State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt. Lko vs Gyanendra @ Monu And 3 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 113 of 2026
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Deptt. Lko
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Gyanendra @ Monu And 3 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : G.A.
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Ram Prakash Verma

Court No. - 11
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON'BLE RAJEEV BHARTI, J.
1. Heard learned AGA for the appellant. Despite notice having been
issued to the respondents and having been duly served on them as per
service report nobody responds on their behalf.
2. Under challenge is the judgment and order dated 14.05.2025 passed in
Sessions Trial No. 199 of 2017 arising out of Case Crime No. 917 of 2017
under Sections 341, 504, 506, 376 of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the
Prevention of Children From Sexual Offences Act and Section 3(2)(v) of
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, Police Station Kakori, District Lucknow, by which the
respondent accused has been acquitted and hence the instant appeal.
3. Prior to considering the ground (s) as raised by the learned AGA, we
may consider the law on the point of acquittal in an appeal.
4. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and
, in paragraph 10, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
others, (2018) 5 SCC 790
considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering
in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that:-
"the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its
entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the
findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind
setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court,
especially when the prosecution case suffers from several
contradictions and infirmities "
5. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213 , the Hon'ble

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Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of
power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order
of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
"The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under
Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the
view formed by the trial court was a ''possible view'. The
judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because
the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the
judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the
conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct
reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it
differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete
misreading of the material evidence which has led to
miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which
can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with.
This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High
Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in
an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding
of fact."
6. In a judgment of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and
the law on the issue involved has been
others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB,
considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as
under:
"10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed
that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate
court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to
arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court
were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court
is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact,
the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible
evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the
aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
"12. This court time and again has laid down the
guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial
Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set
aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two
views are possible, though the view of the appellate
court may be more, the probable one. While dealing
with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has
to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to

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arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the
trial Court were perverse or otherwise
unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to
consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial Court had failed to take into consideration
admissible evidence and/or had taken into
consideration the evidence brought on record
contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden
of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by
the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of
U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr.
v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra
Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104;
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC
699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006
SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007
SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by
his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr.
Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara
Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98;
and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal
Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR
1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
"...the High Court should and will always give
proper weight and consideration to such matters as
(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility
of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at
his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of
any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate
court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a
Judge who had the advantage of seeing the
witnesses...."
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently
been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v.
The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of
Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton &
Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan
and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412;
Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4
SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and

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Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka
(2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal
position as under:
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-
appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very strong circumstances", "distorted
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes
of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent
unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court."
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008)
10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view,

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observing that the appellate court in dealing with
the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the
accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's
acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is
innocent. The appellate court must give due weight
and consideration to the decision of the trial court
as the trial court had the distinct advantage of
watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was
in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh
(2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the
earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that
an "order of acquittal should not be lightly
interfered with even if the court believes that there
is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the
accused."
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias
Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave
certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court
would be justified in interfering with a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances
includes:
i) The High Court's decision is based on totally
erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal
position;
ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to
evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal
leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust
and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts
on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in
interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court
and the High Court have recorded an order of

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acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras
(2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that in exceptional cases where there are
compelling circumstances, and the judgment under
appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court
can interfere with the order of acquittal. The
appellate court should bear in mind the presumption
of innocence of the accused and further that the trial
Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his
innocence. Interference in a routine manner where
the other view is possible should be avoided, unless
there are good reasons for interference."
7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of
Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that
while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record
its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it
is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of
acquittal.
8. The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by Supreme
Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166 , Nagabhushan vs. State of Karnataka
(2021) 5 SCC 222 , and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.
9. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajesh
Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
10. Being armed with the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court, now we proceed to consider the argument(s) as
raised by the learned AGA.
11. The learned AGA has argued that the learned trial court has patently
erred in law in acquitting the accused and has failed to appreciate the
evidence which was led before it and has been persuaded by the minor

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inconsistencies which has emerged in the statements of the victims / other
witnesses and has prayed that all the accused merit to be convicted of the
charges as levelled against them.
12. In order to appreciate the arguments and the grounds as raised by the
learned AGA, we have proceeded to consider the judgment of the learned
trial court and the material on record.
13. From the perusal of the material on record, it emerges that an FIR was
lodged on 11.9.2017 contending that on the said date, when the niece of
the complainant was returning from school, the accused had accosted her
with the result that she fell down from her bicycle. Thereafter, the accused
tried to take her to an orchard.
14. Upon the victim having cried out, two persons namely Nanheyke
Yadav and another person, who was going to sell curd, rushed to the place
and upon seeing them, the the accused ran away.
15. Subsequent to the investigation and filing of charge-sheet dated
04.12.2017 and framing of charges, the trial started. In a statement given
under Section 164 of the CrPC, an offence under Section 376 of the IPC
was said to have been committed by the accused apart from the other
sections as indicated above.
16. During the course of trial, the prosecution witness PW-1 i.e. the
maternal uncle of the victim categorically stated, as recorded in paragraph
15 of the impugned judgment, that he had asked the victim to give her
statement as was tutored by him. He also stated that the victim was never
medically examined and that on account of a dispute with the accused, the
FIR had been lodged.
17. The victim, who was PW-2, although stated that an offence under
Section 376 of the IPC was committed against her but thereafter resiled
from the statement by contending that on the fateful day her cycle had
struck the motorcycle of the accused on account of which she fell down
and there were heated arguments with the accused but the accused neither
misbehaved with her nor committed anything wrong against her. She had
given a statement of the accused having committed the offence under

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Section 376 of the IPC as she had got frightened and thus stated before
the learned Magistrate of the said offense. However, she was aware that
on account of deposing falsely she could be punished. She also stated in
her statement that she did not want any action to be taken against the
accused.
18. It is also relevant to mention that in his cross-examination, the PW-1
i.e. maternal uncle of the victim categorically stated that the victim never
used to go to her school on her cycle rather she used to go by bus and that
she never went alone rather went with her classmates.
19. We have carefully examined the entire record of the case. Upon
perusing the evidence, we find that the prosecution case does not support
any reliable material evidence.
20. The testimony of PW-1 (the maternal uncle of the victim) severely
damages the prosecution case. He candidly admitted during the trial that
he had tutored the victim to give statements against the accused. He
further confirmed that the victim was never medically examined and that
the FIR was lodged merely on account of a pre-existing dispute with the
accused. Additionally, he admitted in his cross-examination that the
victim never used a bicycle to go to school, but always traveled by bus
with her classmates.
21. Furthermore, PW-2 (the victim herself) did not support the core
charges. Although she initially mentioned a serious offense, she clearly
explained that the incident was simply an accidental collision between her
cycle and the motorcycle of the accused, followed by a minor heated
argument. She stated that the accused did nothing wrong to her, that she
had given her earlier statement out of fear, and that she does not want any
legal action taken against the accused.
22. When the material witness admits to tutoring and filing a false case
out of personal enmity, and when the victim herself resiles from the
charges and offers a natural explanation for her earlier panic, the
prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt.
23. Consequently, we find no error, perversity, or illegality in the findings

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of the trial court. The view taken by the trial court is a plausible and
reasoned one, which warrants no interference by this appellate court.
24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that benefit of doubt
ensues to accused. If two views are possible, the benefit of doubt must be
granted to accused. It has been further held that if two views are possible,
the order of acquittal should not be set aside by High Court because there
is double presumption of innocence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para
39 in Dhanapal v. State By Public Prosecutor, Madras, (2009) 10 SCC
401 while dealing with scope of interference at appellate stage has held:
"39. The following principles emerge from the cases above:
1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.
The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the
trial court. The trial court acquittal bolsters the presumption that
he is innocent.
2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate
court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can
review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and
law, but the appellate court must give due weight and
consideration to the decision of the trial court.
3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the trial
court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of
the witnesses. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses.
4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the
trial court acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling
reasons" for doing so.
5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached-one that
leads to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High
Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused."
25. In the case in hand, the opinion expressed by the trial court is not
only a possible view, but also it is fair and reasonable and cannot be
termed as perverse in any manner, thus, it does not warrant
interference.
26. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is
made out. The appeal is dismissed summarily.

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27. The trial court record, if any, be returned back as per rules.
(Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
October 27, 2026
A. Katiyar
Digitally signed by :-
AMIT KATIYAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench