutory appellate authority is circumscribed by the
provisions of the enactment conferring such jurisdiction
and must be exercised within the limits prescribed by
law, thus, according to learned counsel, in the absence of
statutory authority for remanding the matter in the
manner directed by the learned Commissioner, the
impugned order cannot be sustained; that, proceedings
under the Act, 1970, are preventive in nature and are
intended to protect public order by restraining persons
whose activities create fear, terror or insecurity among
members of the public.
8. It is contended that the learned Commissioner
failed to appreciate the preventive object of the legislation
and proceeded as though the allegations against
respondent no.2 were required to be established in the
manner applicable to a criminal trial; that, while
exercising appellate jurisdiction, the learned
Commissioner was required to examine whether the
satisfaction recorded by the learned District Magistrate
was founded upon relevant material and whether the
order suffered from any illegality, arbitrariness or
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procedural infirmity; that, instead, according to learned
counsel, the learned Commissioner directed
reconsideration of matters which were not determinative
of the preventive proceedings under the Act, 1970,
thereby exceeding the permissible scope of appellate
scrutiny.
9. Learned counsel would further submit that the
learned District Magistrate had recorded findings on the
basis of the enquiry report submitted by the Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, the criminal antecedents of
respondent no.2, the statements of the residents of the
locality, the documentary material, the electronic
evidence produced by the petitioner and the conduct
attributed to respondent no.2. It is contended that the
learned Commissioner erred in directing the learned
District Magistrate to reconsider the final reports
submitted in certain criminal cases; that, the mere
submission of a final report in a criminal case, according
to learned counsel, does not automatically render the
underlying material irrelevant for the purposes of
preventive proceedings, provided such material is
otherwise legally admissible or capable of consideration
under the applicable statutory framework.
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10. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also
submit that the proceedings under the Act, 1970, are
distinct from criminal prosecution and that the
competent authority is required to consider the overall
conduct of the person concerned, together with the
material bearing upon the statutory requirements for
taking preventive action; that, the learned Commissioner
committed a manifest error in directing reconsideration
of cross-FIRs and pending civil disputes without properly
appreciating the nature and object of the proceedings
under the Act, 1970. It is contended that the existence of
cross-cases or civil litigation cannot, by itself, negate
otherwise relevant material concerning the alleged
habitual conduct of a person or its impact upon public
order; that, the learned Commissioner, according to
learned counsel, failed to appreciate that the jurisdiction
under the Act, 1970, depends upon the satisfaction of
the competent authority, founded upon relevant material,
regarding the activities of the person concerned and their
bearing upon public order; that, in the absence of any
demonstrated perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides or
reliance upon irrelevant considerations, the appellate
authority ought not to substitute its own assessment for
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that of the competent authority merely because another
view of the material may be possible.
11. It is further contended that, by remanding the
matter for fresh consideration despite the availability of
material on record and the passing of a detailed order by
the learned District Magistrate, the learned
Commissioner has unnecessarily prolonged the
proceedings and thereby caused prejudice to the
petitioner and other residents of the locality. He would
further submit that the impugned order suffers from
perversity, as relevant material has allegedly been
disregarded and irrelevant considerations have been
taken into account; that, the standard of proof applicable
to a criminal trial, according to learned counsel, cannot
be mechanically imported into preventive proceedings
under the Act, 1970. He would contend that the learned
District Magistrate was required to assess the material in
the context of the statutory requirements governing
preventive action and to determine whether the
continued presence of respondent no.2 within the district
warranted the action contemplated under the Act. He
also referred to Section 6 of the Act, 1970, and the
judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
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Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.2700 of 2026, in
support of his submissions. He has further relied upon
Sections 2(b), 3(1)(c) and 8 of the Act, 1970, contending
that the nature of the material to be considered by the
competent authority and the scope of the preventive
proceedings must be determined in accordance with the
statutory scheme.
12. It is submitted that the order dated 14.05.2026
was passed not merely on the basis of the registration of
five First Information Reports in the State of
Uttarakhand, but also upon consideration of the
confidential report submitted by the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, the video recordings, and other material
pertaining to the alleged activities of respondent no. 2,
some of which had been widely circulated on social
media. Learned counsel would, therefore, submit that the
learned Commissioner, without properly appreciating the
aforesaid material and the findings recorded by the
learned District Magistrate, erred in remanding the
matter for fresh consideration. On the aforesaid grounds,
learned counsel prays that Criminal Writ Petition No.
1602 of 2026 be allowed, the impugned appellate order
be set aside, and WPCRL No. 1912 of 2026, preferred by
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respondent no. 2, be dismissed.
13. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing
for respondent no.2 would submit that the learned
Commissioner correctly found the externment order
dated 14.05.2026 passed by the learned District
Magistrate to be illegal and contrary to the principles of
natural justice, although the consequential direction
remanding the matter for fresh consideration was,
according to him, unnecessary and legally unsustainable.
He would further submit that the power of remand may,
in an appropriate case, be regarded as an ancillary power
of an appellate authority, even where such power is not
expressly mentioned in the relevant statutory provision.
However, it is contended that the exercise of such power
in the present case was improper, since the proceedings
initiated against respondent no.2 were defective from
their inception. He would further submit that the alleged
illegality in the order dated 14.05.2026 had already been
noticed by the learned Commissioner while passing the
impugned appellate order dated 18.07.2026; that, the
show-cause notice dated 25.04.2026 had also been
challenged before this Court in Criminal Writ Petition
No.762 of 2026. However, before the said writ petition
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could be finally decided, the learned District Magistrate
proceeded to pass the final order dated 14.05.2026, as a
result whereof the writ petition was dismissed as
infructuous vide order dated 24.08.2026.
14. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that, out of the five First Information Reports referred to
in the externment order, final reports had been
submitted in two cases, interim orders had been passed
in favour of respondent no.2 in two other cases, and
respondent no.2 was not even named in the fifth First
Information Report. It is contended that the learned
District Magistrate failed to properly appreciate the
status and nature of the aforesaid criminal cases before
arriving at the conclusion that respondent no.2 was
liable to be externed from District Dehradun; that, the
externment order was passed without a proper
assessment of the material and without due
consideration of the objections raised by respondent
no.2.
15. Learned senior counsel would place reliance
upon the judgment rendered by the High Court of Kerala
in N.K. Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal
of Kerala and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine Ker
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136, to contend that an appellate authority, in the
absence of an express statutory provision, may exercise
the power of remand as an ancillary or incidental power
necessary for the effective exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; that, the aforesaid decision was rendered in
the context of Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
wherein the power of remand was recognised as
incidental to the proper exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
16. Learned senior counsel would further submit
that the notice issued under Section 3(1) of the Uttar
Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act, 1970”), was legally defective,
inasmuch as the proceedings were allegedly initiated
without compliance with the requisite statutory
requirements concerning the supporting affidavits and
material forming the basis of the proposed action. He
would contend that the complaint or application giving
rise to the proceedings was not accompanied by the
requisite material and that the proceedings were initiated
at the instance of persons harbouring personal animosity
against respondent no. 2; that, according to learned
senior counsel, such circumstances cast serious doubt
upon the bona fides of the proceedings and the legality of
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the action taken against respondent no. 2.
17. In support of his submissions concerning the
procedural safeguards governing proceedings under the
Act, 1970, learned senior counsel would also place
reliance upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in
Bhim Sain Tyagi v. State of U.P. and Others, reported in
1999 SCC OnLine All 1403, to emphasise the necessity of
strict compliance with the statutory procedure and the
principles of natural justice while exercising preventive
powers that affect an individual's liberty and movement.
He would submit that an externment order cannot be
sustained where the competent authority fails to adhere
to the prescribed procedural safeguards or deprives the
person concerned of a meaningful opportunity to defend
himself. He further rely upon the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court in Ramji Pandey v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, reported in 1981 SCC OnLine All 305, in
support of his contention that a notice issued under
Section 3(1) of the Act, 1970, must disclose the general
nature of the material allegations against the person
proceeded against; that, a mere recital of past First
Information Reports, pending criminal cases, convictions
or acquittals, without adequate disclosure of the
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substance of the allegations and the material relied upon,
may not satisfy the statutory requirement; that, the
notice must contain sufficient particulars to enable the
noticee to understand the case he is required to meet and
to submit an effective explanation in response thereto.
Reliance has also been placed upon the judgment of the
Uttarakhand High Court in Rakesh Kaintura v. State of
Uttarakhand and Others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine
Utt 21019, in support of the submissions advanced on
behalf of respondent no. 2.
18. On the strength of the aforesaid decisions,
learned senior counsel would contend that the
externment order dated 14.05.2026, having allegedly
been passed without due compliance with the statutory
requirements and the principles of natural justice, was
not sustainable in law. He would, therefore, submit that
the impugned appellate order dated 18.07.2026, insofar
as it interferes with the externment order, does not
warrant interference at the instance of the petitioner in
Criminal Writ Petition No. 1602 of 2026, and that the
challenge raised in the writ petition is liable to be
considered in the light of the statutory framework and
the legal principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions.
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19. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner
would submit that as many as eight complaints had been
received against respondent no.2 and that affidavits of
eight persons had also been placed on record in support
thereof. He would, therefore, contend that the objection
regarding the alleged absence of supporting affidavits is
contrary to the material available on record.
20. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
21. The principal questions for consideration are
whether the learned Commissioner, while exercising
appellate jurisdiction under Section 6 of the Uttar
Pradesh Control of Goondas Act, 1970 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act, 1970”), was competent to remand
the matter to the learned District Magistrate and whether
interference with the externment order dated 14.05.2026
was otherwise justified.
22. Section 6(3) of the Act, 1970 empowers the
Commissioner to confirm the impugned order, with or
without modification, or to set it aside. The provision
does not expressly confer any power of remand. Although
learned senior counsel for respondent no. 2 has relied
upon N.K. Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate
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Tribunal of Kerala and Others, reported in 1962 SCC
OnLine Ker 136, in support of the proposition that
remand may be an incidental power of an appellate
authority, such power cannot be exercised contrary to
the express statutory scheme. The decision in Anil
Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,
reported in 2026 LiveLaw (AB) 377, which specifically
examines Section 6 of the Act, 1970, also supports the
view that the Commissioner cannot remand the matter
for fresh adjudication on merits.
23. Learned senior counsel for respondent no. 2
has further relied upon Bhim Sain Tyagi v. State of U.P.
and Others, reported in 1999 SCC OnLine All 1403,
Ramji Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,
reported in 1981 SCC OnLine All 305, and Rakesh
Kaintura v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, reported in
2026 SCC OnLine Utt 21019, to emphasise the necessity
of strict compliance with the statutory safeguards
governing externment proceedings. In particular, Ramji
Pandey underscores that a notice under Section 3(1)
must disclose the general nature of the material
allegations so as to afford the person concerned a
meaningful opportunity to defend himself.
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24. The sufficiency of the notice and the legality of
the proceedings must, therefore, be assessed with
reference to the statutory requirements and the material
on record. The petitioner contends that the externment
order was based not merely on five criminal cases but
also on the report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
complaints and statements of local residents, affidavits,
video recordings and the objections submitted by
respondent no. 2. Conversely, respondent no. 2 disputes
the sufficiency of the material and alleges personal
animosity. Neither the existence of criminal cases nor the
submission of a confidential report, by itself, conclusively
establishes the statutory grounds for externment. The
competent authority must arrive at the requisite
satisfaction on relevant material and in accordance with
law. Equally, the registration of criminal cases, the
pendency of cross-cases or the absence of a conviction
cannot, by themselves, determine the validity of
preventive proceedings.
25. The appellate authority was competent to
examine the legality of the externment order and to set it
aside if the statutory requirements were not satisfied.
However, it could not, in the absence of statutory
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authority, direct the learned District Magistrate to
undertake a fresh adjudication. The direction of remand,
therefore, exceeds the jurisdiction conferred by Section
6(3) of the Act, 1970. By the impugned appellate order,
the learned Commissioner set aside the order dated
14.05.2026 passed by the District Magistrate, primarily
on the ground that the District Magistrate had failed to
take into consideration the pendency of civil litigations
between the applicant and the complainant/respondent.
The learned Appellate Authority further observed that,
out of the five FIRs relied upon, final reports had been
submitted in two cases, stay orders were operating in two
cases, and the applicant had not been named in the
remaining one FIR. However, while recording these
findings, the learned Appellate Authority overlooked the
fact that the order of externment passed by the District
Magistrate was also based upon the confidential report
submitted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), the
assessments and statements of several complainants,
and the electronic evidence collected against the
applicant. Further, Section 8 of the Uttar Pradesh
Control of Goondas Act, 1970, provides for consideration
of the nature and probative value of the evidence in the
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proceedings under the Act. The District Magistrate, being
the competent authority, had passed the order of
externment after considering the past and present
conduct and behaviour of the applicant, along with the
material available on record. However, the learned
Appellate Authority, without recording any findings on
these relevant aspects or examining the material forming
the basis of the externment order, set aside the order
dated 14.05.2026 and remanded the matter. In view of
the aforesaid, the impugned appellate order dated
18.07.2026 cannot be sustained in law and the same is
hereby set aside.
27. Consequently, Criminal Writ Petition No. 1602
of 2026 is allowed. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1912 of
2026, insofar as it challenges the impugned appellate
order on the ground of the remand direction for fresh
consideration, is dismissed.
28. No order as to costs.
29. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Dated 16.10.2026 (ALOK MAHRA,J.)
MAMT
A
RANI
Digitally signed by MAMTA RANI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH
COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=6a812005bebfcf46f244
f3e584af1449e430ef900bf09a6d
67ebbd642671329b,
postalCode=263001,
st=Uttarakhand,
serialNumber=5de1751a4f1d9c
abfd54852c9e68911ca8b66dd2
6690a191648ab5d8dd004ef0,
cn=MAMTA RANI
Date: 2026.10.16 19:16:38
+05'30'
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