Kulwant Singh vs State Of Pb.Etc.

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

CRR-2045-2002 (O&M)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH

127 CRR-2045-2002 (O&M)
Decided on : 19.11.2026

Kulwant Singh

..... Petitioner

VERSUS
State of Punjab

..... Respondent

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA PARTAP SINGH

Present : Mr. Bhavyadeep Walia, Advocate for the petitioner.
(joined through VC)

Mr. I.P.S. Sabharwal, DAG, Punjab.



*
SURYA PARTAP SINGH , J.


For the commission of offence punishable under Sections
279/304-A/427 of Indian Penal Code, one FIR, i.e. FIR No.49 dated
15.03.1997 was lodged in Police Station Civil Lines Patiala. Once the FIR
was lodged, the investigation was taken up by the police. On completion of
investigation, the petitioner was sent to the Court of learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class Patiala, hereinafter being referred to as ‘trial Court’,
to face trial for the commission of abovementioned offence.
2. The petitioner participated in the abovementioned trial, which
by virtue of judgment dated 14.05.2001, culminated into his conviction.
Thus, by virtue of order of the even date, i.e. 14.05.2001, on the point of
quantum of sentence, following sentences were awarded to the petitioner:-
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Offence under
Sentence
Sections
279 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months
304-A IPC Rigorous imprisonment for a period of nine months

The fine of Rs.1,000/- was also imposed upon the petitioner,
out of which a sum of Rs.200/- each was ordered to be paid to the family of
all three deceased/ victims. Both the sentences were ordered to run

concurrently.
3. Aggrieved of the abovementioned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence, the petitioner preferred an appeal in the Court of Sessions.
The abovementioned appeal has been decided by the Court of learned
Additional Sessions Judge Patiala, hereinafter being referred to as ‘Appellate
Court’ only. The appeal preferred by the petitioner did not find favour in the
Court of appeal, i.e. Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, and the
same was dismissed by virtue of judgment dated 11.09.2002, hereinafter
being referred to as ‘impugned judgment’ only.
4. Feeling aggrieved of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 14.05.2001, passed by the learned trial Court, and also of the
judgment dated 11.09.2002, passed by the learned Appellate Court, the
present revision petition has been preferred by the petitioner/convict.
5. In nut-shell, the facts emerging from record are that the FIR of
this case came into being at the instance of ‘HC Balwant Singh’, hereinafter
being referred to as ‘complainant’ only. It was stated by the above-named
complainant that on 15.03.1997 at about 07:00 pm, when he was manning a
picket near Green Park Colony, Sirhind Road, a truck bearing registration
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No.PB11-D-2495, driven rashly and negligently by ‘Kulwant Singh’ (the
petitioner herein), came from ‘Dukhniwaran Gurudwara Sahib’ side and hit
scooters No.PCP-7797 and No.PB-11-8477. According to above-named
complainant, the abovementioned truck also overturned, causing all three
persons to suffer injuries, despite crane service being pressed into service.
6. It was a case of the prosecution that on the basis of
abovementioned information, formal FIR of this case was lodged and the
investigation taken up. According to prosecution, during the course of
investigation, the Investigating Officer arrested the petitioner, inspected the
spot, prepared rough site plan of the place of occurrence, recorded the
statement of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC, and completed other
formalities of investigation. Thereafter, the final report under Section 173 of
CrPC was filed.
Heard.
8. It has been contended on behalf of petitioner that the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence, passed by the learned trial Court and the
impugned judgment, passed by the learned Appellate Court, were perverse
and unsustainable. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, merely
on the basis of assumptions and presumptions, the unreliable and self-
contradictory evidence adduced by the prosecution was believed by the
learned trial Court as well as learned Appellate Court. As per learned
counsel for the petitioner , the learned trial Court failed to apply its judicial
mind to the facts of the case, and merely, on the basis of conjectures and
surmises, the finding of conviction of petitioner, for the commission of
offence under Section 279/304-A of IPC, was recorded.
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9. It has been further contended on behalf of petitioner that the
learned trial Court ignored this cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence
that the prosecution had to prove its case beyond the shadow of all
reasonable doubts. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution was grossly inadequate to draw an
inference that all the essential ingredients, meant for the commission of
offence, for which the petitioner was convicted, had been proved. In view of
above, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the case
against the petitioner was not proved by the prosecution, but erroneously the
learned trial Court returned the finding of conviction.
10. However, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel
for the petitioner has contended that in the instant petition, the petitioner is
not inclined to challenge the finding of conviction recorded by the learned
trial Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has categorically
contended that at this stage, by virtue of present petition, the petitioner is
challenging the order on the point of quantum of sentence only.
11. It has been further contended by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the incident had taken place way back in the year 1997
According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner is facing the
agony of litigation for the last more than 28 years and has, in fact, already
suffered more punishment than he deserved. The learned counsel for the
petitioner has further contended that in the present case, the sentence of nine
months was awarded to the petitioner. As per learned counsel for the
petitioner, with regard to abovementioned conviction, it is relevant to note
here that the petitioner was not a previous convict and even after the
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abovementioned offence, he did not indulge in any kind of criminal activity.
In view of above, the learned counsel for the petitioner has requested that the
petitioner may be accorded the benefit of probation/admonition.
12. Per contra , the learned counsel for the respondent/State has
argued that the petitioner was found guilty for the commission of offence
punishable under Section 279/304-A of IPC. According to learned counsel
for the respondent/State, the sentence awarded to the petitioner, i.e.
imprisonment for a period of nine months, is already on lower side, and that
the petitioner is not entitled to a sentence, awarded to him. As per learned
counsel for the respondent/State, the instant petition has no merits and
deserves dismissal.
13. The record has been perused carefully.
14. Although it is categorical stand of the petitioner that he is not
challenging the judgment of conviction, passed by the learned trial Court,
yet, with a purpose to evaluate evidence, the record has been perused
carefully. A perusal of trial Court record shows that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution was thoroughly consistent, and good enough to bring home
guilt of the petitioner, for which he was charge-sheeted. Thus, it is hereby
held that there is no scope for interference or indulgence in the findings
recorded by the learned trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate
Court, with regard to conviction of petitioner, for the offence under Sections
279/304-A of IPC. Accordingly, the abovementioned finding is hereby
affirmed and qua the judgment of conviction instant petition is hereby
dismissed.
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15. If factual matrix of the present case is analyzed, it transpires
that following are the points which are required to be taken into
consideration: -
(a) that the incident in question had taken place about 28 years
ago;
(b) that the petitioner is facing the agony of protracted trial for
the last more than 28 years;
(c) that admittedly the petitioner at the time of commission of
alleged offence was the first offender;
(d) that the petitioner has no criminal history and in the last
more than 28 years, the appellant has not been prosecuted
for any other offence, whatsoever;
(e) that now age of the appellant is 62 year (approx.); and
(f) that the compensation has already been awarded by the
Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal

16. In a recently pronounced judgment, i.e. in Criminal Appeal
No.2133 of 2025 titled as ‘Sanjay Colaro V/s State of Karnataka’, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India gave the benefit of probation to the
accused, who was convicted for the commission of offence punishable under
Section 279/304-A of IPC.
16. In another case, i.e. ‘Mahadevanna D.M. V/s State of Karnatka
& Anr.’ 2026 INSC 504, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has given the
similar benefit to an accused against whom charge for the commission of
offence punishable under Sections 279/304-A of IPC was proved.
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17. Similar question has been dealt with by this Court in the case of
‘Lakshay Jain V/s State of Punjab & Anr.’ CRR-2697-2025. In the
abovementioned case, for the commission of offence punishable under
Sections 279/304-A of IPC, the petitioner (Lakshay Jain) was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. However, this
Court accorded the benefit of probation to the petitioner in that case.
18. Similarly in ‘Sardool Singh V/s State of Punjab’ CRR-1683-
2002, this Court accorded the benefit of probation to an accused, who had
faced charge for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 304-
A and 279 of IPC, and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period
of one year. The abovementioned benefit was given to the accused in the
abovementioned case by taking into consideration that he had already faced
the agony of trial for a period of 11 years.
19. The abovementioned principles of law squarely cover the
factual matrix of the present case. With regard to benefit of probation, the
relevant principles have been propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of ‘Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar’ (1972) 2 SCC
633. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while considering the scope of the
Probation Act has held as under: -
“ The Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in 1958 with a
view to provide for the release of offenders of certain
categories on probation or after due admonition and for
matters connected therewith. The object of the Act is to prevent
the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals as
a result of their association with hardened criminals of mature
age in case the youthful offenders are sentenced to undergo
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imprisonment in jail. The above object is in consonance with
the present trend in the field of penology, according to which
effort should be made to bring about correction and
reformation of the individual offenders and not to resort to
retributive justice. Modern criminal jurisprudence recognises
that no one is a born criminal and that a good many crimes are
the product of socioeconomic milieu. Although not much can be
done for hardened criminals, considerable stress has been laid
on bringing about reform of young offenders not guilty of very
serious offences and of preventing their association with
hardened criminals. The Act gives statutory recognition to the
above objective. It is, therefore, provided that youthful
offenders should not be sent to jail, except in certain
circumstances. Before, however, the benefit of the Act can be
invoked, it has to be shown that the convicted person even
though less than 21 years of age, is not guilty of an offence
punishable with imprisonment for life. This is clear from the
language of Section 6 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of that section
reads as under: -
“ When any person under twenty-one years of age is
found guilty of having committed an offence punishable
with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life),
the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not
sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that,
having regard to the circumstances of the case including
the nature of the offence and the character of the
offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under
Section 3 or Section 4, and if the Court passes any
sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record
its reasons for doing so.”
20. The similar question was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in a subsequent judgment, i.e. in the case of ‘Chellammal and
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Another v. State’ 2025 SCC Online SC 870. In the abovementioned case, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed as under: -
“ On consideration of the precedents and based on a
comparative study of Section 360, Cr. P.C. and subsection (1)
of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the
latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former.
Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender,
more twenty one years old, on probation when he is sentenced
to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of
the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in
any case where the offender is found to have committed an
offence such that he is punishable with any sentence other than
death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante
clause in subsection gives overriding effect to sub-section (1) of
Section 4 over any other law for the time being in force. Also, it
is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. P.C. itself, being a
subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision that in any case
where the court could have dealt with an accused under the
provisions of the Probation Act but has not done so, it shall
record in its judgment the special reasons therefor.
What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-section
(1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361, Cr. P.C.
is that if Section 360, Cr. P.C. were not applicable in a
particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the
Probation Act would not be attracted.
Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an
offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a
matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory
provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the several
decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of Section 4
of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is
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excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in
subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are attracted,
the court has no discretion to omit from its consideration
release of the offender on probation; on the contrary, a
mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider whether the
case before it warrants releasing the offender upon fulfillment
of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of probation
could be decided either way. In the event, the court in its
discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it may
upon considering the report of the probation officer impose
such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if the
answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper for
the court to record the reasons therefor.”
21. Following the precedents discussed above, and taking into
consideration the abovementioned factors, it is hereby observed that the ends
of justice would be better served, if the benefit of probation is accorded to
the petitioner and he is released on probation of good conduct. In my
considered opinion, in the given fact situation, instead of awarding sentence
to undergo imprisonment for the period fixed by the learned trial Court, it
shall be more appropriate that the petitioner is given the benefit of probation
of good behaviour, mandated under Section-360 of CrPC.
22. Accordingly, the instant petition is partly allowed with regard
to order on quantum of sentence and the same is hereby modified to the
extent that the petitioner shall be released on probation for a period of six
months on furnishing requisite bonds before the learned trial Court. The
petitioner shall undertake to keep peace and maintain good behaviour for a
period of six months. Obvious to say that in case of default with regard to
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terms & conditions of probation order, the petitioner shall receive sentence
as and when called upon to do so.
23. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.


(SURYA PARTAP SINGH)

JUDGE
19.11.2026
Gaurav Thakur


Whether speaking / reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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