SRI MARUTI VENKAPPA BALANNAVAR vs SRI PRATAPRAO SULTANRAO SHINDE
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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R
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
TH
DATED THIS THE 28 DAY OF APRIL 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 959 OF 2008 (INJ-)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. MARUTI VENKAPPA BALANNAVAR,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS.
1A. SMT. YALLAVVA
W/O MARUTI BALANNAVAR,
AGE. 53 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 130
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
1B. SMT. BHARATI W/O MARUTI PUJER
W/O SHIVAPPA BALANNAVAR,
AGE. 43 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 130
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
1C. SADASHIVA S/O MARUTI BALANNAVAR,
AGE. 39 YEARS,
OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 130
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
1D. SMT. PADMA W/O MAHENDRA KITADAL,
AGE. 38 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. UJJINAKOPPA, CHUNCHUR- 591114,
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
APPELLANTS NO. 1A TO 1D
HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ON RECORD AS THE
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF
DECEASED APPELLANT NO.1.
GIRIJA A.
BYAHATTI
Digitally signed by
GIRIJA A. BYAHATTI
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
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2. SRI. SHIVAPPA VENKAPPA BALANNAVAR,
AGED. 43 YEARS,
OCC: PRIVATE SERVICE,
R/O: KULLUR, TALUKA: RAMDURG,
DISTRICT: BELGAUM- 590004.
3. SRI. LAXMAN VENKAPPA BALANNAVAR,
AGED. 34 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KULLUR, TALUKA: RAMDURG,
DISTRICT: BELGAUM- 590004.
4. SRI. BASAPPA VENKAPPA BALANNAVAR,
AGED: 36 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KULLUR, TALUKA: RAMDURG,
DISTRICT: BELGAUM- 590004.
5. SMT. SATYAVVA
W/O VENKAPPA BALANNAVAR,
AGED: 68 YEARS,
OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O: KULLUR, TALUKA: RAMDURG,
DISTRICT: BELGAUM- 590004.
6. SMT. NAGATEVVA
W/O KARIYAPPA ANAWALAR,
SINCE DECEASED BY LRS.
6A. KAREPPA S/O YELLAPPA ANAWAL,
AGE. 78 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 126
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
6B. SMT. RUKAMAVVA
W/O SHIVAPPA BALANNAVAR,
AGE. 50 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 126,
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
6C. SMT. RENUKA W/O SURESH PULLI,
AGE. 45 YEARS,
OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 126,
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TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
6D. SURESH S/O KAREPPA ANAWAL,
AGE. 40 YEARS, OCC. COOLIE,
R/O. KULLUR- 591 126,
TAL. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
6E. SMT. TANGEVVA
W/O RAMACHANDRA LANKANNAVAR,
AGE. 35 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O. TONDIKATTI- 591126,
TQ. RAMDURG, DIST. BELAGAVI.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SMT. SURABHI KULKARNI, ADVOCATE FOR A1(A TO D),
A2 TO A4, R6 (A TO E);
A1-A4 ARE TREATED AS LRS OF DECEASED A5 & A6
(A TO E) ARE ALSO TREATED AS LRS OF DECEASED
A5)
AND:
SRI. PRATAPRAO SULTANRAO SHINDE,
AGED: 50 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KULLUR, TQ: RAMDURG,
DISTRICT: BELGAUM- 590004.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. R.K. KULKARNI, ADVOCATE FOR SOLE RESPONDENT)
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION
100 OF CPC, IS PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGEMENT AND
DECREE DATED 22.01.2008 PASSED IN R.A.NO.45/07 ON THE
FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) AT RAMDURG, CONFIRMING
THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 11.4.2001 PASSED IN
O.S.NO.119/87 ON THE FILE OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (JR.DN),
RAMDURG, SUIT BE DECREED AS PRAYED FOR AND THIS
APPEAL BE ALLOWED WITH COSTS THROUGHOUT.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS
DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE GEETHA K.B.
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ORAL JUDGMENT
Heard arguments of learned counsel for both sides.
2. This is the appeal filed under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) challenging the
Judgment and decree dated 22.01.2008 passed in RA
No.45/2007 (Old RA No.5/2001) on the file of Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Ramdurga (for short ‘First Appellate
Court’) and to set aside the Judgment and Decree dated
11.04.2001 passed in OS No.19/1987 on the file of Civil
Judge (Junior Division) Ramdurga (for short ‘trial Court’) to
decree the suit of the plaintiff.
3. Plaintiffs have filed the suit before trial Court
praying for the relief of declaration that the plaintiffs have
absolute right over suit schedule property and also for the
relief of permanent injunction restraining defendants from
interfering with their peaceful possession over suit schedule
property.
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4. The case of plaintiffs before trial Court in nutshell
is that suit schedule property bearing Re.Sy.No.141
measuring 6 acres 1 gunta situated at Kullur Village,
Ramadurga Taluk, is the property of plaintiffs and their
forefathers who were enjoying this property as they and
their family were working as Halabaki, an inferior village
office. Plaintiffs further contended that their grandfather Sri
Tammanna Balappa Balannavar resident of Kullur was in
possession of this property as Inam land. It was continued
in their families; the father of plaintiff Nos.1 to 4 Sri
Venkappa was in possession of it, cultivating it and was
getting its proceeds. Defendants having no right, title or
interest in or over suit schedule property, but because they
are very influential family, have colluded with higher
officers, illegally got the revenue entries into their names
and based on those revenue entries, they are trying to
forcibly evict plaintiffs from suit schedule property and
hence the suit for appropriate relief.
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5. After service of notice, defendants have filed
their written statement wherein they denied all other
averments made in the plaint. They contended that initially,
suit schedule property was in possession of Srimantha
Ramachandra Rao Dattaji Rao Shinde and he was the owner
of this property. Afterwards, during 1955 there was
partition in between said Srimantha Ramachandra Rao
Dattaji Rao Shinde and his brothers. He further contended
that suit schedule property was Dumaldar Gao Sanadi Inam
land and it continued with their possession and accordingly
mutation is certified in the year 1954 by revenue officials in
the name of elder brother of defendant No.1 and after
partition, it is mutated into the name of defendant No.1 as
per diary No.281; as per diary No.282, after
commencement of Mumbai Inams Abolition Act, as the suit
scheduled property was ryotwari land, it continued in the
name of defendants. Defendants have planted
approximately 200 Eucalyptus plants in 4 acres of suit
schedule property. They have obtained loan from Syndicate
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Bank, Ramdurga Branch for planting the Eucalyptus
plantation. As per the plaint pleadings, suit schedule
property is Inam land and hence this Court has no
jurisdiction to try the suit. The Court fee paid is insufficient
and valuation made for the purpose of Court fee and
jurisdiction is incorrect. Hence, prayed for dismissal of suit
with costs.
6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has
framed the following issues and additional issues:-.
Issues :
1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit land was
Halabaki Inam land and the same was given to their
fore-fathers for rendering services as Halabas as
contended in para 3 of the plaint?
2. Whether the plaintiffs further prove that they are in
actual possession and making wahivat of the suit land
since their fore-fathers till today?
3. Whether the plaintiffs prove that defendants have no
right or interest over the suit land even then they are
interfering the lawful possession of plaintiff?
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4. Whether the defendants proves that the suit land has
fallen to their share in the year 1955 and ever since
they are enjoying the suit land as owner and
possession as contended in para 2 of written
statement?
5. Whether the defendants further prove that they have
planted Nilagiri tree in the suit land as contended in
para 4 of their written statement?
6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the relief of
declaration and permanent injunction as prayed in the
plaint?
7. What order or decree?
Additional Issue
1. Whether this Court is having jurisdiction to entertain
the suit?
7. After recording evidence of both sides and
hearing arguments of both sides, the trial Court came to the
conclusion that the regrant in favour of plaintiff is not
established by producing any cogent evidence and plaintiffs
have not established their ownership and possession over
suit schedule property and thereby dismissed the suit.
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8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree,
plaintiffs-appellants have preferred the appeal before First
Appellate Court.
9. Plaintiffs-appellants have produced the grant
order in the first appeal and it was marked with consent as
Ex.P13. Even then, the First Appellate Court has dismissed
the suit opining that the regrant order was passed during
pendency of the suit and that will not confer possession of
plaintiffs over suit schedule property before regrant and
plaintiffs failed to establish their ownership over suit
schedule property as on the date of suit and further made
an observation that defendants have produced certain
documents to show that suit schedule property was in their
possession at the time of filing of the suit and hence,
dismissed the appeal by confirming the judgment and
decree of First Appellate Court.
10. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and
decree, plaintiffs- appellants are before this Court.
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11. At the time of admitting the appeal, this Court
has framed the following substantial questions of law:
i) Whether the courts below were right and
justified in holding that the suit was not maintainable
as the suit property was an inam land governed by
the provisions of the Karnataka Village Office
Abolition Act, despite the fact that the land in
question was regranted in favour of the plaintiffs
though after the institution of the suit?
ii) What is the effect of pendency of the appeal
before the District Judge against the order passed by
the Assistant Commissioner ordering regrant of land
in favour of the plaintiffs under the provisions of
Karnataka Village Office Abolition Act?
iii) Whether the courts below were right and
justified in ignoring the regrant order and the
mutation entries while coming to the conclusion that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove their possession?
12. Heard arguments of both sides.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants, Ms. Surabhi
Kulkarni, would submit that even though there are
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate
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Court, the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of declaration
and permanent injunction; the first appellate court has not
considered the material documents, especially Exs.P.1 and
P.13.
14. Ex.P.1 shows the name of plaintiff’s grandfather,
Thammanna Balappa Balannavar, in Column No.4 of the
Inam Register in respect of Survey Nos. 18 and 141. The
suit schedule property bearing Survey No. 141, was
admittedly a Dumaldar Gao Sanadi Inam land, as is evident
from Ex.P.1. defendants also not dispute the nature of suit
schedule property.
15. After commencement of the Bombay Paragana
and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950, the lands in
question were vested with the Government, which is
established by Ex.D.6 (Mutation Entry No.282). After such
vesting of land with Government, the plaintiffs have given
an application for regrant of the land to the Land Tribunal,
and accordingly, as per Ex.P.13, the suit schedule property
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was regranted to them by order dated 30.12.1999, i.e.,
during pendency of the suit. However, the Trial Court and
the First Appellate Court have not considered the prayer of
the plaintiff only on the limited ground that the regrant
order was passed only during the pendency of the suit with
misnomer that as on the date of suit, the plaintiffs were not
in possession.
16. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs have
prayed for declaration of their rights and permanent
injunction. Even though there is no specific word used to
declare that plaintiffs are absolute owners of the suit
schedule property, the mofussil pleadings must be
understood in a proper legal manner. Thus, the plaintiffs
have prayed for declaration of their title to the suit schedule
property and not any other right.
17. Secondly, the Trial Court dismissed the suit on
the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit,
because the tenancy dispute is to be decided by the Land
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Tribunal and not by the Civil Court. However, the dispute
between the parties in the present case is civil in nature
i.e., prayer to declare rights of plaintiff and to grant
permanent injunction to plaintiff. Hence, civil Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant would further
submit that, as per Section 2(g) of the Bombay Paragana
and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950, “Watan Act”
means the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (Bombay
Act III of 1874). As per Schedule I of this Act, whole of the
Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 and Bombay
Hereditary Offices (amendment) Act, 1886, were ceased to
apply. Hence, as per Section 4 of this Bombay Paragana
and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950, the holder of
Watan land to be occupant and regrant shall be made to the
holder of the land. Accordingly, as per Ex.P.13, regrant was
made to plaintiffs’ father-Venkappa. When the earlier
Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 itself is ceased to
apply in toto, the submission of learned counsel for the
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respondent that the suit schedule property was Ryotwari
land and defendants need not pray for regrant cannot be
accepted.
19. The judgment of Limbaji Vs. Rama reported in
P.J. 1898 127 , is not applicable to the present case,
because, long after passing the said judgment, when the
entire Act of 1874 was ceased to apply, it cannot be said
that the Ryotwari land need not be regranted.
20. Learned counsel for the appellant would further
submit that, as far as possession is concerned, both Courts
have held that the defendant is in possession of the suit
schedule property.
21. The plaintiffs are in possession of suit schedule
property, and only after making spot inspection and coming
to know that plaintiffs are in possession of the suit schedule
property, regrant was made to the plaintiffs. Furthermore,
the regrant dates back to the commencement of the Act,
i.e., to the year 1950. Hence, possession of plaintiff as on
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the date of filing of the suit is proved. Further, the plaintiff
has established her possession over the suit schedule
property by examining himself and also examining the
witnesses. The trial court and the first appellate court have
not examined these points of law properly; and hence
prayed for allowing the appeal.
22. Learned counsel for the respondents, Sri. R. K.
Kulkarni, would submit that, earlier Survey No.141 was
given as Inam land to the grandfather of the plaintiffs by
the defendants, as per Ex.P.1. The defendants are
Dumaldars of the village. Thus, they had power to give the
property and the power to take it back. The defendants,
being the Dumaldars, had every right to appoint or remove
the Sanadi and to attach the Sanadi Watan. The suit
schedule property might have been given earlier and it was
taken back from the predecessors of the plaintiffs.
23. Ex.D.5 is the Mutation Entry Nos. 1 and 281.
This document reveals that the suit schedule property was
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in possession of the defendants and it was fully assessed
land; and thus, it was not vested with the Government
under the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous
Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, with effect from
08.05.1955, the land became fully assessable and taxable
(Ryotwari lands) and the RTCs also disclose payment of full
assessment.
24. Furthermore, in the year 1952 itself the dispute
arose between father of plaintiffs-Venkappa and
defendants. The father of plaintiffs had given an application
before the Assistant Commissioner for resumption of the
land, but the said application was rejected, as evidenced by
Ex.D.20 dated 29.07.1952. Thus, in the year 1952 itself,
the plaintiffs’ predecessors were not in possession of the
suit schedule property and no material is produced by them
to show that they came into possession of the suit schedule
property thereafter.
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25. Even in the year 1960, the defendants have
given the suit schedule property to tenant by name
Yamunappa; however, since there was no registered
agreement or deed, the application for change of name of
the tenant in the RTC was rejected, as evidenced by
Ex.D.22.
26. Thus, at no point of time, the plaintiffs were in
possession of the suit schedule property. There are
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court on this aspect. The RTCs, since from inception, stand
in the name of the defendants and not in the name of the
plaintiffs at any point of time.
27. The alleged regrant was not in existence as on
the date of the suit. Furthermore, as per Mutation Entry
No.282, under the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous
Alienations Abolition Act, 1955, the lands were not vested
with the Government, but continued in the name of
defendants as Ryotwari land. Under such circumstances, the
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alleged grant of land in favour of the plaintiffs under
Ex.P.13 under the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watan
(Abolition) Act, 1950 is of no consequence.
28. Even though the said grant was challenged
before the Deputy Commissioner, the same was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction. No further appeal was preferred
before the competent court. Therefore, even if the grant is
not challenged, it does not confer any enforceable right
upon the plaintiffs.
29. Learned counsel for respondent would further
submit that the suit filed by the plaintiff without possession
is not at all maintainable in law. Both the trial court and the
first appellate court have held that the plaintiff is not in
possession of the suit schedule property. This finding is a
finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in Second
appeal.
30. Learned counsel for the respondent would submit
that Ex.D.6 clarifies that there need not be any regrant to
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defendants. The lands in question were not vested with the
Government even as per Bombay Merged Territories
Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955.
31. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2006) 3
KCCR 186 (Head Note -). Hence, prayed for dismissal of the
appeal.
32. Having heard arguments of both sides and
verifying the appeal papers along with trial court record, the
findings of this court on substantial questions of law are as
follows:
REASONS
Regarding substantial question of law No.2:-
33. Learned counsel for respondents would submit
that even though the regrant as per Ex.P.13 was challenged
by defendants before the Deputy Commissioner, the same
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was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. No further appeal
was preferred before the competent District court.
34. As per the submission of the learned counsel for
respondent, the regrant in favour of plaintiff/appellant was
not at all challenged before any District Court. It was a
wrong submission that an appeal is pending before the
District Court, but no such appeal is filed at all.
35. Learned counsel for the respondent fairly submits
that no appeal is preferred against the re-grant in favour of
the plaintiff before the District Judge. The appeal filed
before the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, substantial
question of law No.2 does not exist, because no such appeal
is preferred. Accordingly, substantial question of law No.2
is answered.
36. Regarding substantial questions of law No.1
& 3:-
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The contention of plaintiffs is that their grandfather
Thammanna Balappa Balannavar was granted with suit
Sy.No.141 along with Sy.No.18, as he was performing the
services of Halabaki, a type of inferior village office.
37. Plaintiffs have produced Ex.P.1 maintained in the
office of the Village Accountant in Form No.1. It reveals that
the suit schedule property was Dumaldar Gaon Sanadi Inam
and plaintiffs’ forefather was Tammanna Balappa
Ballannavar was the Inamdar and he got his Inam through
Dumaldar Saheb. Not only this suit survey No.141, but also
Survey No.18 measuring 19 acre 12 guntas, were given to
the plaintiffs’ forefather as Dumaldar Sanadi Inam through
Dumaldar Saheb.
38. T he trial Court has dismissed the suit holding
that plaintiffs have not produced the regrant order.
39. D uring pendency of the First appeal, plaintiffs
have produced the re-grant order as per Ex.P.13 and it was
marked with consent. According to the Ex.P.13 as per
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Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watan (Abolition) Act,
1950, the suit schedule property is granted to Balappa
Maruthi Venkappa, Sakin Kulluru i.e., in favour of plaintiff
No.1.
40. Defendants are not disputing that Thammanna
Balappa Balannavar was serving inferior village office and
also not disputes that Sy.No.141 & Sy.No.18 were granted
to him for serving said village office under Ex.P.1. Their
contention is that as per Ex.P.1, Sanadi rights were given to
the plaintiffs’ ancestors by the Dumaldar and later
Sy.No.141 was withdrawn by them, as defendants and their
ancestors are Dumaldars and are having every right to
grant or to withdraw the grant. However, they have not
produced documents to show that they have withdrawn it.
41. In this regard, reliance is placed on Exs.D.5 and
D.6. Exs.D.5 and Ex.P.3 are one and the same document.
Ex.D.6 is the Diary No.282, wherein it is stated that, after
coming into force of the Bombay Watans (Abolition) Act,
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1950 on 01.08.1955 and as per the Circular No.WTN SR
1012 Inamadar was deleted from the list; Government is
mentioned in revenue records regarding several properties
including suit schedule property; then after The Bombay
Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act,
1955 came into force, as per circular No.WTN SR 1012,
Inamdar was deleted and for two survey numbers, including
suit schedule property, Dumaldars’ name was removed
except the right of Government on public roads, water
tanks, well and graveyards.
42. Learned counsel for the respondents further
relies upon M.E.No.281, which is found on the backside of
Ex.D.5. According to this document, there was partition
amongst Defendant No.1 and his brothers, and in the said
partition, several properties were allotted to the share of
Defendant No.1, which includes R.S. No.141 measuring 5
acres 5 guntas.
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43. The RTC pertaining to the suit survey number
141 is produced as Ex.P.2, which stands in the name of
Defendant No.1. Plaintiffs have also produced Ex.P.3 -
Diary Extract to show that some survey number properties
were vested with the Government immediately after
commencement of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni
Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950. According to the said
document, Shrimant Ramachandrarao Dattaji Rao Sindhe
has given application seeking to record possession of
certain survey numbers in to his name and certain other
survey numbers into the names of farmers, who were in
enjoyment of the same as Inam lands. In the said
application, the suit Survey No.141 was shown as the land
in possession of Shrimant Ramachandrarao Dattaji Rao
Sindhe.
44. Plaintiffs have produced Ex.P.4 - RTC for the year
1989–90 of the suit Survey No.141, wherein name of
plaintiff No.1 is entered in column No.9 & 12 (2) based on
court order. Ex.P5 is the Diary No.1425, pertaining to the
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entry of the plaintiffs’ names in the suit schedule property.
This entry and RTC were shown because the present suit
was decreed exparte .
45. Thereafter, defendants contested the matter by
filing petition under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, and the suit was
restored. Hence, the entries standing in the name of the
plaintiffs as per Exs.P4 to P6 is of no consequence.
46. Ex.P.7 is the order passed in the revenue
proceedings. Ex.P.8 is the document issued by the
Tahsildar, Ramdurg, indicating that the plaintiffs’ father, Sri.
Venkappa Hanamappa Balannavar, R/o.Kullur, was in
Sanadi service from 01.02.1962 and he was entitled to
receive pension and other benefits.
47. The contention of defendants is that, the suit
schedule property ought not to have been granted in favour
of the plaintiffs by the revenue authorities, and they were
not having any right to regrant the said property to
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plaintiffs because it was Ryotawari property and fully
assessable to land revenue and thus, no regrant is required.
48. Learned counsel for respondent would further
submit that Sanadi holding is Watan until the decision in
Limbaji vs. Rama is overruled. When full assessment is
levied on the Shetsanadi land, then the tenure is changed,
and the holder becomes an ordinary Ryotwari tenure
instead of W atan as before, and the holder becomes an
ordinary occupant entitled to occupy the land so long as he
pays the survey assessment.
49. Based on the above commentary to Shetsanadi
lands in the text book, the learned counsel for the
respondents vehemently submitted that the regrant in
favour of appellants as per Ex.P.13 has no value in the eye
of law.
50. It is to be noted here that there is no document
except Ex.D.6 to say that suit schedule property is Ryotwari
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land. As discussed earlier, under Watan Abolition Act, it is
mentioned as Ryotwari land in said document.
51. There is no Watan Abolition Act. In Clause
No.2(g) of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watan
Abolition Act, 1950, it is stated that the “Watan Act” means
the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (Bombay Act No.3
of 1874). Schedule I of this Act shows that the said the
Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (Bombay Act No.3 of
1874) cease to operate immediately after commencement
of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watan Abolition Act,
1950.
52. Admittedly, the suit property was an Inam land.
As per Section 3 of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni
Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950, certain Inams stood
abolished. Section 3 is extracted below:
3. With effect from and on the appointed day,
notwithstanding anything contained in any law,
usage, settlement, grant, sanad or order-
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1) all Paragana and Kulkarni watans shall be
deemed to have been abolished;
2) all rights to hold office and any liability to
render service appertaining to the said watans
are hereby extinguished;
(3) subject to the provisions of section 4, all
watan land is hereby resumed and shall be
deemed to be subject to the payment of land
revenue under the provisions of the code and
the rules made thereunder as if it were an
unalienated land:
Provided that such resumption shall not
affect the validity of any alienation such watan
land made in accordance with the provisions of
section 5 of the Watan Act or the rights of an
alienee thereof or any person claiming under or
through him;
(4) all incidents appertaining to the said
watans are hereby extinguished.
53. According to Section 4 of the said Act, watan
land resumed under the provisions of this Act shall be
regranted to the holder of the watan to which it
appertained, on payment of occupancy fees.
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54. Section 9 of the said Act says how the competent
authority shall determine to whom such application for
regrant is to be given. Admittedly, the
defendants/respondents have not filed any application to
the concerned authority for regrant.
55. Section 11 of the said Act makes it very clear
that, any award made by the competent authority, subject
to an appeal to Bombay Revenue Tribunal and decision of
the Tribunal, shall be final, conclusive and shall not be
questioned in any suit or proceedings before civil court.
Thus, the regrant made in favour of the plaintiff cannot be
questioned before the Civil Court, and it shall be challenged
only before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal.
56. In any case, learned counsel for the respondents
vehemently submits that the respondents have challenged
the regrant order before the District Commissioner;
however, the same was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
and they were directed to approach the competent
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authority/Tribunal. However, they did not approach the said
authority. Hence, the regrant order in favour of the
plaintiff’s father, as per Ex.P.13, has attained finality.
57. It is to be noted here that even as per the
provisions of Section 7 of the Bombay Merged Territories
Miscellaneous Alienations Abolition Act, 1955 the occupancy
rights in respect of land shall be regranted to the holder in
some cases without payment of any occupancy price;
sometimes, regranted by taking 12 times amount of the full
assessment as occupancy price, and in some cases by
taking 6 times amount of the full assessment as occupancy
price; but the fact is that lands shall be regranted. Thus,
the contention of respondents that as per M.E.No.282, this
property was Ryotwari land, hence, no regrant is necessary
is not correct proposition of law.
58. There is bar to entertain suit under Section 11 of
Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950,
to entertain a suit in respect of regrant. In this regard the
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appellants counsel rely upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex
Court:
1. AIR 1967 MYS 111 in the case of Annaji
Vasudev Dongarkar and others Vs.
Venkatesh Ramchandra Deshpande and
another , wherein at paragraph No.37 it is
held as under:
“37. Regarding the jurisdiction of the
civil Court, the only other question that
survives is whether the civil Court can go
into the merits of the decision of the
revenue authorities in re-granting the suit
lands to the defendants or in refusing such
re-grant to the plaintiffs and correct any
errorneous decision of revenue
authorities.”
2. (1968) 22 STC 416 in the case of
Dhulabhai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
and another , wherein it is held as under:-
“Special Bench considered Basappa's
case (2) and distinguished it from
the Firm of Illuri Subayya Chetty's case
(3) on the ground that the former was
not barred by S. 18-A as it did not exist.
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The, Special Bench, however, made an
observation to the following effect :
"In cases where the exclusion of the
civil courts' jurisdiction is expressly
provided for, the, consideration as to the
scheme of the statute in question and the
adequacy or the sufficiency of the
remedies provided for by it may be
relevant but cannot be decisive. But
where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of
necessary implication, such consideration
would be very important, and in
conceivable circumstances, 1-night even
become decisive. If it appears that a
statute creates a special right or a liability
and provides for the determination of the
right and liability to be dealt with by
tribunals specially constituted in that
behalf, and it further lays down that all
questions about the said right and liability
shall be determined by the tribunals so
constituted, it becomes pertinent to
enquire whether remedies normally
associated with actions in civil courts are
prescribed by the said statute or not."
(1) Where the statute gives a finality
to the orders of the special tribunals the
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Civil Courts' jurisdiction must be held to
be excluded if there is adequate remedy
to do what the Civil Courts would
normally do in a suit. Such provision,
however, does not exclude those cases
where the provisions of the particular Act
have not been complied with or the
statutory tribunal has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure.”
59. Thus, specific provisions of the Section 11 of the
Act coupled with the observations made in the above said
judgment, it is very clear that the regrant in favour of
plaintiffs’ father cannot be questioned by the
defendants/respondents in this suit. Furthermore, they have
not questioned it before appropriate authority. But, their
only contention is that this regrant under said provision is
without the validity. However, the said contention is not
accepted by this Court for the reasons already stated
above.
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60. Learned counsel for the defendants would further
submit that, in the year 1952 itself, there was dispute
between the father of the plaintiffs and the defendants with
regard to possession of the suit schedule property. The
application filed by the plaintiffs’ father in respect of
possession was rejected by the concerned authority.
Hence, at no point of time, plaintiffs were in possession of
the suit schedule property.
61. In this regard, learned counsel for the
respondents has relied upon Exs.D.20 to D.22. Ex.D.20 is
said to be the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner.
However, this document does not bear the seal or signature
of the authority which has passed this order. Furthermore,
it is the original document produced by defendants. How
defendants would be in custody of this document which
ought to be maintained in the office of Assistant
Commissioner is not forthcoming. Hence, the importance
cannot be attached to Ex.D.20.
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62. Under Ex.D.22, the revenue authorities recorded
that the defendants had leased the suit schedule property
to one Yamunappa; however, there was no registered lease
agreement, and hence his name could not be entered in the
RTC. Only because defendants are in possession of the
property, they have given lease to said Yamunappa. When
there is no admissible document to show that defendant
No.1 has given this property on lease to third party, this
document is not helpful for defendants to prove their
possession.
63. As far as Ex.P.21 is concerned, it is the order
passed by the Range Forest Officer, Ramadurg on
30.11.1988 i.e., during pendency of the suit. According to
this document, plaintiffs have given complaint to Range
Forest Officer that in the property which is in their
possession, defendants have trespassed and cut the
Eucalyptus trees. At that time, it was ordered that as
already defendant No.1 has cut the trees, it shall be used
by him, but he has to pay penalty of Rs.50/- and if the Civil
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Court has passes any order for paying compensation as
damages to plaintiffs, then he is liable to pay such
compensation. Thus, even this document will not establish
the possession of defendants over suit schedule property.
64. Learned counsel for defendants would further
submit that plaintiffs have not prayed for possession of suit
schedule property from defendants. When there are
concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court, coupled with the revenue records standing in the
name of the defendants since inception, this Court cannot
interfere with the findings of the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court in respect of possession.
65. In this regard, he relied on the judgment of co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in K. Jayaramaiah Vs.
1
Nijalingaiah and others wherein paragraph Nos.8 and 9
reads as follows:
1
2026 (1) KCCR 782
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“9. Having considered the admissions, pleadings
and also the material available on record,
the Trial Court has not committed any
error in dismissing the suit in coming to
the conclusion that suit
for partial partition is not maintainable, when
unequivocal admission was given by the
plaintiff during the course of cross-examination
that except the properties which have been
sold, other family properties were not included.
Hence, the Trial Court arrived at the conclusion
that the sale made by the brother is illegal
does not arise. Therefore, no grounds are made
out to admit the appeal and frame substantial
question of law.”
66. T he general rule is that the concurrent findings
of Trial Court and First Appellate Court are the same. They
shall not interfere with by High Court in second appeal.
However, when such finding is completely erroneous,
passed without any basis, then always the High Court can
interfere with. In this regard, in the judgment of Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Jaichand (Dead) through LRS
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2
& ORS. Vs. Sahnulal and ANR , wherein paragraph No.29
is extracted below:-
“29. The High Court in the Second Appeal can
interfere with the findings of the trial Court on the
ground of failure on the part of the trial as well as the
first appellate Court, as the case may be, when such
findings are either recorded without proper construction
of the documents or failure to follow the decisions of
this Court and acted on assumption not supported by
evidence. Under Section 103, C.P.C, the High Court has
got power to determine the issue of fact. The Section
lays down:-
“Power of High Court to determine issue of fact: In
any Second Appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence
on the record is sufficient to determine any issue
necessary for the disposal of the appeal,-
(a) Which has not been determined by
the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court
of first instance and the lower Appellate Court,
or
(b) Which has been wrongly determined
by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision
2
Civil Appeal Nos.14138-14139/2024
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on such question of law as is referred to
in Section 100.”
67. Relying on the above said judgment, this court is
of the opinion that the First Appellate Court has not at all
interpreted Ex.P.13. Hence, this court can interfere on
finding of fact of possession.
68. Learned counsel for the defendants/respondents
vehemently submit that the grant in favour of the plaintiffs,
as evidenced by Ex.P.13, was made without authority, and
therefore, he need not challenge the said grant.
69. In support of this contention, reliance is placed
on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.
Jitendernath Vs. Jubilee Hills Co-operative House
3
Building Society and another wherein short Note-B is
extracted as below:
“ SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963-Section 34- An
order which was passed by an authority without
3
2006 (3) KCCR 186
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jurisdiction need not be set aside, being a nullity,
in the eyes of law never existed.”
70. It is to be noted here that the defendants have
sought to establish that the revenue authorities had no
authority to regrant the suit schedule property in favour of
the plaintiffs’ father and that Ex.P.13 has no value in the
eye of law. The said regrant as per Ex.P.13 is made under
the provisions of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni
Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950.
71. It is to be noted here that, in the year 1950,
when the said Act came into force, the suit schedule
property situated within Belagavi District was under Mumbai
Province. Hence, at the time of inception, this Bombay
Paragana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 was in
force. Based on the provisions of the said Act, the plaintiffs’
father had applied for regrant, and accordingly, Sy.No.141
measuring 6 acres 1 gunta was re-granted to plaintiffs’
father.
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72. However, in the revenue documents produced by
the defendants, as per M.E.No.281, only an extent of 5
acres 12 guntas in Sy.No.141 was allotted to the share of
defendant No.1. As discussed above, the total extent of
Sy.No.141 is 6 acres 1 gunta, and the remaining extent in
the said survey number was not shown as allotted either to
defendant No.1 or to his other brothers. Thus, there is clear
discrepancy between the extent claimed by the plaintiffs in
the plaint and the extent reflected in M.E.No.281 in favour
of defendant No.1, indicating that both do not correspond to
each other.
73. Always there is presumption under Section 133
of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 that the entries in
revenue records shall be presumed to be true unless it is
rebutted.
74. In the instant case, as discussed above, the
record of rights were standing in the name of defendants as
on the date of filing of the suit. However, as discussed
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above after filing the suit, Ex.P.13 came into existence i.e.
regrant in favour of father of plaintiffs. Always the revenue
authorities have to pass such a regrant orders by making
spot inspection and by making enquiry. Hence, there is
presumption in respect of Ex.P.13 that by following due
procedure, Ex.P.13 might have been issued. It cannot be
challenged before Civil Court as discussed above. Thus, the
regrant in favour of plaintiffs in the year 1999 shows that
plaintiffs are in possession of the property as on the date of
said re-grant.
75. The learned counsel for appellants relied on the
judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Galappa
4
Vs. State of Karnataka , wherein paragraph Nos.1 and 3
reads as follows:
“Land S. No. 29 of Nagarbhavi village was
a Thoti service inam land. All village offices were
abolished under Karnataka Village Offices
Abolition Act, 1961, w.e.f. 1-2-1963. The lands
4
ILR 1987 Karnataka 2989
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attached to the village offices were resumed by
the State and they became liable for the payment
of land revenue Sections 5 and 6 of the Karnataka
Village Offices Abolition Act provided for regrant
to the holder and authorised holders respectively.
"Holder" and "Authorised Holders" are defined.
The limited right given to these persons was to
make an application for re-grant. The holders
could be granted occupancy rights, on payment of
three times the assessment in case of inferior
village office and six times of the assessment in
case of other village offices. On such regrant, the
holder shall be deemed to be occupant or holder
of ryotwari patta and shall be liable to pay land
revenue to the State Government from the
appointed day (i.e. 1-2-1963). In the case of
authorised holder, it shall be regranted on
payment of six times the full assessment, the
other conditions being the same as are applicable
to holders. In the instant case the petitioner was
regranted these lands on 31-5-1983. On payment
of three times or six times, as the case may be,
he becomes an occupant or holder of ryotwari
land. There is no material to indicate these
payments. One important and valuable
consequence that follows the payments is that the
grantee becomes the occupant or holder of
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ryotwari land with effect from 1-2-1963 and he
becomes liable to pay assessment from that day.
By fiction the land, resumed to Government on
1-2-1963, stands vested in the regrantee from
that day. This position is enunciated by this Court
in Laxmangouda -vs- State of Karnataka (ILR
(Karnataka) 1980 (2) 892 = 1981 (1) KLJ 1 , thus:
“…From this pronouncement of the
Supreme Court, it follows that the holder
or the authorised holder of a Service Inam
land did not get title to such land
simultaneously with the coming into force
of the Principal Act providing for
resumption and regrant of such land to the
holder or the authorised holder, but he got
title to such land only after such actual
regrant was made, though by such actual
regrant, has title to the land related back
to the date of commencement of the
Principal Act."
Thus, by virtue of deeming provision, the
grantee becomes the title holder from 1-2-1963,
but only for the limited purpose as mentioned in
the Act.
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3. In the counter it is asserted that notice is
sent to the Tahsildar on 29-9-1982. I have no
reason to disbelieve. Though the land was in
possession of the petitioner, the title stood in the
State Government. The divesting takes place on
the date the regrant is made, though it relates
back to 1-2-1963. During the period intervening
the appointed day and date of grant, the title
vests with the State, which is represented by
Tahsildar. Tahsildar holds the property, for and on
behalf of true owner. If there is a regrant,
notionally he divests himself of this right. The
deeming provision in Section 5, which is equally
applicable to Section 6, reads thus;
“…The holder shall be deemed to be an
occupant or holder of a ryotwari patta within the
meaning of the code in respect of such land and
shall primarily be liable to pay land revenue to the
State Government from the appointed date in
accordance with the provisions of Code and the
rules and orders made thereunder…”
The legislative intent in enacting the
deeming provision is to maintain the continuity of
title, by fiction, for fixing the liability to pay land
revenue. This is because the holder or authorized
holder, being divested of the right to hold the
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property, has been allowed to enjoy the
possession; as held by Supreme Court in M.L.B.
Menon –vs- A.C. Estate Duty (AIR 1971 SC
2392) “the legal fiction also which has been
introduced should only be limited to that purpose
and there can be justification for extending it”.
76. As per the principles of aforesaid case, even
though the property was re-granted in the year 1999, it
dates back to the date of commencement of Bombay
Pargana and Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 i.e.,
25.01.1951. Hence, it is presumed that on the date of filing
of the suit in the year 1987 plaintiffs are in possession of
the suit schedule property.
77. L earned counsel for appellants vehemently
submitted her arguments that the Courts have to take note
of subsequent events that have taken place after filing the
suit. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellants
relies upon the below mentioned judgments of Hon’ble Apex
Court:-
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1. (1975 1 SCC, 770) in the case of Pasupuleti
Venkateswaralu Vs. The Motor and General Traders.
Paragraph No.4 is extracted as below:
4. We feel the submissions devoid of
“
substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety
vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being
subsequent to the commencement of the
proceedings. It is basic to our processual
jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged
to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal
proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that
procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of
the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has
come to court and has a fundamental impact on the
right to relief for the manner of moulding it, is
brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it
cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify
or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies
bending the rules of procedure, where no specific
provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to
promote substantial justice--subject, of course, to the
absence of other disentitling (actors or just
circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation
on this power to take note of updated facts to confine
it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power
exists, absent other special circumstances repelling
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resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this
point are legion, even as situations for applications of
this equitable rule are myraid. We affirm the
proposition that for making the right or remedy
claimed by the party just and meaningful as also
legally and factually in accord with the current
realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take
cautious cognisance of events and developments
subsequent to the institution of the proceeding
provided the rules of fairness to both sides are
scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High
Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later
recovery of another accommodation by the landlord,
during the pendency of the case, has as the High
Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the
right to evict in view of the inhibition written
into Section 10(3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to
disturb this approach in law or finding of fact.”
2 . (1976) 1 SCC 194 in the case of Rameshwar
and Ors. Vs. Jot Ram and Anr. Paragraph No.9 is
extracted as below:
“9. The impact of subsequent happenings may now be
spelt out. First, its bearing on the right of action, second,
on the nature of the relief and third, on its impotence to
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create or destroy substantive rights. Where the nature of
the relief as originally sought, has become obsolete or
unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more
efficacious on account of developments subsequent to
the suit or even during the appellate stage, it is but fair
that the relief is moulded, varied or re-shaped in the light
of dated facts. Patterson (Patterson v. State of Alabama,
(1934) 294 US 600, 607) illustrates this position. It is
important that the party claiming the relief or change of
relief must have the same right from which either the
first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent
events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of
substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation
except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may
influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs.
Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party,
they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events
save where there is a change in the law and it is made
applicable at any stage. Lachmeshwar Prasad Shuku v.
Keswar Lal Chaudhuri (1940 FCR 874: AIR 1941 FC 5)
falls in this category. Courts of justice may, when the
compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs
cannot rights- to make them justly relevant in the
updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary,
courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice.
Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under
the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain
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basic facts at the time the relief is to in ultimately
granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such
supervening facts with fundamental
impact Venkateswarlu (supra), read in its statutory
setting, falls in this category. Where a cause of action is
deficient but later events have made up the deficiency,
the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation,
permit amendment and continue the proceeding,
provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All
these are done only in exceptional situations and just
cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal
proceeding is based, inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise,
such change in cause of action or relief. The primary
concern of the Court is to implement the justice of the
legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be
divested by this equitable doctrine (See Chokalingam
Chetty : 54 MLJ 88 (PC). The law stated in Ramji Lal v.
the State of Punjab (ILR (1966)( 2 Punj 125: AIR 1966
Punj)) is sound:
"Courts do very often take notice of events that
happen. subsequent to the filing of suits and at times
even those that have occurred during the appellate stage
and permit pleadings to be amended for including a
prayer for relief on the basis of such events but this is
ordinarily done to avoid multiplicity of proceedings or
when the original relief claimed has, by reason of change
in the circumstances, become inappropriate and not
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when the plaintiff's suit would be wholly displaced by the
proposed amendment (see Steward v. The North
Metropolitan Tramways Company (1885) 16 QBD
178)) and a fresh suit by him would be so barred by
limitation."
One may as well add that while taking cautious
judicial cognizance of 'post-natal' events, even for the
limited and exceptional purposes explained earlier, no
court will countenance a party altering, by his own
manipulation, a change in situation and plead for relief
on the altered basis.”
3 . (2004) 8 SCC 76 in the case of Kedar Nath
Agrawal(Dead) and Anr. Vs.Dhanraji Devi(Dead) by
LRs and Ors. Paragraph No.16 is extracted as below:-
“16. In our opinion, by not taking into account
the subsequent event, the High Court has committed
an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our
judgment, the law is well settled on the point, and it is
this: The basic rule is that the rights of the parties
should be determined on the basis of the date of
institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action
should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it
existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This,
however, does not mean that events happening after
institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at
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all. It is the power and duty of the court to consider
changed circumstances. A court of law may take into
account subsequent events inter alia in the following
circumstances:
(i) The relief claimed originally has by reason of
subsequent change of circumstances become
inappropriate; or
(ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent
events in order to shorten litigation; or
(iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do
complete justice between the parties.”
78. As discussed above in the instant case, the
regrant in favour of plaintiff is during pendency of the suit.
Thus, the trial Court and First Appellate Court ought to have
taken notice of such subsequent event of regrant. Of
Course, the regrant order was not produced before Trial
Court. But, it is produced before First Appellate Court and
marked with consent as per Ex.P13. Thus, respondents
absolutely have no objection about the said document. The
subsequent events that had taken place in favour of the
plaintiff ought to have been considered by the First
Appellate Court. But, it did not do so. Thus, the judgment of
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First Appellate Court on this point is erroneous in this
regard.
79. The above discussion reveals that Courts below
are not right and not justified in holding that suit was not
maintainable. The present suit is filed praying for
declaration and permanent injunction and this suit is not
filed to reconsider or to regrant the property in favour of
plaintiffs. Hence, Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act,
1961 cannot be a bar to file the suit of present nature.
However, without considering these aspects properly, the
trial Court and First Appellate Courts have dismissed the
suit on the ground that suit is hit by Karnataka Village
Offices Abolition Act, 1961.
80. As discussed above, the First Appellate Court is
not justified in ignoring the regrant order as per Ex.P.13
and only based on mutation entries, the First Appellate
Court and the trial Court came to the wrong conclusion that
plaintiffs failed to prove their possession. Accordingly,
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substantial question of law No.1 and 3 are answered in the
Negative .
81. In view of finding on substantial question of law
Nos.1 to 3, this Court proceeds to pass the following:
ORDER
Appeal filed under Section 100 CPC is allowed
by setting aside the judgment and decree dated
22.01.2008 passed in RA No.45/2007 (Old RA
No.5/2001) on the file of Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Ramdurga and by setting aside the
Judgment and Decree dated 11.04.2001 passed in
OS No.19/1987 on the file of Civil Judge (Junior
Division) Ramdurga.
Suit of plaintiffs is decreed with costs.
Plaintiffs are declared as owners in possession
of the suit schedule property.
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Permanent injunction is granted in favour of
plaintiffs against defendants.
Defendants are hereby restrained from
interfering with the peaceful possession and
enjoyment of plaintiffs over suit schedule property.
SD/-
(GEETHA K.B.)
JUDGE
HMB- Upto para 38
GAB- para 37 to 56
SSP – 57 to 65
HMB – 66 to end
CT-GTB
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 29