MANAGER RAJ PATRIKA PVT LTD vs MS KUMKUM SHARMA
- Court
- Rajasthan High Court
[2026:RJ-JP:32936-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 253/2018
CNR: RJHC020036702018 | URN: SAW / 760U / 2018
Manager, Rajasthan Patrika Pvt. Ltd, Keshargarh, Jawahar Lal
Nehru Marg, Jaipur
----Appellant
Versus
Ms. Kumkum Sharma D/o Shri Madan Mohan Sharma, R/o 1638,
Chaura Rasta, Jaipur
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Sunil Nath Raunak
Mr. Mahendra Singh
Ms. Shreya Sangayach
Mr. Ankit Pople
For Respondent(s) : Ms. Shefali Sharma
Ms. Harshita Thakral
Mr. Rajendra Prasad
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
Order
Reportable
Judgment Reserved on :- 18/08/2026
Pronounced on :- 17/11/2026
By the Court (Per, Arun Monga, J):-
1. This intra court appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 20.12.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No.12832/2016. By that judgment, the respondent’s removal
from service vide management order dated 27.02.2009 was set aside.
The orders of the Labour Court dated 24.03.2015 and 31.05.2016 were
also set aside. The respondent was directed to be reinstated in service
with continuity and all consequential benefits, including back wages.
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2. The appellant seeks that the impugned judgment be set aside
and the writ petition be dismissed. For convenience, the appellant is
referred to as the management. The respondent, who was the writ
petitioner, is referred to as the employee.
FACTS
3. The employee was appointed as an Artist vide order dated
30.06.1995. About eight years later, by order dated 17.04.2003, she
was transferred to Udaipur on the ground of administrative exigency. At
Udaipur, she was posted in the Editorial Department. She did not
challenge the transfer. On 27.09.2004, she submitted an explanation
about her performance. She stated that she would continue to
discharge the work assigned to her.
4. On 17.03.2006, she asked to be transferred back to Jaipur. She
said she was unmarried and was living with her aged mother, whose
health was poor. There was no vacant post of Artist at Jaipur. Even so,
she was transferred to Jaipur vide order dated 27.04.2006 as a special
case, on sympathetic grounds. At Jaipur too, she was posted in the
Editorial Department.
5. Advisory and warning letters about her work followed. These
include letters dated 25.09.2007, 29.09.2007, 19.11.2007 and
18.12.2007. The employee herself placed them on record as Annexure
12 to the writ petition.
6. On 03.10.2007, a charge sheet containing six charges was
issued. In substance, the charges were these.
(i) Her complaint dated 29.08.2007 about her work seat was
found untrue. She refused to read and receive the reply
dated 30.08.2007. She similarly refused communications
given to her on 08.09.2007 and 10.09.2007.
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(ii) On 06.09.2007, after reading a letter handed over by the
Personnel Officer, she shouted loudly and disturbed
discipline in the office.
(iii) On the same day, she returned the letter, refused to accept
it and, when cautioned, asked the officer what he could do
to her.
(iv) She was instructed on 30.08.2007 to review two editions of
the newspapers every day. She sent reviews late, at
intervals, and of one edition only.
(v) She received a letter dated 25.09.2007 on this subject but
refused to acknowledge it. She is alleged to have said that
she would work only in her own way.
(vi) Despite warning letters dated 25.08.2006 and 21.08.2007,
her work did not improve.
7. Each charge was linked to specific sub clauses of Clause 20(2) of
the Certified Standing Orders. The employee did not reply within the
time allowed. The management appointed an Enquiry Officer on
28.11.2007. She filed her reply to the first charge sheet before the
Enquiry Officer on 08.12.2007.
8. Meanwhile, a second charge sheet dated 04.12.2007 was issued
with two charges. It alleged that she had refused to receive the charge
sheet dated 03.10.2007 and the communication dated 19.11.2007. It
further alleged that she had failed to improve her work despite several
opportunities. She replied on 07.12.2007 and filed an additional reply
on 22.12.2007. An Enquiry Officer was appointed for this charge sheet
on 11.12.2007.
9. Both charge sheets were entrusted to the same Enquiry Officer,
Mr. Rupin Kala, learned Advocate. Common proceedings were held with
the consent of both sides. The employee raised no objection at that
stage to the Enquiry Officer or to the common proceedings. Sittings
were held on 08.12.2007, 15.12.2007, 22.12.2007, 26.12.2007,
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29.12.2007, 05.01.2008, 12.01.2008, 19.01.2008, 29.02.2008,
05.04.2008 and 17.05.2008.
10. In the early enquiry sittings, the employee was given time on
more than one occasion to arrange a Defence Assistant. Documents
were exchanged. Copies of the documents produced by the Presenting
Officer were supplied to her. On 24.12.2007, she sought permission to
engage a person from outside the establishment as her Defence
Assistant.
11. On 19.01.2008, statements of three management witnesses were
taken on record. She was asked to cross examine them. She left the
proceedings without doing so. The Presenting Officer asked that the
enquiry proceed ex parte. The Enquiry Officer declined that request. He
instead sent her copies of the statements by registered post and gave
her another date.
12. On 29.02.2008, two more witnesses were examined. The Enquiry
Officer recorded that she had declined to sign the order sheet of
19.01.2008 and had declined to inspect the original documents. She
again left without cross examining anyone. The matter was adjourned
to 05.04.2008 and she was informed by registered post. She did not
appear on 05.04.2008. The matter was adjourned again to 17.05.2008.
She did not appear on that date either, though, according to the
Presenting Officer, she was present in the same premises. The Enquiry
Officer then proceeded in her absence.
13. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 25.12.2008. He held
all charges in both charge sheets proved. On 07.01.2009, the
competent authority sent her the report and asked her to show cause
why she should not be removed from service.
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14. In her reply dated 19/23.01.2009, she said she had stayed away
from the enquiry because it was being conducted in a biased and
arbitrary manner. She filed further replies on 02.02.2009 and
05.02.2009. On 27.02.2009, the Disciplinary Authority passed a
speaking order. It held the charges proved and removed her from
service.
15. A cheque dated 21.03.2009 for Rs.1,56,821.20 was sent to her
towards terminal benefits. This included gratuity of Rs.1,12,554/-. She
encashed the cheque.
16. The employee raised an industrial dispute. Conciliation failed. By
notification dated 30.07.2009, the State Government referred the
dispute to the Labour Court in the following terms.
" Whether removal of the petitioner Ms. Kumkum Sharma by the
management of the Rajasthan Patrika Pvt. Ltd. vide order dated 27.2.2009
was legal and justified and if not to what relief and amount she is entitled? "
17. In her statement of claim in L.C.R. No.120/2009, she pleaded that
though appointed as an Artist, she was made to do other newspaper
work without facilities or training. She said that when she protested,
she was charge sheeted and removed. The management denied this. It
pleaded that a full and fair enquiry had been held and that the charges
stood proved.
18. By interim order dated 24.03.2015, the Labour Court held the
enquiry fair and proper. Her writ petition against that order was
dismissed on 12.01.2016 as being directed against an interim order.
She was left free to challenge it along with the final award. By award
dated 31.05.2016, the Labour Court answered the reference against
her.
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19. The employee then filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12832/2016.
She challenged the Labour Court orders dated 24.03.2015 and
31.05.2016 and sought reinstatement with back wages.
20. The writ petition was allowed and reinstatement with full back
wages was directed. Aggrieved, the appellant-management has filed the
instant appeal.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT
21. Learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions.
(i) The company and the Disciplinary Authority were necessary
parties. The Labour Court was also a necessary party to a
petition for certiorari. The writ petition was bad for non
joinder.
(ii) The learned Single Judge set aside a reasoned award
without examining its findings. The enquiry report, the
evidence and the removal order were not even referred to.
(iii) Eight charges were framed. Most related to insubordination,
refusal to receive orders and misbehaviour. The learned
Single Judge dealt with only one charge, relating to review
of editions.
(iv) The employee walked out of the enquiry and abandoned it
despite repeated opportunities. She cannot now complain of
denial of natural justice.
(v) She never objected to the appointment of the Enquiry
Officer. Not during the enquiry, not in her replies and not
before the Labour Court. Reliance was placed on U.D. Lama
1
v. State of Sikkim . The appointment of a lawyer as
Enquiry Officer does not by itself show bias, as held in
2
Saran Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishwanath and Dalmia
3
Dadri Cement Ltd. v. Murari Lal Bikaneria .
1(1997) 1 SCC 111
21964 SCC OnLine SC 9
3 (1970) 3 SCC 259
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(vi) The plea that the Presenting Officer could not be a witness
was never raised before the Labour Court or in the writ
petition.
(vii) In any case, if the enquiry was found defective, the
management should have been allowed to prove the
charges on merits. It had sought this in its written
statement. Direct reinstatement with full back wages was
not permissible.
(viii) Reinstatement of an employee guilty of repeated
insubordination would harm discipline. There was no
pleading that she remained unemployed after 27.02.2009.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
22. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned
judgment. The submissions were these.
(i) The core finding of the learned Single Judge is that the
management, the Presenting Officer and the Enquiry Officer
joined hands to hold her guilty. This finding has not been
specifically challenged. Bias renders the forum coram non
judice . Reliance was placed on Ranjit Thakur v. Union of
4
India .
(ii) The Enquiry Officer was the management's regular lawyer.
He later defended his own report before the Labour Court
and the writ court.
(iii) She was an Artist, not trained in law. She was denied a
Defence Assistant of her choice. She was denied relevant
documents. The Presenting Officer was himself a material
witness. No date was fixed for defence evidence even after
the management closed its evidence.
(iv) She stayed away only after losing all hope of a fair hearing.
She kept writing to the Enquiry Officer in protest.
(v) The charges, at best, amount to minor misconduct under
the standing orders. Removal is a major penalty and is
disproportionate. Reliance was placed on Reserve Bank of
4(1987) 4 SCC 611
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5
India v. C.L. Toora and Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v.
6
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut , .
(vi) The plea for remand is misconceived. The management has
not shown that since 2009, she was gainfully employed.
Reliance was placed on Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti
7
Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and
Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of
8
Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd.
23. In the aforesaid backdrop, we have heard learned counsel for
both sides and gone through the record, and shall now proceed to
render our opinion by recording reasons and discussion thereof in the
succeeding part of the order.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT:-
24. Before proceeding further it would be apposite to notice the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. Relevant
thereof is reproduced as under: -
“ 20. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and carefully examined
the material available on record.
21. Adverting to the first issue raised by the petitioner regarding inherent
bias of the being thing case Enquiry Officer where he also being a
Lawyer of the re representing case of the respondent-Rajasthan Patrika
and also the Lawyer being their Legal Advisor as well as being the
Lawyer who appeared in the present case and contested the matter
before the Labour Court and before this Court, this Court finds that a
presumption of bias cannot be sustained on the sole ground that the
Officer was a part of the Management. In the case of Biecco Lawrie Ltd.
and another Vs. State of West Bengal and another: 2009(4) L.L.N. 91,
the fact that the Enquiry Officer was the Company Lawyer was not
considered as being biased and partisan who favoured and was partial
towards the Management of the Company. In the said case, the
delinquent employee was denied right to engage Lawyer while the
Management was represented by a person who was a Commerce
Graduate but was not a Lawyer but was a legally trained person. The
said action was also not held to be in violation of the principle of natural
justice since the charges were specific and simple and not difficult to
comprehend.
22. In the case of Saran Motors Private Ltd. New Delhi Vs. Vishwanath
and another: FLR 1964(9) (SC) 7, it has been held by the Supreme Court
as under:-
5(2004) 4 SCC 657
6(1984) 1 SCC 1
7(2013) 10 SCC 324
8 (1979) 2 SCC 80
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"In our opinion, this view is completely erroneous and cannot be
sustained. We have repeatedly pointed out that domestic enquiries
in industrial relations must be fairly conducted and whenever we
are satisfied that any enquiry was not fairly conducted or its
conclusions were not supported by evidence, we have
unhesitatingly ignored the findings recorded at such an enquiry
and held that the Tribunals must deal with the merits of the dispute
for themselves; but it is impossible to accept the argument that
because a person is sometimes employed by the employer as a
lawyer, he becomes incompetent to hold a domestic enquiry. It is
wellknown that enquiries of this type are generally conducted by
the officers of the employer and in the absence of any special
individual as attributable to a particular officer, it has never been
held that the enquiry is bad just because it is conducted by an
officer of the employer. If that be so, it is obviously unsound to take
the view that a lawyer who is not a paid officer of the employer, is
incompetent to hold the enquiry, because he is the employer's
lawyer and is paid remuneration for holding the enquiry.
Therefore, the first reason given by the Tribunal for ignoring the
findings of the domestic enquiry must be reversed."
23. In the case of M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. Vs. Murari Lal
Bikaneria: FLR 1970(21) (SC) 201, it was held as under:-
"We find ourselves unable to accept the conclusions arrived at by
the Tribunal. The Tribunal seems to have been greatly impressed by
the fact that instead of appointing someone in the appellant's
factory itself as the Enquiry Officer the Works Manager had
brought in an outsider who was no other than a junior advocate
occasionally assisting Anand Prakash, their counsel in some
matters. The Tribunal's view that this was wholly unwarranted and
done with the purpose of loading the dice against the workmen
appears to be unreasonable. Merely because the Enquiry Officer
was a junior advocate and that he had on occasions been engaged
by the appellant, it is not possible to take the view that he would
necessarily be biased against the workmen. Evidently some of the
workmen had behaved rudely to some members in the managerial
cadre and it would not have been at all difficult for the Works
Manager to appoint as Enquiry Officer some person of the factory
itself over whom he was likely to have greater influence than on an
outsider. As he himself was going to be a witness in the enquiry he'
entrusted the appointment of the Enquiry Officer to the Director of
the Company. We find nothing unfair in this and are unable to take
any exception to the course adopted."
24. The element of fairness in an enquiry and the apprehension rness
in an enquiry of bias was aptly consi considered and quoted by the Apex
Court in the ate of Punjab 1 others: (2001 thers: (2001) case of State of
Punjab Vs. V.K. Khanna and others: (2001) 2 SCC 330 where
observations of the English Courts have been quoted as quoted under:-
"7. Incidentally, Lord Thankerton in Franklin v. Minister of Town
and Country Planning (1948 AC 87) opined that the word bias is to
denote a departure from the standing of even-handed justice. Girja
Shankars case (supra) further noted the different note sounded by
the English Courts in the manner following:
"30.Recently however, the English Courts have sounded a different
note, though may not be substantial but the automatic
disqualification theory rule stands to some extent diluted. The
affirmation of this dilution however is dependent upon the facts
and circumstances of the matter in issue. The House of Lords in the
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case of Reg. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [2000 (1) A.C. 119] observed:
..In civil litigation the matters in issue will normally have an
economic impact; therefore a judge is automatically disqualified if
he stands to make a financial gain as a consequence of his own
decision of the case. But if, as in the present case, the matter at
issue does not relate to money or economic advantage but is
concerned with the promotion of the cause, the rationale
disqualifying a judge applies just as much if the judges decision
will lead to the promotion of a cause in which the judge is involved
together with one of the parties.
31. Lord Brown Wilkinson at page 136 of the report stated:
It is important not to overstate what is being decided. It was
suggested in argument that a decision setting aside the order of 25
November 1998 would lead to a position where judges would be
unable to sit on cases involving charities in whose work they are
involved. It is suggested that, because of such involvement, a judge
would be disqualified. That is not correct, The facts of this present
case are exceptional, The critical elements are (1) that A.I. was a
party to the appeal; (2) that A.I. was joined in order to argue for a
particular result; (3) the judge was a director of a charity closely
allied to A.I. and sharing, in this respect, A.I.'sobjects. Only in
cases where a judge is taking an active role as trustee or director
of a charity which is closely allied to and acting with a party to the
litigation should a judge normally be concerned either to recuse
himself or disclose the position to the parties. However, there may
well be other exceptional cases in which the judge would be well
advised to disclose a possible interest.
Lord Hutton also in Pinochets case (supra) observed:
there could be cases where the interest of the judge in the subject
matter of the proceedings arising from his strong commitment to
some cause or belief or his association with a person or body
involved in the proceedings could shake public confidence in the
administration of justice as much as a shareholding (which might
be small) in a public company involved in the litigation.
33. Incidentally in Locabail (Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield
Properties Ltd.: 2000 Q.B. 451), the Court of Appeal upon a detail
analysis of the oft cited decision in Reg. v. Gough [(1993) A.C.
646] together with the Dimes case, (3 House of Lords Cases 759):
Pinochet case (supra), Australian High Courts decision in the case
of re J.R.L., Ex parte C.J.L.: (1986 (161) CLR 342) as also the
Federal Court in re Ebner (1999 (161) A.L.R. 557) and on the
decision of the Constitutional Court of Sourth Africa in President
of the Republic of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football
Union (1999 (4) S.A. 147) stated that it would be rather dangerous
and futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or may
not give rise to a real danger of bias. The Court of Appeal
continued to the effect that everything will depend upon facts which
may include the nature of the issue to be decided. It further
observed:
By contrast, a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if
there were personal friendship or animosity between the judge and
any member of the public involved in the case; or if the judge were
closely acquainted with any member of the public involved in the
case, particularly if the credibility of that individual could be
significant in the decision of the case; or if, in a case where the
credibility of any individual were an issue to be decided by the
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judge, he had in a previous case rejected the evidence of that
person in such outspoken terms as to throw doubt on his ability to
approach such persons evidence with an open mind on any later
occasion; or if on any question at issue in the proceedings before
him the judge had expressed views, particularly in the course of the
hearing, in such extreme and unbalanced terms as to throw doubt
on his ability to try the issue with an objective judicial mind (see
Vakuta v. Kelly (1989) 167 C.L.R. 568); or if, for any other reason,
there were real ground for doubting the ability of the judge to
ignore extraneous considerations, prejudices and predilections and
bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues before him. The
mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous
case, had commented adversely on a party witness, or found the
evidence of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without
more found a sustainable objection. In most cases, we think, the
answer, one way or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case
there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in
favour of recusal. We repeat: every application must be decided on
the facts and circumstances of the individual case. The greater the
passage of time between the event relied on as showing a danger of
bias and the case in which the objection is raised, the weaker
(other things being equal) the objection will be.
34. The Court of Appeal judgment in Locabail (supra) though
apparently as noticed above sounded different note but in fact, in
more occasions than one a in the judgment itself, it has been
clarified that conceptually the issue of bias ought to be decided on
the facts and circumstances of the individual case a slight shift
undoubtedly from the original thinking pertaining to the concept of
bias to the effect that a mere apprehension of bias could otherwise
be sufficient.
8.The test therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension
of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is on this score that
the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and
necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the
conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias
administrative action cannot be sustained: If on the other hand
allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in
administrative action, question of declaring them to be
unsustainable on the basis therefor would not arise."
25. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court adverted to the facts of the
case and observed as under:-
"25. Bias admittedly negates fairness and reasonableness by
reason of which arbitrariness and malafide move creep in issuance
of the two notifications assuming in hot haste but no particulars of
any malafides move or action has been brought out on record on
the part of Shri V.K. Khanna while it is true that the notings
prepared for Advocate Generals opinion contain a definite remark
about the malafide move on the part of Shri V.K. Khanna yet there
is singular absence of any particulars without which the case of
malafides cannot be sustained. The expression malafide has a
definite significance in the legal phraseology and the same cannot
possibly emanate out of fanciful imagination or even
apprehensions but there must be existing definite evidence of bias
and actions which cannot be attributed to be otherwise bonafide
actions not otherwise bonafide, however, by themselves would not
amount to be malafide unless the same is inaccompanymen with
some other factors which would depict a bad motive or intent on
the part of the doer of the act."
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26. In the said case, it was further held as under:-
"37. As noticed above malafide intent or biased attitude cannot be
put on a straight jacket formula but depend upon facts and
circumstances of each case and in that perspective judicial
precedents would not be of any assistance and as such we refrain
from further dealing with various decisions cited from the Bar
since facts are otherwise different in each of the decisions. "
26. In the case of International Airports Authority of India Vs. K.D. Bali
and another: (1988) 2 SCC 360, while examining an her: (1988) 2 SCC
360, arbitration award, it was held by the Apex Court as under:-Court as
under:
"6.In the words of Lord O'Brien, LCJ there must be a real
likelihood of bias. It is well settled that there must be a real
likelihood of bias and not mere suspicion of bias before the
proceedings can be quashed on the ground that the person
conducting the proceedings is disqualified by interest. See in this
connection Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. The State of Andhra
Pradesh, [1960] 1 SCR 580 and Mineral Development Ltd. v.
State of Bihar, [1960] 2 SCR 609. Recently this Court in a slightly
different context in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and others,
A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2386 had occasion to consider the test of bias of
the Judge. But there must be reasonableness of the apprehension
of bias in the mind of the party. The purity of administration
requires that the party to the proceedings should not have
apprehension that the authority is biased and is likely to decide
against the party. But we agree with the learned Judge of the High
Court that it is equally true that it is not every suspicion felt by a
party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing
the proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from
a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere
apprehension of any whimsical person. While on this point we
reiterate that learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in his
submissions made a strong plea that his client was hurt and had
apprehension because the arbitrator being the appointee of his
client was not acceding to the request of his client which the
petitioner considered to be reasonable. We have heard this
submission with certain amount of discomfiture because it cannot
be and we hope it should never be in a judicial or a quasi-judicial
proceeding a party who is a party to the appointment could seek
the removal of an appointed authority or arbitrator on the ground
that appointee being his nominee had not acceded to his prayer
about the conduct of the proceeding. It will be a sad day in the
administration of justice if such be the state of law. Fortunately, it
is not so. Vague suspicions of whimsical, capricious and
unreasonable people are not our standard to regulate our vision. It
is the reasonableness and the apprehension of an average honest
man that must be taken note of. In the aforesaid light, if the
alleged grounds of apprehension of bias are examined, we find no
substance in them. It may be mentioned that the arbitrator was
appointed by the Chief Engineer of the petitioner, who is in the
service of the petitioner."
27. Thus, for arriving at a conclusion regarding bias and arriving at a
conclusion re prejudice, facts of the case need to be examined. In the
present case, the petitioner has alleged that she was an Artist appointed
but her field of duties was different from the field of work for which she
was served with the charge-sheet. It is her case that she has been
continuously representing the authorities for allotting her the work for
which she has been appointed. Mr. Rupin Kala, Advocate, who appeared
for the respondent-Rajasthan Patrika in the present case, was appointed
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as an Enquiry Officer case, was app by the management even before she
could file her reply to the charge-sheet. Mr. Rupin Kala, Enquiry Officer
recorded evidence of Mr. PK Gupta, who was also the Presenting Officer
of the Management. The petitioner was not given opportunity of placing
her case through Defence Assistant of her choice. The Enquiry Officer
did not allow her request for making available the documents and her
application was dismissed. She has apprehended of not getting an
impartial verdict from the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer has
given his verdict ex-parte.
28. Thus, this Court finds that there was a reasonable apprehension in
the mind of the petitioner of inherent bias and prejudice of the Enquiry
Officer. Although, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, as
quoted above, mere appointment of Court, as quoted above, Lawyer to
conduct t enquiry, who a fadice and b S not who also appears for the
Management in cases, may not be ipso-facto case for presumption of bias
and prejudice and bald allegations of bias may not be made out but if the
facts of the case are examined, it is found that there has been perversity
in arriving at findings by the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer,
who is supposed to have knowledge of law, being an Advocate, acts
contrary to the provisions of law and denies the delinquent fair
opportunity to defend, a likelihood of bias and prejudice as well as
unfairness and partiality towards the Management can be inferred. In the
present case, taking note of the submissions, which are found to be
correct on record, specially with regard to the fact that the enquiry
officer has allowed the Presenting Officer to be a witness in the enquiry
and has also not allowed the Defence Assistant Assistant to to the the
petition petitioner, an inference can be drawn of bias on his part.
Further, he has argued on behalf of the Management also to support not
only his enquiry report but also the decision taken by the Management of
removing the petitioner from service. It is also seen that the Enquiry
Officer did not give any opportunity to the petitioner to produce
witnesses on her behalf after having closed evidence of the Management.
Thus, the apprehension of the petitioner of the Enquiry Officer having a
role to pay in the entire enquiry proceedings upto the level of final
decision being taken by the Management, is found to be correct and the
circumstances, whereby the disciplinary action and supporting all the
orders of the Labour Court by the same counsel do speak volumes a
predetermined and prejudiced mind. It is a case where the prosecution,
Management and the Enquiry Officer have joined hands to hold the
petitioner guilty and ST petitioner guilty and the Labour Court, without
adverting to these aspects, has held wrongfully the enquiry to be fair.
29. In view of the law laid down in the case of Glaxo Laboratories Vs.
The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut & others (supra), this
Court finds that the allegations levelled against the petitioner was that
the petitioner did not perform the duties to analyze the news and the
work done by the petitioner was compared with Mr. Chandra Bhan
Singh, who was an Assistant Editor while the petitioner had been
transferred from Udaipur to Jaipur with direction that she would assist
the Assistant Editor Mr. Chandra Bhan Singh who was engaged in
analyzing the news. Thus, the charge levelled against the petitioner was
not in accordance with the spheres of duties allotted to her. She was not
competent to analyze the news at her own level and being an Artist, she
was required, as per the duties, to prepare publication of drawing,
layout, map, graphs and other similar embellishment, illustrations of any
kind or creative art. The Enquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority as well
as the Labour Court have failed to examine the basic contention raised
by the petitioner of having not committed any misconduct. Thus, the work
of assisting the Assistant News Editor Mr. Chandra Bhan Singh was not
within the sphere of duties. It is not the case of the Management that the
petitioner had been trained for the said purpose.
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30. The allegation of the petitioner regarding the Deputy Editor having
no competence to issue charge-sheet or to appoint Enquiry Officer,
however, is not made out in view of the submissions of the respondent
that the as Dr Mary e Deputy Editor had been authorized to act
Authority on the basis of the resolution of Board.
31. From the facts of the case, this Court is satisfied that dismissal of the
petitioner is by way by way of victimization and the order dated
27/02/2009 was unjustified and contrary to law. The Management has
relied on a defective enquiry and the said punishment based on defective
enquiry and supported by the Enquiry Officer before the Labour Court
as well as this Court, cannot be held as legal and justified. The findings
of the Labour Court that the petitioner could have been allotted other
work than that for which she was appointed is wholly perverse and for
being not performed work for which she was not trained, she could not
have been punished. A prayer made by an employee for requesting not to
be allotted a work which she may not be able to perform would not come
within the ambit of disobedience and if such an employee is forced to
work by issuing warnings and later on charge sheeted for not performing
the said work, in accordance with law itself amounts to victimization and
harassment.
32. In the circumstances, this Court finds that the petitioner has been
subjected to wrongful departmental proceedings. She has been victimized
and it is because of unfair harassment and exploitation. This Court,
therefore, holds the entire enquiry proceedings against the petitioner as
vitiated and bad in law and the same are set aside.
33. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The order impugned dated
rder & awe noung 27/02/2009 B HIG respondent-Rajasthan Patrika
removing the petitioner from service as well as impugned order & award
dated 24/03/2015 and 31/05/2018 passed by the learned Labour Court
holding the enquiry fair and proper as well as removal of the petitioner
proper and justified are hereby quashed & set aside and the respondent-
Rajasthan Patrika is directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with
all consequential benefits including continuity of service and back
wages. Compliance of this order be made by the respondent within a
period of three months from the date of submission of certified copy of
this order in their office. No costs. ”
25. Having perused the impugned judgment, we find that the learned
Single Judge first held that a presumption of bias cannot arise merely
because the Enquiry Officer is a lawyer engaged by the management.
Learned Single Judge took note that the same advocate had defended
the management, and his own report, before the Labour Court and
before the writ court. The learned Single Judge also found that the
Presenting Officer had been allowed to depose as a witness, that the
request for a Defence Assistant had been refused, and that no
opportunity was given to lead defence evidence. From these
circumstances, a real likelihood of bias was inferred.
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26. The learned Single Judge further held, relying on Glaxo
Laboratories (supra) , that the work of reviewing editions was outside
the duties of an Artist. On that basis, the removal was held to be an act
of victimisation.
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION:-
27. First and foremost, we would proceed to frame the questions that
arise for our consideration. The same are framed as under :-
(a) Whether the domestic enquiry stood vitiated by a real
likelihood of bias?
(b) Whether the employee's abstention, or her failure to object
earlier, saves the enquiry?
(c) Whether the learned Single Judge validly recorded a final
finding of victimisation on the merits of the charges?
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Whether the enquiry is vitiated by bias [Question (a)]
28. The law on bias is well settled. Bias means a departure from even
handed justice. A mere apprehension or vague suspicion is not enough.
There must be a real likelihood of bias. This was explained in State of
9
Punjab v. V.K. Khanna . In International Airports Authority of
10
India v. K.D. Bali , it was held that the apprehension must be judged
from the standpoint of a reasonable and honest person, not a whimsical
one.
29. In Ranjit Thakur (supra) , the test was stated thus. The
question is not whether the adjudicator was in fact biased. The question
is whether a reasonable person, aware of the relevant facts, would think
that bias was likely. It was also held that proceedings tainted by bias
are vitiated.
9(2001) 2 SCC 330
10(1988) 2 SCC 360
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30. We agree with the learned Single Judge that the mere
engagement of an advocate as Enquiry Officer does not show bias. That
is the clear ratio of Saran Motors (supra) and Dalmia Dadri Cement
(supra) . An employer is free to choose a lawyer, even one it engages
from time to time, to hold a domestic enquiry.
31. But this case does not stop there. The Enquiry Officer did not
remain a neutral adjudicator. After submitting his report, he became the
management's counsel in the very dispute that arose out of that report.
He defended his own findings before the Labour Court. He defended
them again before the writ court. He also defended the removal order
founded on those findings. The learned Single Judge has recorded this
fact. It is not disputed before us.
32. This matters for a simple reason. A domestic enquiry is a quasi
judicial exercise. The Enquiry Officer must weigh both sides with an
open mind. In the reference, the very question before the Labour Court
was whether his enquiry was fair. He was the one person whose fairness
was under scrutiny. Yet he appeared as the advocate for one side and
asked the Labour Court to uphold his own findings. An adjudicator
cannot later become the advocate of his own verdict.
33. This is not a case of a fanciful apprehension. The dual role is a
matter of record. A reasonable person, knowing these facts, would be
entitled to conclude that the Enquiry Officer had identified himself with
the management's cause. A reasonable person aware of relevant facts
would also be entitled to doubt that he approached the evidence with an
open mind. The test laid down in Ranjit Thakur and V.K. Khanna is
therefore satisfied.
34. Saran Motors and Dalmia Dadri Cement do not help the
appellant. Those decisions protect the employer's choice of a lawyer as
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Enquiry Officer. Neither of them dealt with an Enquiry Officer who later
turned counsel to defend his own enquiry and the punishment based on
it. That later conduct throws light back on the enquiry itself.
35. The situation brings to mind a well known Urdu couplet. It
captures the grievance of a litigant who finds the accuser and the judge
to be one.
मुद्दईभीवही , मुंसि फ़भीवही , शहरभीउसीका ;
मुझेयक़ीनथा , मेराक़सूरनिकलेगा।
36. The Labour Court, by its order dated 24.03.2015, held the enquiry
fair. It did not examine the effect of the Enquiry Officer appearing
before it as counsel for the management. That fact was before its own
eyes. It did not consider this glaring facts going to the root of the
fairness of the enquiry. Overlooking a circumstance of this kind is an
error apparent on the face of the record. It justified interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Once this foundational defect is found, a
point by point examination of the other findings of the Labour Court
becomes unnecessary. Question (a) is thus answered in favour of the
employee.
Absence of Objection and Abstention from Enquiry [Question
(b)]
37. The appellant says the employee never objected to the Enquiry
Officer. The doctrine of waiver, relied upon in U.D. Lama (supra) ,
presupposes knowledge of the facts constituting bias. The Enquiry
Officer's appearance as the management's counsel came only after the
enquiry was over. The employee could not have objected during the
enquiry to something that had not yet happened.
38. Even otherwise, the plea is not an afterthought. In her reply
dated 19/23.01.2009 to the show cause notice, she stated that she
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abstained because the proceedings were biased. The learned Single
Judge has also noted that she pleaded before the Labour Court that she
could not expect justice from an advocate who represented the
employer. The plea of waiver therefore fails.
39. The appellant next says she walked out of the enquiry and cannot
complain. Her conduct was not commendable. She was given repeated
opportunities and she let them pass. Ordinarily, an employee who
deliberately abstains cannot complain of denial of opportunity. But bias
is a different kind of defect. It does not concern the opportunity given to
the employee. It concerns the neutrality of the forum itself. Participation
by the employee would not have cured it. Her abstention therefore
cannot save the enquiry. Question (b) is accordingly answered. It may,
however, be relevant to the question of back wages. We deal with that
later in the succeeding part of the instant order, at the appropriate
place.
40. We may also note here that the employee also raised other
grievances. These relate to the Defence Assistant, the supply of
documents, the Presenting Officer deposing as a witness and the
absence of a date for defence evidence. Some of these were not raised
before the Labour Court. Whether an outsider could act as Defence
Assistant depends on the Certified Standing Orders, which the parties
read differently. Since the enquiry fails on the ground of bias, we do not
find it necessary to rule finally on these grievances. They are left open.
Alleged Victimization [Question (c)]
41. Here we find force in the appellant's submission. There were two
charge sheets and eight charges in all. Several of them relate to refusal
to receive official communications, shouting in the office, defiant
remarks to superiors and refusal to acknowledge letters. These charges
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do not depend on whether reviewing editions was part of an Artist's
duties.
42. The learned Single Judge examined essentially one charge,
namely the review of editions. On the strength of that, a sweeping
finding of victimisation was recorded. The enquiry report, the evidence,
the show cause replies and the removal order were not discussed. With
respect, a finding on the merits of all charges could not rest on an
examination of one.
43. There is also a deeper difficulty. Once the enquiry is held vitiated
by bias, the findings recorded in it go. But that does not mean the
charges stand disproved. Nor does it mean that the employee stands
exonerated. It only means that the charges have not yet been tested by
a neutral forum. The finding of victimisation, therefore, could not have
been recorded at this stage. Question (c) is thus answered in favour of
management.
RELIEF
44. When a domestic enquiry falls for a defect, the employer is not
left without remedy. Two routes are recognised in law. First, the
employer may prove the misconduct before the Labour Court on fresh
evidence, provided it asks for this at the proper stage. This was laid
11
down in Shankar Chakravarti v. Britannia Biscuit Co. Ltd. ,
12
Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda and Karnataka State
13
Road Transport Corporation v. Lakshmidevamma .
45. Second, where a punishment is set aside because of a defect in
the enquiry, the employer may hold a fresh enquiry from the stage at
which the defect crept in. The question of back wages, and of how the
intervening period is to be treated, then abides the result of that
11(1979) 3 SCC 371
12(1983) 4 SCC 491
13(2001) 5 SCC 433
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enquiry. This principle was laid down by the Constitution Bench in
14
Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar . Here, the defect lies in
the very choice of the Enquiry Officer. The fresh enquiry must therefore
begin from the stage of his appointment.
46. We now turn to reinstatement. Employee would now be about 60
years of age. Reinstatement is therefore no longer a practical relief.
What survives is the monetary consequence, mainly back wages for the
period from removal till superannuation.
47. Back wages do not follow automatically. In Deepali Gundu
Surwase (supra) , it was held that full back wages is the normal rule
when a termination is set aside. But the employee must at least assert
that she was not gainfully employed. The burden then shifts to the
employer to show otherwise. The adjudicating authority may also
consider the nature of the misconduct found proved and other relevant
factors. Hindustan Tin Works (supra) also recognises that back
wages may be moulded on the facts of each case.
48. In the present case, the charges of insubordination and
misbehaviour are serious and remain unadjudicated. It would not be
just to award full back wages without first finding out whether they are
true. Equally, it would not be just to deny her everything when her
removal rested on a biased enquiry. The employee did not plead in the
writ petition that she remained unemployed. The management, for its
part, has not shown that she was gainfully employed. These questions
have to be decided on evidence.
49. The learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly set aside the enquiry,
the removal order and the orders of the Labour Court. But the direction
for reinstatement with full back wages cannot be sustained. The just
14(1993) 4 SCC 727
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course is to allow the management to hold a fresh enquiry before a
neutral Enquiry Officer about gainful employment of the respondent
during relevant period. The question of back wages must abide the
result.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
50. The appeal is partly allowed. We direct as follows.
(i) The direction in the impugned order to reinstate the
employee with continuity of service and full back wages is
set aside and matter is remanded to the learned Labour
Court for the limited purpose of holding an inquiry regarding
the gainful employment of the respondent during the period
from removal from service till superannuation and
depending upon the result of such inquiry, pass an
appropriate fresh order, either way, qua the back wages.
(ii) Should a favourable order be passed by the Labour Court on
conclusion of the enquiry, the management shall then
decide the entitlement of the employee to back wages for
the period from 27.02.2009 till the date of her
superannuation. The amount of Rs.1,56,821.20 already paid
towards terminal benefits shall be adjusted.
51. The impugned judgment dated 20.12.2017 stands modified to the
above extent. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending applications,
if any, stand disposed of.
(ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J (ARUN MONGA),J
Crt_4/D/115/Anshul
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