Ram Charan Aggarwal (Deceased) Through Legal Heir vs Prem Lata & Anr.

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 18.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026

# CNR No. DLHC013227572022
+ RC.REV. 36/2022, CM APPL. 60370/2025 (Seeking to place
on record affidavits sworn by R-2), CM APPL. 49624/2026 (To
place on record Written Synopsis), CM APPL. 53346/2026
(U/O XXXII Rule 15 CPC) & CM APPL. 53347/2026 (Dir.)

RAM CHARAN AGGARWAL (DECEASED) THROUGH
LEGAL HEIR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Alok Kumar, Sr. Advocate,
with Ms. Manisha Agrawal
Narain, Mr. Amit Kumar Singh,
Mr. Varun Maheshwari, Mr.
Manan Soni, Ms. Kavita Bardia
and Ms. Suhani Jain, Advocates
versus

PREM LATA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Pawan S. Bindra, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sunil Dutt
Dixit and Mr. Shashwat Dixit,
Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1
1. The present Revision Petition has been filed under the proviso
2
to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , assailing

1
Petition
2
DRC Act
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

3
the Order dated 16.09.2021 passed by the learned SCJ-cum-Rent
4
Controller (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Eviction
5
Petition No. RC ARC 79653/2016 , whereby the Application seeking
leave to defend, filed by the Petitioner herein, came to be dismissed
and an Order of eviction was consequently passed in favour of the
Respondents in respect of the ground floor of the property bearing
6
No. 1375, Katra Lehswan, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006 .
2. The dispute between the parties, however, has its genesis in a
series of proceedings concerning the rights in and to the subject
premises, which has been the subject matter of litigation between the
members of the family for several decades. It would, therefore, be
apposite to notice the relevant factual background leading to the filing
of the Eviction Petition and, eventually, the present Petition.

BRIEF FACTS:

3. The subject premises formed part of the properties in which the
partnership firm, M/s Lalji Mal Tika Ram, had tenancy rights. The
tenancy in respect of the subject premises originally commenced
pursuant to an agreement dated 06.04.1935, under which the property,
then belonging to M/s Puran Chand Rattan Lal, was taken on rent by
late Shri Ganeshi Lal, who was at the relevant time the sole proprietor
of M/s Lalji Mal Tika Ram.
4. Late Shri Ganeshi Lal subsequently died on 09.10.1981.
Disputes thereafter arose inter se his two sons, namely , Shri Ram
Charan Aggarwal and Shri Ram Gopal Aggarwal, concerning the
partnership business, its assets and the various properties associated

3
Impugned Order
4
learned RC
5
Eviction Petition
6
subject premises
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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therewith, including the tenancy rights in the subject premises. The
ensuing disputes resulted in several proceedings between the two
brothers before different Courts. During the pendency of the said
proceedings, the parties arrived at a settlement.
7
5. By Order dated 23.10.2007 , the broad terms of the settlement
were recorded, pursuant to which the immovable properties were to be
divided between the two brothers through a bidding process in respect
of three lots, namely , Delhi, Mumbai and Hathras. The bids were
thereafter submitted, and by Order dated 14.02.2008, Shri Ram
Charan Aggarwal emerged as the highest bidder in respect of the
Delhi lot, amongst the other lots.
6. The distinction between the ownership of the subject premises
and the tenancy rights therein subsequently assumed significance. The
subject premises had, in fact, been purchased by Smt. Prem Lata and
Shri Ram Kishan, wife and son of Shri Ram Gopal Aggarwal, by a
8
registered Sale Deed dated 25.05.1998 from Shree Mahalakshmi
Investment and Property Company Limited. At the relevant time, the
ground floor continued to be in the occupation of M/s Lalji Mal Tika
Ram as a tenant.
7. After the settlement, disputes arose as to the precise nature of
the rights which had devolved upon Shri Ram Charan Aggarwal
pursuant to the bidding process. While Shri Ram Charan sought to
assert ownership rights over the subject premises, the Respondents
maintained that what had been transferred to him under the
compromise was only the tenancy rights therein. This question came

7
Compromise Order
8
Sale Deed
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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9
to be considered in Execution Petition No. 227/2010 and thereafter
10
in Appeal in EFA (OS) Nos. 23-24/2010 .
8. The Division Bench of this Court, hearing the Appeal, vide its
Judgment dated 03.08.2012, examined the compromise orders, the
statements of the parties and the decree and held, insofar as the subject
premises were concerned, that the partnership firm had only tenancy
rights therein and that the compromise had conferred upon Shri Ram
Charan Aggarwal the tenancy rights and not the ownership rights in
the property. The said decision thereafter attained finality upon
dismissal of the proceedings carried further by Shri Ram Charan
Aggarwal, including the SLP and Review Petition.
9. In the interregnum , the Respondents, asserting themselves to be
the owners and landlords of the subject premises, instituted the
Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The
Petitioner, in response thereto, filed an Application seeking leave to
defend, raising, inter alia , objections concerning the ownership and
land lordship of the Respondents and the bona fide requirement
pleaded by them.
10. In support of their bona fide requirement, the Respondents
pleaded that, consequent upon the earlier settlement and the handing
over of possession of the Delhi properties, they had been left without
any reasonably suitable commercial premises for carrying on their
business activities. It was stated that the subject premises were
required for their commercial activities and that the other premises
relied upon by the Petitioner either did not belong to the Respondents

9
Execution Petition
10
Appeal
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BHATIA
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or were residential or tenanted accommodations and were, in any
event, not reasonably suitable for the requirement pleaded.
11. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that the present
Eviction Petition had earlier been the subject matter of proceedings
before this Court in RC.REV. 209/2016, Prem Lata & Anr. v. Shri
Ram Charan Aggarwal . The Order dated 28.03.2016, passed by the
learned ARC allowing the application seeking leave to defend, was
assailed before this Court and was set aside vide Order dated
08.03.2018, with the matter being remanded for fresh adjudication of
the application for leave to defend under Section 25-B of the DRC
Act.
12. Upon such remand, the learned RC, after considering the
Application seeking leave to defend, the reply thereto and the
additional material placed on record, dismissed the said Application
vide the Impugned Order and consequently passed an order of eviction
in favour of the Respondents.
13. It is in the aforesaid factual backdrop that the present Revision
Petition falls for consideration before this Court.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
14. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
would submit that the Impugned Order has been passed mechanically,
without examining the circumstances in which the Eviction Petition
came to be instituted and, in particular, the absence of any change in
circumstances between the settlement arrived at between the parties
and the institution of the Eviction Petition.
15. He would submit that the Respondents and the Petitioner belong
to two branches of the same family and that the disputes between the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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parties had culminated in the settlement recorded by this Court in the
proceedings between the family members. Pursuant to the said
settlement, the parties had participated in the bidding process, and the
Petitioner had emerged successful in respect of the Delhi properties,
including the tenancy rights in the subject premises, for which
substantial consideration had been paid to the Respondents‟ branch of
the family.
16. He would submit that the Respondents had, at the time of the
settlement, expressly agreed to the arrangement and had undertaken
that no further claim would be made in respect of the properties
forming the subject matter of the settlement.
17. Learned senior counsel would submit that the Respondents
thereafter obtained the benefit of the consideration flowing from the
settlement and, upon possession of the subject premises being handed
over to the Petitioner on 28.08.2008, instituted the Eviction Petition
on 05.12.2008, i.e. within approximately 100 days of such handing
over of possession.
18. He would submit that the ground pleaded in the Eviction
Petition was that, pursuant to the settlement, the Respondents had
been required to give up possession of their business premises and
consequently required the subject premises for continuing their
business.
19. He would contend that there was, however, no change
whatsoever in the circumstances between the settlement, the handing
over of possession and the institution of the Eviction Petition which
could explain the sudden emergence of such a bona fide requirement.
20. He would submit that the learned RC has failed to examine this
circumstance in its proper perspective and has proceeded to accept the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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plea of bona fide requirement without considering whether the alleged
paucity of accommodation was, in fact, self-induced by the
Respondents themselves pursuant to the settlement voluntarily entered
into between the parties.
21. He would submit that having consciously participated in the
bidding process, accepted the bid in favour of the Petitioner and
received the consideration payable pursuant thereto, the Respondents
could not thereafter seek to recover the very premises in respect of
which the Petitioner had acquired rights under the settlement, by
asserting a requirement which was a direct consequence of the
arrangement voluntarily accepted by them.
22. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the terms of
the settlement and the statements made by the parties before this Court
gave rise to a contractual arrangement governing the rights in the
subject premises and that the Respondents were, therefore, not entitled
to disregard the same and invoke the provisions of the DRC Act
without the said arrangement being examined in evidence.
23. He would submit that the questions of waiver, estoppel and the
effect of the representations and undertakings given by the
Respondents at the time of settlement necessarily raised triable issues
and could not have been summarily rejected at the stage of
consideration of the Application for leave to defend.
24. He would further submit that the learned RC has failed to
appreciate the Judgment dated 03.08.2012 passed by the Division
Bench of this Court in its proper perspective. According to learned
senior counsel, the said Judgment was concerned with the nature and
extent of the rights which had devolved upon the Petitioner pursuant
to the settlement and did not have the effect of extinguishing or
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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rendering nugatory the contractual and equitable consequences
flowing from the settlement itself.
25. He would submit that the learned RC has misread the said
Judgment by treating it as conclusively answering the objections
raised by the Petitioner in the present proceedings, whereas the effect
of the settlement, the consideration paid thereunder and the
subsequent conduct of the Respondents remained matters requiring
adjudication.
26. Learned senior counsel would submit that the Petitioner had
specifically raised these circumstances in the Application seeking
leave to defend and had thereby disclosed facts which, if established,
would materially affect the Respondents‟ claim of bona fide
requirement.
27. He would submit that the learned RC, however, failed to
appreciate the cumulative effect of the settlement, the substantial
consideration paid by the Petitioner, the handing over of possession on
28.08.2008 and the institution of the Eviction Petition on 05.12.2008,
and mechanically proceeded on the basis of the Respondents‟ pleaded
requirement.
28. He would, therefore, submit that the aforesaid circumstances, at
the very least, disclose triable issues with regard to the bona fides of
the requirement pleaded by the Respondents, the effect of the
settlement and the alleged waiver and estoppel arising therefrom, and
that the Petitioner ought to have been granted leave to defend.
29. He would accordingly pray that the Impugned Order be set
aside and the Petitioner be granted leave to defend the Eviction
Petition.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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30. Per contra , learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents would submit that the Impugned Order calls for no
interference and that the learned RC has considered the objections
raised by the Petitioner in their proper perspective.
31. He would submit that the issue regarding the nature of the rights
acquired by the Petitioner pursuant to the compromise is no longer
open for consideration, having been conclusively dealt with by the
Division Bench of this Court in its Judgment dated 03.08.2012 in the
Appeal, wherein it was held that the Petitioner had acquired only the
tenancy rights in respect of the subject premises and not the ownership
thereof.
32. He would submit that the said Judgment was carried further and
the challenge thereto ultimately failed, and consequently the status of
the Respondents as owners/landlords of the subject premises cannot
be reopened in the present proceedings.

33. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the allegation
that the Eviction Petition was actuated by mala fides is without basis.
He would submit that the Respondents had been carrying on their
business from the subject premises and, pursuant to the compromise
and the handing over of the premises to the Petitioner, were left
without any reasonably suitable commercial accommodation for
carrying on their business.
34. He would contend that the requirement pleaded in the Eviction
Petition was, therefore, a genuine consequence of the Respondents‟
existing business requirement and not a device to resile from the
compromise.
35. Insofar as the allegation of self-induced paucity is concerned,
learned senior counsel would submit that the compromise merely
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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determined the respective rights of the two branches of the family in
the properties and did not create any permanent bar against the
Respondents asserting a bona fide requirement of premises which
continued to belong to them.
36. He would submit that the Petitioner cannot derive any right
beyond the tenancy rights which were expressly recognised in his
favour and which had already been upheld by the Division Bench of
this Court.
37. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the
Respondents had specifically disclosed the accommodation which was
available to them and had explained why the same could not constitute
reasonably suitable alternative commercial accommodation.
38. He would submit that the property at 1303, Katra Dhulia,
Chandni Chowk, was itself a small tenanted premises measuring
approximately 12‟ × 7‟, whereas the other properties referred to by the
Petitioner were residential premises and were neither available nor
suitable for the commercial requirement pleaded in the Eviction
Petition. The Respondents had also disclosed the subsequent
residential accommodation occupied by them, despite the same not
having been specifically referred to by the Petitioner.
39. He would submit that the allegation that the Respondents had
deliberately concealed properties is, therefore, incorrect and that each
of the properties relied upon by the Petitioner had been dealt with in
the pleadings and material placed before the learned RC. The mere
existence of residential properties or a small tenanted commercial
premises cannot displace the Respondents‟ right to seek possession of
the subject premises for their bona fide commercial requirement.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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40. Learned senior counsel would accordingly submit that the
learned RC has correctly appreciated the effect of the compromise, the
subsequent Judgments of this Court, the Respondents‟ ownership and
the requirement pleaded by them, and has rightly concluded that no
triable issue was disclosed by the Petitioner.
41. He would, therefore, pray that the present Petition be dismissed.

ANALYSIS:
42. This Court has heard learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material on
record, including the Impugned Order.
43. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

44. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
11
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
12 13
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua ,
has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
45. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj

11
(1998) 8 SCC 119
12
(2014) 9 SCC 78
13
(2022) 6 SCC 30
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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14
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
15
Grover .
46. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior
court on the decision-making process, inclusive of procedural
compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and
supplant its views with that of the trial court by exercising the
appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process
adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very
restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on
the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence
of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to
disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving
inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to
converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first
appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.”

47. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that

14
2024:DHC:9322
15
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
48. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
49. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
50. The first aspect which requires consideration is the nature of the
enquiry which the learned RC was required to undertake while
considering the Application seeking leave to defend. Section 25-B of
the DRC Act prescribes a special and summary procedure for eviction
petitions instituted on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso
to Section 14(1) of the DRC Act. However, the summary nature of the
procedure does not dispense with the statutory right of the tenant to
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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defend where the affidavit discloses facts which, if established, would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction.
51. Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act casts a positive obligation
upon the Rent Controller to grant leave to defend where the affidavit
filed by the tenant discloses facts which, if established, would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of
possession. At this stage, the Rent Controller is not required to
determine whether the defence raised by the tenant would ultimately
succeed at trial. The limited enquiry is whether the facts disclosed in
the tenant‟s affidavit raise a triable issue which, if proved, could
defeat the landlord‟s claim for eviction. Section 25-B of the DRC Act
is reproduced hereinbelow:
“25-B. Special procedure for the disposal of applications for
eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement .- (1) Every
application by a landlord for the recovery of possession of any
premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to
16
sub-section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A [or under
section 14B or under section 14C or under section 14D], shall be
dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in this
section.
(2) The Controller shall issue summons, in relation to every
application referred to in sub-section (1), in the form specified in
the Third Schedule.
(3) (a) The Controller shall, in addition to, and simultaneously
with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant, also direct the
summons to be served by registered post, acknowledgment due,
addressed to the tenant or his agent empowered to accept the
service at the place where the tenant or his agent actually and
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for
gain and may, if the circumstances of the case so require, also
direct the publication of the summons in a newspaper circulating in
the locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or
carried on business or personally worked for gain.
(b) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the
tenant or his agent is received by the Controller or the registered
article containing the summons is received back with an
endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee

16
Ins. by Act 57 of 1988, sec. 13 (w.e.f. 1-12-1998).

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BHATIA
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to the effect that the tenant or his agent had refused to take delivery
of the registered article, the Controller may declare that there has
been a valid service of summons.
(4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in
the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in the
Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the
premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which
he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave
from the Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his
appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such
leave, the statement made by the landlord in the application for
eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the
applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground
aforesaid.
(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the
application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts
as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in
clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under
section 14A.
(6) Where leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application,
the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as
early as practicable.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of
section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in a
proceeding to which this Chapter applies, follow the practice and
procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of
evidence.
(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the
recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in
accordance with the procedure specified in this section:
Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying
itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is
according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such
order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.
(9) Where no application has been made to the High Court on
revision, the Controller may, exercise the powers of review in
accordance with the provisions of Order XLVII of the First
Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908).
(10) Save as otherwise provided in this Chapter, the procedure for
the disposal of an application for eviction on the ground specified
in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or
under section 14A, shall be the same as the procedure for the
disposal of applications by Controllers.”

52. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Precision Steel & Engineering
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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17
Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal , while considering the
scope of Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act, emphasised that the
statutory language casts a mandatory obligation upon the Rent
Controller to grant leave where the affidavit discloses facts which
would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of recovery of
possession. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court further recognised that the
question whether a triable issue arises has to be determined with
reference to the facts and circumstances of each case.
53. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Hon‟ble Supreme
18
Court in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh , wherein it was held that
there appears to be a mistaken belief that the tenant must, at the stage
of seeking leave to defend, make out a case so strong as would itself
non-suit the landlord. The test is one of a triable issue and not of final
success in the eviction proceedings. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court
further cautioned that, at that stage, the parties ordinarily rely upon
affidavits and assertions and counter-assertions, which may not
furnish incontrovertible material enabling the Court to arrive at a final
conclusion one way or the other. The relevant paragraphs from the
said decision are as follows:
“11. As is evident from Sections 25-B(4) and (5) of the Act,
burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit
filed by him discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord
from obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the
premises on the ground specified in clause ( e ) of the proviso to
Section 14(1) of the Act, with which we are concerned in this case,
are good enough to grant leave to defend.
12. A landlord, who bona fidely requires a premises for his
residence and occupation should not suffer for long, waiting for
eviction of a tenant. At the same time a tenant cannot be thrown
out from a premises summarily, even though prima facie he is able
to say that the claim of the landlord is not bona fide or untenable
and as such not entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence the

17
(1982) 3 SCC 270
18
(2001) 1 SCC 706
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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approach has to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing
leave to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition within the
broad scheme of Chapter III-A and in particular having regard to
the clear terms and language of Section 25-B(5).
13. We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant
seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a
case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from
obtaining an order of eviction. It would not be a right approach to
say that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong
case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend should not be
granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25-B(5). A leave
to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a
routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special
provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. Leave to defend
cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere
design or desire of a landlord to recover possession of the premises
from a tenant under clause ( e ) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may not be
bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction
of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his
family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is
granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of
eviction. At the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on
affidavits in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and
counter-assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and
acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one
way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable evidence
available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by
the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable
or most unreasonable. Take a case when possession is sought on
the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his
need and not his mere desire. The ground under clause ( e ) of the
proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 enables a landlord to
recover possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of his
bona fide requirement. This being an enabling provision,
essentially the burden is on the landlord to establish his case
affirmatively. In short and substance, a wholly frivolous and totally
untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend, but
when a triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent
Controller by the statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of
granting leave the real test should be whether facts disclosed in the
affidavit filed seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the
landlord would be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction
and not whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to remember
that when leave to defend is refused, serious consequences of
eviction shall follow and the party seeking leave is denied an
opportunity to test the truth of the averments made in the eviction
petition by cross-examination. It may also be noticed that even in
cases where leave is granted provisions are made in this very
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Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25-
B(6) states that where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the
eviction application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of
the application as early as practicable. Section 25-B(7) speaks of
the procedure to be followed in such cases. Section 25-B(8) bars
the appeals against an order of recovery of possession except a
provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined effect of
Sections 25-B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to expeditious disposal of
eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for a
long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to
defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer
great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having
regard to competing claims.
14. This Court in Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand [(1983) 1
SCC 301] while dealing with the question in the matter of granting
leave to defend to contest the eviction petition filed on the ground
of personal requirement, in para 5 has stated thus: (SCC pp. 302-
03)
“ 5 . What should be the approach when leave to defend is
sought? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless
the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as
would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be
granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to
defend is sought, the tenant must make out such a prima
facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would
emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to
grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not
the final success in the action (see Santosh Kumar v. Bhai
Mool Singh [AIR 1958 SC 321 : 1958 SCR 1211 ] ). At
the stage of granting the leave parties rely in support of
their rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and
counter-assertions on affidavits may not afford such
incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative
conclusion one way or the other. Conceding that when
possession is sought on the ground of personal
requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a
mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be
something more than a mere desire. And being an
enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to
establish his case affirmatively. If as it appears in this
case, the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is
purchased, may be in the name of his sons and daughters,
but there may not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in
his old age, a triable issue would come into existence and
that was sufficient in our opinion to grant leave to defend
in this case.”
In the same judgment, in para 7 it is further observed: (SCC p. 303)
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“ 7 . The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to
principles of natural justice, the principal amongst them
being that no one shall suffer civil or evil or pecuniary
consequence at his back without giving him an adequate
and effective opportunity to participate to disprove the
case against him and provide his own case. Summary
procedure does not clothe an authority with power to
enjoy summary dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly frivolous
defence may not entitle a person leave to defend. But
equally a triable issue raised, enjoins a duty to grant leave.
Maybe in the end the defence may fail. It is necessary to
bear in mind that when leave to defend is refused the party
seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of
the averments of the opposite party by cross-examination
and rival affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for
concluding the point one way or the other. It is not for a
moment suggested that leave to defend must be granted on
mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to grant
leave though triable issues are raised and the controversy
can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth
through cross-examination of witnesses who have filed
their affidavits. Burden is on the landlord to prove his
requirements and his assertion is required to be tested
more so when it is shown that for long he is staying
outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing in the
names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at
which place he receives his normal correspondence. If in
such a situation one can say that a triable issue is not
raised, one is at a loss to find out where, when and in what
circumstances such an issue would arise. We are,
therefore, satisfied that this is a case in which triable
issues were raised and both the learned Rent Controller
and the High Court were in error in refusing to grant the
leave.”
15. This decision is also referred to, reiterating the same view, in a
later decision of this Court in the case of Precision Steel & Engg.
Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal [(1982) 3 SCC 270].”
(emphasis supplied)

19
54. Similarly, in Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand , the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that when leave to defend is sought, the
tenant is required to disclose a prima facie case raising a triable issue.
The test is not whether the defence would ultimately succeed. It was

19
(1983) 1 SCC 301
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further emphasised that a summary procedure does not clothe the Rent
Controller with the power to summarily dismiss a defence where the
controversy requires adjudication upon evidence and examination of
witnesses. The said principles were subsequently reiterated in
Inderjeet Kaur (supra).
55. The aforesaid principles have particular significance in a
petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, since the requirement
of the landlord is required to be bona fide . The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Inderjeet Kaur (supra) has specifically observed that where
possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, the
landlord has to establish a genuine need and not merely a desire.
Where the defence raised by the tenant is not wholly frivolous or
untenable and raises a triable issue concerning such requirement, leave
to defend ought to follow.
56. It is equally well settled that while the landlord's assertion of
bona fide requirement is entitled to due consideration, such assertion
is not immune from scrutiny at the stage of leave to defend. In Baldev
20
Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini , while considering a similar statutory
scheme, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court recognised that the requirement
of the landlord has to be genuine or bona fide and that the tenant
cannot be deprived altogether of the opportunity to demonstrate that
the requirement is not genuine. The tenant, however, has to place
cogent material facts before the Controller to rebut the initial
presumption in favour of the landlord.
57. Thus, the enquiry under Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act lies
between two extremes. While leave to defend cannot be granted on the
basis of vague, bald or wholly frivolous assertions, the tenant is not

20
(2005) 12 SCC 778
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required to conclusively establish his defence or prove that the
eviction petition must ultimately fail.
58. Upon a cumulative consideration of the foregoing statutory
provisions, the scheme and object of Section 25-B of the DRC Act,
and the principles consistently laid down in the judicial precedents
referred to hereinabove, the following principles emerge as governing
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Controller while considering
an application for leave to defend under Section 25-B(5) of the DRC
Act:
(a) Section 25-B(5) casts a positive and mandatory obligation upon
the Rent Controller to grant leave where the tenant‟s affidavit
discloses material facts which, if established, would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order of eviction.
(b) The test is whether the tenant has disclosed a triable issue, and
not whether the defence would ultimately succeed. The tenant
need only make out a prima facie case warranting adjudication
and is not required to conclusively establish the defence at this
stage.
(c) Where the defence involves disputed questions of fact requiring
evidence, cross-examination or fuller adjudication, such issues
ordinarily warrant leave and should not be conclusively
determined merely on the basis of competing affidavits.
(d) The summary procedure under Section 25-B is intended to ensure
expeditious disposal and does not permit summary rejection of a
defence where a genuine triable issue is disclosed.
(e) In proceedings under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord must
establish a bona fide requirement and not merely a desire for
possession. Material facts which genuinely place such
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requirement in issue may therefore constitute a triable issue.
Conversely, vague, bald, frivolous or wholly untenable assertions
do not constitute a triable issue and, by themselves, do not
warrant grant of leave.
(f) The tenant‟s pleadings must be considered cumulatively. Where
the facts disclosed, read with the material on record, raise a
reasonable and bona fide controversy concerning an essential
ingredient of the landlord‟s claim, the tenant ought to be granted
leave to defend.
59. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid statutory framework and
the principles governing the grant of leave to defend under Section 25-
B(5) of the DRC Act that the findings and conclusions recorded by the
learned RC in the present case are required to be examined. The
relevant findings and observations contained in the Impugned Order
are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:
“i) Availability of alternate suitable accommodation.
Respondent has stated that petitioners are in possession of
property no. 1303, Katra Dhuliya, Chandni Chowk from where Sh.
Ram Kishan is carrying on his business. However, the petitioner
has already stated in reply to leave to defend that the said property
is a small rented accommodation measuring 12X7 feet and the
same was taken on rent only in June 2008. Even rent receipts with
respect to the said property have been filed by the petitioners. The
respondent had contended that the said rent receipts can not be
taken into account as the same is not signed by tenant. However,
the contentions of the respondent is baseless as the said rent
receipts is duly signed by the landlord. Since, the petitioner is
claiming that he has taken the said property on rent, it was
imperative that the same should have been signed by the landlord,
which is the case herein.
ii Property no. A-2, Bhamashah Road , Delhi:- It is
contended by the petitioner that the said property had been taken
on rent only for 11 months.
The respondent had merely made bald allegations, without
any supporting documents or proof to show that the said property
is still in occupation of the petitioner.
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iii Property no. B-3/2, Rana Pratap Bagh , Delhi:-The
respondent had merely made bald allegations, without any
supporting documents or proof to show that the said property is
still in occupation of the petitioner.
iv Propety no. C-7/7, Model Town , Delhi:-As regard this
property, respondent himself has mentioned in his first application
for subsequent events dated 03.03.2016, in para no. 7 that the said
property is on first floor. It is further contended by the petitioner
that the said property is purely residential.
The respondent had not been able to show by way of
documentary or any other evidence that the said property is being
utilized for commercial purpose.
v Property no. D-6/2A, First Floor, Rana Pratap Bagh ,
Delhi:- The respondent had not been able to show by way of
documentary or any other evidence that the said property is being
utilized for commercial purpose.
14. In order to show that the property is alternatively availabile, it
is essential for the respondent to show that the property available is
also suitable to meet the bonafide requirement as set by the
petitioner in the eviction petition. In the present case, the
respondent had mentioned number of properties which are
available to the petitioner, however, as per the petitioner, need of
the petitioner is for commercial property. The mere occupation or
possession of property in residential area would not meet the need
of the petitioner suitably. As regard, the properties which have
been taken on rent by the petitioner, it is more practicle for any
person to utilize the property he owns rather than to take another
property on rent to meet his requirement.
“it has been held by Hon'ble Delhi High Court recently in
KHEM CHAND & ORS. Vs. ARJUN JAIN & ORS.
pronounced on 13.09.2013 , "that while applying the
principle that landlord is the best judge in case of
commercial tenancy, the court should act cautiously and
should not apply principle to such case as liberally as
applied on residential premises. The principle that the
landlord is the best judge to decide his residential
requirements and the court has no business to interfere
cannot be applied as a matter of necessary consequence
without application of the judicial mind. This is due to the
reason that even though the ground of eviction available to
the landlord to vacate the tenant for both residential or
commercial premises is the same, still the requirement of
landlord vary from case to case basis. Eviction of the
commercial premises effects right to livelihood of one
person who is a tenant. The said right of livelihood is
equally the other facet of right to live as available to the
landlord under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Thus, in the event of adopting a summary procedure to
vacate the tenant, who is earing his livelihood from a
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commercial place at the behest of the landlord and
proceeding to effect the longstanding status of commercial
tenancy on the ground of bonafide requirement, the court
must take a precautious approach. While deciding question
of genuineness of the need or availability of alternative
accommodation, the court must apply judicial mind rather
than merely reiterating the theorem based principle that
landlord is the best judge to decide his need. The court
should weigh the competing right to livelihood of both the
landlord and the tenant and adopt a balance approach”.
“The Supreme Court in Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai (2002)
6 SCC 16 held that 'an alternative accommodation', to
entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be
reasonably suitable, obviously in comparision with the
accommodation whereform the landlord is seeking
eviction. It was further held that the availability of another
accommodation suitable and convenient in all respects as
the accommodation from which the landlord is seeking
eviction may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to
bonafides of the landlord, if he unreasonably refuses to
occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. It
was yet further held that the bonafides of the need of the
landlord for the premises or additional premises have to
be determined by the Court by applying objective
standards and once the Court is satisfied of such bonafide,
then in the matter of choosing out of more accommodation
than one available to the landlord, his subjective choice
shall be respected by the Court. It was yet further held that
for the business which the landlord proposes to start, an
accommodation situated on the first floor cannot be said to
be an alternative suitable accommodation in comparision
with the shops situated on the ground floor; a shop on the
first floor cannot attract the same number of customers
and earn the same business, as a shop situated on the
ground floor would do. Again, in Uday Shankar
Upadhyay v. Naveen Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503, it
was held that it is not for the Courts to say that the
landlord should shift to the first floor or any higher floor
as it is well known that shops and businesses are usually
conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can
reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court cannot
dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his
business and that is for the landlord himself to decide".
"In Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 405 ,
it has been clearly held that “A tenant who alleges that
landlord has at his disposal other accommodation has to
place before the Ld. ARC some material to show that the
landlord has a specific alternative accommodation at his
disposal” Therefore, even if the petitioner has properties
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available, the same are already occupied or are in
residential area. The property in question is situated at a
Commercial hub, and the respondent had not been able to
bring out any property which is equally suitable to the
petitioner as the tenanted premises".
The respondent had contended that the petitioners have
purchased the abovesaid property at Rana Pratap Bagh, Delhi.
However, the entire family of the petitioners are not expected to
adjust in one accommodation, specially when the petitioners were
earlier residing at Sultan Singh and had ample space. The growing
need of the petitioners for residence cannot be ignored.
In the judgment tiled as "Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh
Chand Gupta " reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 2507 , it
was held:
“…The landlord may convince the Court that the alternate
residential accommodation though available is still of no
consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to
satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in
demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an
alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the
landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in
comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction.
Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family
members would be relevant factors. While considering the
totality of the circumstances, the Court may keep in view the
profession or vocation of the landlord and his family
members, their style of living, their habits and the
background wherefrom they come...".
Further, in another landmark case of " Sarla Ahuja v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME
COURT 100" , whereby it was held that :
".....The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section
14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for
occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When
a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own
occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the
presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When
other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the
landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent
Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the
landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not
for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else
he can adjust himself without getting possession of the
tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides
of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to
make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself....".
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Therefore, expecting that the petitioners would adjust themselves
in a small space or would sit idle till the disposal of the eviction
petition, would go beyond the scope of DRC Act. The need of the
petitioners cannot be looked into with criminal suspicion. Neither
the need of the petitioners can be rejected only on the ground that
they have acquired residential property. The respondent had taken
the risk while bidding before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and had
tendered the rent even after the bid. The respondent was aware of
the consequences of the bid, specially when the other bidding party
was the owner of the tenanted premises. In respect of other
properties in the bid, it was categorically stated that ownership
rights were being transferred. The concept of perpetual or
permanent tenancy cannot be stretched in the present case. The
term that the parties would enjoy unhindered and unobstructed
possession, did not mean that that the respondent would enjoy the
property forever. It could have meant that the parties would not
interfere with the possession illegally, however, in the present case,
the petitioner had approached the court within the boundary of law.
Furthermore, it had already been held by Hon'ble DB, that the
petitioner can file eviction petition.
In view of the above, the plea regarding availability of
alternate suitable accommodation is dismissed.
iii) It is contended that the tenated premises was commercial in
nature and the judgment in Satyawati has not attained finality.
The respondent had taken exhaustive pleas on the validity of
the judgment titled as, Satyawati Sharma Vs Union of India
2008 5SCC 287.
Admittedly, there is no stay as to the operation of law as held
in the landmark judgment Satyawati Sharma Vs Union of India
2008 5SC 287 . Therefore, the plea taken by the respondent is
rejected as baseless.
iv) That the petitioners intend to sell the tenanted premises on huge
Pugree and therefore the petition has been filed malafidely.
The only consideration before the Court while deciding leave
to defend is whether the need of the petitioner is bonafide and
whether the petitioner does not have any other suitable alternate
accommodation. The apprehension that the petitioner might not
utilize the property for the bonafide purpose or he might resell it,
has been taken care of by the legislature in Section 19 of DRC Act
itself. Hence, leave to defend can not be granted on the mere
apprehension of the property being resold. The plea is accordingly
rejected.
v) Non-filing of the complete site plan of the entire
accommodation. The respondent had merely stated that many
portion of the entire accommodation are in the occupation of the
petitioner and are lying locked and vacant. However, no supporting
document has been filed by the respondent to clearly show as to
which all portions are available with the petitioner. The respondent
himself has not filed the site plan of complete accommodation and
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only site plan of ground floor of the property (tenanted premises)
has been filed.
If a tenant does not file any site plan, then site plan filed by the
landlord is assumed to be correct. R.K. Bhatnagar Vs. Sushila
Bhargav 1986 RLR 232; Jagmohan Singh Vs. K.M. Bhatnagar
1995 RR 527; V.S. Sachdeva vs M. L. Grover 67(1997) DLT 737;
Harvansha Lal vs Madan Lal 1997RLR383;
The respondent had further contended that the petitioner has
wrongly named certain rooms as godown, however, the same is
only nomenclature used by the petitioner.
The tenanted premises is in possession of the respondent, the
respondent herein had not disputed the size of the tenanted
premises, therefore, the plea taken by the respondent is rejected
being baseless.
vi) It has been contended by the respondent that he had got
physical possession of the tenanted premises in a compromise
which was arrived on 23.10.2007 before Hon'ble Delhi High Court
after paying huge bid amount. It had been further stated that in the
said order of Hon'ble Delhi High Court, it was categorically stated
that “Whoever suceeds to this property consequent to the bid
would not be hindered in the enjoyment of the same”.
Hence, it had been contended that once the respondent had
paid amount towards the premises, the tenancy could be best
described as permanent tenancy and therefore, the petitioner has
not right to obtain possession by filing eviction petition. The
respondent had also challenged the bonafide need of the petitioner
stating that the tenancy rights were acquired in bid and present
petition has been filed after 100 days of handing over of the
possession.
I have perused the orders of Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the
Apex Court.
Hon'ble Division Bench of HMJ Sanjiv Khanna and HMJ S.P.
Garg, Delhi High Court had set aside the order of execution of
settlement qua the tenanted premises, holding that only the tenancy
rights have been acquired by Sh Ram Charan in the bid and not the
ownership rights as such. That Sh ram Charan had moved Review
petition of the said order, stating that it had been agreed that he
would not be evicted. The said Review was also dismissed, as the
same was found without merits, vide order dated 26.9.2012.Sh
Ram Charan preferred SLP against the said order, and the same
was also dismissed vide order dated 24.1.2013. The Review
petition was also dismissed the apex court vide order dated
10.7.2013.
In paragraph no. 26 of EFA(OS) 23 and 24 of 2010, dated
03.08.2012, i.e order on appeal by DB of Hon'ble D.B. of HMJ
Sanjiv Khanna and HMJ SP Garg, it is stated that “Ld. Counsel for
the respondent submitted that reading of the order dated
14.02.2008 and the statement of the parties recorded on the same
date show that the parties were entitled to possession and enjoy
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properties without any obstruction. The contentions do not have
any merits. The order and the statement of the parties show what
was to be transferred and handed over was the possession of the
property. The tenancy rights of the property were earlier in favour
of partnership firm of which both Ram Gopal and Ram Charan
were partners. In view of the aforesaid order and payment made,
Ram Charan became the sole tenant and entitled to tenancy rights
in the property to the exclusion of Ram Gopal. It was to this extent
and reason that the possession was to be transferred. In none of the
orders, it is recorded that ownership of the property was to be
transferred”. Further, in para 23 of the same order, it had been held
that "the respondent had given bid only for tenancy rights and not
for the ownership rights that belongs to Prem Lata and Ram
Kishan.
In para 29, it had been held that “the respondent was aware
that he was giving a bid for the tenancy rights and not the
ownership rights. When the bids were given, they also took the
inherent risk involved when a person take or required tenancy
rights, which are protected in law. Any other person or third person
could have been landlord or owner of the property and right to seek
eviction would have approved to the benefit of said owner or
landlord”.
Hence, it is ample clear and had been already held by the
Hon'ble Division Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the same
has been affirmed by the Apex Court that ownership rights were
not transferred to the respondent. As regard to the claim of the
respondent with respect to permanent tenancy, the term “use of
property without obstruction” has also been dealt with in the above
order of the Hon'ble Division Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court.
In fact, it has been categorically stated in the abovesaid order that
the right to file eviction petition would not be dilluted. The
respondent had been taken plea regarding permanent tenancy,
however, the same goes against the order of the Hon'ble Division
Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court as mentioned above. It had
already been held that the respondent had taken the risk of the
tenancy while bidding for the same. The issue once decided
operates as resjudicata and can not be readjudicated in the present
petition as a plea in leave to defend.
As per law, the ownership rights can not transferred only in
view of the transfer of property act coupled with registration act. In
the present case, the respondent had got the compromise arrived
before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court registered, however, mere
registration of the compromise would not change and would not
come in the way of the finality of order of the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court. Once, it had been held that the petitioner herein have the
right to file the petition for eviction, the respondent can not claim
that since the compromise had been registered, respondent had
acquired some special rights even contrary to what has been held
by the Hon'ble Division Bench.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

Respondent has relied upon number of judgments in support
of his contentions of permanent tenancy, however, same are not
relevant in view of the discussion above.
The respondent has challenged the bonafide of the petitioner.
Bonafide requirement
In order to evaluate whether the need of the petitioner is bonafide
or not, let us understand the legislative and judicial connotation of
the term, „bonafide‟.
In landmark case Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC
705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:-
“The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken
ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a
landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that
there must be first a requirement by the landlord which
means that it is not a mere whim. or a fanciful desire by
him; further, such requirement must be bonafide which is
intended to avoid the mere whim or desire . The bonafide
requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested
in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is
not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative
intent is made further clear by making the provision that
the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or
town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need
is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative
for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the
accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in
sub-section (e) of Section 12(1) of the Act in respect of
accommodation let for residential purposes. Thus, the
legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the
Court is duty-bound to examine not merely the
requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction
petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable
non-residential accommodation in his occupation in the
city/town is available, The judgment/order of the
court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not
show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these
statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the
superior court will be justified in upsetting such
judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision.
Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a
question of fact . But in recording a finding on the question
the court has to bear in mind that statutory mandate
incorporated in Section 12(1)(f ). If it is found that the
court has not applied the statutory provisions to the
evidence on record in its proper perspective then the
finding regarding bonafide requirement would cease to
be a mere finding of fact. for such erroneous finding
illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment."
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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th
Chambers 20 Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean
"in good faith and genuine". Requirement is not a mere desire. The
degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more
higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is
suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the
outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control
legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an
outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with mere
pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord
claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of
the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant.
Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and
circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides
would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective
determination by the court. In short, the concept of bonafide need
or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by
the realities of life. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the
landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe
for him a residential standard of their own.
The meaning of “Bonafide” in the context appears to be in
two folds. (a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and
not a frivolous one. (b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous
considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant
with a view to let it out again to another tenant at a higher rent.
It had been contended that since the present petition has been
filed within 100 days of the compromise, it means that the need of
the petitioner is not bonafide. However, as has been held in the
Judgment of the Hon'ble DB as held above, mere bid before the
Hon'ble Delhi High Court did not take away the right of the
petitioner to file eviction petition. The respondent must have
carried the risk of eviction and tenancy at the time of bidding.
In the present case, the petitioners had stated that they have no
place to carry out business. As regards shop no 1303, the same is
rented out. Even otherwise, the petitioners are not supposed to sit
idle and the law does not mandate that after filing of the eviction
petition, the petitioner/landlord cannot do any business. The
present petition was filed in 2008, more than 12 years have already
passed.
In view of the above the pleas taken by the defendants are
rejected.
vii) That Ms. Prem Lata is a very simple lady having no business
acumen. Hence,
It had been held in Rishal Singh V Bohat Ram, RC Rev 495
of 2012, High ourt of Delhi, by HMJ Najmi Waziri, that “The
argument of the counsel of the tenant that the grandson of the
landlord, lacking the skill and knowledge to operate such a
business, should not be granted eviction petition, lacks merit as
there is rich body of judicial pronouncements which has settled the
law, by holding that the landlord or the member of the family of
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BHATIA
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the landlord who is construed to be dependent,does not necessarily
need to possess the skill or knowledge in the area of business for
which the eviction is sought.
In Ram Babu Vs Jai Kishan 2009 RL 58 (NSC), SC, it had
been held, “a person can start a new business even if he has no
experience. That does not mean his claim is a false claim. Many
people start new businesses even if they do not have experience in
the new businesses, and are successful.”
viii) That petitioner no. 2 is carrying out the business from 1303,
under the name and style of M/s Mittal Enterprises and the need of
the petitioners is malafide. It had been further contended that the
income of the petitioner had been increased from Rs. 2.2 lakhs in
year 2010 to Rs. 45 lakhs in the year 2018 and petitioner has
purchased D6/2A, Rana Pratap Bagh, Delhi and hence, the
petitioners do not require the tenanted premises.
The respondent has placed clipping in pen drive on record
and also certain documents. It has been contended that phone
number of petitioner no. 2 has been mentioned on the documents
of Mittal Enterprises, hence, petitioner no. 2 only is carrying out
business of Mittal Enterprises in the name of his wife.
The facts that the income of the petitioners have increased
does not stops the petitioners from working or from filing eviction
petition.
I have perused all the documents filed by the respondents and
have also gone through the pen drive. There is apparently nothing
on the record to show that the petitioner no. 2 is carrying out the
business in the name of his wife. Merely because the phone
number of the petitioner no 2 is mentioned on the record of the
M/S Mittal Enterprises, do not mean that the petitioner no 2 is
carrying out the business. Eevn otherwise, the petition has been
filed for the business need of all the petitioners. Law does not
expect the landlord to sit idle. Each and every petitioner, is entitled
to start a business and to work, irrespective of the fact whether the
other members of his family are working or not. The tenant cannot
curtail the fundamental right of a person to work.
On the other hand, the respondent has himself has stated that
the premises are in the dilapidated condition. The respondent has
himself has not placed any document on record to show that he is
actually working from the tenanted premises or that the tenanted
premises are being utilized by the tenant. The respondent had taken
a plea that the premises is situated in congested area and therefore
the same is not suitable. There is no bar on carrying out of business
from the area in which the tenanted premises is situated.
Furthermore, the premises, admittedly, is situated in commercial
hub in Chandni Chowk, Delhi, hence, can not be said that the same
is not suitable for carrying out commercial activity.
The respondent had made bald allegations challenging the
bonafide of the petitioners, however, there is no bar under law that
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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husband and wife can have two separate businesses. The plea taken
by the defendant is thus rejected.
11. In Ram Swaroop v. Viney Kumar Mahajan dated 24h July,
2017 in RC Rev. No. 112/2016 and Lalta Prasad Gupta v. Sita
nd
Ram dated 2 August, 2017 in RC Rev. No. 352/2017, it has been
held that leave to defend application has to be treated differently
from a written statement and on the basis of simple denial of
averments in the petition for eviction or by merely making vague
averments, leave to defend cannot be obtained and that if the same
were to be permitted there would be hardly any case where leave
to defend would be refused in as such as the Advocates with their
skilful drafting would be able to take pleas in the application for
leave to defend irrespective of whether there is any merit therein or
not.
Section 25 (B) 5 of the Delhi Rent Control Act requires the
tenant to, in the application for leave to defend, disclose facts as
would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction
under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act. If the facts disclosed,
even though disputed by landlord, even if believed, would not
disentitled the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under
Section 14 (1) (e), then also, no leave to defend has to be granted.
Only if the facts disclosed in the application for leave to defend are
such which though are disputed by the landlord but on trial if
proved would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of
eviction under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act, can leave to defend be
granted.
When the tenant does not produce anything at all before the
Court on the basis whereof there is any chance of the tenant
proving what he has stated, the only inference is that the facts
disclosed are not capable of being proved and/or not capable of
disentitling the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction under
Section 14 (1) (e) of the Rent Act.
In Labhu Lal v. Sandhya Gupta, 173 (2010) DLT 318 , it was
held that “Before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must
show that some triable issues which dis-entitled the applicant from
getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same
time, entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is
prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows.”
Hence, in view of the above discussion, I am of the view that the
respondent had not been able to put forth a defence which if
proved would disentitle the petitioners of the relief claimed. The
respondent had not been able to prove how the bonafide need as
portrayed by the petitioners is not bonafide or that the petitioners
are having alternate suitable accommodation which can be utilized
to meet the bonafide need.
12. In view of the above discussion and the judicial
pronouncements, leave to defend application is dismissed.
Landlord tenant relationship is not disputed. The petitioner has
been able to establish its better title on the tenanted premises. As
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BHATIA
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discussed in the aforesaid paragraphs, the petitioner has been able
to prove its bonafide requirement as well. Since leave to defend is
dismissed, and considering the petitioner has shown its bonafide
and fulfilled the requisites of section 14 DRC, petitioner has
become entitled to eviction. Consequently, eviction order is liable
to be passed against the respondents u/s Section 25 B (4) of the
Act. In view of above, petitioner is held entitled for recovery of the
tenanted premises, ground floor of the property bearing no. 1375,
Gali Lehwan, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-110006, as shown in the red
color in the site plan as annexed with the petition.
However, the petitioner would not be entitled to initiate
execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted
premises before expiration of six months from today in view of
provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act. Keeping in view the
facts & circumstances of the case, no order as to costs.”

60. A bare perusal of the Impugned Order, as extracted
hereinabove, shows that the learned RC considered the objections
raised by the Petitioner in detail. While doing so, in respect of the
contentious facts, the learned RC made the following material
findings:
(a) In relation to property No. 1303, Katra Dhuliya, Chandni Chowk,
the learned RC recorded that the premises measured
approximately 12‟ × 7‟ feet and had been taken on rent by the
Respondents herein ( Petitioners therein ) in June 2008. The
learned RC also accepted the rent receipts relied upon by the
Respondents herein.
(b) In relation to property No. A-2, Bhamashah Road, Delhi, the
learned RC noted the contention of the Respondents that the
premises had been taken on rent for a period of only 11 months.
The learned RC further observed that the Petitioner herein
( Respondent therein ) had produced no material to establish that
the premises continued to be in the occupation of the
Respondents herein.
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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(c) In relation to property No. B-3/2, Rana Pratap Bagh, Delhi, the
learned RC similarly recorded that the Petitioner herein had
produced no material to establish that the premises continued to
be in the occupation of the Respondents herein.
(d) In relation to property No. C-7/7, Model Town, Delhi, the
learned RC noted that the premises were situated on the first
floor and that the Respondents herein claimed them to be purely
residential. The learned RC further observed that the Petitioner
herein had produced no material to establish that the premises
were being used for commercial purposes.
(e) In relation to property No. D-6/2A, First Floor, Rana Pratap
Bagh, Delhi, the learned RC recorded that the Petitioner herein
had produced no documentary or other material to establish that
the premises were being used for commercial purposes.
(f) The learned RC also recorded the contention of the Petitioner
herein that Respondent No. 2 herein was carrying on business
from property No. 1303 under the name and style of M/s Mittal
Enterprises, and that the income of the Respondents herein had
increased from approximately Rs. 2.2 lakhs in 2010 to Rs. 45
lakhs in 2018.
(g) In support of that contention, the learned RC noted the
documents and other material relied upon by the Petitioner
herein, including documents bearing the telephone number of
Respondent No. 2 in connection with M/s Mittal Enterprises.
According to the Petitioner herein, those documents indicated
that Respondent No. 2 was carrying on the business in the name
of his wife.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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(h) Upon considering the material on record, the learned RC found
no material to establish that Respondent No. 2 herein was
carrying on the business of M/s Mittal Enterprises in the name of
his wife.
(i) The learned RC further noted that the Petitioner herein had
himself described the tenanted premises as being in a dilapidated
condition and situated in a congested area.
(j) The learned RC also noted that the tenanted premises were
situated in Chandni Chowk, which was admittedly a commercial
area.
(k) The learned RC further recorded that the Petitioner herein had
produced no material to establish that he was actually carrying on
business from the tenanted premises or that the premises were
being used by him for any commercial purpose.
(l) On a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid and its other
findings, the learned RC concluded that the Petitioner herein had
failed to establish either that the Respondents herein had
alternative suitable accommodation or that their pleaded
requirement was not bona fide . On that basis, the application for
leave to defend was dismissed.
61. On a consideration of the aforesaid findings in conjunction with
the other factual circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the
view that the learned RC failed to apply the requisite legal test for
determining whether the Petitioner had disclosed facts warranting the
grant of leave to defend. On a consideration of the material on record,
this Court is unable to sustain the conclusion that the Petitioner‟s
application for leave to defend was liable to be rejected.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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62. The error in the learned RC‟s approach is evident from the
manner in which the objections raised by the Petitioner were
considered. The learned RC repeatedly proceeded on the basis that the
Petitioner had failed to prove or conclusively establish various aspects
of the case, including the availability and suitability of the alternative
properties and their alleged use. This approach, however, overlooks
the limited and specific enquiry required at the stage of considering an
application for leave to defend under Section 25-B of the DRC Act. At
that stage, as noted hereinabove, the Court is not required to finally
adjudicate disputed questions of fact or determine whether the tenant
has conclusively established the defence sought to be raised.
63. Once the contents of the affidavit filed by the Petitioner,
considered along with the material brought on record, disclosed facts
and circumstances which, prima facie , could bear on the landlord‟s
pleaded requirement, the availability or suitability of alternative
accommodation, or another essential element of the eviction claim, the
learned RC was required to consider whether those assertions raised a
genuine and triable issue. The enquiry at that stage was not whether
the Petitioner had already proved those assertions by conclusive
documentary or other evidence. If the material on record disclosed a
plausible factual dispute requiring adjudication on evidence, leave to
defend ought to have been granted. The parties could then lead
appropriate evidence and place the necessary material on record, after
which the disputed factual issues could be finally determined.
64. A plain reading of the Impugned Order, however, shows that
the learned RC took substantially converse approach. The learned RC
appears to have required the Petitioner to establish, at the threshold,
the very facts constituting the proposed defence.
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BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
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65. The question before the learned RC was not whether the
Petitioner had conclusively proved, at the leave to defend stage, that,
inter alia , the alternative properties were available to and suitable for
the Respondents, that the tenanted premises were being used by him
for commercial purposes, or that Respondent No. 2 was carrying on
business under the name and style of M/s Mittal Enterprises. The
question was whether the facts pleaded by the Petitioner, supported by
the material on record, raised a reasonable and bona fide dispute
which, if established, could affect the Respondents‟ entitlement to an
order of eviction. In the considered opinion of this Court, the
Impugned Order does not show that this distinction was adequately
appreciated or applied.
66. A perusal of the Impugned Order further shows that, although
the learned RC referred to judgments laying down the principles
governing the grant or refusal of leave to defend, those principles were
not appropriately applied to the facts of the present case. Merely
stating the correct legal principles is insufficient; the material question
is whether the tenant‟s factual objections and supporting material were
examined in accordance with those principles. The findings recorded
by the learned RC indicate that the enquiry proceeded on whether the
Petitioner had proved the assertions in his affidavit, rather than
whether those assertions, if established, could affect the Respondents‟
entitlement to an eviction order and therefore warranted an
opportunity to defend the proceedings.
67. The consequence of this approach is particularly significant in
the present case. Several objections raised by the Petitioner concern
disputed questions of fact relating to the nature, availability,
occupation and use of different properties, as well as the alleged
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BHATIA
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carrying on of business from one of them. Depending on the material
ultimately brought on record, these matters may require examination
of documentary evidence, the circumstances surrounding the
occupation and use of the properties and, where necessary, oral
evidence. By requiring the Petitioner to establish these matters
conclusively at the threshold, the learned RC effectively subjected the
application for leave to defend to a standard of proof applicable to the
final adjudication of the eviction petition.
68. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that
the learned RC failed to undertake the enquiry required at the stage of
considering the Petitioner‟s application for leave to defend. The
Impugned Order proceeds substantially on the basis that the Petitioner
had failed to conclusively establish the facts pleaded in support of the
defence. This amounts to an erroneous application of the governing
principles and renders the rejection of the application for leave to
defend unsustainable.
69. At this juncture, this Court also notes that the dispute between
the parties was not an ordinary landlord-tenant dispute. The subject
premises had been the subject matter of prolonged litigation between
two branches of the family. That litigation culminated in a settlement
recorded before this Court, pursuant to which the parties participated
in a bidding process concerning the properties in question. The
parties‟ rights in respect of the subject premises were thereafter the
subject matter of further proceedings, which ultimately resulted in the
judgment dated 03.08.2012 passed by the Division Bench in EFA(OS)
Nos. 23-24/2010.
70. It is not in dispute that, pursuant to the settlement and bidding
arrangement, the Petitioner acquired tenancy rights in respect of the
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BHATIA
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subject premises and possession thereof was handed over to him on
28.08.2008. The Eviction Petition was instituted on 05.12.2008. Thus,
approximately 100 days elapsed between the handing over of
possession and the institution of the Eviction Petition.
71. The significance of this chronology cannot be brushed aside
merely by observing that the Respondents were legally entitled to
institute an eviction petition. The Division Bench judgment dated
03.08.2012, which subsequently attained finality, determined the
nature of the rights acquired by the Petitioner pursuant to the
settlement and recognised that the Respondents, as owners, retained
the statutory right to seek eviction in accordance with law. However,
that judgment did not adjudicate upon the bona fide nature of the
requirement subsequently pleaded by the Respondents in the Eviction
Petition.
72. The distinction is material. Whether the Respondents retained a
legal right to seek eviction is one question; whether the requirement
pleaded by them satisfied the statutory test of bona fide requirement
under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act is another. The former does
not, by itself, determine the latter.
73. The Petitioner specifically pleaded that, pursuant to the
settlement, the Respondents had surrendered or given up the premises
from which they had been carrying on their business and that the
alleged shortage of commercial accommodation was, therefore, a
circumstance brought about by an arrangement voluntarily entered
into by them. The Petitioner further relied upon the substantial
consideration paid pursuant to the bidding arrangement and the fact
that the Eviction Petition was instituted shortly after possession of the
subject premises had been handed over to him. In this regard, the
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BHATIA
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Petitioner also pleaded that he had successfully bid for the subject
premises for a consideration of Rs. 3.00 crores, out of which Rs. 1.50
crores were paid to the Respondents and their family members in
terms of the bidding arrangement.
74. These circumstances, considered individually, may not
necessarily establish that the requirement of the Respondents was
mala fide . That, however, is not the enquiry at the leave stage. The
contention is whether these circumstances, if established by evidence,
could bear on the bona fide nature of the pleaded requirement. In this
Court‟s view, they could.
75. The parties had consciously and voluntarily agreed to resolve
the use and occupation of the premises through a fair bidding process,
which resulted in the Petitioner acquiring the right to use and occupy
them. The subsequent assertion by the Respondents of a need for
those same premises, particularly after substantial consideration had
changed hands, may raise a question as to whether the eviction
proceedings were an attempt to resile from the settlement. The subject
premises were put to an inter se bidding process to determine which
party would use and occupy them. Although that process did not
confer ownership rights, the consideration paid for the use and
occupation of the premises cannot be disregarded. Having assented to
the process through which the Petitioner acquired the right to use and
occupy the premises, the Respondents later resorted to the DRC Act
on the basis of an alleged bona fide requirement. In light of the
parties‟ prolonged and bitter contest, it is relevant to consider whether
the Respondents had not evaluated their need for the premises before
agreeing to put their use and occupation to bidding. The circumstances
leading to the bidding process, and the parties‟ state of mind, may
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therefore have a bearing on the dispute and require determination at
trial.
76. The Impugned Order also reflects that it proceeds on the basis
that the fact that the Respondents had surrendered their earlier
business accommodation pursuant to the settlement did not disentitle
them from seeking eviction, and that the Petitioner had taken the risk
inherent in acquiring tenancy rights. In the considered opinion of this
Court, such an approach does not fully address the statutory enquiry
under Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act. The fact that the Respondents
were not legally precluded from instituting the Eviction Petition does
not answer whether the circumstances preceding its institution raise a
triable issue as to the bona fide nature of the requirement pleaded
therein.
77. Nor can the observation that the Petitioner had taken a risk
while acquiring tenancy rights, by itself, answer the defence raised by
him. The risk undertaken by a tenant in acquiring tenancy rights and
the statutory entitlement of a landlord to seek eviction on the ground
of bona fide requirement are distinct matters. The former does not
dispense with the landlord‟s obligation to satisfy the requirements of
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
78. This distinction is particularly significant because the pleaded
requirement of the Respondents was founded on circumstances arising
from the settlement. Their case, in substance, was that, after the
settlement and the consequent handing over of premises, they were
left without reasonably suitable commercial accommodation and
therefore required the subject premises for their business. The
circumstances relied upon to establish the requirement were thus
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BHATIA
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closely connected with the settlement that preceded the institution of
the Eviction Petition.
79. In these circumstances, whether the Respondents had
voluntarily altered their position pursuant to the settlement and
thereby created the alleged shortage of accommodation, and whether
that circumstance affected the bona fide nature of their requirement,
could not appropriately be decided on affidavits alone.
80. This Court is conscious that a landlord cannot be compelled to
remain without accommodation merely because an earlier
arrangement affected the landlord‟s property or business. Equally, the
statutory requirement of bona fide need cannot be reduced to an
assertion that the landlord presently has insufficient accommodation.
The circumstances in which that insufficiency arose may, in an
appropriate case, be relevant to assessing bona fides .
81. Among the other things, the prolonged litigation between the
parties, the subsequent settlement and bidding process, the substantial
consideration involved, the handing over of possession on 28.08.2008,
the absence of any substantial intervening change pleaded by the
Respondents, and the institution of the Eviction Petition on
05.12.2008 form a chain of circumstances that would require
consideration.
82. At the cost of repetition, in the opinion of this Court, this
approach overlooks the distinction between proving a defence and
raising a triable issue. The error is apparent from the manner in which
the learned RC dealt with the question of bona fide requirement.
Although the learned RC recognised that such a requirement must be
genuine and pressing, rather than fanciful, it principally accepted the
assertion of the Respondents that they had no place from which to
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BHATIA
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carry on their business. The learned RC then rejected the challenge
raised by the Petitioner on the basis that the law did not require a
landlord to remain idle.
83. The question, however, was not whether the Respondents were
required to sit idle. The question was whether, in the peculiar factual
setting of the present case, the requirement projected by them, when
tested against the chronology and circumstances preceding the filing
of the Eviction Petition, raised a genuine triable issue. That question
required consideration of the Petitioner's defence as a whole and not
merely rejection of its individual components.
84. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Inderjeet Kaur (supra) has
cautioned against precisely such an approach. The Apex Court
observed that at the stage of leave to defend, rival affidavits may not
furnish incontrovertible evidence enabling the Court to reach a final
conclusion, and that where a triable issue is raised, the tenant ought to
be given an opportunity to test the assertions of the landlord through
evidence and cross-examination.
85. The same principle was emphasised in Charan Dass Duggal
(supra), where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that a summary
procedure does not authorise the Rent Controller to undertake a full-
fledged adjudication of disputed questions and that the possibility that
the defence may ultimately fail is not a ground for refusing leave
where a triable issue has otherwise been raised.
86. The present case also cannot be viewed as one where the
defence raised by the Petitioner was merely a bald assertion. The
Petitioner placed before the learned RC, inter alia , the settlement
proceedings, the bidding arrangement, the subsequent handing over of
possession, the substantial consideration involved and the proximity
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between such handing over and the institution of the Eviction Petition.
They formed part of the Petitioner‟s defence before the learned RC
itself.
87. The inquiry contemplated by the DRC Act is that of a bonafide
requirement, meaning thereby, a lack of or absence of malafides . The
circumstances appurtenant to the entire sequence of events leading up
to the premises being subjected to a bidding process and the close
proximity of the date when the eviction petition came to be filed, and
the baggage of the litigation history would be necessary to be
examined to negate the possibility of any malafides, in this case, an
examination as to whether the Petition was not wielded as a means to
negate or effectively resile from the express settlement arrived at as
between the parties. The learned RC has, however, not ventured
anywhere near this threshold, and instead chosen to lean heavily on
the Judgment of the learned Division Bench to hold that, in view of
the same, the full force of the presumption of bonafide requirement as
otherwise available under the DRC Act was extendable in the present
case as well. This, in the view of the Court, is where the fundamental
flaw in the Judgment lies.
88. The error committed by the learned RC becomes clearer when
the finding regarding alternative accommodation is also considered, as
noted earlier. The Petitioner had specifically referred to various
properties allegedly available with the Respondents, including
property No. 1303, Katra Dhulia, Chandni Chowk, and other
properties at Bhamashah Road, Rana Pratap Bagh and Model Town.
The learned RC rejected these objections substantially on the ground
that the Petitioner had not produced sufficient documentary material
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to establish that the said properties were available and suitable for the
commercial requirement pleaded by the Respondents.
89. This Court is not, at this stage, recording a final finding that the
properties referred to by the Petitioner constitute reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation. Nor is this Court recording a final finding
that the Respondents‟ requirement is mala fide . Such questions must
appropriately be determined after the parties have had an opportunity
to lead evidence.
90. The limited conclusion which this Court is required to reach is
whether the defence disclosed by the Petitioner is sufficient to warrant
such adjudication. Tested on that anvil, the defence raised by the
Petitioner cannot be characterised as frivolous, vexatious or a mere
moonshine. The defence rests upon a specific and identifiable factual
chronology and raises a substantive question concerning the
circumstances in which the alleged paucity of accommodation arose
and the consequent bona fide nature of the requirement projected by
the Respondents.
91. The learned RC, therefore, fell into error in effectively treating
the leave-to-defend stage as an occasion for conclusively determining
whether the Petitioner's defence would ultimately succeed.
92. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is undoubtedly limited. This Court is
not sitting as a first appellate Court and would ordinarily not substitute
its own assessment of facts for that of the learned RC. However,
where the statutory test governing the grant of leave to defend has
itself not been correctly applied, and the decision proceeds upon an
erroneous approach to the nature of the enquiry contemplated under
Section 25-B(5), interference in revision is warranted.
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93. The present case is not, therefore, one where this Court is
merely substituting its view on the sufficiency of the evidence for that
of the learned RC. The interference is necessitated by the fact that
material circumstances bearing directly upon the bona fide nature of
the requirement were considered from the perspective of whether the
Petitioner had already established his defence, rather than whether the
circumstances disclosed a triable issue requiring adjudication.

CONCLUSION:
94. In the considered view of this Court, the cumulative effect of
the circumstances noticed hereinabove is sufficient to hold that the
Petitioner has disclosed facts which, if established, could have a
material bearing on the Respondents‟ entitlement to an order of
eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The Petitioner was,
therefore, entitled to an opportunity to contest the Eviction Petition.

95. Consequently, the application seeking leave to defend filed by
the Petitioner could not have been dismissed at the threshold. The
Impugned Order, insofar as it rejects the said application and
consequently directs the eviction of the Petitioner, therefore, cannot be
sustained.
96. The Impugned Order passed by the learned RC in the Eviction
Petition is, accordingly, set aside. The application seeking leave to
defend filed by the Petitioner is allowed, and all consequential
directions or orders flowing from the Impugned Order are also set
aside. The Petitioner shall be entitled to contest the Eviction Petition
in accordance with law.
97. It is clarified that the scope of examination in the present
proceedings was confined to determining whether, on the facts and
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material available on record, the Petitioner was entitled to leave to
defend the Eviction Petition. This Court has answered the said
question in the affirmative. However, no final opinion is expressed on
the merits of the rival claims, including the bona fide requirement of
the Respondents, the availability or suitability of alternative
accommodation, or the effect of the settlement, except to the extent
already determined by the Division Bench in EFA (OS) Nos. 23-
24/2010. All such issues shall be considered by the learned RC
independently and in accordance with law, after affording the parties
an opportunity to lead evidence.
98. The learned RC shall proceed with the Eviction Petition from
the stage at which the Impugned Order was passed, treating the
Petitioner‟s application for leave to defend as having been allowed,
and shall proceed thereafter in accordance with law.
99. Given that the Eviction Petition has been pending for a decade,
the learned RC is requested to take this fact into account and
accordingly endeavour to adjudicate the same with reasonable
dispatch.
100. The present Petition is, accordingly, allowed in the above terms.
101. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/jk

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