Paras Jain & Anr. vs Nemo
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Case type
- Matrimonial Application Family Court
- Decided on
- 10-03-2026
$~43
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 10.03.2026
+ MAT.APP.(F.C.) 72/2026 & CM APPL. 14421/2026
PARAS JAIN & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Ms. Isha Khanna, Adv. with
Appellant in person.
versus
NEMO .....Respondent
Through: Counsel (appearance not given)
with Respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
J U D G M E N T
CM APPL. 14422/2026 (condonation of delay of 36 days in filing the
appeal)
1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in view of the
reasons assigned in the application, the present application is allowed and
the delay in filing of the appeal is, hereby, condoned.
2. Accordingly, the present application stands disposed of.
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 72/2026
3. The present appeal assails the Order dated 08.12.2025 passed by
the learned Family Judge-03, Karkardooma Courts, Shahdara, Delhi
(“Family Court”) in HMA No. 1772/2025 (hereinafter referred to as the
“impugned order”), whereby the application filed by the parties under
Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) seeking waiver of
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
04:48:41
the statutory period of one year from the date of marriage was declined
and, consequently, the petition filed by the parties under Section 13B(1)
of the HMA seeking dissolution of marriage by mutual consent was
dismissed.
4. The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 07.05.2025.
It is the undisputed factual position that the marriage was never
consummated and no child has been born from the wedlock. The parties
could not adjust with each other and have been living separately since
15.05.2025. A mutual settlement was executed between the parties on
19.09.2025, whereby they mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage by
way of divorce by mutual consent upon payment of a consolidated
settlement amount.
5. By the impugned order, the learned Family Court declined to grant
leave under Section 14 of the HMA on the ground that the statutory
period of one year from the date of marriage had not elapsed and that the
parties ought to wait for the expiry of the said period before seeking
dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. Consequently, the divorce
petition by way of mutual consent was also dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. Learned counsel for the parties submits that continuation of the
marriage would cause exceptional hardship to the parties. It is submitted
that the parties lived together only for about seven days after their
marriage and thereafter separated. The marriage was never consummated
and the parties could not reside together. It is further submitted that the
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Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
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parties belong to different backgrounds and have been unable to adjust
with each other. It is also submitted that there are no children from the
wedlock.
8. The parties have also relied upon Amardeep Singh v. Harveen
Kaur , (2017) 8 SCC 746, with regard to waiver of the period under
Section 13B(2) of the HMA, wherein the Supreme Court was of the view
that the said period is not mandatory but directory.
9. It is pertinent to note the Section 13B(1) of the HMA, which reads
as under:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for
dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented
to the district court by both the parties to a marriage together,
whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the
commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976
(68 of 1976), on the ground that they have been living
separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not
been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed
that the marriage should be dissolved.”
10. Section 14 of the HMA provides as under:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not
be competent for any court to entertain any petition for
dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless at the
date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed
since the date of the marriage:
Provided that the court may, upon application made to it in
accordance with such rules as may be made by the High Court
in that behalf, allow a petition to be presented before one year
has elapsed since the date of the marriage on the ground that
the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of
exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, but if it
appears to the court at the hearing of the petition that the
petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any
misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the
court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the
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Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
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condition that the decree shall not have effect until after the
expiry of one year from the date of the marriage or may dismiss
the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be
brought after expiration of the said one year upon the same or
substantially the same facts as those alleged in support of the
petition so dismissed.
(2) In disposing of any application under this section for leave
to present a petition for divorce before the expiration of one
year from the date of the marriage, the court shall have regard
to the interests of any children of the marriage and to the
question whether there is a reasonable probability of a
reconciliation between the parties before the expiration of the
said one year.”
11. The scope and application of the aforesaid provisions has recently
been considered by the Full Bench of this Court in MAT.APP. (F.C.)
111/2025, titled Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar , decided on
17.12.2025, wherein it was held as under:
“57. We may summarise our conclusions in response to the
questions posed, as follows:
57.1. The statutory period of 01-year prescribed under section
13B(1) of the HMA as a pre-requisite for presenting the first
motion, can be waived, by applying the proviso to section 14(1)
of the HMA;
57.2. The waiver of the 01-year separation period under section
13B(1) of the HMA does not preclude waiver of the 06-month
cooling-off period for filing the second motion under section
13B(2); and waiver of the 01-year period under section 13B(1),
and the 06-month period under section 13B(2), are to be
considered independently of each other;
57.3. Where the court is satisfied that the 01-year period under
section 13B(1) and the 06-month period under section 13B(2) of
the HMA deserve to be waived, the court is not legally
mandated to defer the date from which the divorce decree
would take effect, and such decree may be made effective
forthwith;
57.4. Such waiver is not to be granted merely for the asking but
only upon the court being satisfied that circumstances of
‘exceptional hardship to the petitioner’ and/or ‘exceptional
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Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
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depravity on the part of the respondent’ exist, while also testing
the case on the anvil of the considerations set-out in Pooja
Gupta;
57.5. Waiver, as above, can be granted both by the Family
Court as well as the High Court; and
57.6. As contemplated in the proviso to section 14(1) of the
HMA, where a court finds that the waiver of the 01-year period
under section 13B(1) has been obtained by misrepresentation or
concealment, the court may defer the date on which the divorce
would take effect, as may be considered appropriate; or may
dismiss the divorce petition, at whichever stage it is pending,
without prejudice to the right of the parties to present a fresh
petition under section 13B(1) of the HMA after expiration of the
01-year period, on the same or substantially the same facts as
may have been pleaded in the petition so dismissed.”
12. Section 14 of the HMA embodies the legislative intent that parties
should ordinarily not seek dissolution of marriage within one year of its
solemnization so that they may have sufficient time to reconsider their
decision and attempt reconciliation. However, the proviso to Section 14
recognizes that in certain situations insistence on the statutory waiting
period may itself result in undue hardship and therefore empowers the
Court to grant leave where the circumstances disclose exceptional
hardship.
13. We have also interacted with the parties in chambers. During the
course of the chamber interaction, the Court is satisfied with the personal
reasons raised by the parties and that the reasons stated by them justify
the request for waiver. Looking into the issue of privacy of parties, we
restrain ourselves from recording the same.
14. Further, the undisputed factual position demonstrates that the
parties lived together only for about seven days after the marriage and
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Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
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thereafter separated. The marriage has remained unconsummated, and the
parties have been living separately since 15.05.2025. There are no
children from the wedlock.
15. The absence of cohabitation and consummation, coupled with the
immediate separation of the parties soon after the marriage, clearly
indicates that the matrimonial relationship between the parties never took
shape in any meaningful sense.
16. The Court is also required to consider whether there exists any
reasonable probability of reconciliation between the parties. In the
present case, both parties have entered into a mutual settlement and have
unequivocally expressed their intention not to continue the matrimonial
relationship. The material on record does not indicate any possibility of
resumption of matrimonial life.
17. In such circumstances, insisting that the parties wait for
completion of the statutory period would serve no meaningful purpose
and would only prolong a marriage that exists merely in law and not in
substance.
18. We find it appropriate that the parties should start their life afresh
and in view of the above circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the
present case falls within the scope of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the
HMA.
19. Accordingly, the Order dated 08.12.2025 passed by the Family
Court is set aside.
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
04:48:41
20. The application filed by the parties under Section 14 of the HMA
is allowed and leave is granted to the parties to present their joint petition
for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B(1) of the HMA before
the Family Court forthwith, without waiting for the expiry of one year
from the date of marriage.
21. The matter is remanded to the Family Court concerned to proceed
with the petition under Section 13B(1) of the HMA in accordance with
law. Further, as soon as the second motion petition under Section 13B(2)
of the HMA will be filed, the Family Court shall consider and decide the
said petition as expeditiously as possible, keeping in view the law laid
down in case of Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra).
22. The appeal stands allowed in the above terms.
23. Pending application(s) also stand(s) disposed of.
(VIVEK CHAUDHARY)
JUDGE
(RENU BHATNAGAR)
JUDGE
MARCH 10, 2026/nc
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Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ROHIT SAIN
Signing Date:13.03.2026
04:48:41