Devilal Gond vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Court
Supreme Court

2026 INSC 1226
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
C R I M I N A L A P P E A L N O . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ O F 2 0 2 6
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 1 2 2 1 7 O F 2 0 2 6 )
DEVILAL GOND .…. APPELLANT (S)
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & ORS. ..…RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. Appellant impugns order dated 01.05.2026 of the High Court of
Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR No. 505 of 2025 to the extent that it awards
compensation of only Rs. 2,00,000/- to the Appellant for the illegal detention
and the egregious violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Appellant was illegally detained, without any authority of law, for a period of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Deepak Guglani
Date: 2026.11.16
18:39:42 IST
Reason:
7 years, 3 months and 21 days.
1

3. On 07.12.2012, Appellant was arrested in an First Information Report
registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
1
Code . Appellant was tried for the offence and by judgment dated 14.08.2013
in Sessions Case No. 14 of 2013, the court of Sessions Judge Distt.-
Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh) convicted the Appellant under section 302 IPC
and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
4. Appellant appealed against the judgment dated 14.08.2013 in Criminal
Appeal No. 968 of 2013. By order dated 20.01.2018, the appeal was allowed
and the conviction and sentence were set aside and appellant was acquitted of
the charges. The High Court in its order dated 20.01.2018 noticed that
Appellant was on bail and directed that “the surety and personal bonds earlier
furnished at the time of suspension of sentence shall remain operative for a
period of six months in view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Criminal
2
Procedure Code . The appellant shall appear before the higher Court as and
when directed.” The State did not challenge the order and as such the order of
the High Court dated 20.01.2018 setting aside the conviction and sentence and
acquitting the Appellant became final.

1
IPC for short
2
CrPC for short
2

5. It appears that when the appeal of the Appellant was allowed, setting
aside the sentence and conviction, it was not brought to the notice of the Court
that Appellant was incarcerated and the High Court was given an impression
that the sentence had already been suspended and that is why the High Court
directed that his surety and personal bonds earlier furnished at the time of
suspension of sentence shall remain operative for a period of six months.
6. The order of acquittal dated 20.01.2018 was not given effect to and his
detention continued for a further period of 7 years 3 months and 29 days till
19.05.2025, when he was finally released. Appellant thereafter filed the
subject Writ Petition being WPCR No. 505 of 2025, seeking compensation of
Rs. 50,00,000/- for the prolonged illegal detention of 7 years, 3 months and
29 days after his acquittal.
7. The High Court in the impugned order held as under:
“15. In the considered opinion of this Court, the continued detention of
the petitioner for more than seven years after his acquittal is wholly illegal,
arbitrary, and violative of his fundamental, rights guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India. The explanation offered by the respondents
is insufficient and does, not justify such inordinate delay.
16. While determining the quantum of compensation, this Court cannot
lose sight of the fact that the petitioner was deprived of his personal liberty
3

for more than seven years despite having been acquitted by a competent
Court, Such: prolonged and unlawful detention strikes .at .the very core of
the guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and reflects a
grave and inexcusable failure of the State machinery. The explanation
sought to be offered by the respondents, founded upon procedural
formalities does not absolve the State of its constitutional obligation to
ensure that no individual is deprived of liberty, except in accordance with
law. Administrative inefficiency or systemic lapses can never be pleaded as
a defence in cases involving infringement of fundamental rights. The right
to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is not a mere formality but a
substantive and enforceable guarantee, forming the very foundation of a
civilized constitutional order. Any infraction thereof, particularly by the
State; must invite strict scrutiny and immediate redress.
17. This Court is of the considered view that the present case is not one
of mere, negligence but discloses a disturbing degree of apathy and lack of
accountability on the part of the authorities entrusted with the duty of
safeguarding the liberty of citizens. The failure to verily the status of the
petitioner's appeal for years together, despite available mechanisms,
demonstrates a callous disregard for human liberty, in such circumstances,
the compensation awarded must not only serve as a alleviative to the victim
but also operate as a deterrent against recurrence of such egregious
violations by the State. The quantum therefore, has to be realistic and.
commensurate with the nature and duration of the deprivation suffered.
Having regard to the prolonged period of Illegal detention, the violation of
the petitioner's fundamental rights, and the need to uphold constitutional
values, this Court is of the opinion that a higher compensation is
warranted.”
4

8. By the Impugned order dated 01.05.2026, the High Court has awarded
only a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- for the illegal detention of 7 years, 3 months and
21 days and the egregious violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
Aggrieved from the said order, Appellant has filed this appeal seeking
enhancement of compensation.
9. In the Counter Affidavit filed before this Court, it has been stated on
behalf of the State, that this discrepancy was noticed on 15.05.2025, during a
records-verification exercise undertaken in respect of appeals filed by
convicted prisoners lodged in Central Jail. Thereafter a request was made to
the Sessions Judge, Ranjandgaon to issue a supersession warrant with regard
to the release of the Petitioner, which was issued on 19.05.2025.
Consequently, Appellant was released from custody on the very same day.
10. In the affidavit, it is further stated that the Jail Superintendent, Central
Jail, Durg, has as far back as in the year 2018, addressed communications
dated 03.04.2018 and 18.06.2018 to the concerned Panel Lawyer, Legal Aid,
seeking the status of the Appellant’s Criminal Appeal; however on account of
an unfortunate gap in the communication and coordination mechanism
between the jail and the concerned quarters at the relevant time, the
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information regarding the outcome of the appeal did not reach the jail
authorities pursuant to the said communication. It is further stated that a
subsequent inquiry conducted by the office of the Deputy Inspector General
(Prisons), upon examination of statements of the officials of Central Jail, Durg
and the material on record that the lapse occurred on account of a bona fide
and unfortunate gap in the communication and verification mechanism, and
not on account of any mala fide or oblique motive.
11. The explanation given on behalf of the State for the illegal detention of
7 years, 3 months and 21 days shows complete remissness on the part of all
Authorities. There appears to be lack of coordination and institutional
dysfunction. Appellant lost his prime youth on account of the apathy and lack
of promptitude on the part of the authorities. His prime period of life cannot
be restored, however only solace to him can be to recompense him in
monetary terms, which should be enough to make amend for the prolonged
incarceration.
12. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees ‘Right to Life’. It mandates
that ‘No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.’ In the case of the Appellant, there
6

has been a clear contravention of the Constitutional Guarantee of the
Fundamental Right of ‘Right to Life’ of the Appellant.
13. The Justice J.S. Vemra, Judge Supreme Court of India in Nilabati
Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 held as under:
“10. In view of the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar
[(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] , Sebastian
M. Hongray v. Union of India [(1984) 1 SCC 339 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 87 :
(1984) 1 SCR 904(I)] , Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India [(1984) 3
SCC 82 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 407 : (1984) 3 SCR 544(II)] , Bhim Singh v. State
of J & K [1984 Supp SCC 504 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 60] , Bhim Singh v. State
of J & K [(1985) 4 SCC 677 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 47] , Saheli : A Women's
Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters
[(1990) 1 SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 145] and State of Maharashtra v.
Ravikant S. Patil [(1991) 2 SCC 373 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 656] the liability of
the State of Orissa in the present case to pay the compensation cannot be
doubted and was rightly not disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor
General. It would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle
on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of
compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in
private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It may be
mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding under
Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for
contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign
immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in
private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two
remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which
7

compensation is awarded in such proceedings. We shall now refer to the
earlier decisions of this Court as well as some other decisions before further
discussion of this principle.
11. In Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3
SCR 508] it was held that in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution,
this Court can grant compensation for deprivation of a fundamental right.
That was a case of violation of the petitioner's right to personal liberty
under Article 21 of the Constitution. Chandrachud, CJ., dealing with this
aspect, stated as under : (SCC pp. 147-48, paras 9 and 10)
“It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the
enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced
efficaciously through the ordinary processes of courts, civil and
criminal. A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and
adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a court of lowest grade
competent to try it. But the important question for our consideration
is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, this
Court can pass an order for the payment of money if such an order
is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation
of a fundamental right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases
….
… The petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy
of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in
the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim.
But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover
damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have
to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate, in the
absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in
his favour. In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass
8

an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing
mere lip-service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State
Government has so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees
the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content
if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders to release
from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation
of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with
the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the
payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis
leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be
corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The
right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of
instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which
present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If
civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some
others too well known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate
ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is
the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the
damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have
recourse against those officers.”
(emphasis supplied) (SCR pp. 513-14)
12. It does appear from the above extract that even though it was held
that compensation could be awarded under Article 32 for contravention of
a fundamental right, yet it was also stated that “the petitioner could have
been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation
was actually controversial” and “Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute
for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced
efficaciously through the ordinary processes”. This observation may tend
to raise a doubt that the remedy under Article 32 could be denied “if the
9

claim to compensation was factually controversial” and, therefore,
optional, not being a distinct remedy available to the petitioner in addition
to the ordinary processes. The later decisions of this Court proceed on the
assumption that monetary compensation can be awarded for violation of
constitutional rights under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution, but
this aspect has not been adverted to. It is, therefore, necessary to clear this
doubt and to indicate the precise nature of this remedy which is distinct and
in addition to the available ordinary processes, in case of violation of the
fundamental rights.
13. Reference may also be made to the other decisions of this Court after
Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] .
In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India [(1984) 1 SCC 339 : 1984 SCC
(Cri) 87 : (1984) 1 SCR 904(I)] it was indicated that in a petition for writ
of habeas corpus, the burden was obviously on the respondents to make
good the positive stand of the respondents in response to the notice issued
by the court by offering proof of the stand taken, when it is shown that the
person detained was last seen alive under the surveillance, control, and
command of the detaining authority. In Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of
India (II) [(1984) 3 SCC 82 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 407 : (1984) 3 SCR 544(II)]
in such a writ petition, exemplary costs were awarded on failure of the
detaining authority to produce the missing persons, on the conclusion that
they were not alive and had met an unnatural death. The award was made
in Sebastian M. Hongray-(II) [(1984) 3 SCC 82 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 407 :
(1984) 3 SCR 544(II)] apparently following Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141
: 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] , but without indicating anything
more. In Bhim Singh v. State of J & K [(1985) 4 SCC 677 : 1986 SCC (Cri)
47] , illegal detention in police custody of the petitioner Bhim Singh was
held to constitute violation of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) and this
Court exercising its power to award compensation under Article 32 directed
10

the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner for violation of his
constitutional right by way of exemplary costs or otherwise, taking this
power to be settled by the decisions in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983
SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and Sebastian M. Hongray [(1984) 3
SCC 82 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 407 : (1984) 3 SCR 544(II)] . In Saheli [(1990) 1
SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 145] the State was held liable to pay
compensation payable to the mother of the deceased who died as a result of
beating and assault by the police. However, the principle indicated therein
was that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. In
State of Maharashtra v. Ravikant S. Patil [(1991) 2 SCC 373 : 1991 SCC
(Cri) 656] the award of compensation by the High Court for violation of the
fundamental right under Article 21 of an undertrial prisoner, who was
handcuffed and taken through the streets in a procession by the police
during investigation, was upheld. However, in none of these cases, except
Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508]
anything more was said. In Saheli [(1990) 1 SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri)
145] reference was made to the State's liability for tortious acts of its
servants without any reference being made to the decision of this Court in
Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965
SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144] wherein sovereign immunity was upheld in
the case of vicarious liability of the State for the tort of its employees. The
decision in Saheli [(1990) 1 SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 145] is, therefore,
more in accord with the principle indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC
141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] .
14. In this context, it is sufficient to say that the decision of this Court in
Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144]
upholding the State's plea of sovereign immunity for tortious acts of its
servants is confined to the sphere of liability in tort, which is distinct from
the State's liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the
11

doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in the constitutional
scheme, and is no defence to the constitutional remedy under Articles 32
and 226 of the Constitution which enables award of compensation for
contravention of fundamental rights, when the only practicable mode of
enforcement of the fundamental rights can be the award of compensation.
The decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC
(Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and others in that line relate to award of
compensation for contravention of fundamental rights, in the constitutional
remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand,
Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144]
related to value of goods seized and not returned to the owner due to the
fault of Government servants, the claim being of damages for the tort of
conversion under the ordinary process, and not a claim for compensation
for violation of fundamental rights. Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR 375 : AIR
1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144] is, therefore, inapplicable in this
context and distinguishable.
15. The decision of Privy Council in Maharaj v. Attorney-General of
Trinidad and Tobago (No. 2) [(1978) 2 All ER 670] is useful in this context.
That case related to Section 6 of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago
1962, in the chapter pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms,
wherein Section 6 provided for an application to the High Court for redress.
The question was, whether the provision permitted an order for monetary
compensation. The contention of the Attorney General therein, that an order
for payment of compensation did not amount to the enforcement of the rights
that had been contravened, was expressly rejected. It was held, that an order
for payment of compensation, when a right protected had been contravened,
is clearly a form of ‘redress’ which a person is entitled to claim under
Section 6, and may well be ‘the only practicable form of redress’. Lord
Diplock who delivered the majority opinion, at page 679, stated:
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“It was argued on behalf of the Attorney General that Section 6(2)
does not permit of an order for monetary compensation despite the
fact that this kind of redress was ordered in Jaundoo v. Attorney
General of Guyana [(1971) AC 972 : (1971) 3 WLR 13] . Reliance
was placed on the reference in the sub-section to ‘enforcing, or
securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the said
foregoing sections’ as the purpose for which orders etc. could be
made. An order for payment of compensation, it was submitted, did
not amount to the enforcement of the rights that had been
contravened. In their Lordships' view an order for payment of
compensation when a right protected under Section 1 ‘has been’
contravened is clearly a form of ‘redress’ which a person is entitled
to claim under Section 6(1) and may well be the only practicable
form of redress, as by now it is in the instant case. The jurisdiction
to make such an order is conferred on the High Court by para (a) of
Section 6(2), viz. jurisdiction ‘to hear and determine any application
made by any person in pursuance of sub-section (1) of this section’.
The very wide powers to make orders, issue writs and give directions
are ancillary to this.”
Lord Diplock further stated at page 680, as under:
“Finally, their Lordships would say something about the measure of
monetary compensation recoverable under Section 6 where the
contravention of the claimant's constitutional rights consists of
deprivation of liberty otherwise than by due process of law. The
claim is not a claim in private law for damages for the tort of false
imprisonment, under which the damages recoverable are at large
and would include damages for loss of reputation. It is a claim in
public law for compensation for deprivation of liberty alone.”
(emphasis supplied)
13

Lord Hailsham while dissenting from the majority regarding the liability for
compensation in that case, concurred with the majority opinion on this
principle and stated at page 687, thus:
“… I am simply saying that, on the view I take, the expression
‘redress’ in sub-section (1) of Section 6 and the expression
‘enforcement’ in sub-section (2), ‘although capable of embracing
damages where damages are available as part of the legal
consequences of contravention, do not confer and are not in the
context capable of being construed so as to confer a right of
damages where they have not hitherto been available, in this case
against the State for the judicial errors of a judge.”
Thus, on this principle, the view was unanimous, that enforcement of the
constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation
as part of the legal consequences of its contravention.
17. It follows that ‘a claim in public law for compensation’ for
contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of
which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for
enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict
liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the
enforcement of a fundamental right is ‘distinct from, and in addition to, the
remedy in private law for damages for the tort’ resulting from the
contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity
being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental
rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the
constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary
compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for
the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise
14

of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by
resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul
Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] and is
the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded
under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, for contravention of
fundamental rights.
18. A useful discussion on this topic which brings out the distinction
between the remedy in public law based on strict liability for violation of a
fundamental right enabling award of compensation, to which the defence of
sovereign immunity is inapplicable, and the private law remedy, wherein
vicarious liability of the State in tort may arise, is to be found in Ratanlal
& Dhirajlal's Law of Torts, 22nd Edition, 1992, by Justice G.P. Singh, at
pages 44 to 48.
19. This view finds support from the decisions of this Court in the
Bhagalpur Blinding cases : Khatri (II) v. State of Bihar [(1981) 1 SCC 627
: 1981 SCC (Cri) 228] and Khatri (IV) v. State of Bihar [(1981) 2 SCC 493
: 1981 SCC (Cri) 503] wherein it was said that the court is not helpless to
grant relief in a case of violation of the right to life and personal liberty,
and it should be prepared “to forge new tools and devise new remedies” for
the purpose of vindicating these precious fundamental rights. It was also
indicated that the procedure suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted
for conducting the inquiry, needed to ascertain the necessary facts, for
granting the relief, as the available mode of redress, for enforcement of the
guaranteed fundamental rights. More recently in Union Carbide Corpn. v.
Union of India [(1991) 4 SCC 584] Misra, CJ. stated that “we have to
develop our own law and if we find that it is necessary to construct a new
principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and
15

which is likely to arise in future … there is no reason why we should hesitate
to evolve such principle of liability …”. To the same effect are the
observations of Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was), who rendered the
leading judgment in the Bhopal gas case [(1991) 4 SCC 584] with regard
to the court's power to grant relief.
20. We respectfully concur with the view that the court is not helpless and
the wide powers given to this Court by Article 32, which itself is a
fundamental right, imposes a constitutional obligation on this Court to
forge such new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete justice
and enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution, which
enable the award of monetary compensation in appropriate cases, where
that is the only mode of redress available. The power available to this Court
under Article 142 is also an enabling provision in this behalf. The contrary
view would not merely render the court powerless and the constitutional
guarantee a mirage, but may, in certain situations, be an incentive to
extinguish life, if for the extreme contravention the court is powerless to
grant any relief against the State, except by punishment of the wrongdoer
for the resulting offence, and recovery of damages under private law, by the
ordinary process. If the guarantee that deprivation of life and personal
liberty cannot be made except in accordance with law, is to be real, the
enforcement of the right in case of every contravention must also be possible
in the constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that which is
appropriate in the facts of each case. This remedy in public law has to be
more readily available when invoked by the have-nots, who are not
possessed of the wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in private law,
even though its exercise is to be tempered by judicial restraint to avoid
circumvention of private law remedies, where more appropriate.
16

21. We may also refer to Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 1966 which indicates that an enforceable right to
compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed
right. Article 9(5) reads as under:
“Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention
shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”
22. The above discussion indicates the principle on which the court's power
under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution is exercised to award
monetary compensation for contravention of a fundamental right. This was
indicated in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3
SCR 508] and certain further observations therein adverted to earlier,
which may tend to minimise the effect of the principle indicated therein, do
not really detract from that principle. This is how the decisions of this Court
in Rudul Sah [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508]
and others in that line have to be understood and Kasturilal [(1965) 1 SCR
375 : AIR 1965 SC 1039 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 144] distinguished therefrom. We
have considered this question at some length in view of the doubt raised, at
times, about the propriety of awarding compensation in such proceedings,
instead of directing the claimant to resort to the ordinary process of
recovery of damages by recourse to an action in tort. In the present case, on
the finding reached, it is a clear case for award of compensation to the
petitioner for the custodial death of her son.
14. Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, concurring with the view of Justice J.S. Verma
in Nilabati Behera (supra) held as under:
“34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the
private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as
exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under
17

Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the
indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a
remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for
contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen.
The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to
assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect
their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds
the relief by granting “compensation” in proceedings under Article 32 or
226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental
rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer
and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in
its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment
of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally
understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the
broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’
under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not
protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the
nature of ‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for the
breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to
the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an
action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent
jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law.
35. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil
liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an
obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and
226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim whose
fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are
established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to
repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the
18

citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a
civil suit or criminal proceedings. The State, of course has the right to be
indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the
wrongdoer in accordance with law — through appropriate proceedings. Of
course, relief in exercise of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be
granted only once it is established that there has been an infringement of
the fundamental rights of the citizen and no other form of appropriate
redressal by the court in the facts and circumstances of the case, is possible.
The decisions of this Court in the line of cases starting with Rudul Sah v.
State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR
508] granted monetary relief to the victims for deprivation of their
fundamental rights in proceedings through petitions filed under Article 32
or 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the rights available
under the civil law to the aggrieved party where the courts found that grant
of such relief was warranted. It is a sound policy to punish the wrongdoer
and it is in that spirit that the courts have moulded the relief by granting
compensation to the victims in exercise of their writ jurisdiction. In doing
so the courts take into account not only the interest of the applicant and the
respondent but also the interests of the public as a whole with a view to
ensure that public bodies or officials do not act unlawfully and do perform
their public duties properly particularly where the fundamental right of a
citizen under Article 21 is concerned. Law is in the process of development
and the process necessitates developing separate public law procedures as
also public law principles. It may be necessary to identify the situations to
which separate proceedings and principles apply and the courts have to act
firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and self-restraint, lest
proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a disguised substitute
for civil action in private law. Some of those situations have been identified
by this Court in the cases referred to by Brother Verma, J.”
19

15. The Supreme Court in Nilabati Behera (supra) relying on earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court inter alia in Rudul Shah (supra), and
Sebastian M. Hongray (supra) spelt out clearly the principles on which the
liability of the State arising in such cases for payment of compensation and
the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for
payment of compensation in an action on tort. It held that award of
compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public
law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which
the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, which may be available
as a defence in private law in an action based on tort.
16. The Supreme Court referred to Rudul Shah (supra) wherein it was held
that this Court could grant compensation for deprivation of a fundamental
right. A caveat was placed that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for
the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously
through the ordinary processes of courts, civil and criminal. A money claim
has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a
court of lowest grade competent to try it. The question arising for
consideration in Rudul Shah (supra) was whether in the exercise of its
20

jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court could pass an order for the payment
of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon
the deprivation of a fundamental right.
17. It further held that The right to life and personal liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 would lose much of its substantive significance if the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were confined merely to directing the
release of persons subjected to unlawful detention. An effective means of
preventing violations of this fundamental right and ensuring compliance with
the constitutional mandate of Article 21 is to impose monetary liability upon
those responsible for such violations. Institutional apathy and administrative
inefficiency resulting in egregious infringements of fundamental rights cannot
be effectively remedied through any other judicial measure. The award of
compensation therefore serves as a measure of redress for unlawful acts
committed by State instrumentalities operating in the name of public interest
and seeking to shield their misconduct behind the authority and power of the
State.
18. In Bhim Singh (supra), where there was illegal detention in police
custody of the petitioner therein, it was held to constitute violation of his rights
21

under Articles 21 and 22(2) and exercising its power under Article 32, this
court directed the State to pay monetary compensation to the petitioner therein
for violation of his constitutional right.
19. The Court further examined and clarified the decision in Kasturilal
(supra), wherein the Supreme Court had upheld the State’s plea of sovereign
immunity in respect of tortious acts committed by its servants. It held that
such immunity was confined to the realm of tortious liability and was distinct
from the State’s liability for violations of fundamental rights. Under the
constitutional framework, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no
application to such violations and cannot be invoked as a defence against
constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226. These provisions empower
constitutional courts to award compensation for the infringement of
fundamental rights, particularly where monetary compensation constitutes the
only practicable means of enforcing those rights. Relying on Maharaj v.
Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (supra), the Court further held that
an order directing the payment of compensation for the violation of a protected
right constitutes a form of ‘redress’ to which the aggrieved person is entitled
and may, in certain circumstances, be the ‘only practicable form of redress’.
22

20. The Supreme Court held that a claim for compensation under public
law arising from the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution is a recognised remedy for the enforcement
and protection of such rights. A claim founded on the principle of strict
liability and pursued through constitutional proceedings for the enforcement
of fundamental rights is distinct from, and additional to, a claim for damages
under private law in respect of the tort arising from such violation. Since the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is incompatible with the constitutional
guarantee of fundamental rights, it cannot be invoked as a defence in
proceedings seeking constitutional remedies. This principle provides the basis
for awarding monetary compensation for the infringement of fundamental
rights by the State or its servants while purporting to exercise their official
powers, particularly where compensation represents the only practicable form
of redress and enforcement of the violated rights is sought through the public
law remedies available under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
21. Reliance was also placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
Bhagalpur Blinding Cases , namely Khatri (II) (supra) and Khatri (IV) (supra),
as well as Union Carbide Corporation (supra), to affirm that the Court is not
powerless in the face of violations of fundamental rights. The expansive
23

powers conferred upon the Supreme Court under Article 32, which is itself a
fundamental right, impose a constitutional obligation upon it to devise
appropriate remedies and innovative mechanisms necessary to secure
complete justice and enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. These powers include the authority to award monetary
compensation in appropriate cases where such compensation constitutes the
only effective means of redress. The Court further recognised that Article 142
also serves as an enabling provision in this regard.
22. It was held that adopting a contrary interpretation would render the
Court powerless to remedy violations of fundamental rights and reduce
constitutional guarantees to mere illusions. For the constitutional guarantee
that life and personal liberty shall not be deprived except in accordance with
law to have real and meaningful effect, there must be an effective mechanism
for enforcing that right whenever it is violated. The nature and form of relief,
however, must be determined in accordance with what is appropriate to the
facts and circumstances of each case.
23. It has been further held that this remedy in public law has to be more
readily available when invoked by the have-nots, who do not possess the
24

wherewithal for enforcement of their rights in private law, though with a
caveat that its exercise is to be tempered by judicial restraint to avoid
circumvention of private law remedies, where more appropriate.
24. Refence was also made to Article 9(5) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 1966 which stipulates that anyone who has been a
victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to
compensation.
25. Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, concurring with the view of Justice J.S. Verma
in Nilabati Behera (supra) held that public law proceedings serve a different
purpose than the private law proceedings. The award of monetary
compensation as exemplary damages by the Supreme Court under Article 32
or by the High Courts under Article 226, for an established violation of the
fundamental and indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution, constitutes a public law remedy founded on the principle of strict
liability for the infringement of the citizen’s guaranteed basic and indefeasible
rights.
26. The objective of public law is not merely to regulate and restrain the
exercise of public power, but also to assure citizens that they are governed by
25

a legal system committed to safeguarding their interests and protecting their
rights. Accordingly, when a court grants compensation in proceedings under
Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement or protection
of fundamental rights, it exercises its public law jurisdiction to penalise the
wrongdoer and impose liability for the public wrong upon the State, which
has failed to discharge its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of
citizens.
27. Such compensation must not be construed in the same manner as
damages awarded in a civil action under private law. Rather, it represents a
broader public law remedy through which monetary redress is provided for
the violation arising from the State’s failure to discharge its public duty to
safeguard fundamental rights. The compensation thus awarded assumes the
character of exemplary damages imposed upon the wrongdoer for breach of a
public law obligation. This remedy operates independently of the aggrieved
person’s right to seek compensation under private law through a tort action
before a court of competent jurisdiction and/or to initiate criminal proceedings
against the offender under the applicable penal law.
26

28. The Supreme Court and the High Courts, as guardians of citizens’ civil
liberties, possess not only the power and jurisdiction but also the
constitutional obligation to grant relief under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution to victims, or the heirs of deceased victims, where a flagrant
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 has been
established. In such circumstances, the courts may direct the State to
compensate for the harm caused by its officers through the infringement of
the citizen’s fundamental rights, irrespective of the availability of alternative
remedies by way of civil suits or criminal proceedings. The State, in turn,
retains the right to recover the compensation from the responsible officials
and to initiate such appropriate legal proceedings against them as may be
permissible under law. However, the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 32
and 226 to grant such relief is warranted only where the infringement of
fundamental rights has been established and, having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, no other appropriate form of judicial redress is
available.
29. Punishing the wrongdoer is a well-founded principle of justice, and it
is in furtherance of this objective that courts, while exercising their writ
jurisdiction, have fashioned appropriate relief by awarding compensation to
27

victims. In doing so, the courts consider not merely the interests of the
individual applicant and the respondent, but also the broader public interest,
with the aim of ensuring that public authorities and officials refrain from
unlawful conduct and faithfully discharge their public duties, particularly
where the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
is involved.
30. As the law continues to evolve, there is a corresponding need to develop
distinct procedures and principles governing public law remedies. It is
therefore necessary to delineate the circumstances in which such procedures
and principles may appropriately be invoked. While exercising their
jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226, courts must adopt a firm yet cautious
approach, ensuring that these constitutional remedies are not misused as
indirect substitutes for civil proceedings seeking relief under private law.
31. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. , (1997) 1 SCC 416, this court analysed
how similar infractions of fundamental rights were approached by other
jurisdiction and held as under:
“47. A similar approach of redressing the wrong by award of monetary
compensation against the State for its failure to protect the fundamental
rights of the citizen has been adopted by the Courts of Ireland, which has a
written constitution, guaranteeing fundamental rights, but which also like
the Indian Constitution contains no provision of remedy for the infringement
28

of those rights. That has, however, not prevented the Courts in Ireland from
developing remedies, including the award of damages, not only against
individuals guilty of infringement, but against the State itself.
48. The informative and educative observations of O'Dalaigh, C.J. in
State (At the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan [1965 IR 70] (IR at p. 122)
deserve special notice. The Learned Chief Justice said:
“It was not the intention of the Constitution in guaranteeing the
fundamental rights of the citizen that these rights should be set at
nought or circumvented. The intention was that rights of substance
were being assured to the individual and that the Courts were the
custodians of those rights. As a necessary corollary, it follows that
no one can with impunity set these rights at nought or circumvent
them, and that the Court's powers in this regard are as ample as the
defence of the Constitution requires.”
(emphasis supplied)
49. In Byrne v. Ireland [1972 IR 241] Walsh, J. opined at p. 264:
“In several parts in the Constitution duties to make certain
provisions for the benefit of the citizens are imposed on the State in
terms which bestow rights upon the citizens and, unless some
contrary provision appears in the Constitution, the Constitution
must be deemed to have created a remedy for the enforcement of
these rights. It follows that, where the right is one guaranteed by the
State, it is against the State that the remedy must be sought if there
has been a failure to discharge the constitutional obligation
imposed.”
(emphasis supplied)
*
29

51. In Simpson v. Attorney General [1994 NZLR 667] (Baigent case)
the Court of Appeal in New Zealand dealt with the issue in a very elaborate
manner by reference to a catena of authorities from different jurisdictions.
It considered the applicability of the doctrine of vicarious liability for torts,
like unlawful search, committed by the police officials which violates the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990. While dealing with the enforcement
of rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights for which no
specific remedy was provided, Hardie Boys, J. observed:
“The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, unless it is to be no more than
an empty statement, is a commitment by the Crown that those who
in the three branches of the government exercise its functions,
powers and duties will observe the rights that the Bill affirms. It is I
consider implicit in that commitment, indeed essential to its worth,
that the Courts are not only to observe the Bill in the discharge of
their own duties but are able to grant appropriate and effective
remedies where rights have been infringed. I see no reason to think
that this should depend on the terms of a written constitution.
Enjoyment of the basic human rights are the entitlement of every
citizen, and their protection the obligation of every civilised State.
They are inherent in and essential to the structure of society. They
do not depend on the legal or constitutional form in which they are
declared. The reasoning that has led the Privy Council and the
Courts of Ireland and India to the conclusions reached in the cases
to which I have referred (and they are but a sample) is in my opinion
equally valid to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act if it is to have
life and meaning.”
(emphasis supplied)
30

52. The Court of Appeal relied upon the judgments of the Irish Courts,
the Privy Council and referred to the law laid down in Nilabati Behera v.
State [(1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] thus:
“Another valuable authority comes from India, where the
Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to enforce rights
guaranteed under it. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [(1993) 2
SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527 : 1993 Cri LJ 2899] , the Supreme
Court awarded damages against the State to the mother of a young
man beaten to death in police custody. The Court held that its power
of enforcement imposed a duty to “forge new tools”, of which
compensation was an appropriate one where that was the only mode
of redress available. This was not a remedy in tort, but one in public
law based on strict liability for the contravention of fundamental
rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply.
These observations of Anand, J. (at p. 2912 of Cri LJ) may be noted
: (SCC p. 768, paras 33 and 34)
‘The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the
remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts
too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible
rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to
satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the
courts and the law are for the people and expected to
respond to their aspirations. … The purpose of public law is
not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen
that they live under a legal system which aims to protect
their interests and preserve their rights.’ ”
53. Each of the five members of the Court of Appeal in Simpson case
[1994 NZLR 667] delivered a separate judgment but there was unanimity
31

of opinion regarding the grant of pecuniary compensation to the victim, for
the contravention of his rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights Act,
notwithstanding the absence of an express provision in that behalf in the
Bill of Rights Act.
54. Thus, to sum up, it is now a well-accepted proposition in most of the
jurisdictions, that monetary or pecuniary compensation is an appropriate
and indeed an effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for
redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental right to life of
a citizen by the public servants and the State is vicariously liable for their
acts. The claim of the citizen is based on the principle of strict liability to
which the defence of sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen
must receive the amount of compensation from the State, which shall have
the right to be indemnified by the wrongdoer. In the assessment of
compensation, the emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on
punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to the wounds and not to
punish the transgressor or the offender, as awarding appropriate
punishment for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the
criminal courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law,
is duty bound to do. The award of compensation in the public law
jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any other action like civil suit for
damages which is lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the
deceased victim with respect to the same matter for the tortious act
committed by the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation
will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case and no strait-
jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. The relief to redress the wrong
for the established invasion of the fundamental rights of the citizen, under
the public law jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies
and not in derogation of them. The amount of compensation as awarded by
the Court and paid by the State to redress the wrong done, may in a given
32

case, be adjusted against any amount which may be awarded to the claimant
by way of damages in a civil suit.”
32. In D.K. Basu ( supra), this court after analysing the law laid down by
this court and also various other jurisdictions ultimately held that it is now a
well-established principle across several jurisdictions that monetary
compensation constitutes an appropriate, effective, and, in certain
circumstances, the only adequate remedy for an established violation of a
citizen’s fundamental right to life by public officials. In such cases, the State
bears vicarious liability for the acts of its officials. The citizen’s claim is
founded upon the principle of strict liability, against which the defence of
sovereign immunity is unavailable. Accordingly, the State is obligated to pay
compensation to the victim, while retaining the right to recover the amount
from the official responsible for the violation.
33. In determining the quantum of compensation, the primary
consideration must be its compensatory rather than punitive character. The
object is to provide relief to the victim and alleviate the harm suffered, rather
than to punish the wrongdoer. The imposition of appropriate punishment for
the offence, independently of the payment of compensation, falls within the
jurisdiction of the criminal courts before which the offender is prosecuted.
33

The State is legally obligated to ensure that the offender is prosecuted in
accordance with law.
34. Furthermore, the award of compensation in the exercise of public law
jurisdiction does not prejudice or extinguish any other remedy available to the
victim or the legal heirs of a deceased victim, including the institution of a
civil suit for damages arising from the tortious acts of State officials. The
amount of compensation must be determined in light of the specific facts and
circumstances of each case, and no uniform formula can be prescribed for its
assessment.
35. Thus, compensation awarded under public law for an established
infringement of a citizen’s fundamental rights is an additional remedy that
supplements, rather than replaces, the conventional remedies available under
law. In an appropriate case, the compensation paid by the State pursuant to a
court’s order may be adjusted against any damages subsequently awarded to
the claimant in civil proceedings concerning the same injury.
36. An issue similar to the present case, came up before this Court in S.L.P.
(Crl) 11244/2025 titled Sohan Singh @ Bablu vs State of MP. The Petitioner
therein had been illegally detained for a period of 4 years and 7 months after
34

having completed the sentence. The explanation given by the State was similar
that the supersession warrant was not received in the office of the
Superintendent, Jail. This court by Judgment dated 08.09.2025 directed the
State to pay to the petitioner therein an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- (Rupees
twenty five lakhs only) as compensation for the unlawful detention of over 4
years. This court also directed the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to entrust a
responsible officer to ascertain if there were any other convicts still
languishing in jail having completed the entire period of sentence.
37. Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court in Sohan Singh @ Bablu,
(supra) and to prevent any future reoccurrence of similar nature, the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh on 20.11.2025 issued the following directions:
“1. the copy of certificate prepared under Section 429 of BNSS read with
Rule 315 of the of Criminal Courts - Rules and Orders along with
copy of judgment of Hon'ble High Court or the copy of
judgment/order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as the case may be,
(in case the same is received by the High Court), be sent
simultaneously to the email ID of the concerned District/Sub-Jail
where the convict(s) is detained, the email ID of the concerned
District Establishment and the email ID of the concerned District
Legal Aid Services Authority for their information and compliance
on the same day when the judgment or order is pronounced or when
the copy of judgment/order is received, as the case may be;
35

2. the concerned trial court be required to submit before the Hon'ble
High Court, the compliance report in pursuance of aforesaid
certificate of the Hon'ble High Court or the judgment/order of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the said compliance report
shall invariably, accompany with the certificate of concerned
District Jail/Sub-Jail, where the convict(s) is detained mentioning
specifically that the official record of the concerned jail has been
amended/revised as conformable to the judgment or order so
received and/or the convict has been released (in case of acquittal
of the convict) on the same day itself;
3. the concerned office of the District Legal Aid Services Authority
(DALSA) through its Secretary be required to submit the compliance
report before the Hon'ble High Court as to submission of intimation
of certificate or the copy of judgment/order with the concerned jail
on the same day itself;
4. the compliance report alongwith such certificate of the concerned
jail of the concerned trial court and compliance report submitted by
DALSA be placed in the concerned court file of the Hon'ble High
Court for record and reference purpose;
5. the periodical jail inspection reports/certification in writing,
preferably on monthly basis, be summoned from all the Principal
District & Sessions Judge/PDJ s of all District Establishments of the
State of Madhya Pradesh in the light of Rule 716 of Chapter 31 of
Criminal Courts - Rules and Orders inter-alia covering the
following specific points of certification:-
A. Date of making the physical inspection in all the jail of the
District?;
36

B. Whether there exists any convict still languishing in jail
having completed the entire period of sentence?;
C. Whether the convict(s) is/are currently undergoing sentence
according to the sentence warrant/supersession warrant
which is in operation for the time being?
6. the periodical jail inspection reports/ certification in writing,
preferably on weekly basis, be summoned from all the Secretaries of
the District Legal Aid Services Authority (DALSA) through the M.P.
State Legal Services Authority, Jabalpur inter-alia covering the
following specific points of certification:-
A. Date of making the physical inspection in all the jail of the
District?
B. Whether there exists any convict still languishing in jail
having completed the entire period of sentence?;
C. Whether the convict(s) is/are currently undergoing sentence
according to the sentence warrant/supersession warrant
which is in operation for the time being?
7. the Secretaries of the District Legal Aid Services Authority (DALSA)
be required strictly to pay personal visits to the concerned jail to
ensure that there exists no convict(s) who is/are still languishing in
jail having completed the entire period of sentence during the
inspection which he/she shall conduct on weekly basis;
8. the aforesaid periodical jail inspection reports/certification in
writing from all the Principal District & Sessions Judge/PDJs of all
District Establishments of the State of Madhya Pradesh and the
Secretaries of the District Legal Aid Services Authority (DALSA) be
required to be submitted with the office of Registrar (J-I), High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur by the end of first week of each
month (in case of monthly inspection for PDJ s) or by the end of
37

each week (in the case of weekly inspection for Secretaries/DALSA)
henceforth;
8. the DE (Registrar) be instructed to circulate the aforesaid directions
to all the District Courts across the State of Madhya Pradesh
through the Principal District & Sessions Judge to comply _with the
aforesaid directions;
9. the Member Secretary, M.P. State Legal Services Authority,
Jabalpur be instructed to circulate the aforesaid directions amongst
all the District Legal Aid Services Authority (DALSA) across the
State of Madhya Pradesh through the Chairman, District Legal Aid
Services Authority to comply with the aforesaid directions;”

38. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has also launched an Online
Criminal Justice Ecosystem. The Online Criminal Justice Ecosystem is an
integrated platform for Police, Courts, Prisons, Prosecution, Forensics &
Hospitals. It facilitates sharing of online criminal justice data among all
stakeholders. These systems help in improving efficiency and transparency
and provide speedy justice to citizens. It digitises and streamlines the bail
processing workflow and all related activities under criminal justice system.
The Online Criminal Justice Ecosystem has been launched to inter alia ensure
immediate sharing of information between the various stake holder. Be it the
Police, Courts, Prisons, Prosecution, Forensics or Hospitals, it facilitates
38

transmission of data, case diaries, medical & forensic reports and court orders
in a prompt and secure atmosphere ensuring timely service and compliances.
39. Apart from putting in place sufficient safeguards to prevent such
reoccurrence, reasonable compensation has to be awarded to the Appellant. It
may be noticed that there is at present no legislative mechanism in place to
determine the compensation to be awarded to such victims.
40. Reference may be had to the judgment of the Delhi High Court in
Babloo Chauhan @ Dabloo versus State (NCT of Delhi) 2017 SCC OnLine
Del 12045 . The Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi held as under:
“Remedies for wrongful incarceration
11. The third issue concerns the possible legal remedies for victims of
wrongful incarceration and malicious prosecution in India. The report of
Prof Bajpai refers to the practice in the United States of America (USA) and
the United Kingdom (UK). He points out that that there are 32 states in the
USA including District of Columbia (DC) which have enacted laws that
provide monetary and non-monetary compensation to people wrongfully
incarcerated. There are specific schemes in the UK and New Zealand in this
regard.
12. As far as India is concerned, there is no exclusive legislation on the
topic. The decisions in Khatri v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627; Veena
Sethi v. State of Bihar, (1982) 2 SCC 583 : AIR 1983 SC 339; Rudul Sah v.
State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086; Bhim Singh v. State
of Jammu and Kashmir, (1985) 4 SCC 677 and Sant Bir v. State of Bihar,
39

(1982) 3 SCC 131 : AIR 1982 SC 1470, are instances where the Supreme
Court has held that compensation can be awarded by Constitutional Courts
for violation of fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. These have included instances of compensation being awarded to
those wrongly incarcerated as well. But these are episodic and are not
easily available to all similarly situated persons.
13. There is at present in our country no statutory or legal scheme for
compensating those who are wrongfully incarcerated. The instances of
those being acquitted by the High Court or the Supreme Court after many
years of imprisonment are not infrequent. They are left to their devices
without any hope of reintegration into society or rehabilitation since the
best years of their life have been spent behind bars, invisible behind the
high prison walls. The possibility of invoking civil remedies can by no
stretch of imagination be considered efficacious, affordable or timely.
Further, this has to invariably await the final outcome of the case which
may take an unconscionably long time.
14. Section 436-A CrPC (introduced with effect from 23-6-2006)
permits release on personal bond of under trial prisoners who have
completed up to one half of the maximum period of imprisonment for that
offence. Its object is laudable but its effective implementation is still a
challenge. In any event, it is not an answer to the hardship undergone by
an innocent person who is declared as such after spending more than a
decade in jail.
15. As far as compensating the victims of crime is concerned, Sections
357 and 357 A to C of the CrPC provide for compensation to the victim of
crime. The effective implementation of these provisions hinges upon the
concerted efforts of legal services authorities and governments. As far as
compensating “persons groundlessly arrested”, Section 358 CrPC offers
40

some token relief. This provision however fails to acknowledge the multiple
ways in which not only the prisoner, who may ultimately be declared to be
innocent, but the family of the prisoner faces deprivation and hardship.
Particularly poignant is the plight of the spouse, children and aged parents
of the prisoner who are unable to find legal redress for their losses. The
Delhi High Court has on more than one occasion stepped in to order
provision of shelter, educational and health needs of the children whose
parents, either or both, are in jail serving sentence.
16. There is an urgent need, therefore, for a legal (preferably
legislative) framework for providing relief and rehabilitation to victims of
wrongful prosecution and incarceration. Whether this should be an
omnibus legislation or scheme that caters to both the needs of the victim of
the crime, as well those wrongfully incarcerated, including the family and
dependants of the prisoner, or these have to be dealt with in separate
legislations or schemes is a matter for discussion, deliberation and
consultation with a cross-section of interest groups. Specific to the question
of compensating those wrongfully incarcerated, the questions as regards
the situations and conditions upon which such relief would be available, in
what form and at what stage are also matters requiring deliberation. This
is a task best left in the first instance to the body tasked with advising the
government on the legislative measures needed to fill the obvious gap.
17. The Court, accordingly, requests the Law Commission of India to
undertake a comprehensive examination of the issue highlighted in paras
11 to 16 of this order and make its recommendation thereon to the
Government of India.”
41. Prof Dr. G S Bajpai, (then the Registrar and now the Vice Chancellor
of the National Law University Delhi) was appointed as Amicus Curiae by the
41

Court in Babloo Chauhan (supra). He in his report titled ‘On Wrongful
Incarceration Default in Payment of Fine Suspension of Sentence’ as noticed
in Babloo Chauhan (supra) referred to the practice in the United States of
America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK). He points out that that there
are 32 states in the USA including District of Columbia (DC) which have
enacted laws that provide monetary and non-monetary compensation to
people wrongfully incarcerated. There are specific schemes in the UK and
New Zealand in this regards. He specifically referred to the Mechanism of
Awarding Compensation in US State Laws.
42. After considering the Report and noticing that there was no statutory
mechanism in place in India, the Court requested the requested the Law
Commission of India to undertake a comprehensive examination of the issues
highlighted. Pursuant to the directions by the Delhi High Court in Babloo
Chauhan (supra), the Law Commission of India in its Report No. 277 titled
“Wrongful Prosecution (Miscarriage of Justice): Legal Remedies” dated
August 2018, extensively examined the issue of miscarriage of justice
resulting in wrongful prosecution, incarceration and/or conviction. The
Report discussed the international perspective on addressing the issue of
miscarriage of justice; delving into the current scenario - remedies as
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available under the existing laws - identifying the standard of miscarriage of
justice in the Indian context; and concluded with the recommendations of the
Commission in terms of a legal framework to address the issue.
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43. The 277 Report of the Law Commission considered the International
Perspective and also recommendations of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, which had, after discussing Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, required the State Parties to enact
legislation ensuring that compensation as required by the said provision could
be paid and that the payment is made within a reasonable period of time. The
Report notices that a total of 168 State parties, including India, had ratified
the ICCPR. However, all countries had not converted their commitment into
Law.
44. The Report examined the legal framework put in place by various
countries for remedying such miscarriage of justice by compensating the
victims of wrongful convictions, providing them pecuniary and/or non-
pecuniary assistance. The establishment of State's responsibility of
compensating the said victims and also lay down other substantive and
procedural aspects of giving effect to this responsibility - quantum of
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compensation - with minimum and maximum limits in some cases - factors to
be considered while deciding the right to compensation as well as while
assessing the amount, claim procedure, the institution set up etc. The Report
examined the Legal Frameworks of United Kingdom, Germany, United States
of America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The Committee noted that
in the absence of a legal framework or even guidelines for the award of
compensation, the ex gratia compensation payments have been noted to be
‘arbitrary' and generally very modest, marred by lack of transparency, making
it difficult to establish any formal or informal tariff of compensation payable.
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45. The 277 Report takes into account the ‘Federal/Provincial Guidelines
on Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons’
formulated by the Federal and Provincial Miniters of Justice in 1988 in
Canada. The Guidelines lay down the prerequisites for eligibility for
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compensation. The 277 Report notices the same as under:
“3.34 As per the said Guidelines, the prerequisites for eligibility for
compensation are as follows:
(i) the wrongful conviction must have resulted in imprisonment, all or
part of which has been served;
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(ii) compensation should only be available to an individual who has
been wrongfully convicted and imprisoned as a result of a Criminal
Code or other federal penal offence;
(iii) the conviction has been reversed, outside the normal appeal process,
on the basis of a new or newly discovered fact;
(iv) the new fact shows that the applicant is factually innocent i.e. the
applicant did not commit the crime, and that there has been a
miscarriage of justice; and
(v) when all available appeal remedies have been exhausted.
3.35 The considerations for determining the quantum of compensation
under the Guidelines include both non-pecuniary and pecuniary losses:
(i) Non-pecuniary losses
a) Loss of liberty and the physical and mental harshness and
indignities of incarceration;
b) loss of reputation which would take into account a consideration of
any previous criminal record;
c) loss or interruption of family or other personal relationships.
(ii) Pecuniary Losses
a) Loss of livelihood, including of earnings, with adjustments for
income tax and for benefits received while incarcerated;
b) loss of future earning abilities;
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c) loss of property or other consequential financial losses resulting
from incarceration.
3.36 In assessing the aforementioned amounts, the inquiring body is
required to consider the following factors:
(i) Blameworthy conduct or other acts on the part of the applicant
which contributed to the wrongful conviction:
(ii) due diligence on the part of the claimant in pursuing his remedies.
3.37 Additionally, reasonable costs incurred by the applicant in
obtaining a pardon or verdict of acquittal should he included in the award
for compensation. Compensation for non-pecuniary losses should not
exceed $ 100,000. It is to be noted that these Guidelines are not regarded
as binding legislation; and just as they do not create any legal right to
compensation, they also do not create any legal bar to compensation,
payment of compensation remains at the discretion of the Crown, In this
manner, reportedly, many of the awards of compensation that have been
made in the last 20 years departed in some manner or the other from the
criteria proposed by the Guidelines.
3.38 In addition to the above, a wrongfully convicted person, in Canada,
also has the option to pursue a civil cause of action, such as a claim in tort
for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, prosecutorial
misconduct, or false imprisonment, or a claim for breach of rights protected
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms………..”
46. After noticing the legal framework in India already in place and the
judicial precedents, the Commission recommended amending the then
existing legal framework. In respect of award of compensation, the
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Commission recommended that the compensation should include both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary assistance to effectuate the rehabilitation of
these victims of wrongful prosecution into society. While pecuniary assistance
will be in terms of monetary award as may be determined by the Special
Court; non-pecuniary assistance will be awarded in the form of services such
as counselling, mental health services, vocational/employment skills
development, and such other similar services. Non-pecuniary assistance shall
also include a specific provision for removing disqualifications attached to a
prosecution or conviction - particularly affecting wrongfully accused person’s
chances of finding employment in public and private sectors; getting
admission in an educational institution. The Commission further
recommended that the factors to be taken imo consideration while
determining the amount of ,compensation can be broadly categorised as
‘financial’ and 'other factors' including inter alia seriousness of the offence,
severity or the punishment, the length of incarceration, loss or damage to
health, psychological and emotional harm; status of the victim in the society,
harm to reputation, loss of opportunities (of education, livelihood), loss of
income/ earnings, loss or damage to property.
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47. Compensation for wrongful incarceration embodies the principles of
restorative justice by seeking to address, to the extent possible, the physical,
psychological, social, and economic harm suffered by an individual as a
consequence of unlawful imprisonment. It facilitates the victim’s
rehabilitation and reintegration into society by providing financial assistance
to mitigate the loss of livelihood, damage to reputation, emotional distress,
and disruption of family and social relationships resulting from the wrongful
deprivation of liberty. Beyond its monetary value, the award of compensation
represents a formal acknowledgment by the State of the injustice suffered by
the individual and reinforces the principle that the unlawful deprivation of
personal liberty cannot be treated as an inconsequential consequence of the
administration of justice. It also affirms the State’s responsibility to uphold
constitutional guarantees and protect the fundamental rights of every citizen,
particularly the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
48. Furthermore, compensation serves an important deterrent function by
promoting accountability within law enforcement agencies and the criminal
justice system. The imposition of financial liability upon the State for
established violations of fundamental rights encourages greater diligence,
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procedural fairness, and adherence to legal safeguards at every stage of
investigation, arrest, detention, and prosecution. It also underscores the need
for effective institutional mechanisms to identify and rectify errors that may
lead to miscarriages of justice. Although monetary compensation cannot fully
restore the lost years of liberty or erase the adverse consequences of wrongful
incarceration, it provides a meaningful form of redress, reinforces public
confidence in the administration of justice, and encourages the development
of a more accountable and rights-oriented legal system.
49. In the present case, the Appellant was arrested in 2012 for an offence
under section 302 IPC. He was convicted by the Sessions Court on 14.08.2013
and sentenced to Life Imprisonment. He was ultimately acquitted by the High
Court on 20.01.2018. The order of acquittal was not appealed against by the
State and became final. He was released on 19.05.2025 i.e. after 7 years 3
months and 29 days of the order of acquittal.
50. Appellant was arrested in 2012. In his appeal filed before the High
Court (CRA No. 968 of 2013) he has stated his age as about 22 years. In this
petition filed in June 2026, has stated that he is aged 36 years. He was
acquitted on 20.01.2018, when he was about 28 years of age and was released
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on 19.05.2025 at the age of about 35. This implies that when he was arrested
he was 21 years of age and when he was released he had attained the age of
35 years. Admittedly, in the prime of his youth from the age of 28 years to 35
years he was wrongfully confined. He lost the hey days of his youth being
incarcerated.
51. Not only was there Loss of liberty but Appellant also had to undergo
physical and mental harshness and indignities of incarceration for an
unjustifiable period of over 7 years and 3 months. For this prolonged
unjustified period there was loss of consortium besides loss of livelihood and
earning. Appellant also lost out on advancement opportunities in terms of
education, skill development and future earning abilities.
52. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the compensation
awarded to the Appellant must be commensurate with the gravity of the
injustice suffered and the enduring consequences it has had on his life,
livelihood, dignity, and prospects for the future. The object of compensation
in cases of wrongful incarceration ought not to be confined to providing
merely symbolic or nominal monetary relief; rather, it must serve as a
meaningful remedial measure capable of assisting the victim in rebuilding his
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life and restoring, to the extent possible, the opportunities and independence
of which he has been deprived. The period of wrongful incarceration may
have far-reaching consequences, including the loss of livelihood and earning
capacity, disruption of family and social relationships, impairment of future
prospects, and the considerable difficulty of reintegrating into society after
release. These consequences cannot be adequately addressed through an
award that fails to account for the practical and long-term challenges
confronting the Appellant.
53. Accordingly, the compensation awarded must be of such a nature and
magnitude as would enable the Appellant to regain his financial independence,
acquire the means of sustainable livelihood, and establish himself as a self-
sufficient individual capable of standing on his own feet. Such compensation
must afford him a genuine opportunity to rebuild his life with dignity and to
overcome, at least in some measure, the material disadvantages occasioned by
the wrongful deprivation of his liberty. It must also reflect the State's
recognition of the injustice suffered by him and its obligation to provide an
effective remedy for the violation of his rights. While no monetary award can
fully compensate for the loss of liberty, time, and opportunities that can never
be restored, the inadequacy of monetary compensation cannot be an excuse
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for denying the Appellant a remedy that is practical, effective, and
proportionate to the harm suffered.
54. In these circumstances, ensuring that the Appellant is placed in a
position to regain his self-sufficiency and rebuild his life is not an act of
charity or benevolence on the part of the State; it is the bare minimum required
to meaningfully redress the wrong inflicted upon him. The State, having failed
to protect the Appellant from such injustice, must extend a remedy that goes
beyond a mere formal acknowledgement of the violation and addresses its
tangible consequences. Any lesser approach would risk rendering the right to
compensation illusory and would fall short of the constitutional commitment
to justice, fairness, and human dignity. Therefore, an award of compensation
sufficient to enable the Appellant to stand on his own feet and lead a life of
dignity is essential to doing substantial justice in the present case.
55. In view of the above, the Appeal is disposed of in the following terms:
(i) The impugned order dated 01.05.2026 is modified and the
amount of compensation is enhanced to a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/-
(Rupees thirty lakhs only) towards all kinds of heads: pecuniary
and non-pecuniary; and
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(ii) Respondent State of Chhattisgarh shall, within a period of four
weeks, in the manner as specified hereinafter, pay the said
amount of Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty lakhs only) to the
Appellant, after adjusting the amount, if any, paid pursuant to
the impugned order; and
(iii) The amount shall be paid by way of RTGS/NEFT/IMPS directly
to the Bank, where the Appellant has a savings bank account; and
(iv) The Bank to which the amount is remitted shall transfer a sum of
Rs. 5,00,000/- to the savings bank account of the Appellant; and
(v) The balance amount shall be deposited by the Bank in an interest
bearing fixed deposit account with an auto renewal facility to be
opened in the name of the Appellant; and
(vi) The Bank shall not permit any joint name to be added in the fixed
deposit account of the appellant i.e. the fixed deposit account of
the appellant shall be an individual account and not a joint
account; and
(vii) The original fixed deposit receipt (FDR) shall be retained by the
bank in safe custody. However, the statement containing FDR
number, FDR amount, date of maturity and maturity amount
shall be furnished by the Bank to the Appellant as well as the
Secretary, District Legal Services Authority of District Mohla
Manpur, Ambarbagh Chowki, Chhattisgarh; and
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(viii) The monthly interest accrued on the fixed deposit shall be
credited by Electronic Clearing System (ECS) in the savings
bank account of the appellant; and
(ix) No loan, advance, withdrawal or pre-mature discharge shall be
allowed on the fixed deposit without the prior permission of the
Secretary, District Legal Services Authority of District Mohla
Manpur, Ambarbagh Chowki, Chhattisgarh; and
(x) The Secretary, District Legal Services Authority of District
Mohla Manpur, Ambarbagh Chowki, Chhattisgarh may grant
permission in case appellant requires the amount for some
medical emergency or creation of a long term revenue generating
asset;
(xi) The Secretary, District Legal Services Authority of District
Mohla Manpur, Ambarbagh Chowki, Chhattisgarh shall
supervise and ensure compliance of the directions issued herein;
and
(xii) A direction is issued to all the High Courts to consider issuing
directions in line with the directions issued by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh pursuant to the order of this Court in Sohan
Singh @ Bablu, (supra) and also to consider setting up a
Criminal Justice Ecosystem akin to the Online Criminal Justice
Ecosystem set up by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
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56. Copy of this Judgment shall be forwarded to the Registrar Generals of
all the High Courts for placing the same before the respective Chief Justices
for their consideration. Copy of this Judgment shall also be forwarded to the
Secretary, District Legal Services Authority of District Mohla Manpur,
Ambarbagh Chowki, Chhattisgarh for necessary compliance.

………………………….J.
[AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH]




…………………………….J.
[SANJEEV SACHDEVA]

New Delhi;
November 16, 2026

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