Brijmohan Kushwah vs M.P.Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Co.Ltd.

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33969
1 WP-4291-2007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
th
ON THE 4 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 4291 of 2007
CNR No.: MPHC030146112007
BRIJMOHAN KUSHWAH
Versus
M.P.MADHYA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN CO.LTD. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Pratap Singh - Advocate for the petitioner.

ORDER
This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been
filed seeking following relief(s):-

"i- Respondents may kindly be directed to consider the
case of promotion of petitioner.
ii- The consequential benefit be also directed to be paid
to the petitioner and all the arrears along with interest
be also directed to be paid to petitioner.
Any other relief which this Hon'ble High Court deems
fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may also
kindly be granted."
2. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the controversy
involved in the present petition has already been adjudicated by this Court
vide judgment dated 28.10.2026 passed in W.P.No.17885/2019 ( Baburam
Uchadiya Vs. The State of M.P. and Another).
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to distinguish
the controversy involved in the present petition from the controversy
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 05-Nov-26
10:38:36 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33969
2 WP-4291-2007
adjudicated by this Court in the aforesaid case.

4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5 . The judgment dated 28.10.2026 passed by this Court in
W.P.No.17885/2019 ( Baburam Uchadiya Vs. The State of M.P. and
Another) reads as under:-
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been filed by the petitioners seeking the following reliefs:-
"i-The order impugned annexure P/1 may kindly be quashed.
ii- Respondents may kindly be directed to consider and decide the
representation submitted by the petitioner by a reasoned order.
Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts
and circumstances of the case may also kindly be granted."
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner
was initially appointed as Office Assistant Grade-III in the
respondent company on 29.01.1983. Thereafter, he was promoted
as Office Assistant Grade-II vide order dated 15.04.1998, Office
Assistant Grade-I vide order dated 06.01.2000, and Section
Officer vide order dated 02.12.2011. Subsequently, the petitioner
retired from service.
3. It was further submitted that the petitioner’s juniors, namely, Jay
Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar, were appointed on
21.01.1983 and 31.01.1983, respectively. In the seniority list as on
01.04.1989, the petitioner was placed at serial No.766, whereas
Jay Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar were placed at serial
Nos.767 and 768, respectively.
4. Learned counsel further submitted that Jay Ram Ahirwar was
promoted as Office Assistant Grade-II on 03.02.1992 and Ram
Dayal Mehar on 13.02.1991, whereas the petitioner was promoted
to the said post only on 15.04.1998. Thereafter, the petitioner was
promoted as Office Assistant Grade-I on 06.01.2000, while Jay
Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar were promoted to the said
post on 04.02.2000 and 11.10.2000, respectively. The petitioner
was promoted as Section Officer on 02.12.2011, whereas his
juniors had already been promoted to the said post on 06.07.2007
and 08.06.2007, respectively.
5. It was also submitted that Jay Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal
Mehar were subsequently promoted as Account Officers vide
orders dated 27.09.2012 and 08.10.2012, respectively. However,
the petitioner was not promoted to the post of Account Officer till
the filing of the present petition in 2019. Learned counsel for the
petitioner contended that, as per the instructions dated 23.09.2016,
filed as Annexure-C to the rejoinder, the respondents failed to
assign the petitioner his proper place in the seniority list, resulting
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 05-Nov-26
10:38:36 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33969
3 WP-4291-2007
in the denial of promotion to him while his juniors were promoted.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that
the petitioner was initially appointed as Office Assistant Grade-III
on 17.05.1983 at Sehore Circle Office, Bhopal. In 1985, he was
transferred in the same capacity to the Circle Office, Morena, and
was subsequently posted at Mehgaon, considering that his
hometown was Bhind.
7. It was further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents
that, vide order dated 03.06.1989, the Bhopal and Gwalior regions
were separated, and separate regional establishments were
constituted. Due to this bifurcation, the employees continued at
their respective places of posting, but their administrative control
was changed. Consequently, the petitioner came under the
Gwalior region, whereas Jay Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar
came under the Bhopal region when the promotions were made.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the
regional bifurcation was undertaken due to administrative
exigencies, and there was no requirement to obtain the consent of
the employees. After publication of the region-wise seniority lists,
the petitioner was given an opportunity to raise objections but did
not do so at the relevant time.
9. It was also submitted that, after 03.06.1989, promotions were
made on the basis of the respective region-wise seniority lists. The
petitioner was included in the seniority list of the Gwalior region,
whereas Jay Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar were included
in the seniority list of the Bhopal region. Following the Regional
Selection Committee meeting dated 31.08.1991, the petitioner
continued under the Gwalior region from 1985 until his
retirement. The seniority list for the Gwalior region for the year
1991-1992 was duly published, but the petitioner neither raised
any objection nor challenged it at the relevant time. On the
contrary, he subsequently availed himself of three promotions
under the said seniority arrangement without questioning the
region-wise seniority.
10. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
petitioner did not raise any objection regarding his seniority or
promotion after the regional bifurcation in 1989 and filed the
present petition for the first time on 26.08.2019. Therefore, the
petitioner is not entitled to any relief.
11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
12. Upon perusal of material available on record reveals that the
petitioner was initially appointed as Office Assistant Grade-III on
17.05.1983 at the Sehore Circle Office, Bhopal. In 1985, he was
transferred in the same capacity to the Circle Office, Morena, and
was subsequently posted at Mehgaon, considering that his
hometown was Bhind.
13. Vide order dated 03.06.1989, the Bhopal and Gwalior regions
were separated and separate regional establishments were
constituted. Due to this bifurcation, the employees continued at
their respective places of posting, but their administrative control
was changed. Consequently, the petitioner came under the

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 05-Nov-26
10:38:36 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33969
4 WP-4291-2007
Gwalior region, whereas Jay Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar
came under the Bhopal region at the time of their promotions.
14. The regional bifurcation was undertaken due to administrative
exigencies, and there was no requirement to obtain the consent of
the employees. After publication of the region-wise seniority lists,
the petitioner was given an opportunity to raise objections;
however, he did not raise any objection at the relevant time.
15. After the bifurcation dated 03.06.1989, promotions were made
on the basis of the respective region-wise seniority lists. The
petitioner was included in the seniority list of the Gwalior region,
whereas Jay Ram Ahirwar and Ram Dayal Mehar were included
in the seniority list of the Bhopal region. Following the meeting of
the Regional Selection Committee dated 31.08.1991, the petitioner
continued under the Gwalior region from 1985 until his
retirement.
16. The seniority list of the Gwalior region for the year 1991-1992
was duly published. However, the petitioner neither raised any
objection to the said seniority list nor challenged it at the relevant
time. On the contrary, he subsequently availed himself of three
promotions under the same seniority arrangement without
questioning the region-wise seniority.
17. The petitioner did not raise any objection regarding his
seniority or promotion after the regional bifurcation in 1989 and
approached this Court for the first time by filing the present
petition on 26.08.2019.
18. The law with respect to delay and laches is settled by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in large number of cases. No benefit can
be extended to the sleeping litigant.
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa &
Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as
under:-
“54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case
the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot
wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment
in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court
within a reasonable time.”
20. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs
Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53
relying upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed as under :
“10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible conclusion that
appellant is guilty of delay and laches. Its conduct disentitles it to
any relief. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court has held that delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable
jurisdiction. In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder
Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has observed that
discretionary relief can be provided to one who has not by his act

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 05-Nov-26
10:38:36 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33969
5 WP-4291-2007
or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant
rather than an indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali
Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that where third
party rights are created, the High Court should not interfere.
Similarly, in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been held
that the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not
encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties
crystallizes in the interregnum.”
21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has
held as follows:
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in
mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant
to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.
Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within
the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR
1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised
judicially and reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC
221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in
Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service
[(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:


“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases are,
the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done
during the interval which might affect either party and
cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 05-Nov-26
10:38:36 AM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:33969
6 WP-4291-2007
22. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3
SCC 311 that :-
“10. … It is time and again, stated that a party who has slept over
his right since is not entitled to the discretionary relief of the High
Court."
23. Considering the aforesaid, as the present petition has been
filed after an inordinate delay of approximately thirty years and
the delay has not been satisfactorily explained, no case for
interference is made out. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

6 . In view of the aforesaid judgment, and considering that learned
counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any distinguishing feature in
the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds no reason to
take a different view.
7. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is hereby
dismissed.
(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE
AVI

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: AVINASH
BHARGAV
Signing time: 05-Nov-26
10:38:36 AM