PRAFULLA KUMAR BHOI vs STATE OF ODISHA
- Court
- Odisha High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
WP(C) No.11092 of 2025
Prafulla Kumar Bhoi ..... Petitioner
Represented by Adv. -
Sisir Das
-versus-
State of Odisha & Ors. ..... Opposite Parties
Represented by Adv. -Mr.
S.K.Parhi, A.S.C.
CORAM:
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR
MOHAPATRA
Date of hearing: 21.07.2026 | Date of Judgment:31.10.2026
__________________________________________________
A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition, under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing Order
No.6157, dated 04.02.2025, at Annexure-3, passed by the
Director, Higher Education, Odisha (Opposite Party No.3),
wherein the claim of the Petitioner for regularisation of his
services in the post of Peon has been rejected, along with a further
prayer to direct the Opposite Parties to regularise his services in
the post of Peon.
Page 1 of 38.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE
2. The essential facts of the case, as borne out from the record,
are as follows; initially the Petitioner was engaged as a
Peon/Attendant by the Principal of S.C.S. (Autonomous) College,
Puri, in the year 1999 on a daily-wage basis and, according to the
Petitioner, he has continued in the College since then without any
break. Furthermore, the Petitioner has been discharging his duties
against a substantive, existing, sanctioned post of Peon. It is the
case of the Petitioner that certain persons, who were similarly
engaged on a daily-wage basis in the year 1999, came to be
regularised, whereas his own case for regularisation against the
vacant post of Peon was not considered. Aggrieved, the Petitioner
approached the Chairman of the College Governing Body. The
matter was placed before the Executive Committee of the College
in its meeting held on 12.06.2008, which resolved to entrust the
Principal with the task of corresponding with the Government.
Pursuant thereto, the Principal of the College (Opposite Party
No.4), by his letter No.2454 dated 31.07.2010, at Annexure-1,
forwarded to the Opposite Party No.3-Director, Higher Education,
a list of four daily-labour-rated (DLR) employees, with the
Petitioner’s name finding place at serial no.3, working in different
capacities in the College for regularisation of their services. The
Page 2 of 38.
said letter also indicates that one post of Attendant and two posts
of Peon were lying vacant on that date, and, the Principal,
requested that steps be taken for regular absorption of the DLR
employees in accordance with the applicable Acts and
Government Rules.
3. The Writ Petition also reveals that, during the long tenure
of the Petitioner, he has been assigned varied duties by the
Principal, such as assisting the College Football Team and the
Wrestling (Men) Team while attending tournaments, and that he
was also deputed for duties in the General Election held in 2024,
like other regular employees. Copies of some of such assignment
orders have been annexed as Annexure-2 Series. Despite
rendering such service for such a long period of time, since the
Petitioner was not regularized, the Petitioner approached this
Court in W.P.(C) No.28457 of 2023. On 08.09.2023, which was
disposed of at the stage of admission, without an adjudication non
the merits of the matter, with a direction to the Opposite Party
No.3 to take a decision in the said petition within three months. In
purported compliance, Opposite Party No.3, by the impugned
order dated 04.02.2025, at Annexure-3, rejected the claim of the
Petitioner. The Petitioner thereupon instituted the present Writ
Petition.
Page 3 of 38.
4. It is pertinent to mention that during the pendency of the
Writ Petition, the Principal of the College (Opposite Party No.5)
disengaged the Petitioner after 27 years of continuous service, by
an order dated 20.04.2026 and placing reliance on Letter
No.19410/HE dated 13.04.2026 issued by the Special Secretary to
Government, Department of Higher Education. The Petitioner
assailed the same in W.P.(C) No.13991 of 2026, which was
disposed of on 06.05.2026, setting aside the order of
disengagement and directing his reinstatement, subject to the
result of the present Writ Petition. However, since the Petitioner
was not re-instated, he preferred CONTC No.3479 of 2026, which
was listed on 10.07.2026, and later adjourned to 07.08.2026 for
instructions from the contemnors.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER
5. Heard Mr. Sisir Das, learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioner. The primary contention advanced by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner, including the grounds put forth in the
Writ Petition, the Rejoinder Affidavit, and the Written
Submissions, is that the Petitioner has been working continuously
for over 26 years, without any break and to the satisfaction of the
authorities, against an existing sanctioned post of Peon. It has
been stated that the Principal of the College himself, by
Page 4 of 38.
Annexure-1, admitted that posts of Peon and Attendant were
vacant and recommended the Petitioner for regular absorption.
Therefore, the Opposite Parties are therefore incorrect in asserting
that no sanctioned post exists. To further substantiate such a
contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Nihal Singh v.
State of Punjab , reported in AIR 2013 SC 3547 , for the
proposition that a person whose services have been utilised over a
long period against a sanctioned post ought to be regularised, and
that engagement of persons in contractual, ad hoc or daily-wage
capacity for decades is nothing but exploitation.
6. Next, referring to the case of one Gadei Swain, the co-
employee figuring at Sl. No.2 of Annexure-1, the learned counsel
stated that his claim was also rejected by the Opposite Party No.3.
Later, he approached this Court in W.P.(C) No.33108 of 2020,
which was allowed vide judgment dated 12.10.2022, at Annexure-
4, with a direction to regularise the employee. The States’s appeal,
being W.A. No.1706 of 2023, was dismissed on 17.10.2023, at
Annexure-5. Thereafter, in compliance with the directions of this
Court, Opposite Party No.3, by Order No.13627/HE dated
08.04.2024, at Annexure-6, regularised the services of Gadei
Swain against a vacant sanctioned post of Junior Clerk in the
College. It was contended that the Counter Affidavit by the
Page 5 of 38.
Opposite Parties itself records that such regularisation was with
prospective effect.
7. In the aforesaid context, the learned counsel submitted that
the Petitioner stands on an identical footing with Gadei Swain,
who was recommended along with him in the same letter, whose
claim was rejected by the same authority on the very same
grounds, and who was regularised pursuant to the judgment of this
Court dated 12.10.2022, the dismissal of the Writ Appeal, and the
dismissal of the State’s challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court. It was contended that the judgments in Gadei Swain
( supra ) and Surama Manjari Das v. State of Odisha , bearing
W.P.(C) No.15763 of 2021 , have been implemented by the State,
however, the Petitioner, being similarly circumstanced, has been
discriminated against in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. In fact, the learned counsel for the Petitioner also stated
before this Court that the case of the Petitioner is squarely covered
by the judgment of this Court in Sitaram Behera v. State of
Odisha , bearing W.P.(C) No.8236 of 2024 , decided on
16.05.2025 (paras 20 to 24).
8. It was further contended that the Finance Department
Circular No.178(45)/F dated 12.04.1993 and Resolution
No.31715/F dated 04.09.2012 cannot be pressed into service
Page 6 of 38.
against the Petitioner, especially since this Court, in Prafulla
Kumar Sahu v. State of Odisha , reported in O.J.C. No.126 of
2001 , decided on 01.12.2002, held that the Finance Department
has no jurisdiction or authority to impose a ban in respect of
appointments under the Higher Education Department/educational
institutions. The same plea, it was contended, taken by Opposite
Party No.3 against one Gadei Swain, was negatived by this Court
in W.P.(C) No.33108 of 2020.
9. Thereafter, the learned counsel stated that the rejection of
the claim of the Petitioner on the strength of Secretary, State of
Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , reflects a
misreading of that judgment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made a
distinction between illegal and irregular appointments, and
directed that irregular appointees who had completed ten years of
service be considered for regularisation, without fixing any rigid
cut-off date. The Petitioner's engagement is, at the very worst,
irregular and not illegal, and the fact that he has served 26 years
shows the existence of the post and the perennial need for his
work. The fixation of a cut-off date as 01.04.2006 is without any
basis, and, what is actually relevant is the continuous service of
ten years and above.
10. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the
Page 7 of 38.
principle in Umadevi ( supra ) has since been explained in a catena
of judgements viz. Jaggo v. Union of India , reported in 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3826 (paras 16, 20, 21, 22, 26 and 27); Shripal
v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
221 ; and Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. , bearing Civil Appeal
No.8558 of 2018 , decided on 19.08.2025, wherein it has been
observed that where public institutions depend, day after day, on
the same hands for permanent tasks, equity demands that those
tasks be placed on sanctioned posts and that the workers be
treated with fairness and dignity. Therefore, the learned counsel
contended, the pronouncement in Umadevi ( supra ) cannot be
“weaponised” against employees like the Petitioner who have
rendered indispensable, continuous service over decades.
11. Next, referring to Notification dated 12.11.2013, at
Annexure-8, by the GA&PG Department, Government of Odisha,
wherein the Odisha Group-C and Group-D Posts (Contractual
Appointment) Rules, 2013 were framed, the learned counsel for
the Petitioner stated that as per Rule 10(1) of the aforesaid
notification, upon satisfactory completion of six years of
contractual service under Rule 9(1), the appointee shall be
deemed to have been regularly appointed and a formal order of
regular appointment shall be issued by the appointing authority. In
Page 8 of 38.
the present case, the Petitioner, having served for 26 years, cannot
be deprived of the benefit of the policy embodied in the said
Rules, and the Opposite Party No.3 has failed to consider the
same.
12. It was contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner
that the nature of the work performed by the Petitioner is regular
and perennial, that he has rendered more than 240 days of service
in every year and, the Opposite Parties, having taken work from
him for 26-27 years, are estopped from questioning the nature of
the engagement. It has been contended that the Opposite Parties
have exploited the Petitioner by engaging him as a casual labourer
and paying him less than regular Group-C and Group-D
employees, while never considering his case for regularisation
despite the admission of vacant sanctioned posts by Opposite
Party No.4.
13. In such view of the matter, the learned counsel for the
Petitioner contended that the impugned order has been passed
without application of mind and in complete disregard of the
settled law as well as the earlier orders of this Court, resulting in
the loss of livelihood of the Petitioner after 27 years of continuous
service. As such, the learned counsel for the Petitioner stated that
the service of the Petitioner be regularised and all related service
Page 9 of 38.
benefits be disbursed in his favour.
CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES
14. Heard Mr. S. K. Parhi, learned Additional Standing Counsel
appearing for the Opposite Parties. The State-Opposite Party No.1
has resisted the Writ Petition by filing a counter affidavit and
taking the stand, at the outset, that since the Petitioner, despite the
ban imposed by the Finance Department vide its Circular
No.178(45)/F dated 12.04.1993, was engaged as Peon/Attendant
in 1999 on a daily-wage basis, without following the due
procedure of selection and without the prior approval of the
Administrative Department, his claim for regularisation does not
merit consideration. Additionally, it was contended that in
compliance with the order dated 08.09.2023, passed in W.P.(C)
No. 28457 of 2023, the Higher Education Department examined
the claim of the Petitioner, which had been submitted in the shape
of a proposal by the Principal of the College, for filling up vacant
non-teaching Group-C and Group-D posts, with reference to
Finance Department Resolution No.31715/F dated 04.09.2012 and
General Administration and Public Grievance Department Letter
dated 03.03.2021, and rejected it by a well-reasoned order dated
04.02.2025.
Page 10 of 38
.
15. Learned ASC, again submitted before this Court that the
Finance Department, by Circular No.178(45)/F, dated 12.04.1993,
banned the engagement of daily-wage workers, work-charged
employees and NMRs in Government establishments, and by
Resolution No.31715/F dated 04.09.2012 stipulated that any
engagement in violation thereof would result in personal
responsibility being fixed on the officer engaging such persons
and, on the person disbursing their wages. A regular vacant Class-
IV post cannot, therefore, be filled by engagement of outsiders as
work-charged/NMR/daily-wage workers without the concurrence
of the Finance Department.
16. Learned ASC appearing for the State-Opposite Parties
further contended that earlier the State had framed a scheme for
absorption of NMR/DLR workers engaged prior to 12.04.1993, by
conferring ‘Temporary Status’ in the first instance, and thereafter
providing scope for absorption against Group-D vacancies in the
event such persons were conferred with a temporary status and
continued in service for at least 240 days in a year since initial
engagement. The learned ASC submitted that the Petitioner,
engaged in 1999, was not eligible for conferment of temporary
status and is outside the scheme. It is further averred that no
Page 11 of 38
.
vacant sanctioned/created posts existed in the institution for
absorption on a permanent basis.
17. Next, relying on Umadevi ( supra ) and on the gist thereof
outlined in the GA&PG Department Letter dated 03.03.2021 and
Office Memorandum No.10682/Gen dated 19.04.2022, at
Annexure-B/1, the learned ASC contended that illegal
appointments cannot be regularised at all, that irregular
appointments cannot be regularised save for the one-time
relaxation in favour of those who had continued for at least ten
years as on 10.04.2006 without the protection of any court order,
and that the ratio of Umadevi ( supra ) does not extend to
contractual engagements made after 11.04.1996 or those not
continuous for ten years as on 10.04.2006. Long continuance, it
was urged by the learned ASC, does not give rise to a right for
regularisation.
18. Thereafter, the learned ASC relied on State of Rajasthan v.
Daya Lal , reported in (2011) 2 SCC 429 , to put forth the
proposition that Courts cannot direct absorption or regularisation
of temporary employees whose initial appointments were not in
accordance with statutory rules, and that equitable considerations
cannot override mandatory legal requirements. Likewise, referring
Page 12 of 38
.
to State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari , reported in AIR 2010 SC
2587 , the learned ASC submitted that courts must be wary not to
interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of the State’s
affairs nor lend themselves as instruments for bypassing
constitutional and statutory mandates. In a similar vein, relying on
Upendra Chandra Gogoi v. State of Assam , reported in AIR
1998 SC 1289 , the learned ASC put forth the proposition that an
illegality at inception cannot be sanctified at a later stage.
19. The learned ASC also submitted that the Petitioner appears
to have continued in service, but without any formal or periodic
renewal orders by the competent authority, and such continuation
dehors the rules creates no enforceable right in favour of the
Petitioner. Particularly, in the absence of a sanctioned post or
regular appointment, the engagement of the Petitioner is untenable
in law. The learned ASC submitted that at best, irregularly
engaged employees might be permitted to compete in a regular
recruitment with relaxation of age and some weightage for
service, and nothing beyond that can be directed.
20. Lastly, addressing the Petitioner’s reliance on Gadei Swain
( Supra ), learned ASC submitted that such reliance is misplaced
since Gadei Swain’s case ( supra ) was decided on its own facts
Page 13 of 38
.
and legal context, and cannot be treated as a binding precedent or
a general policy decision. The learned ASC, in this context, also
invokes the principle that Article 14 does not envisage negative
equality, placing reliance on Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab ,
bearing Civil Appeal No.2273 of 2011 . In such view of the matter,
the learned ASC submitted before this Court that granting
regularisation without open selection would violate equality of
opportunity, merit-based competition and administrative fairness,
would encourage similar demands and would undermine
recruitment discipline. As such, it was prayed that the present
Writ Petition, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
21. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned
ASC appearing for the State-Opposite Parties. Perused the Writ
Petition, the Counter Affidavit by the Opposite Party No.1, the
Rejoinder thereto filed by the Petitioner, along with the Written
Notes by the Petitioner. At the outset, it needs to be noted that
vide its earlier order dated 08.09.2023, this Court had called upon
Opposite Party No.3 to decide the claim “in accordance with
law”, without any expression of opinion on merits. The question
before this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
Page 14 of 38
.
226, therefore, is whether the decision taken in the impugned
order dated 04.02.2025, at Annexure-3, is in accordance with law,
that is to say, whether it is founded on relevant and applicable
legal and factual considerations and is consistent with the
constitutional guarantee of equality and non-arbitrariness under
Articles 14 and 16, or whether it proceeds on a mechanical
application of instruments and precedents which do not govern the
case, while ignoring material that ought to have been considered.
22. One of the primary grounds on which the State-Opposite
Party has controverted the Petitioner’s stance, is the Finance
Department Circular No.178(45)/F dated 12.04.1993, read with
Resolution No.31715/F dated 04.09.2012. In this context, the
Petitioner has pleaded, and the State has not effectively countered,
that this Court in Prafulla Kumar Sahu v. State of Odisha ,
bearing O.J.C. No.126 of 2001 ; 2003 (I) OLR 1991 decided on
01.12.2002, held that the Finance Department has no jurisdiction
to impose a ban order in respect of educational institutions. The
counter affidavit does not refer to this judgment, much less does it
suggest that it has been overruled, reversed or otherwise rendered
inapplicable in any way whatsoever. More significantly, the very
same defence was taken by Opposite Party No.3 in the case of
Page 15 of 38
.
Gadei Swain ( supra ), a co-employee of the Petitioner in the same
College, and was negatived by this Court in W.P.(C) No.33108 of
2020 , at Annexure-4, particularly at paragraph 6.
23. Similarly, even taken at its highest, the Resolution of
04.09.2012, a copy of which is available at Annexure-A/1 series
to the Counter Affidavit, prescribes a consequence, as extracted in
the counter affidavit itself at para 9, namely the fixation of
personal responsibility on the officer engaging such persons and
on the person disbursing their wages. It does not say that a person
who has actually worked and has been paid wages for long years
forfeits any claim in law, nor does it say that the institution is to
be denied the benefit of regularising a long-serving worker against
a sanctioned vacant post. The default, if any, lay with the College
and the supervising authorities, who allowed the Petitioner to
work for 26 years and drew wages for him from the public
exchequer. The consequence of that default cannot be visited
upon the employee-Petitioner.
24. As regards the ‘Temporary Status’ scheme, the Counter
Affidavit makes it clear that the scheme applies to persons
engaged prior to 12.04.1993, with continuous service of 240 days
in a year. The Petitioner concedes that his engagement was in the
Page 16 of 38
.
year 1999 and, therefore, has no claim under that scheme. That
said, it must be borne in mind that the scheme is one avenue
framed by the State for a particular class of workers. Ineligibility
under one scheme cannot be transmuted into a bar under all
schemes and under the general law. Especially since the Petitioner
rests his claim of regularisation of his service on long continuous
service against a sanctioned post, on the settled law regarding
irregular appointments as explained by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, and on parity with a similarly placed co-employee. The
rejection of the Petitioner’s claim solely for want of Temporary
Status, therefore, fails to address the real basis on which such a
claim was put forth.
25. At this stage, it is apposite to reiterate the distinction
between an ‘illegal’ and an ‘irregular’ appointment which lies at
the heart of Umadevi (3) ( Supra ). The Constitution Bench, in
Umadevi (3) ( Supra ), held that regularisation is not a mode of
recruitment, that appointments made dehors the constitutional
scheme cannot confer a right to be absorbed, but recognised, in
paragraph 53, that a distinction must be drawn between an illegal
appointment and an irregular one, and directed a one-time
exercise for regularisation of those irregularly appointed, who had
Page 17 of 38
.
worked for ten years or more against duly sanctioned posts
without the protection of orders of courts or tribunals. The
classification adopted by the State’s own GA&PG Department, as
reproduced in the counter affidavit at paragraph 15, is also to the
same effect, i.e., an appointment made against a non-sanctioned
post, or of a person not possessing the essential qualification, is
illegal and, an appointment made against a sanctioned post of a
person who possessed the prescribed qualification, but otherwise
than by the due recruitment procedure, is irregular.
26. It is in this backdrop that it has to be seen on which side of
the line the case of the Petitioner falls, on the material available
on record. The Counter Affidavit, in paragraphs 12 and 20, asserts
in general terms that there were no vacant sanctioned/created
posts in the institution and that in the absence of any sanctioned
post the engagement is not valid in law. On a perusal of the
record, this Court finds the said assertion unsupported by any
document. In fact, it stands contradicted by Annexure-1, which is
a communication from the Principal of the College himself, being
the appointing/controlling authority, stating that posts of Peon and
Attendant were vacant and recommending the Petitioner and
others for regular absorption. Nothing has been placed on record
Page 18 of 38
.
by the State to show that this communication was incorrect. It is
also relevant to note that the Counter Affidavit, in para 24, admits
that Gadei Swain was indeed regularised against a vacant
sanctioned post in the same College with prospective effect. The
counter affidavit does not, moreover, specifically plead that the
Petitioner lacks the qualification prescribed for the post of Peon.
As such, the stance of the Petitioner in this regard, stands
unrebutted. Additionally, the counter affidavit, at paragraph 20,
itself concedes that the Petitioner “appears to have continued in
service in the college”, which is an acknowledgement that the
College has, for a quarter of a century, availed the services of the
Petitioner. Therefore, this Court finds it difficult to accept that the
Petitioner’s engagement was ‘illegal’ in the sense in which
Umadevi (3) ( Supra ) uses the expression. At most, the
engagement of the Petitioner can be said to have been made
without the observance of the due procedure of open selection,
and would therefore fall within the category of an ‘irregular’
engagement.
27. It is clear that the State has placed significant weightage on
the fact that, having been engaged in 1999, the Petitioner had not
completed ten years of service as on 10.04.2006. The GA & PG
Page 19 of 38
.
Department Office Memorandum dated 19.04.2022, as extracted
in the counter affidavit at Annexure-B/1, proceeds on the same
footing as well.
28. However, keeping the aforesaid in mind, this Court is
unable to accept that the one-time measure in Umadevi (3)
( Supra ) exhausts the entire field of the law on the subject or
operates as a perpetual bar on long-serving employees who could
not complete ten years by 10.04.2006. Firstly, the direction in
paragraph 53 of Umadevi was in the nature of a one-time measure
which the Constitution Bench itself directed the State
Governments and their instrumentalities to undertake, so as to put
an end to the practice of ad hoc engagements. In State of
Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari , reported in (2010) 9 SCC 247 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the one-time exercise
contemplated by Umadevi (3) ( Supra ) was to be undertaken by
the State, and that irregular appointees who had completed ten
years of service without the protection of court orders were to be
considered. In the present case, as the Petitioner has pointed out in
his rejoinder (at paragraph 6) that the Opposite Parties took no
steps whatsoever in this regard in the intervening period and
allowed the Petitioner to continue for a further period of nearly
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.
two decades. The State, having failed to do what it was called
upon to do, cannot rely on that very inaction to shut out a claim
that has since matured with the passage of time.
29. Secondly, and more importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has, in a line of recent decisions, cautioned against the
mechanical use of Umadevi (3) ( Supra ) as a shield to perpetuate
insecure, long-term temporary engagements against permanent
posts. In Jaggo v. Union of India , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3826 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Courts must look
beyond the labels attached to an engagement and consider the
realities of employment, namely continuous long-term service,
indispensable duties and the absence of mala fides or illegality in
the engagement. The Apex Court deprecated the pervasive misuse
of temporary engagements and, on a comparison with persons
who had been regularised, found the disparity violative of Articles
14 and 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also distinguished
Umadevi (3) ( Supra ) as being aimed at preventing backdoor
entries and not at penalising employees who have rendered long
service in roles integral to the functioning of the institution, and
relied on its earlier decision in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India ,
reported in (2024) 1 SCR 1230 . The relevant paragraphs of the
Page 21 of 38
.
pronouncement in Jaggo ( supra ) are reproduced hereinbelow for
better appreciation;
“ 19. It is evident from the foregoing that the
appellants' roles were not only essential but also
indistinguishable from those of regular employees.
Their sustained contributions over extended periods,
coupled with absence of any adverse record, warrant
equitable treatment and regularization of their
services. Denial of this benefit, followed by their
arbitrary termination, amounts to manifest injustice
and must be rectified.
*
21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the
initial label of the appellants' engagements and the
outsourcing decision taken after their dismissal.
Courts must look beyond the surface labels and
consider the realities of employment : continuous,
long-term service, indispensable duties, and absence
of any mala fide or illegalities in their appointments.
In that light, refusing regularization simply because
their original terms did not explicitly state so, or
because an outsourcing policy was belatedly
introduced, would be contrary to principles of fairness
and equity.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment
contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a
broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers'
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.
rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise
of the gig economy has led to an increase in
precarious employment arrangements, often
characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair
treatment. Such practices have been criticized for
exploiting workers and undermining labour standards.
Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the
principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater
responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment
practices. When public sector entities engage in
misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the
detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but
also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public
trust in governmental operations.
*
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to
curtail the practice of backdoor entries and ensure
appointments adhered to constitutional principles, it is
regrettable that its principles are often misinterpreted
or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of long-
serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish
between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It
categorically held that employees in irregular
appointments, who were engaged in duly sanctioned
posts and had served continuously for more than ten
years, should be considered for regularization as a
one-time measure. However, the laudable intent of the
judgment is being subverted when institutions rely on
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.
its dicta to indiscriminately reject the claims of
employees, even in cases where their appointments are
not illegal, but merely lack adherence to procedural
formalities. Government departments often cite the
judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no vested
right to regularization exists for temporary employees,
overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of
cases where regularization is appropriate. This
selective application distorts the judgment's spirit and
purpose, effectively weaponizing it against employees
who have rendered indispensable services over
decades. ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
30. A similar view was also reiterated in Shripal v. Nagar
Nigam, Ghaziabad , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 , where
the appellants, who had continuously performed perennial
horticultural and maintenance duties under the supervision of the
Nagar Nigam, claimed regularization and statutory benefits before
the Labour Court and, thereafter, the High Court The Apex Court
accepted the substance of their claim, holding, inter alia, that the
work performed by them was integral and perennial to the
municipal functions and that Umadevi (3) ( supra ) could not be
mechanically invoked to justify such prolonged temporary
engagement. The appeals preferred by the workmen were
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.
accordingly allowed. The relevant paragraphs of the decision are
quoted below for better appreciation;
“ 13. By requiring the same tasks (planting,
pruning, general upkeep) from the Appellant
Workmen as from regular Gardeners but still
compensating them inadequately and inconsistently
the Respondent Employer has effectively engaged in
an unfair labour practice. The principle of “equal
pay for equal work,” repeatedly emphasized by this
Court, cannot be casually disregarded when workers
have served for extended periods in roles resembling
those of permanent employees. Long-standing
assignments under the Employer's direct supervision
belie any notion that these were mere short-term
casual engagements.
14. The Respondent Employer places reliance
on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or
temporary employees cannot claim permanent
absorption in the absence of statutory rules providing
such absorption. However, as frequently reiterated,
Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments
that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the
latter being eligible for regularization if they meet
certain conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi
cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative
engagements persisting for years without the
Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given
the record which shows no true contractor-based
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.
arrangement and a consistent need for permanent
horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh
recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite
daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen
continuously rendered their services over several
years, sometimes spanning more than a decade. Even
if certain muster rolls were not produced in full, the
Employer's failure to furnish such records—despite
directions to do so—allows an adverse inference
under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian
labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage
or contractual engagements in circumstances where
the work is permanent in nature. Morally and legally,
workers who fulfil ongoing municipal requirements
year after year cannot be dismissed summarily as
dispensable, particularly in the absence of a genuine
contractor agreement… ”
( Emphasis Supplied )
31. In a similar vein, in Dharam Singh v. State of U.P. ,
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735 , the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, at the very outset, observed that where public institutions
depend, day after day, on the same hands to perform permanent
tasks, equity demands that those tasks be placed on sanctioned
posts and that the workers be treated with fairness and dignity.
Page 26 of 38
.
The Apex Court also, once again, cautioned against the selective
invocation of Umadevi (3) ( Supra ) to overlook the very cases
which the judgment itself acknowledged as appropriate for
regularisation. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid decision
are quoted hereinbelow;
“ 11. Furthermore, it must be clarified that the
reliance placed by the High Court on Umadevi
(Supra) to nonsuit the appellants is misplaced. Unlike
Umadevi (Supra) , the challenge before us is not an
invitation to bypass the constitutional scheme of public
employment. It is a challenge to the State’s arbitrary
refusals to sanction posts despite the employer’s own
acknowledgement of need and decades of continuous
reliance on the very workforce. On the other hand,
Umadevi (Supra) draws a distinction between illegal
appointments and irregular engagements and does not
endorse the perpetuation of precarious employment
where the work itself is permanent and the State has
failed, for years, to put its house in order. Recent
4
decisions of this Court in Jaggo v. Union of India
and in Shripal & Another v. Nagar Nigam,
5
Ghaziabad have emphatically cautioned that
Umadevi (Supra) cannot be deployed as a shield to
justify exploitation through long-term “ad hocism”,
the use of outsourcing as a proxy, or the denial of
basic parity where identical duties are exacted over
extended periods. The principles articulated therein
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.
apply with full force to the present case… ”
(Emphasis Supplied)
32. In Vinod Kumar v. Union of India , reported in (2024) 9
SCC 327 , the appellants, appointed on temporary basis, continued
to discharge the duties of the posts for more than 25 years. Their
claim for regularization and absorption was rejected by the
Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that their
appointments were temporary and scheme-specific, and the High
Court subsequently affirmed the said decision. In appeal, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the employment status of the
appellants could not be determined merely by reference to the
initial terms of appointment. Ultimately, while allowing the
appeals and setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the
Apex Court made the following observations;
“ 5. Having heard the arguments of both the sides, this
Court believes that the essence of employment and the
rights thereof cannot be merely determined by the
initial terms of appointment when the actual course of
employment has evolved significantly over time. The
continuous service of the appellants in the capacities
of regular employees, performing duties
indistinguishable from those in permanent posts, and
their selection through a process that mirrors that of
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.
regular recruitment, constitute a substantive departure
from the temporary and scheme-specific nature of
their initial engagement. Moreover, the appellants'
promotion process was conducted and overseen by a
Departmental Promotional Committee and their
sustained service for more than 25 years without any
indication of the temporary nature of their roles being
reaffirmed or the duration of such temporary
engagement being specified, merits a reconsideration
of their employment status.
6. The application of the judgment in Umadevi (3)
[State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 753] by the High Court does not fit
squarely with the facts at hand, given the specific
circumstances under which the appellants were
employed and have continued their service. The
reliance on procedural formalities at the outset cannot
be used to perpetually deny substantive rights that
have accrued over a considerable period through
continuous service. Their promotion was based on a
specific notification for vacancies and a subsequent
circular, followed by a selection process involving
written tests and interviews, which distinguishes their
case from the appointments through back door entry
as discussed in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753].
7. The judgment in Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka
v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S)
Page 29 of 38
.
753] also distinguished between “irregular” and
“illegal” appointments underscoring the importance
of considering certain appointments even if were not
made strictly in accordance with the prescribed Rules
and Procedure, cannot be said to have been made
illegally if they had followed the procedures of regular
appointments such as conduct of written examinations
or interviews as in the present case… ”
( Emphasis Supplied )
33. Likewise, in Bhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand & Ors. ,
reported in 2026 INSC 99 , the Appellants had been engaged by
the State against sanctioned posts on a contractual basis in 2012
and continued in service through successive extensions for over a
decade. Their claim for regularization was rejected by the High
Court on the ground that their appointments were contractual. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, examined the State’s action in
discontinuing such long-standing engagement in the context of
Article 14 of the Constitution and its obligation to act as a model
employer, and held such abrupt discontinuance of long-standing
engagement, solely on the basis of contractual nomenclature, as
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While setting
aside the impugned judgement of the High Court, the Apex Court
made the following observations relevant for the present matter;
Page 30 of 38
.
“ 13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid
action is not only vitiated by arbitrariness but is also
in clear derogation of the equality principles
enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The
respondent-State initially engaged the appellants in
their youth to discharge public duties and functions.
Having rendered long and dedicated service, the
appellants cannot now be left to fend for themselves,
particularly when the employment opportunities that
may have been available to them a decade ago are no
longer accessible owing to age constraints.
13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis
for the respondent-State’s decision to discontinue the
appellants after nearly ten years of continuous service.
We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship
between the appellants and the respondent-State was
mutually beneficial, the State derived the advantage of
the appellants’ experience and institutional
familiarity, while the appellants remained in public
service. In such circumstances, any departure from a
long-standing practice of renewal, particularly one
that frustrates the legitimate expectation of the
employees, ought to be supported by cogent reasons
recorded in a speaking order.
13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a
conscious and reasoned one. An employee who has
satisfactorily discharged his duties over several years
and has been granted repeated extensions cannot,
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.
overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We
are unable to accept the justification advanced by the
respondents as the obligation of the State, as a model
employer, extends to fair treatment of its employees
irrespective of whether their engagement is
contractual or regular.
*
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-
time employees, such as the appellants, constitute an
integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery
of the State continues to function. They are not merely
ancillary to the system, but form essential components
thereof. The equality mandate of our Constitution,
therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated
in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring that
decisions of the State affecting the careers and
livelihood of such part-time and contractual
employees are guided by fairness and reason.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
34. It may be noted at this stage, that unlike in some of the
cases decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Petitioner’s case
presents an even more compelling picture, because in the present
case there is an admission by the head of the institution, in
Annexure-1, that vacant sanctioned posts existed as far back as
2010, and the Petitioner was recommended for regular absorption.
Page 32 of 38
.
The Petitioner has by now rendered 27 years of continuous
service, which is far in excess of the ten years contemplated even
by Umadevi (3) ( Supra ). His duties, as borne out by Annexure-2
Series, were not confined to those of a mere Peon but extended to
varied institutional responsibilities, including election duties in
2024 discharged in the manner of regular employees. The
aforesaid facts have not been disputed by the Opposite Parties.
The claim of the Petitioner that he has put in more than 240 days
of service every year, and that the work was of a regular and
perennial nature, has also not been specifically controverted. Such
long-drawn and uninterrupted engagement, against work of a
perennial nature, and against a post which the institution itself has
declared vacant, does not fall prey to the ‘backdoor entry’ which
Umadevi (3) ( Supra ) set out to prevent. Instead, it is the kind of
long, continued irregularity which the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
Jaggo ( supra ), Shripal ( supra ), and a catena of other decisions
cited above, has held must be redressed on the wider principles of
fairness and equity.
35. Additionally, also, to advance his case the Petitioner claims
parity with the case of one Gadei Swain. On a perusal of the
record, particularly the copy of the judgement of this Court in
Page 33 of 38
.
W.P.(C) No.33108 of 2020, decided on 12.10.2022, this Court
notes the following undisputed features; both the Petitioner as
well as Gadei Swain were DLR employees of the same College
and both were recommended for regular absorption by the
Principal of the institution by the same letter, at Annexure-1, at Sl.
Nos. 3 and 2 respectively. Gadei Swain’s claim was initially
rejected by the same authority, Opposite Party No.3, on the same
grounds. However, this Court, in abovementioned judgement, set
aside the rejection and directed regularisation. The subsequent
Writ Appeal preferred by the State (W.A. No.1706 of 2023) was
dismissed and the State’s challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court also did not succeed. In the end, by Order No.13627/HE,
dated 08.04.2024, at Annexure-6, Gadei Swain was regularised.
Para 24 of the counter affidavit filed by the Opposite Party No.1
accepts these facts, including the fact that regularisation was made
against a vacant sanctioned post in the College.
36. The State’s opposition to the aforesaid claim of the
Petitioner is twofold: that Gadei Swain ( supra ) was decided on its
own facts and cannot be treated as a binding precedent or general
policy, and that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not
embrace negative equality. So far as the first defence is
Page 34 of 38
.
concerned, this Court, on a perusal of the record, is of the
conclusion that the State has not pointed to a single fact
distinguishing the case of the Petitioner from that of Gadei Swain.
No difference in the date or manner of engagement, in the nature
of the post, in the length of service, or in the qualifications, has
been pleaded. A bald plea that the case of the co-employee was
decided on its own facts, without specifying in what respect the
facts differ, cannot be considered as a defence to the allegation of
discriminatory treatment.
37. Likewise, regarding the second defence of negative
inequality, the principle, as explained in Chaman Lal v. State of
Punjab , reported in (2014) 15 SCC 715 , at para 15, and
Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer , reported in
(2013) 14 SCC 81 , at para 8, undoubtedly precludes a person from
claiming parity merely on the basis of an illegal, irregular,
inadvertent or erroneous benefit extended to another. The
principle, however, is not attracted to the present case in the
manner sought to be invoked by the Opposite Parties. The benefit
in question, regularisation of service of Gadei Swain, was not the
result of an inadvertent administrative error or an isolated wrong
order sought to be replicated as a matter of parity. Rather, it
Page 35 of 38
.
flowed from a considered adjudication by this Court, which was
subjected to appellate scrutiny, attained finality, and was
thereafter acted upon and implemented by the State itself. The
State, having accepted and given effect to the said determination,
cannot, for the purpose of defeating the Petitioner’s claim, seek to
characterise the benefit in Gadei Swain’s case as a mere wrong or
inadvertent benefit attracting the doctrine of negative equality.
38. Viewed in the light of the foregoing discussion, the
impugned order at Annexure-3 cannot be sustained, especially
since it proceeds on (a) the Finance Department circular and
resolution, without any reference to the judgment of this Court
holding that the Finance Department has no authority to impose a
ban in respect of educational institutions and without reference to
the judgment in Gadei Swain ; (b) the Temporary Status scheme,
which the Petitioner does not claim under; and (c) an unqualified
application of Umadevi (3) ( supra ) with reference to a cut-off
date, without considering the distinction between illegal and
irregular appointments, the subsequent explanation of the said
judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the admission of
vacancy in Annexure-1, and the claim of parity with Gadei Swain.
39. Moreover, this Court cannot lose sight of the human
Page 36 of 38
.
element of the case as well as the exploitation of employees by
engaging them for several decades with lower remuneration. The
Petitioner was engaged initially in 1999 and has served the
College in varied capacities, being treated as a regular functionary
when it suited the institution, for more than a quarter of a century.
The State, being a model employer, cannot, after taking work for
27 years, discard the workman on the ground that his initial
engagement was not preceded by a selection which the State’s
own agents failed to conduct. As the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed in Jaggo ( supra ) and Shripal ( supra ), financial
stringency and the label of the engagement cannot be used to
defeat fairness. Also, the plea of the State-Opposite Parties that
regularisation of the Petitioner’s service would encourage similar
demands and undermine recruitment discipline does not carry
weight in a case where the State has already extended the same
benefit to similarly situated persons of the same College.
40. As such, in view of the discussion above, this Court is of
the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 04.02.2025,
at Annexure-3, passed by the Director, Higher Education
(Opposite Party No.3), is unsustainable in law. The same is
hereby set aside. The Petitioner shall, in the meantime, be
Page 37 of 38
.
continued in service in terms of the order dated 06.05.2026 passed
in W.P.(C) No.13991 of 2026. The Opposite Parties are hereby
directed to regularise the services of the Petitioner in the post of
Peon in S.C.S. (Autonomous) College, Puri, against the
sanctioned vacant post, within a period of eight weeks from the
date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. The
Petitioner shall also be entitled to such consequential service
benefits flowing from the regularisation, as are admissible in law.
41. So far as the CONTC No.3479 of 2026 is concerned, it
shall be dealt with on its own merits, in accordance with law.
42. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed. However, there
shall be no order as to costs.
(Aditya Kumar Mohapatra)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
st
The 31 October, 2026/ Rubi/ Sr. Stenographer
Signature Not Verified
Page 38 of 38
.
Digitally Signed
Signed by: RUBI BEHERA
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC
Date: 02-Nov-2026 16:53:29