STATE vs HARE KRUSHNA PANDIT

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.34 of 2012

CNR No. ODHC010010372012
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Hare Krushna Pandit Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : None

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 17.09.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 01.02.2011 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Berhampur, Ganjam in T.R. No.77 of 2000 arising out of
G.R. Case No.14 of 2000, whereby the respondent-accused was

acquitted of the charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that P.W.1 Susila Kumar
Panigrahi had retired as a Junior Engineer from Gudari P.W.D. Section
on 30.06.1996. Although he was receiving pension after retirement, his
gratuity had not been finalized because the No Due Certificate (N.D.C.)
from Parlakhemundi P.W.D. Division had not been issued despite
repeated reminders from the office of the Chief Engineer. According to
the prosecution, the respondent, who was functioning as Cashier in the
said Division, intentionally delayed processing of the N.D.C. for several
months.
It is alleged that while P.W.1 repeatedly approached the
respondent for issuance of the N.D.C., the respondent demanded illegal
gratification of Rs.1,000/- for forwarding the certificate. Thereafter, on
02.02.2000, the amount was allegedly negotiated to Rs.500/- with an

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assurance that the N.D.C. would be issued only upon payment of the said
amount.

4. Unable to meet the illegal demand, P.W.1 approached the
Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur on 04.02.2000 and
lodged the First Information Report. Acting upon the complaint,
Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case No.5 dated 05.02.2000 was registered
and a trap was organized. Two independent Government officials were
requisitioned as witnesses, phenolphthalein powder was applied to the
notes, chemical demonstration was conducted before the witnesses, and
instructions were issued that the money should be handed over only upon
demand by the respondent.

5. The trap party thereafter proceeded to the office of the respondent.
According to the prosecution, after reiteration of the demand, P.W.1
handed over the tainted money to the respondent, who accepted the
same. Immediately thereafter, the vigilance officials entered the office,
recovered the tainted currency notes from the possession of the
respondent, and conducted hand-wash tests which allegedly yielded
positive chemical reaction. The tainted money, sample bottles and other

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relevant articles were seized, and after completion of investigation and
obtaining sanction for prosecution, charge-sheet was submitted against
the respondent.
6. During trial, the prosecution examined seven prosecution
witnesses and one defence witness. The defence denied the allegations in
their entirety.
7. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court found that
although recovery of the tainted currency notes and positive hand-wash
test stood proved, the prosecution failed to establish the essential
ingredients of demand and voluntary acceptance of illegal gratification.
The trial Court noticed that the respondent was merely a clerk-cum-
cashier having no authority to issue the N.D.C., that no pending N.D.C.
file had been seized from his custody, that departmental correspondence
indicated substantial outstanding liability against the informant, and that
the sanctioning authority had not been examined. Holding that these
circumstances created serious doubt regarding the prosecution version,
the learned Special Judge acquitted the respondent under Section 248(1)

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Cr.P.C. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein
for ready reference:-
“…………… The unfortunate aspect of this case is
the Superintending Engineer, has mechanically
signed the sanction order on 21.6.2000 to start
prosecution against the accused whereas from the
office of the said Superintending Engineer in the
year 2003 vide Ext.A, a direction has been given to
the Executive Engineer unless Rs.21,30,711/- the
loss from the departmental store articles are not
finalised or recovered through criminal action or
civil suit from the informant the Government is to
be moved suitably. Usually the Civil Engineers are
prone to accept percentage from contract work
unless contrary is proved. Or otherwise. In the
particular case a shortage of departmental store
materials is there which was about Rs.21 lakhs and
odd and responsibility is going to be fixed against
the Junior Engineer, the informant. He was trying
to manage and take back his gratuity amount from
the Government which was stopped by the
authority. Again it is seen that the Superintending
Engineer is according sanction purely
mechanically without verifying the case records
signed the sanction order in the year 2000, though
before according sanction stated he perused case
diaries, F.I.R. etc. he has stated that he has
discussed with the I.O. (P.W.6), P.W.6, the I.O. has
not stated so in his evidence in cross examination,
The unfortunate aspect of the case is the
Superintending Engineer who is the sanctioning
authority, has not been examined in this case who
might have disclosed the entire fact. In this view of
the matter, the prosecution case is seriously

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doubted by this Court and merely because the hand
of the accused was turned pink, the Court without
appreciating the fact and circumstances of the case
will put to the accused to task. As a matter of fact
no NDC either was prepared nor was delayed to be
prepared at the hands of the accused who is
nothing but the clerk simplicitor. No such pending
file was seized from the Parlakhemundi Executive
Engineer, Divisional Office.
7. In view of the above findings of this Court, the
prosecution has failed to establish the charges u/s.
7 and 13(1)(d) read with Sec. 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused,
therefore, is found not guilty u/ss. 7 and 13(1)(d) of
the P.C. Act, 1988 and is acquitted u/s. 248(1)
Cr.P.C. and set him at liberty. His bail bond is
cancelled.
”

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-State submitted that the
learned Special Judge committed a serious error in appreciating the
evidence on record, particularly with regard to the demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. P.W.1, the decoy,
categorically deposed that the accused demanded a bribe of Rs.500/-
for issuing the No Due Certificate, and his testimony stood fully
corroborated by P.Ws.2, 5 and 6. Particular emphasis was placed on
the evidence of P.W.2, the accompanying witness, who

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independently witnessed the transaction and corroborated the
complainant's version regarding the demand, acceptance of the
tainted currency notes by the accused and the concealment of the
same in his pant pocket. The hand-wash and pant-pocket wash of the
accused yielded positive chemical reaction, conclusively establishing
acceptance of the tainted money, and that the recovery of the tainted
currency notes from the accused, as consistently spoken to by
P.Ws.1, 3, 5 and 6, remained substantially unchallenged during trial.
9. The learned counsel further contended that the learned Special
Judge failed to apply the statutory presumption available under
Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, despite the
prosecution having established the foundational facts of demand,
acceptance and recovery of the tainted amount. He also argued that
the trial court erroneously relied upon the defence evidence and
Exhibit-A while overlooking the earlier departmental proceedings
reflected in Letter No.6494 dated 28.10.1997 issued by the Executive
Engineer, Parlakhemundi, R&B Division. According to the counsel,
the issue relating to shortage of store materials had already been

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decided prior to the year 2000, and the No Due Certificate had in fact
been prepared by the accused on the application of the decoy but was
deliberately withheld by him. Consequently, it was submitted that the
testimony of D.W.1 was inherently unreliable and ought not to have
been accepted, as it stood contrary to the prosecution evidence as
well as the departmental records.
10. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State at
length.

11. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions

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are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-

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“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”

12. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence

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following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
13.
At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 15 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of

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reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
14. Accordingly, CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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