Amit Kumar Jaiswal And Anohter vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others

A.F.R.
RESERVED
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 11615 of 2026
Amit Kumar Jaiswal and Anohter
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 3 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Anwar Hussain, Mohammad Alam
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Deepak Upadhyay, G.A., Paras
Dubey, Rajesh Kumar Singh
Court No. - 47
HON'BLE RAJIV GUPTA, J.
HON'BLE DR. AJAY KUMAR-II, J.
(Per : DR. AJAY KUMAR-II, J.)
1. The instant writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioners
seeks quashing of the first information report dated 17.04.2026,
registered as Case Crime No.253 of 2026, under Sections 316(5),
318(4) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (B.N.S.), 2023, Police Station
Kotwali, District Ghazipur.
2. As per the allegations made in the impugned first information
report, which was lodged by the respondent no.4, presently working
as Assistant Manager in Hitachi Payment Services Pvt.
Ltd.,Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Company') and has
been appointed by the Company to pursue the present matter, it is
averred that the said Company is a duly registered Organization,

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which has been authorized by the Reserved Bank of India to run /
operate the ATM (Automated Teller Machine). The Company
operates ATM / CRM (Cash Recycling Machines) machines across
the Country for various Banks under the name and style of  'Hitachi
Money Spot', through which banking facilities like cash deposit and
cash withdrawal are provided to the general public and ATM
cardholders. To fulfill this purpose, an agreement namely, 'Master
Franchisee Service Agreement' was executed on 12.08.2024,
08.01.2025 and 31.12.2025 between the Company and M/s. Asha
Enterprises having its Proprietor Amit Kumar Jaiswal (petitioner
no.1), son of Shri Awadhesh Kumar Jaiswal, resident of 9, Ward
Number 6, Holika Mahal, Dildarnagar, District Ghazipur, Uttar
Pradesh - 232326 (Office: 36, Ward Number 6, DL Road,
Dildarnagar, Ghazipur). In January, 2025, police verification of
Amit Kumar Jaiswal has been requested by the Company and the
verification report was found negative. On the basis of said negative
report, the Company desired to end their relation with aforesaid
Amit Kumar Jaiswal. Albeit, a special request has been made by
Amit Kumar Jaiswal to transfer all the existing ATM sites in the
name of his son Harsh Raj (petitioner no.2) and in support thereof,
he presented an affidavit confirming the change in the name of
master franchise and also requested for mapping of the on-boarding
security deposit amount earlier deposited, in favour of Harsh Raj.
After considering the aforesaid request and documents presented by
Amit Kumar Singh, on 21.04.2025, the Company executed Master
Franchise Agreement with Harsh Raj and thereafter on 22.04.2025,
the Company terminated the Master Franchise Agreement with
Amit Kumar Jaiswal executed on 31.12.2024 with the condition that
inspite of termination of the said agreement, the Company reserves
the right to recover its entire amount, due amount, compensation,
damages and losses. In this way, under the said agreement, two
ATM Machines were installed at Ghazipur. It was proposed by Amit

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Kumar Jaiswal to the Company that his subordinate employee
Vishwajeet Raj son of Shri Santosh Kumar (Aadhar Number: 7729-
7279-9793), be authorized by the Company to perform 'Axis Indent'
withdrawals. Therefore, at the request of Amit Kumar Jaiswal, the
Company authorized Vishwajeet Raj to withdraw funds via Axis
Indent. The Company issued Indent to Amit Kumar Jaiswal, Harsh
Raj and Vishwajeet Raj to operate the aforesaid ATMs through
Hitachi's Account number 910020009415214 via Axis Bank,
Ghazipur Branch. In addition to this, payment was also made
through Union Bank of India Account number 441501010250763,
IFSC: UBIN0544159, held by account holder Asha Enterprises.
After reviewing and examining the ATM switch data, it has come
out that an amount of Rs. 43,37,600/- (Rupees Fourty Three Lakhs
Thirty Seven Thousand Six Hundred) was less loaded into the
aforesaid ATM by Amit Kumar Jaiswal, Harsh Raj and Vishwajeet
Raj. Despite repeated requests made by the Company, on
18.11.2025, only an amount of Rs.8,09,700/- and on 19.11.2025, an
amount of Rs.4,32,200/- were deposited by Amit Kumar Jaiswal,
Harsh Raj and Vishwajeet Raj. In this way the remaining amount of
Rs.30,95,700/- (Thirty Lakhs Ninety Five Thousand Seven
Hundred) has not been returned to the Company despite repeated
requests. Despite this, Amit Kumar Jaiswal, Harsh Raj and
Vishwajeet Raj kept providing wrong information and misleading
the Company regarding the cash loading and they tried to
show/convince that the entire amount was loaded into the ATM.
This act has not only caused financial loss to the Company but has
also caused inconvenience to the general public due to the
disruption of ATM services. In the relevant terms and conditions of
the aforementioned agreement, especially in Clause 1, Sub-clause
(n) of the agreement, responsibilities regarding cash management
and security were clearly defined for Amit Kumar Jaiswal and
Harsh Raj. Under the present agreement, amongst other things

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agreed by and between the Parties hereto, the Master Franchise
Agent shall (i) act as the custodian of the ATM/CRM and other
related assets installed in the said Premises; (ii) be the trustee of the
physical cash amount lying at the ATM/CRM vault and will provide
necessary security to the cash to prevent any kind of incidents like
robbery or theft; (iii) keep and maintain the said Premises at all time
in clean, hygienic and good condition (iv) withdraw the cash
amount as per the requirement, which shall be determined by the
Company from time to time, from the designated bank A/c (a
Designated Bank A/c is an A/c opened up by the Master Franchise
Agent in his individual name at a local branch exclusively used for
the purpose of withdrawing cash to replenish into the ATM/CRM
and this designated Bank A/c shall not be utilized for his/her other
personal use including but not limited to deposit, transfer or
withdrawn of amount for his personal use) (v) the amount
withdrawn from the Designated bank A/c shall be replenished into
the ATM/CRM machine installed in the said Premises to enable the
cardholders to withdraw the cash; (vi) at no point of time remove
the cash amount from the ATM/CRM and misappropriate the same
for his/her personal use; (vii) ensure that the camera installed in the
said Premises is functioning properly and if the camera is found to
be defective, then the Master Franchise Agent should immediately
inform the Company; (viii) to assist the Company's representative to
carry out required First Level Maintenance (FLM) or Second Level
Maintenance (SLM) services in the said Premises; and (ix) such
other activities as may be informed by the Company from time to
time. According to Clause 1, Sub-clause (o) of the agreement, The
Master Franchise Agent shall, under no circumstances, use any cash
amount or intermingle funds, from his / her own source or from any
third-party source without approval of the Company in writing for
the purpose of replenishment. The Master Franchise Agent will use
the currency notes withdrawn from the Designated Bank A/c only

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for replenishing it into the ATM/CRM. The Master Franchise Agent
hereby agrees and aware that if he / she utilizes the currency notes
from sources other than the one withdrawn from the Designated
Bank A/c, then it will be considered as a material breach of this
Agreement and the Master Franchise Agent shall be solely liable
and responsible for the consequences arising therefrom. In such
case, the Company shall be entitled to forthwith terminate this
Agreement and forfeit the security deposit amount maintained with
the Company without any intimation to the Master Franchise Agent.
Clear instructions of the Company were that if for any reason the
cash amount could not be loaded into the ATM, then it would be
mandatory to return it to the Company. However, Amit Kumar
Jaiswal, Harsh Raj and Vishwajeet Raj, deliberately did not return
the remaining amount to the Company and misled the Company by
giving false information. After the ATM switch data was updated,
fraud was detected, and despite several requests for the return of the
amount being made in writing and verbally, neither was the money
returned, nor was any satisfactory clarification provided by them to
the Company. In this way, Amit Kumar Jaiswal, Harsh Raj and
Vishwajeet Raj, while acting in the capacity of a banking agent,
have embezzled the Company's funds under a pre-planned
conspiracy, which falls under the category of a punishable offence.
The complainant (respondent no.4) had submitted an application
regarding the above to the Police Station Kotwali on 24.01.2026,
but the Kotwali Police have neither taken any action till date nor
have they registered the complainant's case, due to which this
application is being moved. Request has been made to register the
case against Amit Kumar Jaiswal, his son Harsh Raj and Vishwajeet
Raj and initiate legal proceedings.

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3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned AGA for the
State, Shri Deepak Upadhyay alongwith Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent no.4 and perused the record.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the present
first information report was lodged on 17.04.2026, by the
respondent no.4 giving rise to Case Crime No.253 of 2026, under
Sections 316(5), 318(4) of B.N.S., 2023 for alleged
misappropriation of Rs.30,95,700/-. A bare reading of the present
first information report clearly demonstrates that the dispute / entire
allegation arises out of ATM cash loading, withdrawal and
reconciliation under commercial agreements dated 12.08.2024,
08.01.2025 and 31.12.2025 executed between the parties.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the
aforesaid agreements specifically contain a clause regarding
arbitration. The said arbitration clause clearly establishes that any
dispute that arises under the aforesaid agreements shall be attempted
to settle through negotiation and mutual agreement and if it could
not be settled through such negotiation and mutual agreement, then
it shall be finally settled by sole Arbitrator, which shall be appointed
by the informant Company. The award of the Arbitrator shall be
final and binding between the parties. A bare perusal of the first
information report reveals that the dispute is based upon internal
reconciliation of ATM cash and alleged outstanding amount, which
squarely falls within the scope of dispute contemplated under the
aforesaid arbitration clause. Therefore, the dispute between the
parties is purely contractual and arbitral in nature. However, the
respondent no.4 has deliberately bypassed the agreed arbitral
mechanism and had resorted to criminal proceedings in order to
exert pressure upon the petitioners for recovery of alleged due
amount, which is impermissible in law. Earlier, the petitioner no.1

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had already moved an application under Section 173(4) B.N.S.S.
against the respondent no.4 and other persons, which is still
pending.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that on
receipt of show cause notice cum demand notice dated 06.01.2026,
the petitioner no.2 had given a legal notice on 13.01.2026 and had
also replied on 21.01.2026 to the show cause notice cum demand
notice specifically denying any breach of trust as alleged in
the show cause notice cum demand notice dated 06.01.2026, but on
09.02.2026, the informant Company had terminated the aforesaid
agreements executed between the parties and had also forfeited the
security deposit.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that the
entire allegations, even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the
essential ingredients of offence under Sections 316(5), 318(4) of
B.N.S., as the dispute is purely civil in nature arising out of
contractual obligations and thus no criminal proceedings could have
been instituted as a substitute for civil remedies. Even otherwise the
responding no.4 has lodged multiple F.I.R.s on the same cause of
action, which is impermissible in view of the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala &
Others, 2001 (6) SCC 181 and Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat &
Others, 2010 (12) SCC 254.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the
impugned first information report has been lodged with malafide
intention and ulterior motive and it is a classic example of abuse of
criminal machinery for settling civil dispute and continuation of the
impugned criminal proceedings would result in miscarriage of
justice and irreparable injury to the petitioners.

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9. It was lastly argued that the present proceedings are liable to
be quashed in view of the settled law that where a dispute is
predominantly civil in nature with no element of criminality, the
same cannot be allowed to continue as criminal case. 
10. Per contra, learned A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for the
respondent no.4 vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing of the
F.I.R. as well as the submissions made by learned counsel for the
petitioners and submitted that in the present case, the act of the
petitioners has not only caused financial loss to the Company but
has also caused inconvenience to the general public owing to the
disruption of ATM services. They have embezzled the Company's
funds by hatching conspiracy. Neither the embezzled money was
returned nor any plausible explanation for the same was given by
the petitioners. In this way, the petitioners have siphoned off the
money meant for ATM cash replenishment by keeping the Company
in dark. The petitioners were entrusted with collecting cash from the
Bank and depositing it into ATM. However, instead of loading the
cash, they pocketed the money.
11. Learned A.G.A. as well as learned counsel for the respondent
no.4 next submitted that from the allegations made in the impugned
first information report, involvement of the petitioners is writ large
on the face of it and prima facie, offence is clearly disclosed against
the petitioners and the matter requires deep probe and thorough
investigation.
12. Lastly, they submitted that from the allegations made in the
first information report, prima facie offence, complained of, is
clearly disclosed against the petitioner and, as such, the first
information report cannot be quashed in view of the law laid down
by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Telangana vs. Habib
Abdullah Jellani reported in (2017) 2 SCC 779, Neeharika

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Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported
in (2021) SCC Online SC 315 and in a recent decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2024) 5 SCC 419, Directorate of
Enforcement Vs. Niraj Tyagi and others.
13. Having considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties, we have carefully perused the allegations
made in impugned first information report as well as the documents
annexed with the petition in regard to the aforesaid agreements.
14. A bare perusal of the first information report clearly reveals
that the petitioner no.1 firstly executed an agreement namely,
'Polaris Model Master Franchisee Service Agreement' with the
Company. When police verification of petitioner no.1 was found
negative, then on his request through an affidavit, fresh Master
Franchise Service Agreement was executed by the Company with
the son of petitioner no.1 i.e. petitioner no.2 on 21.04.2025, while
terminating earlier agreement with petitioner no.1. The Company
reserved their right of recovery, compensation, damages and losses
against petitioner no.1. Thus, it is crystal clear that petitioner no.2
was working as an Agent of Hitachi Payment Services Pvt. Ltd. in
view of agreement dated 21.04.2025. As per Clause 1 (n) of the
agreement, petitioner no.1 was the custodian of the ATM/CRM and
was also trustee of the physical cash amount lying at the ATM/CRM
vault. There is a clear stipulation in the agreement that the cash
amount withdrawn from the local Branch was to be replenished into
the ATM/CRM. It was also clearly stipulated that the cash amount
so withdrawn for this purpose shall not be utilized for his other
personal use. It was also clearly stipulated that at no point of time,
the petitioner shall remove the cash amount from the ATM/CRM
and misappropriate the same for his personal use. Thus, the
petitioner no.2 was duty bound to act strictly in accordance with the

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terms and conditions of the agreement. At no point of time, he was
authorized to withdraw the cash amount from the concerned Branch
for his own personal utilization instead of replenishing the whole
such withdrawn cash into the designated ATM/CRM.
15. The roles of petitioners no.1 and 2 are also clearly specified in
the first information report. Vishwajeet Raj was authorized to
receive cash amount from the authorized Bank by issuing an indent
on the instructions of petitioner no.2. There is a clear averment that
an amount of Rs.43,37,600/- was less loaded in the designated
ATM/CRM, causing a loss to the Company, and resultantly an
unlawful gain to the petitioners. However, amounts of Rs.8,09,700/-
and Rs.4,32,200/- were deposited by the petitioners on 18.11.2025
and 19.11.2025. Thus, an amount of Rs.30,95,700/- was not
returned and was accordingly misappropriated. Deposit of aforesaid
amounts are also prima facie indicative of temporary embezzlement.
The misappropriation of money amounting to Rs.30,95,700/- was
done by the petitioners while working as an Agent of Hitachi
Payment Services Pvt. Ltd., violating the terms and conditions of
the agreement. The aforesaid act is prima facie an offence, covered
under Sections 316(5) of B.N.S., 2023.
16. From the facts stated in the first information report, it is
apparent that the Company and ATM cardholders were deprived of
an amount of Rs.30,95,700/-, which resulted into causing wrongful
loss to the Company and was a wrongful gain to the petitioners. By
committing wrongful fraudulent act and violating the terms and
conditions of the agreement, the petitioners embezzled and
misappropriated an amount of Rs.30,95,700/- of the Company.
Thus, there seems to be necessary mens rea in the present case as
far as petitioners are concerned. Law is well settled that the same set
of facts can give rise both to civil liability and a criminal

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prosecution if the facts constitute a mens rea. If there is no mens rea
or if the other essential ingredients of an offence are lacking in such
facts, only then the same facts may not sustain a criminal
prosecution, though a civil action may lie.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Kathyayini Vs. Sidharth P.S.
Reddy & Ors., 2025 INSC 818, has clearly held that there is no bar
against prosecution during the pendency of a civil suit if the
offences punishable under criminal law are made out against the
parties. The Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly observed by relying on
its previous judgment in K. Jagadish Vs. Udaya Kumar G.S. and
another, (2020) 14 SCC 552 that it is well settled that in certain
cases the very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as
well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed
by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the
proceedings in criminal law. The other relevant paragraphs 20 and
21 of the Kathyayini (supra) case are reproduced here-in-below.
20. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, (1985) 2 SCC 370,
this Court summed up the distinction between the two remedies as under :
“21. … There are a large number of cases where criminal law and
civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive
but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and
consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who
commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the
accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some
cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all
for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an
anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal
prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite
different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to
take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan
property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution
under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC
nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman
is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as
no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.”
21. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamaladevi Agarwal v.
State of W.B. and others, (2002) 1 SCC 555,

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“17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are
satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings
initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not
impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High
Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case
either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be
proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the
Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a
different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a
basis for quashing of the proceedings.”
18. The Apex Court in Punit Beriwala V. The State of NCT of
Delhi and Ors. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 reiterating the same in
para 28 has held thus:
“28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground
for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute.
This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a
remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the
Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of
criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the
court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed
during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the
complaint did not warrant a further investigation and if necessary, a trial.”
19. Thus, law has been well settled that pendency of civil
proceedings or availability of civil remedies on the same subject
matter involving the same parties is no justification to quash the
criminal proceedings if a prima facie case exists against the accused
persons.
20. It is no doubt true that an arbitration clause [clause 20 (e)]
exists in the present case and binds parties to seek adjudication of
their disputes, before an Arbitrator. The mere existence of an
arbitration clause cannot prevent criminal prosecution against the
petitioners, if an act constituting a criminal offence is made out even
prima facie. As already held hereinbefore, a given set of facts may
give rise to both civil and/or criminal consequences. The existence
of one would not necessarily rule out the other. An arbitration clause
enables parties to seek adjudication of the civil consequences of the
violation of a contract. An arbitration clause does not envisages

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adjudication of criminal consequences of an alleged breach of
contract. The Arbitrator, would obviously adjudicate the civil
consequences of the violation of the the contract and if this violation
leads to the commission of a criminal offence, the Arbitrator would
have no jurisdiction to investigate or launch prosecution, in respect
thereof. The criminal prosecution and remedy by way of arbitration
are two separate and distinct courses available to an aggrieved party.
The mere existence of an arbitration clause or even the pendency of
arbitration proceedings or availability of civil remedies would, in
our considered opinion, not oust the jurisdiction of criminal Courts,
to consider whether on the facts narrated in the FIR, a criminal
offence has been committed.
21. The conclusion that the existence of an arbitration clause is
not a bar to the initiation of criminal proceedings is fortified by a
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical
Industry v. Rajesh Aggarwal, 1994(4) RCR (Crl.) 223 (SC)(supra)."
In Trisuns Chemical 's case (supra), it was held as under:-
"We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the provision incorporated
in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective
substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence.
Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party affected by breach
of the agreement but the arbitrator cannot conduct a trial of any act which
amounted to an offence albeit the same act may be connected with the
discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence, those are not good
reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint at the threshold
itself. The investigating agency should have had the freedom to go into the
whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its own. Pre-
emption of such investigation would be justified only in very extreme cases
as indicated in Bhajan Lal v. State of Haryana."
22. The Apex Court in Digambar Pathak V. State of UP SLP (Cr.)
No. 7341 of 2025 in para 8 has again observed as under:
“8. In such circumstances, before taking a decision to quash the
proceedings arising from FIR, it was incumbent upon the High Court,
exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, to advert to the allegations and the materials collected during the
course of investigation so as to find out whether a prima facie case is made
out or not to proceed against the accused. The High Court quashed the
proceedings on the singular ground that there is an arbitration agreement

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between the parties where they can resolve their differences amicably. It is
well-settled that mere existence of an arbitration clause in the contract
between the parties is not a sufficient ground for quashing the criminal
proceedings if the necessary ingredients of a criminal offence are made out
from the allegations and the materials collected during the course of
investigation or inquiry.[Trisuns Chemical Industry V. Rajesh Agarwal &
Others (1999) 8 SCC 686]”
23. While reverting back to the facts of present case, it is clear
that it is a case where the Company has suffered a wrongful loss of
Rs.30,95,700/-, therefore, in this situation, the aforesaid Company
has a right to institute civil proceedings for the recovery of aforesaid
amount. However, the Company is also at liberty to invoke
arbitration clause for recovering the aforesaid amount. The
arbitration clause of the agreement cannot be read as a bar to
institution of criminal proceedings, if an offence is prima facie
made out against the petitioners. By invoking the arbitration clause,
either the Company can initiate proceedings for recovery of its
wrongful loss or even the petitioners can invoke the aforesaid
arbitration clause to challenge the termination of their agreement,
but by no stretch of imagination, the aforesaid arbitration clause can
be read as a bar to initiation of criminal proceedings against the
petitioners for their such acts, which prima facie constitute the
commission of a cognizable offence.
24. We have also carefully gone through the F.I.R. No.46 dated
20.04.2026 and F.I.R. No.253 dated 17.04.2026. It was argued that
for same cause of action, two different F.I.R.s have been registered,
which is impermissible in law. However, perusal of both the F.I.R.s
clearly reveals that these two F.I.R.s have been lodged for two
different ATM machines installed at two different places. Even the
amount involved in these two F.I.R.s is totally different. In F.I.R.
No.46, there is an embezzlement of an amount of Rs.3,08,400/-,
whereas in F.I.R. No.253, there is an embezzlement of
Rs.30,95,700/- after a deposit of Rs.8,09,700/- on 18.11.2025 and a

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deposit of Rs.4,32,200/- on 19.11.2025, by the petitioners.
Therefore, both these F.I.R.s have been registered for different set of
facts for two different locations and even the F.I.R.s have been
lodged in two different police stations, meaning thereby that the
jurisdiction to lodge and investigate the offences alleged in those
F.I.R.s vests in two different police stations. Therefore, in the
totality of the circumstances, these two F.I.R.s are not lodged on the
same cause of action. Thus, we find no force in the arguments so
raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
25. In the light of aforesaid discussions and keeping in view the
principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions
cited above, we are of the opinion that the impugned first
information report cannot be quashed qua the petitioners at this
nascent stage.
26. The prayer for quashing of the first information report is
therefore, refused.
27. The instant writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly
dismissed.
July 15, 2026
ss
(Dr. Ajay Kumar-II,J.) (Rajiv Gupta,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
SANDEEP SHARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad