Matambar Mishra vs The State Of U.P. And 3 Others

Reserved
A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 3807 of 2023
Matambar Mishra
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
The State of U.P. and 3 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Mata Achal Mishra, Vinay Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A.
Court No. - 47
HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
HON'BLE SANJIV KUMAR, J.
(Delivered by Hon’ble J.J. Munir, J.)
1. This is a writ petition, which discloses a very substantial
cause of action, but seeks a non-substantial relief.
2. The case of the petitioner is one about illegal detention in
police custody for 24 hours from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, but
the relief that the petitioner seeks is a mandamus commanding
the State of Uttar Pradesh through the Additional Chief Secretary
(Home), Government of U.P., Lucknow, to ensure an inquiry into
the matter by any other superior police officer. In order to
understand the prayer for a direction to get an inquiry done by
'any other superior officer', one has to look into the deleted prayer
No.1, where the petitioner had sought quashing of the inquiry
report dated 28.12.2022 submitted by the Assistant Commissioner
of Police, Handia, Prayagraj to the Commissioner of Police,
Prayagraj, discarding the petitioner's case of illegal detention. The
first relief was deleted under orders of the Division Bench dated
14.03.2023 and notice issued with regard to Relief Nos.2, 3 and 4.

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Relief Clause No.3 is the residual clause, where the Court is
entrusted with the discretion to issue any other suitable writ, order
or direction that may be deemed fit and proper, and the fourth is
about costs. In our opinion, this is one of the very exceptional
cases, where we have to consider granting just relief to the
petitioner under Residual Clause No.3.
3. The case of the petitioner is that he was living at
Mehmoorganj in the district of Varanasi and had come over to his
native village Sidhwar, Tehsil and P.S. Handia, District Prayagraj,
th
to look after his agricultural property located there. On the 26 of
November, 2022, the petitioner had gone to his fields to take care
of his paddy crop and returned home in Village Sidhwar at about
3.00 p.m., when one Surya Prakash Dubey, the then In-charge
Police Outpost Baraut, P.S. Handia, District Prayagraj, entered the
petitioner's house. Without intimating anyone of anything or the
petitioner himself, he dragged the petitioner out of his house,
dressed in just a lungi and kurta and carried him off to the Police
Outpost Baraut. Thereafter, the petitioner was conveyed to P.S.
Handia. On way to P.S. Handia via Police Outpost Baraut, the
petitioner repeatedly asked Dubey the reason why he was being
taken to the police station. Dubey abused the petitioner and did
not disclose any reason. The petitioner was put in the Lockup of
P.S. Handia for about 24 hours from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022.
4. There are specific allegations in paragraph Nos.11 to 17 of
the writ petition to the effect that during those 24 hours of illegal
detention, the petitioner asked to be set at liberty, but Dubey
demanded a bribe of Rs.20,000/- as price for the petitioner's
liberty. The petitioner's younger brother endeavoured hard to
secure the petitioner's release and for the purpose requested Mr.
Rahul Mishra, an Advocate of District Court, Allahabad, but all
efforts proved in vain and each time, the petitioner faced a
demand of Rs.20,000/- in bribe by Dubey for his release from

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illegal custody. It is also averred that on 27.11.2022, the
petitioner's younger brother repeatedly attempted to contact
Dubey over his cellphone, but Dubey remained elusive. It is
averred specifically in paragraph No.17 that the petitioner was
released from illegal custody on 27.11.2022 at 4.00 p.m., but not
before he was forced to pay a bribe of Rs.20,000/- to Dubey.
5. Complaints in the matter were addressed by the petitioner's
son Mr. Ashish Kumar Mishra, Advocate of Delhi, to Hon'ble the
Chief Minister of U.P., the Director General of Police, U.P. and the
Commissioner of Police, Prayagraj, all sent by registered post, but
all in vain. In vain in the sense that respondent No.3, the Assistant
Commissioner of Police, Handia, Prayagraj was directed to
inquire into the matter by the Commissioner of Police, Prayagraj,
but he submitted a report rejecting the petitioner's complaint on
specious grounds and without hearing the petitioner. The most
serious objection to the inquiry undertaken by the A.C.P., Handia
is that the inquiry report was submitted by the A.C.P. and an
opinion formed about the petitioner's complaint without recording
the statement of the petitioner, his son and persons, who visited
the petitioner in the Lockup of P.S. Handia, Prayagraj during time
that he was in illegal detention. About the last part of the
allegation, it is averred in paragraph Nos.12 and 13 that one Devi
Shankar Mishra, a resident of the petitioner's village, came to
meet him in the Lockup of P.S. Handia on 26.11.2022 and also
brought him food cooked at the petitioner's home. The petitioner
ate that food on 26.11.2022 at 9.00 p.m. in the Police Lockup.
Devi Shankar Mishra was also an important witness about the fact
of illegal detention, whose statement was not taken down by the
A.C.P. while writing his inquiry report.
6. There is another objection taken by the petitioner in
proceedings drawn against him on 29.11.2022 under Section
107/116 Cr.P.C. The case is that proceedings under Section

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107/116 were a cover up to justify the petitioner's illegal detention
in the Police Lockup from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022. These
proceedings were taken on 29.11.2022 and it is argued that for a
private dispute between the petitioner and his brother's daughter-
in-law, no security proceedings for keeping peace could have
been initiated, inasmuch as those proceedings relate to instances
of breach of peace or disturbance of public tranquility, or any
wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of peace or
disturbance of public tranquility. A case of domestic violence is far
away from the Chapter proceedings under the Cr.P.C.
7. About the last part of the matter, upon notice being issued, a
counter affidavit has been filed by the Additional District
Magistrate (Judicial), Etah. The respondent's folly in initiating
proceedings under Section 107/116 concerning a case of
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domestic violence has been admitted by the 5 respondent. It is
averred in paragraph Nos.8 and 9 of the counter affidavit filed on
behalf of respondent No.5 thus:
“8. That in reply to the contents of paragraph No. 28 &
29 of the writ petition it is humbly submitted that the
notice under Section 111 Cr.P.C. was issued by the
respondent solely on the basis of a challani report
submitted by Police Station Handia. The respondent had
no independent knowledge of any domestic dispute
between the petitioner and other parties. The
respondent was not informed of the alleged incidents
dated 26.11.2022 and 27.11.2022, nor was any detail of
such domestic violence dispute brought to his attention
at the time of issuing the notice. No further
proceedings or consequential action were taken against
the petitioner pursuant to the notice issued under
Section 111 Cr.P.C. It is also humbly submitted that
while issuing the notice, the aspect of domestic
violence was not considered, which was an inadvertent
omission. For this oversight, the respondent tenders an
unconditional apology to the Hon'ble Court.
9. That it is respectfully submitted that the notice
issued under Section 111 Cr.P.C. and the challani
report forwarded by Police Station Handia were neither
served upon the petitioner nor executed in any manner.
With the passage of time, the said notice has lapsed
and, therefore, carries no present effect or operation
in law.”
8. Heard Mr. Mata Achal Mishra, learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwari, learned Additional
Government Advocate on behalf of the State.

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9. So far as the issue of proceedings under Section 107/116
Cr.P.C. is concerned, we must remark that what was reported to
the Police, in whatever form, was at best a case of domestic
violence, or may be a domestic squabble. There was nothing
which was an offence, on the basis of which an FIR or even an
NCR could be registered. If that could not be done, the scope of
security proceedings under Section 107/116 Cr.P.C. and all the
other relevant provisions of Chapter VIII of Cr.P.C. would not be
attracted. Those proceedings are essentially designed to preserve
peace and public tranquility. Such proceedings are about public
peace and tranquility and not domestic peace or tranquility. These
should never have been taken and the affidavit on behalf of
respondent No.5 admits that the fact was not brought to his notice
that at the bottom of the proceedings, was a case of domestic
violence. Reference in this connection may be made to a Bench
decision of the Bombay High Court in Fayyaz Shamshoddin Attar
v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 9012,
where it has been held:
“20. The record and circumstances already mentioned
show that it was purely matrimonial dispute. From the
wording of section 107 of Cr. P.C., this Court has no
hesitation to observe that it was not possible to take
the matter under section 107 of Cr. P.C. No crime was
registered either of cognizable nature or non-
cognizable nature by police on the basis of application
dated 22.7.2012. No crime was registered against the
present petitioner in the past also. No attempt was
made to see that settlement can be arrived between the
parties as it was dispute of matrimonial nature and
wife had approached police for first time.”
10. There are definite allegations in paragraph Nos.8, 9 and 10
of the writ petition about the petitioner being dragged to the police
station by Dubey, a Sub-Inspector, In-charge of Police Outpost
Baraut, P.S. Handia and illegally confined him in the Police
Lockup from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022. In paragraph Nos.11 and
14 of the writ petition, there is a specific allegation that upon the
petitioner's demand to be released from illegal police custody,
Dubey demanded a bribe of Rs.20,000/-. In paragraph Nos.12
and 13 of the writ petition, there is a case about Devi Shankar

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Mishra, a resident of the petitioner's village, visiting him in the
Police Lockup and bringing him food cooked at the petitioner's
home for his evening meal.
11. The most relevant of the counter affidavits, though others
are also relevant, is Dubey's personal affidavit dated 03.12.2025.
While answering the case of the petitioner in paragraph Nos.8, 9
and 10 of the writ petition about being illegally dragged out of his
house by Dubey and confined in the Police Lockup from
26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, there is no specific denial of the fact in
paragraph No.4 of Dubey's counter affidavit. In the absence of a
specific denial of the petitioner’s case of illegal detention in the
police lockup by Dubey from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, the fact of
illegal detention would be deemed to have been admitted. What is
said there, is that as per G.D. No.23 dated 27.11.2022, Dubey
came to his office and a compromise letter was prepared
regarding a domestic violence complaint between the first party
Ritika and the second party Matambar Mishra, that is to say, the
petitioner. The compromise was made mutually without any
pressure. Both parties came to the Police Outpost Baraut, Handia
and agreed that there would be no dispute. Their Advocate, Mr.
Rahul Mishra, prepared the compromise letter. Both parties
agreed to the compromise letter. They did not criticize behaviour
of the Police. In paragraph No.5 of the rejoinder affidavit, the
petitioner has reiterated his case of being dragged out of his
home by Dubey, dressed in just a lungi and kurta and forcibly
taken first to Police Outpost Baraut and thence to P.S. Handia,
where he was illegally detained in the Police Lockup from
26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, in order to insult him and lower his
status and dignity in the society.
12. What we notice is, as already remarked, that there is no
outright denial of the fact that Dubey did not bring the petitioner to
the police station. What is attempted is a tacit denial, which, in

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reality, is no denial in the face of such specific allegations of rough
handling and illegal confinement by a police officer. The fact of
illegal detention would, therefore, be deemed to have been
admitted. What is acknowledged by Dubey is the fact that there
was a complaint against the petitioner by Ritika, his daughter-in-
law, who in fact is the petitioner's brother's daughter-in-law, about
domestic violence. It is then said that the petitioner and Ritika,
both came to the police station and mutually compromised the
matter without any pressure. The foremost thing to be seen is that
if it was a case of domestic violence and nothing more. The Police
had little business in the matter unless there was a definitive
cognizable offence committed. Admittedly, that was not. If it was
only a case of domestic violence, Ritika's remedy lay in moving
the learned Magistrate for appropriate relief under the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
13. Apparently, Ritika went to the police station with a complaint
against the petitioner and it was Dubey, who swung into action. It
is beyond all possible standards of behaviour of a man,
circumstanced as the petitioner, that he would walk in to the police
outpost or the station upon his daughter-in-law lodging a
complaint of domestic violence, and without hassle amicably write
out a compromise in Dubey's presence. Dubey after all was not a
spiritual Guru, a Panch Parmeshwar or a community leader, to
whom the petitioner and his daughter-in-law would head out
voluntarily to submit their dispute for guidance and amicable
settlement. He is a police officer, who is feared because he
possesses the coercive authority of the State. There is a gaping
flaw in Dubey's account between Ritika's complaint about
domestic violence made to him and the petitioner coming over to
the police outpost or the station voluntarily, as if it were, and
writing out a compromise. It is impossible that the petitioner would
have walked in to the police outpost or the station to compromise.

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14. In these circumstances, there is little cavil that entertaining a
complaint of mere domestic violence, Dubey dragged the
petitioner to the police outpost and then locked him up at the
police station, as the petitioner says, for 24 hours. The petitioner
has not given an exaggerated account and it inspires confidence
with us. The allegations about Dubey demanding a bribe, we are
not inclined to go into. In so far as the last mentioned allegation is
concerned it truly goes to the remit of the disciplinary authority or
the Police themselves, or may the Vigilance Establishment or the
Anti-Corruption Bureau, to examine and determine.
15. Here all that we are concerned with is a question of the
petitioner's right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution in its most nascent form. We are convinced that
Dubey has recklessly violated the most fundamental essence of
this most valuable fundamental right by dragging the petitioner out
of his home on the basis of a complaint, he was not authorized to
act upon, and, then, carrying the petitioner away in custody, first
to the police outpost, Baraut and then confining him in the police
lockup at Police Station Handia from 26.11-2022 to 27.11.2022
without the authority of law.. The proceedings under Section
107/116 Cr.P.C., that were drawn up against the petitioner by
Dubey, which could never have been taken in regard to a case of
domestic violence, were also a cover up to somehow obliterate
Dubey's misdeed in illegally confining the petitioner in the Police
Lockup at P.S. Handia for 24 hours without authority of law.
th
Though, proceedings were taken on the 29 and the petitioner
was liberated from Dubey's illegal custody on 27.11.2022, these
proceedings were a measure taken out of panic to raise a
semblance of defence for all that Dubey had done to the
petitioner. It is for this reason that respondent No.5 has
acknowledged the fact that the proceedings, though instituted, did
not lead to service of processes upon the petitioner and he was

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not asked to furnish any bonds etc. during the relevant period of
time of six months.
16. In Pankaj Kumar Sharma v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and
others, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6215, confronted with a similar
question, the Delhi High Court held:
“7. It is stated that the Petitioner herein called the
police. However, when the police reached the spot, they
picked up the Petitioner and placed him in the lock-up. The
fact that the Petitioner was picked up from the spot
without an FIR against him, subsequently brought to the
Police Station and placed in the lock-up has not been
disputed by the State authorities.
8. The facts of the case reveal that, even though it was
for a short period of time, the Petitioner was deprived of
his personal liberty, a right protected under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. It is evident that the
authorities acted in a high-handed manner without
respecting the Petitioner's liberty placed him in the lock-
up without following due procedure of law or the principles
that have been laid down when an arrest is made.
xxxxx
10. This Court is deeply troubled by the fact that the
Petitioner was not even arrested. He was simply picked up
from the spot, brought to the Police Station and placed
inside the lock-up for no rhyme or reason. The high-handed
way in which the Police authorities have acted, throwing to
winds the constitutional and fundamental rights of a
citizen, is appalling. This Court is troubled at the way
the citizens are being treated by the Police authorities
who behave as if they are above the law. A punishment of
censure alone is not sufficient in the facts and
circumstances of this case.
11. The Apex Court in D.K. Basu (supra) also observed as
under:-
"44. The claim in public law for compensation for
unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to
life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed
under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict
liability and is in addition to the claim available in
private law for damages for tortious acts of the public
servants. Public law proceedings serve a different
purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of
compensation for established infringement of the
indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution is a remedy available in public law since
the purpose of public law is not only to civilise
public power but also to assure the citizens that they
live under a legal system wherein their rights and
interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of
compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article
226 of the Constitution of India for the established
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the
public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer

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CRLP No. - 3807 of 2023
and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the
State which failed in the discharge of its public duty
to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.
x x x x
46. In Nilabati Behera case [(1993) 2 SCC 746: 1993 SCC
(Cri) 527: 1993 Cri LJ 2899], It was held: (SCC pp.
767-68, para 32)
"Adverting to the grant of relief to the heirs of a
victim of custodial death for the infraction or
Invasion of his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India, it is not always enough to
relegate him to the ordinary remedy of a civil suit
to claim damages for the tortious act of the State as
that remedy in private law indeed is available to the
aggrieved party. The citizen complaining of the
infringement of the indefeasible right under Article
21 of the Constitution cannot be told that for the
established violation of the fundamental right to
life, he cannot get any relief under the public law
by the courts exercising writ jurisdiction. The
primary source of the public law proceedings stems
from the prerogative writs and the courts have,
therefore, to evolve 'new tools' to give relief in
public law by moulding it according to the situation
with a view to preserve and protect the Rule of Law.
While concluding his first Hamlyn Lecture in 1949
under the title 'Freedom under the Law' Lord Denning
in his own style warned:
'No one can suppose that the executive will never
be guilty of the sins that are common to all of us.
You may be sure that they will sometimes do things
which they ought not to do: and will not do things
that they ought to do. But if and when wrongs are
thereby suffered by any of us what is the remedy?
Our procedure for securing our personal freedom is
efficient, our procedure for preventing the abuse
of power is not. Just as the pick and shovel is no
longer suitable for the winning of coal, so also
the procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions
on the case are not suitable for the winning of
freedom in the new age. They must be replaced by
new and up-to-date machinery, by declarations,
Injunctions and actions for negligence.... This is
not the task of Parliament the courts must do this.
of all the great tasks that lie ahead this is the
greatest. Properly exercised the new powers of the
executive lead to the welfare state; but abused
they lead to a totalitarian state. None such must
ever be allowed in this country.""
12. Similarly, In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orisa, (1993)
2 SCC 746, while dealing with the power of a constitutional
court to award compensation rather than relegating such
person to file a suit for recovery of damages, the Apex
Court observed as under: -
"22. The above discussion indicates the principle on
which the court's power under Articles 32 and 226 of
the Constitution is exercised to award monetary
compensation for contravention of a fundamental right.
This was indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 1983
SCC (Cri) 798: (1983) 3 SCR 508] and certain further

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CRLP No. - 3807 of 2023
observations therein adverted to earlier, which may
tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated
therein, do not really detract from that principle.
This is how the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah
[(1983) 4 SCC 141: 1983 SCC (Crl) 798: (1983) 3 SCR
508] in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal
((1965) 1 SCR 375 AIR 1965 SC 1039 (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144]
distinguished therefrom. We have considered this
question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at
times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in
such proceedings, instead of directing the claimant to
resort to the ordinary process of recovery of damages
by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case,
on the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of
compensation to the petitioner for the custodial death
of her son."
13. The said principle is now well established that in
cases where there can be no dispute of facts, the
constitutional courts have the power to award compensation
in case person has been deprived of his life and liberty
without following the procedure established by law.
14. The time spent in the lock-up by the Petitioner, even
for a short while, cannot absolve the police officers who
have deprived the Petitioners of his liberty without
following the due procedure established by law. A
punishment of censure which is not likely to have any
effect on the career of the police officers will not be a
sufficient deterrent to the officer. The censure should be
of such nature that other officers too must not emulate
such actions in future. This Court is of the opinion that a
meaningful message must be sent to the authorities that
police officers cannot be law unto themselves. In the facts
of this case, even though the illegal detention of the
Petitioner was only for about half an hour, this Court is
inclined to grant compensation of Rs. 50,000/to the
Petitioner, which shall be recovered from the salaries of
Respondents No. 4 and 5.”
17. This Court must remark at this stage that ideally cases of
such kind of illegal detention should go to the Courts of ordinary
original civil jurisdiction. In this State, ordinary original civil
jurisdiction vests depending upon the valuation, either with the
Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) or the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), the latter holding
unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. Whatever the causes might be,
including a large number of statutes that exclude the jurisdiction of
the Civil Court in all matters, wherever action of administrative
authorities is the subject matter of issue, even in cases where a
statute is not in the field and it is a tort pure and simple done by
administrative functionaries under the colour of authority, or may
the brazen violation of a fundamental right, as precious as liberty,
be
by constant course of social frown and at times the supervising

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CRLP No. - 3807 of 2023
Courts' discouragement, the Civil Judges in the State for decades
have lost the working authority, if not the jurisdiction, to try such
suits and award compensation. It is for this reason that whenever
the few and far between cases of the award of compensation for
brazen acts of torts committed by functionaries of the Electricity
Corporation or the Municipal Corporation or deprivation of liberty
etc. at the hands of Police come to pass, it is in the exercise of the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Such compensation or damage
awarded albeit has to be ad hoc in nature.
18. We must take note of the fact that though the cause of
action here is one essentially complaining of illegal deprivation of
the petitioner's liberty in its most basic form by illegal confinement
in a Police Lockup at the hands of a police officer, acting under
the colour of authority, the petitioner's Relief Clause No. 2 is
limited to seeking an inquiry into Dubey's conduct by any other
superior police officer. The holding of a disciplinary inquiry into the
conduct of a police officer is essentially an administrative function
of the Government or the superior officers of the police. Even if
that relief is granted and Dubey punished in departmental
proceedings, it would not remedy the wrong which the petitioner
has suffered on account of illegal deprivation of his liberty. It is not
a matter with which the Court is primarily concerned or would
recognize as relief for violation of the petitioner's liberty
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. When the fact was
pointed out to the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there
was no relief claimed on the foot of which a violation of his right
under Article 21 the Constitution, if found in his favour, could be
remedied, he came up with an oral prayer that grant of some
monetary compensation may be considered by this Court. No
doubt that relief has not been claimed but the mere absence of a
formal relief in a matter which is as fundamental as the most
brazen violation of the petitioner's fundamental right to life and
liberty in its most nascent form would not deprive this Court of its

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jurisdiction to grant necessary relief to remedy the violation of that
fundamental right. In the view that we take we are fortified by the
guidance of the Supreme Court on principle in M. Sudakar v. V.
Manoharan and others, (2011) 1 SCC 484. In M. Sudakar (supra),
it was held:
“ 14. The power to mould relief is always available to the
court possessed with the power to issue high prerogative
writs. In order to do complete justice 9 it can mould the
relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the
case. In the facts of a given case a writ petitioner may
not be entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but
this itself will not preclude the writ court to grant such
other relief which he is otherwise entitled…………….”
19. Reference for the principle may be made to a Bench
decision of the Orissa High Court in Berhampur University and
another v. Ganesh Chandra Behera and others, 2021 SCC
OnLine Ori 2399. In Ganesh Chandra Behera (supra), it has been
held:
“29. Therefore, in view of pronouncements of the Apex
Court, so far as “moulding of relief" is concerned, this
Court is of the considered view that even if there is no
such specific prayer has been made in the writ petitions,
this Court can and ought to grant such relief The principle
of "moulding of relief" has been rightly invoked by the
learned. Single Judge because allowing the writ petitions
in its original form would have been antithetical to the
relief sought in the original form of the writ petitions.
Therefore, the learned Single Judge after due consideration
of the fact that it was the second round of litigation and
in order to thwart any possibility of future litigation
arising out of the same issue did well to cut through the
clutter and get to the root of the issue in order to do
complete and substantial justice between the parties by
moulding the relief.“
20. This Court, in Shiv Kumar Verma and another v. State of
U.P. and another, 2021(5) ADJ 493 (DB), was confronted with a
claim by the petitioners seeking compensation for illegal detention
from 12.10.2020 to 21.10.2020 in connection with Case No. 624
of 2020 under Sections 151, 107 and 116 CPC, Police Station
Rohania, District Varanasi. After extensively considering the
question of abuse of authority by Public Authorities, the Court took
note of the State Government's policy dated 23.03.2021 providing
for the payment of compensation of Rs. 25,000/- for illegal

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detention of any citizen by any officer of the State and initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against such officer. This Court disposed
of the aforesaid writ petition in terms of the following order:
“23. We record our appreciation for the State Government to
take the aforequoted policy decision dated 23.3.2021 for
payment of compensation of Rs. 25,000/- for illegal
detention of any citizen by any Officer of the State
Government and initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against such officer. Since the State Government itself has
taken a policy decision and has paid compensation to the
petitioners herein, therefore, no further direction for
payment of compensation is required to be issued in the
present writ petition.
24. In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition is
disposed of with the following directions :
(i) The State Government shall ensure that the provisions
of the Cr.P.C. as referred in the policy decision dated
23.3.2021 are strictly followed/observed by all the
concerned officers.
(ii) The State Government shall further ensure that
paragraph 12 of the policy decision dated 23.3.2021 is
strictly implemented, which at the cost of repetition is
reproduced below:
(1) भारत के संवि धान के अनुच्छेद  की अैध विहरासत विकये
-21 का उल्लंघन करते हुये विकसी व्यवि
जाने के लि$ए अनुशासविनक प्राधिधकारी द्वारा जांच में दोशी पाये जाने पर उत्तरदायी अधिधकारी के वि रूद्ध
उ0 प्र0 सरकारी से क (अनुशासन ए ं अपी$ ) विनयमा $ी , 1999, विद आ$ इंधि7या सर्वि सेज
(धि7सिसप्$ीन एं7 अपी$) रूल्स, 1969 ए ं उ 0 प्र0 अधीनस्थ श्रेणी के पुलि$स अधिधकारिरयों की
(दण्7 और अपी$) विनयमा $ी , 1991 (यथा संशोधिधत) में संगत विनयमों के अंतगFत दण्7ात्मक
कायF ाही की जायेगी।
(2) अनुशासविनक प्राधिधकारी द्वारा अपनी जांच रिरपोर्टF 03 माह में अथ ा संगत विनयमा$ी में यथा
उसिल्ललिKत समयानुसार प्रस्तुत की जायेगी।
(3) यविद विकसी नागरिरक की अ ैध रूप से विहरासत प्रमाणिणत पायी जाती है तो पीविMत व्यवि को
रू0-25,000/ की धनराणिश का भुगतान मुआ जे के रूप में विकया जायेगा।
(iii) The State Government shall publish Para 12 of its
Policy decision dated 23.3.2021 in all largely circulated
National Level Newspaper having circulation in the State of
Uttar Pradesh and shall also display it on display board at
prominent places within public view, in all blocks, Tehsil
Headquarters, Police Stations and in campus of District
Collectorate in the whole of the State of Uttar Pradesh.
(iv) Copy of this order shall be sent by the State
Government to all District level and Tehsil level Bar
Associations in the whole of the State of Uttar Pradesh.
21. Declaration of the law by this Court and the laying down of
good policies by the Government, more often than not, has little
effect upon the sundry officers who have to implement the policy
of the Government or the laws laid down by this Court. They are
persistent by habit in their old ways and seem to have faith more

15
CRLP No. - 3807 of 2023
in the statistics that out of a case of one thousand violations or
may be much more hardly, one citizen would go forward to
enforce his right and bring accountability to them. It is for this
reason that in cases where a citizen gets up to enforce his right
and comes forward to this Court, it becomes our duty to enforce
what is already a declared right of his under the Constitution, the
laws, the State Government policy and our interpretation thereof.
After all, there are officers all around who believe that the violation
would go unnoticed, more often than not.
22. In the totality of circumstances, we hold that the petitioner
was illegally deprived of his liberty by Dubey, a police officer, in
the colour of exercise of authority of the State, and for the
aforesaid act, the petitioner must be given monetary recompense.
We think that ends of justice would be met, if the State are
ordered to pay the petitioner for his illegal detention in police
custody from 26.11.2022 to 27.11.2022, a total sum of Rs.25,000/-
together with costs in the sum of Rs.10,000/-. We are also of
opinion that the State ought be granted liberty, upon payment of
the compensation and costs awarded to the petitioner, to recover
it from Dubey in whatever manner they deem appropriate,
including deducting it from his remuneration.
23. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed with
costs, which we quantify in the sum of Rs.10,000/-. Respondent
Nos.1, 2 and 3 are ordered by a mandamus to pay the petitioner
ad hoc compensation in the sum of Rs.25,000/- within a period of
thirty days of the communication of this order with liberty to
recover the sum of this compensation, together with costs, after
these have been paid to the petitioner, from Dubey in whatever
manner respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 find it appropriate, including
recovery from Dubey's remuneration and other funds in the hands
of the respondents. Needless to say that it will be open to the
petitioner to bring a regular suit for damages and establish his

16
CRLP No. - 3807 of 2023
claim before a Court of competent jurisdiction in regard to his
illegal detention, where any compensation, if awarded, shall take
into account the ad hoc compensation that we have granted here.
24. Let this judgment be communicated to the Additional Chief
Secretary (Home) Government of U.P., Lucknow, the
Commissioner of Police, Prayagraj, the Assistant Commission of
Police, Handia, Prayagraj and Surya Prakash Dubey, the then In-
charge, Police Outpost Baraut, P.S. Handia, District Prayagraj by
the Registrar (Compliance).
(Sanjiv Kumar,J.) (J.J. Munir,J.)
May 29, 2026
Anoop/ Prashant
Digitally signed by :-
ANOOP KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad