Jaison Electronics vs Mujahid Baig

2026:MHC:4386
THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Order reserved on : 28.09.2026 Order pronounced on : 30.10.2026
CORAM

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI
CRP.No.1837 of 2026
& CMP.No.8259 of 2026
M/s.Jaison Electronics,
Represented by Kalapana R.P,
No.35/18, Wallers Road and
No.9A, Ritchie Street,
Chennai – 600 002. ..Petitioner
Vs.
1.Mujahid Baig
2.Shabeena Begum .. Respondents
Prayer : Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to
set aside the judgment and decree dated 11.02.2026 in RLTA.No.236 of 2023, on the file
of the learned VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, (VII Additional City Civil
Court), Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree dated 29.09.2023 in RLTOP.No.43
of 2023 on the file of the learned XV Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai, and
consequently dismiss the RLTOP.
For Petitioner : Mr.V.Raghavachari
Senior Counsel
for Mr.R.Venkata Varathan
For Respondents : Mr.T.Jayaramaraj
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ORDER
The unsuccessful tenant is the revision petitioner, challenging the concurrent order
of eviction passed by the Rent Court and confirmed by the Rent Tribunal.
2.I have heard Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Mr.R.Venkata Varathan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant and
Mr.T.Jayaramaraj, learned counsel for the respondents/landlords.
3.Brief ground facts are as hereunder:
The respondents, as landlords, filed RLTOP No.43 of 2023 before the Rent Court,
Chennai, alleging that they are entitled to recovery of possession on the grounds that
there has been a failure to enter into a tenancy agreement, as mandated under Section
21(2)(a) of TNRRRLT Act, (Act 42 of 2017) and also on the ground that the tenant has
committed default in payment of rent at Rs.89,000/- per month from October 2022
onwards. The tenant filed a counter-statement, objecting to the relief sought for by the
landlords, contending that the RLTOP itself was not maintainable and though under the
Act, a period of 575 days had been fixed for enabling the landlord and tenant to enter
into a tenancy agreement, steps were admittedly not taken on both sides, for entering
into a tenancy agreement, as contemplated under Section 4(2) of the Act. The tenant
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therefore contended that there is no failure to enter into a tenancy agreement, as alleged
by the landlords. It is the further contention of the tenant that the demand for monthly
rent at Rs.89,000/- is only fanciful and a unilateral enhanced monthly rent, and not the
last paid rent. Therefore, the tenant is not guilty of default in payment of rents. The Rent
Court, by order dated 29-09-2023, allowed the said RLTOP, on the ground of Section
21(2)(a) r/w Section 4(2) of the Act, whil dismissing the petition under Section 21(2)(b),
in and by which, the landlords had alleged default in payment of rents. In fact, it is
relevant to note at this juncture, that, on the side of the landlords, Ex.P1 to Ex.P7 were
marked and on the side of the tenant, Ex.R1 to Ex.R14 were marked. However, no oral
evidence was adduced on both sides.
4.Aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenant preferred RLTA.No.236 of 2023
before the Rent Tribunal. The Rent Tribunal, after considering the arguments advanced
by either side, in and by a judgment dated 11.02.2026, confirmed the order of eviction
passed by the Rent Court. It is as against the said concurrent findings that the present
revision petition has been filed.
5.Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner
would firstly contend that merely because jural relationship of landlord and tenant is
admitted by the tenant, the landlord cannot take advantage of such fair admission in
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order to slap an eviction petition alleging that there has been a failure to enter into a
tenancy agreement, as mandated under Section 21(2)(a) of the Act 42 of 2017. The
learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the contractual rent that was being
paid at the commencement of the new Act has been duly paid, month on month, without
any default and therefore, the question of alleging default in payment of rent does not
arise for consideration and rightly the Rent Court dismissed the application, on the
ground of default in payment of rent, as against which, the landlords themselves did not
deem it fit to prefer an appeal, challenging the dismissal of the eviction petition on the
ground of default in payment of rents.
6.It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that though the landlords
issued a notice on 19-10-2022, calling upon the petitioner to enter into a written tenancy
agreement at a fanciful rent of Rs.89,000/- per month or alternatively vacate the tenanted
premises within a period of one month, the petitioner had duly sent a reply on 11-11-
2022, contending that the demand of the landlords to enter into a written tenancy
agreement had lapsed by efflux of time, since the Act contemplates an agreement to be
entered into within a period of 575 days and therefore, falling back on the ratio laid
down by this Court in S.Muruganandam Vs. J.Joseph , reported in 2022 (2) CTC 291 , it
is contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the only recourse open
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to the landlords was to move the competent Civil Court and the application filed under
the newly introduced legislation was not even maintainable.
7.The recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Division Bench of Madurai Bench of
this Court in Hemalatha Vs. Jeevanantham and others , reported in 2026 (4) CTC 39, is
also relied upon. The learned Senior Counsel taking me through various observations
and findings of the Hon’ble Division Bench, would fortify his arguments, contending
that the Division Bench had clearly expounded the legal position that the eviction
petition filed under Section 21(2)(a), after lapse of 575 days, was not maintainable and
that a cause of action could not be alleged by the landlords to have arisen once 575 days
contemplated under the Act comes to an end. It is also contended by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that even though the Division Bench held its decision to be
prospective, relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.V.George and
others Vs. State of Kerala and others , reported in (2007) 3 SCC 557 and State of
Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Nurpur Private Bus Operators’ Union and others ,
reported in (1999) 9 SCC 559 , the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the
doctrine of prospective overruling is permissible only under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India and in other words, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court alone can
invoke and given effect to it and not the High Courts.
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8.The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would also bring to my notice the
divergent views taken by this Court in Dilip Solanki Vs. Kiran Kumar , reported in 2023
(4) CTC 705, where the learned Single Judge of this Court had referred the matter to a
Division Bench to be constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, with particular reference
to the interpretation of Section 4(2) r/w Section 21(2)(a) of the Act. The question that
was in fact formulated by this Court for reference to be answered by the Division Bench
was as to whether Section 21(2)(a) r/w Section 4(2) can be interpreted in a manner that
irrespective of who is responsible for non execution of a tenancy agreement, an eviction
application can be filed, invoking Section 21(2)(a) of the Act.
9.It is also brought to my notice that the very same matter, subsequent to the
reference to the Division Bench, was listed before another learned Single Judge of this
Court, who by order dated 24.06.2025, held that though the revision petition was
directed to be tagged along with a batch of writ petitions in W.P.No.3985 of 2020 etc.,
challenging the constitutional validity of the Act, the revision petition was de-tagged
from the batch and the writ petitions were separately disposed of by a very detailed
order dated 23-04-2024, in and by which, the constitutional validity of the Act was
upheld. In fact, this Court also relied on the decisions of this Court in Habeeb Hardware
Vs. Noor Hardware , reported in 2025 (1) CTC 241 and Babitha Devi Vs. Rajendra
Kumar , reported in 2025 SCC Online (Mad) 77, held that the issue which was referred to
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the Division Bench had already been answered, yet respecting the order of reference to
the Division Bench, gave liberty to the counsel appearing on either side to move the
Hon’ble Division Bench for necessary clarification. Relying on the said orders, learned
Senior Counsel would contend that necessarily the order directing the dispute to be
resolved by the Division Bench, has to be placed before the Division Bench and a clarity
should be obtained and without the reference being answered, the present revision
petition cannot be decided either way since the very same issue falls for consideration in
the said revision petition as well.
10.Further, in any event, once I concur with their argument that the High Court
does not have the power of prospective overruling, then the decision of the Division
Bench in Hemalatha’s case would apply retrospectively and therefore, the stand taken by
the petitioner that after expiry of 575 days, the landlords cannot allege a failure to enter
into a tenancy agreement, would stand vindicated. It is therefore prayed on the side of
the petitioner that the revision petition is to be allowed or at least the matter may be
tagged along with Dilip Solanki’s case , so that a quietus is given by the Hon’ble
Division Bench.
11.Per contra, Mr.T.Jayarajraj, learned counsel for the respondents would contend
that the very cause of action for alleging failure to enter into a tenancy agreement can
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arise only after the expiry of 575 days, within which period of time, the parties should
enter into a tenancy agreement, as contemplated under Section 4(2) of the Act. He would
therefore state that the Rent Court and the Rent Tribunal have rightly found that there
has been a failure to enter into a tenancy agreement and the reason for such failure being
irrelevant, there is absolutely no bar for the Rent Court to order eviction. He would also
contend that the Division Bench has made it clear that the decision would not affect
pending proceedings or proceedings where eviction has been ordered on the ground of
failure to enter into a tenancy agreement and the matter is pending either in appeal or in
revision.
12.He would also rely on a recent decision rendered by me in M/s.Ven Ponn Shoes
Private Limited Vs. M/s.Balaji Bhavan and others in CRP.No.956 of 2025 dated
31.08.2026 , where I specifically dealt with the issue of maintainability of an eviction
petition before the expiry of 575 days. I also referred to the recent decision in
Hemalatha’s case , as well as the divergent views in Ramesh Salunke Vs. Pramila Jain,
reported in 2022 (1) CTC OL 994 , Lalith Kumar Vs. Pramila Jain , reported in 2022 (2)
MWN (Civil) 516 and Top Kapi Vs. S.Sarath Babu , in CRP.No.445 of 2023 dated
06.04.2023 , which were also dealt with in Habeeb Hardware’s case . In fact, I had also
relied on the view taken by me in R.Mangilal Ranka and others Vs. S.Shohan Singh ,
reported in 2026 (1) MWN (Civil) 241 as well, where irrespective of the fact that the
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tenant was ready to enter into an agreement and even if the landlord is evading to clinch
a written tenancy agreement, even then when ultimately there has been a failure to enter
into a tenancy agreement, as mandated under Section 4(2) of the Act, then the landlord is
entitled to invoke Section 21(2)(a) of the Act.
13.In fact, the decision of the yet another Single Judge in CRP.No.1891 of 2025,
again, taking a similar view that Section 21(2)(a) can be maintained, irrespective of
whether the tenant was willing and the landlord was not willing, came to be affirmed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.Ganesh Vs. S.Balaji in SLP (Civil) Nos.17295 to 17296
of 2025 dated 04.07.2025 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly approved the view of
the learned Single Judge of this Court in CRP.No.1891 of 2025, holding that since the
last rental agreement had expired prior to the commencement of the new Rent Act, no
objection can be taken to the maintainability of the landlords’ petition under Section
21(2)(a) of the Act. In fact, yet another Division Bench in S.R.Venkatesh Vs. Union of
India , in W.P.No.26344 of 2022 dated 30.09.2022 , upheld the constitutional validity of
the proviso appended to Section 4(2) r/w Section 21(2)(a) of the Act. Unfortunately, the
said Division Bench judgment was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench in
Hemalatha’s case as well. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sundeep Kumar Bafna Vs. State of Maharashtra and another , reported
in AIR 2014 SC 1745 , I held that the view in Hemalatha’s case being in direct conflict
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with the decision in S.R.Venkatesh’s case , cannot be a binding precedent. Moreover, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, by a speaking order in V.Ganesh’s case , confirmed the order of
eviction passed concurrently up to this Court in CRP.No.1891 of 2025, on the ground
that there has been a failure to enter into a tenancy agreement, clearly holding that an
eviction petition under Section 21(2)(a) is maintainable.
14.Though I am in entire agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned
Senior Counsel, Mr.V.Raghavachari, relying on two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court that the High Court cannot apply or invoke the doctrine of prospective overruling,
which is available only to the Hon’ble Supreme Court, even then, when this Court has
already held the Division Bench judgment in Hemalatha’s case to be per incuriam in
Neelavathi Vs. Arockia Francina in CRP.(MD).No.1357 of 2026 dated 12.06.2026, as
well as in L.Mohamed Ibrahim Sait and another Vs. Aboobacker Shamsudheen and
another in CRP.No.4791 of 2026 dated 12.08.2026 , I am unable to countenance the
submissions of the learned Senior Counsel in this regard and apply the ratio laid down
by the Division Bench in Hemalatha’s case .
15.As far as the reference to the Division Bench, by a learned Single Judge of this
Court by order dated 30.06.2023 in CRP.NPD.No.941 of 2023, though the said revision
was initially tagged along with the writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity
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and vires of the rent legislation, Act 42 of 2017, subsequently, the same has been de-
tagged from the batch and thereafter, it has been posted before the another Single Judge
and out of sheer judicial propriety and respect, this Court did not pass any final orders,
even though this Court found that the issue which was placed for reference was no
longer res integra , in view of several other subsequent decisions of this Court. In the
light of the above, I am unable to also countenance the arguments of the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that this matter will have to be posted along with Dilip
Solanki’s case , with a direction to the Division Bench to decide the issue, since there is
conflicting opinion with regard to the applicability of Section 21(2)(a). At the risk of
reiteration, there is no conflict with regard to the applicability of Section 21(2)(a) for
more than one reason. Firstly, as held by me in M/s.Ven Ponn Shoes Private Limited’s
case , the Act provided a period of 90 days initially for the parties to enter into a tenancy
agreement as required under Section 4(2) of the Act. The said period was later
substituted to 275 days and thereafter substituted with 575 days. Therefore, even on a
plain reading of the statute, the cause of action for alleging failure can arise only after
the expiry of 575 days. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner that Section 21(2)(a) cannot be invoked after the expiry
of the period of 575 days. Secondly, the law is now fairly well settled by a catena of
decisions which I have dealt with in M/s.Ven Ponn Shoes case as well and the consistent
view taken by this Court with regard to the maintainability of an eviction petition under
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Section 21(2)(a), which has also been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
V.Ganesh’s case . In the light of the above, I do not see any merit in the revision petition.
The revision petition fails.
16.In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The petitioner is directed to
vacate and hand over vacant possession by 31.12.2026. No costs. Connected Civil
Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
30.10.2026
Neutral Citation Case : Yes / No
Speaking / Non-speaking order
Index : Yes/No
ata
To
1.The VII Additional District and Sessions Judge, (VII Additional City Civil Court),
Chennai.
2.The XV Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai.
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P.B.BALAJI. J,
ata
Pre-delivery order made in
CRP.No.1837 of 2026
30.10.2026
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