Sanjay Kumar vs The State Of Bihar
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 735
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3316 OF 2026
Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4268 of 2026
(Diary No. 6004 of 2026)
SANJAY KUMAR ...APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. …RESPONDENT (S)
J U D G M E N T
NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal assails the judgment dated
11.09.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in
Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 224 of 2025, whereby the High Court
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
dismissed the appeal preferred by the present petitioner and
Date: 2026.07.22
17:14:14 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 35
affirmed the judgment of acquittal dated 24.12.2024 passed by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Hilsa, District
Nalanda, in Sessions Trial No. 596 of 2003 / Reg. No. 8423 of
2014, arising out of Hilsa P.S. Case No. 373 of 1998. By the
judgment of the learned Trial Court, the Respondent No. 2,
namely Nakul Prasad @ Nakul Yadav, was acquitted of the
offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms Act,
1959. The High Court, while affirming the acquittal, held that
the prosecution case was not free from doubt. The High Court
principally noticed the mismatch between the ocular version and
the medical evidence, the non-examination of material
independent witnesses, the hostility of the two independent
witnesses examined at the trial, and the fact that the remaining
material witnesses were related/interested witnesses whose
evidence required closer scrutiny.
3. The limited question before us is, whether the concurrent
acquittal recorded by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court suffers from such perversity, manifest illegality, or
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gross misappreciation of evidence as would warrant interference
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4. The prosecution case, shorn of unnecessary details, is
that on 11.10.1998, the informant Raju Kumar, along with his
elder brother Vinod Prasad, (hereinafter referred to as the
“deceased”), the present petitioner Sanjay Kumar (son of the
deceased), and other villagers had gone to Yogipur market for
purchasing household articles. While they were returning, at
about 4:00 p.m., near the paddy field of one Jairam Singh at
Soharpur Village, the Respondent No. 2, along with other
accused persons, allegedly intercepted and surrounded them.
The Respondent No. 2, armed with a country-made rifle, is
alleged to have fired at the deceased, the shot striking him on
the right side of his chin/beard. As observed by the High Court
in para 2,
“ 2. ...One of the accused named Anugrah Prasad, then
instigated others, that their enemy and main opponent
Binod Prasad (deceased) somehow came into clutch,
shoot him to death. After that, the accused Anugrah
Prasad, armed with a rifle fired a bullet which struck
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the deceased on the forehead, then the accused Bablu
Prasad who was armed with rifle fired a shot that hit
on the kanpati of the deceased, after that accused
Rajdev Prasad who was armed with rifle fired a bullet
which hit at the back of head and Nakul Prasad
(accused in the present case) who was also armed with
rifle fired a bullet which hit the deceased on the right
side of the chin. Consequently, the informant's brother
Binod Prasad sustained severe injuries and died on
spot… ”
5. The deceased succumbed to the firearm injuries at the
spot. The fardbeyan was recorded on the same day at about
21:45 hours, and the FIR came to be registered the next day on
12.10.1998 at about 09:30 hours as Hilsa P.S. Case No. 373 of
1998, under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms
Act. The Respondent No. 2 was named as one of the accused.
6. The case of the Respondent No. 2 was subsequently split
up and was tried separately in Sessions Trial No. 596 of 2003.
Cognizance was taken on 08.09.2003, and charges were framed
against the Respondent No. 2 on 13.06.2012.
7. During the trial, the prosecution examined, among
others, Sanjay Kumar (PW-1), Sudhanshu Kumar Vibhav (PW-
2), Raj Kumar (PW-4), Dr. Awadesh Kumar Singh (PW-6), and
Manmohan Prasad (PW-7), the Investigating Officer. Tunni
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Prasad (PW-3) and Vinni Bhagat @ Vindi Bhagat (PW-5) were
declared hostile. The defence examined several witnesses in
support of the plea of alibi , inter alia .
8. The learned Trial Court acquitted the Respondent No. 2.
The Appellant, being the son of the deceased and the informant,
preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High Court
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the acquittal. Hence, the
present appeal.
OBSERVATIONS OF THE HIGH COURT
9. The High Court noted that the principal question before
it was whether the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court required
interference. In paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment, the
High Court observed that the FIR alleged four gunshot injuries
to the deceased, whereas the post-mortem report showed only
three entry wounds. The High Court treated this as a “clear
mismatch” between the medical evidence and the FIR,
weakening the prosecution case.
“10. On scrutiny of the evidence available on records,
this Court finds that the prosecution case is not free
from doubt. the F.I.R. alleges that four gunshot Injuries
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were caused to the deceased by the accused persons,
but the postmortem report shows only three entry
wounds. This clear mismatch between the medical
evidence and the version in the F.I.R. weakens the
prosecution case. ”
10. In paragraph 11, the High Court further observed that
though the chargesheet named five independent witnesses, only
two were examined, and both PW-3 and PW-5 did not support
the prosecution case and were declared hostile. The High Court
also relied upon the non-examination of other independent
witnesses.
11. The High Court also observed that the witnesses relied
upon by the prosecution were related to the deceased and,
therefore, their evidence required closer scrutiny. Though the
High Court referred to the principle in Dalip Singh v. State of
1
Punjab , that evidence of related witnesses cannot be discarded
merely on the ground of relationship, it proceeded to hold that
in the present case, the testimony of such witnesses was
unreliable as, according to the High Court, the same stood
contradicted by the medical evidence. The High Court finally
1
AIR 1953 SC 364
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held that no perversity or illegality existed in the Trial Court
judgment warranting interference.
SUBMISSION BY PARTIES
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant:
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted
that the High Court committed a serious error in affirming the
acquittal by mechanically invoking the limited scope of
interference with an order of acquittal, without independently
examining whether the appreciation of evidence by the Trial
Court was manifestly erroneous or perverse.
13. It was submitted that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 are
eyewitnesses who consistently attributed the fatal shot to
Respondent No. 2. Sanjay Kumar (PW-1), the son of the
deceased, categorically stated that Respondent No. 2, fired the
shot which struck the deceased on the right side of his
chin/beard, causing his death. PW-2, Sudhanshu Kumar
Vibhav corroborated PW-1 and identified the Respondent No. 2
in the court. PW-4, Raj Kumar also categorically deposed that
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Respondent No. 2 fired the fatal shot and further affirmed the
presence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 as eyewitnesses.
14. It was further submitted that the medical evidence does
not contradict the ocular version. PW-6, Dr. Awadesh Kumar
Singh noted, inter alia, a lacerated wound on the right side of
the chin with inverted margin and blackening of surrounding
skin, which was a firearm entry wound. He further opined that
death occurred due to shock and haemorrhage caused by
firearm injuries. In cross-examination, the doctor also accepted
the possibility of such a wound being caused from a short
distance, depending upon the weapon and angle of firing.
15. It was submitted that the High Court’s reasoning that
the FIR mentioned four gunshot injuries while the post-mortem
mentioned three entry wounds is wholly unsustainable. The
post-mortem injuries, properly read, correspond to the
prosecution version. The injury attributed to Anugrah
corresponds to injury no. 1; the injury attributed to Bablu
corresponds to injury no. 2; the injuries attributed to Rajdev
correspond to injuries no. 3 and 4, including the rib
fracture/back shot; and the injuries attributed to Nakul, i.e.,
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Respondent No. 2, correspond to injuries no. 5 and 6 relating to
the gunshot injury on the chin/right side of the beard. The
alleged discrepancy is, therefore, neither material nor
fundamental.
16. It was further submitted that the High Court failed to
give due weight to the post-mortem evidence of PW-6, which
conclusively established a firearm entry wound on the right side
of the chin with blackening, perfectly matching the ocular
account regarding the manner, distance, and nature of assault
by the Respondent No. 2, Nakul Prasad, thereby providing
complete medical corroboration to the prosecution story so far
as the Respondent No. 2 Nakul Prasad is concerned.
17. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court failed to
appreciate that related witnesses are not necessarily untruthful
witnesses. If they are natural witnesses and their presence at the
place of occurrence is established, their testimony cannot be
discarded merely because of their relationship with the
deceased. It was further submitted that no motive has been
attributed to PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 to falsely implicate the
Respondent No. 2 while allowing the real assailant to escape.
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18. It was further submitted that the High Court overlooked
that while exercising appellate jurisdiction against a judgment of
acquittal, interference is not barred where the findings are
manifestly erroneous, unreasonable, or result in miscarriage of
justice. The impugned judgment mechanically affirmed the Trial
Court judgment.
19. The Respondent No. 1, State in its counter has
highlighted the criminal antecedents of the Respondent No. 2
and submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from non-
consideration of material evidence and erroneous application of
settled principles governing appreciation of ocular testimony and
has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. Notably, PWs 1, 2
and 4 all gave consistent eyewitness accounts of the incident
including the role played by the Respondent No. 2 in firing at the
deceased. PW-6 in his examination in chief, corroborated the
ocular accounts with his medical examination that mentioned a
firearm entry wound on the right side of the chin of the deceased
with blackening of the surrounding skin. Though PWs 3 and 5
turned hostile, PW-3 admitted to the occurrence and that there
had been a commotion at the place of the incident. The IO, PW-
Page 10 of 35
7 further supported the case of the prosecution and clearly
stated that no contemporaneous defence evidence had been
given at the time of investigation regarding the alleged alibi plea
of the Respondent No. 2. Under these circumstances, the non-
examination of independent witnesses could not be said to be
fatal to the case of the prosecution.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondents
20. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
Respondent No. 2 supported the judgments of the Trial Court
and the High Court. It was submitted that this Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution,
ought not to interfere with concurrent findings of acquittal
unless the findings are manifestly perverse or result in gross
miscarriage of justice.
21. It was submitted that the Trial Court, upon a
comprehensive examination of the documents, witness
testimonies, and submissions, found that the prosecution case
stood cumulatively discredited. The Trial Court noted that the
medical evidence did not support the prosecution version; story
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itself appeared improbable; presence of interested eye ‑ witnesses
was doubtful; there was unexplained delay in lodging the FIR;
conduct of the informant and family members was unnatural;
several witnesses were inimical; and the prosecution failed to
secure corroboration from independent witnesses. These
infirmities, coupled with serious lapses in investigation, led to
the irresistible conclusion that the prosecution had failed to
prove the charges against the Respondent No. 2 beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in his acquittal.
22. It was submitted that the High Court found itself in
agreement with the above view founded on that the principle that
the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The High Court while affirming the acquittal and upholding the
order of the Trial Court further reiterated the well-settled
principle:
“ 19. Thus, an order of acquittal is to be interfered with
only for compelling and substantial reasons. In case if
the order is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling
reason for interference. But, where there is no
perversity in the finding of the impugned judgment of
acquittal, the Appellate Court must not take a different
view only because another view is possible. It is
because the Trial Court has the privilege of seeing the
demeanour of witnesses and therefore, its decision
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must not be upset in absence of strong and compelling
grounds. 20. In view of the above, we do not find any
illegality and perversity in the findings recorded by the
Trial Court .”
23. It was submitted that the Trial Court had the benefit of
observing the demeanour of witnesses, and the High Court
rightly refused to interfere with the acquittal. Learned counsel
also submitted that the prosecution failed to examine
independent witnesses, that the related witnesses were
interested, and that the medical evidence did not support the
ocular version. Reliance was placed on the general principle that
where two views are possible, the view favouring the accused
must prevail.
24. It was further submitted that as recorded in Para 26 of
the Trial Court judgment, it is evident that statements of more
than twenty (20) witnesses were recorded. However, out of the
twenty witnesses, only ten (10) best witnesses were named as
charge-sheet witnesses. Out of the ten charge-sheet witnesses,
three (3) were held up by the prosecution and were not produced
before the Trial Court for reasons best known to the prosecution.
That out of the remaining seven (7) witnesses who were
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examined in the present case, PW-3 and PW-5 were independent
witnesses who turned hostile. The independent witnesses who
were witnesses of the inquest report and seizure list were also
neither recorded before the investigating officer nor examined
before the Trial Court. PW-6, was the medical officer and PW-7
was the Investigating Officer in the present case. Thus, the entire
prosecution case rests only on the three (3) related and highly
interested witnesses.
25. It was also submitted by the Respondent 2 that the
deceased person had a criminal antecedent, being known to have
killed Respondent No. 2’s father and had been pursuing
Respondent No. 2 due to past animosity and jealousy arising
from Respondent No. 2’s good social standing and respect in
society. The chargesheet dated 12.01.1999 bearing No. 02/99
was filed against two co ‑ accused, who were subsequently
convicted (Para 19 of the counter).
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ANALYSIS
Scope of interference with an acquittal:
26. At the outset, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the
settled principles governing interference with an order of
acquittal. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
When a court of competent jurisdiction acquits the accused, the
presumption of innocence is not weakened but reinforced. Where
such acquittal is affirmed by the High Court, the caution to be
exercised by this Court under Article 136 is even greater.
2
27. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh , this
Court explained the golden thread running through criminal
jurisprudence in the following words:
“25. Another golden thread which runs through the
web of the administration of justice in criminal cases is
that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced
in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and
the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable
to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a
special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the
accused is sought to be established by circumstantial
evidence. Rule has accordingly been laid down that
unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
is inconsistent with that of his innocence, the Court
2
( 1973) 2 SCC 808
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should refrain from recording a finding of guilt of the
accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case the
Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt
of the accused, the accused must have the benefit of
that doubt. Of course, the doubt regarding the guilt of
the accused should be reasonable; it is not the doubt
of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is
incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that
is hesitant and afraid to take things to their natural
consequences. The rule regarding the benefit of doubt
also does not warrant acquittal of the accused by
resort to surmises, conjectures or fanciful
considerations. As mentioned by us recently in the
case of State of Punjab V. Jagir Singh a criminal trial is
not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to
one’s imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with
the question as to whether the accused arraigned at
the trial is guilty of the offence with which he is
charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the
product of interplay of different human emotions. In
arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused
charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has
to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities
intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every
case in the final analysis would have to depend upon
its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable
doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts
should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex
facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in
the nature of conjectures.”
28. The decision in Kali Ram (supra) further cautions that
wrongful acquittal and wrongful conviction do not stand on the
same footing, for conviction of an innocent person causes grave
injustice and shakes public confidence in the administration of
criminal justice. The rule of benefit of doubt, therefore, is not a
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technical rule; it is a substantive safeguard flowing from the
presumption of innocence.
3
29. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh , this Court
reiterated the limited scope of interference with acquittals. This
Court observed:
“75. The Trial Court has the advantage of watching
the demeanour of the witnesses who have given
evidence, therefore, the appellate court should be
slow to interfere with the decisions of the Trial Court.
An acquittal by the Trial Court should not be
interfered with unless it is totally perverse or wholly
unsustainable.”
30. The decision in Ghurey Lal (supra) also crystallised
certain propositions: first, there is a double presumption of
innocence in favour of an acquitted accused; secondly, if two
views are possible, the view favourable to the accused must
prevail; thirdly, though the appellate court has the power to
reappreciate evidence, it should interfere only when the acquittal
is manifestly illegal, perverse or results in miscarriage of justice;
and fourthly, due weight must be given to the Trial Court’s
3
(2008) 10 SCC 450
Page 17 of 35
findings, particularly because the trial judge had the advantage
of observing the demeanour of witnesses.
4
31. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka , this Court
held that though the appellate court has full power to review and
reappreciate the evidence, the presumption of innocence is
strengthened by an order of acquittal. It was held that when two
reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal.
32. The same principle was restated in Mrinal Das v. State
5
of Tripura , wherein this Court held that an order of acquittal
is to be interfered with only when there are compelling and
substantial reasons for doing so. If two reasonable views are
possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal.
33. Therefore, the question before us is not whether another
view on the evidence is possible. The question is whether the
view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is
4
(2007) 4 SCC 415
5
(2011) 9 SCC 479
Page 18 of 35
impossible, perverse, wholly unsustainable, or manifestly illegal.
Having examined the record, we are unable to hold so.
Related witnesses and need for close scrutiny:
34. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
evidence of a related witness cannot be rejected merely on the
ground of relationship. Dalip Singh (supra) and the long line of
decisions following it make it clear that a close relative is often a
natural witness and may not ordinarily allow the real offender to
go scot-free by falsely implicating an innocent person.
35. However, the said principle does not mean that the
evidence of related witnesses must be accepted as a matter of
course. The correct rule is one of careful scrutiny. If the related
witnesses are otherwise reliable, their testimony can sustain
conviction. But where their evidence suffers from material
infirmities, where their presence is doubtful, where independent
witnesses do not support the prosecution, and where the
medical evidence does not fully fit the ocular version, the court
must necessarily proceed with caution.
Page 19 of 35
36. In the present case, the prosecution case ultimately
rests upon PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4. PW-1 is the son of the
deceased. PW-2 and PW-4 are also not wholly independent of the
complainant side. The independent witnesses, PW-3 and PW-5
did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile.
The remaining independent witnesses named in the chargesheet
were not examined.
37. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the High
Court was not justified in holding that the evidence of PW-1, PW-
2 and PW-4 required close scrutiny. The High Court did not
reject their evidence merely because they were related or
interested. It found that their version, when tested against the
medical evidence and the overall circumstances, was not free
from doubt.
Ocular evidence vis-à-vis FIR and post-mortem report:
38. The central plank of the appellant’s argument is that
PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 consistently attributed a specific role to
the Respondent No. 2, namely that he fired a shot which hit the
deceased on the right side of the chin/beard. It is also urged that
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this allegation corresponds to injury no. (v) in the post-mortem
report, namely the firearm entry wound on the right side of the
chin with blackening.
39. We have considered this submission carefully. At first
blush, the injury on the right side of the chin does appears to
correspond with the role attributed to the Respondent No. 2.
However, criminal conviction cannot be based on an isolated
matching circumstance by separating it from the remaining
prosecution case. The court has to consider whether the
prosecution version as a whole inspires confidence and whether
the ocular account, read with the medical evidence, proves the
charge beyond reasonable doubt.
40. The FIR version, as noticed by the High Court, alleged
that four shots were fired by four accused persons causing four
gunshot injuries: one on the forehead, one on the temple, one on
the back/head region, and one on the right side of the chin. The
post-mortem report, however, showed three firearm entry
wounds with corresponding exit wounds. The High Court treated
this as a clear mismatch between the medical evidence and the
FIR. We do not find such reasoning to be perverse.
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41. The prosecution seeks to explain this discrepancy by
saying that one gunshot may have entry and exit wounds and
that lay witnesses may not be expected to medically classify
injuries. That proposition, in the abstract, is correct. However,
in the present case, the difficulty is not merely numerical. The
difficulty lies in the manner in which individual overt acts are
assigned to different accused and the corresponding medical
injuries do not neatly support the entire ocular account.
42. The correlation between the ocular account and the
post-mortem injuries may be stated thus:
Post-mortem injury
/ medical
description
Witness statement /
ocular corroboration
Observations
Injury No. (i) :
Lacerated wound of 1'
x '3/4' x cavity Deep
circular with inverted
margin and
blackening of
surrounding area in
the fore head just
abuse the nose i,e.
wound of entry.
Attributed to Anugrah
Prasad (Accused 1)
corresponds with this first
firearm injury.
This portion broadly
corresponds with one
firearm track.
However, the medical
evidence treats the
temporal injury as the
exit wound of the
forehead entry wound,
whereas the ocular
version separately
attributes a temple
shot to Babloo
(Accused No. 2).
● PW-1 states
Anugrah Prasad
fired a shot from his
rifle which hit Vinod
Prasad right in the
middle of his
forehead.
● PW-2 states that all
accused except
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Ramanand were
carrying rifles.
● PW-4 states that
Anugrah Prasad
fired a shot from his
rifle which stuck my
brother in the
forehead, directly
above the nose.
Injury No. (ii):
Lacerated wound of
left temporal region
with everted margin
4"x2"x cavity deep
brain and brain
matter brotruted
temporal bone left
side fractured i.e. exit
wound.
The injury attributed to
Babloo (Accused No. 2)
corresponds with this
firearm injury.
This creates a
difficulty. If the left
temporal injury was an
exit wound
corresponding to the
forehead entry wound,
the ocular version
attributing a separate
temple shot to Babloo
does not fully accord
with the medical
evidence.
● PW-1 states that
Babloo fired a shot
that hit Vinod on
the left temple.
● PW-4 states that
Bablu Prasad fired
the gun and the
bullet hit my
brother in the left
temple.
Injury No. (iii):
Lacerated wound on
the left side of the
chest at third in
temporal space with
inverted and black
margin charring
around the skin 2"x
1/2" x’ cavity deep i.e.
wound of entry. 2nd,
3rd and 4th ribs
fractured.
Attributed to Rajdev
(Accused No. 3)
This is a material area
of concern. The
medical injury is an
entry wound on the
left chest with exit on
the back, whereas the
ocular version does
not consistently or
clearly correspond to
this chest-entry
firearm track, rather
speaks of being shot in
the back, thus there
● PW-1 states that
Rajdev fired a shot
that hit him in the
back ( राजदेव गोली
चलाए जो पीठ के पीछे
लगा। @Pg 51) .
● PW-4 states that
Rajdev fired the
gun and the bullet
hit his brother in
Page 23 of 35
Injury No. (iv):
Lacerated wound on
the back of the left
side on bars Area-
21/2" x 2"x cavity
deep with everted
margin i.e. exit
wound,
the back of the
head on the left
side ( राजदेव ने गोली
would be entry wound
in the back.
चलाया जो भाई के सिर
के पीछे बाएँ तरफ लगा।
@Pg. 101).
Injuries (iii) and (iv) are
connected with each other
as per PW-6 Doctor’s
deposition
Injury No. (v):
Lacerated wound
measuring about 1½"
x 1" x bone deep on
the right side of the
chin, with inverted
margin and
blackening of
surrounding skin —
wound of entry.
Injury No. (vi):
Lacerated wound in
the occipital region of
the scalp with everted
margin, fracture of
occipital bone and
protrusion of brain
matter -
corresponding exit
wound.
Attributed to Nakul Yadav
(Accused No.
4/Respondent No. 2)
This is the most crucial
injury for the present
appeal.
This portion does lend
some support to the
prosecution case
against the
Respondent No. 2.
However, the court
cannot isolate this one
circumstance from the
broader
inconsistencies in the
prosecution version,
particularly when the
case rests on
related/interested
witnesses and
independent
witnesses have not
supported the
prosecution.
● PW-1 Sanjay Kumar
specifically stated
that Respondent
No. 2 Nakul Prasad
@ Nakul Yadav
fired the shot
which hit the
deceased on the
right side of the
chin/beard .
● PW-2 corroborated
PW-1 in material
particulars and
identified
Respondent No. 2.
● PW-4 also
categorically
deposed that
Respondent No. 2
fired the shot
Page 24 of 35
which hit the
deceased on the
right side of the
chin/beard .
● The post-mortem
injury no. (v) is
therefore a direct
medical
corroboration of the
role assigned to
Respondent No. 2.
43. The above comparison shows that although one part of
the ocular version appears to correspond with injury no. (v), the
overall prosecution version is not free from doubt. The FIR and
eyewitnesses attribute distinct shots to distinct accused in a
particular manner. The medical evidence, however, shows three
firearm tracks. The left temporal injury, which the ocular
witnesses attribute to a separate shot by Babloo, is medically
recorded as an exit wound corresponding to another entry
wound. The chest/back injury also does not fully correspond
with the ocular description of a shot at the back/head region.
44. This assumes significance because the present case is
not one where there is a single eyewitness speaking to a single
injury. The prosecution has built its case on a detailed
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attribution of separate shots by separate assailants. Where such
detailed attribution is not fully supported by medical evidence,
and where independent witnesses do not support the
prosecution, the court must be slow in overturning an acquittal.
45. The High Court, therefore, cannot be said to have acted
perversely in treating the mismatch between the FIR/ocular
version and the post-mortem report as a relevant circumstance.
It is not necessary for the accused to demonstrate that the
prosecution case is false in every respect. It is sufficient if the
evidence creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the
prosecution has proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
46. We are also unable to accept the appellant’s submission
that since injury no. (v) corresponds to the role attributed to the
Respondent No. 2, conviction must necessarily follow. The
criminal court cannot pick one apparently corroborated portion
while ignoring other material inconsistencies, especially in an
appeal against acquittal. The question is whether the evidence
as a whole crosses the threshold of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. In our view, the Trial Court and High Court were justified
in holding that it does not.
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Independent witnesses and hostile witnesses:
47. The prosecution case is further weakened by the fact
that though five independent witnesses were named in the
chargesheet, only two were examined at trial, and both did not
support the prosecution case. PW-3 and PW-5 were declared
hostile. The remaining independent witnesses were not
examined.
48. It is true that non-examination of independent
witnesses is not always fatal. If the evidence of examined
witnesses is otherwise cogent, reliable and trustworthy, non-
examination of other witnesses may not affect the prosecution
case. However, this principle cannot be applied mechanically in
every case.
49. In the present matter, the independent witnesses were
not peripheral witnesses. The prosecution itself considered them
material enough to cite them in the chargesheet. When the two
independent witnesses examined did not support the
prosecution, and the remaining independent witnesses were
withheld without satisfactory explanation, the courts below were
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entitled to treat this as a circumstance creating doubt on the
prosecution case.
50. The argument that hostile witnesses do not completely
efface the prosecution case is again correct as a proposition of
law. But where the prosecution case is otherwise attended by
contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, doubtful
presence of interested witnesses, and lack of independent
corroboration, the hostility of independent witnesses assumes
greater significance.
51. Therefore, we find no perversity in the High Court’s
reliance on this circumstance.
Delay, conduct and investigation lapses:
52. The Courts below also noticed other circumstances
which, cumulatively, affected the prosecution case. The
Respondent No. 2 has pointed out that there was a delay of more
than five hours in recording the fardbeyan and of more than
seventeen hours in registration of the FIR. The information was
allegedly received from an unidentified person, but the name and
time of such information were not properly recorded.
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53. It was also argued on behalf of the Respondent No. 2
that the allegation was of indiscriminate firing for several
minutes, yet no person other than the deceased received even a
scratch injury. Only two empty shells were recovered from the
place of occurrence. The investigation was also stated to be silent
regarding the identification of three unknown persons
mentioned in the chargesheet.
54. Each of these circumstances, viewed in isolation, may
perhaps not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case. But
criminal trials are not decided by isolating circumstances
favourable to one side. The Court must assess the cumulative
effect of all infirmities. In the present case, the Trial Court and
the High Court found that these circumstances, taken together,
created a reasonable doubt on the prosecution case. We cannot
hold such a view to be perverse.
PLEA OF ALIBI
55. Considerable argument was addressed before us on the
plea of alibi. The appellant submitted that the plea of alibi set up
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by the Respondent No. 2 was weak and belated, and that the
defence witnesses did not establish the plea with certainty.
56. It is true that a plea of alibi must be proved with a high
degree of certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of
the accused being present at the place of occurrence. However,
in the present case, the order of acquittal does not rest solely on
the plea of alibi. The Respondent No. 2 is correct in contending
that both the Trial Court and the High Court found broader
infirmities in the prosecution case. The Trial Court, as
submitted, did not base the acquittal only on the alibi plea, but
on the cumulative failure of the prosecution to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt.
57. Thus, even if the alibi is kept aside, the prosecution is
still required to stand on its own legs. The weakness of the
defence or falsehood of the plea of defence does not relieve the
prosecution of its burden. Where the prosecution evidence itself
creates reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to acquittal,
even if his defence plea is not found credible.
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Criminal antecedents and subsequent cases:
58. The Appellant and the State have referred to criminal
antecedents of the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2, on
the other hand, has submitted that he had no criminal
antecedents at the time of the occurrence and that subsequent
unrelated cases cannot be used to prejudice the judicial
assessment of the present case.
59. We find merit in the caution suggested by the
Respondent No. 2. The guilt or innocence of an accused in a
criminal trial must be determined on the basis of evidence
adduced in that trial. Subsequent or unrelated allegations
cannot be used to fill gaps in the prosecution case or to reverse
a concurrent acquittal. Unless such material is legally relevant
and properly proved, it cannot substitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
60. In the present case, the concurrent acquittal must be
tested on the evidence relating to the occurrence dated
11.10.1998. We are not inclined to allow extraneous subsequent
material to displace the findings recorded by the Courts below.
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Whether the concurrent acquittal warrants interference:
61. Applying the principles in Kali Ram , Chandrappa ,
Ghurey Lal , and Mrinal Das (supra), we find that the present
case does not meet the threshold for interference with the
concurrent acquittal.
62. The view taken by the Courts below may not be the only
possible view. The Appellant has attempted to demonstrate that
the injury on the chin corresponds to the role attributed to the
Respondent No. 2. However, the question is not whether another
view is possible. The question is whether the view taken by the
Courts below is so unreasonable that no court could have taken
it.
63. We are unable to say so. The Courts below noticed
material circumstances: the mismatch between ocular and
medical evidence; the fact that independent witnesses did not
support the prosecution; non-examination of remaining
independent witnesses; reliance on interested/related
witnesses; delay and investigative lapses; and the broader
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improbabilities in the prosecution story. These are relevant
considerations in a criminal trial.
64. The High Court did not acquit the Respondent No. 2 on
fanciful grounds. It affirmed an acquittal after noticing that the
prosecution case was not free from doubt. The Trial Court, which
had the advantage of observing the witnesses, had also found
the prosecution case insufficient to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Such concurrent findings cannot be lightly
interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution.
65. The benefit of doubt doctrine is not an empty formality.
Where the evidence leaves room for reasonable doubt, the court
must lean in favour of the accused. This is particularly so where
the accused has already secured acquittal from the Trial Court
and the acquittal has been affirmed by the High Court,
strengthening his case of innocence.
CONCLUSION
66. On an overall consideration of the evidence, we are also
of the view that the prosecution has not been able to establish
guilt of the Respondent No. 2 with such a clear, cogent and
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unimpeachable case as would justify reversal of his concurrent
acquittal.
67. Though the prosecution witnesses have attributed a role
to the Respondent No. 2, the ocular version, when read with the
FIR, the post-mortem report, the testimony of the doctor, the
hostility of independent witnesses, non-examination of other
independent witnesses, and other surrounding circumstances,
does not exclude reasonable doubt about his role.
68. The High Court’s view that the mismatch between the
medical and ocular evidence weakens the prosecution case
cannot be said to be perverse. Nor can it be said that the High
Court ignored material evidence or adopted a view which is
wholly unsustainable in law.
69. In an appeal against acquittal, and more particularly in
a case of concurrent acquittal, this Court would not substitute
its own view merely because another view is possible. The
findings recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court are based on appreciation of evidence and do not call for
interference.
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70. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment
dated 11.09.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Patna in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 224 of 2025 , affirming the
judgment of acquittal dated 24.12.2024 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-III, Hilsa, District Nalanda in
Sessions Trial No. 596 of 2003 / Reg. No. 8423 of 2014 , is
affirmed.
71. The Respondent No. 2, Nakul Prasad @ Nakul Yadav
on being acquitted, shall stand discharged of his bail bonds, if
any, subject to compliance with Section 437-A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, if applicable.
72. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
……..……………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
……..…………..….……………….………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 21, 2026
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