Uttar Pradesh Ground Water Department Non Gazetted Employee Association (Regd.) vs The Chief Secretary

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1252



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1458 OF 2020


UTTAR PRADESH GROUND WATER DEPARTMENT
NON GAZETTED EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION (REGD.)
& ANR. … PETITIONERS
VERSUS
THE CHIEF SECRETARY & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH
W.P.(C) NO. 74 OF 2021
WITH
W.P.(C) NO. 332 OF 2021
WITH
W.P.(C) NO. 333 OF 2021
WITH
W.P.(C) NO. 474 OF 2023
WITH
Signature Not Verified
W.P.(C) NO. 432 OF 2024
Digitally signed by
MANIK KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.19
19:26:17 IST
Reason:
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W.P.(C) NO. 440 OF 2024
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W.P.(C) NO. 459 OF 2024
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W.P.(C) NO. 156 OF 2025
WITH
W.P.(C) NO. 193 OF 2025
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W.P.(C) NO. 979 OF 2025
WITH
W.P.(C) NO. 342 OF 2026
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 22530 OF 2018]

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. OF 2026]
@ DIARY NO. 1747 OF 2020

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 6206 OF 2020]

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 13043 OF 2021]

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 17982 OF 2021]


2

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 4385 OF 2022]

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 5859 OF 2022]

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 6091 OF 2022]

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 5393 OF 2023]


WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 21165 OF 2023]

WITH
MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION DIARY NO. 3248 OF 2024
[IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6799 OF 2019]

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 4686 OF 2024]

WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 18332 OF 2024]



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WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) DIARY NO. 12683 OF 2025
[IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8340 OF 2019]

WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) NO. 2115 OF 2018
IN C.A. NO. 2896 OF 2018

WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) NO. 306 OF 2020
IN C.A. NO. 6804 OF 2019

WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) NOS. 309-313 OF 2020
IN C.A. NOS. 6799-6803 OF 2019

WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) NOS. 314-318 OF 2020
IN C.A. NOS. 6938-6942 OF 2019

WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) NO. 319 OF 2020
IN C.A. NO. 6805 OF 2019

WITH
CONMT. PET.(C) NO. 332 OF 2020
IN SLP(C) NO. 19326 OF 2017

WITH
CONMT. PET. (C) NOS. 429-431/2021
IN C.A. Nos. 7029-7031/2019

4


I NDEX

I. P ROLOGUE
....................................................................................................................... 6
II. C ONTEXTUAL M ILIEU ................................................................................................ 8
RAVAMEN OF THE IS
III. G L ....................................................................................... 10
IV. S UBMISSIONS
........................................................................................................... 14
A. On behalf of the Employees/Petitioners ......................................... 14
B. On Behalf of the STATE .............................................................................. 18
C. On behalf of the Impleaded Petitioners/Retired personnel of
the PWD .......................................................................................................................... 22
V. Q UESTIONS OF L AW ................................................................................................ 25
VI. A NALYSIS
................................................................................................................... 26
A. Validity of the Validating Acts – Validation or Disguised
Perpetuation of the Exclusion? ......................................................................... 27
B. The Mandamus that has attained Finality Inter Partes ......... 43
C. The Independent Test for Challenge under Articles 14 and

21 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….49
D. The Substantive Question – Obliteration of Birthmark upon
Regularisation? .......................................................................................................... 58
E. The Onerous Burden?
................................................................................. 64
F. Proceedings at the instance of Associations – A Necessitated
Detour .............................................................................................................................. 65
G. A Final Reckoning ......................................................................................... 68
VII. O PERATIVE D IRECTIONS .................................................................................... 71
VIII. F ATE OF THE C ONTEMPT P ROCEEDINGS ......................................................... 74
A PPENDIX
.............................................................................................................................. 79



5

J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
I. P ROLOGUE

1. The extant controversy has emerged wearing a garb of novelty;
however, novelty of form does not necessarily tantamount to novelty
of substance. The wisdom from the eons has long recognised this
distinction: in Swami Vivekananda’s felicitous prose, “Name and form
1
come and go, but substance remains ever the same ” . Here, the bottle
may have changed but the wine it holds remains vintage – the
proceedings are but a new form for an old, continuing grievance.
2. The present batch of matters has its genesis in a controversy which,
spanning several decades and even receiving judicial attention before,
revolves around a single factual matrix. The precise question is,
2
whether the service rendered by employees of the State prior to their
regularisation – particularly service rendered in a work-charged
establishment in any of the departments of the State, and in some
cases, rendered in a temporary, daily-wage or muster-roll capacity –
could be reckoned as service qualifying for determining the eligibility
to receive pension.
3. At first sight, the protracted proceedings stem from a dispute
concerning the entitlement of a class of employees to pension. Beneath

1 th
Swami Vivekananda’s lecture, titled “I am that I am”, dated March 20 , 1900
2
State of Uttar Pradesh
6

this factual thicket, lies the need for an inquiry into the limits of
legislative power when exercised after a judgment of this Court has
finally crystallised the legal position. The cause has travelled through
3
the High Court and this Court on previous occasions. It has further
borne the incidence of executive instructions; a decision of this Court
4
in Prem Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh ; subsequent
review and contempt proceedings; legislative intervention by the
State, thus, seeking to overrule the judicial verdict after all earlier
efforts had failed to secure reversal of the same through procedure
known to law, a further enactment thereafter dealing with entitlement
to pension during the pendency of the present batch of petitions (more
importantly when one coordinate Bench was deep into the nitty-gritty
of the controversy and had made certain, prima facie , observations
unfavourable to the State). The dispute turns not so much on facts as
on principles of constitutional importance, and thus requires a
principled rather than a fact-intensive inquiry.
4. Delay in filing and refiling the Special Leave Petitions, wherever
applicable, is condoned. Leave granted. The applications seeking
substitution, setting aside abatement and condonation of delay in filing
applications for setting aside abatement are allowed. Resultantly, the
legal representatives of the deceased employees are permitted to be
brought on record. Registry shall carry out the necessary amendments

3
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
4
(2019) 10 SCC 516
7

in the array of appellants, accordingly. All pending applications stand
disposed of.
ONTEXTUAL ILIEU
II. C M

5. Petitioners in the principal group are employees or retired employees
of various departments of the State, including the Public Works
Department, Ground Water Department and Irrigation Department. A
substantial number of them were initially engaged between the late
1970s and the mid-1980s in work-charged establishments. Their
services were subsequently regularised at different points of time. The
compass of consideration before us also bears out matters concerning
individuals who commenced their service as daily-wage or muster-roll
employees and were thereafter brought into the work-charged
establishment before ultimately being regularised. In other matters,
the initial engagement was on a temporary basis or as Seasonal
Collection Amins.
6. The dossier in the lead petition traces the engagement of several of
the employees concerned to the period between 1978 and 1986. They
were appointed in various capacities in the Irrigation/Ground Water
Department, Public Works Department and allied establishments of the
State. The service conditions of work-charged employees were
thereafter the subject-matter of repeated administrative
consideration. The record refers to Government instructions issued in
1987 and 1997 concerning pension/family pension and, more
8

particularly, to proceedings concerning regularisation of work-charged
and muster-roll employees. In proceedings arising from Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 140 of 1989, this Court dealt with the question of
regularisation of a large body of work-charged employees and muster-
roll labourers employed in different projects of the State. It is evident
from the materials placed before this Court that the State, pursuant to
directions issued in those proceedings, formulated a scheme for
regularisation.
7. Employees of the Ground Water Department similarly approached this
Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 468 of 1996 seeking regularisation.
The proceedings were ultimately connected, in the factual tapestry of
the present batch, with the subsequent regularisation of the
employees concerned. Several employees who had initially served in
work-charged establishments were eventually absorbed or regularised
against posts in the regular establishment.
8. The subsequent dispute did not, therefore, primarily concern whether
these employees had served the State. The service rendered in its
various forms is not in dispute, at least at the factual level, for the
present. The controversy, however, arose from the legal character
attributed to the different periods of service rendered by them at
different points in time for the limited purpose of pensionary benefits.
In particular, the question arose as to whether the period served in a
work-charged establishment could be treated as qualifying service
given the employee's subsequent regularisation of service.
9

III. G RAVAMEN OF THE L IS

9. Some of the employees, who had been earlier appointed in work-
charged establishments and were subsequently regularised,
approached the High Court questioning the validity and application of
5
Rule 3(8) of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961 , and
6
Regulation 370 of the Civil Service Regulations . Apropos the said rules
and regulations, their grievance was that the exclusion of the period
spent in a work-charged establishment from qualifying service
engendered the denial of pension to employees who had rendered
substantial service to the State preceding their eventual regularisation.
rd
10. The High Court, by a judgment and order dated 3 February, 2017
passed in the relevant proceedings, dismissed the challenge. The
reasoning inter alia was that the provisions could not be struck down
merely on the anvil of arbitrariness and that the impugned provisions
were not beset by Article 14 of the Constitution. Appeals emanating
from the afore-mentioned controversy thereafter reached this Court.
nd
The principal decision was rendered on 2 September, 2019 in Prem
Singh (supra). The factual underpinning of Prem Singh (supra) itself
has a material bearing on the present batch of petitions.
11. Prem Singh had been appointed as a welder in 1965 in a work-charged
establishment of the Ram Ganga River Valley Project at Kalagarh. After
completing his stint in that capacity and being transferred from one

5
1961 Rules
6
Regulations
10

th
place to another, his services came to be regularised on 13 March,
2002. He was posted as Pump Operator in the regular establishment.
st
He superannuated on 31 January, 2007. His claim for reckoning the
period spent in the work-charged establishment as qualifying service
was turned down by the authorities and by the High Court before the
matter reached this Court.
nd
12. This Court in its judgment dated 2 September, 2019, inter alia ,
ultimately read down Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules and held that the
services rendered in the work-charged establishment were to be
treated as qualifying service for the grant of pension. The arrears were,
however, truncated to three years preceding the date of the order, and
the other ancillary benefits were directed to be paid within three
months. The appeals preferred by the employees therein were
accordingly allowed, whereas the appeals filed by the State were
dismissed. The State, thereafter, sought review of the judgment. The
th
review petition was dismissed on 13 February, 2020.
13. The record further discloses contempt proceedings having been
instituted by some of the employees, alleging non-compliance with the
nd
judgment dated 2 September, 2019. In the proceedings before this
th
Court on 28 February, 2020, the issue of compliance was considered
in the context of those contempt petitions. The record also contains an
order in the contempt proceedings noting that the State had
subsequently taken legislative action concerning pension of work-
charged employees. The Court was informed by the State that an
11

Ordinance had been promulgated, retrospectively operating from
7
1961, and that the Ordinance was subsequently replaced by an Act
th
which came into force on 5 March, 2021.
14. The Ordinance and the subsequent validating legislation triggered the
challenge before this Court in the present batch. The legislative
response, however, did not cease with the enactment of 2021. In the
year 2025, when the proceedings in the present batch were afoot, the
State once again promulgated an Ordinance dealing with the
entitlement to pension and the validation of actions taken in that
regard. The said Ordinance was thereafter repealed by the Uttar
8
Pradesh Entitlement to Pension and Validation Act, 2025 , enacted as
U.P. Act No. 5 of 2026, which was given retrospective operation from
st
1 April, 1961. The said enactment introduced, inter alia, the statutory
expression “substantive appointee”, prescribed the class of persons
who are entitled to pension with reference thereto, and further entailed
a validating provision in respect of the actions taken, things done and
Government Orders issued time and again notwithstanding any
judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or authority.
15. Thus, the legislative history germane to the controversy comprises not
one, but various legislative responses in close succession: the
Ordinance of 2020, followed by the Validation Act, 2021, then by the
subsequent Ordinance of 2025, and thereafter by the Validation Act,

7
Validation Act, 2021
8
Validation Act, 2025
12

2025. The challenge to these enactments (the latter by amendment)
falls for consideration as against the backdrop of the earlier legislative
measure, and more fundamentally, the judgment rendered by this
Court in Prem Singh (supra) which preceded both the legislative
interventions.
16. For the extant purpose of dealing with the different sets of petitions
engaging our consideration, they may be conveniently grouped in
three categories as hereinbelow indicated, and we need not encumber
the body of our decision with the factual granularities of each of these
petitions. Rather, the same is conveniently encapsulated in the tables
featuring in the appendix to this judgment. Nonetheless, compelled by
the contextual necessity and for the sake of referential convenience, a
brief conspectus of a representative case in each of these groups may
be adumbrated as follows:
Group-I: Aggrieved employees/associations directly challenging the
Ordinance/Validating Legislation, promulgated/enacted by the State
subsequent to Prem Singh (supra), including the Validation Act, 2021
and the Validation Act, 2025 (12 petitions);
Group-II: Aggrieved individual employees whose claims had earlier
been rejected by the High Court, whose individual cases differ in their
factual particulars (5 petitions); and
Group-III: Appeals preferred by the State against judgments of the
High Court, which were favourable to the employees. These appeals
require us not only to examine the mere validity of the subsequent
13

legislation, but also whether the High Court correctly construed the
ratio of Prem Singh (supra) and the extent to which the service of the
concerned employees falls within it. No conclusiveness may be
attributed to the subsequent legislation, at this juncture, since even
the legislation is under assail before us on various counts (7 petitions).
IV. S UBMISSIONS

17. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties in extenso.
Since the questions raised before us have bearing on the larger aspect
of constitutional dimension involving the interplay between legislative
power and the finality of judicial adjudication, the submissions merit
notice with some fullness, though not reduced to a forensic catalogue.
A. On behalf of the Employees/Petitioners

18. Learned senior counsel/learned counsel appearing for the
employees/petitioners contended that they constitute a class of
employees who were initially engaged as work-charged employees in
various departments of the State of Uttar Pradesh, including the
Ground Water Department, Irrigation and Water Resources
Department, Public Works Department and Rural Engineering
Department, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They remained in
service sans any interruption, were subsequently regularised and, in
large measure, have since superannuated. It was urged that their
service was not ephemeral or casual in any real sense, and that the
State, having accepted and utilised their services over decades and
14

subsequently regularised them, cannot now retrospectively erase the
earlier period of service for the purpose of pension.
19. Learned counsel further contended that the controversy stands
substantially settled by the judgment of this Court in Prem Singh
(supra). According to them, this Court, while considering Rule 3(8) of
the 1961 Rules, recognised the impermissibility of excluding the period
of work-charged service of an employee who was concomitantly
regularised from computation of qualifying service. Reliance was
sought to be placed upon the reasoning adopted in Kesar Singh v.
9
State of Punjab and affirmed in Prem Singh (supra), particularly
the principle that once a work-charged employee is regularised and
becomes a public servant, there is no rational basis for depriving him
of pensionary benefits by disregarding the service which he had
already rendered.
20. The next submission has been that Prem Singh (supra) was not
premised upon an indulgence extended to a particular group of
litigants but upon a constitutional determination that the exclusion
crystallised in Rule 3(8) was impermissibly discriminatory. It was urged
before us that the similarly situated employees cannot be segregated
into those who happened to be parties before the Court and those who
were not. Once the impugned provision was read down, its legal
ramifications, as it was contended before us, necessarily extended to
all persons similarly placed. Reliance was placed on State of Uttar

9
AIR 1988 P&H 265
15

10
Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava , in furtherance of the
proposition that equals cannot be treated unequally merely because
only some of them had approached the Court.
21. It was submitted with considerable vehemence that the State
thereafter unsuccessfully pursued the remedies available against
Prem Singh (supra). The review petition was dismissed, and the
curative petition was subsequently withdrawn. It was pointed out that,
following the judgment, the State itself issued an office memorandum
th
dated 20 November, 2019 directing compliance, and pensionary
benefits were in fact released to a number of similarly situated
employees. It was contended that this subsequent conduct of the State
demonstrates that the judgment was treated, in practice, as laying
down the governing law and not merely as conferring an individual
benefit upon the original appellants before this Court.
22. The principal grievance of learned counsel for the petitioners was
directed against the Validation Act, 2021. The legislation, it was
submitted, does not cure the defect flagged in Prem Singh (supra)
but merely seeks to restore under a different statutory formulation,
the very exclusion which this Court had found constitutionally
untenable. In effect, it was argued that the impugned enactment is not
a proper validating law in the constitutional paradigm. The vice
identified in Prem Singh (supra) was the impermissible classification
between those who had rendered work-charged service and those

10
(2015) 1 SCC 347
16

whose service germinated in the regular establishment. It was
contended that merely redefining “qualifying service” so as to exclude
the very period of work-charged service does not remove that
constitutional infirmity. The legislative device, in the submission of
learned counsel, changes the language but leaves the substance of the
discrimination intact.
23. On the anvil of Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural
11
Development Bank Ltd. v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies ,
12
T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana and State of M.P v. Yogendra
13
Srivastava , it was argued that the retrospective operation of the
impugned legislation is particularly objectionable because, by the time
the legislation was enacted, the petitioners had already rendered the
relevant service and, in many cases, had retired. The pensionary
entitlement flowing from that service, according to learned counsel,
had acquired the character of a vested right and could not
retrospectively be divested by an enactment which did not satisfy the
standards of constitutional reasonableness.
24. It was contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners
that while the hearing on the challenge against the validity of the
Validity Act, 2021 was going on, the State in a clandestine manner,
had promulgated the 2025 Ordinance, which was later subsumed in
the Validation Act, 2025. However, nothing substantial has been

11
(2022) 4 SCC 363
12
1986 Supp SCC 584
13
(2010) 12 SCC 538.
17

pressed into service by the counsel on behalf of the learned counsel
for petitioners on this plank of challenge as against the Validation Act,
2025 as such, rather the contentions stem from the Validation Act,
2021.
B. On Behalf of the STATE

25. Shri R. Venkataramani, learned Attorney General for India, appearing
for the State submitted that the controversy must be examined against
the settled principle that the constitution, classification and conditions
of service, including the prescription of pensionary benefits, fall within
the legislative and executive domain, subject always to constitutional
limitations. It was argued that pension is a creature of the governing
statutory rules, and there is no constitutional imprimatur that every
category of employment under the State must carry identical retiral
benefits. A work-charged establishment, he submitted, is structurally
and legally distinct from a regular establishment, being ordinarily
created for execution of specified works and governed by a different
fiscal and administrative regime.
26. It was further submitted that Prem Singh (supra) proceeded upon an
erroneous equation of work-charged service with regular service.
According to the learned Attorney, the Note to Rule 3(8) of the 1961
Rules was intended only to protect an employee otherwise serving in
a pensionable establishment from losing continuity on account of an
intervening period spent in a work-charged or non-pensionable
establishment; it was not a provision conferring an independent
18

pensionary right upon work-charged employees. When Rule 3(8),
Regulations 361, 368 and 370 and the provisions of the Financial
Handbook are read together, the statutory scheme, it was urged,
consistently excluded work-charged service from pensionary
entitlement.
27. Learned Attorney next contended that the distinction between work-
charged and regular service is not merely nomenclatural but rests
upon materially different modes of appointment, the existence or
otherwise of sanctioned posts, the nature and duration of the
establishment, and the applicable service regime. Length of service,
by itself, it was argued, cannot obliterate these foundational
distinctions. Regularisation, moreover, ordinarily operates
prospectively and does not retrospectively convert an antecedent
engagement into a substantive appointment to a regular post.
28. Apropos the validity of the impugned legislation, the learned Attorney
contended that the State Legislature was competent to clarify the
governing law and to displace the legal basis of a judicial decision by
altering the underpinning statutory framework. He urged that the
validating enactments do not merely declare a judgment ineffective;
they redefine the statutory conditions governing qualifying service and
pension entitlement by making “substantive appointee” as the eligible
category for the entitlement of pensionary benefits. It was argued that
such enactments satisfy the three-pronged test in Shri Prithvi Cotton
19

14
Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality : legislative
competence, removal of the defect identified by the Court, and
adherence to Part-III of the Constitution. Reliance was, inter alia,
15
placed on Indian Aluminium Co. v. State of Kerala , Bakhtawar
16
Trust v. M.D. Narayan and other decisions which, according to him,
judicially sanctify the legislative power to retrospectively alter the legal
fulcrum around which a judgment pivots.
29. It was further urged before us with considerable vehemence that the
present case is also distinguishable from instances where legislation
merely purports to annul a judicial command without altering the
underlying law. The persons who were parties to Prem Singh (supra),
it was submitted, would remain governed by the judgment inter
partes ; the present legislation operates upon the broader class of
persons seeking to invoke the ratio of that decision for pensionary
claims. The validating enactments, therefore, were said to constitute
an exercise of legislative power to prescribe the substantive conditions
of pension rather than an impermissible usurpation of judicial power.
30. Qua retrospectivity, the learned Attorney submitted that retrospective
operation is intrinsic to validating legislation where the legislative
object is to remove the legal substratum of past judicial decisions and
to validate past actions. A valid retrospective enactment, within the
legislative competence and subject to constitutional limitations, may

14
(1969) 2 SCC 283
15
(1996) 7 SCC 637
16
(2003) 5 SCC 298
20

alter the legal consequences of past events and render a prior judicial
decision ineffective. In this vein, reliance was placed upon State of
17 18
H.P. v. Narain Singh , NHPC Ltd. v. State of H.P. , National
Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v.
19
Union of India , Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v.
20
Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. , and Virendra Singh
21
Hooda v. State of Haryana . It was followingly contended that the
2021 and 2025 enactments must be accorded their intended
st
retrospective effect from 1 April, 1961.
31. Sequentially, the learned Attorney submitted that besides the validity
of the validating enactments, the correctness of Prem Singh (supra)
itself warrants reconsideration by a larger Bench. The judgment, it was
urged, failed to adequately consider the statutory distinction between
work-charged and regular establishments, the relevant provisions of
the Financial Handbook and the State’s Regularisation Rules, and the
extant jurisprudence governing substantive appointment and
regularisation. It was therefore characterised as a decision that
proceeded per incuriam and as having, in substance, engendered a
pensionary right by judicial interdiction where none existed under the
relevant statutory scheme. In his submission, the Court’s power and
duty to reconsider an earlier decision in the rare case of manifest legal

17
(2009) 13 SCC 165
18
(2023) 17 SCC 1
19
(2003) 5 SCC 23
20
(2021) 9 SCC 657
21
(2004) 12 SCC 588
21

error is well settled, and the present matter warrants such
reconsideration in the interests of constitutional and legal correctness.
32. Learned Attorney’s ultimate submission, pressed as the final plank of
argument, was that the Validation Act, 2021 and Validation Act, 2025
are constitutionally valid exercises of legislative power, that they have
altered the statutory bedrock governing qualifying service and pension
entitlement and validly operate retrospectively; that claims founded
upon Prem Singh (supra) must concomitantly be gauged under the
altered statutory regime; and that Prem Singh (supra) itself warrants
reconsideration by a larger Bench. One other submission, made in the
passing by the learned Attorney, will be spelt out and dealt with at a
later part of this judgment.
C. On behalf of the Impleaded Petitioners/Retired personnel of
the PWD

33. Learned counsel appearing for the impleaded petitioners as well as a
section of retired personnel submitted that the challenge to the
Validation Act, 2021 had originally been raised before the High Court,
but the proceedings were ultimately disposed of with liberty to the
concerned petitioners to approach this Court, the validity of the
enactment itself being already under consideration in the present
proceedings.
34. On merits, learned counsel sought to position the controversy in its
historical and administrative setting. It was submitted that over
several decades, particularly in the Public Works Department, the
22

Government had itself followed a policy of progressively absorbing and
regularising work-charged personnel into the regular establishment.
Reference was made to the Government orders and office memoranda
issued from 1967 onwards providing for the creation of temporary
posts, absorption of work-charged employees who had completed the
prescribed period of service, preservation of seniority from the date of
initial appointment in the work-charged establishment, and eventual
movement from muster-roll and work-charged employment to the
regular establishment. They submitted that regularisation of such
employees was thus not an isolated or exceptional occurrence but
constituted part of the administrative practice followed by the State
over a considerable period.
35. It was further submitted by learned counsel that the service of field
employees had historically been dealt with through different
administrative categories, including regular work-charged employees
absorbed against available posts, work-charged employees appointed
from district-wise seniority lists and muster-roll employees who had
rendered long and continuous service. According to learned counsel,
the nomenclature dovetailed to the initial engagement could not
muddle the factual continuity of service rendered by these employees
over several decades.
36. Reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Habib Khan v.
22
State of Uttarakhand , wherein work-charged service was held

22
Civil Appeal No. 10805-10807 of 2017
23

liable to be counted for computation of qualifying service for pension,
and Prem Ram v. Managing Director, Uttarakhand Pey Jal &
23
Nirman Nigam , to contend that belated regularisation ought not to
operate to the prejudice of employees who had continued in service
for long periods. Reference was further made to State of U.P. v.
24
Chandra Prakash Pandey to buttress the submission that the
character of the duties actually discharged by an employee, rather
than merely the nomenclature of the post, may be relevant in
determining his status in public employment. Reliance was also placed
25
on Jaggo v. Union of India with particular emphasis on the Court's
caution against employing the principle in Secretary, State of
26
Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi selectively so as to defeat the claims
of employees who had rendered indispensable services over long
periods.
37. The argument was taken to its culmination with the submission that
the impugned Validation Act was internally incongruous in its approach
to the expression “qualifying service”. While purporting retrospectively
st
to validate the statutory definition with effect from 1 April, 1961, the
enactment subsequently introduced a new conception of “qualifying
service” , its Statement of Objects and Reasons echoing the need to
overcome what it described as subjective interpretation. It was

23
(2015) 11 SCC 255
24
(2001) 4 SCC 78
25
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
26
2006 (4) SCC 1
24

contended that this alteration, coupled with the asserted ambiguity in
the statutory framework, demonstrated that the legislation did not
merely clarify the existing position, rather sought to alter the legal
position retrospectively, and was therefore liable to be struck down.
V. Q UESTIONS OF L AW

38. The rival submissions, unencumbered by tangential issues, crystallise
into the following questions of law to which answers are to be sought
in their proper constitutional sequence as follows:
i. Whether, having regard to the law laid down in Prem Singh
(supra) and the subsequent dismissal of the review petition and
withdrawal of the curative petition, the legislature could, by
promulgating the Ordinance followed by enactment of the
Validation Act retrospectively, alter the legal position governing
qualifying service and thereby affect the legal consequences
flowing from the judgment? If that be the case, whether such
legislative interdiction is constitutionally permissible only to the
extent of removal of the defect which constituted the basis for
such judicial determination?
ii. Whether the Validation Act, 2021 and the Validation Act, 2025,
insofar as they retrospectively exclude service rendered in a
work-charged establishment from qualifying service and
purport to validate past orders, actions and denials of pension,
would amount to a genuine alteration of the legal substratum
25

of the rights declared in Prem Singh (supra), or constitute, in
substance, an impermissible legislative annulment of a binding
judicial determination?
iii. Whether the impugned validating enactments comply with the
settled requirements governing the field of validating
legislation, namely, legislative competence, removal of the
defect highlighted by the Court, and even its standalone
adherence to Part-III of the Constitution?
iv. Whether on regularisation of the service of an employee and
integrating him into the mainstream of public service, the
birthmark of his initial appointment stands obliterated? Or,
whether the State can, by a legislative measure, resurrect that
erased distinction to deprive him of the retiral benefits attached
to their regular status?

VI. A NALYSIS

39. At the threshold, lies the need to identify the precise nature of the
controversy. Neither the State nor the employees seem to have qualms
with the State’s general legislative competence or overarching
prerogative to regulate conditions of service or to prescribe the
circumstances in which pension may be granted; nor is the proposition
in dispute that, subject to constitutional fetters, legislation may
operate retrospectively if in the wisdom of the legislature it is deemed
necessary. The controversy may profitably be viewed as a
26

constitutional sequence rather than as a succession of statutes. A rule
entailed exclusion; this Court intervened; the legislature responded;
and the question arising now is whether, in so responding, it altered
the law or merely altered the vocabulary of earlier exclusion. Between
these two possibilities across the spectrum lies the entire controversy.
40. In our pursuit to answer this question, we would have to pass through
three gates – legislative competence, removal of the defect, and
conformity with Part III of the Constitution – and only then decide the
distinct questions and the competing claims of the parties.
A. Validity of the Validating Acts – Validation or Disguised
Perpetuation of the Exclusion?

41. We may now come to the heart of the controversy. Learned Attorney
has placed considerable reliance upon the jurisprudence of validating
legislation as such, by urging that there is nothing constitutionally
suspect in a legislature acting within its field giving retrospective
operation to a law, thereby changing the course of the consequences
flowing from a judgment. Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) and Indian
Aluminium Co. (supra) are pressed into service for the proposition
that a judgment does not acquire an immutable characteristic merely
because it has been pronounced, thus, rendering nugatory the
legislature’s competence to alter the foundation of the law upon which
the judgment had proceeded. The proposition, canvassed at this level
of generality, is unexceptionable. However, the difficulty lies in the
second prong of the proposition: legislature may change the law or
27

basis of the judgment; but, can it by mere change of language, change
the judgment?
42. These arguments rest on a characterisation of Prem Singh (supra)
which, in our considered view, is a subterfuge. Prem Singh (supra)
did not proceed on the abstract basis that every work-charged
employee, irrespective of the conditions of appointment, is entitled to
pension. Our plain reading of the decision is this: when seized with
examining the validity of the exclusion of service rendered in a work-
charged establishment from the computation of qualifying service,
upon examining the statutory and regulatory scheme, this Court had
found the exclusion impermissible, and consequently read down Rule
3(8) of the 1961 Rules. The same can be evinced from the operative
portion of the decision, expressed in the following terms:
37. In view of reading down Rule 3(8) of the U.P. Retirement Benefits
Rules, 1961, we hold that services rendered in the work-charged
establishment shall be treated as qualifying service under the aforesaid
rule for grant of pension. The arrears of pension shall be confined to three
years only before the date of the order. Let the admissible benefits be paid
accordingly within three months. Resultantly, the appeals filed by the
employees are allowed and filed by the State are dismissed.

43. The basis of the decision, therefore, matters. This Court did not create
a pensionary entitlement in disregard of the statutory scheme, as the
learned Attorney contended. It interpreted the existing framework so
as to eschew an exclusion, which could not constitutionally survive.
The distinction is crucial because the legislative response must be
28

gauged against the defect identified by the judgment, and not against
a proposition never laid down thereby in the first place.
44. A prefatory conspectus of the decisions illumining this domain would
be necessary, which is as follows:
a. The starting point of the jurisprudence concerning validating
legislations may safely be traced back to Prithvi Cotton Mills
(supra), wherein the controversy arose from municipal taxes,
which had been levied on the basis of the capital value of lands
and buildings. This Court had earlier held in Patel Gordhandas
27
Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner that the
expression “rate”, as employed in the governing legislation,
carried a settled legal meaning and that the levy based upon
capital value was therefore beyond the statutory authority of
the municipality. The legislature thereafter enacted a validating
law which retrospectively authorised the imposition of the tax
on land or buildings on the basis of capital value and validated
the assessments already made. Upholding the legislation, the
Bench drew the foundational distinction which has since
governed this branch of constitutional law: the legislature
cannot simply declare a judicial decision to be wrong, but it can
alter the law retrospectively so as to remove the legal
foundation upon which the decision rested. The Court identified
two essential conditions for such validation: first, legislative

27
1964 2 SCR 608
29

competence over the subject-matter; and secondly, removal of
the defect identified by the Court. The validation was sustained
because the legislature did not merely pronounce the earlier
levy valid; it changed the underlying law by expressly providing
for the very basis of taxation which the earlier law, as judicially
interpreted, did not countenance.
b. The converse principle finds lucid expression in Janapada
28
Sabha v. Central Provinces Syndicate . Therein, certain
increases in coal cess had been effectuated without the
sanction of the local Government which the governing statute
required. This Court had concomitantly declared the enhanced
levies illegal. The subsequent legislation sought to deem those
increases valid as though the original statute had, at all times,
conferred the requisite power upon the local authority. The
enactment, in effect, did neither remove the requirement to
obtain sanction, nor it introduced any legal fiction, which cured
the absence of such sanction. The validating enactment was
henceforth held ineffective. Of specific significance was the
Court’s observation that the legislature could not declare the
earlier judgment to be invalid or erroneous, whether as inter
partes or as a precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution.

28
(1970) 1 SCC 509
30

c. The subsequent decision in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union
29
of India decided by a 7-Judge Bench further illumines the
precincts, particularly where the judicial adjudication
culminated in an operative mandamus. The dispute pertained
to a settlement between the Life Insurance Corporation of
30
India and its Class III and IV employees providing for annual

bonus. The High Court at Calcutta had issued a writ of
mandamus, directing LICI to honour the settlement. Parliament
thereafter enacted the Life Insurance Corporation (Modification
of Settlement) Act, 1976, purporting retrospectively to render
the relevant bonus provisions otiose. This Court held the
enactment invalid. In distinguishing Prithvi Cotton Mills
(supra), this Court emphasised that the validating legislation
therein had not purported to undo the judicial interpretation;
rather it had changed the law by expressly providing for
taxation on the basis of capital value. Per contra , in Madan
Mohan Pathak (supra), the High Court's judgment had
culminated in a specific mandamus directing payment, and the
legislation did not remove the basis of that adjudication.
d. Indeed, the decision in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd.
31
v. State of Rajasthan is further instructive in this regard.
Therein, the State Legislature had enacted a validating statute

29
(1978) 2 SCC 50
30
LICI
31
(1996) 2 SCC 449
31

purporting to deem certain villages to have always constituted
part of the municipal limits and, commensurately, to deem
taxes collected within those areas to have always been lawfully
levied. The difficulty was that the earlier judicial decision had
proceeded upon the failure to adhere to the mandatory
statutory requirements regarding the alteration of municipal
limits. Those statutory criteria themselves had not been
amended and, hence, the Court struck down the enactment and
directed the consequent refund of the octroi. Interestingly
enough, Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) itself was noticed while
the validating legislation before the Court was nevertheless
found constitutionally wanting.
e. The silos were strung together in the decision in Indian
Aluminium Co. (supra), wherein the controversy related to
surcharge on electricity which was imposed by the State
Government under the delegated legislative authority. The High
Court of Kerala and, thereafter, this Court concurrently held
that the State Government merely acting as a delegate under
the earlier enactment, did not possess competence to impose
what was, in substance, a tax, and a mandamus that had been
issued for refund of the amounts collected. The State
Government came up with a legislation subsequently validating
the past collection, which was upheld by this Court. In doing
so, it expressly formulated the requirements crystallised in
32

Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra): the legislature must possess
competence; the validating legislation must remove the defect
identified by the Court; and the enactment must otherwise
conform to Part III of the Constitution.
45. There is, in our considered view, no doctrinal conflict running between
Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) and the decisions in which the validating
enactments have been struck down. Indeed, the apparent tension
vanishes once the constitutional inquiry is kept in view. The answer
lies in Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) itself, for it did not lay down that
the legislature may simpliciter declare that an earlier judicial decision
shall no longer bind. Inherent in it was the recognition that the
legislature may alter the legal basis upon which the Court had
pronounced its decision, and having done so, may retrospectively
validate the consequences flowing therefrom the altered law. Sublato
fundamento cadit opus ! The power sanctified therein is, therefore, not
the one to overrule the judgment as a judgment; it is a power to
change the law so fundamentally that the defect upon which the
judgment rested, no longer survives in the altered legal field. The
inquiry, therefore, is two-fold: first , whether the legislature possesses
legislative competence over the subject-matter; and, secondly , and
more importantly for the present purpose, whether the defect
identified by the Court has in fact been removed by the validating
enactment. Competence is the threshold; removal of the defect
constitutes the substance. A validating enactment satisfying the first
33

requirement but leaving untouched the very infirmity which occasioned
the judicial decision, cannot derive constitutional validity merely from
the fact that it has been enacted by a competent legislature. The
legislature may alter the law; it cannot merely pronounce that the law,
as judicially found defective, shall henceforth be treated as though it
had never been defective.
46. This is why the authorities relied upon by the learned Attorney,
including Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) and Indian Aluminium Co.
Ltd. (supra), must be understood in their own factual and legal setting.
The said decisions sustained the validity of the respective validating
legislations not upon the mere presence of a retrospective or validating
clause but upon the removal of the judicially-identified defect
effectuated by such legislations. The decision in Madan Mohan
Pathak (supra) itself underscores that the Court must examine the
precise defect and the precise legislative response, rather than fixate
on what the enactment is called. The question is never answered by
what the legislature has called its enactment a “Validation Act”. As
32
Juliet asked, what’s in a name?
47. As has already been delineated, there is no warrant for reading
Janapada Sabha (supra) as laying down a doctrine contrary to
Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra). The absence of any doctrinal conflict
between the two is evinced by the absence of discussion of Prithvi
Cotton Mills (supra) in Janapada Sabha (supra), for the ratio in the

32
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, Act 2, Scene 2
34

latter ought to be construed as an extension of, rather than an
exception to, the ratio in the former. The principle which emanates
from the line of authorities is consistent: the legislature may remove
the foundation of a judicial decision by changing the law, but cannot,
under the guise of retrospective legislation, merely declare the judicial
determination to be ineffective while leaving the underlying defect
untouched.
48. The decision in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. (supra),
underscoring the ratio of Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra), does not
conclude the inquiry in favour of the State. It reinforces the need to
ask, whether the conditions which make validation constitutionally
permissible have actually been fulfilled.
49. The decision in Indian Aluminium Co. (supra) serves as a doctrinal
bridge between the two converse sets of cases, bringing the divergent
lines of authorities in tandem – those in which validating legislation
had been sustained because the defect had been rectified and those in
which it had failed because the legislature had merely attempted to
abridge the judicial determination through a legislative subterfuge. The
illustration falling from the decision itself would suffice: where a tax
was held invalid because the authority levying it did not have the
requisite legislative competence, the defect could be removed by a
competent legislature itself imposing or authorising the tax. What
cannot be countenanced is merely to declare that the tax which was
declared invalid shall be deemed always to have been valid.
35

50. A survey of the extant scholarship presents before us two apparently
opposite lines of decisions. Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra) and Indian
Aluminium (supra) recognise the legislature's power to change the
law and thereby alter the legal substratum of a judicial decision. On
the other hand, Janapada Sabha (supra), Madan Mohan Pathak
(supra) and Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) bear out
the converse: the legislature cannot change the result while leaving
the law and, therefore, the defect substantially untouched. The two
lines of authority are not antithetical to each other, rather are
complementary manifestations of the same constitutional limitation.
51. Our present inquiry ought not to be truncated to ascertaining whether
the impugned enactment has a validating clause, or even whether it
has been given retrospective operation, since these features are not
determinative. The anterior question is this: what was the defect
identified by this Court; what has the legislature altered in response
thereto; and does that alteration take away the defect or merely
declare the consequence of the earlier law to have been valid ever
since?
52. Learned Attorney has placed particular emphasis upon the statutory
introduction of the expressions “qualifying service” and “substantive
appointee” and submitted that the new enactments constitute a fresh
legislative policy under which pension is confined to those satisfying
the newly stipulated statutory conditions and, thereby, the highlighted
defect was removed. There is force in the argument that pension is a
36

creature of statute and that it is the prerogative of the State to lay
down the conditions for its grant. But the existence of a new definition
does not, by itself, establish that the defect identified by Prem Singh
(supra) has been cured. If the vice identified in Prem Singh (supra)
was the exclusion of long and continuous service rendered in a work-
charged establishment from the computation of qualifying service,
then merely defining the bounds of beneficiary class so as to exclude
the same service does not necessarily remove that vice. The State
must demonstrate why the altered classification is constitutionally
sustainable and how the new statutory basis answers the reason for
which the earlier exclusion was found impermissible.
53. The employees contend that it does neither. According to them, the
2021 enactment and the later 2025 enactment simply resurrect,
through statutory language, the exclusion which Prem Singh (supra)
had judicially disapproved. The impleaded petitioners reinforce this
contention by drawing attention to the State's own historical practice
of progressively absorbing work-charged employees into the regular
establishment, preserving seniority from initial appointment and
framing successive measures for regularisation.
54. The defect was not simply that the State had failed to grant pension
to a particular group of employees; rather the defect rudimentarily lay
in the exclusion of service rendered in a work-charged establishment
from qualifying service, despite the character and subsequent
treatment of that service, and the consequences of exclusion under
37

the pension scheme. This Court, therefore, read down Rule 3(8) of the
1961 Rules. The legislative response was necessitated to sustain the
exclusion with retrospective effect, by curing the underlying legal and
constitutional defect. The Validation Act, 2021 did not do so. For ease
of understanding, the validating provisions of the said Act are
reproduced hereunder:
2. Notwithstanding anything contained in any rule, regulation of
Government order for the purposes of entitlement of pension to an
officer, "Qualifying Service" means the services rendered by an officer
appointed on a temporary or permanent post in accordance with the
provisions of the service rules prescribed by the Government for the
post.
3. Notwithstanding any Judgement, decree or order of any Court,
anything done or purporting to have been done and any action taken
or purporting to have been taken under or in relation to sub-rule (8)
of rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 before
the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to be and always to
have been done or taken under the provisions of this Act and to be
and always to have been valid as if the provisions of this Act were in
force at all material times with effect from April 1, 1961.
(emphasis ours)

55. The Validation Act, 2025 does not do so either. It instead reiterates the
exclusion by redefining the class of persons entitled to pension and
then declares that past denials of pension to those falling de hors the
definition shall be deemed valid. The sequence is striking. Clause 4 of
the 2025 Validating Ordinance reads as under:
4. Notwithstanding any judgement, decree or order of any Court,
Tribunal or Authority, all actions taken, things done or Government
orders issued or purporting to have been taken, done or issued, by
which pension has been denied to any persons or class of persons
who are not substantive appointees and who are or have been
subscribers to any Contributory Provident Fund or the Employees’
Provident Fund, shall be deemed to be and always to have been
validly taken, done or issued under the provisions of this Ordinance
and to be and always to have been valid as if the provisions of this
38

Ordinance were in force at all material times with effect from April 1,
1961.
(emphasis ours)
56. Repealing the 2025 Ordinance, the Validation Act, 2025 came to be
passed; and the germane provisions thereof read thus:
3. Notwithstanding anything contained in any rules, regulations or
Government orders, no person who,—
(a) is not a substantive appointee in any department or in any
organization under any department of the Government; and
(b) is or has been a subscriber to any Contributory Provident
Fund or the Employees’ Provident Fund;
shall be entitled to pension under any rules, regulations or
Government orders relating to the grant of pension.
4. Notwithstanding any judgement, decree or order of any Court,
Tribunal or Authority, all actions taken, things done or Government
orders issued or purporting to have been taken, done or issued, by
which pension has been denied to any persons or class of persons
who are not substantive appointees and who are or have been
subscribers to any Contributory Provident Fund or the Employees’
Provident Fund, shall be deemed to be and always to have been
validly taken, done or issued under the provisions of this Act and to
be and always to have been valid as if the provisions of this Act were
in force at all material times with effect from April 1, 1961.
(emphasis ours)
57. The foregoing discussion, taken as a whole, points to this conclusion:
the vice identified in Prem Singh (supra) lay not in the nomenclature
employed in the Pension Rules, but in the exclusion, for pensionary
purposes, of service actually rendered by the employees in the work-
charged establishment antecedent to their induction in the regular
establishment. That legal standpoint could legitimately have been
altered by a valid enactment, which removed the basis of the Court’s
conclusion. But Section 3 substitutes the expression “substantive
appointee” as a new criterion for pensionary entitlement, thereby
39

reproducing the same exclusion, although in a new statutory dress,
which Prem Singh (supra) had earlier found impermissible.
58. What is the test for determining the legality / validity of a validating
enactment? The test of a validating enactment is more peculiar vis-à-
vis the test of an ordinary legislation. The former has to be gauged
alongside the defect which was identified in the earlier judgment, in
addition to its general adherence to the provisions of the Constitution,
whereas the latter is not exposed to the rigour of an additional test of
“removal of defect” in the rung of scrutiny. The test for the validating
legislations impugned before us, therefore, is not whether it has
supplied a new verbal formula for an old exclusion; but whether it has
removed the infirmity which rendered the exclusion constitutionally
unsustainable. Tested on that touchstone, the legislative response
before us does seem to fall short of the threshold.
59. In Prem Singh (supra), the Court did not stop with merely identifying
the deficiency in the plain language of Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules; it
went on to examine the substance and consequence of excluding work-
charged service from the computation of qualifying service for
pension; and rendered the exclusion incapable of being sustained in
the form in which it operated. The Validation Act, 2021 does not
countervail that objection. What it rather does is to recast qualifying
service by reference to appointment against a temporary or permanent
post in accordance with the stipulated service rules, but does not
eschew the exclusion, which was interdicted earlier, thereby
40

constituting the core of the controversy emanating herein. The
subsequent Validation Act, 2025 does not carry the argument any
further. Usage of the expression “substantive appointee” may be
novel; but the consequence sought to be achieved is not. The earlier
attempt was: the employee’s service was excluded by reference to the
nature of the establishment in which it was rendered, and now to be
excluded by referring to the nature of the appointment per se. The
same exclusion was perpetuated in the present format; a change in
the description of the excluded class is not, without more, a
constitutional justification to sustain the exclusion. The legislature has
not demonstrated as to why service actually rendered, accepted by
and ultimately followed by regularisation, should be denied recognition
by a rule carved out with retrospective effect, for the purposes of
pension alone. The post-judgmental legislative attempt has marched
forward on the premise that the exclusion must stand and declare that
the past denials, if any whatsoever, founded upon it to have been valid
all along. This, in effect, reverses the constitutional inquiry: it
presupposes the validity of law, which the law was required to
establish. Prithvi Cotton Mills (supra), forming the locus classicus in
the canvas of our extant inquiry, permits the legislature to remove the
foundation of a judgment – provided the defect is removed; and
instead of the same, the judgment cannot be legislatively deprived of
its effects.
41

60. Section 4 further entrenches the exclusionary approach. It does not
merely give prospective operation to the newly prescribed rule; it
retrospectively declares that the past denial of pension to persons
falling outside the new definition “shall be deemed to be and always to
have been valid”, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of a
court. The legislation, thus, does not remove the legal defect which
engendered the judgment; it validates the very consequence which the
judgment had interdicted. At the cost of repetition, both in Prithvi
Cotton Mills (supra) and Indian Aluminium (supra), the legislature
altered the law so as not to be bound by the factors, which played out
during judicial determination, thereby ensuring tabula rasa. However
here, the foundation is left substantially undisturbed, and the
consequence is attempted to be rescued through a deeming fiction,
i.e., pensionary entitlement contingent upon the introduction of the
words “substantive appointee”. Section 4 read with Section 3, changes
the statutory label, but not the identified legal vice. On the whole, the
learned Attorney’s submission that the newly enacted 2021 and 2025
Validating Acts effectively cured the defect identified in Prem Singh
(supra) is untenable, and the conditions for the validity of validating
enactments are not fully complied with.
61. We find it apposite to punctuate the foregoing analysis with what Dr.
B.R. Ambedkar presciently echoed in the Constituent Assembly as:
“… The forms of the administration must be appropriate to and in the
same sense as the form of the Constitution. The other is that it is
perfectly possible to pervert the Constitution, without changing its
42

form by merely changing the form of the administration and to make
33
it inconsistent and opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.”
(emphasis ours)

62. The aforesaid foresight of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar is strikingly conspicuous
in the present series of litigation. The repeated re-enactment of the
same provisions, which have been struck down by the judiciary,
evinces that the “form of the administration” is being calibrated in a
manner “inconsistent” with the spirit of the Constitution, as highlighted
by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.

B. The Mandamus that has attained Finality Inter Partes

63. The significance of the foregoing conclusion is not limited to the validity
of the legislations in the abstract. The State, through these not-so-
piecemeal legislative steps, does not merely seek to stipulate a
different regime for the pensionary entitlement by infusing the
enactments with retrospective operation and expressly validating the
past denials “notwithstanding” judgments of this Court inter alia , it
seeks to annul the legal consequences of a judgment which attained
finality and had entailed positive directions calling for its
implementation. Hence, it would be a miscarriage of justice to end the
enquiry at whether the legislature was competent to alter the
governing law. The enquiry must go further: whether without
disturbing the foundation of the judgment, can such legislation
dislodge a judicial imprimatur that has already crystallised into an

33 th
Constituent Assembly Debates Vol. VII, dated November 4 , 1948
43

enforceable obligation between the parties? It is at this juncture that
the principle governing the fate of a final mandamus against the
backdrop of an altered legislation, assumes relevance and significance.
64. The question acquires a sharper edge when tested against the
operative directions issued in Prem Singh (supra), and the principle
elucidated in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra). Learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that Prem Singh (supra) did not merely declare
the law; it also culminated in a positive obligation to be performed by
the State. The State, on the other hand, contended that no judgment
can preclude the legislature from subsequently altering the law, and
that the Validation Act, 2021 and the Validation Act, 2025 supplied a
new statutory canvas to look into. Again, we may fall back on the
decisive question, as answered for different purposes, in the earlier
section, which is: has the law been changed so as to remove the
foundation of the mandamus, or has the mandamus been legislatively
declared ineffective?
65. Apropos the discussion, the decision of this Court in Madan Mohan
Pathak (supra) again comes to the fore. There, too, the legislature
exercised the power to alter the general law governing the entitlement
in question, but the subsequent enactment could not, without more,
efface a mandamus which had attained finality. The significance of the
mandamus lay not merely in the proposition of law which it embodied,
but in the judicial obligation which had thereby crystallised between
the parties. Once the judgment had become final, the State was no
44

longer confronted only with an abstract question of what the general
law permitted; it was confronted with a subsisting judicial command
governing its conduct towards the successful litigants.
66. The rationale is not difficult to appreciate. A mandamus is not merely
a declaratory pronouncement of general law capable of being altered
like any other statute upon which it rests; it is a specific, enforceable
command addressed to a named party enjoining it to do a particular
thing for the benefit of a specific set of persons, thereby operating in
personam . Once it has attained finality, the relationship between those
parties, qua that obligation, ceases to be governed by the general law
alone; it partakes the character of a judicially crystallised right. A
validating law operates in rem , upon the general edifice of law; it is
analytically unsuited to reopen what a court has settled inter partes
through the exercise of its judicial power, unless the constitutional
amendment route, or removal of the very basis of the judgment, is
resorted to.
67. As a corollary, we are invited to address the submission advanced by
the learned Attorney that the impugned enactments stand on a
different constitutional footing merely because they are targeted at a
class of employees larger than the parties before this Court in Prem
Singh (supra), projecting the in rem nature of the enactments; and
the alleged in personam reliefs in the judgment. The said submission,
though artfully crafted, mistakes the reach of the relief for the reach
of the constitutional vice. The mere fact that Prem Singh (supra) had
45

granted relief to some employees before the Court therein does not
truncate the said decision to a private dispensation, nor does it
parochialize the constitutional principle therein to the four corners of
the cause title of that decision. The relief granted therein had stemmed
from the principle enunciated; and the former cannot be divorced from
the latter. The lis may have been inter partes ; but the vice discerned
in the governing norm was not thereby rendered so. The legal edifice
of exclusion of the work-charged employees for the purposes of
pensionary benefits was examined in extenso ; the consequence
thereto was reading down Rule 3(8) of the 1961 Rules; striking down
Regulation 370 and paragraph 669 of the Financial Handbook. The
State’s answer to the infirmity flagged therein cannot be the
satisfaction of the obligation engendered by the judgment only qua the
parties therein; while changing its form but preserving the substance
of exclusion intact. Fidelity to the judicial command does not
countervail the constitutional infirmity.
68. That, indeed, is the difficulty confronting the State in the present case.
The argument grounded upon retrospectivity proffers no answer to it.
Retrospectivity is a characteristic of a legislation; and not a cure for
the constitutional vice of legislative annulment of a judicially-
crystallised right. The enquiry still hinges upon whether the legal basis
upon which Prem Singh (supra) had proceeded is taken away. As we
have held above, Sections 3 and 4 of the Validation Act, 2025 do not
do so.
46

69. The intervening contempt proceedings reinforce, rather than water
down, this conclusion. The proceedings go on to show that Prem
Singh (supra) continued to operate as a subsisting judicial covenant
while the legislative measures went on back and forth – enacted and
challenged in the course. The subsequent legislation cannot undo the
consequences of earlier non-compliance with the subsisting judicial
command by declaring the underlying denial valid simpliciter. The fate
of the contempt petitions must, therefore, be taken to their logical
conclusions and, thus, dependent on the precise obligations alleged to
have been disobeyed and the legal effect of the conclusions arrived at
in the present judgment, which we propose to analyse at the end. The
mere existence of the intervening contempt proceedings prima facie
takes the controversy beyond the pale of pension law, and it ventures
into the extent to which a final judicial command, once issued, may be
transplanted by a legislation.
70. We, therefore, find ourselves in agreement with the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioners in this narrow compass: Madan
Mohan Pathak (supra) does not place a final judgment beyond
legislative reach as such; in fact, it places the judicial determination
embodied therein beyond legislative interference, unless the law is
validly altered so as to remove the legal foundation upon which that
determination rests. The Constitution permits the legislature to change
the law; however, the Constitution does not permit the legislature,
under the garb of changing the law, to command that a final judicial
47

determination shall be construed as though it had never been made in
the first place. Here, the former has not occurred; it is the latter which
the impugned validating provision attempts to achieve.
71. Pertinently, adjudication in Prem Singh (supra) did not merely offer
an advisory interpretation of an abstract provision and left the parties
simply where they stood; rather this Court allowed the employees’
appeals, dismissed the appeals preferred by the State; and held that
the relevant service was to be treated as qualifying service for pension,
and issued operative directions concerning payment of admissible
benefits. The judgment was confirmed in review and the curative
proceedings were withdrawn by the State. Thus, the adjudication had
traversed the full distance from contest to finality. The distinction
between a declaration and a mandamus is of constitutional
significance, wherein the former says what the law is and the latter
commands the party before the Court to do what the law requires.
Where the mandamus has been issued and the litigation has attained
finality, the right of the successful litigant cannot be reduced merely to
a hope resting upon an uncertain interpretation of law; rather the same
has crystallised through adjudication. This was the gravamen in
Madan Mohan Pathak (supra), wherein the question was answered
not merely by saying that Parliament possessed legislative competence
over the subject of bonus: that proposition was too broad to meet the
constitutional difficulty; and hence, this Court distinguished a situation
48

in which the legislation seeks to extinguish the consequence of a final
judicial imprimatur sans touching the foundation of that command.
72. In our considered opinion, insofar as the impugned validating
enactments purport to extinguish the operative effect of the final
adjudication in Prem Singh (supra) without removing the legal defect
upon which the adjudication premised, they are constitutionally infirm.

C. The Independent Test for Challenge under Articles 14 and 21


73. Apart from the foregoing, there is a further and independent
constitutional difficulty for the State to contend with. Even if the
impugned enactments were to satisfy the requirements of legislative
competence and retrospective validation, that would not put a quietus
to the inquiry. A validating enactment is not positioned beyond the
discipline ingrained in Part III merely because it is enacted to alter the
legal consequences of an earlier judgment. Its provisions must
themselves withstand constitutional scrutiny on a standalone basis.
The question is not simply whether the legislature possessed the power
to enact the law, but whether that power has been exercised in a
manner consistent with the guarantees of equality and dignity. The
yardsticks upon which the validating enactments have to be tested
were succinctly encapsulated in the following passage in Indian
Aluminium Co. Ltd (supra) as follows:
36. The validity of the Validating Act is to be judged by the following
tests: ( i ) whether the legislature enacting the Validating Act has
competence over the subject-matter; ( ii ) whether by validation, the
49

legislature has removed the defect which the court had found in the
previous law; ( iii ) whether the validating law is inconsistent ( sic
consistent) with the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution. If
these tests are satisfied, the Act can confer jurisdiction upon the
court with retrospective effect and validate the past transactions
which were declared to be unconstitutional. The legislature cannot
assume power of adjudicating a case by virtue of its enactment of
the law without leaving it to the judiciary to decide it with reference
to the law in force. The legislature also is incompetent to overrule
the decision of a court without properly removing the base on which
the judgment is founded .
(emphasis ours)
74. Flowing from the above, the third requirement, i.e., consistency with
the provisions of Part-III of the Constitution, now falls for our
consideration. Even if a validating enactment satisfies legislative
competence and cures the basis of the earlier judicial decision,
compliance with Part III of the Constitution remains indispensable. The
further question, therefore, is whether the distinction drawn by the
legislature and the retrospective consequences attached to that
distinction, are themselves constitutionally sustainable.
75. A perusal of the provisions of the impugned enactments could shed
light in this regard. The following table provides the necessary context
to commence with.

P REM S INGH J UDGMENT
(2019)
V ALIDATION A CT , 2021 V ALIDATION A CT , 2025
Rule 3(8), U.P.
Retirement Benefits
Rules, 1961: read down;
relevant service rendered
in a work-charged
establishment held
countable as qualifying
service for pension.
Section 2: redefines
“qualifying service” by
reference to service on a
temporary or permanent
post in accordance with
applicable service rules.
Contention: whether
this removes the defect
identified in Prem Singh
Section 2(d): introduces
“substantive appointee”,
tied to appointment to a
temporary or permanent
post in a permanent
establishment.
Contention: whether the
new classification
supplies a constitutionally
50

(supra) or reproduces the
exclusion through a
revised definition?
adequate basis for
excluding prior work-
charged service?
Court rejected the
exclusion in the
circumstances before it.
Retrospective effect:
deemed operative from 1
April 1961.
Contention: whether the
revised criterion can
constitutionally govern
service already rendered
and past pension claims?
Section 3: denies
pension to the specified
class of non-substantive
appointees who are or
have been subscribers to
the specified provident
funds.
Contention:
whether this cumulative
classification passes
muster under Article 14?
Section 4:
retrospectively validates
past actions and denials
notwithstanding judicial
orders, with effect from 1
April 1961.
Contention: whether it
rectifies the defect or
merely neutralises Prem
Singh (supra) without
removing the underlying
constitutional infirmity?


76. Reiterating what has already been incorporated in the table
hereinabove, the Validation Act, 2021 defines “qualifying service” by
referring to service rendered by an officer appointed to a temporary or
permanent post in accordance with the applicable service rules. The
Validation Act, 2025, in turn, introduces a new term “substantive
appointee” and defines the same as under Section 2(d) by reference
not merely to appointment in accordance with the prescribed
procedure, but also to appointment to a post in a “permanent
establishment of the Government”. Section 3 further denies pension to
a person who is not a substantive appointee or who is or has been a
51

subscriber to a Contributory Provident Fund or the Employees’
Provident Fund. Section 4 retrospectively validates the past denials of
pension to that class, notwithstanding judgments, decrees or orders of
courts, tribunals or authorities by deeming the impugned actions valid
st
from the stipulated cut-off date, i.e., 1 April, 1961. Thus, the
constitutional vice must be examined through the three-fold lens of
these provisions in tandem: the definition carving out the class; the
entitlement provision attaching disqualification; and the validating
provision so as to validate the past denials as well.
77. The State is well-entitled to distinguish between different modes of
appointment and different kinds of establishments. Article 14 does not
enjoin upon the State to afford equal treatment to every temporary,
work-charged and regular appointment for all purposes of service law.
But that proposition is of little help to answer the question before us.
The classification impugned before us is not simpliciter a distinction
between modes of entry into public employment. It is rather the
provision, pressing this distinction into service, to deny pensionary
entitlement to those services of whom have been regularised
subsequently by the State.
78. Does the distinction between service rendered in a permanent
establishment and service rendered in a work-charged establishment
have any rational nexus to the object of determining pension
entitlement, where the employee’s prior service was real, continuous
and accepted by the State, and ensued in regularisation? The statutory
52

description of the establishment may be relevant to that inquiry; it
cannot, without more, conclude it. The status of the appointment and
the fact and duration of the service are distinct matters. To treat the
former as necessarily dispositive of the latter is to assume the very

proposition that requires constitutional justification. The State’s
reliance on the administrative and fiscal distinction between the
regular establishments and the work-charged establishments, as
contended by the learned Attorney, must be considered, but the same
cannot be taken as self-justifying. The existence of different
establishments may, at best, justify the different appointment systems
existing for different categories. However, sans a rational connection,
it does not explain why the entire period of service should be discarded
for pension after the employees have subsequently entered the regular
establishment.
79. Section 3 of the Validation Act, 2025 warrants a further and distinct
examination. Its plain statutory text strings two conditions together:
the person must not be a substantive appointee, and the person must
be or have been a subscriber to a Contributory Provident Fund or the
Employees’ Provident Fund. The constitutional objection is not that
provident-fund membership can never be factored in to determine
eligibility for pension. It is that the legislature must explain why the
combination of non-substantive appointment and past or present fund
membership justifies the denial of pension under the statutory
scheme, including where the employee’s service was subsequently
53

regularised. Unless that combination is demonstrated to have a
rational relation to the pensionary consequence imposed, the
conjunction of the two conditions does not serve as a panacea for the
arbitrariness in the result. A classification cannot be rendered
constitutional merely because it is framed through more than one
condition.
80. The relevant comparison, therefore, is not between every work-
charged employee and regular employee, regardless of the governing
service rules or the facts of the particular case. The distinction is
between employees whose prior service is excluded solely by reason
of statutory classification and those employees whose service is
counted for pension. Such distinction bears no rational nexus to the
object of the pension scheme.
81. Section 4 of the Validation Act, 2025 surmounts a greater difficulty. It
declares that past actions, things done and Government orders
denying pension to the specified class shall be deemed valid as though
st
the Act had been in force at all material times from 1 April, 1961. The
words “notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order” make the
intended reach of the provision lucid; however, they do not establish
its constitutional validity. When the substantive classification which
engenders the denial itself is incongruous with Article 14, Section 4
cannot render such denials automatically valid by creating a deeming
fiction to render it valid all along. A validating provision cannot be
permitted to direct indirectly what the Constitution forbids directly. In
54

the totality of the scheme, the impugned legislations fall afoul of Article
14 of the Constitution.
82. We are unable to be persuaded by the submission of the learned
Attorney that the defect identified by this Court in Prem Singh (supra)
stood definitionally or interpretationally cured by the introduction of
the expressions “qualifying service” and “substantive appointee”
through the Validation Act, 2021 and the Validation Act, 2025,
respectively. The contention advanced was that Prem Singh (supra)
had, under the guise of interpretation, engendered judicial legislation;
that the enactment of both Validation Acts was necessitated to remedy
the perceived anomaly and alleviate the financial burden upon the
State; and that the definitions so introduced continued to remain open
to interpretation. The submission, however, begets the more
fundamental question: who, indeed, is to interpret these definitions,
and within what permissible limits? What cannot be lost sight of is that
the Validation Acts were brought into force in the face of interpretation
authoritatively rendered by this Court in Prem Singh (supra). The
question, therefore, is not merely whether the legislature has
introduced new definitions, but whether, by doing so, it has truly
removed the very basis of the defect identified by this Court. At this
juncture, we deem it equally apposite to note that the basis on which
a classification can be mounted across categories is not the province
of the judiciary to venture into. We are conscious of the incisive
55

observations in the opinion of Hon’ble Vivian Bose, J. (as His Lordship
34
then was) in State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar , as follows:
46. What, after all, is classification? It is merely a systematic
arrangement of things into groups or classes, usually in accordance
with some definite scheme. But the scheme can be anything and the
laws which are laid down to govern the grouping must necessarily be
arbitrarily selected; also granted the right to select, the classification
can be as broad based as one pleases, or it can be broken down and
down until finally just one solitary unit is divided off from the rest.
Even those who propound this theory are driven to making
qualifications. Thus, it is not enough merely to classify but the
classification must not be “discriminatory”, it must not amount to
“hostile action”, there must be “reasonable grounds for distinction”,
it must be “rational” and there must be no “substantial
discrimination”. But what then becomes of the classification? and who
are to be the judges of the reasonableness and the substantiality or
otherwise of the discrimination? And, much more important, whose
standards of reasonableness are to be applied?—the Judges'?—the
Government's?—or that of the mythical ordinary reasonable man of
law which is no single man but a composite of many men whose
reasonableness can be measured and gauged even though he can
neither be seen nor heard nor felt? With the utmost respect I cannot
see how these vague generalisations serve to clarify the position. To
my mind they do not carry us one whit beyond the original words and
are no more satisfactory than saying that all men are equal before
the law and that all shall be equally treated and be given equal
protection. The problem is not solved by substituting one
generalisation for another.

(emphasis ours)

83. In a similar vein, the classic exposition of Hon’ble S.R. Das, J. (as the
Chief Justice then was) in the same decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar
(supra) on the classification test as a guide for the present inquiry
attracts attention. The instructive passage reads thus:
85. It is now well established that while Article 14 is designed to
prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out from
others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected
to discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an

34
(1952) 1 SCC 1
56

“abstract symmetry” in the sense that every piece of legislation must
have universal application. All persons are not, by nature, attainment
or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of
persons often require separate treatment and, therefore, the
protecting clause has been construed as a guarantee against
discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the
State the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. This
classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or
according to objects or occupations or the like. Mere classification,
however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the article. The
classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to
say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics
which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in
others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must
have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order
to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, ( 1 ) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes those that are grouped together from others, and ( 2 )
that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought
to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the
classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is
necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short,
while the article forbids class legislation in the sense of making
improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities
upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other
persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be
conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid
classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such
classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just explained. The
doctrine, as expounded by this Court in the two cases I have
mentioned, leaves a considerable latitude to the Court in the matter
of the application of Article 14 and consequently has the merit of
flexibility.
(emphasis ours)

84. Accordingly, apropos the third limb of consideration in Indian
Aluminium Co. Ltd. (supra), the impugned legislations falter not only
in removing the defect earlier identified in Prem Singh (supra), but
also falls afoul of its standalone conformity with Article 14 of the
Constitution.
57

D. The Substantive Question – Obliteration of Birthmark upon
Regularisation?

85. Although placed last in the order of issues but far from the least, we
find ourselves confronting a foundational question, distinct from the
challenge grounded on Article 14: whether an employee, once
regularised in public service pursuant to a duly formulated scheme,
continues to bear the birthmark of his initial appointment for the
purpose of determining his retiral entitlements.
86. This question is not res integra . The principle finds lucid expression in
two decisions of this Court, which merit notice.
87. First, we may profitably refer to the 3-Judge Bench decision in
35
Shailendra Singh v. Union of India in this regard. The controversy
arising therein, pertained to the antecedent character of service vis-à-
vis retiral benefits of Judges appointed to the high courts from two
distinct sources, namely, the district judiciary and the Bar. Petitioners
therein, who had initially served in the district judiciary and were
subsequently elevated to the high court, contended that upon such
appointment, they became part of the same constitutional institution
as Judges drawn from the Bar and could not, therefore, be subjected
to a differential treatment in the matter of their service conditions and
retiral benefits on the basis of their source of recruitment. The issue
arose, inter alia , in the context of their entitlement to subscribe to the

35
(2024) 16 SCC 517
58

General Provident Fund under Section 20 of the High Court Judges
36
(Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 , notwithstanding their
prior service in the district judiciary and the pension scheme applicable
thereto. Hon’ble D.Y. Chandrachud, CJI (as His Lordship then was)
speaking for the Bench concluded:
34.1. The High Courts are constitutional institutions and upon appointment
as Judges of the High Court, all Judges, irrespective of the source from
which they are drawn, partake the character of holders of constitutional
offices in equal measure;
34.2. Neither Article 221(1) of the Constitution which empowers Parliament
to determine the salaries of the Judges of the High Court nor Article 221(2)
which empowers Parliament to determine the allowances and rights in
respect of the leave of absence and pension permits discrimination between
Judges of the High Court based on the source from which they are drawn;
34.3. Article 217 of the Constitution specifies distinct sources of
recruitment for Judges of the High Court from the district judiciary or, as
the case may be, the Bar. But once appointed to the High Court, all Judges
form one homogeneous class of constitutional office holders;
34.4. Judicial independence is a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution and there is an intrinsic relationship between financial
independence of Judges and judicial independence;
34.5. The significance of provisions pertaining to the guarantee of service
conditions, while in service and post retiral benefits for Judges is evidenced
by the fact that the salaries and allowances of sitting Judges and the
pensions of retired Judges are in the nature of a charge on the Consolidated
Fund of the State and the Consolidated Fund of India, respectively;
34.6. Any determination of the service benefits of sitting Judges of the High
Court and the retiral benefits which are payable to them including pension,
must take place on the basis of the fundamental principle of non-
discrimination between Judges of the High Court who constitute one
homogeneous group; and
34.7. All Judges of the High Court, irrespective of the source from which
they are drawn, are entrusted with the same constitutional function of
discharging duties of adjudication under the law. Once appointed as Judges
of the High Court, their birthmarks stand obliterated and any attempt to
make a distinction between Judges, either for the purpose of determining
their conditions of service while in service or any form of retiral dues would
be unconstitutional.
(emphasis ours)

36
1954 Act
59

88. Close on the heels of the said decision, this Court treaded upon a
similar line of reasoning in High Court Judges Pension Refixation
Considering Service Period in District Judiciary & High Court,
37
In re . In the factual panorama, unfolding therein, this Court was
seized with a batch of matters raising diverse, though interconnected,
issues concerning the pensionary and other retiral entitlements of
Judges who had served in the district judiciary before their elevation
to the high courts. The issues, inter alia , concerned the computation
of pension by taking into account the service rendered as District
Judges; the denial of full pension on account of an alleged break in
service between retirement from the district judiciary and assumption
of charge as a high court Judge; the pensionary entitlement of Judges
who had entered the stream of State judiciary after the introduction of
the New Pension Scheme; and the entitlement of Additional Judges, as
well as their surviving spouses, to pension, gratuity and family
pension. The said batch also raised the question whether Judges
appointed to the high courts after the introduction of the New Pension
Scheme could be denied the benefit of provident fund under Section
20 of the 1954 Act, on that account. Thus, at the heart of the
controversy was the question whether, after appointment as a Judge
of a high court, the source and antecedent character of a Judge’s
service could continue to operate as a basis for differential treatment

37
(2025) 7 SCC 674
60

in the matter of service and retiral benefits. Hon’ble B.R. Gavai, CJI
(as His Lordship then was), speaking for the Bench, opined as follows:
58. A perusal of all the aforementioned judgments would reveal that a
common thread running in all the judgments is that there cannot be any
discrimination in the matter of payment of pension to the retired Judges on
any basis. This Court emphasised on the principle of one rank one pension
for a constitutional class i.e. the office of High Court Judge. This Court found
that, for ensuring independence of judiciary, it is necessary that like the
salary to which a Judge is entitled to as a serving Judge, even after
retirement he should get the same terminal benefits as that of a High Court
Judge. Any discrimination on the ground of source of entry as a High Court
Judge has been frowned upon. It has been emphasised that once a Judge
enters into a constitutional office of the High Court Judge, then the dignity
of the constitutional office demands that all Judges be paid the same
pension. In this respect, it will be relevant to note that the ceiling of Rs
15,00,000 p.a. in the case of a Chief Justice and Rs 13,50,000 in the case
of any other Judge as provided in Para 2 of Part I as well as Part III of the
First Schedule to the HCJ Act is identical. It is thus clear that even such of
the Judges who enter as High Court Judge from the District Judiciary shall
be entitled to the maximum pension of Rs 13,50,000 p.a. irrespective of
whether they opt for Part I of the First Schedule to the HCJ Act or not. As
held by this Court in M.L. Jain (2) [ M.L. Jain v. Union of India , (1991) 1 SCC
644 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 694], any restriction imposed in any of the clauses
of Para 2 of Part III of the First Schedule to the HCJ Act which would result
in reducing the pension than the one provided in Para 2 of both Part I and
Part III of the First Schedule to the HCJ Act, would be patently
discriminatory and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.
*
65. In this respect, it is to be noted that, when a Judge of the High Court
is in office irrespective of his/her source of entry, he/she is entitled to the
same salary and the same perquisites. When all the Judges of the High
Courts, when in office, are entitled to the same salary, perks and benefits,
any discrimination amongst them on the ground of their source of entry, in
our view, would be patently discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. When an equal treatment is given to all the Judges of
the High Courts when they are in service and forming a class of Judges of
the High Court, discrimination amongst them on any ground after their
retirement for terminal benefits, in our considered view, would be violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(emphasis ours)
61

89. The relevant consequence attached to regularisation, as can be
distilled from the aforementioned decisions is this: the character of
service rendered antecedent to regularisation cannot be taken as a
determinant to decide upon the entitlement of service and retiral
benefits of the employees, since the act of regularisation obliterates
the source or birthmark of the appointment simpliciter.
90. Conscious as we are that the aforesaid decisions were rendered in a
distinct constitutional setting, dealing with Judges of the High Courts,
and that the status and conditions of service of such constitutional
functionaries can never be equated with those of the employees we
are concerned with, we cannot, for that reason alone, brush aside the
principle of wider import, underlying those decisions. Its application in
the present context would, of course, be subject to the terms and
conditions of the scheme governing regularisation. The determinative
question, therefore, is whether, upon regularisation in public service
under a duly formulated scheme, the antecedent character of an
employee's appointment can nonetheless be invoked to curtail or deny
the service and retiral benefits otherwise available to employees
forming part of the regular establishment?
91. Transposing the afore-canvassed principle herein, having regard to the
subject matter of challenge in Prem Singh (supra) and the ultimate
adjudication as well as the legislative history that ensued, which is the
non-consideration of the services put in by the work-charged
employees for the purposes of regularisation, let us now articulate our
62

views premised on the settled law on obliteration of birthmark upon
regularisation. The proposition has three limbs:
92. First , regularisation confers a substantive status; once regularised
under a scheme, the employees are no longer ad hoc . They enter the
regular stream. Secondly , regularisation erases the birthmark and the
appointment becomes regular. Thirdly , denial of retiral benefits by
resurrecting the birthmark by a retrospectively applicable law is
impermissible.
93. Ad hoc / casual / daily-rated employees, once regularised in public
service pursuant to a duly formulated scheme, acquire the status of
substantively appointed public servants and become entitled to all
benefits flowing from such regularisation. The birthmark of being ad
hoc / casual / daily-rated employees stands obliterated and they are
integrated into the regular stream of service, with all consequential
benefits.
94. After such status is acquired, the employer cannot thereafter seek to
deny retiral benefits by resurrecting the obliterated birthmark, even by
resorting to legislation with retrospective effect. Such an attempt
would be vitiated as being opposed to Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the
Constitution, as it seeks to create a class within a class and to deprive
a regular employee of a vested right.
95. Also, pension not being a bounty, such deprivation of a vested right to
pension, which is a facet of Article 21, and classification based on a
vanished birth-mark would be arbitrary and discriminatory.
63

96. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position that emerges is that
regularisation, once effected pursuant to a duly formulated scheme,
marks the transition of an employee into the regular establishment and
his integration in service while obliterating the birthmark of the initial
appointment. The antecedent nature of such appointment, having
ceased to bear legal relevance upon regularisation, cannot thereafter
be resurrected as a ground to disentitle or curtail the service and retiral
benefits stemming from the employee's status as a member of the
regular establishment. Consequently, the initial source or character of
appointment of the employees concerned cannot be pressed into
service to deny them the service and retiral benefits otherwise
admissible to them as regular employees.
E. The Onerous Burden?

97. Having addressed the questions formulated, we now turn to a point
mentioned in the passing by the learned Attorney. In course of hearing,
we heard him express an apprehension that should this Court rule in
favour of the employees, settlement of the claims for pension would
impose an onerous financial burden upon the State running into
thousands of crores of rupees.
98. The submission is entirely unpersuasive. Judicial notice is taken that
not too long back, the State had itself committed substantial public
funds, worth thousands of crores, towards the construction and
beautification of parks and public spaces. Not for a moment do we
suggest that expenditure on public infrastructure, development or
64

beautification is, by itself, unjustified. However, the contrast assumes
pronounced significance when the State seeks to invoke financial
constraints to resist or defer the discharge of obligations lawfully owed
to individuals, who are its subjects, as in the present case. Expenditure
undertaken at the State's discretion for aesthetic enhancement and
public embellishment cannot be positioned on a higher pedestal than
the obligation to honour legal entitlements, such as those flowing from
Prem Singh (supra). The public exchequer exists not merely to
finance projects reflecting the priorities of a particular dispensation,
but also to fulfil the State's obligations under law. Fiscal considerations
may inform the manner and mechanism of compliance; they cannot
become a ground for indefinitely proroguing the same. Our endeavour
is not to question the State’s spending choices, rather this is a question
of priorities in the public expenditure by the State. In our considered
opinion, the bogey of financial constraints of the State should never be
raised, even in the passing, to defeat a legal obligation.
F. Proceedings at the instance of Associations – A Necessitated
Detour

99. One more important aspect, umbilical to the controversy at hand,
warrants consideration to provide necessary guidelines for abidance in
future. Evidently, the writ petition which is first in the series and was
treated as the lead matter in this cluster of proceedings has been
presented by an Association. An Association must first build consensus
amongst its members, secure authority to litigate on their behalf, and
65

then pursue a collective claim where the interest of no single member,
generally, can be isolated or settled separately. Once authorised in
terms of its memorandum/bye-laws, the Association espouses the
cause of its members and seeks relief on their behalf. Such
proceedings, by their very nature, traverse a long and protracted
course often spanning years across multiple fora before culminating in
a final determination. In the interregnum, however, the composition of
the Association may undergo a change. Many a time, whether the
individuals who constituted its membership at the time of institution
of the writ petition continue to remain its members as on the date of
the final decision is not readily discernible from the material placed on
record. The difficulty, as in the present case, is compounded by the
fact that the names of all the members of the Association are not even
disclosed in the writ petition.
100. A brief digression seems apposite to clarify the legal position
governing the institution of writ petitions at the instance of
Associations.
101. An Association may invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court where its
own legal rights or interests are affected. It may also, in an appropriate
case, espouse the cause of its members in a representative capacity,
provided that it is duly authorised under its memorandum or bye-laws
to do so and the proceedings are instituted through persons competent
to represent it. The mere fact of registration or existence of an
66

Association however does not, by itself, confer an unrestricted or
independent right to invoke writ jurisdiction.
102. The maintainability of a writ petition at the instance of an Association
would, therefore, depend upon the nature of the grievance projected,
the rights sought to be vindicated and the capacity in which the
Association approaches the Court. Where the grievance concerns a
common cause affecting its members, and the Association is duly
authorised to represent them, the proceedings may be maintained in
a representative capacity, subject to the requirements of law. This is
distinct from a case where the Association seeks to assert an
independent legal right despite neither its own rights nor interests
having been affected.
103. The governing principle, therefore, is that the writ jurisdiction is not
foreclosed merely because the proceedings are instituted through an
Association; equally, the Association's registration or representative
character cannot, on its own, dispense with the requirement of
establishing its competence to maintain the proceedings. The question
must be examined in the context of the nature of the relief sought and
the capacity in which the Association has approached the Court.
104. In light of the foregoing discussion and to obviate any complication
as regards identity of the members of an Association presenting a writ
petition, we wish to observe, prospectively, that subject to rules
framed by each high court, it would be eminently desirable if writ
courts insist on a list of members of the petitioning Association being
67

appended to each writ petition whenever such petition is presented by
an Association espousing the cause of its members. Such list ought to
duly disclose and contain the names of all individuals borne on the
Association’s membership roll, as on the date of presentation of the
writ petition. Further, to claim benefit of the final adjudication, the writ
courts could consider whether such persons have continued to be
members of the Association on the date the decision is pronounced.
As regards individuals inducted into the Association after presentation
of the writ petition, the question of their entitlement should be left
open for the respective writ courts to determine in the facts and
circumstances of each case. Any concomitant additions to the
membership, which are sought to be brought within the sweep of the
relief claimed, ought also to be necessarily brought to the notice of the
writ courts, so that their entitlement may be appropriately considered.
105. Be that as it may, since the directions proposed to be issued in this
judgment are to operate in rem , and not confined inter partes , the
entitlement to the benefits flowing therefrom shall not be contingent
upon an employee being a member of the Association. Every employee
falling within the ambit of this judgment shall, irrespective of such
membership, be entitled to its benefit.
G. A Final Reckoning

106. Before parting, one significant aspect of the decision in Prem Singh
(supra) cannot be overlooked from the remit of our consideration. This
Court had restricted the monetary benefits therein to a period of three
68

years preceding the institution of the writ petition. Consistency in the
application of the principle would posit that the present judgment also
adheres to the same measure. Accordingly, the benefits stemming
from this judgment should ideally stand restricted to a period of three
years, in consonance with the principle enunciated in Prem Singh
(supra), read with the decisions in Shiv Dass v. Union of India &
38 39
Ors. and Union of India v. Tarsem Singh .
107. However, yet another aspect would seem to merit clarification at this
stage. A coordinate Bench of this Court in its recent decision in Maya
40
Banerjee v. Union of India (delivered after judgment was reserved
by us) chose not to follow Tarsem Singh (supra); instead, it chose to
follow the earlier decision in S.K. Mastan Bee v. GM, South Central
41
Rly reasoning that it was not noticed in Tarsem Singh (supra).
Relevant paragraphs from Maya Banerjee (supra) read as follows:
14. The principle laid down in S.K. Mastan Bee (supra) is also by a
two-Judge Bench like that in the matter of Tarsem Singh (supra).
However, S.K. Mastan Bee (supra) is directly related to the case of
family pension claim by a widow like in the present case. This Court,
while taking a view in Tarsem Singh (supra) that the consequential
relief of recovery of arrears should be restricted by the High Courts
normally to a period of three years prior to the date of the filing of
the writ petition, has not taken into consideration the earlier view of
this Court in S.K. Mastan Bee (supra). In a situation like this, this
Court is required to ponder as to what course is open when there is
conflict in the views taken in two judgments of this Court rendered
by the Benches of equal strength.
*

38
2007 (9) SCC 274
39
(2008) 8 SCC 648
40
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1928
41
(2003) 1 SCC 184
69

21. In our considered view, considering the right of an individual to
receive family pension which is held akin to a valuable right and
property in her hand and is no longer treated as a bounty, restricting
the same from 2014 onwards would not only be arbitrary, but it will
amount to inflicting injustice upon a poor widow who was earning
livelihood by working as a house maid in the neighbourhood when
her husband died in harness. Not only that her husband was
dismissed after his death which was impermissible as per the Railway
Board's own circular, the appellant's subsequent representation
claiming family pension was rejected on the ground of incongruity as
to the date of death of her late husband. The appellant had to file a
civil suit to obtain a declaration as to the exact date of death of her
husband, for which otherwise, a death certificate, a statutory
document, had already been issued in her favour. Thus, the appellant
was not at fault in laying the delayed challenge to the Railways'
refusal to grant family pension to her. In our view, the ratio in S.K.
Mastan Bee (supra) has dealt with the specific issue of restricting the
past arrears of pension in more appropriate manner and the same
having not been considered by the latter Bench of equal strength in
Tarsem Singh (supra), the only choice open to us is to rely on S.K.
Mastan Bee (supra) to allow the present Appeals.
(emphasis ours)
108. The said conclusion, arrived at while dealing with a claim for family
pension by a widow, is based on facts which are singularly singular.
The coordinate Bench, it would appear, was justified in not restricting
the benefits following S.K. Mastan Bee (supra) which, too, dealt with
a widow’s claim for pension and was rendered in the factual setting
obtaining therein. The said two decisions of this Court, i.e., S.K.
Mastan Bee (supra) and Maya Banerjee (supra) must be viewed
through the prism of clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution, which
is not the case here, and hence are distinguishable. On the contrary,
Prem Singh (supra) happens to be a larger Bench decision which
adopted the course of action conceived in Shiv Dass (supra), since
followed in Tarsem Singh (supra), and has the efficacy of a binding
70

precedent on restricting pensionary benefits to three years preceding
institution of proceedings when the jurisdiction of the court is belatedly
invoked.
109. What emerges as a matter of importance regarding applicability of
precedents is that the mere non-consideration of an earlier decision in
a subsequent decision does not furnish a legally sustainable basis for
not following its ratio. A judgment rooted in its own facts cannot be
lifted out of context and applied as a uniform principle. As a corollary,
the doctrine of per incuriam may not be invoked merely because an
earlier decision has not noticed another judgment, without first
establishing that the latter laid down a binding proposition of law
directly governing the controversy and that its omission occasioned a
manifest disregard of the applicable law.
110. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, the only course left for us is to tread
upon the zone delineated by the trifecta of decisions in Shiv Dass
(supra), Tarsem Singh (supra) and Prem Singh (supra) with the
latter being a decision of a 3-Judge Bench, which binds us.
VII. O PERATIVE D IRECTIONS

111. To sum up, the retrospective exclusion of service rendered in a work-
charged establishment or as temporary / daily-wage / muster-roll
employee, upon regularisation of service, from the computation of
qualifying service for pension cannot be sustained merely by
introducing a new statutory definition or validating past denials of
71

pension. For the detailed reasons assigned in the earlier segments, the
consequential directions flowing therefrom are as follows:
a. The Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation
Act, 2021, and the Uttar Pradesh Entitlement to Pension and
Validation Act, 2025, are declared ultra vires the Constitution
of India in exercise of the power of judicial review of this Court;
b. The rights and claims of eligible work-charged employees for
pension shall be considered in light of the decision in Prem
Singh (supra) and the law made applicable thereby;
c. Every retired Government employee, falling within the ambit of
this judgment, may approach the competent authority with his
claim for pension and other retiral benefits with full particulars
of service rendered over the years.
d. As and when a claim is received, the competent authority shall
consider and determine the same in accordance with law within
a period of 6 (six) months of receipt thereof and extend the
benefits, wherever found due.
e. The benefits towards pension shall be calculated for each
employee, including employees who have passed away after
the decision in Prem Singh (supra), bearing in mind the
restriction of monetary benefits to a period of three years
preceding institution of the writ petition by Prem Singh.
f. However, the above restriction will not apply in case any claim
is lodged by the heir(s) / legal representative(s) of an employee
72

who, upon retirement, passed away prior to the decision in
Prem Singh (supra) being delivered by this Court. In such
case, the claimant(s) will be under an obligation to produce
unimpeachable proof to succeed in any claim as heir / legal
representative of the deceased employee, as the case may be.
g. Should any claim prima facie seem unacceptable, an
opportunity of hearing must precede final rejection of claim;
and, needless to mention, such rejection must be by a reasoned
order.
h. While disposing of each claim favourably, the competent
authority shall furnish to the employee concerned a chart of all
payments made towards settlement thereof including the head
under which each payment was made.
i. The State is not saddled with any interest in view of the law it
enacted which, for the conclusions reached, would henceforth
have no existence and effect. But, if payment is not released to
the eligible employee within the time frame(s) given above, the
State shall be liable to bear simple interest @ 9% per annum
till such time payment is finally released.
j. The judgments and orders of the High Court, under challenge
in the civil appeals filed by the employees, shall stand set aside.
112. The writ petitions and the civil appeals (Groups I & II), thus, stand
allowed on the aforesaid terms, while the civil appeals (Group III) are
dismissed. The Miscellaneous Application shall stand disposed of.
73

113. Connected applications, if pending, shall also stand disposed of.
VIII. F ATE OF THE C ONTEMPT P ROCEEDINGS

114. There are multiple contempt petitions which have accompanied the
present controversy through its various stages. The contempt petitions
before us comprise: Contempt Petition (C) No. 2115 of 2018 in Civil
Appeal No. 2896 of 2018 ; Contempt Petition (C) No. 306 of 2020 in Civil
Appeal No. 6804 of 2019 ; Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 309 – 313 of 2020
in Civil Appeal Nos. 6799 – 6803 of 2019 ; Contempt Petition (C)
Nos. 314 – 318 of 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 6938 – 6942 of 2019 ; Contempt
Petition (C) No. 319 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 6805 of 2019 ; Contempt
Petition (C) Nos. 429 – 431 of 2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 7029 – 7031 of
2019 332 2020 19326
; Contempt Petition (C) No. of in SLP(C) No. of
2017 and Contempt Petition (C) D. No. 12683 of 2025 in C.A. No. 8340
of 2019 . These petitions stem from the asserted failure to implement
the judgment in Prem Singh (supra), concerning the treatment of
service rendered in a work-charged establishment as qualifying service
for pension, subject to the directions enshrined therein.
th
115. The relevant procedural trajectory is crucial. On 28 February, 2020,
notices were directed to be issued in the contempt petitions and the
matters were ordered to be tagged together. Thereafter, vide order
th
dated December 07 , 2023, this Court recorded that the State was
nd
unsuccessful in the review of the judgment dated 2 September, 2019,
th
the review petition having been dismissed on 13 February, 2020, and
the subsequent withdrawal of the curative petition. This Court also
74

recorded the State’s submission that it was ready and willing to comply
with the judgment in respect of the contempt petitioners and directed
compliance within four weeks. The record of proceedings thereafter
bears out a further statement made on behalf of the State before this
rd
Court on 23 January, 2024. Learned Attorney submitted that steps
had been taken to comply with the judgment and that pension
payment orders had been issued in favour of the contempt petitioners,
with the transfer of money to their accounts expected within two
weeks. This statement was taken on record, and the State was directed
to ensure compliance within the time sought. Affidavits on behalf of
the State and the concerned departments were subsequently filed in
several of these proceedings, including affidavits stated to have been
th
filed in compliance with the order dated 7 December, 2023.
116. The issuance of pension payment orders is, indeed, a material step
taken towards compliance; and it is not, without more, a conclusive
proof that every amount due has reached every beneficiary. Equally,
the filing of an affidavit asserting compliance cannot be brushed aside
merely because the original grievance occasioned contempt
proceedings. The Court must distinguish between an obligation
acknowledged, a direction acted upon, and a benefit actually received.
Each has its own evidentiary significance.
117. The State cannot shield itself from the consequences of non-
compliance by taking shelter in the passage of time; change of
governmental policy, or the mere enactment of subsequent legislation
75

as dispositive of the history of compliance with a subsisting judicial
command. Amongst the aforementioned, the enactment of subsequent
legislative measures raises a distinct constitutional question, which has
been examined in the main judgment. The validity or propriety of those
measures and their effect upon the enforceability of the earlier
judgment cannot be transposed in the factual inquiry whether, and to
what extent, the specific directions in the contempt petitioners’ cases
have been obeyed. A legislative response, cannot be taken to mean as
a proof of payment; equally, the pendency of a challenge to that
response, does not fasten the personal guilt upon any alleged
contemnor. These two strands of inquiries must be kept distinct.
118. In fact, the conclusions drawn by us in the foregoing discussion,
apropos the unconstitutionality of the legislative measures occasioned
subsequent to the judgment in Prem Singh (supra), tested in light of
the yardsticks peculiar to the validating legislations as well as the
general compliance with Part-III, in effect, fortify the gravamen of the
contempt proceedings emanating herein, since the ratio of Prem
Singh (supra) has hitherto been not validly dislodged.
119. The material presently at hand, establishes that compliance was
directed, that the State represented that pension payment orders had
been issued, and that affidavits were filed in the subsequent
proceedings, showing the disbursement of amounts due to some of the
parties. However, the office reports available to us do not, on their own
footing, establish that the complete amount due to every contempt
76

petitioner was actually credited, nor do they furnish an adequate basis
for a uniform finding of wilful disobedience against each alleged
contemnor. Such findings must flow from the relevant affidavits,
payment records, individual claims and explanations on record,
considered in the light of the precise operative directions applicable to
each case. Thus, we refrain from making any conclusive findings as to
the extent of non-compliance with the directions given in Prem Singh
(supra), at this stage, without having the benefit of perusing the
compliance material.
120. For ensuring full and complete compliance, the State is hereby granted
one further and final opportunity to comply with the directions issued
in Prem Singh (supra) insofar as they relate to payment of the
amounts found payable to the concerned petitioners. Such payment,
together with the admissible arrears, shall be effectuated within a
period of six months from the date of this order. The State, in default
of compliance, shall be liable to bear simple interest @ 9% per annum
till such time payment is finally released.
121. It is made clear that the period of six months granted herein is a
special and final indulgence in the contempt proceedings and is distinct
from the time frame stipulated in the main judgment. The State shall
not construe this indulgence as an extension or dilution of the
directions contained in the main judgment, nor shall it be construed as
granting any further latitude for delayed compliance.
77

122. In view of the final opportunity now granted, no contempt petition shall
remain pending and all the pending contempt proceedings are
accordingly disposed of, without prejudice to the consequences that
may follow in the event of further non-compliance. It is expressly
clarified that any failure on the part of the State to comply with the
payment directions in Prem Singh (supra) within the aforesaid period
shall be viewed extremely seriously and may constitute aggravated
contempt, warranting appropriate proceedings and orders in
accordance with law, as and when such occasion arises. All questions
concerning such subsequent non-compliance and the responsibility of
the persons concerned are left open.



…………………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)




…………………………..………….J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
New Delhi;
November 18, 2026.
78

PPENDIX
A
C ATEGORISATION OF THE P ETITIONS I NVOLVED
Group I (12 Petitions):
Group of Employees/Employee Organizations Impugning either the 2020
Ordinance/2021 Validating Act/Judgement of HC against them.
Case No. Case Title and Brief Facts Impugned
WP (C) No.
1458/2020
(Head
Petition/Main
Petition)
U.P. Ground Water Department Non-
Gazetted Employee Association (Regd.) &
Anr. v. The Chief Secretary & Ors.
Uttar Pradesh
Qualifying
Service For
Pension And
Validation
Ordinance 2020.
Members of this organization were

employed as work-charged employees from
period starting from 1978-1986.
(Annexures, P-1 to P-10)
 With regard to regularization, they filed a
WP 468/1996 (Annexure P-13, pg. 63)
before SC which was disposed of with
directions that the matter of regularization
shall be considered in accordance with a
previous case WP 140/1989 (Annexure,
P-12, pg.59-62 ), wherein a scheme
framed by UP for regularization was
reviewed and directions regarding
regularization was given.
 Some employees of PWD, who were
previously work-charged employees were
later regularized. They filed WP at
Allahabad HC (Annexure P-14, pg. 64-
83 ) to challenge the vires of Rule 3 (8) of
the Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961 and
Regulation 370 of the Civil Service
Regulations which excluded work-charged
employees from claiming pensionary
benefits unless after regularization they
had completed minimum 10 years of
regular service.
Note: - The rules bar period of work-charged
employment to be counted towards qualifying
service to be eligible for grant of pension.
(Annexure P-15, pg. 148-149 ).
 HC vide judgement dt. 03.02.2017
dismissed the WP reasoning that the rules
are not liable to be struck down on the
basis of arbitrariness and are not hit by
Article 14. (Annexure P-15, pg. 152-
156).
SC in CA 6798/2019, “ Prem Singh and
42
Others vs State of UP” allowed the
appeal of employees/dismissed appeals of
State and read down the impugned Rule
and Regulation (Annexure P-16, pg. 212
pp.32,33) and held that service rendered
as work-charged employee shall be
counted towards qualifying service for
grant of pension and further directed that

42
[coram : Hon’ble Arun Mishra, Hon’ble S. Abdul Nazeer & Hon’ble M.R. Shah, JJ. (as
their Lordships then were)].
79

arrears of pension shall be restricted to 3
years from date of order. (Annexure P-
16, pg. 213, pp.36)
 Review Petition was filed. Dismissed.
(Annexure P-21, pg. 229).
 After dismissal, R issued direction for
compliance with “Prem Singh” to Director,
UP Groundwater Deptt. (Annexure, P-23,
pg.233). Consent was granted multiple
times to calculate length of service
(Annexures P-24, P-26). Fresh letter
issued by R to comply with SC Judgement
 Respondents enacted impugned Ordinance
which effectively nullified the directions
given in Prem Singh. Dept. cancelled earlier
orders of compliance vide order dt.
09.11.2020. (Annexure P-29, pg. 257-
259)

WP (C) No.
332/2021
Brijendra Bahadur Singh & Ors. v. The Chief
Secretary, Secretariat, State of U.P. & Ors.
The Uttar
Pradesh
Retirement
Benefit Rules
1961, Rule 3(8).
Ordinance,
2020.

 Group of employees employed as work-
charged employees b/w 1978-1986.
Services regularized similarly to WP
1458/2020(Head Petition). This group
also petitioners in Prem Singh judgement
(pg. 18 pp.4.17). Some of the petitioners
filed contempt petition for repeated non-
compliance of Prem Singh judgement
(pg.20, pp. 4.23). Thereafter, Rs passed
impugned ordinance.
WP (C) No.
74/2021
Narayan Dutt Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors
Ordinance,2020.
 11 Ps – all employed as work-charged
employees with Groundwater Dept.
Services regularized similarly to WP
1458/2020 (Head Petition). 2 Ps – still in
service, rest retired (pg. 4, pp.2) Ps were
parties to SLP 19362/2017 which was
disposed of in same terms to Prem Singh
Judgement (Annexure P-3, pg. 111).
Review Petition also dismissed. Ps have
also filed contempt petition pending
disposal. (pg. 33-34, pp.12,13)
 P-2, P-5 and P-7 were directed to get
pension which they received on various
dates in 2020. However, this was later
stopped after the impugned ordinance was
passed (pg. 31-32, pp.4).
WP (C) No.
333/2021
Rakesh Kumar & Ors. v. The Chief Secretary,
Secretariat, State of U.P. & Ors.
The Uttar
Pradesh
Retirement
Benefit Rules
1961, Rule 3(8).
Ordinance,
2020.

[Almost Identical to Brijendra
Bahadur ]
 Group of employees employed as work-
charged employees b/w 1978-1986.
Services regularized similarly to WP
1458/2020 (Head Petition). This group
80

also petitioners in “Prem Singh”
judgement (pg. 17 pp.4.17). Some of the
petitioners filed contempt petition for
repeated non-compliance of Prem Singh
judgement (pg.20, pp. 4.26). Review
filed by State dismissed. Letters and Office
Memos were issued for compliance with
“Prem Singh” (Annexures P-15 to P-
18). Thereafter, Rs passed impugned
ordinance.
WP (C) No.
432/2024
Banshi Dhar Chandola & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors.
The Uttar
Pradesh
Qualifying
Service for
Pension and
Validation Act,
2021
 11 Ps – All first employed as daily wage
workers between 1982-1986 in PWD (pg.
5 pp. C), thereafter placed in work charge
establishment (pg. 5 pp. D). All
regularized in 2011, all except P-9 have
retired (pg. 8, pp. L). Ps filed WP 32130/
2017 stating that they are entitled to get
the benefits of Prem Singh judgement
(Annexure P-5, pg. 38-51 ). WP disposed
of vide order dt. 28.11.2019 with direction
that Ps entitled to move representation for
grievances (Annexure P-6, pg. 52-53).
 Principal Secretary, PWD filed compliance
affidavit stating that Ps not entitled to
pension as per OM dt 18.11.2020 (pg. 8,
pp. L). Allahabad HC dismissed contempt
petition of Ps regarding non-compliance of
HC direction in order dt. 28.11.2019
reasoning that after the compliance
affidavit order complied with, however Ps
at liberty to approach appropriate forum
w.r.t. OM dt 18.11.2020 denying them
pensionary benefits. (Annexure P-7, pg.
54) .
 Reliance placed on WP(C) 23912/2020 “Jai
Prakash and Others Vs. State of U.P.&
Others” which challenged Validation
Ordinance, 2020 and then Validation Act,
2021 before Allahabad HC, Lucknow Bench.
 This WP (along with batch of 75 Petitions)
was disposed of vide order dt. 18.03.2021
with reasoning that since WP 1458/2020
(Head Petition) is pending before the SC
which is also impugning the same act and
ordinance, liberty is granted to Ps therein
to approach the SC for appropriate relief.
(Annexure P-9, pg. 58-69)

WP (C) No.
156/2025
Babulal & Ors. v. State of U.P.
-ditto-
[Identical To Banshi Dhar Chandola]
 26 Ps – all first employed on muster roll
then in work charge establishment and
then subsequently regularised in PWD. P-
26 retired, rest on verge of retirement.
(pg. 8 pp. II)
81

 Reliance has again been placed on WP(C)
23912/2020 “Jai Prakash and Others
Vs. State of U.P.& Others” (Annexure
P-8, pg. 113,114)

WP (C) No.
193/2025
Krishan Kumar Dixit & Ors. v. State of U.P.
-ditto + Rule
3(8)-
[Similar to Head Petition]
 40 Ps – all retired employees from
PWD/Groundwater/Irrigation Deptt. who
were first work-charge employees and later
regularized. They were also parties to the
1996 WP which was disposed of with
directions for regularisation. Some of the Ps
filed WP before Allahabad HC to challenge
the vires of Rule 3 (8) of the Retirement
Benefits Rules, 1961 and Regulation 370 of
the Civil Service Regulations. (pg. 11, pp.
4.11-4.15) which was dismissed. SLPs
filed by colleagues of P which led to the
Prem Singh Judgement. Representation of
Ps to comply with the direction given in
Prem Singh disposed of vide OM dt.
18.11.2020 in view of the 2020 Ordinance.
(pg. 27, pp.4.31, Annexure P-11 ).
 Ps filed WP before Allahabad HC, disposed
of with direction that since WP 1458/2020
(Head Petition) is pending before the SC
which is also impugning the same act and
ordinance, liberty is granted to Ps therein
to approach the SC for appropriate relief.
(Annexure P-16, pg. 194).
WP (C) No.
979/2025
Subodh Kuldeep Tiwari & Ors. v. State of U.P
-ditto-
+The Uttar
Pradesh
Entitlement to
Pension and
Validation
Ordinance,
2025.

[Similar to Head Petition]
 22 Ps – all employed in work charge
establishment later on regularized in
Ground Water Deptt. (pg. 8).
 Have relied upon multiple HC judgements
which have granted to pensionary benefits
to Ps as well as other similarly situated
persons.
Note: Ps are impugning The Uttar Pradesh
Entitlement to Pension and Validation Ordinance,
2025 (has been enacted since then). Act passed
during pendency of these bunch of matters. The
Impugned Act has included another rider to
entitlement of pension; that of being a substantive
employee.
 S. 2(d) defines substantive appointee as
one being appointed as per rules and
procedures to any temporary or permanent
post in a permanent establishment
 S. 3 excludes persons not being
substantive appointees or those who
had subscribed to any
Contributory/Employee Provident
Fund from getting pensionary benefits.
 S. 4 is the Validating Provision.
82

WP (C) No.
474/2023
Lal Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Validation Act,
2021.
[Similar To Banshi Dhar Chandola]

 3 Ps – all work charged employees,
regularized; P-2 retired.
 Pleading that similarly situated to Ps in
Prem Singh, hence entitled to benefit and
also have apprehension that due to
Impugned Act would not get benefit of
pension.
WP (C) No.
440/2024
Mohd. Nafis Ahmed & Ors. v. State of U.P.
-ditto-
[Identical To Banshi Dhar Chandola]
 33 Ps – all work charge employees who
were later regularized in PWD.
 Reliance has again been placed on WP(C)
23912/2020 “Jai Prakash and Others
Vs. State of U.P.& Others” (Annexure
P-8, pg. 105-106)
D. No.
3248/2024
Ram Naresh Yadav and Ors. v. The State of
U.P. and Others
Note: - In the file provided there are only
permission to implead/direction applications filed
on behalf of Ps to be made parties in CA 6799-
6803 OF 2019 [Prem Singh Bunch Matters].
-ditto-
 Ps were also work-charged employees who
were regularised in UP Groundwater. They
want to be impleaded in view of Prem
Singh Judgement.
WP (C) No.
459/2024
Kalika Prashad & Ors. v. State of U.P. and
Ors.
-ditto-
[Identical To Banshi Dhar Chandola]
 28 Ps – all employed as first muster roll
employees, then work charge and finally
regularized and all retired from PWD.
 Reliance has again been placed on WP(C)
23912/2020 “Jai Prakash and Others
Vs. State of U.P.& Others” (Annexure
P-7, pg. 102-104)


83

Group II (5 Petitions):
Employees Impugning Judgement of HC against them.
Case No. Case Title and Brief Facts Impugned
SLP(C) No.
22530/2018
Aqil (Dead through LRs) v. State of U.P.
& Ors.
Judgement dt.
01.03.2016 by
Allahabad HC
 P – hired on work-charge basis as
Beldar in PWD. Regularized on
05.04.1999 ( Annexure P-1, pg.43-
49). Retired in 2007.
P approached for grant of pension. R

refused citing GO 02.12.2000 (10-year
minimum regular service). P filed WP
7427/2010 in same regard. Disposed
of vide order dt. 11.02.2010 with
direction that representation of P be
decided within 3 months. (Annexure
P-3, pg. 50)
P’s representation dismissed on
grounds that he has not completed 10
years as regular employee (Annexure
P-4, pg. 51-52). P provided details of
employees who had not completed 10
years requisite service but still
receiving pension. R did not consider
the same. (Annexure P-5, pg. 53).
 P filed WP 1269/2014 before HC which
was dismissed vide judgement dt.
01.03.2016 (pg. 2) citing a judgement
of HC in Babu @ Babu Ram Vs. State
of U.P. & Ors dt. 18.02.2016 in which
it was held that service under work
charge establishment shall not be
counted towards qualifying service
(pg. 12). As per P, HC did not consider
the single judge decision in Prem Singh
dt. 17.01.2014 which was later
confirmed by SC.
SLP D. No.
1747/2020
Amrit Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors.
Judgement dt.
20.04.2017
dismissing the
Special Appeal
filed by P against
judgement dt.
14.02.2017
denying him
pensionary
benefits.

 P – initially appointed on temporary
basis in 1975. (Annexure P-1, pg.
25-27). Retired in 2015. P filed WP
22696/2016 before HC for post-
retirement dues. HC disposed of WP
with direction that unless there is any
legal impediment P entitled to such
dues within 4 months (Annexure P-6,
pg. 34-39). Regularized w.e.f. 2010
vide order dt.08.09.2016 (Annexure
P-7, pg. 58-59). However, not
entitled to pensionary benefits as did
not complete requisite 10 years.
 P filed WP 1897/2017. Vide judgement
dt. 14.02.2017, HC dismissed the WP
on grounds that requisite 10 years of
regular service have not been
completed and relied upon Babu @
84

Babu Ram . (Annexure P-9, pg.71-
74) P filed Special Appeal also
dismissed vide judgement dt.
20.04.2017 (Annexure P-10, pg. 75-
79).
SLP(C) No.
6206/2020
Jawahar Lal Kushwaha v. State of U.P. &
Ors.
Judgement dt.
13.12.2019
 P – employed in work charged
establishment. Regularized after WP
29814/1997 was disposed of with
direction to consider regularization;
w.e.f. 2000 after due consideration.
 P filed WP 48159/2000 to consider
regularization from actual date of
appointment i.e. 1981. Dismissed by
Single Judge vide judgement dt.
18.11.2004 (Annexure P-2, pg. 15-
16).
Note: In the judgement P relied upon a Govt.
Order dt. 1992 which stated that all daily wage
workers who had completed at least 3 years
of service shall be considered for
regularization in case of future vacancies.
However, the Court had dismissed P’s claim
stating that there is no averment that any
vacancy had arisen after this Order (pg. 15)
 Special Appeal preferred; dismissed
for want of prosecution.
 In 2011, P retired. P made
representation for fixation of pension
after adding years of work as work
charge employee. Thereafter filed WP
16820/2019; dismissed citing the
previous dismissal of WP 48159/2000.
SA Defective 1089/2019 filed; also
dismissed vide impugned judgement
dt. 13.12.2019.
SLP (C) No.
4686/2024
Bharat Sharma v. State of U.P. & Ors.
Judgement dt.
12.04.2023
 P – appointed as temporary godown
watchman with office of R-3 in 1984.
Made multiple representations for
regularization. Regularized vide order
dt. 12.12.2011 (Annexure P-3, pg.
20-23).
 P made representation for counting
service from 1984. Thereafter, P filed
WP 21253/2017, disposed of vide
judgement dt. 16.05.2017 with
direction to R-3 to consider the
grievances of P. (Annexure P-5, pg.
25-26).
 R-3 rejected claim of P vide order dt.
20.09.2017 (Annexure P-6, pg. 27-
29). P retired from service. SC gave
Prem Singh Judgement. P filed WP
58545/2017 against order dt.
20.09.2017, allowed by Ld. Single
85

Judge vide judgement dt. 12.04.2023
granting pensionary benefits and
setting aside aforesaid order
(Annexure P-7, pg. 31-33).
Thereafter, State filed appeal 782/
2023, allowed vide judgement dt.
12.04.2023 and judgement of Single
Judge was set aside after considering
the Act of 2001 (Impugned
Judgement, pg. 1-3.)
SLP (C) No.
21165/2023

Ganesh Prasad Yadav & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors
Impugned
Judgement dt.
31.05.2023
 9 Ps – all appointed as Seasonal
Collection Amins (Seasonal Land
Revenue Collection Officials) b/w
1983-1993.
 Services regularized; thereafter all
retired. Ps filed WP before Allahabad
HC for consideration of their case for
pension/qualifying service. WP
30661/2021 disposed with direction to
consider representation of Ps.
(Annexure P-16, pg. 84-85).
 Ps filed representations. DM,
Pratapgarh dismissed representations
stating that Ps do not qualify for
pension in accordance with established
rules vide order dt. 12.05.2022
(Annexure P-18, pg. 96)
 Ps filed WP 6005/2022 against said
order. Single Judge allowed WP, held Ps
entitled to grant of pension (pg. 126-
127)
R preferred Appeal, HC allowed appeal

vide impugned judgement.
Note: In the appeal, HC has placed reliance
upon the 2021 Validating Act. The Judgement
rendered in Prem Singh was brought into the
notice of the Court, however the Court held
that the 2021 Act was not into force when the
Prem Singh Judgement was passed and
therefore the judgement is not an authority to
interpret the said Act. (Pg. 11, pp. 36).


86

Group III (7 Petitions):
State Appeals against HC Judgements Favourable to Employees
Case No. Case Title and Brief Facts Impugned
SLP (C) No.
4385/2022
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Love Prasad Dwivedi &
Ors.
Judgement dt.
26.07.2021 HC
in Special
Appeal.
 State filed Appeal against 3 Rs. Rs appointed
as Co-Operative Supervisors (Non-
Pensionable/Irregular) in UP Co-operative
Union Ltd. in 1978; were granted ad-hoc
promotion to Assistant Development Officer
(Regular) for 90 days; Rs reverted back to
original post vide order dt. 1990.
 WP 33208/1990 preferred against this,
interim order was passed for continuing ad-
hoc promotion ultimately, WP dismissed vide
judgement dt. 07.02.2012. (Annexure P-3,
pg. 32).
 Rs preferred Special Appeal 401/2012;
remanded back to Single Judge for fresh
consideration. (Annexure P-4, pg. 33-35).
R-3 retired without regular promotion to post.
R-1 & R-2 promoted and retired from ADO
post.
 Writ-A 33208/1990 disposed of directing Ps
to finalise pension treating them as promoted
to ADO on regular basis from 2001.
 Review application dismissed, Special Appeal
dismissed vide impugned judgement after
due consideration of 2020 Ordinance.
SLP (C) No.
5859/2022
Nagar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam Bareilly & Ors. v.
Rakesh Babu Saxena

Judgement dt.
24.08.2021 in
Writ A 4224/
2021.
 R – appointed as daily wager 1986; later on,
engaged as a clerk in 1989. Regularized in
2008. Retired in 2020; R made
representation that his services prior to
regularization be counted for pension
purposes.
 Sheet prepared by Account Officer of P,
stating that while R has completed 11 years
of regular service; his regular service was
started after the cutoff date of 01.04.2005
( After NPS ) and hence not entitled to any
pension (Annexure P-5, pg. 24.)
 Writ A 9577/2020 filed by R disposed of with
direction that P to considered representation
in view of Prem Singh (P-6, pg. 25,26). P
rejected R’s claim vide order dt. 08.02.2021
(P-7, pg. 27-29). R filed Writ A 4224/ 2021
for quashing of said order. HC vide impugned
judgement allowed R’s writ.
Note : - While the disposal order mentions that
representation is being disposed of due to R not
providing relevant details. In the impugned
judgement; P has taken the argument that in view
of the ordinance of 2020 R not liable to get pension
(pg.2).
87

SLP (C) No.
13043/2021
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Mahendra Singh
Judgement dt.
04.02.2021 in
Special Appeal
Defective
1003/2020
[Similar to previous petitions]

 R – appointed as Chowkidar with P-2 in 1981.
Regularized from 1997. Retired in 2010.
Pensionary benefits given from 1997. R filed
representation for refixation of his pension. R
filed WP; disposed of with direction to decide
representation. P-2 dismissed
representation. R filed WP; allowed in view of
Prem Singh, SA filed by P dismissed vide
impugned judgement. Ordinance of 2020
discussed in the impugned judgement.
( Note : HC reasoned that u/s 2 of the ordinance
there is inclusion of temporary service period in
qualifying service; since R employed as temporary
officer b/w 1981-1997, entitled to claim pension
( pgs. 5-8 )
SLP (C) No.
17982/2021
State of U.P. & Anr. v. Jai Chandra
[Identical to Mahendra/Same Post/Same
Deptt.]
Judgement dt.
07.07.2021
 Only difference w.r.t to appointment date
which is 1975 in temporary post and 1992 in
permanent post.
SLP (C) No.
6091/2022
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Rakesh Kumar & Ors.
[Almost Identical to previous cases]
Judgement dt.
15.09.2021
 6 Ps – all employed on temporary basis
(1978-1983) then regularized b/w 1983-
1985 in Irrigation Dept. G.O. dt. 23.12.2016
stated that employees retiring after 2006
shall only be eligible for pensionary benefits
after 20 years of regular service (P-2, pg.
15). Rs started getting pensionary benefits
from date of regular appointment Rs filed WP
they are entitled to Assured Career
Progression from date of temporary
appointment. HC disposed of with direction to
decide representation. Ps disposed of
representation. Rs filed WP 6627/2021. HC
allowed WP vide impugned judgement.
SLP (C) No.
5393/2023
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Chandrama Yadav & Ors.
Judgement dt.
24.08.2021
 R-1 to R-4 – appointed as Seasonal Collection
Amins b/w 1978-1990 (Governed by U.P.
Collection Amin Service Rules, 1974) .
Regularized in 2009. All retired from service
b/w 2014-2017. Rs. filed WP 6846/2014;
disposed with direction that Rs pensionary
benefits should be given as per their
appointment dates in temporary service.
(Annexure P-4, pg. 35-36) ; Meanwhile
Ordinance of 2021 was passed. Ps filed
Special Appeal Defective 585/2021.
Dismissed vide impugned judgement after
considering the judgement in Prem Singh.
SLP (C) No.
18332/2024
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Kalpnath
Judgement dt.
21.12.2023
 R – appointed as Ameen in PWD as daily
wager in 1979; placed in work charge
establishment in 1989; regularized in 1999.
88

Retired in 2001. P did not sanction pension. R
approached HC by filing WP; WP disposed of
with direction to consider representation.
Claim of R rejected. WP 38969/2004 filed
against rejection order.
 WP dismissed by Single Judge relying upon
Babu Ram Judgement, Article 370 of Civil
Service Regulations and Rule 3 of UP
Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961 (Annexure
P-7, pg. 49-51). R filed SA 1040/2019
against this order. Disposed of in view of and
in the same terms as Prem Singh Judgement
vide impugned judgement.

89