Ramkishan Digambar Jadhav vs State Of Maharashtra
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 1187
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1849 OF 2013
RAMKISHAN DIGAMBAR
JADHAV ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 962 OF 2014
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. These connected criminal appeals are filed by
the appellants assailing the common judgment dated
rd
3 July, 2013 passed by the High Court of Bombay
1
at Aurangabad in Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 1998
and 395 of 1998.
3. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 1998 preferred
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2026.11.02
17:43:09 IST
Reason:
1
Hereinafter, referred to as “the High Court”.
1
by the appellants, Ramkishan Digambar Jadhav
2
(accused No. 1) , Digambar Narba Jadhav (accused
3 4
No. 2) , and Venkat (accused No. 5) , thereby
affirming their conviction and sentence for the
offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-
B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
5
1860 .
4. At the same time, the High Court partly allowed
Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 1998 filed by the State of
6
Maharashtra by setting aside the partial acquittal of
the appellant-Ramkishan by the trial Court, and
convicted him for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of his wife
Vimalbai, and sentenced him to imprisonment for life
with a fine of Rs.5,000/- with a default stipulation,
while maintaining the acquittal of accused Nos. 2 to
6 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
5. Criminal Appeal No. 1849 of 2013 has been
preferred by the appellant-Ramkishan, whereas
Criminal Appeal No.962 of 2014 has been preferred
by co-convicts Digambar and Venkat before this
2
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-Ramkishan”.
3
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-Digambar”.
4
Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-Venkat”.
5
For short, “IPC”.
6
Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent-State”.
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
Court. Ramkishan and Venkat are the sons of
Digambar.
6. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the
appellant-Digambar in Criminal Appeal No. 962 of
2014 passed away during the pendency of the appeal
and hence the appeal qua him stands abated.
BRIEF FACTS
7. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and
essential for disposal of these appeals are noted
hereinbelow.
8. The marriage of the appellant-Ramkishan with
7 th
Smt. Vimalbai was solemnised on 12 May, 1995.
The prosecution alleges that, shortly after marriage,
Smt. Vimalbai was subjected to continuous
harassment, maltreatment, and physical as well as
mental torture at the matrimonial home in
connection with unlawful demands for dowry,
specifically comprising a television set, a tape deck, a
plot of land in the MIDC area, and cash amounting to
Rs. 50,000/-, so that the husband, i.e. the appellant-
Ramkishan could get some employment. However,
st
within barely nine months of the marriage, on 1
7
Hereinafter, also referred to as “deceased-Vimalbai”.
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February, 1996, Smt. Vimalbai met an unnatural and
homicidal death at the matrimonial home.
9. The prosecution also alleges that whenever the
deceased-Vimalbai visited her parental home, she
used to complain to her brother Narayan, the first
8
informant (PW-2) , that the accused persons were
coercing her with unlawful demands for cash and
other valuables, and that she was being subjected to
unrelenting harassment and humiliation on this
account.
10. The complainant-Narayan expressed his
inability to meet these demands and sent his sister
back to the matrimonial home after consoling her.
th
On 12 January, 1996, Smt. Vimalbai had been
brought to the parental home on the festival of
Sankrant. Even at that time, she complained of
maltreatment at the matrimonial home. She also
expressed that she was being beaten and was being
starved. On one occasion, she was strung with a rope
and was hung in the well with a threat that if the
demands were not met, she would be killed.
8
Hereinafter, referred to as “complainant-Narayan”.
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st
11. In the early hours of 1 February, 1996, at
about 01:00 a.m, the appellant-Ramkishan came to
the house of the complainant-Narayan and informed
him that Smt. Vimalbai was experiencing
convulsions and was being taken to Naigaon for
medical treatment. On hearing so, the complainant-
Narayan, accompanied by his father Ramrao, mother
Anjanabai, brother Chandraprakash, and several co-
villagers, proceeded to Naigaon in a jeep. En route ,
near the agricultural field of one Udhav Sawarkar,
they intercepted a bullock cart whereupon the
deceased-Vimalbai was lying lifeless, with blood
oozing from her nostrils and right hand’s fingers. She
was immediately taken to the Naigaon Hospital,
where, upon medical examination, the doctors
declared her as brought dead. The complainant-
Narayan lodged an oral complaint against the
appellants and other family members at the Police
Station Naigaon which was reduced to writing by
Police Sub-Inspector Anwar Khan (PW-7) and based
thereupon, Crime No. 11 of 1996 came to be
registered for the offences punishable under Sections
302, 498-A, and 34 of the IPC.
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12. Prior to the lodging of the complaint by the
complainant-Narayan, the appellant-Ramkishan had
presented an application at the Police Station
st
Naigaon on 1 February, 1996 at 08.00 a.m., setting
up a theory that his wife met an accidental death. He
alleged in the application that while he was having
sexual intercourse with his wife Vimalbai, she
experienced sudden giddiness, her jaws got locked
and she passed away. Based on this information, the
police recorded an entry in the Accidental Death
Register and commenced a preliminary inquiry,
during which an inquest panchnama was drawn up.
Thereafter, two medical officers of Rural Hospital
Naigaon conducted post-mortem examination on the
dead body and the cause of death was opined as
“asphyxia due to throttling”.
13. Upon completion of the investigation, a
chargesheet was submitted against six accused
persons including the appellants herein. The case
was committed to the Court of Additional Sessions
9
Judge, Biloli , where charges were initially framed
under Sections 498-A and 302 read with Section 34
9
Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”.
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
of the IPC, and an additional charge for the offence
punishable under Section 304-B read with Section 34
of the IPC was subsequently added on an application
filed by the prosecution. The accused persons denied
the charges and were accordingly subjected to trial.
st
14. By judgment and order dated 21 September,
1998, the trial Court convicted the appellant-
Ramkishan (accused No. 1-husband), the appellant-
Digambar (accused No. 2-father-in-law) and the
appellant-Venkat (accused No. 5-brother-in-law) for
the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC. For the offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the IPC, each of
the three convicts was sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 500/-,
with a further term of rigorous imprisonment for one
month in default of payment of fine. For the offence
punishable under Section 304-B of the IPC, each
accused was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for
seven years. The substantive sentences were directed
to run concurrently.
15. At the same time, all six accused persons were
acquitted of the offence punishable under Section
302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, while the three
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
female relatives (accused Nos. 3, 4, and 6) were
exonerated and acquitted of all charges.
16. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence rendered by the trial Court, the
convicted accused i.e., the appellant-Ramkishan
(accused No. 1-husband), appellant-Digambar
(accused No. 2-father-in-law), and appellant-Venkat
(accused No. 5-brother-in-law), preferred Criminal
Appeal No. 311 of 1998 before the High Court,
assailing the findings of the trial Court holding them
guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 498-
A and 304-B read with Section 34 of the IPC.
Simultaneously, the respondent-State also filed
Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 1998, challenging the
judgment of acquittal recorded in favour of the
accused persons in respect of the offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
17. The High Court, by the impugned judgment,
disposed of both appeals in the manner indicated
10
hereinabove .
10
Supra para Nos. 3-4.
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rd
18. The said judgment dated 3 July, 2013 passed
by the High Court is the subject matter of challenge
in the present appeals with special leave.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
19.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellants
submitted that the prosecution case hinges entirely
on circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution
has miserably failed to establish a complete and
unbroken chain of incriminating circumstances
pointing conclusively and unerringly towards the
guilt of the appellants.
20. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-
Ramkishan submitted that the deceased-Vimalbai
met with a tragic, accidental death, having suffered a
sudden epileptic seizure while the appellant was
engaged in sexual intercourse with her.
21. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-
Digambar and appellant-Venkat submitted that
these accused have been roped in solely on account
of their familial relationship with the appellant-
Ramkishan, without any specific overt act or definite
role being ascribed to them regarding the alleged
harassment of the deceased on account of demands
of dowry soon before her death.
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
22. It was contended that since the Courts below
had already acquitted three other family members,
namely the mother-in-law (accused No. 3), sister-in-
law (accused No. 4), and co-sister (accused No. 6) on
the very same evidence, the appellants-Digambar and
Venkat are also entitled to acquittal on parity.
23. On the strength of the above submissions,
learned counsel for the appellants prayed that the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court be set
aside and the appellants be acquitted of the charges
levelled against them.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
24. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State vehemently and fervently opposed
the submissions advanced on behalf of the
appellants.
25. Learned counsel submitted that the deceased-
Vimalbai met with an unnatural, homicidal death
within barely nine months of marriage inside her
matrimonial home, while in the exclusive custody
and company of her husband, i.e., the appellant-
Ramkishan. It was urged that by virtue of Section
10
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
11
106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 , a heavy
burden rested upon the appellant-Ramkishan to
explain the circumstances under which his wife
suffered fatal injuries by strangulation in the privacy
of the matrimonial home, which burden he
conspicuously failed to discharge.
26. It was submitted that, rather than discharging
the statutory onus cast upon him under Section 106
of the Evidence Act, to offer a plausible explanation
regarding the circumstances resulting in death of
Smt. Vimalbai, the appellant-Ramkishan presented a
demonstrably false and concocted narrative claiming
that the deceased-Vimalbai suffered giddiness and
convulsions during sexual intercourse which led to a
seizure and death. Such a false and far-fetched
explanation serves to fortify the prosecution’s case
and provides a vital additional link reinforcing the
inference of his guilt.
27. It was further submitted that the post-mortem
examination conducted by Dr. Shyam Nagapurkar
(PW-1) conclusively established the cause of death as
“asphyxia due to throttling”, demonstrating clear
11
Hereinafter, referred to as “Evidence Act”.
11
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
evidence of death by strangulation that could not
have been self-inflicted or accidental as claimed by
the defence.
28. Learned counsel contended that since the
unnatural death occurred within nine months of
solemnisation of marriage, preceded by persistent
cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry
demands soon before death, attributed to the
appellants herein, all the foundational facts for
invoking the statutory presumption under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act, stand fully established.
29. It was accordingly contended by learned
counsel representing the respondent-State that in
absence of any demonstrable perversity or
miscarriage of justice in the impugned judgment, no
case for exercise of power under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India is made out, and the present
appeals ought to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
30. We have heard and considered the submissions
advanced by learned counsel appearing for the
appellants and learned counsel representing the
12
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
respondent-State and have gone through the
impugned judgment and the material placed on
record.
31. Aggrieved by their conviction and sentences
awarded to them by the trial Court, for the offences
punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-B read
with Section 34 of the IPC, the convicted accused
persons, namely Ramkishan (accused No. 1-
husband), Digambar (accused No. 2-father-in-law),
and Venkat (accused No. 5-brother-in-law) preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 1998 before the High
Court. Concurrently, the respondent-State preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 395 of 1998, assailing the
acquittal of the accused persons of the charge of
murder punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the IPC.
32. The High Court the impugned judgment
vide
dismissed the appeal preferred by the convicts
(Ramkishan, Digambar, and Venkat) and partly
allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent-State.
Finding that the acquittal of the appellant-
Ramkishan, husband of the deceased-Vimalbai, for
the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC
tantamounted to perversity and suffered from a total
13
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
failure of justice, the High Court set aside his
acquittal, and accordingly convicted him for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, and
sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.
5,000/- with default stipulation, while upholding the
acquittal of the co-accused persons under Section
302 of the IPC.
33. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1849 of
2013 filed by the appellant-Ramkishan assails his
conviction for the offences punishable under Sections
302, 498-A, and 304-B of the IPC, whereas Criminal
Appeal No. 962 of 2014 filed by the appellants,
Digambar and Venkat, before this Court, challenges
their conviction for the offences punishable under
Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34 of the
IPC.
34. It is an admitted fact that the deceased-
Vimalbai had been married to the appellant-
th
Ramkishan on 12 May, 1995. She met with an
st
unnatural death in her matrimonial home on 1
February, 1996, i.e., within nine months of the
marriage. The fact that the cause of death of the
deceased-Vimalbai was homicidal has been
emphatically stated by Dr. Shyam Nagapurkar (PW-
14
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
1), who deposed that he, along with Dr. Gunturkar
(DW-3), performed a post-mortem on the dead body
of the deceased-Vimalbai and found multiple
injuries, including subcutaneous haemorrhage over
the laryngeal area, bruises over the thyroid
cartilages, and fracture of the left cornua of the hyoid
bone. An explicit opinion was given by the doctor
that the cause of death was “asphyxia due to
throttling”.
35. The appellant-Ramkishan took a patently false
plea in defence that the deceased-Vimalbai was
suffering from epilepsy and that she suffered the fatal
injuries during an epileptic fit, which was triggered
when he was indulging in a carnal act with his wife.
However, the medical jurist emphatically denied this
suggestion noting that there was no lock-jaw or
displacement of the tongue, and that the internal
neck injuries could not be caused by an epileptic fit.
36. Consequently, the defence theory of death as a
result of an epileptic fit suffered during a sexual act
was found to be false and concocted by both the trial
Court and the High Court.
37. It is undisputed that none of the accused denied
their presence inside the residential premises at the
15
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time of the occurrence. The appellant-Ramkishan, in
fact, took a positive stance in defence that he was
indulging in sexual intercourse with his wife who
went into a seizure, resulting into her meeting
accidental death. He also lodged a report at the Police
Station with these very assertions.
38. In these circumstances, the fact that the
deceased-Vimalbai was in the exclusive company of
the appellant-Ramkishan at the matrimonial home
when she met her unnatural death assumes
significance. By virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, the statutory burden rested heavily upon the
appellant-Ramkishan, who was in the exclusive
company and holding custody of his wife Vimalbai in
the privacy of the matrimonial home when she met
with unnatural death, to offer a cogent, credible, and
satisfactory explanation regarding the circumstances
culminating into her death. Instead of discharging
this statutory burden, the appellant-Ramkishan set
up a demonstrably false and concocted defence,
alleging that the deceased-Vimalbai suffered an
epileptic seizure and giddiness while they were
engaged in sexual intercourse, a plea categorically
16
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excluded and refuted by the medical evidence and
post-mortem findings.
39. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the
following observations made by this Court in
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of
12
Maharashtra :-
“14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy
of a house and in such circumstances where the
assailants have all the opportunity to plan and
commit the offence at the time and in
circumstances of their choice, it will be
extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if
the strict principle of circumstantial evidence,
as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts.
A judge does not preside over a criminal trial
merely to see that no innocent man is punished.
A judge also presides to see that a guilty man
does not escape. Both are public duties. (See
Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944
AC 315 : (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted with
approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab
v. Karnail Singh [(2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC
(Cri) 135] .) The law does not enjoin a duty on
the prosecution to lead evidence of such
character which is almost impossible to be led
or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The
duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence
which it is capable of leading, having regard to
the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it
12
(2006) 10 SCC 681.
17
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is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the
Evidence Act which says that when any fact is
especially within the knowledge of any person,
the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
Illustration (b) appended to this section throws
some light on the content and scope of this
provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with
travelling on a railway without ticket. The
burden of proving that he had a ticket is on
him.”
15. Where an offence like murder is committed
in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to
establish the case would undoubtedly be upon
the prosecution, but the nature and amount of
evidence to be led by it to establish the charge
cannot be of the same degree as is required in
other cases of circumstantial evidence. The
burden would be of a comparatively lighter
character. In view of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act there will be a corresponding
burden on the inmates of the house to give a
cogent explanation as to how the crime was
committed. The inmates of the house cannot
get away by simply keeping quiet and offering
no explanation on the supposed premise that
the burden to establish its case lies entirely
upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all
on an accused to offer any explanation.”
40. The failure of the appellant-Ramkishan to
furnish a plausible explanation and in discharging
the burden cast upon him by virtue of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act coupled with the introduction of a
18
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1849/2013 with connected matter
false defence, provides an additional incriminating
link that completes the chain of circumstantial
evidence, and thereby establishing his guilt for the
offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of
the IPC.
41. Having concluded that the charge of murder
stands proved beyond reasonable doubt, against the
appellant-Ramkishan, this Court is also of the firm
view that the prosecution has duly proved the
essential ingredients of the offences punishable
under Section 498-A and Section 304-B read with
Section 34 of the IPC against the appellants.
42. The deceased-Vimalbai was married to the
th
appellant-Ramkishan on 12 May, 1995. She was
strangulated and done to death inside the
st
matrimonial home in the early hours of 1 February,
1996 i.e., within approximately nine months of her
marriage (and well within the statutory period of
seven years prescribed under Section 304-B of the
IPC).
43. There is clear, consistent, and mutually
corroborative evidence establishing that the
deceased-Vimalbai was subjected to persistent
physical cruelty, mental torture and even starvation
19
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at her matrimonial home over unlawful demands for
dowry, specifically comprising Rs. 50,000/- in cash
(to secure employment/service for her husband), a
television set, a tape deck, and the transfer of a plot
in the MIDC area at village Ghungrala.
44. Evidence regarding the persistent harassment
and cruelty to which the deceased-Vimalbai was
subjected in connection with unlawful demands for
dowry was given in unequivocal terms by the
complainant-Narayan (PW-2) who testified that,
during her visits to the parental home, the deceased-
Vimalbai complained of being beaten by the accused
persons, tortured mentally, starved, and a horrifying
incident where she was tied with a rope and lowered
into a well accompanied by a threat to kill her if the
demands raised by the accused were not satisfied.
This unflinching narrative of PW-2 receives strong
corroboration from Sambhaji Turatwad (PW-3), the
mediator who facilitated the marriage; Ramrao (PW-
4), the father of the deceased-Vimalbai, who affirmed
the persistent demands and physical abuse; as well
as Vaijnath Sambhaji Marpatwar (PW-5) and
Mahajan Munjaji Yembalwad (PW-6), two
independent neighbours of the parental home of the
20
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deceased-Vimalbai, who also supported the
prosecution version regarding the ongoing
harassment of Smt. Vimalbai owing to unmet
unlawful dowry demands. Hence, we are of the firm
opinion that the accused-appellants failed to rebut
the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of
the Evidence Act and were rightly convicted by the
Courts below.
CONCULUSION
45. In the wake of the discussion made
hereinabove, we find no reason to interfere with the
rd
impugned judgment dated 3 July, 2013, whereby
the High Court dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 311 of
1998 preferred by the appellants, Ramkishan,
Digambar and Venkat (affirming their conviction
under Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section
34 IPC), and partly allowed Criminal Appeal No. 395
of 1998 preferred by the respondent-State of
Maharashtra, setting aside the judgment of acquittal
recorded in favour of the appellant-Ramkishan for
the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC;
convicting him for the offence of murder of his wife,
and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life.
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46. Resultantly, the appeals fail and are accordingly
dismissed as being devoid of merit.
47. During the pendency of the present appeals, the
appellants had been released on bail. As a
consequence of the dismissal of the appeals, the bail
bonds executed by them stand cancelled, and they
are directed to surrender before the trial Court
concerned within a period of four weeks from today
to serve out the remaining period of their sentences,
failing which the trial Court shall take all necessary
steps, including the issuance of non-bailable
warrants, to secure their arrest and take them into
custody.
48. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
…………………..….……………………J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
………………….....…………………….J.
(DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 02, 2026.
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