Saregama India Limited vs Black Madras Films & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Order reserved on: 18.05.2026
Order delivered on: 01.07.2026
CS(COMM) 1310/2025, I.A. 11010/2026, I.A. 13142/2026 & I.A.
+
13143/2026
SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED .....Plaintiff
versus
BLACK MADRAS FILMS & ORS. .....Defendants
+ CS(COMM) 143/2026
SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED .....Plaintiff
versus
MR ILAIYARAAJA .....Defendant
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff : Mr. Chander M. Lall, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Ankur Sangal, Mr. Ankit Arvind, Mr. Shashwat
Rakshit, Ms. Sucheta Roy and Mr. Rishabh
Rao, Advocates. [In 143/2026]
Mr. Akhil Sibal, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Ankur Sangal, Mr. Ankit Arvind, Mr. Shashwat
Rakshit, Ms. Sucheta Roy and Mr. Rishabh
Rao, Advocates. [In 1310/2025]
For the Defendants : Ms. Swathi Sukumar, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Naveen Nagarjuna, Ms. Shloka Narayanan, Mr.
Ritk Raghuwanshi, Ms. Rishika Agarwal and
Ms. Anshu Tulsyan, Advocates for D-5.
Mr. Vinayak Batta, Advocate for D-1 to 4.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 1 of 58
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
O R D E R
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
1. With the consent of the parties, the applications seeking interim
injunction on behalf of the plaintiff and those seeking vacation of the exparte
ad interim injunction orders passed in both suits are being taken up for
adjudication together as issues are similar and overlapping in certain areas.
CS(COMM) 143/2026
I.A. 4116/2026 & I.A.6361/2026 (Under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC
& Order XXXIX Rule 4, CPC)
2. The plaintiff/Saregama India limited in has filed an application bearing
I.A. No. 4116/2026 under XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC” ) seeking ex-parte ad-
interim injunction against the defendants.
3. By the order dated 13.02.2026, this Court had granted ex-parte ad-
interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA restraining him from using the plaintiff’s
copyrighted works i.e. the sound recordings and literary and musical works
forming a part of the said cinematograph films which are enlisted as Annexure
A to the said order.
4. The defendant/ILAIYARAAJA has filed an application bearing I.A.
No.6361/2026 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC seeking vacation of the
ex-parte ad-interim order dated 13.02.2026.
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 2 of 58
5. Before adverting to and considering the applications aforementioned, it
may be appropriate to state the brief background of the plaintiff’s case as
under:
5.1. Plaintiff claims to be a company engaged in the business of
acquisition of copyrights in the songs/sound recording and in the
underlying literary, musical and dramatic works contained therein and
distribution, sale and exploitation of the same through various modes and
mediums.
5.2. It is stated that the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff
against the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA to restrain him from infringing the
copyrighted works of the plaintiff, granting unauthorised licenses to the
third-parties.
5.3. Plaintiff further claims that it is the owner of the sound
recordings and the musical and literary works in the songs of the
cinematograph films provided in para 7 of the plaint, by virtue of various
assignment agreements signed by the plaintiff with the original producers
of the said cinematograph films.
5.4. Plaintiff claims that it has recently come across infringing use of
the plaintiff’s copyrighted works by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA by
uploading the same on various platforms like Amazon Music, Apple
iTunes and JioSaavan, and whereby the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is
claiming copyright over the same.
5.5. Hence the suit.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS:
6. Arguing for the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA, Ms. Swathi Sukumar,
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learned senior counsel would argue as under:
6.1. Learned senior counsel contended that as a preliminary objection,
the plaint suffers from misjoinder of causes of action for the reason that
the prayer clause of the plaint contains only a single prayer for all the 134
films which are subject matter of the present suit. She would submit that
contrary to normal procedure, the plaintiff has not provided even a single
reason as to why all the 134 films have been bundled together in one plaint
inasmuch as barring certain clauses which may be common to the
contracts entered into, substantially all contracts would have some
differences and most importantly different parties.
6.2. She would vehemently contend that since the parties to the
agreement apart from the plaintiff being common, are different persons or
entities and none of them having been impleaded, it would be onerous to
expect the defendant to give a parawise, clear and concise reply thereby
depriving the defendant of a valuable right to his defense. It was argued
that even the plaint does not carry any specific details in respect of the 134
films or the agreements/assignment deeds claimed to be executed by the
plaintiff and, therefore, it could not be expected from the defendant to give
a precise and clear written statement to the averments contained in the
plaint. According to learned senior counsel, the suit cannot be proceeded
with, for lack of clarity and preciseness.
6.3. Learned senior counsel would contend that the plaintiff has very
cleverly drafted the plaint particularly the cause of action paragraph. In
that, she would contend that the said paragraph refers to an omnibus
contention that the plaintiff came across infringing content uploaded by
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the defendant on online streaming platforms which would amount to
infringement of plaintiff’s copyright. She would contend that the precise
nature or the name of the online platform is conspicuous by its absence in
the said paragraph. Though, in the body of the plaint the plaintiff has
referred to online platforms like Amazon Music, Apple iTunes and
JioSaavan, the deliberate non-inclusion of these names in the cause of
action paragraph appears to be with oblique motive.
6.4. Explaining further the aforesaid contention, she would contend
that the non-mentioning of the aforesaid entities is deliberate as the
plaintiff is aware of the songs being exploited by the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA in the YouTube channel since at least the year
2017. Thus, in order to conceal the active knowledge of the defendant, the
plaintiff has deliberately omitted the names of not only the three online
platforms but also the YouTube channel.
6.5. While referring to the defendant’s document particularly the
screenshot of the YouTube Channel of the defendant, she would contend
that the said screenshots, like many others filed on record, clearly indicate
the date of publication or uploading of the songs by the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA. Some of them clearly indicated the month of
August, 2017. Predicated on the aforesaid fact, she would contend that the
plaintiff being a phonographic company, cannot feign ignorance of the
music channel of the defendant on YouTube. The plaintiff, according to
her, is well aware of all the online music platforms including YouTube
and, therefore, cannot profess ignorance. She would stoutly contend that
having regard to the fact that the music was being exploited since the year
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2017 at least, the suit itself would be barred by limitation and in view of
the knowledge, the balance of convenience is clearly not in favour of the
plaintiff.
6.6. Learned senior counsel handed over the Bench a set of
documents containing screenshots of the plaintiff’s YouTube channel to
demonstrate that the plaintiff had already launched its YouTube channel
way back in the year 2012. The said documents also contained a report
uploaded by the plaintiff for the years 2023-24 displaying that it had 373
billion viewers in FY 2023-24 and 107 million subscribers for its
YouTube channel. The said channel also boasted uploading and
exploitation of more than 1,50,000 songs. In the context of the aforesaid
information furnished in the YouTube channel as also the integrated
report, learned senior counsel would contend that the presence of plaintiff
on its YouTube channel since the year 2012 and read with the contents of
the integrated report, plaintiff cannot be heard to say that it had no
knowledge of the exploitation of the songs by the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA till the year 2025-26. Thus, she would contend
that the conduct of the plaintiff would clearly establish that it recognizes
the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA unalienable rights to exploit not only his
own musical compositions but also the sound recordings alleged to have
been infringed by the defendant.
6.7. Apart from the above, she would contend that the parties have
been in litigation from the past many years and, thus, the plaintiff cannot
contend that it did not have any knowledge of the songs being exploited by
the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA over the YouTube channel.
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6.8. Learned senior counsel would next draw attention of this Court to
one of the many agreements filed on record by the plaintiff. While reading
through some of those agreements she emphasised on various clauses like
Clause 4(b) of the assignment agreement dated 25.08.1981, Clause 5 of
the assignment agreement dated 12.03.1978, Clause 6(b) and (e) and
Clause 18 of the assignment agreement dated 18.01.2001 to submit that (i)
in most of the agreements, the name of either the cinematograph film or
the songs were not mentioned and thus, there is no way of ascertaining as
to which of the cinematograph films or songs was the said agreement
executed for. According to her in the absence whereof, the suit ought to be
dismissed for lack of material particulars; (ii) the Clauses when read
together in conjunction would clearly indicate that the
agreements/assignment deeds were contingent, in that, the rights which are
purported to have been conferred upon the plaintiff would have crystalised
only when the Producer would have secured the consent in writing of all
artists, musicians, lyric writers, music directors and other persons
associated with or engaged in the cinematograph films. Having regard to
the contingent nature of the contract, learned senior counsel would
contend that, plaintiff has failed to place on record any document to prove
any such consent having been obtained by the producer from the
aforenoted persons. In the absence whereof, according to learned senior
counsel, the contracts are not concluded and, therefore, do not confer any
further right upon the plaintiff in legal terms. Construed and viewed in that
manner, the plaintiff has no right whatsoever either in the cinematograph
films or in the sound recordings embodied therein. Thus, the ex-parte ad-
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interim injunction ought to be vacated forthwith on this score alone.
6.9. She also referred to the various provisions of the Copyright Act,
1957 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) particularly Section 2(xx),
Section 2(p), Section 14(a) and Section 14(d) and (e) of the said Act to
submit that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that it has any rights
over the sound recording. According to her, the agreements placed on
record being contingent contracts and having not been concluded in the
manner stipulated thereunder coupled with the absence of written consent
from the owners of artistic, literary and dramatic works, the said
agreements cannot be enforced as they do not confer any right whatsoever
of a Producer as defined under the Act. She also contended that at least 57
agreements out of a total of 106 had already expired.
6.10. Learned senior counsel referred to Section 31 of the Contract Act,
1872 as also the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Shankar Bhat
and Anr. vs. Claude Pinto, since deceased by LRs and Ors.: (2003) 4
SCC 86 , particularly para 14 and 31 to submit that when an agreement is
subject to ratification by others a concluded contract cannot be deemed to
have been arrived at. Particularly, when the ratification is by persons who
are not parties to the agreement, such clause has to be held to be a
condition precedent for construing a concluded contract. She also
contended that a Division Bench of this Court in Shri Baij Nath vs. M/s.
Ansal & Saigal Properties Pvt. Ltd.: 1992 SCC OnLine Del 221,
particularly in para 6, to submit that unless the contingency contemplated
in the contract was not fulfilled, the contract could not be specifically
enforced. Thus, she would contend that there being no valid documentary
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evidence of the contingency having been complied with, the said contracts
do not have any legal standing and cannot be made the basis of plaintiff’s
suit.
6.11. For the proposition that the plaint suffers from misjoinder of
causes of action, Ms. Sukumar, learned senior counsel, relied upon the
judgments of Shivnarayan (Dead) By Legal Representatives vs. Maniklal
(Dead) Through Legal Representatives & Ors.: (2020) 11 SCC 629 and
Full Bench of this Court in Carlsberg Breweries A/s vs. Som Distilleries
and Breweries Ltd.: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 12912 . Relying upon the Full
Bench Judgment of this Court in Carlsberg ( supra) , she would contend
that for joinder of causes of action it would be necessary to demonstrate as
to whether the evidence to be led in the separate causes of action would be
common. In case, the evidence for most part is different, there cannot be a
joinder of causes of action. According to her, the said proposition applies
to the present case and would take wind out of the sails of the plaintiff’s
suit.
6.12. On the contention that plaintiff was already in the know of the
exploitation of the sound recordings by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA
over the YouTube channel in the Month of August, 2017 itself, learned
counsel referred to various screenshots filed on record by the defendant to
demonstrate that the defendant had been exploiting the said sound
recordings for the last almost ten years on one of the most popular music
platforms like YouTube. It was the contention of the learned senior
counsel that a music company like the plaintiff which claims to be the
producer of the cinematograph films enlisted in the plaint from the last 30
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years and has been exploiting the same over many online music platforms
cannot feign ignorance of not having knowledge of the exploitation being
continued by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA for the last almost ten years
on YouTube channel. According to her, the knowledge attributable to the
plaintiff and no action having been taken in the last ten years, are clear
pointers to the fact that the plaintiff knew and fully understands that the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is the sole owner of the sound records
embodied in the suit referred films. She relies upon the judgment of this
Court in the case of DCM Shriram Limited vs. Amreek Singh Chawla &
Ors: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 197 to submit that once that Court is made
aware of the fact that a plaintiff has deliberately concealed material and
relevant facts and has not approached the Court with clean hands, an ex-
parte ad-interim injunction which might have been granted, needs to be
vacated forthwith. Similarly, she also relied upon the judgment of Bombay
High Court in Commercial Suit (L) no.18278/2025 titled Shoham Salim
Thakur vs. Chaitanya Arora decided on 15.10.2025, particularly paras 11,
12, 64(A)(iii), 64D, 64J for the said proposition.
6.13. In order to buttress the argument that all rights embodied in the
cinematograph film including the original artistic, dramatic, literary works
were never assigned to the plaintiff, learned counsel also draws attention
to the plaintiff’s documents containing the agreement executed by the
predecessor in interest of the plaintiff whereby as per Clause 14 the
agreement/assignment deed does not include rights to manufacture and sell
compact disks and was restricted to the manufacture and sale of
records/audio cassettes within the territories of India only. As against this,
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Ms. Sukumar would contend that the plaint falsely avers that the
agreements conferred all rights as a producer in the cinematograph films
for exploitation in any manner and that too, worldwide and in perpetuity.
6.14. Handing over a chart of various provisions of the copyright Act,
1957 as originally enacted and amended in the years 1994 and 1995, she
would forcefully contend that despite a number of amendments to various
provisions, from time to time, sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Act, has
always retained its original character. Relying on the provisions of the
sub-section (4) of section 13, learned senior counsel would contend that
the plain reading of the said section would demonstrate the intent of the
legislature in protecting the individual rights of owners of different
embodiments of a sound recording like, artistic, literary or musical work.
She would contend that the copyright of a producer in a cinematograph
film or for that matter even in a sound recording does not affect the
separate copyright subsisting in any work. In support of the said
proposition she would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. vs. Eastern Indian Motion
Pictures Association & Ors.: (1977) 2 SCC 820 . Predicated on the
aforesaid ratio, learned senior counsel would contend that there is no
averment or a statement in the plaint that the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA
has signed any contract of service or was commissioned or that he was
ever paid for the musical composition created by him. In the absence
whereof, learned counsel would contend that the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA would be the copyright owner of the musical
composition as also the sound recording. She relied upon the judgment of
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Kerala High Court in Madhu Alappuzha vs. R. Remesan & Ors.: 1987
SCC OnLine Ker 94.
6.15. Challenging the omnibus manner in which the plaintiff has
asserted copyrights in the sound recording, musical work and literary work
of the cinematograph film based on various assignment agreement, learned
senior counsel would contend that the plaint grossly suffers from not only
clarity and conciseness but from lack of material particulars as envisaged
under Order VI Rule 2, Rule 6 as well as Rule 9 of the CPC. At the risk of
reputation, she would reiterate that the pleadings are neither specific nor
do they clearly disclose any detail of the 106 agreements later placed on
record. According to learned senior counsel, the plaint lacks in details with
regard to the specific songs or the cinematograph films. She relies on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Jhabbar Singh v. Jagtar Singh: (2023)
14 SCC 199 and Thiagarajan Kumararaja vs. Capital Film Works
(India) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.; 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 37588 (DB) in support
of the said contention.
6.16. Ms. Sukumar would also submit that the plaintiff has also falsely
averred that it is only in the first week of February that the plaintiff
became aware of the infringing views by the defendant by uploading the
copyrighted works on platforms like Amazon Music, Apple iTunes and
JioSaavan etc. According to her, it was only after the defendant had issued
a legal notice to the plaintiff on 13.01.2026, that the plaintiff
surreptitiously filed the present suit. She would contend that the Acts of
infringement complained of by the plaintiff comprises (i) “underlying
works” and (ii) “sound recordings”. So far as the issue of underlying
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works are concerned, learned senior counsel relied upon the judgment of
RDB and Co. HUF vs. Harpercollins Publishers India Pvt. Ltd.: 2023
SCC OnLine Del. 3046 (SB) and RDB and Co. HUF vs. Harpercollins
Publishers India Pvt. Ltd.: 2023 SCC OnLine Del. 7165 to submit that
the learned Single Judge as also the learned Division Bench had
categorically and clearly upheld the right of the owner in underlying works
as posited in Section 13(4) of the Act. She relies upon the judgment of
Madras High Court in O.A.No.1370/2007 titled “Sri Lalgudi G.
Jayaraman vs. Cleveland Cultural Alliance” decided on 01.11.2008, to
contend that the plaintiff has not placed on record any document to show
that either the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA or any of the persons who are
owners of the underlying words in the sound recording were either
engaged or paid consideration by the plaintiff. According to her, in the
absence whereof, plaintiff cannot contend to substitute itself as “ Producer
having copyright over the cinematograph films as also the sound
recordings and underlying works ”. Additionally, she would contend that if
at all anyone would have a grievance against defendant/ILAIYARAAJA,
it could be only and only the original producer who has neither issued any
notice nor filed any lawsuit against the defendant. She argued that the
word “Producer” was not defined in the Act till the amendment of the year
1994. In the absence of such definition and having regard to the statement
of the plaintiff that most of the agreements were signed and executed
before the year 1994, the copyrights in not only the underlying works but
also the sound recording in the cinematograph films purely belong to the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA. Thus, any exploitation of such sound
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recordings by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA cannot be construed to be
infringement.
6.17. So far as the other limb of infringement i.e. “sound recording” is
concerned, learned senior counsel would submit that the defendant has
already filed a suit before the Madras High Court in respect of 112 out of
134 cinematograph films forming subject matter of the present suit,
asserting ownership of copyrights on the sound recordings and underlying
works embodied therein. She would contend that the defendant has sought
permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff herein from manufacturing,
selling, distributing or in any other way infringing the exclusive rights of
the defendant herein.
6.18. Learned senior counsel would refer to Section 18 particularly the
2nd and 3rd proviso which were inserted on 21.06.2012 to submit that
unless the assignments categorically specify any medium or mode of
exploitation, which did not exist or was not in commercial use at the time
of the assignment, the said agreement/contract agreement shall not be
applied to such medium; and that there is no automatic waiver of right to
receive royalties by the author of the literary or musical work which may
be included in a cinematograph film. According to her, in the present case,
both provisos have been violated inasmuch as, while the
agreements/assignments referred to by the plaintiff expressly conferred
exploitation by way of gramophone records/cassettes only, the exploitation
for the last many years through online music platforms etc., were clearly
not envisaged thus, such exploitation is not only illegal but also violative
of the authors right. Equally, no royalties till date have been received by
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the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA on account of exploitation by the plaintiff
on various platforms including the online music platforms.
6.19. Thus, predicated on the aforesaid arguments, Ms. Sukumar,
learned senior counsel would pray that the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA
being undoubtedly not only the author of the musical composition but also
the copyrighted owner of the sound recording, cannot be injuncted from
exploitation of his own works and thus the ex-parte ad-interim injunction
order dated 13.02.2026 may be vacated forthwith.
ARGUMENTS OF MR. CHANDER M. LALL, LEARNED SENIOR
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
7. Mr. Chander Lall, learned senior counsel contended that he would
address arguments in respect of the general issues including various provisions
of the Act while Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned senior counsel who addressed
arguments on behalf of the plaintiff on specific Sections of the Act which have
been referred to and relied upon by the defendant in support of their
arguments. The argument of Mr. Lall are summarised hereunder:
7.1. Learned counsel referred to the definition of the word “work” as
specified in Section 2 (y) of the Act. He would contend that work would
mean (i) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work; (ii) a cinematograph
film; and (iii) a sound recording. In other words, learned senior counsel
would urge that the Act envisaged the underlying work like literary,
dramatic and musical work as one embodiment, a cinematograph film
separately and the sound recording as an entirely different category. He
further argued that as per the Act, cinematograph film would include
sound recording. According to him, as per the Act, sound recording would
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mean recording of sound from which such sounds may be produced
regardless of the medium on which such recording is made. In other
words, learned senior counsel would stoutly contend that the plaintiff is
simply enforcing its right over the “sound recordings” which form part of
the cinematograph film over which the plaintiff exercises its right as a
Producer/owner.
7.2. Mr. Lall would submit that so far as the musical work or
composition is concerned, the author as per the Act would be the
Composer. Thus, he would submit that at best, the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA, would be the author of the musical
composition as he is the composer. He would submit that it is the Producer
who engages the lyricist and the composer to create the musical work
which gets incorporated in the cinematograph film as a raw material. He
would further submit that till the year 1995 composition meant something
which is in writing and is de hors the music. He would contend that the
lyricist as also the singer also would have their own individual copyrights
on the lyrics as also the song respectively. Thus, according to him, the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is neither the Producer nor the copyright
owner or the author of the sound recording as sound recording by itself has
different copyright owners/authors for the literary and musical works
embodied therein.
7.3. Referring to Section 2(uu) of the Act, learned senior counsel
would submit that in relation to a cinematograph film or a sound
recording, a person who takes initiative and is responsible for making the
work is a Producer. He would submit that it cannot be denied by the
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defendant/ILAIYARAAJA that the plaintiff is the Producer of the
cinematograph film and the sound recordings embodied therein and which
rights the plaintiff has been exploiting and uninterruptedly broadcasting
for the last more than 30 years without any objection from any quarter.
According to learned senior counsel, a music composer like the present
defendant does not have any right in the sound recording. He relies upon
Section 2(d)(ii) and (v) to submit that the composer is only the author in
relation to a musical work while as per the Act, the Producer is the author
of the sound recording. He would further argue that reading the aforesaid
definitions with the definition of the word “cinematograph film” as per the
Act there cannot be any doubt that it is the plaintiff and the plaintiff alone
who is the author of not only the cinematograph film but also the sound
recording.
7.4. Referring to Section 17(b) of the Act, learned senior counsel
would submit that it is clear that the plaintiff is the first owner of the
copyright subsisting in a cinematograph film unless there is any agreement
to the contrary. According to him, there being no agreement to the
contrary, plaintiff is clearly the first owner of the copyright subsisting in a
cinematograph film which also incorporates the sound recording. He also
stated that the Act does not envisage any written document so far as
Section 17(b) of the Act is concerned. In other words, the film producer
becomes the first owner of all underlying works without the requirements
of written agreement. He would rely upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in IPRS (supra) to contend that all independent rights of the author
gets extinguished once the Producer produces the sound recording.
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7.5. Referring to Section 14 of the Act, learned counsel would submit
that the Act envisages copyright to mean, in case of a literary, dramatic or
musical work, the right to make any cinematograph film or sound
recording in respect of the work; in the case of a cinematograph film to
make copy of the film and communicate it to the public amongst others;
and in the case of a sound recording to make any other sound recording
and communicate to the public amongst others. He would contend that any
violations of these rights would tantamount to infringement of copyright
as per Section 51 of the Act. Thus, when the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA
communicates to the public, the sound recording of which the copyright
subsists in the plaintiff as a Producer, it would tantamount to infringement
as per Section 51 of the Act.
7.6. He would further contend that even if the contention of the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA that provisions of Section 18 has been violated
by the defendant, though not admitted, is taken at its face value, the same
would not fall within the purview of Section 52. Furthermore, learned
senior counsel forcefully contended that by virtue of the provisions of
Section 55 under Chapter XII, civil remedies for the infringement of
copyright have been provided. It is these rights that the plaintiff is
exercising which are clearly statutorily recognised.
7.7. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the judgments of the
Supreme Court in IPRS (supra) , order of the Coordinate Bench of this
Court in CS(COMM) 38/2025 titled “ Saregama India Limited vs. Vels
Film International Limited & Ors.” decided on 30.01.2025 and Indian
Record Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. Agi Music Sdn Bhd & Anr.: 2020
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SCC OnLine Mad 626 .
ARGUMENTS OF MR. AKHIL SIBAL, LEARNED SENIOR
COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF
8. Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned senior counsel also appears for the plaintiff,
however, would argue primarily on the factors surrounding the controversy
raised by the defendant in respect of alleged violation by the plaintiff of the
provisions under Section 18 of the Act and also as to whether there was any
concealment or acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff. The argument of Mr.
Sibal are summarised as under:
8.1. At the outset, learned senior counsel would submit that the Act
envisages works in which copyright subsists and is delineated in Section
13 thereunder. He would contend that sub-Section (4) of Section 13
clarifies that the copyright in a cinematograph film or sound recording
would not affect the separate copyright in any work embodied in the sound
recording or the cinematograph film. He would submit that, thus, all that
the defendant can, at best, exercise his right, would be in respect of only
the musical composition and nothing else. He would also submit that the
aforesaid submission needs to be read in conjunction with the provisions
of Section 14(a), (c), (d) & (e) of the Act.
8.2. Referring to Section 18 of the Act, learned counsel would submit
that as per the third proviso, the author of the literary or musical work
would have its rights reserved for receiving the royalties to be shared on
equal basis with the assignee of the copyright except for the utilisation of
the said work by communication to the public the said work alongwith the
cinematograph film in a cinema hall. He further relied upon sub-Section
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(2) of Section 18 to submit that whatever copyrights have been assigned to
the plaintiff, to that extent the plaintiff is treated to be the owner of the
copyright in terms of the provisions of the Act. Thus, according to him,
the plaintiff has been assigned by individual producers all the rights in not
only the cinematograph film but also the sound recording and therefore,
the plaintiff is also the owner of the sound recording as also the musical
works and literary works embodied therein.
8.3. Mr. Sibal next referred to Section 33(1), particularly the 2nd
proviso to submit that the defendant was the member of IPRS till the year
2017 and thereafter became member of the sister society called PRS in
England. He submitted that the IPRS being the copyright society conducts
the business of issuing licenses in respect of literary, dramatic, musical
and artistic works incorporated in a cinematograph film or sound
recording. According to learned senior counsel, the IPRS and PRS are
obligated under the provisions of Section 35 to carry out the duties and
responsibilities including distribution of fee among the authors and other
owners of rights in proportion to the actual use of their works. He would
forcefully assert that the IPRS had been collecting royalties for and on
behalf of the plaintiff as well as the defendant and distributing royalties in
the proportion as posited in Section 35 of the Act from a long time and
that too in respect of the very same cinematograph films which are the
subject matter of the present suit. Additionally, learned senior counsel
contended that the plaintiff has no legal standing or entitlement to either
collect or pay royalties to the persons entitled under the Act particularly
Section 18. Thus, according to him, the irresponsible contention that the
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defendant/ILAIYARAAJA has not been paid royalties at all is neither
factually nor legally founded.
8.4. In furtherance to the aforesaid arguments, learned senior counsel
had handed over a compilation of documents which according to him
establish receipt of proportionate royalties by the defendant from the
IPRS/PRS in respect of the cinematograph films which are subject matter
of the suit.
8.5. Learned senior counsel would contend that, basis the aforesaid
legal and factual narration, at the interim stage, this Court need not detain
itself to conduct an inquiry as to whether the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA
has or has not received the royalties as falsely contended by the defendant.
He would submit that the ascertainment of such contentions, albeit false,
would require evidence which can be assisted only at the time of trial.
8.6. Moreover, he would also contend that the amendment to the
Copyright Act, 1957 to Section 18 was inserted on 21.06.2012 and will not
have any retrospective effect, rather it will be prospective. In that context,
he relied on the judgment of Mumbai High Court in Maganlal Savani of
Mumbai vs. Multi Screen Media Pvt. Ltd.: 2016 SCC OnLine Bom
10472 and the judgements of Supreme Court in Sangam Spinners vs.
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner I: (2008) 1 SCC 391,
Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Vatika Township Private Limited:
(2015) 314 ITR 338 in support of such propositions.
8.7. On misjoinder, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of
Supreme Court in Prem Lala Nahata vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria: (2007)
2 SCC 551 in the context of Order 2 Rule 3 of CPC as also the Full Bench
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of this Court in Carlsberg (supra) to submit that there is neither any
misjoinder of causes of action nor misjoinder of parties as was contended
by the defendant.
8.8. So far as the contention of knowledge of the defendant’s
broadcasting of certain sound recordings which are subject matter of the
present suit in the YouTube channel available since August, 2017
attributed to the plaintiff, learned senior counsel would contend that the
entire bouquet of sound recordings of the suit comprises approximately
542 songs, out of which only 25 songs may be available on the said
channel and the plaintiff being a large organisation is not expected to open
up each and every online music platform to check whether any
infringement of its copyrights is taking place. Moreover, he would insist
that every time the sound recordings are infringed by the defendant upon
broadcasting of the same, every such infringement would be a fresh cause
of action giving right to the plaintiff to file a suit. Other than that, the
knowledge of such broadcast would surely not disentitle the plaintiff from
instituting a suit.
8.9. To the argument of the defendant that the plaintiff had
surreptitiously served the defendant of the advance copy of the suit and
not upon the lawyers engaged by the defendant appearing in another
contested legal proceeding pending before this Court in order to obtain ex-
parte ad-interim injunction is concerned, learned senior counsel forcefully
and vehemently refuted the same. He would forcefully contend that (i)
effecting of service that too an advance service, as per the rules is
envisaged upon the parties and in the present case the defendant has not
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denied the same, and (ii) there is no compulsion upon the plaintiff to effect
advance service of the suit upon the counsel for the defendant appearing in
other legal proceeding inasmuch as the defendant would be at liberty to
engage any professional as his counsel and not necessarily the same
counsel who may have appeared in some other legal proceeding. He
submits that this is true in the present case as the defendant has engaged a
counsel other than the one who was appearing in the other legal
proceeding. Thus, according to the learned counsel the said contention is
false and vexatious on the face of it. He relies upon the following
judgments:
1. Bengal Waterproof Limited vs. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing
Company & Anr.: (1997) 1 SCC 99.
2. Dindayal Industries Ltd. vs. Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan & Anr.: 2025
SCC OnLine Del 9473.
3. Castrol Limited vs. Sanjay Sonavane & Ors.: 2025 SCC OnLine Del
8646.
4. Tata Sia Airlines Limited vs. Vistara Home Appliances Private
Limited & Ors.: 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3343.
8.10. So far as the contention of the defendant that a consent or
permission was necessary to be obtained by the Producer of the
cinematograph film from the owners/authors of literary, dramatic and
musical works for the subject matter assignments/agreements to be legally
valid and enforceable is concerned, learned senior counsel would contend
that the defendant Illyaraja not being privy to any of the said agreements
cannot have any objection in respect of the aforesaid contentions or even
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challenged the validity of the same. Alternatively, learned counsel also
submitted that Section 17 particularly sub-Section (b) does not envisage
any written agreement or consent while declaring the persons such as
producers to be the first owner of the copyright subsisting therein. That
apart, he further contended that the subject matter contract
agreements/assignments have been placed on record purely to convey and
corroborate the fact that the plaintiff is the Producer or not only the
cinematograph film but also the sound recording incorporated therein.
Thus, the argument of the defendant is stated to be untenable by learned
senior counsel.
REJOINDER ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT/ILAIYARAAJA :
9. In rejoinder, Ms. Swathi Sukumar, learned senior counsel argued as
under:-
9.1. Learned senior counsel reiterated and reaffirmed the earlier
submissions that the agreement/assignments relied upon by the plaintiff
are all contingent contracts and as stated earlier, coupled with the ratio of
the judgements, are not concluded contracts which can either be relied on
or sought specific performance of. Thus, the very edifice of the plaint falls
and the suit ought to fail.
9.2. That apart, learned senior counsel would contend that these
agreements/assignment deeds are in the nature of title documents which
need to be proved in accordance with law and cannot be taken on their
face value particularly when the defendant has raised substantial ground of
challenge of those not being concluded contracts and hence enforceable.
She would argue that most of the agreements/assignment deeds are prior to
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the year 1994 when the previous Act did not define ‘Producer’ and thus,
the plaintiff has to necessarily prove as to how it holds itself to be a
Producer.
9.3. On the submission that the issues arising in the present suit have
already been adjudicated by other High Courts as well as the coordinate
Bench of this Court, learned senior counsel stoutly opposed the same by
rejoining that the issue in respect of the legality and validity of the
agreements/assignment deeds has not been urged or considered by any
Court. Thus, the issue being core to the very maintainability of the suit
prayers itself is the primary distinguishing aspect.
9.4. She relies on the judgement of Vicco Laboratories and Another
vs. Art Commercial Advertising Pvt. Ltd. and Others , 2001 (7) SCC 81 ,
particularly paragraphs 9, 10, 12 and 13 to submit that the plaintiff has not
been able to even, prima facie, establish that the defendant was employed
or engaged by it for composing the musical composition; or that any
valuable consideration was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant or that
defendant was the agent of the plaintiff. According to her, in the absence
of such necessary facts to be stated and proved, the plaintiff cannot claim
ownership on the basis of sections 17(b) and (c) of the Act.
CLARIFICATION ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF:
10. On the issue of the dispute raised in regard to the
agreements/assignment deed, Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel would submit
as under:
10.1. He submitted that at the stage of consideration of interim relief,
Courts are not expected to conduct a mini trial. He would urge that the
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plaintiff has established prima facie evidence of ownership of copyrights
as Producer by placing on record Inlay Cards which are almost 30 years
old and later which raises a presumption of ownership in terms of section
55(2) of the Act. In contrast, the defendant has argued without any
documents to establish how he would be the owner of the sound recording
and all the other works embodied therein except for the musical
composition.
10.2. Learned senior counsel would assert that the defendant has
acquiesced to plaintiffs right on sound recordings and the underlying
literary and musical works since the past 30 years. That apart, plaintiffs
ownership is in the knowledge of the defendant and acknowledged as is
established by the IPRS document which demonstrates the receipt of
royalties by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA, that too on a proportionate
basis. The document also displays the status of the persons receiving the
royalties, according to which plaintiff is the Owner and defendant is the
Composer.
10.3. Mr. Sibal, learned senior counsel also stated that those of the
agreements/assignment deeds which did not contain any names of the
cinematograph films, were not for limited periods and whatever
cinematograph films were produced during that period of contract, the
rights in the sound recordings and underlying works got vested in the
plaintiff. The expiry of the agreement per se did not cause any legal
inconvenience or impediment as the conveyance was of the copyrights for
which there was no set term and rather were in perpetuity, that too
worldwide.
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10.4. So far as the agreements/assignment deeds being contingent
contracts are concerned, he would reiterate his arguments already
addressed earlier except that none of the Producers who executed the
agreements/assignment deeds, referred and annexed to the suit, have ever
challenged the validity of the said contracts in the last 30 years.
10.5. According to learned senior counsel, the ex-parte ad-interim
injunction order must be made absolute for a period till the disposal of the
suit.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS:
11. This Court has heard Ms Swathi Sukumar, learned senior counsel for
the defendants, Mr Chander M. Lall and Mr Akhil Sibal, learned senior
counsel for the plaintiff and with their valuable assistance, perused the records
of the case and considered the judgements relied upon by the parties.
12. Before adverting to the arguments addressed by the parties it would be
significant to consider two judgements of this Court directly on the issue in
hand. One is by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Saregama vs. Vels
Film (supra) and the other is the judgement dated 21.05.2026 passed by the
learned Division Bench in FAO(OS)(COMM) 52/2025 titled Mr. Ilaiyaraaja
vs. Saregama India Limited: Neutral Citation 2026:DHC:4556-DB in the
appeal filed by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA against the judgement passed
by the coordinate bench on 30.01.2025. For the sake of convenience the
relevant paragraphs of the judgement of the learned Division Bench eruditely
scholared by none other than esteemed brother C Hari Shankar, J, are
extracted hereunder:
25. To our mind, the answer to the imbroglio is to be found in the
provisions of the Copyright Act, outside which it is hardly necessary to
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peregrinate.
26. Section 2(p)
“Musical work” is defined, in Section 2(p) as a work consisting of
music, excluding lyrics. There is, therefore, statutorily, no distinction
between the “musical work” and the music which forms part thereof
(the other part being the lyrics). As such, the musical component of the
disputed song, of which Ilayaraaja is undisputedly the composer, is a
musical work, in which, by virtue of Section 13(1)(a), copyright vests.
27. Section 17
27.1 Section 17 makes the author of a work the first owner of copyright
in the work. Of course, Section 17 is expressly made subject to other
provisions of the Copyright Act.
27.2 The “author”, in the case of a musical work, is its composer, as
defined in Section 2(d)(ii).
27.3 As the composer of the disputed song, therefore, Ilaiyaraaja was
the author of the “musical work” forming part thereof, i.e., the
musical component of the disputed song. By operation of Section 17,
therefore, he was the first owner of copyright in the musical work in
the disputed song.
27.4 Clauses (b) and (c) of the first proviso to Section 17 do not, in our
opinion, apply, for the following reasons:
(i) Clause (b) does not apply either to sound recordings or to musical
works.
(ii) Clause (c) applies where the work is made in the course of its
author’s employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship. It
is nobody’s case that there was any “contract of service” between
RCA and Ilaiyaraaja. A “contract of service”, legally, connotes the
existence of a relationship of master and servant. No such contract
existed between RCA and Ilaiyaraaja, nor is there any pleading by SIL
to that effect.
28. Ilaiyaraaja’s right under Section 14(a)
28.1 As the first owner of copyright in the musical work in the disputed
song, Ilaiyaraaja possessed the exclusive right, under Section
14(a)(vi), to make any adaptation of the musical work. “Adaptation”,
as defined in Section 2(a)(iv) in the context of a musical work, includes
any arrangement or transcription of the musical work. However, this
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right of adaptation was limited to the musical work, i.e., the musical
component of the disputed song, as that was the extent of Ilaiyaraaja’s
copyright in the disputed song. The lyrics of the disputed song were no
man’s land, and Ilaiyaraaja would have no copyright over the lyrics
and, consequently, none of the rights envisaged under Section 14(a)
would be available to Ilaiyaraaja in so far as the lyrics in the disputed
song were concerned.
28.2 Section 14(a)(vi) also conferred, on Ilaiyaraaja, the exclusive
right to do, in relation to any adaptation of the musical work contained
in the disputed song, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in
sub-clauses (i) to (vi). Of these, Section 14(a)(iv) included the right to
make any cinematographic film or sound recording in respect of the
adapted musical work.
28.3 Ilaiyaraaja was, therefore, entitled to contract with any third
party for use, or for adaptation, of the musical work contained in the
disputed song, i.e, the musical component thereof. That right could
not, however, extend to doing anything involving the sound recording
of the disputed song, or the lyrics thereof. Copyright in the sound
recording of the disputed song would, by a conjoint application of
Section 17, 2(d) and 2(f), vest in the producer of the film of which the
song constituted part of the soundtrack, whereas copyright in the lyrics
of the disputed song would, by application of Section 2(d)(i)24 , vest in
the lyricist.
29. SIL’s copyright in the sound recording of the disputed song, vis-à-
vis Section 13(4)
29.1 SIL has sought to contend that, by virtue of the definition of
“cinematograph film” in Section 2(f), the sound recording
accompanying a cinematograph film was also included within the
definition of “cinematograph film”. There can be no cavil with this
contention.
29.2 Ergo, submits SIL, the sound recordings contained in the various
songs in the film Moodu Pani were also contained within the ambit of
the expression “cinematograph film”. There can be no cavil with this
proposition either.
29.3 Section 13(4), however stipulates that the copyright in a
cinematograph film or a sound recording would not affect the separate
copyright in any work in respect of which, or in respect of a
substantial part of which, the film, or the sound recording, is made.
29.4 The plea of infringement, raised by SIL, is predicated on the
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copyright claimed to be held by it in the sound recording of the
disputed song, as a consequence of the copyright held by it in the
cinematograph film Moodu Pani. Inasmuch as (i) RCA was the
producer of the film Moodu Pani and was, therefore, the author of the
copyright in the cinematograph film, (ii) RCA was also, therefore, the
author of the sound recordings in the cinematograph film, which
included the sound recording of the disputed song En Iniya Pon
Nilave, and (iii) RCA had, therefore, competently assigned the
copyright in said sound recording to SIL under the Agreement dated
25 February 1980, SIL is correctly claiming copyright in the sound
recording in the disputed song.
29.5 By operation of Section 13(4), the copyright, if any, held by RCA
and, later, by SIL, in the sound recording relating to the musical work
contained in the disputed song cannot derogate from, or affect, the
separate copyright held by Ilaiyaraaja in the musical work contained
in the disputed song. Ilaiyaraaja’s copyright in the musical work
contained in the disputed song, therefore, continues to remain
protected and, consequently, his right to exploit the musical work in
the manner envisaged by Section 14(a)(iv) and 14(a)(v) read with
14(a)(vi), also remains inviolate and sacrosanct.
29.6 This right was, however, necessarily limited to the musical
component of the disputed song, i.e., the music therein, of which
Ilaiyaraaja was the composer. It did not extend to the lyrical
component of, or the sound recording in, the disputed song.
13. The aforesaid ratio laid down, succinctly interprets the law. Having
regard to the fact that almost identical grounds of challenge have been raised
by the defendants in the present case, the said ratio would be applicable to the
facts of the present case too. In that, the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA has rights
to the extent of “musical composition” of the songs and not even the lyrics and
muchless the sound recordings. The indelible rights as “owner” and “author”
bestowed by the Act clearly vest in the Producer first, then unto the plaintiff
by virtue of various assignment deeds executed by the Producers with the
plaintiff. Similarly, the defendant cannot assail the copyright of the plaintiff
who has stepped into the shoes of the Producer in the cinematograph films,
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which are the subject matter of the present suit, nor the sound recordings
which are incorporated and embodied in the said cinematograph films.
14. It is imperative to also appreciate the provisions of Section 2(y) of the
old Act which clearly delineates the definition of the word “work” as (i) a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work; (ii) a cinematograph film; (iii) a
record, which has essentially remained the same, except the word “record” has
been replaced now by “sound recording” by virtue of amendment in the year
1995 to the Act. Thus, musical composition and cinematograph film are two
separate and distinct “works”. Cinematograph film has been defined in
Section 2 (f) to include “sound track” as per the old Act while as per Section
2(f) of the amendment in the year 1995, it would include “sound recording”.
As per Section 2(x) of the old Act, “recording” would mean the aggregate of
the sounds embodied in and capable of being reproduced by means of a record
which definition has now been expanded by insertion of sub section (xx)
which now defines “sound recording” by way of an amendment in the year
1995. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid sections clearly postulate two things
(i) musical composition and cinematograph film are separate and distinct
works and (ii) recording or sound recording by virtue of Section 2(f), once
incorporated in the cinematograph film, become embodied therein for the
purposes of the Act. While musical composition may become part of the
cinematograph film by being embodied in the sound recording, the reverse
may not be true.
15. Ergo , the Producer of the cinematograph film would be the copyright
owner of the sound recording embodied or incorporated into the said film.
However, the Composer i.e., defendant/ILAIYARAAJA, by virtue of Section
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2(d)(ii) would be the “author” and by virtue of the provisions of Sections
13(4) read with 14(1)(a) of the old Act and Section 14 (a) of the new Act, be
vested with the copyrights over the musical composition alone. However, such
rights cannot include the “sound recordings” which have necessarily been
incorporated or embodied into the “cinematograph film”.
16. The right of the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA to the extent conferred by
Section 14(a) of the Act of the right to adaptation is limited to the extent of
“musical work”, that is, the musical composition of the songs claimed to have
been infringed, sans the lyrics. A harmonious and conjunctive reading of the
provisions of Sections 17, 2(d) and 2(f) would postulate vesting of the
copyright in the sound recording upon the Producer of the cinematograph film
as it was incorporated as soundtrack in the said films. The fact that the
plaintiff has by virtue of execution of the suit agreements/assignment deeds
replaced itself in place of the Producer, would, by virtue of the provisions of
Section 2(f) have rights over the sound recording forming part of the
cinematograph film. Thus, as a necessary corollary, the sound recordings in
various songs of the cinematograph films forming subject matter of the suit,
also fall within the definition of “cinematograph film” as envisaged by the
Act.
17. It may be significant to note that, notwithstanding the above
observations, the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA would, in the humble opinion of
this Court, undisputedly have, separate copyrights in the musical work
contained in the disputed songs by operation of section 13(4) of the Act. As
posited by the learned Division Bench, the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA,
consequently would have the rights to exploit the musical work in the manner
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envisaged by Sections 14(a)(iv) and 14(a)(v) read with 14(a)(vi) of the Act.
18. That is where the rights of the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA would end.
19. Ab supra , any form of exploitation of the sound recordings
incorporated in the subject matter cinematograph films, would then, prima
facie, be infringement. Since there is no denial to the broadcasting of songs
which are subject matter of the suit referred cinematograph films, the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA, prima facie , appears to be indulging in acts which
would tantamount to infringement.
20. Another aspect which would be essential to consider would be the
contention of the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA regarding non-receipt of royalty
as envisaged under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act.
21. This contention was strongly, stoutly and with great vehemence refuted
by learned senior counsel for the plaintiff. In fact, Mr. Sibal, learned senior
counsel, has placed on record documents which purport to demonstrate that
the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA alongwith the plaintiff has been receiving
royalties, and as an example referred to one song amongst many others, for
which royalty was paid by the IPRS, which is a Performing Rights Society as
envisaged under Section 33, and discharges its obligations under Section 35 of
the said Act. One of such examples is the song “Ishtakarrikku” against which
the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is reflected as the Composer to whom 25%
royalty share is being paid and the plaintiff is reflected as the Original
Publisher and is being paid 50% as royalty share proportionately. The said
aspect is tabulated hereunder:
Royalty Claim Percentage of Royalty Share
Saregama India Limited - Owner 50%
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Ilaiyaraaja (Defendant) - Composer 25%
Girish Puthencherry - Lyricist 25%
22. Similarly, many such other songs and their percentage of royalty share
have also been placed on record by the plaintiff’s vide Index dated
21.04.2026. If nothing else, the aforesaid table as also the documents referred
to above, at least prima facie disclose two things, (i) that the IPRS is indeed
reflecting the percentage of royalty share in those documents and complying
with the mandate under Section 35 read with Section 18 of the Act which the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA may be receiving and (ii) the defendant appears to
be aware as to the assertion of the plaintiff that it is the owner and Original
Publisher of the songs by virtue whereof the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is
receiving royalties. To the aforesaid argument and aforenoted documents, no
counter argument or submission has been tendered or urged before this Court.
Thus, leaving the right reserved to the defendant regarding the probative value
of the said documents to be raised at the appropriate stage, at this juncture, the
Court takes note of the documents and the contents therein.
23. Predicated on the aforesaid submissions and documents, this Court is of
the prima facie view that the provisions of Section 18 to the extent shown
above, appear to be complied with. That apart, this Court is also of the prima
facie view that the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA was aware of the rights asserted
by the plaintiff over not only the cinematograph films, which are subject
matter of the suit, but also the sound recordings and the songs incorporated
therein. Thus, the submissions regarding non-payment of royalties, if any, may
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 34 of 58
be left to be ascertained after full trial.
24. Much was argued at length and extensively, on the misjoinder of parties
and causes of action.
25. So far as the issues of misjoinder of parties is concerned, at this stage,
all that the Court needs to ascertain and that too prima facie , is as to whether
the plaintiff has copyrights over the cinematograph films, the sound
recordings and the songs incorporated therein. Whether the producers who are
claimed to have signed and executed the subject matter agreement/assignment
deeds or the authors/owners of copyrights in lyrical and artistic works are to
be impleaded or not, and whether they are necessary at all in the first place or
not, would by itself not be fatal to the maintainability of the suit itself.
Moreover, the subject matter of the suit being an allegation of infringement by
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA of the copyrights owned by the plaintiff as
Producer of the cinematograph films and the songs incorporated therein, may
not be impacted or adversely affected by non-joinder of those parties. In case
at a later stage, those parties are found to be proper and necessary, they can be
impleaded.
26. Even otherwise, it appears to this Court that the said
agreement/assignment deeds have been placed on record by the plaintiff only
for the purposes of establishing its ownership rights over the copyrights which
it has been exercising and exploiting from the last more than 30 years with no
objection from any quarter whatsoever, least from the defendant. This,
coupled with the aforesaid observation regarding receipt of royalties by
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA has also propelled this Court to conclude that the
submission regarding non-joinder of parties will not be fatal to this Suit, at
Signature Not Verified
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 35 of 58
least at this stage.
27. So far as the issue of misjoinder of causes of action is concerned, this
Court is not impressed with the said arguments urged on behalf of the
defendant for the reason that, at this juncture, it appears to the Court that the
cause of action i.e. infringement of the copyrights of the plaintiff as Producer
in the sound recordings and songs incorporated in the suit subject
cinematograph films, is common to all the songs, the cinematograph films as
also the different agreements/assignment deeds. Even otherwise, Order II Rule
3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”)
permits unison of several causes of action against the same defendant. In the
present case, the plaintiff is the same as also the defendant. Thus, joinder of
causes of action is clearly permissible under the aforesaid provision. The
defects or lacunae as alleged and purported to be existing in the suit subject
agreement/assignment deeds urged by the defendant, are possibly triable
issues which are best left for the parties to adduce during trial. Thus, on this
count too, at the prima facie stage, the interim prayer does not appear to be
affected/impacted by the said submission.
28. Ms. Sukumar, learned senior counsel for the defendant had forcefully
argued the aspect of the suit subject agreements/assignment deeds being
contingent contracts and virtue whereof, cannot be deemed to be concluded
contracts and resultantly, the plaintiffs would have no copyrights over the
cinematograph films or the sound recordings which include the songs which
are stated to be infringed by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA. She had relied
upon Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 as also judgments rendered
by the Supreme Court in that regard.
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Signing Date:01.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 36 of 58
29. In the aforesaid context, it is pertinent to note that the
defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is not privy to any of the said
agreements/assignment deeds which are placed on record. It would also be
relevant to note that as per the relevant Clause 4(b) of the assignment
agreement dated 25.08.1981 which is common to most of the said agreements,
it was for the Producer, if at all, to obtain consent in writing from all artists,
musicians, lyric writers, music directors. It was this clause which was made
subject matter of the argument that no written proof has been placed on record
to demonstrate or evidence that such consent was indeed obtained. In the
absence whereof, it was contended that the contracts being contingent, the
non-fulfilment of necessary conditions would grant no advantage or vest
copyright to the plaintiffs.
30. Firstly, the plaintiff has been able to demonstrate by the documents in
respect of percentage royalty share emanating from IPRS that the defendant
was aware of its copyrights in respect of the subject cinematograph films and
the songs which were incorporated in the sound recording; and secondly, by
virtue of operation of Section of 17(b) the Producer of the cinematograph film
would be the first owner as there is no contract to the contrary. It does not lie
in the mouth of the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA to submit that the literary,
dramatic or artistic works created by their respective authors in the course of
their employment, were either not engaged so or that they were not paid
compensation for the works. Thus, the provisions of Section 17, in the present
case, have to be construed in favour of the plaintiff, at least, at this stage.
Contrary to the IPRS documents placed on record by the plaintiff, no counter
submission nor any document to show that the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA had
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Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 37 of 58
challenged any of the suit subject agreements/assignment deeds in the last 30
years has been placed on record. The defendant also cannot assert his own
right in the context of an agreement to which he is not privy. Those too, in the
absence of even a single scrap of documentary proof of his own purported
rights.
31. That apart, on a plain and holistic reading of the clause 4, it appears that
they are worded to, in fact, protect the plaintiff’s interest qua the Original
Producer in which case it would be the plaintiff who would be at a risk, and no
one else. It is significant to note that sub clause (c) of clause 4 of the
assignment agreement dated 21.08.1981 also indemnifies the plaintiff from the
artists who created the lyrics and dramatic works etc. Thus, if any person
could possibly have any grievance with respect to any of the clauses of the
agreement/assignment deed, it could only be either the plaintiff or the Original
Producer. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Shankar Bhat
(supra) , the question which arose for consideration was as to whether the
restricted covenant in agreement dated 04.12.1979 amounted to a conditional
agreement or concluded contract and/or whether the same was for the benefit
of plaintiff no.1. In that case, the testator by the will dated 25.04.1972 had
granted liberty to the Original Defendant to sell the property in question and
disburse the proceeds as stated in the Will, however, the legatees were given
an option to partition the property. The Will also provided that if the heirs of
the testator wanted to partition the property, the executor was mandated to
consent to it. It was in this context that the Supreme Court declined to grant
specific performance in favour of the plaintiff no.1 on the ground that
necessary consent was not obtained from the other legatees and that the said
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 38 of 58
clause was a condition precedent for coming into force of a concluded
contract. In the present case, a plain reading of the said clauses appears to be
for the benefit of the plaintiff herein. Inasmuch as between the parties to the
agreement, it would clearly be the plaintiff which would be at a risk or loss in
case such indemnity was not promised or assured by the Original Producer.
Thus, the said judgment may not be strictly applicable to the facts of this case.
32. The case of Shri Baijnath (supra) of the learned Division Bench of this
Court was purely in the realm of the Specific Relief Act. The contract which
was subject matter of the appeal was construed to be in the nature of a
contingent contract as the sale itself was dependent on the sanction of
additional FAR in favour of the defendant by the appropriate authorities.
However, in the present case, the validity or enforceability of the
agreements/assignment deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff does not seem
to be adversely impacted by such clauses for the reason that (i) the clauses as
observed above appear to be in favour of the plaintiff and (ii) in view of the
provisions of Section 17, the absence of any such consent having been
obtained by the Original Producer would possibly not derail or disentitle the
plaintiff from exercising the rights conferred under such agreements as the
rights of the artists for the literary, dramatic or artistic work as “authors”
would still be available to them under the provisions of the Act. Thus the
absence of such consent, whether in writing or otherwise, does not appear to
impact any of the parties adversely as there is adequate protection available in
the Act itself. Ergo , looked at it any which way, the submission appears to be
unmerited.
33. Based on the provisions of Order VI Rule 2 CPC, it was submitted that
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By:YASHRAJ
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CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 39 of 58
the plaint suffers from gross lack of material facts. In that, there is lack of
reference to the agreements/assignment deeds, the parties, the relevant clauses,
the cinematograph films or the specific details of the songs and sound
recordings of which infringement is alleged.
34. This Court has perused the plaint and finds that the plaintiff has given
general references regarding the vesting of copyrights on it by virtue of
agreements/assignment deeds executed by Original Producers based whereof
the suit for infringement was filed. Though, at the initial stage, the plaintiff
had already placed on record a few agreements/assignment deeds however,
subsequently, has placed on record all the agreements which, according to it,
vest copyrights over the cinematograph films and the sound recordings
incorporated therein. In para 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff has clearly mentioned
the cinematograph films of which copyrights are claimed to have vested upon
the plaintiff. It is asserted that the defendant has infringed the copyrights of
the sound recordings incorporated in the said cinematograph films by
broadcasting the same over various online music platforms like Amazon
Music, Apple iTunes and JioSaavan in para 12 of the plaint. In para 15 of the
plaint, the plaintiff has also placed the screenshots of certain songs which are
alleged to be infringed by the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA by broadcasting in
the aforesaid online music platforms, though, all the songs have not been
enumerated. In the list of documents also, all the songs which may have been
incorporated in the cinematograph films enlisted in the plaint, have not been
enlisted in a detailed manner. However, that by itself will not disentitle the
plaintiff from seeking interim injunction in case sufficient grounds are made
out.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 40 of 58
35. It needs no emphasis that a plaint is only a pleading which requires a
concise statement of facts and neither evidence nor any legal propositions
therein. If sufficient facts, which are material to the cause of action which
needs to be necessarily traversed by the defendants are present, it can be
inferred that the requirements of Order VI Rule 2 CPC are generally met with.
As a word of caution, this Court would note that the aforesaid observations in
this context are only prima facie and the defendant would surely be entitled to
raise this objection and agitate the same at the appropriate stage.
36. An argument on procedural defect was sought to be raised by the
learned Senior Counsel for the defendant. In that, the copy of the suit was
alleged to have been deliberately served upon the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA
and not the counsel for the defendant who was appearing in another
suit/appeal pending in this Court. It was stated that the plaintiff deliberately
served the defendant and not the counsel so as to take the defendant by
surprise and obtain an ex-parte ad-interim injunction behind his back. It was
argued that had the plaintiff been fair and served an advance copy of the suit
upon the counsel for the plaintiff who had appeared in the other suit, the
occasion or reason to pass an ex-parte ad-interim injunction order may not
have arisen and/or avoided as the defendant would furnished sufficient
grounds for refusal. This submission was vehemently opposed by the learned
Senior Counsel for the plaintiff, both on law as also on facts.
37. The aforesaid argument is clearly contrary to the provisions of law.
Order V of CPC governs issuance and service of summons upon the
defendant. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order V CPC contemplates issuance of
summons to the defendant alone. It does not postulate or envisage or even
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 41 of 58
recognise any person other than the defendant upon whom serving of
summons can be effected except those which are specified under the rules
stipulated under Order V CPC. However, at the first instance, Order V Rule 1
contemplates service upon the defendant only. It is only after the summons
have been served upon the defendant that under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of
Order V CPC that the defendant may appear (i) in person, or (ii) by a pleader
duly instructed who may answer all material questions relating to the suit or
(iii) by a pleader accompanied by some person able to answer all such
questions. Other than that summons may be served upon the defendant either
through his agent or on an adult family member of the defendant. Neither the
Rules, nor Order V CPC, anywhere contemplate or envisage service of
summons of the suit plaint, on a pleader or counsel. Thus, the contention that
summons of the suit ought to have been served upon the counsel for the
defendant in advance, is legally untenable. Learned senior counsel for the
defendant did not dispute that the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA was in fact,
served in advance.
38. In the present case, the counsel for the plaintiff has filed an affidavit of
service deposing that the complete set of Paper Book was served upon the
defendant at two e-mail addresses of the defendant on 12.02.2026 at 11:50
a.m. and which have not bounced back. This advance service is stated to be in
terms of Rule 22 of the Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022. The
suit was listed before this Court on 13.02.2026 when it was taken up for
consideration. It is not the case of the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA that advance
service was not effected at all. Moreover, having regard to the fact that both
parties including the defendant are hotly contesting the other cases in this
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 42 of 58
Court, it is expected that the parties would be extra vigilant. Clearly, the
defendant was served with the advance copy of the suit plaint atleast 24 hours
before it was taken up for consideration. So much for arguing that advance
service of the suit was not effected upon the counsel for the defendant in the
other case, it is interesting to note that the counsel who entered appearance
and is representing the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA in the present suit is not the
same counsel who appears for the said defendant in the other suit. In any case,
it is the defendant’s prerogative to choose or engage a particular counsel to
appear and defend him in a fresh suit and is not determined by the service of
the suit by the plaintiff on a particular counsel, who may be appearing in some
other matter too. Thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has violated any
provisions of the law. The arguments in this context cannot be appreciated at
all, in law, much less on facts.
CS(COMM) 1310/2025
I.A. 30776/2025 & I.A.4553/2026 (Under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC
& Order XXXIX Rule 4, CPC)
39. The plaintiff/Saregama India Limited has filed an application bearing
I.A.30776/2025 under XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the CPC seeking ex-parte ad-
interim injunction against the defendants.
40. By the order dated 09.12.2025, this Court had granted ex-parte ad
interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and
directed the defendant nos. 1 and 2 to either remove the subject song from the
defendants’ film or deposit an amount of Rs.30,00,000/- before the release of
the defendants film on OTT platforms, failing which they were restrained
from releasing the defendants’ film on OTT Platforms, Satellite Television or
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 43 of 58
any other online platform, while using the subject song.
41. The defendant Black Madras Films has also filed an application bearing
no. 4553/2026 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC seeking vacation of the ex-
parte ad-interim order dated 09.12.2025.
42. Before adverting to and considering the applications aforementioned, it
may be appropriate to state the brief background of the plaintiff’s case as
under:
42.1. Plaintiff claims to be the copyright owner of the sound recordings
as well as the underlying musical and literary works in the songs of the
subject film (“Pallavi Anupallavi”), including the subject song (“Naguva
Nayana”), by virtue of Copyright Assignment Agreement dated
27.12.1980 entered into between the plaintiff and the producer of
plaintiff’s cinematographic film i.e. M/s Venus Pictures.
42.2. On 26.11.2025, plaintiff claims to have come across the subject
song from the subject film being used by the defendant nos.1 and 2 as a
background score without any authorization/license from the plaintiff. It
further claims that the defendants’ film had already been theatrically
released worldwide on 21.11.2025. Upon acquiring such knowledge,
plaintiff sent a Cease and Desist Notice dated 26.11.2025 to the Defendant
nos.1 & 2, informing them of its rights in the subject song and the subject
film, and directing them to regularise the unauthorised usage of the subject
song.
42.3. Vide response email dated 27.11.2025, defendant no.1 brought to
the notice of the plaintiff that it had already taken a license form defendant
no.5 (Mr. Ilaiyaraja), to adapt, record/recreate and synchronize the subject
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 44 of 58
song, and therefore, defendant no.1, 2 and 4 did not agree to comply with
the requisitions sought by the plaintiff in the notice.
42.4. Being aggrieved by the infringement of its Copyright in the
subject song and its underlying literary and musical works from the
subject film, by the defendants reproducing the same in their
cinematographic film “Mask”, plaintiff filed the present suit.
43. The arguments were addressed by learned senior counsel for the parties
in this suit too qua the applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 as also
Order XXXIV Rule 4 CPC. This Court is not dealing separately with the
submissions of the learned counsel for the reason that the issue raised by the
learned senior counsel for the defendant nos.1, 2 and 5 is clearly covered,
mutatis mutandis, by the observations in the judgment of the learned Division
Bench in the FAO(OS) COMM 52/2025 titled “Mr. Ilaiyaraaja vs. Saregama
India Limited” pronounced on 21.05.2026. The relevant paragraphs of the
judgement is extracted hereunder:-
31.3 However, Ilaiyaraaja was not the owner of copyright in the
sound recording, or the lyrics underlying the disputed song. His
copyright was limited to the musical work, the very definition of
which, in Section 2(p), excludes the lyrical component of the song.
Ilaiyaraaja could not, therefore, have assigned, to VFIL, the lyrics
underlying the disputed song.
31.4 Equally, Section 17 makes the author of a work the first owner
of copyright therein. For a cinematograph film, the author is, per
definition in Section 2(d)(v), the producer of the film. As such, RCA
was the first owner of the copyright in the film Moodu Pani.
“Cinematograph film” is defined, in Section 2(f), as including the
sound recording accompanying the visual recording of the film. RCA
was also, therefore, the first owner of copyright in the sound
recordings contained in the film Moodu Pani. Ilaiyaraaja could not,
therefore, have assigned, to VFIL, the sound recordings in the film
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 45 of 58
Moodu Pani either, which would include the sound recording
relating to the disputed song En Iniya Pon Nilave.
32.2 Thus, by this Agreement, copyright in the sound recordings
contained in the cinematograph film Moodu Pani was transferred to
Gramophone Co. of India Ltd – which was later rechristened as SIL
– for consideration in the form of a stipulated royalty.
33. The position that thus emerges is that
(i) copyright in the sound recordings in Moodu Pani, which would
include the sound recording in the song En Iniya Pon Nilave, vested
in RCA, and never resided in Ilaiyaraaja, and
(ii) RCA, by the Agreement dated 25 February 1980, transferred
copyright in the said sound recordings to SIL. SIL, thereby, became
the owner of copyright in the sound recordings contained in the film
Moodu Pani, which included the sound recording of the song En
Iniya Pon Nilave.
34. Without a licence, or permission, from SIL, therefore, VFIL could
not have exploited any of the sound recordings contained in the film
Moodu Pani, including the sound recording relating to the song En
Iniya Pon Nilave. By recreating/adapting the said sound recording,
therefore, VFIL has infringed the copyright of SIL .
44. In the present case, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant nos.1 and 3 or
even defendant no.5-Ilaiyaraaja has placed on record any agreement having
been executed between the defendant nos.1 and 2 on one hand and defendant
no.5, on the other. Although, certain other documents to indicate business
transactions between the parties have been placed on record by defendant
no.5.
45. The plaintiff has placed on record the agreement/assignment deed dated
27/12/1980 by virtue whereof, the Original Producer/Venus Pictures had
assigned its copyright entirely in the cinematograph film “Pallavi Anupallavi”
- Kannada including the sound recordings. The said agreement is extracted
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 46 of 58
hereunder:
“ THIS AGREEMENT made the 27 th day of December 1980 between
THE GRAMOPHONE COMPANY OF INDIA LIMITED
Having its Registered Office at 5, Old Court House Street, Calcutta 700 001
(hereinafter called “the Company” which expression shall include its
successors and assigns), represented and signed by
SARASWATHI STORES
Carrying on business at 806, Mount Road, Madras 600 002 (hereinafter
referred to as “Sarastores” which expression shall include partners or partner
of the firm, the heirs executors or administrators of last surviving partner and
their or his permitted assigns) on behalf of The Gramophone Co. of India Ltd.
of the one part and
M/s- Venus Pictures, 7 & 8,
Venus Colony, Alwarpet, Madras
– 600 018.
(hereinafter called “the Producer” which expression shall include in the case
of corporation its successors and permitted assigns, in the case of firm the
partners or partner of the firm, the heirs executors or administrators of last
surviving partner and their or his permitted assigns and in the case of
individual his heirs administrators executors and permitted assigns) of the
other part.
Whereas the Producer hereby represents and assures the Company
and Sarastores that the Producer has absolute and unfettered right and is free
from any obligation to third parties which would in any way restrict the
Producer from entering into this Agreement for carrying out the Producer’s
obligations to the Company and Sarastores as hereinafter appearing.
Now in consideration of the aforesaid representation and assurance and the
respective obligations hereinafter set forth it is hereby agreed by and between
the parties hereto as follows:-
1. This Agreement shall be for only the Picture ‘Pallavi Anupallavi’ –
th
Kannada year(s) commencing on the 27 day of December 1980 and shall
continue for successive periods of each on the same terms and conditions as are
herein laid down unless the Company or Sarastores terminates the Agreement
by giving notice in writing to the Producer 60 days before the expiration of the
initial or extended period.
2. For the purpose of this Agreement the following words shall have the
meanings set forth against them:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 47 of 58
“WORK” shall mean any one or more of a
literary dramatic musical or
artistic work as defined in the
Copyright Act, 1957.
“RECORD”
shall include a gramophone disc
record magnetic tape record
(whether reel to reel, endless loop,
in cassette or cartridge form or
otherwise howsoever) or any other
contrivance or appliance whatever
bearing or used for emitting
sounds whether or not the same
also bears or can bear visual
images or is or can be joined to be
used in conjunction with or part of
a contrivance or appliance
bearing or used for giving visual
images but shall exclude a
cinematograph film as
immediately hereafter defind.
“CINEMATO-
GRAPH FILM”
shall include soundtrack and any
recording however made of a
sequence of visual images which is
capable of being used as a means
of showing that sequence as a
moving picture (whether or not
joined to or part of a record as
defined herein) provided that it
shall only include such recordings
as aforesaid as are used for
presentation through cinema
theatrical or television
transmission or diffusion media or
by any gauge of film derived from
such recordings so presented and
shall not include any such
recordings as are used for
presentation in any other manner
whatsoever.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 48 of 58
“PERFORMANCE” shall include speech dialogue
monologue recitation acting
singing playing an instrument or
instruments conducting or
directing either alone or with
another or others or any other
sound and visual effects of any
kind.
“PRODUCER’S
FILMS”
shall mean all cinematograph
films commenced and/or under
production during the period of
this Agreement and the
extensions(s) (if any) thereof,
whether or not the production
thereof may have been completed
after the expiry of this Agreement,
which contain performances of
any work(s) in respect of which
the Producer directly or
indirectly:
(i) is or shall be the producer or
owner or
(ii) otherwise owns controls or
shall own or control the rights to
make available licence and assign
the rights granted to the Company
under this Agreement.
“CONTRACT
RECORDINGS”
Shall mean recordings of
performances comprising the
Producers Films whether or not
they are incorporated in the final
versions of the Producer’s Films.
“CONTRACT
WORKS”
shall mean all works of a literary
dramatic or musical nature
performed in contract recordings.
3. (A) The Producer hereby assigns and transfers and agrees to assign and
transfer to the Company absolutely and beneficially for the world:1.
(i) the copyright for making records of all contract works which are made
available to the Company under the terms of this Agreement and the copyright
performing right and all other rights title and interest in and to the literary
dramatic and musical works embodied in the Producer's Films including all
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
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rights of publication, sound and television broadcasting, public performance
and mechanical reproduction of the said works.
(ii) the sole and exclusive right to make or authorise the making of any record
embodying the contract recordings, either alone or together with any other
recordings.
The Producer undertakes to execute or obtain the execution of such further
assignments or assurances as may be required to safeguard the parties' rights.
(B) It is hereby declared that the rights hereby assigned and transferred or
agreed to be assigned and transferred in pursuance of this Agreement include
but are not limited to:
(i) the sole right of production reproduction sale (under such trademarks as
the Company may select) use and public performance (including sound and
television broadcasting) throughout the world by any and every means
whatsoever of records made in pursuance of this Agreement.
(ii) the sole right to decide based on market demand whether and/or when to
discontinue or recommence the said production and sale of records and to fix
and alter the prices of such records and the irrevocable right and licence at all
times to use and publish the names and photographs of artistes, musicians, lyric
writers, music directors and other persons associated with and/or engaged in
the Producer's Films in any manner whatsoever and the Producer's trademarks
and logos for labelling cataloguing promoting and marketing the said records.
(iii) the right to grant licences for publication, sound and television
broadcasting, public performance and mechanical reproduction of the contract
works or any of them.
(iv) the right of use and public performance (including sound and television
broadcasting) throughout the world by any and every means whatsoever of the
contract works or any of them.
and the Company shall have the irrevocable right to authorise any other
person, firm or corporation to do any and all such acts and things.
4. The Producer hereby assures the Company and Sarastores:-
(a) That the copyright and other rights as mentioned in Clause 3 are or will be
the Producer's free and unencumbered property immediately prior to their
assignment or transfer to the Company.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
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(b) That prior to the despatch of soundtrack or recorded tape thereof or any
other materials considered necessary to be made available to the Company
under this Agreement the Producer will have secured the consent in writing of
all artistes musicians lyric writers music directors and other persons associated
with and/or engaged in the Producer's Films in any matter whatsoever together
with all other consents necessary for the manufacture and sale of the records
and the use and publication by the Company and its Licensees of the names
including professional names (if any) and photographs of the artistes musicians
lyric writers music directors and other persons for trade and advertising
purposes as aforesaid for the purposes of this Agreement.
(c) That except as otherwise expressly provided herein the Company and
Sarastores shall be under no liability whatsoever to any of the said artistes or
musicians or lyric writers or music directors or to any other third party arising
out of the Company's exercise of any of its rights under this Agreement.
5. The Producer shall at his own expense promptly after the completion of
each of the Producer's Films or, if so required by the company, or Sarastores
before such completion, make available solely and exclusively to the Company,
the soundtrack or a recorded tape thereof and/or any other materials
considered necessary for the purposes of this Agreement, which, in the
reasonable opinion of the Company, should be technically suitable for use in
the manufacture of records therefrom.
6. Both the parties shall ensure the security of the soundtrack or recorded
tape thereof or any other materials considered necessary for the purposes of
this Agreement while these are within their respective control and shall prevent
their loss pilferage theft and/or unauthorised use or duplication contrary to the
rights and obligations of the parties hereto.
7. The Company shall manufacture for sale in one configuration or another
records of at least the songs contained in the contract recordings unless the
Company reasonably believes that discharge of this obligation shall cause
moral, moral, religious or political offence or infringe the rights of any third
parties.
8. The Company shall be the owner of the original plate within the meaning
of the Copyright Act, 1957 and any extensions or modifications thereof of any
performance from which any records are manufactured in pursuance of this
Agreement.
9. The Producer:
(a) Shall not directly or indirectly supply or make available to any individual
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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firm company corporation or other person for the purposes of manufacturing
and selling records the whole or any part of the soundtrack or recorded tape
thereof or any other materials made or to be made available to the Company
under this Agreement.
(b) shall not directly or indirectly provide the services of any of the said artistes
and or musicians to perform any of the works performance of which have been
made available to the Company for the purpose of manufacturing and selling
records hereunder on their own account or for any individual firm company
corporation or other person other than the Company whereby such
soundtrack(s) and performances are or are intended to be recorded in any form
from which a record may be offered to the public provided that such
soundtrack(s) and performances by the said artistes and musicians can be made
available for sound or television broadcasting or cinematograph films in cases
in which records thereof are not and are not intended to be offered to the public
except by or with the prior written consent of the Company.
(c) shall not do any act which derogates from the grants to the Company in this
agreement or exercise any rights granted to the Company in this agreement.
10. The Producer shall not without the prior written consent of the Company
or Sarastores:-
(a) assign all or any of the Producer's rights or obligations whatsoever under
this agreement nor
(b) appoint an agent to collect on the Producer's behalf any monies due under
the provisions of this Agreement.
11. The Producer agrees that all the rights and obligations under this
Agreement shall be construed to apply to works included or to be included in
Producer's Films commenced and/or under production during the period of this
Agreement.
12. (A) Subject as hereinafter mentioned the Producer shall be entitled in
respect of all records made in pursuance of this Agreement (excluding records
for promotional purposes) and sold by the Company and its Licensees in any
part of the World or by Sarastores and not returned to a royalty calculated on
the Company's domestic dealer price per record (excluding any taxes levied or
leviable in respect of such sale by the Company and its Licensees and
Sarastores and then less a packaging allowance at % on tape records) at the
following rates:-
(a) On a record reproducing:
(i) Contract recordings alone % ( per cent) per record.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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(ii) Contract recordings together with other recordings a proportion of %
( per cent) per record according to the number or duration of other recordings.
(b) The Producer shall also be entitled to additional royalty in respect of
records sold by the Company or Sarastores, but not by its Licensees, calculated
as follows:-
(i) When the total value of records sold by the Company or Sarastores
appearing in the Producer's royalty statement during a half-year exceeds Rs.
but does not exceed Rs. % ( per cent) of total half-yearly sales value
on the basis of the Company’s domestic dealer price.
(ii) When the total value of records sold by the Company or Sarastores
appearing in the Producer’s royalty statement during a half-year exceeds Rs.
- % ( per cent) of total half-yearly sales value on the basis of the Company’s
domestic dealer price.
For arriving at the total half-yearly sales value proportionate value will be
taken where contract recordings are combined in a record with other
recordings.
(B) Records manufactured for the Company outside India on a custom
pressing basis but intended by the Company primarily for sale in India shall for
the purposes of this Clause 12 be considered as having been manufactured in
India and to have been sold when sold by the Company; similarly records
manufactured other than by the Company for any of its Licensee outside the
country in which such Licensee has its main operating office may be deemed to
have been manufactured in such country and to have been sold when sold by
such Licensee.
(C) In addition to the royalty provided for in Clauses 12(A) hereof the
Producer shall also be paid an all-inclusive copyright royalty at the rate of % (
Company and its Licensees or Sarastores of records containing per cent) in
respect of of sales by the performances of contract works and the provisions of
Clause (12A) shall apply to the calculation of such copyright royalty.
(D) Royalty as above shall be payable as long as records covered by the
Agreement continue to be sold by the Company and/or its Licensees and/or
Sarastores but not beyond the period for which the copyright in records and in
contract works is legally protected in each country in which such records are
sold.
13. The Company shall deduct or shall authorise the deduction from royalty
payments to the Producer any sums deductible under any laws and/or which
may be demanded by the Government or other authorities from the Company
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
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and its Licensees in respect of such payments.
14. The Company's liability to pay royalty hereunder shall be limited to the
amounts thereof actually received from its Licensees and shall not be payable
until received. In countries where currency restrictions are in force and should
such restrictions in any country prevent the remittance of the whole or part of
the royalty due any royalty not remitted shall if requested by the Producer and
at the Producer's expense be held in an account to be nominated by the
Producer in the country concerned subject to the laws of such country and of
India.
15. Within six months after the end of each half-year the Producer shall be
provided with a statement showing the latest information received by the
Company or Sarastores for such half-yearly period as to the number of records
sold (after making any permissible deductions as aforesaid) and the amount of
royalty due in respect thereof and subject to the provisions of Clause 13 hereof
such amount shall be paid to the Producer or the Producer's agent appointed
under Clause 10 of this Agreement and such payment shall be a complete
discharge of the Company's liability to make payments hereunder. The
Producer shall at the expense of the Producer be entitled to receive upon so
requesting the Company or Sarastores in writing a Certificate of the Company's
or Sarastores' Auditors as to the correctness of any such statement.
16. Notwithstanding anything herein contained the Producer agrees to receive
either from the Company or Sarastores royalties specified in Clause 12 hereof,
it being understood that payment of the said royalties by either of them will
always operate as a good and sufficient discharge of the liability to the
Producer.
17. The provisions of this Agreement shall be applicable to records
manufactured and sold or to be manufactured and sold under any earlier
Agreement(s) entered into by the Company with the Producer either directly or
through Sarastores.
18. The Producer without prejudice to the Producer's responsibilities and
obligations hereunder hereby nominates constitutes and appoints the Company
as the Producer's attorney to bring and conduct in such form and manner as to
the Company may seem reasonable any legal proceedings whatever in the name
of the Company against any person for the purpose of enforcement of the
provisions of this Agreement or against any person who has committed
anything whereby the Company's rights and interests under this Agreement are
adversely affected provided that the authority hereby granted may be exercised
by any Director or Secretary of the Company or by any officer of the Company
duly authorised for the purpose.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 54 of 58
19. This Agreement is being entered into by the Company with the Producer
on the Producer's representation and assurance that the Producer is entirely
free to enter into and to perform the Producer's obligations under this
Agreement and in case such representation and assurance prove to be incorrect
and the Company suffers any loss and/or damage the Producer shall indemnify
the Company against all such losses and/or damages and such indemnity is
without prejudice to any other rights or remedies that may be available to the
Company.
20. Any notice given under the provisions of This Agreement may be given by
hand to the Producer or to Sarastores or to the Principal Officer of the
Company or may be sent by registered letter to the address of the Producer
appearing above or to such other address as the Producer may for the purpose
notify to Sarastores or the Company in writing or to Sarastores at the address
given above or to the Company at its Registered Office in which event such
notice shall be deemed to have been received in the course of the normal post.
21. The rights and obligations of the parties hereunder and the terms and
conditions of the Agreement shall be governed by and be construed according
to the Laws of India.
In witness whereof S. KRISHNAMOORTHY Partner VENUS PICTURES on
behalf of the Producer and M. KUMARAN Managing Partner of Sarastores
have hereunto set their hands the day and year first above mentioned.
Signed by the said for Venus Pictures
Sd/-
S. KRISHNAMOORTHY
On behalf of the Producer
In the presence of”
46. The recitals in the aforesaid agreement/assignment deed are similar to
or identical in material terms with the agreements in CS(COMM)
No.143/2026 and thus the analysis and observations recorded hereinabove in
respect of those assignment deeds too, shall apply to the present case. It is
apparent that the plaintiff has been exploiting the copyrights conferred upon it
by virtue of the aforesaid agreement/assignment deed since execution. It is in
the aforesaid context that the plaintiff seeks interim injunction against
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 55 of 58
defendant nos.1 and 2 and 5 from infringing the sound recording which
embodies and incorporates the song “Naguva Nayana” by including and
incorporating the same in the cinematograph film “Mask”.
47. As observed by this Court, while dealing with application bearing I.A.
4116/2026 & I.A.6361/2026 in the CS(COMM) No.143/2026, the defendant
ILAIYARAAJA could not demonstrate his ownership in copyrights in the
sound recording or the lyrics underlying in the disputed song. The copyright
was limited to the musical work, the definition whereof as per Section 2(p) of
the Act excludes the lyrics. In this case too, nothing substantial has been
demonstrated to arrive at a contrary conclusion. Resultantly, the defendant
no.5 ILAIYARAAJA could not have, by any stretch of imagination, assigned
unto the defendant no.1 and 2 the lyrics in the underlying song.
48. That apart, the Original Producer/Venus Pictures, in terms of Section
17, read with Section 2(d)( v ) of the Act, would be the “author” of the
cinematograph film. Thus, the Original Producer/Venus Pictures would be the
first owner of the copyright in the film “Pallavi Anupallavi” which would also
include sound recording accompanying the visual recording in terms of the
definition of “cinematograph film” in Section 2(f) of the Act. Thus, the
Original Producer/Venus Pictures was also the first owner of copyright in the
sound recordings contained in the film “Pallavi Anupallavi”. Consequently,
the defendant no.2/ILAIYARAAJA could not have assigned the sound
recordings in the film “Pallavi Anupallavi” which also would include the song
“Naguva Nayana” to the defendant nos.1 and 2.
49. Furthermore, by virtue of the agreement dated 27/12/1980 executed by
the Original Producer/Venus Pictures in favour of the plaintiff, the copyright
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 56 of 58
in the sound recordings as also the copyrights in the said film “Pallavi
Anupallavi” was transferred to the plaintiff. It is by virtue of this agreement
that the plaintiff is exercising its rights as a Producer and a copyright holder of
the sound recordings in the said film.
50. The facts arising in the present suit are almost identical to the suit
wherefrom the appeal bearing FAO(OS) (COMM) 52/2025 arose and thus, the
observations on facts and the law laid down therein are squarely applicable to
the facts arising herein. Thus, on the anvil of the aforesaid analysis and
observations, this Court is of the considered opinion that the defendant
no.5/ILAIYARAAJA could not have assigned the aforesaid rights to the
defendant nos.1 and 2 which has resulted in infringement of plaintiffs rights.
51. Moreover, once the plaintiff became owner of the copyright in the
sound recordings incorporated in the film “Pallavi Anupallavi” which
included the sound recording of the song “Naguva Nayana”, the defendant
nos.1 and 2 could not have exploited any of the sound recordings incorporated
or embodied in the said cinematograph film. Any such act would, prima facie ,
tantamount to infringement of the copyrights of the plaintiff.
:
COMMON CONCLUSION
52. Premised on the aforesaid conspectus, the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie strong case in its favour and against the defendants in both the
suits. Balance of convenience too is in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
shall suffer irreparable loss and injury which may not be adequately
compensated in case the injunction as prayed for, is not granted.
DIRECTIONS :
53. In view of the aforesaid observations, analysis and findings, the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
CS(COMM) 1310/2025 & CS(COMM) 143/2026 Page 57 of 58
following directions are passed:
A. So far IA No.4116/2026 in CS(COMM) No.143/2026 seeking ad
interim injunction against the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is concerned, the
same is allowed and the defendant/ILAIYARAAJA is restrained from
broadcasting or communicating the songs in the cinematograph films
enlisted in para 7 of the plaint through any online music platform including
but not limited to Amazon Music, Apple iTunes and JioSaavan during the
pendency of the suit or till further orders and as a corollary IA
No.6361/2026 of defendant/ILAIYARAAJA seeking vacation of the ex-
parte order dated 13.02.2026 is dismissed.
B. So far as IA 30776/2025 filed in CS(COMM) No.1130/2025 seeking ad
interim injunction against defendant nos.1, 2 and 5 are concerned, the ex
parte ad interim injunction order dated 09.12.2025 passed against the
defendant nos.1 and 2 is made absolute and as a corollary IA
No.4553/2026 seeking vacation of the ex-parte order dated 09.12.2025 is
dismissed.
54. The applications are disposed of in view of the above directions.
55. The aforesaid analysis and observations shall not tantamount to any
expression of the merits of the suit and are confined only to the consideration
for the adjudication of this application.
CS(COMM) 143/2026 & CS(COMM) 1310/2025
56. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on 20.08.2026. List before the
Court on 29.09.2026.
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
(JUDGE)
JULY 01, 2026/ rl/aky
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
Signing Date:01.07.2026
17:38:32
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