Dr. Kashmir Singh And Another vs Board Of Revenue, Lko. Thru. Chairman And Others
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT – B No. 137 of 2026
Dr. Kashmir Singh And Another
... Petitioners
Versus
Board Of Revenue, Lko. Thru. Chairman And Others
...Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Aseem Goswami
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Bhanu Bajpai, Dhawal Bir Prasad,
Namit Sharma, Ratnesh Chandra,
Shailendra Singh Chauhan
CONNECTED WITH
WRIT – B No. 159 of 2026
M/S Antilia Organics Private Limited, Lko. Thru.
Director Sri Udai Singh
... Petitioners
Versus
Board Of Revenue Thru. Chairman, Near D.M. Officer,
Kaiser Bagh, Lko. And Others
...Respondents
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Azhar Ikram, Rishabh Kapoor
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Bhanu Bajpai, Rajesh Kumar
Singh, Ratnesh Chandra, Shailendra Singh
Chauhan
Reserved: 29.04.2026
Pronounced: 26.05.2026
Court No. 6
WRIT-B No.137 of 2026
WRIT-B No.159 of 2026
2
HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.
J U D G M E N T
1 . Writ – B No.137 of 2026 has been filed by the petitioners seeking
quashing of the order dated 19.01.2026 (Annexure – 1), order dated
18.09.2025 (Annexure – 2) as well as order dated 21.03.2024 (Annexure –
3) whereby revision preferred by the petitioners was dismissed, the appeal
preferred by the petitioner was dismissed and an order was passed against
the petitioner modifying the revenue entries, respectively.
In Writ – B No.159 of 2026 also the same orders have been challenged.
2 . As the facts and the issues raised are same, the facts culled out from
Writ – B No.137 of 2026 are being recorded.
3. The petitioners of Writ – B No.137 of 2026 claim title over the
property which is subject matter of the issue by virtue of two sale deeds
executed in their favour on 30.05.2007 and 11.12.2007 to the extent of
1/3rd of the share each.
4 . The facts as narrated in the writ petition and in the written
submissions filed on behalf of the petitioners, in brief, are that the
petitioners are the owner of 2/3rd share of the land bearing Gata No.315
situate at Village Ardaunamau, Tehsil Sarojni Nagar, Lucknow by virtue
of sale deeds executed in their favour. The said sale deeds were executed
based upon revenue entries which existed in favour of the sellers of the
property. It is also stated that in terms of the sale deeds, names of the
petitioners were mutated in the revenue records and they were in
possession of the property to the extent of sale deed executed. It is stated
that after the execution of the sale deeds some times in the year 2016,
respondent no.4 – the successor of the original tenure holder – filed an
application under Section 30 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (herein after
referred to as ‘the Code’) seeking correction/rectification of the map of
land situate at Gata No.315 M 4. It is stated that in the year 2017 in a
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meeting held in the office of the District Magistrate certain oral
instructions were issued and some inquiry was got conducted in respect of
Gata No.315 and thereafter, a case was registered under Section 32/38
bearing Case No.T2017104639057007 (State v. Hasan Ali and Ors.).
5 . It has also been pleaded that on 05.09.2000 the State Government
had issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act
intending to acquire 4 Bigha of the land comprising Khasra No.315M for
construction of Amar Shaheed Path, Gomti Nagar Vistar Yojna.
Subsequently, the notification was issued on 16.02.2001 under Section 6
read with Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act only in respect of part of
the proposed acquisition and an award was also passed on 17.05.2006
granting compensation to the recorded owner over 2 Bigha 12 Biswa and
5 Biswansi of land out of the acquired land bearing Khasra No.315.
6 . It is also pleaded that on the one hand the application of the
recorded owner moved for correction of the map under Section 30 was
pending, on the other hand, some inquiry was got conducted and inquiry
report dated 31.08.2017 was passed and without giving any opportunity of
hearing, in the said report it was held that the entry in the Khatauni of fasli
year 1359 regarding the area mentioned for Gata No.315 appears to be
suspicious, and recommendation was made for cancellation for which the
case was registered under Section 32/38, as recorded above.
7 . It is also pleaded that in respect of the case instituted by the
erstwhile owners under Section 30 of the Code, spot inspection was
directed to be carried out in terms of the order dated 01.08.2018 and to
submit a report thereafter. In terms of the spot inspection, a detailed report
was submitted on 08.02.2019 (Annexure – 10).
8 . It is also pleaded that in the case under Section 32/38, the Lucknow
Development Authority (LDA) also intervened and alleged that fraudulent
entry in respect of plot bearing Gata No.315 was made in various fasli
year and was liable to be set aside. It is stated that the LDA tried to
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dispossess the petitioners and respondent no.5 (the petitioner of Writ – B
No.159 of 2026) and started raising certain constructions.
9 . Feeling aggrieved by the said action, respondent no.5 preferred a
writ petition being Writ Petition No.2579 (M/B) of 2021 in which
directions were issued for maintaining status quo and for deciding the
proceedings finally under Section 30 as well as under Section 32/38 vide
judgment dated 01.12.2021 (Annexure – 12).
10 . It is stated that in defiance of the said interim order constructions
were being made for which a contempt application was also filed and the
LDA not only raised construction but also earmarked the said land for
public purposes, as such, the present petitioners also preferred a writ
petition being Writ – C No.9137 of 2023 wherein once again directions
were issued that till the disposal of the proceedings under Section 30 and
under Section 32/38, no construction shall be raised. The said direction
was given in the judgment and order dated 17.10.2023. It is stated that in
pursuance to the said direction given the petitioners appeared before
respondent no.3/authority. Both the cases were consolidated.
11. It is also pleaded by the petitioners that a civil suit for permanent
injunction was also filed which subsequently became infructuous. It is
also pleaded that in the proceedings under Section 32/38, three Lekhpals
namely Narendra Pathak who had prepared the report dated 31.08.2017,
Shri Harswaroop and Shri lekhpal Singh had to appear for personal
appearance on 17.11.2023 alongwith the petitioners and the statement of
all three Lekhpals were recorded allegedly in the absence of the counsel
for the petitioners. It is alleged that the petitioners were compelled to
complete the cross-examination of all the three Lekhpals on the said date.
Statements of the Lekhpals and the cross-examinations are contained in
Annexure – 16.
12. It is stated that subsequently vide order dated 23.11.2023 both the
cases were decided (Annexure – 17) wherein it was held that the mutation
entries which were erroneous were liable to be corrected and the case
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instituted under Section 30 was liable to be dismissed, and directions were
issued for carrying out the mutation entries in terms of the said order.
13. Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 23.11.2023 the petitioners
approached this Court by filing a writ petition being Writ – C No.20419 of
2023 and Writ – C No.21718 of 2023 was preferred by the petitioner of
Writ – B No.159 of 2026. Subsequently, both the writ petitions were
allowed vide order dated 05.01.2024 and the order dated 23.11.2023 was
set aside and all the parties were directed to re-appear before ADM,
Finance and Revenue on 16.01.2024. Further, the ADM was directed to
pass fresh order after completing the pleading and after giving them
opportunity to file documents or pleading and evidence that they may
wish to produce. Judgment and order dated 05.01.2024 is on record as
Annexure – 21.
14. It is stated that on the date fixed i.e. on 20.01.2024 preliminary
objections were filed regarding maintainability of the proceedings under
Section 32/38 and certain applications were also moved by the petitioners
which were not disposed off, however, on the preliminary objection,
objections were invited and 12.02.2024 was fixed for final disposal.
15. Subsequently, vide order dated 04.03.2024, the parties were
directed to submit their evidences and the matter was directed to be listed
on 11.03.2024. It is pleaded that as the preliminary objections were not
being disposed off the petitioners filed a writ petition under Art. 227 of
the Constitution which was finally disposed off on 14.03.2024 giving
directions to decide both the pending cases and to submit the order passed
before the High Court.
16. In terms of the directions given by the High Court, the matter was
fixed for hearing on 16.03.2024 in which the LDA was also permitted to
participate; despite them not being a party to the proceedings they were
also permitted to file objections also.
17. It is argued that ultimately vide order dated 21.03.2024 the case of
the petitioners predecessor filed under Section 30 of the Code was
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dismissed and the case of the State under Section 32/38 of the Code was
allowed with directions to rectify the mutation entries.
18. It is stated that against the order dated 21.03.2024 once again a Writ
Petition being Writ – C No.3704 of 2024 was filed, however, the same
was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy against which an order
correction application and a review application was also filed which also
were dismissed.
19. Challenging the order passed by the High Court, an SLP being
Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.12519-12520/2024 was also filed which
came to be dismissed on 03.06.2024. Thereafter, the petitioners preferred
an appeal on 25.06.2024 under Section 38(4) of the Code. It is stated that,
subsequently, on account of the nature of the land being changed, an
application was filed for grant of interim relief along with an urgency
applications on which respondent no.2 vide its order dated 22.07.2025
reserved the judgment on the interim relief application after hearing both
parties and after about two months, respondent no.2 dismissed the appeals
vide order dated 18.09.2025, despite the fact that respondent no.2 had
been transferred from the post of Commissioner, Lucknow Division,
Lucknow on 16.09.2025. Aggrieved against the order dated 18.09.2025,
the petitioners preferred a revision under Section 210 of the Code
20. Two revisions were also preferred by respondent no.5. It is stated
that, in the revision, no orders were passed on the interim relief
application preferred by the petitioners, as such, respondent no.5 preferred
a petition being Matters Under Article 227 No. 7384 of 2025 (M/s Antilia
Organics Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Revenue & Ors.), wherein directions were
issued to move a fresh interim application; further directions were issued
to decide the same and parties were directed to maintain status quo over
the land in question vide its order dated 18.12.2025. It is argued that
respondent no.1, without granting any opportunity and without deciding
the interim application, ultimately dismissed the revisions in terms of the
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order dated 19.01.2026. All the said three orders dated 21.03.24, 18.09.25
and 19.01.26 are under challenge.
21. Sri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the petitioners, argues that the present case is nothing but an abuse of
power by the authorities and impugned orders have been passed under
pressure from the State Government as well as LDA and by the Appellate
Authority despite she being transferred from the post.
22. It is also argued that the LDA has forcefully taken possession of the
land in the garb of an order under Section 32/38 of the Code. It is
contended by the petitioners that the entire proceedings initiated under
Section 32/38 were initiated in the year 2017 in respect of the entries
made in the year 1952 (1359 Fasli) and were changed after lapse of 66
years, which is barred by limitation. It is argued that, by virtue of Section
214 of the Code, the provisions of the Limitation Act are made applicable
and the maximum period of limitation specified under Article 137 of the
Limitation Act could be exercised within this said period i.e. a period of
three years for an application, as such, the proceedings are barred by
limitation. It is further argued that it is fairly well settled by the Supreme
Court that even if no limitation is prescribed, the action should be taken
within a reasonable period, whereas, in the present case action was taken
after 66 years
23. The next limb of the argument is that there was violation of the
principles of natural justice. It is argued that the authorities have given
unnecessary leverage to the LDA to allow them to participate in the
proceedings even after the orders were reserved, which is demonstrative
of the bias and predetermined intent. It is argued that the authorities have
not considered various grounds raised, which are to the following effect:
State being the custodian of Revenue Records.
Presumption of correctness of the revenue records.
Correction sought related to the revenue record of 1359 F.
Long standing entries.
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Unexplained long delay in initiation of proceedings.
Validity of sale deeds and mutation entries.
Collection and increase of revenue (Lagaan) by the State authorities.
Validity of the survey reports done by LDA prior acquisition.
Reports regarding the land available on spot.
Maps of LDA showing the correct size of the land.
Report stating discrepancies in the maps.
Not performing the statutory duty of up keeping the revenue records.
And timely updating by State Authorities.
The land being effected by the alluvial and fluvial action of river being
near to river Gomti.
Contradictory reports of case under 32/38 and case under section 30.
Suppression of material evidence forwarded by the lekhpal including
the 1952 agreement. Respondent no. 1, 2 and 3 mischievously recorded
findings of non-submission of the agreement dated 22.04.1952. In
reality, the said agreement was duly perused by Lekhpal Mr. Narendra
Pathak and forwarded in the case under Section 32/38. His statement
was recorded in examination-in- chief and cross-examination,
confirming the existence of the agreement. And no rebuttal is made of
the same in the entire order.
Contradictory orders passed under 38(1) and 38(5) calling the entry to
be a mistake and calling it fraud.
Title cannot be decided in proceedings u/s 32/38.
Possession cannot be taken in proceedings u/s 32/38.
Non application of section 24 UP ZA & LR Act in the instant case.
Changing of the "appointed date" by the State government by the act
1972.
The agreement (said to be fraud) being dated prior to the appointed
date.
The Jamindar/ intermediary having powers to control the affairs of
land prior to the enactment/application of U.P ZA & LR Act.
The jamindar/ intermediary was the proprietor of the land and was
authorized to enhance the rent of any tenant as well as the area, under
certain conditions, as provided in United Provinces Tenancy Act 1939.
Ignoring this material evidence amounts to perversity and deliberate
suppression. None of these grounds were considered in any orders
passed by any court including the appellate and revisional courts. The
orders are therefore vitiated for non-application of mind and failure to
adjudicate the specific pleas raised by petitioners.
24. It is also argued that the exercise of powers was malafide.
25. It is next argued that the property rights of the petitioners have been
violated in the garb of exercise of powers under Section 32/38 of the Code
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and the LDA has been made owner of the property owned by the
petitioners without there being any acquisition and the same is also in
violation of Art. 300A of the Constitution.
26. In light of this, it is argued that the orders impugned are liable to be
set aside.
27. Shri Azhar Ikram and Shri Rishabh Kapoor, learned counsel(s)
appearing on behalf of the petitioners of Writ – B No.159/2026 argue that
Section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘UPZA & LR Act’) provides that any
contract or agreement made between an intermediary and any person on
or after the first day of July, 1948, which has the effect, directly or
indirectly of contravening the provisions of sub-clauses (a) and (b), shall
be null and void.
28. It is argued that respondent no.1 has failed to appreciate that U.P.
Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) (Re-enactment and validation)
Act, 1972 (herein after referred to as ‘the 1972 Act’) was enacted
precisely to validate transfers of land made by tenure holders before
31.05.1952. It is argued that Section 3 of the 1972 Act provides that all
such transfers shall be deemed valid notwithstanding any defect in
procedure, want of sanction or irregularity, provided consideration was
paid and possession was delivered. It is submitted that thus, the agreement
dated 22.04.1952 being prior to 31.05.1952 squarely falls within the
protective umbrella of the 1972 Act and once validated by statute, such
transfer cannot be reopened or nullified by the revenue authorities under
Sections 32 or 38 of the Code.
29. It is further argued that respondent no.1 has erred in misconstruing
the scope of Section 24 of the UPZA & LR Act. It is argued that Section
19 provides that all the land held by a hereditary tenant shall be deemed to
have been settled with him by the State Government thereby conferring
upon him the status of “ Sirdar” with entitlement to retain possession.
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30. It is also argued that Sections 246 and 247 of the UPZA & LR Act
also contemplate the existence of valid leases executed by Zamindars
between 01.07.1948 and 30.06.1952, thus, the leases executed in this
period are not nullified in toto by Section 24; they are void only for the
limited purpose of determining rehabilitation grant payable to the
Zamindar.
31. Reliance is placed upon a judgment in the case of Ram Piari and
Ors. v. Board of Revenue and Ors.; 1983 AWC 330 All wherein it was
held that the leases executed prior to 30.06.1952 retain validity and cannot
be annulled under Section 24 except for rehabilitation grant computation.
32. Contentions of Shri Azhar Ikram and Shri Rishabh Kapoor, learned
counsel(s) with regard to limitation are similar to the contentions of Mr.
Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate. Submissions with regard to
other arguments are also similar and are not being reproduced for the sake
of brevity.
33. Shri Anuj Kuddesiya, learned Additional Advocate General
appearing on behalf of the State as well as Sri Mukund Tiwari, learned
Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the LDA, controverted the
submissions of the petitioners by arguing that it is wrong to allege that the
Commissioner was not holding the charge on the date when the order was
passed. It is admitted that, although the Commissioner was transferred on
16.09.2025, the actual handing over of the charge happened to the
successor only on 20.09.2025, and thus no contention on that ground
should be accepted.
34. Controverting the allegation with regard to limitation for correction
of the revenue records, it is submitted that the U.P. Revenue Code Rules,
2016 specifically provide under Rule 191 read with Appendix I that for an
application under Section 38(1) of the Code, for correction of records, the
prescribed limitation period is NIL and once the statute itself does not
provide for any limitation, the contention on that count is liable to be
rejected. It is argued that when a special statute prescribes its own
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limitation, the same shall prevail over the general provision contained in
the Limitation Act by virtue of mandate Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act and the U.P. Revenue Code being a special statute governing the land
records would override the prescriptions contained in the Limitation Act,
specifically in respect of Section 38 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2016.
35. It is argued that rules or limitations are not applicable in case of a
fraud. It is argued that the fraudulent entry recorded in the revenue record
came to the knowledge when the application under Section 30 of the Code
was filed sometime in the year 2016, on which the authorities acted
swiftly and the proceedings were initiated in the year 2017, thus, there
was no delay on the part of the State.
36. It is argued that the entire claim of the petitioners is based upon a
fictitious entry which does not confer any right and can be expunged at
any stage and can also be expunged, treating the same to be a clerical
mistake. It is argued that the entire case of the petitioners is that the
predecessor in interest had an agreement in his favor, executed on
22.04.1952, which, according to them, is a registered agreement and is the
foundation upon which legal rights are claimed, however, the said
purported agreement has never been provided, nor have the details of
registration of the said agreement ever been provided in any of the
proceedings, including before this Court.
37. It is further argued that the land bearing Gata No.315 was having an
area of 16 Biswa in the settlement records of 1332 Fasli, however, in the
records of 1359 Fasli, the area was increased to 2 Bigha, 12 Biswa and 5
Biswansis. Somehow, strangely, from the Fasli year 1360, the area of land
was increased to 23 Bighas, 8 Biswas and 5 Biswansi, for which there was
no material to indicate how the area of the Zamindar could be increased
vide an agreement which is alleged to have been in the possession of the
petitioners predecessor in interest. It is, thus, argued that the entry in the
revenue record was fraudulent and was rightly expunged by means of the
impugned orders.
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38. It is further argued that the entry relied upon by the petitioners is
forged and fabricated. It is stated that the order in the revenue records is in
Hindi, however, where the area is increased on the basis of an agreement,
the same is written in Urdu, which does not even disclose the date or
authority/Court which passed the order based upon which the
amendments were carried out in the revenue records.
39. It also bears from the record that no such order could be found in
the record room. It is argued that under the U.P. Tenancy Act or the U.P.
Land Revenue Act or any other applicable statute, there is no provision
entitling the Zamindar to unilaterally increase the area of the plot recorded
in the revenue records. It is argued that the agreement allegedly executed
in favour of the predecessor in interest of the petitioners is dated
22.04.1952 - the same could not have been executed by the erstwhile
Zamindar - and for the sake of arguments even if the same is treated to be
existing, the same would be barred by Section 24(b) of UPZA and LR
st
Act, which came into force from 1 July 1958 and after the enforcement
of the said Act, no authority had the jurisdiction to alter the areas of the
plot or to create any rights inconsistent with the statutory provisions.
Thus, it is argued that the claim of the petitioners based upon the
agreement is neither supported by the fact nor is sanctioned by law and is
nothing but a void document, even if the same is treated to be existing.
40. In the light of said, it is argued that the writ petitions are liable to be
dismissed.
41. In the light of the contentions raised, it is essential to notice the
provisions of law as existed prior to the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 being
enacted.
42. U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enacted in the
year 1951. In terms of Section 4 of the said Act, the State Government
was empowered to declare a date through a notification with effect from
which all estates situated in Uttar Pradesh were to vest in the State
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st
Government. In the present case, vesting took effect from 1 July 1952.
Section 4 of UPZA & LR Act is quoted herein below :
“ 4. Vesting of estates in the State. —(1) As soon as may be after the
commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by notification,
declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estates situate in Uttar
Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so
specified (hereinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall
stand transferred to and vest, except as hereinafter provided, in the State
free from all encumbrances.
(2) It shall be lawful for the State Government, if it so considers
necessary, to issue, from time to time, the notification referred to in sub-
section (1) in respect only of such area or areas as may be specified and
all the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be applicable to and in the case
of every such notification.”
43. It is essential to note the mandate of sections 22, 23 and 24 of
UPZA & LR Act, which were restrictions on the rights of the intermediary
or a tenant in respect of rent quantified or the transfer or the agreement.
Sections 22, 23, and 24 are quoted here in the below:
“ 22. Variation in rent on or after July 1, 1948 not to be recognised .—
Notwithstanding any contract made, or anything done or permitted to be
done, on or after the first day of July, 1948, by or on behalf of an
intermediary or a tenant, in respect of any land forming part of an estate
acquired under this Act, the rent payable therefor by the tenant on the date
immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be an
amount equal to the rent payable by the tenant or his predecessor-in-title
on the date aforesaid and any reduction or remission made therein after
the said date, otherwise than in pursuance of a decree or order of a court,
shall not be taken in account :
Provided that where the rent reduced in pursuance of any decree or order
aforesaid is less than the amount computed at appropriate circle rate the
rent payable shall be an amount so computed.
23. Transfer by way of sale or gift not to be recognised .—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no transfer, by way of sale
or gift, of any estate or part thereof—
(a) made on or after the first day of July, 1948, shall be recognised for the
purpose of assessing the amount of rehabilitation grant payable to the
intermediary,
(b) [ ]*
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to—
(a) any sale made under order of a court in execution of any decree or
order for payment of money, or
(b) any sale or gift made in favour of a waqf, trust, endowment or society
established wholly for charitable purposes, unless the State Government
in any particular case directs otherwise.
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Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (2), “society” means a
society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 [Act XXI of
1860.]
24. Contract of agreement to defeat provisions of this Act to be void .—
Any contract or agreement made between an intermediary and any person
on or after the first day of July, 1948, which has the effect, directly or
indirectly—
(a) of relieving, whether in whole or part, a bhumidhar or sirdar from the
liability for the land revenue, to be paid by him for any land comprised in
his holding, or
(b) of entitling an intermediary to receive, on account of rehabilitation
grant an amount higher than what he would, but for the contract or
agreement, be entitled to under this Act—
shall be and is hereby declared null and void.”
44. The UPZA & LR Act was repealed and its provisions consolidated
under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. As the proceedings have been
initiated under the said Act, it is essential to note the mandates of sections
30, 31, 32, and 38 of the Code, which are relevant in the present case, as
well as section 214 and the limitation prescribed in Appendix-I to the U.P.
Revenue Code Rules, 2016. The said provisions and Appendix are quoted
as under:
“ 30. Maintenance of Map and Field Book. —(1) The Collector shall
maintain, in the manner prescribed, a map and a field book (khasra) for
each such village and shall cause to be recorded therein, annually, or at
such longer intervals as may be prescribed, all changes in the boundaries
of the village or survey numbers, and shall also cause to be corrected, any
errors or omissions which are, from time to time, detected in such map or
field book (khasra).
(2) The minjumla number shall be divided physically in the manner
prescribed and revenue records including map and khasra shall be
corrected accordingly.
31. Record of Rights .—(1) The Collector shall maintain, in the form and
manner prescribed, a record of rights (Khatauni) for each village, which
shall contain the following particulars, namely—
(a) the names of all tenure holders together with survey numbers or plot
numbers held by them and their areas;
(b) the nature or extent of the respective interests including shares of such
persons and the conditions or liabilities, if any, attaching thereto;
(c) the rent or revenue, if any, payable by or to any such person;
(d) particulars of all land (other than holdings) belonging to or vested in
the State Government, Central Government, Gram Panchayat or a local
authority.
(e) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
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(2) Shares of the co-tenureholders shall be determined in the manner
prescribed.
32. Correction of records .—(1) Subject to the control of the Collector, the
Sub-Divisional Officer, the Tahsildar, or the Revenue Inspector shall
record, in the manner hereinafter provided in this chapter, all changes in
the record of rights (Khatauni), the field book (Khasra) and the map that
may take place, and all transactions that may affect any of the rights or
interests recorded, and correct therein any error proved to have been
made in the records previously prepared :
Provided that order for correction in map shall be passed by the Collector.
(2) No application for correction of error under sub-section (1) where the
claim is based solely on possession as well as involving intricate question
of title shall be maintainable.
38. Correction of error and omission. —(1) An application for correction
of any error or omission in the map, field-book (Khasra) or record of
rights (Khatauni) shall be made to the Tahsildar in the manner prescribed.
(2) On receiving an application under sub-section (1) or on any error or
omission otherwise coming to his knowledge, the Tahsildar shall make
such inquiry as may appear to him to be necessary, and refer the case
along with his report to the Collector in the case of map correction and to
the Sub-Divisional Officer in matter of other correction.
(3) The case shall be decided by the Collector or the Sub-Divisional
Officer, as the case may be, after considering any objection filed and
evidence produced before him or before the Tahsildar.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector or the Sub-
Divisional Officer, as the case may be, under sub-section (3), may prefer
an appeal to the Commissioner within a period of thirty days from the
date of such order, and the decision of the Commissioner shall, subject to
the provisions of Section 210, be final.
(5) Any forged or manipulated entry in the map, the khasra or the record
of rights (khatauni) may be expunged under this section.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in other provisions of this Code,
the Revenue Inspector may correct any undisputed error or omission in
the record of rights (khatauni) or khasra in such manner and after making
such inquiry, as may be prescribed.
Explanation.—The power to correct any error or omission under this
section shall not be construed to include the power to decide a dispute
involving question of title.
*
214. Applicability of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Limitation Act,
1963. —Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Code, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Limitation Act,
1963 shall apply to every suit, application or proceedings under this
Code.
*
APPENDIX-I
LIMITATION AND COURT FEES
[Rule 119]
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16
Sl. No. Section Nature of suit,
application and
Period of
limitation
Proper
Court Fee
proceedings
1 2 3 4 5
1. 24(1) Application for
the settlement of
Nil Rs.5
boundary
dispute
2. 24(4) Appeal to
Commissioner
As provided in
Rs.5
Section 24(4)
3. 32 Application for
Nil As in Court
correction of
Fees Act,
records.
1870
4. 35(2) Appeal to Sub-
As provided in
Rs.5
Divisional
Section 35(2)
Officer
5. 38(1) Application for
Nil As in Court
correction of
Fees Act,
records
1870
6. 38(4) Appeal to
Commissioner
As provided in
Rs.5
Section 38(4)
7. 49(8) Appeal to
Record Officer
As provided in
Rs.5
Section 49(8)
8. 57(2) Application for
Nil Rs.5
permission to
plant trees
9. 58(1) Application for
Nil Rs.5
settlement of
dispute referred
to in the Section
10. 58(2) Appeal to
Commissioner
As provided in
Rs.5
Section 38(2)
11. 66(1) Application for
As provided in
Rs.5
cancellation of
Section 66(2)
allotment
12. 67(5) Appeal to
As provide in
Section 67(2)
Rs.5
Collector
13. 80(1) Application for
Nil Amount
mentioned as
declaration
proper Court
fee against
serial number
14 (regarding
Application
for
cancellation
of
declaration)
14. 82(1) Application for
Nil Rs.50
cancellation of
declaration
15. 82(2)(c) Suit for
ejectment by
Nil As in Court
Fees Act,
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17
bhumidhar 1870
16. 85(1) Suit for
ejectment by
Gram Panchayat
Nil As in Court
Fees Act,
1870
17. 85(2) Suit for
ejectment by the
Nil As in Court
Fees Act,
land holder
1870
18. 98(1) Application for
Nil Rs.2
permission to
transfer of land
19. 101(1) Application for
Nil Rs.50
exchange of
land
20. 107(2) Application for
Nil Rs.2
permission to
make a bequest
21. 115(3) Application for
As provide in
Section 115(3)
Rs.5
restoration of
land
22. 116 Suit for division
Nil As in Court
of holding
Fees Act,
1870 payable
on the
plaintiff’s
share of land
revenue
23. 122(3) Application by
person entitled
As provided in
Section 122(3)
Rs.5
to claim land
24. 131(1) Suit for
ejectment of an
Nil As in Court
Fees Act,
1870 on one
asami
year’s rent
25. 131(4) Suit for arrears
Three years
from the date
Rs.5
of rent
when rent
became due
26. 133 Suit for
injunction
compensation or
Three years
As in Court
from the
accrual of
cause of action
Fees Act,
1870
repairs
27. 134 Suit for
ejectment and
Nil As in Court
Fees Act,
damages
1870 on
annual land
revenue
28. 137(1) Suit for
possession or
compensation
Three years
from the date
As in Court
Fees Act,
of wrongful
dispossession
1870
29. 139(1) Application for
One year from
As in Court
fixation of rent
the date of
termination of
rights of asami
Fees Act,
1870
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18
30. 141(1) Application for
computation of
-do- -do-
rent
31. 144 Suit for
declaration by
Nil Rs.10
bhumidhar or
assami
32. 145 Suit for
declaration by
the Gram Sabha
Nil Rs.5
33. 151(1) Suit for
ejectment and
Nil As in Court
Fees Act,
damages by
1870
Goverment
Lessee
45. In the light of the statutory backdrop and the factual averments as
recorded above, the first question to be decided by this Court is to
determine the rights of ownership claimed by the petitioners by virtue of
the registered agreement executed by the tenure holder in favour of the
predecessor in interest, based upon which the entries were mutated in the
year 1952. The said agreement is claimed by the petitioners to have been
executed on 22.04.1952. The admitted facts of the parties are that the
agreement is not on record and is not available even in the revenue
records.
46. The foundation of the petitioners’ argument with regard to the
existence of the said agreement is the report dated 07.09.2017 wherein it
was observed that the entries entered in the records increasing the size of
Gata No.315 from area 2-12-5 to 23-8-5 was without mention of any
orders passed by any competent Court and was in Urdu and appears to be
suspect, as indicated in the report. The said report was subjected to
examination and cross-examination and reliance is placed upon the
statement of the Lekhpal who had stated in his cross-examination that he
had given the report based upon the registered agreement dated 22.4.1952
and the connected records which were seen by him. The said document
was also annexed and the agreement which was revealed to him during
inquiry was translated into Hindi and was annexed along with the report.
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47. Based upon the said statement, it is argued that the agreement exists
and as the petitioners are the subsequent purchasers, they are not in
possession of the said agreement which is in the possession of the
Revenue Authorities, thus, the burden should not be shifted on the
petitioners to produce the said document.
48. Shri Mukund Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
of the LDA argues that even if this statement is treated to be correct, the
said person was only verifying the report and was giving evidence in
support of the said report and anything not supported in the report would
not become evidence as is sought to be argued. It is argued that the
statements were recorded only in support of the report that is given, which
contains no mention of the agreement being seen or being translated, thus,
no benefit flows in favor of the petitioners on that count.
49. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioners merits rejection as
the agreement is said to be a registered agreement and no material exists
on record to demonstrate that any effort was being made by the petitioners
to obtain a copy of the agreement, either from the registrars office or from
the revenue records, in respect of their contentions with regard to
existence of the registered agreement, as such, this Court has no option
but to record that there is no agreement in existence.
50. In the alternative, even if for the sake of arguments it is accepted
that the written agreement existed and is said to have been executed on
22.04.1952, the same would be clearly barred by virtue of the statutory
enactment contained in Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the UPZA and LR Act.
Contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that the said Act came
st
into effect from 1 July 1952 and the provisions of Sections 22, 23 and 24
would have no effect as the agreement was executed on 22.04.1952
further merits rejection as Section 24 provides the bar of the intermediary
st
or a tenant for executing an agreement with effect from 1 July 1948 and
not from the date of enactment of the Act.
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51. It is well settled that the Acts can be enacted with retrospective
effect also and there being no challenge to the provisions of Sections 22,
23 and 24, the only conclusion possible is that the restrictions placed by
virtue of Sections 22, 23 and 24 on the rights of the intermediary or a
st
tenant will trigger from 1 July 1948 and not from the date of enactment
of the Act.
52. Thus, on both counts, i.e., absence of agreement as well as
agreement barred by law, the claim of the petitioners on ownership of land
by virtue of agreement dated 22.04.1952 cannot be accepted and is liable
to be rejected.
53. With regard to the next contention in respect of the increased area
in the mutation entries, no material could be placed by the petitioners as to
how even in terms of the agreement dated 22.04.1952, the area of holding
of property bearing Gata No.315 could be increased from 2 Bighas to
approximately 23 Bighas through insertions made in the revenue records.
There was no order of any Court or any material to demonstrate that any
other part of the land adjacent was added resulting in increase of area.
54. The argument of counsel for the petitioners is that not only the
revenue records were mutated and the names of the persons were mutated,
the revenue was also increased, which clearly demonstrates that the
Government was very well aware of the increase in the holdings which
resulted in the consequent increase in the rent and its acceptance thereof
by the State Government.
55. The said contention, even if accepted for the sake of argument, in
itself would not substantiate the claim of the petitioners of ownership over
the increased area without there being any material to suggest that the
total area acquired by the predecessor in interest was more than 2 Bighas
and odd. Thus, the said contention, based upon the increased area, would
not ipso facto be conclusive of the ownership rights over the increased
area as claimed by the petitioners. Thus, the contention on that count also
deserves to be rejected.
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56. The entire claim of the Petitioners on the land is based upon a
mutation entry. It is well settled that mutation entries do not by
themselves confer title which has to be established independently in a
declaratory suit as also reiterated by Supreme Court in case of
Commissioner, Bruhath Bangalore Mahanagra Palike & Anr. v.
Faraulla Khan, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3633 which in the present case
has admittedly not been filed.
57. Question of limitation was seriously argued by both the sides. It is
argued by Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the petitioners that in terms of the mandate of U.P. Revenue
Code, provisions of the Limitation Act have been specifically made
applicable, thus, any action beyond the prescribed period of limitation
would be barred by law.
58. It is argued, in alternative, that it is well settled that even if no
period of limitation is prescribed, the authorities are bound to act in a
reasonable time. Extensive reliance is placed upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and
Anr. v. D. Narsing Rao and Ors.; (2015) 3 SCC 695 , wherein the
Supreme Court was interpreting the scope of powers of revision which
can be exercised and the limitation within which the same can be
exercised. The Supreme Court, after analyzing the judgments recorded as
under:
27 . To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk
Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy [(2003) 7 SCC 667]
wherein this Court held that even in cases of fraud the revisional power
must be exercised within a reasonable period and that several factors
need to be kept in mind while deciding whether relief should be denied
only on the ground of delay. The Court said : (SCC p. 677, para 9)
“9. … In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a
reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While
exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as
effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property
due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent
bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions
of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act).”
28. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Sulochana
Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport [(2010) 8 SCC 467 :
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22
(2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 415] wherein this Court reiterated the legal position
and held that the power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be
exercised arbitrarily and interminably. This Court observed : (SCC p.
476, para 28)
“28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time-limit for
exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words ‘at any time’ in
Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature
intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for
an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering
title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of
perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that the legislature has
conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the
title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee,
would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the
statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable,
advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute.”
29. In State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh [(2004) 10 SCC 585] this
Court held that in the absence of any special circumstances a delay of 15
years in suo motu exercise of revisional power was impermissible as the
delay was unduly long and unexplained. This Court observed : (SCC pp.
588-89, para 6)
“6. We are now left with the second question which was raised by the
respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the
power under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the
Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the
order of the Collector. It is true that sub-section (3) provides that such
a power may be exercised at any time but this expression does not
mean there would be no time-limit or it is in infinity. All that is meant
is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No
fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in
exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have
attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each
case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo
motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the
appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had
taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be
open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such
that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted
that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was
passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also
withdrawn sometime in March 1976. The learned counsel for the
appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and
circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo
motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a
reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of the
Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a
long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with.
Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have
power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal
preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be,
by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable.
But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of
the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such
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delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise
of power under sub-section (3) of Section 20.”
30. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light
Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [(1992) 2 SCC 598 : AIR
1993 SC 802] wherein the Court explained the legal position as under :
(SCC pp. 602-03, para 13)
“13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated
and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on
sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon
its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental
right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle
on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is
denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the
delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless
there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to
determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the
writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time
is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to
physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the
conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on
the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case
[Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110] relied on is
distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on
the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority
and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though
belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the
High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being
the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole
ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong
in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief
sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed.”
31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon
because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to
challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human
affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no
period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the
intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that
cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power
especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of
law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the
orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be
within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an
act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its
correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would
itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an
authority.
32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described
as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High
Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific
statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact,
which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents.
The attempt of the appellant State to demonstrate that the notice was
issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is,
therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in
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question for housing sites to be given to government employees in the year
1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the
revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course
of official business. Inasmuch as, the notice was issued as late as on 31-
12-2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been
offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted
only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to
reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond
reasonable time and was rightly quashed.
33. Having said that we must make it clear that we have not gone into the
correctness of the alleged fraudulent entry nor have we expressed any
opinion whether the quashing of the notice dated 21-12-2004 would
prevent the State from taking such other steps as may be permissible under
any provision of law. The High Court has, as a matter of fact, made it
clear that the State Government shall be free to take any other steps or
proceedings in accordance with law qua the land in question. That liberty
should suffice for we have examined the matter only from the narrow
angle whether the khasra pahani entry of 1954-1955 could be corrected at
this belated stage in exercise of the revisional powers vested in the
competent authority under Section 166-B of the A.P. (Telangana Area)
Land Revenue Act. That question having been answered in the negative
these appeals must fail and are hereby dismissed leaving the parties to
bear their own costs.”
59. On the foundation of the said judgment, it was strenuously argued
that even if no limitation is prescribed, the same has to be done within a
reasonable time.
60. Controverting the said argument, learned counsel for the
respondents argues that the said judgment would be of no avail to the
petitioners as in the said judgment itself the Supreme Court had held that
the time for limitation would start with effect from discovery of fraud by
the State. In the present case, discovery of fraud happened in the year
2016 when the application under Section 30 of the Code was filed by the
predecessor in interest of the petitioners.
61. It is further argued that the Supreme Court was called upon to
examine limitation on the revisional powers and the same would not apply
in cases of fraud in revenue entries for which no limitation is prescribed,
as admittedly the fraud vitiates everything. Reliance is placed upon
judgment in the case of Bachan and Anr. v. Kankar and Ors.; (1972) 2
SCC 555 , wherein the following was observed in Paras 14 and 17 :
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“ 14. The High Court fell into the error of treating the entry as
irreproachable. A fictitious entry is one which is not genuine. It is an
unreal entry.
17. The rulings of this Court establish that the decision of the learned
Single Judge as well as that of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High
Court is erroneous. Section 20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 speaks of a person recorded as occupant to become
adhivasi of the land and will be entitled to take or retain possession as
mentioned in the section. One of the principal matters mentioned in the
section is that the Khasra or Khatauni of 1356 Fasli is to be prepared
under Sections 28 and 33 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901. The U.P.
Land Records Manual in Chapter A-V in para A-55 to A-67 lays down the
manner in which the Khasra or the field book showing possession is to be
prepared by the Patwari in the areas to which Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 applies. There are detailed instructions about the
manner in which the enquiry should be carried out about actual
possession and change in possession and corrections in the map and field
book, the form in which the khasra is to be prepared. The form of khasra
is given in para A-80. The form shows that the Lekhpal has to prepare a
consolidated list of entries after partial or proper investigation. Again,
para A-70 to A-73 to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act
show how entries have to be made in khataunis every year showing the
nature of tenure of each holder. The khatauni is meant to be a record of
tenure-holders. The manner of changes to be made there is laid down in
para A-82 to A-83. Entries are to be checked. Extract has to be sent to the
Chairman, Land Management Committee as contemplated in paragraph
A-82 (iii). In this context Section 20(b)(i) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act which speaks of the record “as occupant” in the
khasra or khatauni of 1355 Fasli refers to the khasra or khatauni being
prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Act,
1961. Khasra is the field book provided for by Section 28 of the Land
Revenue Act. Khatauni is an annual register prepared under Section 32 of
the Land Revenue Act 1951. It has to be emphasised that the entry under
Section 20 (b)(i) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950 in order to enable a person to obtain adhivasi rights must be an
entry under the provisions of law.”
62. Reliance is also placed upon the coordinate bench judgment of this
Court in the case of Bachcha Lal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.; Writ
– B No.3987 of 2025 decided on 01.04.2026 , with emphasis on
paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 19, which read as under :
“ 13. So far as law in regard to long standing revenue entries is concerned,
Court takes note of a judgment of Supreme Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati
v. Fakhrul Hassan, 1976 (3) SCC 642 which was followed by Supreme
Court in Dharam Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives and others
vs. Prem Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives, (2019) 3 SCC 530
and its relevant paragraph no. 24 is quoted below :-
“24 The High Court has dealt with the above aspect of the matter and
has held that continuation of entry after the order of deletion of the
name of Amar Singh cannot confer any right. The judgment of this
Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan [Vishwa Vijay
Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642] , has rightly been
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referred to and relied on by the High Court. This Court in para 14 of
the judgment has laid down the following: (SCC p. 645)
“14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought,
generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not
embark upon an appellate inquiry into their correctness. But the
presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged
or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real.
The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of
what the entry in the revenue record states but the entry is open to
the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud
and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found
a claim to possessory title.””
14. Above referred rival submissions and concurrent findings of three
Authorities under U.P.C.H. Act has to be dealt with taking note of limited
jurisdiction of writ to cause interference in concurrent findings of
Authorities except being perverse. In this regard, Court takes note of a
judgment pased by Supreme Court in Krishnanand (D) through LRs and
others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation reported in 2015 (1) SCC 553
and for reference, its paragraph 12 is quoted below :-
“12. The High Court has committed an error in reversing the findings
of fact arrived at by the authorities below in coming to the conclusion
that there was a partition. No doubt, the High Court did so in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a settled
law that such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised for reappreciating the
evidence and arrival of findings of facts unless the authority which
passed the impugned order does not have jurisdiction to render the
finding or has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or the finding is
patently perverse. In the present case, though the High Court reversed
the concurrent findings of the authorities below and came to the
opposite conclusion on matter of facts, the High Court did not do so
on the ground that the authorities below acted in excess of their
jurisdiction or without jurisdiction or that the finding is vitiated by
perversity.”
15. Court takes note of above legal position that long revenue entries can
be challenged if made surreptitiously though possibility of any fraud or
forgery was neither pleaded nor mentioned in impugned orders. Reason
for allowing objections filed by predecessors of respondents by all three
Authorities that they failed to show any legal basis or order on which their
names could be recorded suddenly after many years, though they claimed
common ancestors as to respondents.
19. In aforesaid circumstances, concurrent finding of three Authorities
under U.P.C.H Act cannot be interfered being not shown as perverse. An
argument of re-settlement being vague was also rightly rejected by
Settlement Officer of Consolidation and upheld by Deputy Director of
Consolidation. The statement of Kishor was found unsufficient to prove
the case of petitioners which was rejected after much deliberations by all
three Authorities under U.P.C.H. Act. Nature of entries of petitioners in
1309-F was ‘sikmi cultivator’ for fixed period, therefore, they cannot be
considered as co-tenure holder. All above factor goes against the
petitioners and were the basis of all three Authorities to expunge the
entries.”
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63. It is essential to note Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which
reads as under:
“ 29. Savings. — …
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by
the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining
any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
64. On a plain reading of Section 29(2) of the Act it is clear that the Act
applies except when a special or a local law prescribes a different period
of limitation from the period as prescribed in the schedule to the
Limitation Act.
65. In the present case, as per the submission of learned counsel for the
State and LDA, a different limitation is prescribed by a statute which is
clearly a special statute, thus, the limitation as prescribed in the schedule
to the Limitation Act, as argued by learned counsel for the petitioners,
would have no application.
66. On the basis of the judgments cited by both parties and recorded
above, what can be culled down is that the U.P. Revenue Code is a special
Act and in view of the provisions of Section 29(2), the limitation
prescribed in the U.P. Revenue Code and the Rules (Appendix - I to the
Rules), the same would prevail over the limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act.
67. Thus, once the limitation is not prescribed specifically with regard
to correction of entries in exercise of power under Sections 32 and 38, the
contention of learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners that
the exercise of powers was beyond limitation cannot be accepted and is
rejected.
68. Considering the submissions made by Shri Rishabh Kapoor, learned
counsel for the petitioners and recorded in Para 28 of this judgment, it is
necessary to mention Section 3 of the U.P. Land Tenures (Regulation of
WRIT-B No.137 of 2026
WRIT-B No.159 of 2026
28
Transfers) (Re-enactment and validation) Act, 1972. Section 3 is quoted
herein below:
“3. Lease and transactions made or registered after the appointed date
to be void ab initio. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or
contract to the contrary-
(1) a lease of land by an intermediary either granted or registered on
or after appointed date shall be and is hereby declared null and
void from the date of execution, and the lessee (irrespective of
whether he obtained delivery of possession, before or after the
appointed date, either in pursuance or in anticipation of such
lease) shall for purposes of Section 180 of the U. P. Tenancy Act,
1939 (U. P, Act XVII of 1939) and Section 209 of the Abolition Act,
be deemed to be a person in possession of the land otherwise than
in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in
force;
(2) a transaction between an intermediary and a tenant conferring on
the tenant a right to transfer by sale his holding or any part
thereof either made or entered into or registered on or after the
appointed date, shall be and is hereby declared null and void from
the date of execution.
Explanation. In this section, registration means registration in accordance
with the law for the time being in force relating to registration of
documents and includes attestation under Section 57 of the U. P. Tenancy
Act, 1939 (U. P. Act XVII of 1939).”
69. In fact, on a plain reading of Section 3(2), the transaction in the
present case and agreement to sale executed by the tenant, as claimed by
the petitioners, itself have been declared as null and void from the date of
its execution; the said mandate of Section 3 would have no avail on the
rights claimed by the petitioners, as such, contention of Shri Rishabh
Kapoor on that count is liable to be rejected and is rejected.
70. For all the reasons recorded above, both the petitions deserve to be
dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.
71. It is made clear that it will be open to the petitioners to initiate
appropriate proceedings for declaration of their rights if so deemed fit and
as may be advised to the petitioners.
May 26, 2026 [Pankaj Bhatia, J.]
Nishant/-
Digitally signed by :-
NISHANT MOHAN
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench