Aftab Qureshi @ Raja And 3 Others vs Devendra Dhawan

AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 2864 of 2026
Aftab Qureshi @ Raja and 3 others
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Devendra Dhawan
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Rishikesh Tripathi, Shashwat
Tripathi
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Rishabh Agarwal
Court No. - 35
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
Heard Sri Rishikesh Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners
and Sri Atul Dayal, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Sri
Rishabh Agarwal, for the respondent.
2. The present petition arises out of proceedings initiated under
Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
1
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 in relation to a shop situated in District
Jhansi. The petitioners have assailed the order dated 19.12.2025 passed
by the appellate court in Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018, whereby
the review application filed by the respondent-landlord has been
1
U P Act No.13 of 1972

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allowed, the earlier appellate judgment dated 16.10.2025 has been
recalled, and the appeal has been directed to be reheard.
3. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present proceedings are
that the respondent-landlord instituted P.A. Case No. 79 of 2013
(Devendra Dhawan vs. Aftab Qureshi and others) on 22.10.2013 under
Section 21(1)(a) of the U P Act No.13 of 1972 seeking release of the
tenanted premises setting up the ground of bona fide requirement for his
son. Upon notice, the petitioners-tenants entered appearance on
01.09.2014 and filed their written statement contesting the release
application and disputing the alleged need set up by the respondent-
landlord.
4. The Prescribed Authority, after considering the pleadings and
material brought on record, allowed the release application by judgment
and order dated 29.10.2018. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the
petitioners preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018 before the
District Judge, Jhansi. The appellate court, by judgment dated
16.10.2025, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the
Prescribed Authority. While deciding the appeal, the appellate court
framed points for determination and recorded findings, inter alia,
regarding the maintainability of the release application.
5. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord moved a review application in
the said appeal seeking recall of the appellate judgment dated
16.10.2025. The petitioners filed objections to the review application and
also submitted written arguments on 19.12.2025 opposing the prayer for
recall. However, the appellate court, by the impugned order dated
19.12.2025, allowed the review application, recalled its earlier judgment
dated 16.10.2025, and directed rehearing of the appeal. Being aggrieved
by the order dated 19.12.2025 passed in the review proceedings,
Petitioners have approached this Court by means of the present petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned
order primarily on the ground that the appellate court has exercised a
jurisdiction wholly alien to the statutory scheme governing proceedings

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under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 by virtually undertaking a substantive
review of its earlier judgment dated 16.10.2025 despite absence of any
statutory provision conferring such power. It has been submitted that the
power of review is not an inherent power and can be exercised only
where specifically conferred by statute or by necessary implication.
According to the petitioners, the appellate court, under the guise of
exercising inherent powers, has effectively reopened and reconsidered
the earlier adjudication on merits, which is legally impermissible.
7. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
2
Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji , wherein it was categorically held
that the power of review is not an inherent power and must be conferred
by law either expressly or by necessary implication. Learned counsel
submits that the Court clearly observed that where the parent statute does
not confer review jurisdiction, neither the authority nor its delegate can
reopen or reconsider an earlier decision. It has therefore been argued that
the appellate authority functioning under the U P Act No.13 of 1972
could not have recalled its earlier judgment in absence of statutory
conferment of review power.
8. Reliance has further been placed upon Kalabharati Advertising
3
v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania , wherein the Supreme Court
reiterated the settled proposition that unless the statute or rules expressly
so permit, a review application against judicial or quasi-judicial orders is
not maintainable. Learned counsel submits that the Court held that
review jurisdiction is a creation of statute and any order passed in
purported exercise of review powers without statutory sanction is ultra
vires, illegal and without jurisdiction. Particular emphasis has been laid
upon the observations that an authority cannot, under the garb of
clarification, modification or correction, undertake reconsideration of the
matter on merits in absence of statutory power of review.
2
(1971) 3 SCC 844
3
(2010) 9 SCC 437

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9. The petitioners have also relied upon Pushpa Sareen v. State of
4
U.P. to contend that the power of substantive review cannot be implied
and must necessarily emanate from an enabling statutory provision. It
has been argued that while the said judgment recognizes existence of a
limited procedural review inhering in judicial and quasi-judicial
authorities for rectifying defects such as absence of notice or violation of
natural justice, the same simultaneously draws a clear distinction
between procedural review and review on merits. Learned counsel
submits that this Court in the aforesaid judgment expressly held that
substantive review remains impermissible in absence of statutory
conferment and only a limited procedural review is maintainable in
exceptional situations involving procedural defects.
10. Placing reliance upon Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central
5
Government Industrial Tribunal , learned counsel for the petitioners
has further submitted that the Supreme Court itself recognized two
distinct categories of review, namely procedural review and review on
merits. It has been argued that the Court clearly held that while
procedural review may be exercised to cure a procedural defect or
inadvertent error committed under misapprehension, review on merits is
impermissible unless specifically authorized by statute. According to the
petitioners, the present case does not involve any procedural defect
rather, the appellate court has effectively reopened the correctness of the
earlier judgment itself, thereby entering into the prohibited field of
substantive review.
11. The petitioners have additionally relied upon M/s. Bombay T.V.
6
Centre v. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dehradun to
contend that grounds relating to alleged fraud, misrepresentation or
erroneous appreciation of facts pertain to the merits of adjudication and
cannot furnish a valid basis for recall or review in absence of statutory
authority. It has been argued that this Court in the aforesaid decision
specifically held that reopening an order on grounds touching the merits
4
AIR 2015 All 83
5
1980 Supp SCC 420
6
1980 ALJ 537

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of the controversy amounts to review and is impermissible where no
statutory review power exists.
12. The petitioners have further relied upon Reliance General
7
Insurance Company Limited v. Kanika and Others to contend that
while limited clarificatory or clerical corrections may be permissible
under Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C., the Court cannot alter findings
affecting substantive rights under the guise of clarification or correction.
It has been submitted that the Supreme Court has clearly held that any
exercise which alters substantive adjudication or affects rights of parties
would in substance amount to review and must satisfy the strict
requirements governing review jurisdiction.
13 On the strength of the aforesaid authorities, learned counsel for the
petitioners has contended that the impugned order dated 19.12.2025 does
not merely rectify a procedural irregularity but substantially reopens the
earlier adjudication and directs rehearing of the appeal on merits.
According to the petitioners, the appellate court has therefore exercised
an impermissible substantive review in absence of any statutory
conferment of such power and consequently the impugned order is
wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has
supported the impugned order and submitted that although the
authorities functioning under the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 do not possess
any substantive power of review akin to that contained under Order
XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C., nevertheless such authorities retain limited
inherent jurisdiction under Rule 22(f) of the U.P. Urban Buildings
8
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 read with
Section 151 C.P.C. to correct procedural errors, misconceptions, and
manifest illegalities so as to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse
of the process of Court. It has been contended that the exercise
undertaken by the appellate court in the present case was not a rehearing
7
AIR 2026 SC 1188
8
Rules,1972

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of the matter on merits, but merely a procedural and corrective exercise
undertaken to rectify an error which had occasioned failure of justice.
15. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the review
court did not undertake any fresh adjudication on merits nor reassess the
evidentiary material so as to substitute one possible view by another. It is
submitted that the appellate court, while deciding Issue No. 1 in the
judgment dated 16.10.2025, had itself taken note of the registered sale
deed dated 13.02.1963 executed in favour of Smt. Sarla Devi, through
whom the respondent-landlord derived title by testamentary succession.
Despite recording the existence and date of the said registered sale deed,
the appellate court proceeded to hold that the landlord was required to
comply with the statutory requirement of six months’ notice under
Section 21(1)(a) of U P Act No.13 of 1972.
16. It is urged that the review application merely pointed out that the
finding so recorded suffered from a manifest misconception apparent
from the record itself, inasmuch as the property admittedly stood
purchased prior to 15.07.1972 i.e. the date of commencement of the U P
Act No.13 of 1972, and, therefore, the statutory embargo regarding six
months’ notice was not attracted at all. It is, thus, submitted that the
exercise undertaken by the review court was confined to correction of a
patent error arising from misapprehension of the existing record and
was, therefore, within the limited ambit of procedural review and
inherent jurisdiction recognised under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule
22(f) of the Rules, 1972.
17. In support of the aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. ,
wherein the distinction between a substantive review and a procedural
review was recognized. Learned counsel submits that the Court held that
while review on merits is not permissible in absence of statutory
conferment, every Court or Tribunal possesses inherent jurisdiction to
correct a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension or
procedural defect in order to prevent abuse of process and secure the

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ends of justice. Reliance has particularly been placed upon the
observation that procedural review inheres in every Court or Tribunal ex
debito justitiae and stands on a footing distinct from review on merits.
18. The respondents have further relied upon Pushpa Sand v.
9
R.C.E.O./City Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar to contend that where an
authority has failed to decide the controversy on merits owing to
misconception of law or erroneous assumption regarding its jurisdiction,
it is open to such authority to recall its order and reconsider the matter in
exercise of powers under Rule 22 (f). It has been argued that this Court
in the aforesaid decision recognized that although review of an order
passed on merits may not be permissible, recall of an order occasioned
by misconception or failure to exercise jurisdiction is legally
maintainable. Learned counsel submits that the said judgment further
recognizes that even where technical objections regarding review
jurisdiction may exist, this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may decline interference if
setting aside the impugned order would revive an otherwise illegal or
erroneous order.
19. Reliance has also been placed upon Pt. Chet Ram Sharma v. Ist
10
Additional District Judge , wherein this Court, after considering
Section 34 of the Act and Rule 22(f) of the Rules, held that although no
specific power of review is conferred upon appellate authorities
functioning under the U P Act No.13 of 1972, such authorities
nevertheless retain inherent powers analogous to Section 151 C.P.C. to
pass appropriate orders in the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the
process of Court. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid decision
specifically recognizes that Section 151 C.P.C. embodies the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court to act ex debito justitiae where circumstances so
require.
20. The respondents have further drawn attention to the observations
made in the aforesaid judgment that where an order has been passed on
9
1996 SCC Online All 132
10
2004 SCC Online All 818

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grounds which neither arose from pleadings nor were argued by the
parties, the authority would be justified in recalling such order so that a
litigant does not suffer on account of an inadvertent error committed by
the Court itself. It has been argued that the appellate court in the present
case has similarly exercised corrective jurisdiction to rectify an error
arising from misconception and therefore the impugned exercise cannot
be treated as an impermissible review on merits.
21. Reliance has additionally been placed upon Sidh Nath Tripathi
11
(Dr.) v. IInd Additional District Judge to contend that where an order
has been passed under misconception or by overlooking material aspects
on record, the Court is competent to correct such mistake. According to
the respondents, the impugned order merely seeks to remedy such
misconception and therefore falls within the permissible ambit of
inherent procedural jurisdiction.
22. The respondents have also relied upon Sita Ram Sikhaula v.
12
Prescribed Authority , wherein this Court upheld exercise of inherent
jurisdiction by the Prescribed Authority to set aside an unlawful
compromise decree after noticing manifest illegalities apparent from the
record. Learned counsel submits that the aforesaid judgment recognizes
that where an authority notices illegality apparent on the face of record,
it possesses inherent power to rectify the same and that no litigant should
suffer because of a mistake committed by the Court. It has been urged
that the present case also involves correction of an error which had
materially affected the adjudicatory process and therefore the appellate
court rightly exercised its inherent jurisdiction.
23. Further reliance has been placed upon Swaran Singh Chauhan v.
13
Rent Control and Eviction Authorities to contend that although a
review application in the strict sense contemplated under Order XLVII
Rule 1 C.P.C. is not maintainable before authorities under the U P Act
No.13 of 1972, nevertheless Rule 22(1) read with Rule 22(f) expressly
acknowledges the inherent powers of such authorities analogous to
11
1985 SCC OnLine All 297
12
1978 SCC OnLine All 15
13
2006 (4) ARC 373

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Section 151 C.P.C. Learned counsel submits that this Court in the
aforesaid decision categorically held that where an order has been passed
under misconception, by ignoring material facts on record, or in a
manner causing manifest injustice or abuse of process, the authority is
competent to correct such error in exercise of inherent jurisdiction and
such exercise would not amount to substantive review of the earlier
order.
24. It has thus been contended on behalf of the respondents that the
impugned order merely restores the appeal for rehearing so as to ensure
proper adjudication after rectifying the procedural misconception noticed
by the appellate court and does not finally re-adjudicate the controversy
on merits. According to the respondents, the exercise undertaken by the
appellate court is therefore procedural and corrective in nature and falls
squarely within the ambit of inherent jurisdiction preserved under Rule
22(f) read with Section 151 C.P.C. Consequently, it has been submitted
that no interference is warranted by this Court in exercise of its
supervisiory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
25. In light of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the parties, the principal issue which arises for consideration is whether,
in absence of any express statutory provision conferring power of
review, the authority concerned could exercise its inherent jurisdiction
under Rule 22(f) read with Section 151 C.P.C. to recall its earlier order
for correcting a procedural illegality or misconception, and whether such
exercise amounts to a permissible procedural review or an impermissible
substantive review on merits.
26. Before examining the rival submissions on the scope of procedural
and substantive review, it would be apposite to refer to the statutory
framework governing the powers exercisable by the authorities
constituted under the U P Act No.13 of 1972. In the present controversy,
particular significance attaches to Rule 22(f) of the Rules framed under
the Act read with Section 34(1)(g), which reads as follows:

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“22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Section 34
(1) (g)]. [The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or the
Appellate or Revising Authority shall, for the purposes of holding any
inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the
same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit, in respect of
the following matters, namely-
...
...
…
...
(f) the power referred to in Sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908) to make any order for the ends
of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority
concerned.”
27. A careful examination of Rule 22(f) indicates that the authorities
functioning under the U P Act No.13 of 1972 have been vested with
certain powers analogous to those exercisable by a Civil Court under the
Code of Civil Procedure. Amongst such powers, clause (f) specifically
incorporates the powers referred to under Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C.
“to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of the authority concerned.”
28. The incorporation of Sections 151 and 152 C.P.C. within the
statutory framework assumes significance inasmuch as the Act itself
does not contain any express provision conferring a substantive power of
review akin to Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. The scheme of Rule 22(f),
therefore, reflects a legislative recognition of the inherent procedural
powers exercisable by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities while
conducting proceedings under the Act.
29. Section 151 C.P.C., as incorporated through Rule 22(f), does not
create or confer jurisdiction in the strict sense but recognizes the
existence of inherent powers necessary for administration of justice and
for preserving the sanctity of judicial proceedings. Likewise, Section 152
C.P.C. contemplates correction of clerical or accidental errors arising

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from accidental slips or omissions. The expression employed in Rule
22(f), namely “to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of the process,” is couched in broad terms and bears directly upon
the scope of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by authorities under the U
P Act No.13 of 1972.
30. The statutory language of Rule 22(f) further indicates that the
powers preserved thereunder are procedural and ancillary in nature and
are intended to facilitate effective adjudication under the Act. The
provision neither expressly incorporates Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. nor
employs the expression “review.” At the same time, the incorporation of
Section 151 C.P.C. reflects legislative intent to preserve limited inherent
jurisdiction enabling the authority to pass such orders as may be
necessary in aid of justice and proper conduct of proceedings.
31. It is a settled principle of law that the power of review is not an
inherent power. A substantive review, whereby an authority reconsiders,
re-appreciates, or re-adjudicates the correctness of its earlier decision on
merits, can be exercised only when such power is specifically conferred
by statute or flows by necessary implication from the statutory scheme.
In absence of such conferment, no Court or quasi-judicial authority can
sit in appeal over its own judgment under the guise of review.
32. A substantive review ordinarily contemplates reconsideration of
the merits of the controversy, reassessment of findings already recorded,
or re-appreciation of the material forming basis of the earlier
adjudication. Such power is analogous to the jurisdiction contemplated
under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. and is purely statutory in nature.
33. On the other hand, procedural review stands on an altogether
different footing. Procedural review is not directed towards
reconsideration of the merits of the decision, but is confined to
correction of procedural defects which may have vitiated the decision-
making process itself. Such jurisdiction may be exercised where an order
has been passed without notice to a party, in violation of principles of
natural justice, under a mistaken assumption, or owing to some manifest

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procedural irregularity resulting in miscarriage of justice. The foundation
of procedural review lies not in re-examination of the merits of the
dispute, but in ensuring fairness of procedure and preventing abuse of
the process of Court.
34. The aforesaid distinction was lucidly explained by the Supreme
Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal, wherein it was held that while a review on merits is
impermissible in absence of statutory conferment, every Court or
Tribunal possesses inherent power to recall an order passed under
procedural misconception or in violation of natural justice in order to
prevent abuse of its process. The Court clarified that procedural review
inheres in every judicial or quasi-judicial authority ex debito justitiae ,
whereas substantive review must necessarily stem from statutory
authorization.
35. The distinction drawn in the aforesaid judgment assumes
considerable significance in determining the true nature and scope of the
jurisdiction exercised by a Court or Tribunal while entertaining an
application seeking reconsideration of an earlier order. The Supreme
Court expressly recognized that the expression “review” is not employed
in a singular or uniform sense and that a clear conceptual distinction
exists between a procedural review and a review on merits. In that
context, the Court observed as follows:
“Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression
‘review’ is used in the two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural
review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set
aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension
by it , and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected
is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record.”
(emphasis added)
36. The aforesaid exposition makes it evident that the source,
character and object of the two jurisdictions are fundamentally distinct.
A review on merits contemplates re-examination of the correctness of

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conclusions already arrived at upon adjudication of rival claims and
necessarily involves reconsideration of the substance of the controversy.
Such exercise directly affects the finality attached to judicial
determinations and, therefore, can be undertaken only where the statute
expressly or by necessary implication confers such authority. In
contradistinction, procedural review is not directed towards re-
adjudication of the dispute itself, but is confined to rectifying a defect in
the decision-making process which has resulted in a manifest procedural
illegality, misconception, inadvertence, or denial of fair opportunity.
37. What is of particular relevance is that the Supreme Court did not
treat procedural review as a species of appellate or substantive
reconsideration. Rather, the same was recognized as an inherent
jurisdiction inhering in every judicial and quasi-judicial authority to
ensure that its own procedure does not occasion injustice. The emphasis
of the Court was not upon correction of an erroneous conclusion on
merits, but upon correction of the process through which such
conclusion came to be recorded. Thus, where an order is shown to be a
palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by the
authority itself, the jurisdiction exercised for correction thereof partakes
the character of procedural review and not substantive review.
38. The principle laid down therein thus furnishes the controlling test
for determining whether the jurisdiction exercised by the authority is
truly procedural in nature or whether it amounts, in substance, to a
review on merits. The inquiry, therefore, is not governed merely by the
nomenclature of the application or the provision invoked, but by the real
nature of the correction undertaken, the source of the error sought to be
rectified, and the extent to which the authority re-enters into adjudication
of the substantive controversy already decided.
39. The distinction between substantive review and procedural review
was examined by this Court in Pushpa Sareen while considering the
scope of review jurisdiction exercisable by authorities functioning under
the rent control legislation. The Full Bench, after examining the

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principles laid down in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Grindlays Bank
Ltd., expressly recognized the distinction between a substantive review
on merits and a limited procedural review inhering in judicial and quasi-
judicial authorities. It was observed that the power of substantive review
is not an inherent power and cannot be assumed in absence of express
statutory conferment or necessary implication. Simultaneously, it was
clarified that where the error sought to be corrected arises from a
procedural defect, inadvertent mistake, misconception, or violation
affecting the fairness of the adjudicatory process itself, a limited
procedural review may legitimately be exercised in exercise of inherent
jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process.
40. Thus, the legal position which emerges from the aforesaid
authorities is that the determinative test lies in the nature of the exercise
undertaken by the authority. If the authority merely corrects a procedural
defect affecting the fairness of adjudication, such exercise may
legitimately fall within the ambit of procedural review or inherent
jurisdiction. However, where the authority enters into reconsideration of
the correctness of findings already rendered, reassesses the merits of the
controversy, or recalls a judgment for fresh adjudication on grounds
touching the substance of the dispute, the exercise ceases to be
procedural and assumes the character of a substantive review, which
cannot be undertaken in absence of statutory conferment of such power.
41. The following broad tests may, therefore, be culled out for
determining whether the exercise undertaken by an authority constitutes
a permissible procedural recall under its inherent jurisdiction, or an
impermissible substantive review in absence of statutory conferment of
review power:—
(i) Nature of the defect corrected: Where the defect sought to be
corrected pertains to the procedural framework of adjudication,
including misconception of an admitted or undisputed factual
position already borne out from the existing record, accidental
omission, procedural irregularity, or an error attributable to the

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authority itself in the course of decision-making, the exercise may
legitimately partake the character of procedural review; however,
where the authority proceeds to reassess disputed findings upon
re-appreciation of evidence or rival claims, the exercise enters the
field of substantive review.
(ii) Object of the exercise: Where the object of the exercise is
confined to correcting a palpably erroneous order passed under a
misapprehension by the authority itself, restoring procedural
fairness, preventing abuse of process, or curing an inadvertent
error affecting the legitimacy of adjudication, invocation of
inherent jurisdiction may be permissible; however, where the
object is to undertake a fresh determination of issues already
adjudicated on merits independent of such misconception, the
exercise assumes the nature of substantive review.
(iii) Extent of reconsideration involved: A limited
reconsideration undertaken solely for rectifying a procedural
defect, misconception arising from admitted record, or inadvertent
error attributable to the authority itself, without entering into re-
appreciation of disputed evidence or rival factual claims, may fall
within the ambit of procedural review; however, where the
authority undertakes reassessment of contested findings or
substitutes one adjudicatory conclusion by another upon re-
examination of merits, the exercise becomes substantive in
character.
(iv) Consequence of Correction: Where the resultant order is
directed towards removal of a procedural or foundational error
arising from misconception of an admitted or undisputed factual
position already existing on record, the exercise may continue to
retain its procedural character notwithstanding that consequential
restoration or rehearing becomes necessary thereafter; however,
where the authority undertakes a fresh examination of disputed

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merits independent of such foundational error, the exercise would
assume the nature of substantive review.
(v) Source of the error: An inadvertent error arising from the act
of the authority itself, including proceeding upon a misconception
regarding an admitted factual position, overlooking material
already existing on record, or recording findings contrary to the
undisputed record, may justify exercise of inherent jurisdiction ex
debito justitiae; however, a mere assertion that another
interpretation on facts or law is possible would not by itself
furnish foundation for procedural review.
(vi) Affect on finality of concluded findings: Mere reopening of
proceedings or restoration of the matter for lawful reconsideration
does not by itself render the exercise a substantive review where
the reopening is occasioned solely for correcting a palpably
erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by the authority
itself; however, where concluded findings are reopened for re-
appreciation of merits or substitution of one adjudicatory view by
another, the exercise would impinge upon finality and partake the
character of substantive review.
(vii) Correction of the decision-making process or the decision
itself: The determinative consideration is whether the authority is
fundamentally correcting the decision-making process vitiated by
misconception, inadvertence, or procedural error attributable to
itself, or whether it is reassessing the correctness of the conclusion
on merits; for correction of a manifest misconception arising from
the existing record may legitimately fall within inherent
jurisdiction, whereas substitution of one possible view by another
upon reappraisal of merits would amount to substantive review.
(viii) Exercise ex debito justitiae : Inherent powers may
legitimately be invoked ex debito justitiae where failure to
intervene would perpetuate procedural injustice attributable to the
authority itself or result in abuse of the process of the Court;

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however, such jurisdiction remains supplementary and cannot be
utilised as a substitute for an appellate remedy or a substantive
power of review not conferred by statute.
(ix) Existence or absence of statutory review jurisdiction: In
absence of an express or necessarily implied statutory conferment
of review jurisdiction, the authority cannot assume unto itself a
substantive power to reopen and reconsider adjudicated issues on
merits merely by invoking inherent powers under Section 151
C.P.C. or analogous provisions, for inherent jurisdiction cannot be
exercised in a manner that defeats legislative limitations upon
review.
(x) Substance over nomenclature: The true nature of the
jurisdiction exercised must be determined not from the
nomenclature employed in the application or the terminology used
in the order, but from the real substance, purpose, scope, and
effect of the exercise undertaken by the authority concerned.
42. The aforesaid principles are neither exhaustive nor capable of
rigid application, for the distinction between a procedural review and a
substantive review ultimately depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction
exercised, the purpose sought to be achieved, and the effect produced by
the impugned exercise. The enquiry, therefore, must not remain confined
to the form or terminology employed by the authority, but must extend to
the substance of the exercise actually undertaken. It is only upon
application of the aforesaid tests to the facts and tenor of the impugned
order that the Court may determine whether the authority merely
corrected a procedural defect in aid of justice and to prevent abuse of
process, or whether it in effect reopened and reconsidered the
adjudication on merits in absence of statutory conferment of review
jurisdiction.
43. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material brought on
record, this Court finds that the controversy involved in the present case

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essentially turns upon the true nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the
appellate court while passing the impugned order dated 19.12.2025. The
determinative question is not merely whether the authority possessed
power of substantive review, but whether the exercise undertaken by it
was, in fact, a substantive reconsideration on merits or a permissible
procedural correction intended to rectify an apparent illegality affecting
the adjudicatory process itself.
44. From a careful perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the
appellate court has not proceeded to re-adjudicate the controversy on
merits nor has it recorded fresh findings reversing its earlier conclusions
upon re-appreciation of evidence. The appellate court has merely
recalled its earlier judgment dated 16.10.2025 and directed rehearing of
the appeal upon noticing that certain aspects bearing upon the legality
and correctness of the adjudication had not been properly considered.
The exercise undertaken by the appellate court was thus essentially
corrective in nature and intended to ensure that the proceedings receives
adjudication in accordance with law after due consideration of all
relevant aspects.
45. At this stage, it becomes necessary to notice the distinction
between substantive review and procedural review. A substantive review
necessarily involves reconsideration of the correctness of findings
already recorded on merits. Such power is not inherent and must
emanate from an express or necessarily implied statutory conferment, as
contemplated under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. In
the absence of such conferment, no court or tribunal can assume unto
itself a general power to reopen concluded adjudication merely because
another view on facts or law may appear possible.
46. Procedural review, however, stands on a fundamentally different
footing. It is rooted not in statutory conferment but in the inherent
obligation of every court and tribunal to ensure that its own procedure
does not occasion injustice. Thus, where an order has resulted from
procedural misconception, inadvertent omission, absence of notice,

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clerical mistake, misunderstanding of admitted record, or any error
attributable to the adjudicatory process itself, the authority may invoke
its inherent jurisdiction ex debito justitiae to correct such defect and
restore procedural legality. The object of such exercise is not to
reconsider the merits of the controversy but to remove the procedural
impediment which prevented lawful adjudication.
47. Section 151 C.P.C., which preserves the inherent powers of the
Court to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of process, operates
in a field distinct from substantive review jurisdiction under Order
XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. What is prohibited in the absence of statutory
conferment is a rehearing on merits through reassessment of evidence,
rival claims, or legal findings. What remains permissible is correction of
defects striking at the fairness, legality, or integrity of the decision-
making process itself.
48. The distinction between these two jurisdictions has been judicially
recognized in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal , wherein it was explained that though a power of substantive
review must arise from statute, every judicial or quasi-judicial authority
nevertheless possesses inherent jurisdiction to correct procedural errors,
misconceptions, or inadvertent mistakes attributable to the adjudicatory
process itself. Procedural review inheres in every forum ex debito
justitiae and may legitimately be exercised where the earlier order
suffers from procedural misconception or from a palpably erroneous
order passed under a misapprehension by the authority itself.
49. The principle underlying such jurisdiction is founded upon the
maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit , namely, that an act of the Court
shall prejudice no person. A court or tribunal cannot be rendered
powerless to correct an error arising due to its own inadvertence or
misconception which, if permitted to stand, would perpetuate injustice
and undermine confidence in the adjudicatory process. The inherent
jurisdiction preserved under Section 151 C.P.C. and acknowledged under
Rule 22(f) of the Rules exists precisely to enable the authority to remedy

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such situations where continuance of an order suffering from manifest
misconception or procedural defect would itself amount to abuse of the
process of the Court. Such jurisdiction is corrective rather than appellate
in nature and is directed towards rectification of the decision-making
process rather than substitution of one adjudicatory conclusion by
another.
50. Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the
impugned order does not partake the character of a substantive review
akin to jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. The appellate court
has not finally altered or substituted its earlier findings by undertaking a
reappraisal of the controversy. It has merely recalled the earlier judgment
itself for rehearing of the appeal so as to remove what it perceived to be
a procedural infirmity which had occasioned failure of justice.
51. From the material brought on record, it transpires that while
deciding Rent Control Appeal No. 30 of 2018 by judgment dated
16.10.2025, the appellate court had referred to the certified copy of the
registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963 executed in favour of Smt. Sarla
Devi, through whom the respondent-landlord claimed successionary
rights by virtue of testamentary devolution. The appellate court had also
specifically noticed that the said document formed part of the original
record and that the tenancy in question existed much prior to the
institution of the release proceedings.
52. However, despite recording the existence, contents, and
undisputed date of the aforesaid registered sale deed, the appellate court
proceeded to hold that the respondent-landlord was mandatorily required
to serve six months’ notice under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of
1972 prior to institution of the release application, treating non-
compliance thereof as fatal to maintainability of the proceedings.
53. This Court finds substance in the submission advanced on behalf
of the respondents that authorities functioning under the U.P. Act No.13
of 1972 retain limited inherent jurisdiction under Rule 22(f) read with
Section 151 C.P.C. to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of

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process of Court. The exercise of such jurisdiction, where confined to
rectification of procedural irregularity or misconception, cannot be
equated with a substantive review of the earlier adjudication.
54. The review court, while considering the application moved under
Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules, examined the
controversy from the limited perspective as to whether the earlier
appellate judgment had proceeded upon a misconception apparent from
the admitted record itself. In that context, the review court noticed that
although the appellate court had already accepted and recorded the
existence of the registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963, it nevertheless
applied the statutory requirement of notice under the first proviso to
Section 21 despite the admitted position that the property had been
purchased through the said registered sale deed dated 13.02.1963, i.e.,
much prior to the enforcement of the U P Act No.13 of 1972. The review
court accordingly held that the earlier appellate judgment had resulted in
a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension, insofar as
the statutory requirement of notice had been applied despite the
foundational facts already borne out from the existing record indicating
clear inapplicability of such requirement.
55. Significantly, the review court did not reopen any disputed factual
controversy requiring adjudication upon competing evidence nor did it
undertake reassessment of bona fide need, comparative hardship, or any
other substantive issue arising in the release proceedings. The exercise
remained confined to correction of the apparent misconception emerging
from the admitted documentary record already noticed by the appellate
court itself. No fresh adjudicatory exercise upon rival factual claims was
undertaken, nor was one possible view substituted by another upon re-
appreciation of evidence.
56. It further appears that the consequence of the impugned order
dated 19.12.2025 is merely restoration of the appeal for rehearing in
accordance with law and not final adjudication of substantive rights
afresh. The petitioners continue to retain full opportunity to address the

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appellate court on all questions available to them in law during rehearing
of the appeal and no irreversible prejudice is shown to have been
occasioned merely by restoration of the proceedings.
57. In the considered view of this Court, the nature and scope of the
jurisdiction exercised by the review court was corrective and procedural
in character, and not a substantive review on merits. The interference
was confined to removal of an apparent misconception arising from
admitted material already existing on record and attributable to the
adjudicatory process itself. The review court neither reassessed disputed
questions of fact nor reopened the merits of the release proceedings for
fresh determination upon re-appreciation of evidence. Such an exercise,
directed towards securing the ends of justice and preventing continuation
of an error attributable to the authority itself, squarely falls within the
limited ambit of procedural review and inherent jurisdiction recognised
under Section 151 C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules, and cannot
be treated as an impermissible assumption of substantive review
jurisdiction in the absence of statutory conferment.
58. Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court
finds no jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, or perversity in the
impugned order dated 19.12.2025 passed by the appellate court in
exercise of its inherent and procedural jurisdiction under Section 151
C.P.C. read with Rule 22(f) of the Rules. The impugned order merely
restores the appeal for rehearing after correction of an apparent
misconception attributable to the appellate court itself and does not
amount to an impermissible substantive review on merits.
59. No case for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is, therefore, made out.
60. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed .
61. No order as to costs.
(Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)
May 07, 2026
RKK/-
Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad