Manak Yeshwant Patil And 10 Ors. vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai And 3 Ors.

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.1755 OF 2011
Manak Yeshwant Patil and others … Petitioners
Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai & others … Respondents
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.1733 OF 2019
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.1755 OF 2011
---
Dr. Birendra Saraf, Senior Advocate a/w. Ms. Malaika Castellino, Mr. Mehul
Shah and Ms. Chaitali Jadhav for Petitioners.
Mr. Ram Apte, Senior Advocate a/w. Ms. Anuja Tirmali i/b. Komal Punjabi for
Respondent No.1 - BMC.
Ms. Usha Rahi, AGP f or Respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 - State.
CORAM : MANISH PITALE &
SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
Reserved on : JUNE 16, 2026
Pronounced on: JULY 03, 2026
JUDGEMENT : ( Per Justice Manish Pitale )
. This is the fourth writ petition filed in this Court regarding claims
of petitioners concerning acquisition of their lands, possession of which
was admittedly taken by respondent No.1 municipal corporation, way
back in the year 1960. While compensation was paid in terms of
agreements executed between the parties for some portions of the land,
the question regarding acquisition of remaining portions of the land, has
been hanging fire for all these years.
2. The land acquisition award dated 30.08.2001, passed in respect of
the unacquired land, was challenged by the respondent municipal
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corporation itself on the ground that the quantum of compensation was
wrongly calculated by the respondent No.4 Special Land Acquisition
Officer (SLAO). The writ petition filed by the respondent municipal
corporation was allowed and the SLAO was directed to proceed further
in the matter. One of the questions raised on behalf of the petitioners was
that a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (L. A. Act) ought to have been issued. As a matter of fact, in the
said proceedings itself whereby the land acquisition award was set aside,
the petitioners had also raised the issue regarding lapsing of acquisition
on the ground that the declaration under Section 6 of the L. A. Act was
not issued within a year of issuance of the notification under Section 4
thereof. In the special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court
challenging the order of this Court setting aside the land acquisition
award, the aforementioned question and corresponding grounds of
challenge were raised. Eventually, the Supreme Court disposed of the
special leave petition by refusing to interfere with the order of this Court
and granting liberty to the parties to raise all issues before the SLAO.
3. In that light, the petitioners raised the aforementioned issue
regarding the declaration under Section 6 of the L. A. Act being rendered
illegal before the SLAO. But, the SLAO passed the impugned order
dated 19.07.2011, rejecting the applications filed by the petitioners on
the ground that the said issue had been dealt with by this Court as well
as the Supreme Court. The present writ petition has been filed
challenging the said order and also with a specific prayer for declaring
that the acquisition proceeding had lapsed on the ground that the
declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued beyond one year
of issuance of the notification under Section 4 thereof.
4. The replies and rejoinders in the writ petition were filed and the
petition was taken up for hearing.
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5. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be appropriate
that the chequered history of this litigation is briefly referred to, so that
the rival contentions can be appreciated in the proper context.
6. The petitioners were / are owners of lands in Borla and Deonar,
Mumbai admeasuring 50 acres and a few gunthas. In 1958, some of the
lands were acquired by the respondent State for the benefit of the
respondent municipal corporation. As a matter of fact, a notification
dated 27.11.1958 was issued under Section 4 of the L.A. Act for the said
purpose. In this backdrop, on 14.10.1960, an agreement was executed
between the petitioners and their family members on the one hand and
the respondent municipal corporation on the other. This agreement
pertained to acquisition of unacquired land with the rate being fixed at
Rs.4.25 per square yard. In the light of the said agreement, the
respondent municipal corporation took possession of the lands including
the unacquired land.
7. Till 05.12.1970, the respondent municipal corporation acquired
only a small portion of the lands that was subject matter of the said
agreement, despite taking over possession of the lands. For some reason,
portions of land were de-notified from acquisition and thereafter they
were again notified for acquisition for the benefit of the respondent
municipal corporation. In the interregnum, the value of the lands
increased and in that context, the petitioners and their family members
approached the municipal commissioner for increase in the quantum of
compensation. In this backdrop on 28.07.1976, a fresh agreement was
executed between the parties, agreeing to acquire the lands by paying
compensation @ Rs.40/- per square yard.
8. On 11.05.1978, another agreement was executed between the
parties, revoking and cancelling the aforesaid earlier two agreements.
This agreement also specifically recorded that the possession of the
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lands was already taken over in October 1960. The respondent municipal
corporation agreed to purchase the lands described in the first schedule
and it was agreed that the amounts that were paid under the earlier two
agreements would be adjusted towards the amount of compensation that
would be payable under the acquisition proceedings.
9. Since possession of the land had been taken over much earlier and
the land acquisition proceedings were not moving forward, the
petitioners and their family members were constrained to file Writ
Petition No.1385 of 1979 before this Court. The petitioners therein
sought a direction against the respondents for declaring land acquisition
awards and for payment of compensation. On 23.08.1979, this Court
disposed of the said writ petition by directing the respondent municipal
corporation to declare the land acquisition awards in respect of lands that
were already acquired, within a period of six months from the date of the
order. In that light, the SLAO declared 16 awards and in some of the
awards, the amounts already paid under the previous agreements were
adjusted. In the last such award declared in the year 1988, compensation
was paid @ Rs.350 per square yard. But, it is an admitted position that
though the aforesaid exercise was carried out, land admeasuring 9295.25
sq.mtrs. remained unacquired, despite the fact that possession thereof
had already been taken by the municipal corporation. The said
unacquired land was utilized for construction of municipal schools,
roads, public utility services and such other purposes.
10. Since acquisition proceedings, consequent awards and payment of
compensation for the said unacquired land was not undertaken, the
petitioners sent a letter on 12.02.1993 to the respondent municipal
corporation for taking appropriate steps in the matter. On 27.08.1993,
the respondent municipal corporation called upon the petitioners to
submit documentary evidence in support of their claim, further stating
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that a statement with regard to the acquisition of parts of the land of the
petitioners had been sent to the SLAO and that a response was awaited.
On 06.07.1994, the petitioners submitted all the necessary information
and documents to the respondent municipal corporation and yet, there
was no further development in the matter.
11. In this backdrop, the petitioners were constrained to file Writ
Petition No.109 of 1996 before this Court, seeking a direction against
the respondent municipal corporation for restoring possession of the said
unacquired land, with a further direction to the said respondent to pay
compensation to the petitioners for use and occupation of such land. The
petitioners also prayed for a direction, in the alternative, to forthwith
acquire the unacquired land and to pay compensation at market rate to
the petitioners. In this petition, the respondent municipal corporation
claimed that there was some difficulty in ascertaining the exact extent of
unacquired land and therefore, the said pieces of land could not be
acquired. In that light, this Court appointed a surveyor with the consent
of the parties to carry out a survey, in order to identify the unacquired
land. The said exercise was carried out.
12. In this backdrop, on 04.12.1996, this Court disposed of the said
writ petition, specifically directing the respondent municipal corporation
to acquire identified unacquired land of the petitioners within a year
from the date of the order. In this judgement and order, a contention
raised on behalf of the municipal corporation that compensation ought to
be restricted to Rs.40/- per square yard as per the aforementioned
agreements, was rejected and it was specifically observed that in the last
award declared in the year 1988, compensation was already determined
and paid @ Rs.350/- per square yard.
13. The respondent municipal corporation filed Appeal No.1022 of
1997 before Division Bench of this Court to challenge the said
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judgement and order of the learned Single Judge passed in Writ Petition
No.109 of 1996. On 18.03.1998, the Division Bench of this Court
directed that the respondent municipal corporation would initiate
proceedings in respect of the unacquired land, but, if the compensation
determined under the said proceeding exceeded Rs.40/- per square yard,
the excess amount would not be paid to the petitioners during the
pendency of the appeal. It is a matter of record that on 22.06.2004, the
appeal was dismissed as infructuous in the light of the fact that award
dated 30.08.2001 was declared in the meanwhile.
14. In the process of undertaking acquisition of the unacquired land in
terms of the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in
Writ Petition No.109 of 1996, the SLAO had issued notification under
Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act on 08.12.1999, which was published on
23.12.1999. The declaration under Section 6 of the L. A. Act was issued
on 05.01.2001 and it was published in the Government Gazette on
18.01.2001. It is to be noted that the principal contention raised in the
present petition concerns these two dates. Eventually, on 30.08.2001, the
SLAO passed the said award under Section 11 of the L. A. Act. The
SLAO relied upon the ready reckoner value, ascertaining it at
Rs.11,836/- per sq.mtr. The SLAO proceeded to hold that since 40% of
the land under acquisition was encroached, the entire ready reckoner
value could not be the basis and thereupon considered 50% of the ready
reckoner value i.e. Rs.5948/- per sq.mtr., eventually granting
compensation @ Rs.5,000/- per sq.mtr. In the light of the
aforementioned interim order dated 18.03.1998 passed by the Division
Bench of this Court in Appeal No.1022 of 1997, the SLAO held that
compensation @ Rs.40/- per sq.mtr. would be given for three survey
numbers and that, until further orders by this Court, the full amount as
determined by the SLAO would not be paid to the petitioners. It is a
matter of record that the petitioners filed reference under Section 18 of
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the L. A. Act seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the
SLAO.
15. On 27.10.2005, the municipal corporation itself challenged the
said award by filing Writ Petition No.11 of 2006. In the meanwhile, as
referred to hereinabove, on 22.06.2004, the appeal filed by the municipal
corporation bearing Appeal No.1022 of 1997 was already dismissed as
infructuous. In the said petition i.e. Writ Petition No.11 of 2006, filed
more than four years after the said award dated 30.08.2001, the
respondent municipal corporation raised a challenge on the ground that
the SLAO erred in taking the ready reckoner value as the basis for
determination of compensation. On 29.11.2005, this Court directed the
respondent municipal corporation in Writ Petition No.11 of 2006 to
deposit the amount granted under the said award dated 30.08.2001.
There was no direction permitting withdrawal of the amount. The
respondent municipal corporation filed Notice of Motion No.6 of 2006
in Writ Petition No.11 of 2006, seeking modification of the aforesaid
order dated 29.11.2005. In the affidavit in support of the notice of
motion, the respondent municipal corporation stated that the
compensation came to Rs.6,43,87,350/-. On 13.01.2006, the respondent
municipal corporation was directed to deposit the said amount with the
Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court. It is an admitted position
that the said amount was deposited. On 14.02.2006, the said notice of
motion was disposed of, holding that the order dated 29.11.2005 could
not be modified. The respondent municipal corporation was granted time
of four months to deposit the balance amount of compensation. On
23.05.2006, the respondent municipal corporation deposited
Rs.10,79,42,583/- with the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this
Court.
16. The petitioners filed their reply in the said Writ Petition No.11 of
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2006 relying upon sale instances showing the market value to be more
than Rs.16,000/- per sq.mtr. They also moved Notice of Motion No.380
of 2006 in the said writ petition seeking deposit of further amounts by
the respondent municipal corporation and also prayed for withdrawal of
the amounts already deposited. On 22.12.2006, this Court disposed of
the said notice of motion of the petitioners permitting them to withdraw
the amounts deposited by the respondent municipal corporation on
furnishing bank guarantee and on keeping the bank guarantee alive till
Writ Petition No.11 of 2006 was finally heard and disposed of by the
High Court and also for a further period of six months thereafter.
17. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No.5670 of 2007, challenging the said order dated
22.12.2006 passed by this Court. On 18.02.2008, while disposing of the
SLP, the Supreme Court granted leave and hence it was renumbered as
Civil Appeal No.1398 of 2008. While disposing of the appeal, the
Supreme Court modified the order of this Court by directing that the
amounts deposited by the respondent municipal corporation before this
Court shall be placed in fixed deposit in a nationalized bank, initially for
a period of six months, to be renewed from time to time till disposal of
Writ Petition No.11 of 2006. It was further directed that the petitioners
would be permitted to withdraw the interest that would accrue on the
said amount lying in fixed deposit, without furnishing any security or
bank guarantee. It was made clear that the amounts placed in fixed
deposit would not be withdrawn by the petitioners. A direction was
issued for disposing of the writ petition within three months.
18. In this backdrop, on 14.08.2008, this Court disposed of Writ
Petition No.11 of 2006, setting aside the award passed by the SLAO on
the ground that incorrect principles were applied for determining the
quantum of compensation. In the order passed by this Court while
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disposing of the said writ petition, the contentions raised on behalf of the
petitioners regarding lapsing of acquisition and necessity for issuance of
fresh notification by the SLAO under Section 4 of the L. A. Act, were
considered, but they were not accepted. It was held that the said aspect
was within the domain of the SLAO and that the said respondent would
take care of all legalities while declaring a fresh award. Being aggrieved
by the rejection of the aforesaid contentions of the petitioners, they
challenged the said order dated 14.08.2008 passed by this Court in Writ
Petition No.11 of 2006 by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.23894
of 2008. In the special leave petition, the petitioners specifically raised
questions of law and corresponding grounds of challenge, asserting that
the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed on account of failure of
SLAO to issue declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act within a year
of issuance of notification under Section 4 thereof. On 13.10.2008, the
Supreme Court passed an interim order permitting the petitioners to
withdraw the interest accrued on the deposited amounts without
furnishing any bank guarantee or security. On 15.01.2010, the Supreme
Court passed a further order in the said SLP continuing the said
arrangement of the petitioners withdrawing the interest amount, while
the deposited amounts remained in the fixed deposit.
19. Eventually, on 05.04.2011, the Supreme Court disposed of the
pending proceeding. Since leave was granted, it was renumbered as
Civil Appeal No.1115 of 2010. By order dated 05.04.2011, the Supreme
Court disposed of the appeal by directing that the SLAO shall consider
all the issues raised by the parties and thereupon pass the award.
According to the petitioners, the said order of the Supreme Court
reserved liberty for them to raise the aforesaid issue of lapsing of
acquisition before the SLAO. Hence, on 13.05.2011, the petitioners filed
an application before the SLAO, claiming that the acquisition had lapsed
and they also sought permission to withdraw compensation amount
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deposited by the respondent municipal corporation with the
Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court. On 18.05.2011, the
petitioners filed a supplementary application before the SLAO, making
the aforesaid prayers. The said application was heard in the backdrop of
the say filed by the respondent municipal corporation. On 19.07.2011,
the SLAO passed the impugned order rejecting both the applications.
The SLAO held that the issue regarding lapsing of acquisition sought to
be raised by the petitioners was considered by both, this Court and the
Supreme Court in their respective orders passed in Writ Petition No.11
of 2006 and the proceedings arising therefrom before the Supreme
Court. In that light, the prayer of the petitioners seeking lapsing of
acquisition was rejected. As regards the question of withdrawal of
amounts, it was held that since the entitlement of the petitioners
regarding amount of compensation was yet to be adjudicated, the prayer
for withdrawal of amount could not be granted.
20. Aggrieved by the said order dated 19.07.2011 passed by the
SLAO, the petitioners filed the present writ petition. The petitioners
prayed for setting aside of the said order of the SLAO. They also prayed
for a declaration that the acquisition proceeding had lapsed, as the
notification dated 05.01.2001 published on 18.01.2001 under Section 6
of the L.A. Act was rendered void. A further prayer was made for a
direction to the SLAO to initiate the acquisition proceedings afresh. By a
subsequent amendment, it was prayed that such fresh acquisition
proceeding ought to be undertaken as per the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013). On 14.11.2011, this Court granted
Rule in the writ petition and also interim relief in terms of prayer clause
(g), meaning thereby that during pendency of the present writ petition
there was stay of further proceedings before the SLAO for acquisition of
the said land. The replies and rejoinders were filed in the writ petition.
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The writ petition was taken up for hearing.
21. Dr. Birendra Saraf, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners submitted that by operation of law, the land acquisition
proceeding in the present case lapsed as the declaration under Section 6
of the L.A. Act was rendered void as it was clearly issued beyond the
period of one year from issuance of the notification under Section 4 of
the said Act. It was submitted that there was no dispute about the dates.
In such a situation, the acquisition proceeding having lapsed, there was
no option for the respondents but to initiate the acquisition proceedings
for the aforementioned unacquired land afresh, so that appropriate
compensation could be determined for payment to the petitioners. The
learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon judgements of the
Supreme Court in the cases of Vijay Narayan Thatte and others Vs. State
of Maharashtra and others , and Anil Kumar Gupta Vs.
(2009) 9 SCC 92
State of Bihar and others , (2012) 12 SCC 443 . It was submitted that in
the face of lapsing of acquisition by operation of law, the consequence
would be that the respondents would be required to return the
unacquired land to the petitioners. It was emphasized that possession of
the land had been taken as far back as in the year 1960 and the
petitioners were still struggling for payment of compensation for the
aforesaid unacquired land.
22. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the
interregnum, even the unacquired land had been utilized for various
public purposes such as municipal schools etc., as a consequence of
which, it may be impossible for return of the said land and in any case, it
would cause much hardship to the public at large. In that context, it was
submitted that this Court may consider adopting an approach indicated
by the Supreme Court in various judgements, wherein the notification
under Section 4 of the L.A. Act itself was shifted to a future date to
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ensure that justice was done to claimants like the petitioners herein,
without causing inconvenience to the public at large. In this context,
reliance was placed on judgements of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Ram Chand and others Vs. Union of India and others , (1994) 1 SCC 44 ;
Competent Authority Vs. Barangore Jute Factory and others , (2005) 13
SCC 477 ; Special Agricultural Produce Market Committee for Fruits
and Vegetables, Golimangla Vs. N. Krishnappa and others , (2017) 3
SCC 239 and Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and others Vs. Government of
Karnataka and others , (2025) 7 SCC 580 , as also judgement of
Karnataka High Court in the case of M. Suresh Kumar and others Vs.
State of Karnataka and others , .
2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4376
23. By placing reliance on the aforementioned judgements, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that this
Court may consider shifting the date of the notification under Section 4
of the L. A. Act by exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It was submitted that the said judgements clearly
recognized such a power in this Court exercising writ jurisdiction. It was
submitted that if the contention of the petitioners with regard to lapsing
of acquisition is accepted, ideally, the acquisition ought to be undertaken
afresh and that the petitioners would be entitled to press for acquisition
and payment of compensation under the Act of 2013. But, considering
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned
judgements, this Court may pass appropriate orders to grant relief to the
petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
24. It was submitted that the approach adopted by the respondent
municipal corporation in the present case, is most unfortunate. They are
opposing relief to which the petitioners are entitled, despite the fact that
possession of unacquired land was also taken as far back as in the year
1960. The petitioners and their family have been deprived of enjoying of
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their own land, without a farthing being paid towards compensation,
thereby violating their constitutional right under Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India. It was submitted that the Supreme Court in various
judgements, including judgement in the case of Bernard Francis
Joseph Vaz and others Vs. Government of Karnataka and others
(supra), has recognized the right under Article 300-A of the Constitution
of India as a human right. It was submitted that the respondent municipal
corporation cannot be further allowed to trample upon the rights of the
petitioners.
25. As regards the stand taken on behalf of the respondents,
particularly the respondent municipal corporation, the learned counsel
for the petitioners submitted that the respondents cannot claim that the
petitioners are prevented from raising the issue of lapsing of acquisition
for the reason that the said issue was already considered and decided
when Writ Petition No.11 of 2006 was disposed of and when orders
were passed by the Supreme Court in proceedings arising therefrom. By
placing reliance on the aforementioned judgements of the Supreme
Court, it was submitted that once the acquisition had lapsed by operation
of law, there was no question of the petitioners being prevented from
raising the said issue. No order of any Court could revive such a lapsed
acquisition proceeding. In any case, it was submitted that the Supreme
Court in its order dated 05.04.2011, disposing of Civil Appeal No.1115
of 2010, had specifically kept all issues open for consideration before
the SLAO. By referring to the contents of the special leave petition
leading upto the said civil appeal, it was submitted that all questions
including the question of lapsing of acquisition was kept open for further
consideration.
26. On the contention raised on behalf of the respondent municipal
corporation that the petitioners ought not to be permitted to claim
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compensation beyond the rate of Rs.40/- per square yard as per the
agreements executed between the parties, it was brought to the notice of
this Court that an identical contention was rejected by a learned Single
Judge of this Court, as far back as in the year 1996 when Writ Petition
No.109 of 1996 filed by the petitioners had been allowed by order dated
04.12.1996. The said order attained finality. It was submitted that despite
the said admitted position on facts, the respondent municipal
corporation, being a public body, was unnecessarily taking such an
intransigent approach only with the intention of depriving the petitioners
of their rightful claims. It was further submitted that the contention
pertaining to Section 126 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966 (for short ‘MRTP Act’) is absolutely unsustainable
because no such stand has been taken in the reply affidavits filed in the
present writ petition and in any case, even the earlier round of the
arguments concerned the award dated 30.08.2001, which was passed on
the basis of notification issued under Section 4 of the L. A. Act. This
further demonstrated the unsustainable approach of the respondent
municipal corporation to somehow deprive the petitioners of their
rightful claims. On this basis, it was submitted that the writ petition
deserved to be allowed.
27. Ms. Usha Rahi, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the
respondent State authorities i.e. respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4 submitted that
the dates regarding issuance of notification under Section 4 of the L. A.
Act and declaration under Section 6 thereof cannot be denied as they are
a matter of record. But, it was submitted that the contention regarding
lapsing of acquisition cannot be raised by the petitioners in the light of
the findings rendered by this Court while disposing of Writ Petition
No.11 of 2006, filed by the respondent municipal corporation. The
Supreme Court confirmed the said order of this Court and therefore, the
petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the said contention. It was
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submitted that the delay in determination and disbursal of compensation
was due to the petitioners themselves, as they approached this Court to
challenge the order dated 19.07.2011 passed by the SLAO. This Court
granted stay of further proceedings, as a consequence of which, the
award could not be passed for all these years. It was further submitted
that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the order dated
19.07.2011 passed by the SLAO cannot be found fault with and
therefore, the petition deserved to be dismissed.
28. Mr. Ram Apte, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent municipal corporation submitted that the impugned order
dated 19.07.2011 passed by the SLAO was absolutely correct in the facts
and circumstances of the present case. It was submitted that the issue
regarding lapsing of acquisition was indeed dealt with by this Court
while disposing of Writ Petition No.11 of 2006. The specific contention
being raised on behalf of the petitioners in this petition was squarely
rejected and the said order of this Court was confirmed by the Supreme
Court while disposing of the appeal arising from the order of this Court.
It is in this backdrop that the SLAO correctly observed that since this
Court and the Supreme Court had dealt with the said issue, there was no
question of the same being considered again.
29. For the same reason, it was submitted that the petitioners cannot
raise the issue of lapsing of acquisition in this writ petition also. The
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent municipal
corporation submitted that if the petitioners had not challenged the order
dated 19.07.2011 passed by the SLAO, further acquisition proceedings
could have been continued and by this time, the award would have been
rendered ensuring that the compensation was determined.
30. It was submitted that a perusal of the agreements executed
between the parties from the year 1960 onwards would show that the
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petitioners had agreed for monetary compensation at a specific rate. The
last of the said agreements recorded that the compensation would be
payable @ Rs.40/- per square yard. The petitioners cannot be permitted
to claim amount over and above the said quantum of compensation. On
this basis, it was submitted that the writ petition deserved to be
dismissed.
31. Apart from this, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent municipal corporation submitted that since the acquisition
concerned Section 126 of the MRTP Act, wherein acquisition process
starts directly at the stage of declaration similar to the one made under
Section 6 of the L. A. Act, the question of lapsing of acquisition would
not arise. He further submitted that therefore, there was no question of
the petitioners finding support from the aforementioned judgements of
the Supreme Court regarding lapsing of acquisition when declaration
under Section 6 of the L. A. Act is not issued within one year of issuance
of notification under Section 4 thereof. Hence, there is no question of
shifting of the date of notification under Section 4 of the L. A. Act,
thereby demonstrating that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed so
that the SLAO can proceed further in the matter.
32. We have considered the rival submissions in the backdrop of the
pleadings and documents on record, as also the judgements brought to
our notice. In this case, it is not seriously disputed that the possession of
the subject unacquired land was taken by the respondent municipal
corporation way back in the year 1960. Agreements were executed in the
years 1960, 1976 and 1978 between the petitioners, their family
members and the respondent municipal corporation, under which certain
parcels of land were acquired for which compensation was paid as per
mutually agreed terms.
33. After this Court passed order in Writ Petition No.1385 of 1979, as
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many as 16 awards were rendered. In the last of such awards, passed in
the year 1988, compensation was paid @ Rs.350 per square yard,
thereby demonstrating that the rate of Rs.40 per square yard agreed
between the parties in the said agreements, clearly stood superseded.
Yet, the aforementioned unacquired land remained in possession of the
respondent municipal corporation, with no steps taken for payment of
compensation.
34. The second round of litigation before this Court, in the form of
Writ Petition No.109 of 1996, culminated in the order dated 04.12.1996
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, allowing the writ
petition and directing the respondents to acquire the unacquired land
expeditiously and in any case, within a period of one year from the date
of the order. It is an admitted position that during the pendency of the
said writ petition, a surveyor was appointed, who identified the exact
extent of the unacquired pieces of land admeasuring 9295.25 sq.mtrs.
35. The findings rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in
the said order demonstrated that the contention raised on behalf of the
respondent municipal corporation that the petitioners were entitled to
compensation at a fixed rate of Rs.40 per square yard, in the light of the
aforementioned agreement, was rejected. The learned Single Judge of
this Court took specific note of the fact that the last land acquisition
award of the year 1988 granted compensation @ Rs.350 per square yard.
Hence, it was held that the respondent municipal corporation could not
be permitted to fall back on the agreements, in order to restrict the
quantum of compensation payable to the petitioners, while acquiring the
unacquired land, possession of which was already taken decades ago.
These findings rendered in the order dated 04.12.1996 passed in Writ
Petition No.109 of 1996 are significant and they have a bearing on the
present writ petition also.
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36. The third round of litigation was Writ Petition No.11 of 2006 filed
by the respondent municipal corporation, challenging the award dated
30.08.2001 passed by the SLAO. The same was disposed of by order
dated 14.08.2008, whereby the said award passed by the SLAO on
30.08.2001, was quashed and set aside and the SLAO was directed to
proceed in the matter.
37. In the said petition also, the petitioners had raised the issue
regarding lapsing of acquisition, as declaration under Section 6 of the L.
A. Act was not issued within one year of issuance of notification under
Section 4 thereof. But, this Court did not agree with the submission and
observed that the SLAO would have to take care of the legalities
required to be followed, while declaring the award, further specifically
observing that this Court does not wish to interfere in the legal domain
of the SLAO. These observations have to be appreciated in the backdrop
of a specific submission made on behalf of the petitioners that a
direction may be given to the SLAO to issue fresh notification under
Section 4 of the L. A. Act.
38. The petitioners challenged the said judgement and order of this
Court passed in Writ Petition No.11 of 2006 by filing Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No.23894 of 2008 before the Supreme Court. A copy of
the memo of the Special Leave Petition is annexed to the affidavit-in-
rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioners. A perusal of the same shows
that the issue regarding lapsing of acquisition was raised in question (vii)
and grounds (g), (j) and (k).
39. Eventually, on 05.04.2011, the Supreme Court disposed of Civil
Appeal No.1115 of 2010 [arising from Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No.23894 of 2008], observing as follows:-
“ In view of the fact that this Court has set aside the
award by giving cogent reasons and has passed an order
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for passing a fresh award in accordance with law, we are
not inclined to interfere with the same but make it clear
that the SLAO would allow the parties to raise all issues
before him, which may be available to the parties in
accordance with law and upon taking into consideration
all those issues, may pass the award. It shall also be open
to the parties to place all documents or evidence that
may be available with them in support of their claims for
compensation for consideration of the SLAO, which
shall be taken notice of by the SLAO while passing the
impugned award.
It transpires from the records and also, from the
impugned order that certain amount was deposited by the
Municipal Corporation of Bombay in Court which was
invested by the Prothonotary and Senior Master, High
Court. The appellants havé also filed an application in
this court with a prayer to allow them to withdraw an
amount of Rs.6,43,87,350/- as deposited with the
Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court. The
aforesaid prayer could also be made before the SLAO
who shall consider the said prayer and, if it is found that
the appellants are entitled to receive such an amount, the
same shall be ordered to be released in their favour.
While doing so, the order passed by this Court may also
be taken notice of.”
40. Thus, the order passed by this Court, setting aside the award of
the SLAO, was confirmed. This Court had held that the quantum of
compensation was improperly determined by the SLAO by relying upon
the ready reckoner. Hence, the SLAO was required to undertake the
process of determination of compensation afresh. The Supreme Court in
the above-quoted portion of the order dated 05.04.2011 made it
abundantly clear that the SLAO would allow the parties to raise all
issues, which may be available to the parties in accordance with law and
upon consideration of all such issues, the award may be passed. This has
to be read in conjunction with the observation made by this Court, while
disposing of Writ Petition No.11 of 2006, specifically observing that the
SLAO would take care of the legalities, while declaring the award afresh
and that this Court would not enter into the domain of the SLAO.
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41. We are of the opinion that the said observations made by this
Court and the Supreme Court in the said third round of litigation,
indicated that the parties were at liberty to raise all issues before the
SLAO. The petitioners filed applications dated 13.05.2011 and
18.05.2011 before the SLAO, asserting that the acquisition proceedings
had lapsed due to issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the L. A.
Act beyond the period of one year from issuance of notification under
Section 4 thereof and they had prayed for a fresh notification to be
issued under Section 4, for determination of compensation. The
petitioners also prayed for permission to withdraw the amount deposited
by the respondent municipal corporation in this Court.
42. The SLAO rejected the applications by the impugned order dated
19.07.2011. A perusal of the said order shows that the SLAO proceeded
on the basis that the issue pertaining to notification under Section 4 of
the L. A. Act being issued afresh, was considered and rejected by this
Court and the Supreme Court. On this basis, the SLAO concluded that it
would be appropriate for the said authority to consider the applications
filed by the petitioners, as it would amount to interfering with the orders
of this Court and the Supreme Court.
43. We are unable to agree with the approach adopted by the SLAO,
as a proper interpretation of the order dated 14.08.2008 passed by this
Court and order dated 05.04.2011 passed by the Supreme Court, would
show that liberty was reserved for the parties, including the petitioners,
to raise all issues before the SLAO. On this short ground, the impugned
order dated 19.07.2011 deserves to be set aside.
44. In any case, apart from challenging the said impugned order dated
19.07.2011 passed by the SLAO, the petitioners have specifically prayed
for a declaration as per prayer clause (b), to hold and declare that the
acquisition has lapsed, in the face of the admitted position on facts that
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declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued beyond the
mandatory period of one year, specified under Section 4 thereof. As a
writ court, we are required to consider the said issue as it goes to the
very root of the matter. The aforesaid issue has serious consequences,
which need to be considered in the light of the position of law clarified
by the Supreme Court.
45. In the case of Vijay Narayan Thatte and others vs. State of
Maharashtra and others (supra) while considering the issue pertaining
to lapsing of acquisition, the Supreme Court referred to the Constitution
Bench judgement in the case of Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil
Nadu , (2002) 3 SCC 533 and held that proviso to Section 6 of the L. A.
Act is mandatory. On this basis, it was held that if declaration under
Section 6 of the L. A. Act is issued beyond one year from issuance of
notification under Section 4 thereof, such declaration is rendered void
and the acquisition necessarily lapses.
46. It would be appropriate to refer to relevant portion of Section 6 of
the L. A. Act, which reads as follows:-
“6. Declaration that land is required for a public
purpose .- (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this
Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after
considering the report, if any, made under section 5-A,
subsection (2), that any particular land is needed tor a public
purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to
that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such
Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its
orders and different declarations may be made from time to
time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by
the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1),
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or
have been made (wherever required) under section 5-A, sub-
section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any
particular land covered by a notification under section 4,
sub-section (1),—
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(i) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967
(1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the
expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the
notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the
expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the
notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be
made unless the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out
of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a
local authority.”
47. As a matter of fact, a bare reading of proviso to Section 6 of the
L. A. Act shows that no declaration under the said provision can be
published after expiry of one year from the date of publication of
notification under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act. The words of the
provision being clear, there can be no other interpretation. In this
context, in the aforesaid case of Vijay Narayan Thatte and others vs.
State of Maharashtra and others ( supra ), the Supreme Court observed
as follows:-
“21. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the
proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is
totally mandatory and bears no exceptions. In fact, a
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Padma
Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. [(2002) 3 SCC 533] is
clearly in support of the submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants that the proviso to Section 6 is
mandatory, and hence the Notification under Section 6
dated 30-10-2006 is time-barred.
22. In our opinion, when the language of the statute is plain
and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be
applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration
of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the
legislature. It is only when the language of the statute is
not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict, etc. or
the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can
depart from the literal rule of interpretation. A perusal of
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the proviso to Section 6 shows that the language of the
proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule of interpretation
must be applied to it. When there is a conflict between
the law and equity it is the law which must prevail. As
stated in the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex which means
“the law is hard but it is the law”.
xxx xxx xxx
24. In our opinion, there can be no estoppel against a statute.
Since the statute is very clear, the period of limitation
provided in clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the
Act has to be followed, and concessions of the counsel
can have no effect. As already stated above, the proviso
is mandatory in nature, and must operate with its full
rigour vide Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [(2007) 3
SCC 470] (SCC para 17).”
48. The said position of law was followed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Anil Kumar Gupta vs. State of Bihar and others (supra) .
It was observed in the said judgement as follows:-
“18. We may now advert to the main question as to whether
the declaration issued under Section 6(1) was a nullity
because the same was issued after expiry of the period
of one year specified in the first proviso (ii) to that
section. This issue is no longer res integra and must be
treated as settled by the judgments of this Court in
Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.N. [(2002) 3 SCC
533], Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [(2007) 3 SCC
470] and a recent judgment in Devender Kumar Tyagi
v. State of U.P. [(2011) 9 SCC 164 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ)
542] In Padma Sundara Rao case [(2002) 3 SCC 533]
the Constitution Bench unequivocally held that the
second proviso to Section 6(1) is mandatory and a
declaration issued beyond the period of one year from
the last publication of the notification issued under
Section 4(1) is nullity. In view of the proposition laid
down in these judgments, it must be held that the
learned Single Judge had rightly held that the
declaration issued under Section 6(1) was non est.
19. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the
corrigendum dated 1-7-1994 and argued that if the
period of one year is counted from the date of
corrigendum then the declaration issued under Section
6(1) cannot be treated as beyond the period of one year.
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We are unable to accept the submission of the learned
counsel for two reasons. Firstly, it has not been shown
whether the corrigendum had been published in the
manner prescribed under Section 4(1). Secondly, the
corrigendum was issued only for correcting the
typographical mistakes in the gazette publication of the
notification issued under Section 4(1). Such
corrigendum will relate back to the date on which the
notification under Section 4(1) was issued and the same
cannot be relied upon for recording a finding that the
declaration under Section 6(1) was issued within the
period prescribed under the first proviso (ii) to that
section.”
49. The aforesaid judgements of the Supreme Court make it
abundantly clear that the mandatory requirement of law under proviso to
Section 6 of the L. A. Act, has to be applied strictly. It is significant to
note that in this case, the respondent State did not dispute the dates of
issuance and publication of notification under Section 4 and declaration
under Section 6 of the L. A. Act. A perusal of the award dated
30.08.2001 shows that the notification under Section 4 of the L. A. Act,
was issued on 08.12.1999 and published on 23.12.1999, while the
declaration under Section 6 thereof was issued on 05.01.2001, published
in daily newspapers on 19.01.2001 and date of publication on the notice
board of the Collector was 23.01.2001.
50. The aforesaid admitted position on facts shows that declaration
under Section 6 of the L. A. Act was beyond the period of one year from
issuance and publication of notification under Section 4 thereof, thereby
showing that the declaration was rendered a nullity and the said
acquisition process lapsed. Therefore, the relief sought by the petitioners
at prayer clause (b) deserves to be granted and the acquisition process
needs to be undertaken afresh. It is significant to note that such lapsing
is by operation of statute and law itself and therefore, no order of any
Court can undo what has happened by operation of law. As observed by
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the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgement in the case of Vijay
Narayan Thatte and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others
( supra ), the Latin Maxim, dura lex sed lex meaning ‘the law is hard but
it is the law’, applies to the facts of the present case.
51. In this context, we find that the contention raised on behalf of
respondent municipal corporation, by relying upon Section 126 of the
MRTP Act, is a red herring and a desperate attempt to somehow deprive
the petitioners of their rightful dues and consequences that follow due to
lapsing of acquisition, in the light of the observations made hereinabove.
It is an admitted position on record that the respondent municipal
corporation took possession of petitioners’ land way back in the year
1960. While some parcels of land were acquired through agreements and
some compensation was paid and thereafter, certain land acquisition
awards were issued upto the year 1988, in pursuance of the direction
issued by this Court in the first round of litigation (Writ Petition
No.1385 of 1979), the unacquired land identified by the surveyor during
the proceedings concerning Writ Petition No.11 of 2026, was never
acquired and the petitioners were and are clearly entitled to appropriate
relief under law. The respondent municipal corporation being a public
body, having taken possession of lands of the petitioners way back in the
year 1960, has adopted such an intransigent approach in opposing the
contentions of the petitioners tooth and nail, to somehow postpone the
inevitable.
52. It is to be noted that the MRTP Act was itself enacted in the year
1966, much after the possession of lands was already taken by the
respondent municipal corporation in the year 1960 and therefore,
reliance on Section 126 of the MRTP Act, is wholly unsustainable. This
is apart from the fact that as per order passed in Writ Petition No.1385 of
1979 and Writ Petition No.109 of 1996, the acquisition was undertaken
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by the SLAO under the L. A. Act by issuing notification under Section 4
and declaration under Section 6 thereof. It is significant to note that there
is not a whisper in the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent
municipal corporation about Section 126 of the MRTP Act. It is for the
first time in the oral arguments that the said submission was made,
without any basis in the material on record. Hence, the said contention
raised on behalf of the respondent municipal corporation, is rejected.
53. The manner in which the respondent municipal corporation and
the State authorities have proceeded in the present case, demonstrates
that the valuable right of the petitioners under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India, has been violated. Despite possession of the said
unacquired land having taken in the year 1960, compensation has not
been paid till date. In the case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and
( supra ), the
others Vs. Government of Karnataka and others
Supreme Court has relied upon earlier judgements and reiterated that the
right to property is not only considered a constitutional or a statutory
right, but it is also treated as a ‘human’ right. This dimension of the right
to property has to be given its due meaning, particularly in the light of
the observations made by the Supreme Court in various judgements,
including judgements in the cases of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others vs.
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others , (2013) 1
SCC 353 and Kolkata Municipal Corporation and another vs. Bimal
Kumar Shah and others , (2024) 10 SCC 533 .
54. Keeping in mind the importance of said right to property, the
consequence of lapsing of acquisition would be that the respondent
municipal corporation will have to return the said unacquired land to the
petitioners. But, since the said land has been already utilized for public
purpose, it would be a drastic consequence and it would also cause grave
inconvenience to the public at large. In such situations, the Supreme
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Court, in its various judgements, has held that instead of giving the
consequential direction for returning the subject unacquired land to the
land owners / claimants, the Court, by adopting a balanced approach,
can direct shifting of date of notification issued under Section 4(1) of the
L. A. Act.
55. In the case of Haji Saeed Khan and others vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and others , (2001) 9 SCC 513 , the Supreme Court shifted the
date of notification under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act, so that the
interests of all parties were taken care of. In the case of Competent
Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory and others ( supra ), the
Supreme Court, having found that the acquisition itself was rendered
invalid, further took into consideration the fact that the subject land was
indeed acquired and utilized for public purpose and in that backdrop,
directed shifting of notification. The relevant portion of the said
judgement reads as follows:-
“14. Having held that the impugned notification regarding
acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the
statutory requirements and also having found that taking
possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the
present case in pursuance of the said notification was not
in accordance with law, the question arises as to what
relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court
rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the
present case was for a project of great national
importance i.e. the construction of a national highway.
The construction of a national highway on the acquired
land has already been completed as informed to us
during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be
served by quashing the impugned notification at this
stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that
the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh
notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the
impugned notification being quashed. The consequence
of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend
in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to
the landowners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate
question will be about the quantum of compensation
payable to the landowners. Quashing of the notification
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at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and
practical problems. Balancing the rights of the
petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing
the impugned notification, we are of the view that a
better course will be to compensate the landowners, that
is, the writ petitioners appropriately for what they have
been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to
adopt this course of action.
15. Normally, compensation is determined as per the market
price of land on the date of issuance of the notification
regarding acquisition of land. There are precedents by
way of judgments of this Court where in similar
situations instead of quashing the impugned notification,
this Court shifted the date of the notification so that the
landowners are adequately compensated. Reference may
be made to:
(a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri [(1992)
1 SCC 328]
(b) Gauri Shankar Gaur v. State of U.P. [(1994) 1 SCC
92]
(c) Haji Saeed Khan v. State of U.P. [(2001) 9 SCC 513]
In that direction the next step is what should be the
crucial date in the facts of the present case for
determining the quantum of compensation. We feel that
the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date
when possession of the land was taken by the
respondents from the writ petitioners. This date
admittedly is 19-2-2003. We, therefore, direct that
compensation payable to the writ petitioners be
determined as on 19-2-2003, the date on which they
were deprived of possession of their lands. We do not
quash the impugned notification in order not to disturb
what has already taken place by way of use of the
acquired land for construction of the national highway.
We direct that the compensation for the acquired land be
determined as on 19-2-2003 expeditiously and within ten
weeks from today and the amount of compensation so
determined, be paid to the writ petitioners after adjusting
the amount already paid by way of compensation within
eight weeks thereafter. The claim of interest on the
amount of compensation so determined is to be decided
in accordance with law by the appropriate authority. We
express no opinion about other statutory rights, if any,
available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will
be free to exercise the same, if available. The
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compensation as determined by us under this order along
with other benefits, which the respondents give to parties
whose lands are acquired under the Act, should be given
to the writ petitioners along with what has been directed
by us in this judgment.”
56. The said position of law was followed by the Supreme Court in its
judgement in the case of Special Agricultural Produce Market
Committee for Fruits and Vegetables, Golimangla vs. N. Krishnappa
and others ( supra ). The Supreme Court rejected the challenge to an order
passed by the High Court, whereby relief was moulded by shifting the date
of notification under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act, while specifically
referring to the said earlier judgement in the case of Competent Authority
vs. Barangore Jute Factory and others ( supra ).
57. In a recent judgement in the case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz
and others Vs. Government of Karnataka and others ( supra ), the
Supreme Court dealt with the said issue in detail. It is significant to note
that in the said judgement, the Supreme Court held that only the High
Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the Supreme
Court, under Article 32/142, could shift the date of issuance of notification
under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act to a later or subsequent date. It was
specifically held that such power is not available with the SLAO or the
State Government. The relevant portion of the said judgement in this
context reads as follows:-
“15. It can thus be seen that the learned Single Judge of the
High Court, upon appreciation of the material placed on
record, was of the view that insofar as the opinion of the
learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the
date of the preliminary notification to a later date is
concerned, the said opinion was beyond the scope and
ambit of the query put forth to him and consequently, the
said opinion could not have been made the basis by the
SLAO to pass the award. It is further to be seen that the
learned Single Judge of the High Court after considering
the provisions of the 1894 LA Act, the KIAD Act and
various decisions of this Court, observed that the market
value of the acquired land has to be taken as on the date
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of the preliminary notification as contemplated under
Section 11 of the 1894 LA Act. Further, the learned
Single Judge of the High Court observed that only in
exceptional circumstances, where either this Court or the
High Court comes to the conclusion that the acquisition
proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed on
account of certain illegalities or infirmities in the
acquisition process/procedure, it was permissible only
for this Court in exercise of its powers under Article
32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to shift the date to a
later/subsequent date. It was further observed that this
power to shift the date is available only to either this
Court or the High Courts and not definitely/certainly to
the SLAOs or the State Government.
16. We are in agreement with the findings of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court, inasmuch as the SLAO
cannot shift/postpone the date of preliminary
notification. In case, upon appreciation of the material
placed on record if this Court or the High Court, in
exceptional circumstances, came to the conclusion that
the acquisition proceedings themselves were liable to be
quashed only then by exercising inherent powers this
Court under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, respectively, can
shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification to a
later date. In our considered opinion, therefore, the
learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly came to
the conclusion that the award dated 22-4-2019 be
quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx
53. No doubt that as already observed by us hereinabove, we
do not find any error in the approach adopted by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court in holding that
the SLAO could not have shifted the date and it could
have been done only by this Court in exercise of powers
under Article 32/142 of the Constitution of India or by
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. However, the learned Single Judge of the High
Court instead of relegating the appellants to again go
through the rigours of determination by SLAO, ought to
have exercised powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution to do complete justice. Even the Division
Bench of the High Court on a hypertechnical ground has
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non-suited the appellants.”
58. In the said judgement, the Supreme Court took into consideration
the long period of time for which the land owners had been deprived of
their legitimate dues and in that context, observed as follows:-
“49. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have been
deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago.
It can also not be controverted that money is what money
buys. The value of money is based on the idea that
money can be invested to earn a return, and that the
purchasing power of money decreases over time due to
inflation. What the appellants herein could have bought
with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is,
therefore, of utmost importance that the determination of
the award and disbursal of compensation in case of
acquisition of land should be made with promptitude.”
59. Thus, we find that in such situations, where the acquisition itself
is liable to be quashed and it is held that the same has lapsed, as in the
present case, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, has the power to shift the date of notification
under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act to address the concerns of all parties.
We find that if such an approach is not adopted, either the said
unacquired land will have to be returned to the petitioners at grave
inconvenience and cost to the public at large or the petitioners may claim
that compensation be granted for the value of the land as on today.
60. But, by following the position of law enunciated by the Supreme
Court in the aforementioned judgements, we are inclined to shift the date
of notification under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act and to issue
consequential directions to the respondents, while disposing of the
present writ petition. In this context, various submissions were made on
behalf of the rival parties, but we find that in order to balance the
interests of all the parties, it would be appropriate to shift the date of
notification issued under Section 4(1) of the L. A. Act to the date on
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which the present writ petition was filed.
61. The record shows that this petition was lodged in this Court on
26.08.2011 and in the light of the observations made hereinabove, we
are inclined to shift the date of notification issued under Section 4(1) of
the L. A. Act to the said date. By treating the same as the date of
notification, the SLAO shall calculate the quantum of compensation
payable to the petitioners, in accordance with law.
62. In view of the above, the writ petition is disposed of as follows:-
(a) The impugned order dated 19.07.2011 passed by the SLAO
is quashed and set aside;
(b) It is held that in the light of the declaration under Section 6
of the L. A. Act being issued beyond the mandatory period
of one year from issuance of notification under Section 4
thereof, the said declaration is rendered a nullity and the
acquisition process to that extent, is found to be illegal;
(c) In the light of the observations made hereinabove and
following the position of law laid down by the Supreme
Court in such cases and in order to balance the interests of
all the parties, the notification issued under Section 4(1) of
the L. A. Act, is shifted to 26.08.2011;
(d) The SLAO shall now undertake the exercise of calculation
of quantum of compensation, by passing a fresh award,
taking the market value as on 26.08.2011;
(e) The SLAO shall complete the said exercise within a period
of three months from today;
(f) The petitioners shall be entitled to all statutory benefits as
available in law and after the award is passed, the rights of
all parties with regard to further proceedings shall remain
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open;
(g) Since there was no clarity as to whether the amounts
deposited in this Court under the earlier proceedings, were
withdrawn by the respondent municipal corporation or not, it
is directed that in the event the amount is still lying with the
Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court, the same shall
be taken into account and adjusted when the quantum of
compensation is determined by the SLAO in terms of the
directions given hereinabove. Such amount, if any, lying in
this Court along with accrued interest, shall be disbursed
forthwith to the petitioners after the award is passed by the
SLAO;
(h) If the amount has been already withdrawn by the respondent
municipal corporation from this Court, the entire amount of
compensation, as may be determined by the SLAO, shall be
disbursed in favour of the petitioners;
(i) In any case, the awarded amount shall be made over to the
petitioners within four weeks of the award being passed by
the SLAO.
63. Rule is made absolute in above terms.
64. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)
MINAL
SANDIP
PARAB
Digitally signed
by MINAL
SANDIP PARAB
Date: 2026.07.03
15:32:17 +0530
Minal / Priya
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