SRI KISHAN vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- Decided on
- 13-03-2026
1
C:15413
of 2025
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
R
HC-KAR
RU
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALUR
TH
HIS THE 13 DAY OF MARCH, 2026
DATED TH
BEFORE
LE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
THE HON'B
TION NO.25250 OF 2025 (GM-POLICE)
)
WRIT PETIT
BETWEEN
SRI KISHAN
S/O LALARAMJI,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEA
RD
R/AT 3 CROSS,
VENKATAPURA,
KORAMANGALA,
BENGALURU-560034
CURRENTLY SERVING
CENTRAL PRISON, M
ARS,
4
G SENTENCE IN
YSORE.
ITIONER
... PETI
(BY SRI. PRADEEP PA
SRI. PRATHAP S.
AND
ATIL., ADVOCATE FOR
.S., ADVOCATE)
Digitally signed by
VARSHA N
RASALKAR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1. THE STATE OF
F KARNATAKA
BY THE PRINC
HOME DEPART
VIDHANA SOU
BENGALURU-5
IPAL SECRETARY,
TMENT,
UDHA,
560001
2. THE DIRECTOR
R GENERAL OF POLICE
PRISONS AND
SERVICES,
NO.9, SHESHA
GANDHI NAGA
BENGALURU-5
CORRECTIONAL
ADRI ROAD,
AR,
560009
2
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
3. THE CHIEF SU
PERINTENDENT
SON,
007
CENTRAL PRIS
MYSORE-5700
…. RESPON
C.S., AAG A/W
NDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP C
SMT. K.P. YASH
ODHA., AGA)
THIS WRIT PE
ETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
6 & 227
OF THE CONSTITUT
TION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A
A WRIT,
ORDER OR DIRECTIO
ON IN THE NATURE OF MANDAMUS TO
THE R3
TO RELEASE THE PE
ETITIONER FROM PRISON FORTHWITH, I
IN VIEW
OF THE ORDER PA
ASSED BY THE HONORABLE APEX CO
OUT IN
SUKHDEV YADAV @
PEHALWAN V/S STATE OF NCT OF DEL
LHI AND
OTHERS IN CRIMIN
AL APPEAL NO.3271 OF 2025, PRODUC
CED AS
ANNEXURE -C.
THIS WRIT PE
ETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS AND
HAVING
BEEN RESERVED FO
OR ORDERS ON 05.02.2025, THIS DA
AY, THE
COURT PRONOUNCED
D THE FOLLOWING:
CAV ORDER
1. The Petition
for the
ner is before the Court seeking f
following rel
iefs:
of
he
he
a) Issue
Mandam
petitione
order p
Sukhdev
Delhi &
2025) p
b) Pass
the fact
as to co
e a writ, order or direction in the nature o
mus to the respondent No.3 to release th
er from prison forthwith, in view of th
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in
of
of
v Yadav @ Pehalwan v/s State of NCT
& Others in Criminal Appeal No. 3271
produced as Annexure-C.
ng
such other order/s directions considerin
ts and circumstances of the case togethe
osts in the interest of justice.
er
3
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
2. The petitio
ner was convicted for the of
ffences
punishable u
under Section 302, 364A of Indian
n Penal
Code and
awarded death sentence i
n SC
No.463/200
3 by the IV Additional City Civ
vil and
Sessions Co
ourt, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru
u. A
challenge ha
aving been made, this Court in C
riminal
Appeal No.1
1197/2008 vide judgment dated 6.6
6.2013
modified th
e death sentence to life imprison
nment.
The said mo
odified order reads as under:-
“On tho
that the
rarest o
gruesom
been m
does no
calls for
sentenc
accused
imprison
It is fur
not be
fourteen
routine.
sentenc
Section
appeals
3. The petition
orough consideration of the facts, we fi
ind
the
s a
ave
e case does not appears to be one of t
of rare case. It may be fact that it is
me murder and two innocent children ha
murdered. But none the less, the murd
der
ot appear to be rarest of rare case, whi
ich
ath
and
r death sentence. Accordingly, the dea
ce awarded by the trial court is modified a
d nos.1 to 3 are sentenced to l
nment.
life
rther directed that accused nos.1 to 3 sh
hall
given commutation after completion
n years of imprisonment as a matter
of
of
life
The accused have to serve the l
ce and they should be in jail in terms
of
and
57 of IPC. Accordingly, the reference a
are disposed of.”
ner claims to have undergone
twenty
years of act
tual imprisonment as on 15.1.2025
5. His
conduct be
eing satisfactory and there bein
ng no
adverse rep
port as per the Imprisonment Cer
rtificate
dated 15.1.
.2025, the petitioner claims that
he is
entitled to p
remature release.
4
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
4. Sri.Pradeep
Patil/Sri.Prathap S.S., learned c
counsel
for the pet
titioner in this regard relies upo
on the
decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the c
case of
NCT of
Sukhdev Ya
adav @ Pehalwan vs. State of (N
1
others more particularly Paras 3.
2, 15,
Delhi) & o
15.1, 15.2,
15.3, 15.4 and 16, which are repro
oduced
hereunder fo
or easy reference:
on
P.S.
3.2. Th
17.02.20
Kavi Nag
Section
(hereinaf
Smt. Nila
deceased
investiga
and Vish
offences
Section
Additiona
Court”).
imprison
under Se
of fine,
They we
years an
under Se
fine, to
and rigor
10,000/-
of payme
three mo
15. The
inter alia
“Life imp
imprison
fine of Rs
The wo
imprison
1
Criminal Appeal No.32
e relevant facts of the case are that
002, FIR No. 192/2002 was registered at P
der
860
gar, District Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh und
364/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18
fter, “IPC”) on the basis of a complaint filed
am Katara i.e. complainant and mother of t
d. On 28.05.2008, after completion
ation and trial, his co-convicts – Vikas Yad
hal Yadav – were convicted for commission
by
the
of
dav
of
with
under Sections 302, 364, 201 read w
34 of the IPC in SC No. 78/2002 by t
al Sessions Judge (01), New Delhi, (“Sessio
the
ons
life
ach
Thereafter, they were sentenced to undergo l
ment as well as fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- ea
ection 302 of the IPC and in default of payme
ent
ear.
to undergo simple imprisonment for one ye
ere sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for t
nd fine of Rs. 50,000/- each for their convicti
ten
ion
t of
ection 364/34 IPC and in default of payment
hs,
Rs.
ault
undergo simple imprisonment of six month
rous imprisonment for five years and fine of R
- each under Section 201/34 IPC and in defa
for
ent of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment
onths. All sentences were to run concurrently.
sentence imposed on the appellant here
a, is recapitulated as under:
ein,
ual
and
prisonment which shall be 20 years of act
ment without consideration of remission, a
s. 10,000/-.”
life
ted
ord “which” used after the words “l
ment”, is an interrogative pronoun, relat
271/2025 dated 29.7.2025
5
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
pronoun
previous
further i
imprison
actual im
twenty
during h
i.e., afte
433A of
period
whatsoev
make a
sentence
15.1. In
by Vikas
1530 of 2
appellant
sentence
question
sentence
be found
State of
84 of its
Court o
paramete
terms se
15.2. In
imprison
imprison
Soon aft
our view
jail prov
appellant
applicatio
completi
reason t
years of
period of
any remi
of the tw
unnecess
sentence
imprison
other ha
responde
contende
which wa
appellant
and determiner, referring to somethi
ly mentioned when introducing a clause givi
information . Therefore, the sentence of l
ing
ing
life
s of
ment is determined as twenty years which is
mprisonment. Further, during the period
of
ion
ent
years, the appellant cannot seek remissi
his sentence of twenty years of imprisonme
er completion of fourteen years as per Secti
ion
r a
ion
the CrPC but must continue his sentence for
of twenty years without any remissi
ver. Therefore, the appellant has no right
to
ove
ny application for remission of the abo
e for a period of twenty years.
n Criminal Appeal Nos. 1531-1533 of 2015 fil
led
28-
Yadav as well as in Criminal Appeal Nos. 152
2015 which also included the appeal filed by t
t herein, the imposition of a fixed te
e on the appellants by the High Court was a
the
erm
lso
of
not
ed but this Court observed that such a term
e on the appellants by the High Court could n
d fault with. Placing reliance on Gopal Singh
v.
aph
this
Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545, at paragra
judgment in the aforesaid criminal appeal, t
observed that “Judged on the aforesa
ers, we reiterate that the imposition of fix
entence is justified.”
aid
xed
n the instant case, as already noted, the l
life
ual
on.
ment being twenty years of act
ment was without consideration of remissio
ter the period of twenty years is completed,
w, the appellant has to be simply released fro
in
om
The
vided the other sentences run concurrently. T
t is not under an obligation to make
on seeking remission of his sentence
an
on
the
nty
the
d to
on of twenty years. This is simply for t
that the appellant has completed his twen
f actual imprisonment and in fact, during t
f twenty years, the appellant was not entitled
ission. Thus, in the instant case, on completi
wenty years’ of actual imprisonment, it is who
ion
olly
sary for the appellant to seek remission of
e on the premise that his sentence is a
his
life
the
the
ant
ver,
ment i.e. till the end of his natural life. On t
and, learned senior counsel appearing for t
ent-State and respondent-complaina
ed that once the period of twenty years is ov
as without any consideration of remission, t
t had to seek remission of his sentence (l
the
life
6
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
imprison
Sentence
accordan
whether
appellant
cannot b
(i) firstly
life impr
actual im
complete
(ii) seco
appellant
(iii) third
imprison
15.3. Th
death pe
has been
years of
of death
fixed te
possible
period of
the appe
sentence
432 read
has been
mean t
imprison
his sente
imprison
that was
those te
imposed
of actu
remission
period o
actual im
meaning
15.4. In
twenty y
on 09.03
is so, it
his perio
aforesaid
completi
ment) by making an application to t
e Review Board which would consider
nce with the applicable policy and deci
the
in
ide
the
the remission of sentence imposed on t
t has to be granted or not. Such a contenti
be accepted for the following reasons:
ion
y, because, in the instant case, the sentence
of
s of
risonment has been fixed to be twenty years
mprisonment which the appellant herein h
ed;
has
ondly, during the period of twenty years t
the
t was not entitled to seek any remission; and
dly, on completion of twenty years of actu
ual
.
ment, the appellant is entitled to be released.
his is because in this case, instead of granti
enalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonme
n awarded which shall be for a period of twen
ing
ent
nty
nce
actual imprisonment. That even in the absen
penalty being imposed, life imprisonment o
rm of twenty years was imposed which
f a
is
The
only for a High Court or this Court to do so. T
f twenty years is without remission inasmuch
ellant is denied the right of remission of
e on completion of fourteen years as per Secti
as
his
ion
ght
not
d with Section 433-A of the CrPC. Such a rig
n denied by the High Court but that does n
that on completion of twenty years
ment the appellant has to still seek reduction
ence on the premise that he was awarded l
of
n of
life
. If
t in
ment which is till the end of his natural life.
s so, the High Court would have specified it
erms. On the other hand, the High Court h
has
life imprisonment which shall be twenty yea
ual imprisonment without consideration
n. The High Court was of the view that for
of twenty years, the appellant has to under
ars
of
r a
rgo
mprisonment which would not take within
g any period granted for parole or furlough.
its
n the instant case, the actual imprisonment
years was admittedly completed by the appella
of
ant
hat
ted
the
3.2025 which was without any remission. If th
would imply that the appellant has complet
od of sentence. In fact, the award of t
d sentence was also confirmed by this Court.
On
on of twenty years of actual imprisonment
on
7
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
09.03.20
The relea
upon fur
released
granted
fact, the
over wh
sentence
this Cour
the appe
other ha
for furlo
thereafte
25.06.20
then, pe
made by
sentence
incarcera
was illeg
to have b
the sent
affirmed
16. A c
Registry
States/U
accused/
of senten
such acc
025, the appellant was entitled to be release
ed.
end
ase of the appellant from jail does not depe
rther consideration as to whether he has to
be
be
In
ent
the
or not and as to whether remission has to
to him or not by the Sentence Review Board.
Sentence Review Board cannot sit in judgme
hat has judicially determined as t
been
e by the High Court which has been affirmed
by
n of
rt. There cannot be any further incarceration
ellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwards. On t
and, in the instant case, the appellant’s pray
the
yer
nd,
ough was refused by the High Court an
er, this Court granted furlough only
025 as he had completed his actual sentence
on
by
yer
ending consideration of the amended pray
y the appellant herein on completion of
e on 09.03.2025. Therefore, the continuo
his
ous
ation of the appellant from 09.03.2025 onwar
gal. In fact, on 10.03.2025, the appellant oug
rds
ght
ted
been released from prison as he had complet
tence imposed on him by the High Court
as
by this Court.
copy of this order shall be circulated by t
the
the
any
riod
of this Court to all the Home Secretaries of t
Union Territories to ascertain whether a
/convict has remained in jail beyond the peri
nce and if so, to issue directions for release
cused/convicts, if not wanted in any other case
of
e.
4.1. By rely
ying on Sukhdev Yadav @ Peha
alwan,
learned
d counsel submits that where a se
ntence
of life i
imprisonment is specified to mean
a fixed
term o
of actual imprisonment without rem
mission,
the co
onvict becomes entitled to be re
eleased
immed
diately upon completion of the said
period
of actu
ual imprisonment, and such releas
e does
not de
epend upon any further considerat
tion by
the Se
entence Review Board or the gr
rant of
8
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
remiss
ion by the State. He would the
erefore
conten
nd that once the period of se
ntence
impose
ed by the Court has been
fully
underg
gone, any continued incarceration
would
be ille
egal, as held by the Hon’ble Su
upreme
Court i
in the aforesaid decision.
4.2. He reli
es on Section 57 of the IPC, which
h reads
as und
er:
actions of terms of punishment .—
ing fractions of terms of punishmen
nment for life shall be reckoned
ent to imprisonment for twenty years.
—In
57. Fra
calculati
imprison
equivale
nt,
as
4.3. Placing
g reliance on the aforesaid pro
ovision,
learned
d counsel submits that life impriso
onment
is to be
e reckoned as equivalent to twenty
y years
of imp
prisonment, and therefore a convic
ct who
has be
een sentenced to life imprisonment
would
be ent
titled to be released upon comple
tion of
twenty
y years of imprisonment. It is f
further
conten
nded that unless a specific mi
nimum
period
of incarceration is prescribed
in the
order
of conviction, a sentence o
of life
impriso
onment must be understood as
being
satisfie
ed upon completion of twenty ye
ears of
impriso
onment. On that premise, it is sub
bmitted
9
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
that th
he petitioner having completed th
he said
period
of incarceration, the continued det
tention
is illega
al and the present petition deserve
s to be
allowed
d.
5. Sri.Pradeep
C.S., learned Additional Ad
vocate
General wou
uld submit that:
5.1. The in
terpretation sought to be placed
by the
petition
ner on the operative portion o
of the
judgme
ent passed in the aforesaid C
riminal
Appeal
l is wholly misconceived. The pet
titioner
was o
originally convicted and sentenc
ced to
death,
which, in appeal, came to be com
mmuted
to life
imprisonment. The mere refere
nce to
Section
n 57 of the Indian Penal Code
in the
judgme
ent does not mean that the sente
ence of
life im
prisonment is restricted to a per
riod of
twenty
y years. A sentence of life impriso
onment
ordinar
rily means imprisonment for
r the
remain
nder of the natural life of the c
convict,
unless
specifically limited by the Court.
5.2. He wou
uld further submit that it is only in
n cases
where
the conditions governing prem
mature
release
e or remission are satisfied that a c
convict
may be
e released before completion of the
e entire
life ter
rm. Normally, a convict becomes e
eligible
10
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
to see
ek premature release after unde
ergoing
fourtee
en years of actual imprison
nment.
Howev
ver, in the present case, as this Cou
urt has
made
reference to Section 57 of the IP
PC, the
petition
ner would not even be entitled to
o seek
premat
ture release until completion of
twenty
years o
of imprisonment.
5.3. Learne
ed Additional Advocate General
would
further
r contend that the reliance placed
by the
petition
ner on the decision of the H
Hon’ble
Suprem
me Court in Sukhdev Yada
av is
mispla
ced. In the said case, the Cou
rt had
specific
cally fixed the sentence o
f life
impriso
onment to mean twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment without remission, and it w
was on
the ba
sis of such a judicial determinatio
on that
the H
on’ble Supreme Court held tha
at the
senten
ce stood completed upon the c
convict
underg
going twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment.
5.4. In the
e present case, however, the se
ntence
impose
ed is simple life imprisonment w
without
any ju
udicial restriction limiting it to
twenty
years.
Such a restriction cannot be rea
ad into
the jud
dgment merely by referring to Sect
tion 57
11
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
of the
IPC. According to the learned Add
ditional
Advoca
ate General, any such interpre
etation
would
be erroneous and would defea
at the
purpos
se of sentencing.
5.5. He wo
uld further submit that while cons
idering
questio
ons relating to sentence and releas
se, the
Court
must have regard not only to the
rights
of the
convict, but also to the interests
of the
victim
and the society at large. A sente
ence of
life imp
prisonment must therefore be unde
erstood
in it
s ordinary legal sense, n
amely,
impriso
onment for the remainder of the n
natural
life of
the convict, unless expressly limi
ted by
the Co
urt.
5.6. Learne
ed Additional Advocate General reit
terates
that Se
ection 57 of the IPC merely provide
es that
for the
e purpose of calculating fractions of
f terms
of pu
nishment, life imprisonment ma
ay be
reckon
ed as equivalent to twenty year
rs. The
said p
rovision does not determine the
actual
duratio
on of a sentence of life imprisonme
nt, nor
does it
t mandate the release of a convic
ct after
comple
etion of twenty years.
5.7. He fu
urther submits that the questi
ion of
remiss
ion or premature release falls e
entirely
12
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
within
the domain of the appro
opriate
Govern
nment, in exercise of its powers
under
Section
n 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Su
raksha
Sanhita
a, 2023 (earlier Section 432 of the
e Code
of Crim
minal Procedure). Therefore, Section
n 57 of
the IPC
C cannot be invoked to restrict o
or alter
the per
riod of a sentence of life imprisonm
ment.
5.8. He reli
ies on the judgment of the Hon’ble
e Apex
Court
in the case of Gopal Vinayk God
dse vs.
2
of Maharashtra and others ,
more
State
particu
ularly Paras 8 and 9 which are repro
oduced
hereun
nder for easy reference:
8. Br
26 of
be u
impri
After
in th
impri
sente
autho
Pena
prison
law
frame
to ea
the s
term
out th
life is
is on
other
life o
one o
do no
possi
riefly stated the legal position is this: Before A
Act
f 1955 a sentence of transportation for life cou
undergone by a prisoner by way of rigoro
uld
ous
dia.
with
isonment for life in a designated prison in Ind
r the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt w
e same manner as one sentenced to rigoro
isonment for the same term. Unless the sa
ence is commuted or remitted by appropria
ous
aid
ate
ority under the relevant provisions of the Ind
ian
, a
d in
ules
l Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure ,
ner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound
to serve the life, term in prison. The ru
ed under the Prisons Act enable such a prison
arn remissions- ordinary, special and State-a
said remissions will be given credit towards
ner
and
his
ing
of imprisonment. For the purpose of worki
he remissions the sentence of transportation
s ordinarily equated with a definite period, bu
nly for that particular purpose and not for a
for
t it
any
r purpose. As the sentence of transportation
for
, is
ned
r its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment,
of indefinite duration, the remissions so earn
ot in practice help such a convict as it is n
ible to predicate the time of his death. That
not
t is
2
1961 SCC OnLine SC 7
70
13
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
why
appro
Secti
consi
perio
remis
appro
admi
made
Code
entire
petiti
9. Th
that i
at th
that
remit
that h
earne
servic
as we
powe
Gove
canno
not e
the rules provide for a procedure to enable t
opriate Government to remit the sentence und
the
der
n a
on 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on
ideration of the relevant factors, including t
the
d of remissions earned. The question
ssion is exclusively within the province of t
opriate Government; and in this case it
of
the
is
ent
the
the
the
e.
tted that, though the appropriate Governme
e certain remissions under Section 401 of t
of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit t
e sentence. We, therefore, hold that t
ioner has not yet acquired any right to release
he petitioner made an impassioned appeal to
us
be
and
if such a construction be accepted, he would
he mercy of the appropriate Government a
the said Government, out of spite , might n
t the balance of his sentence, with the res
not
sult
he would be deprived of the fruits of remissio
ed by him for sustained good conduct, use
ons
eful
ce and even donation of blood. The Constituti
ell as the Code of Criminal Procedure confer t
er to remit a sentence on the execut
ernment and it is in its exclusive province.
ion
the
tive
We
will
ot assume that the appropriate Government w
exercise its jurisdiction in a reasonable manne
r.
5.9. By re
elying upon Gopal Vinayak G
Godse ,
learned
d Additional Advocate General s
ubmits
that a
sentence of life imprisonment ord
dinarily
means
imprisonment for the remainder
of the
natura
l life of the convict, unless the se
ntence
is com
mmuted or remitted by the appro
opriate
Govern
nment in exercise of its statutory p
powers.
He wou
uld further submit that the said jud
dgment
clearly
lays down that the reference to
twenty
years
in Section 57 of the IPC is only f
for the
limited
d purpose of calculating fractions of
f terms
of pun
nishment, and cannot be constru
ued as
14
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
fixing
the duration of a sentence o
of life
impriso
onment at twenty years. The
refore,
accord
ing to him, the petitioner cannot
t claim
release
e merely on completion of twenty
y years
of impr
risonment.
5.10. He reli
ies on the judgment of the Hon’ble
e Apex
Court
in the case of Mohinder Singh vs.
. State
3
njab , more particularly Paras 26 a
nd 27,
of Punj
which
are reproduced hereunder for
r easy
referen
nce:
Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent
isonment for 14 years or 20 years or even
s, rather it always means the whole natural li
to
30
ife.
ent
26.
impri
years
This
of a
be s
cleme
Gove
reprie
161
exerc
of U.P
3 SC
scope
very
mind
releva
arbitr
comm
exerc
restri
Code
27. I
Code
(2) to
3
(2013) 3 SCC 294
Court has always clarified that the punishme
fixed term of imprisonment so awarded wou
subject to any order passed in exercise
uld
of
the
ency powers of the President of India or t
ernor of the State, as the case may be. Pardon
ns,
icle
eves and remissions under Article 72 or Arti
of the Constitution of India are granted
cise of prerogative power. As observed in Sta
in
ate
12)
P. v. Sanjay Kumar [(2012) 8 SCC 537 : (201
CC (Cri) 970] (SCC p. 546, para 24) there is
no
on
e of judicial review of such orders except
limited grounds such as the non-application
d while passing the order, non-consideration
vant material, or if the order suffers fro
of
of
om
rariness. The power to grant pardons and
mute sentences is coupled with a duty
to
to
s of
cise the same fairly, reasonably and in terms
ictions imposed in several provisions of t
the
.
In order to check all arbitrary remissions, t
the
ons
asic
itself provides several conditions. Sub-sectio
o (5) of Section 432 of the Code lay down ba
15
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
proce
appro
of se
behal
the a
of Se
the s
provi
fulfilm
ment
rules
the
arbitr
remis
fair t
down
check
appro
Court
452
misco
has a
eithe
convi
rema
any
Gove
turn
in the
Secti
edure for making an application to t
opriate Government for suspension or remissi
the
ion
ntence either by the convict or someone on
lf. We are of the view that exercise of power
appropriate Government under sub-section (
ection 432 of the Code cannot be suo motu
his
by
(1)
for
ing
t to
simple reason that this is only an enabli
ision and the same would be possible subject
ment of certain conditions. Those conditions a
tioned either in the Jail Manual or in statuto
are
ory
hat
sed
. This Court in various decisions has held th
power of remission cannot be exercis
rarily. In other words, the decision to gra
ssion has to be well informed, reasonable a
to all concerned. The statutory procedure la
n in Section 432 of the Code itself provides t
ant
and
aid
this
k on the possible misuse of power by t
opriate Government. As rightly observed by t
the
this
SCC
t in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [(2013) 2 S
: (2012) 11 Scale 140] , there is
onception that a prisoner serving life senten
an indefeasible right to release on completion
a
nce
n of
r 14 years' or 20 years' imprisonment.
ict undergoing life imprisonment is expected
ain in custody till the end of his life, subject
A
to
t to
remission granted by the appropria
ernment under Section 432 of the Code which
ate
h in
is subject to the procedural checks mention
e said provision and further substantive check
ion 433-A of the Code.
ned
k in
5.11. By re
elying upon Mohinder Singh , le
earned
Additio
onal Advocate General submits th
hat the
law is w
well settled that life imprisonment
means
impriso
onment for the remainder of the n
natural
life of
f the convict, unless the sente
nce is
commu
uted or remitted by the appro
opriate
Govern
nment in exercise of its statuto
ory or
constit
tutional powers. Therefore, accord
ding to
16
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
him, th
he petitioner cannot claim an aut
tomatic
right o
of release merely on completion of
twenty
years o
of imprisonment.
5.12. He reli
ies on the judgment of the Hon’ble
e Apex
Court
Life Convict Ban
in the case of
ngal @
Khoka
@ Prasanta Sen vs. B.K.Srivastav
va and
4
s , more particularly Para 17, wh
hich is
others
reprod
uced hereunder for easy reference:
:
17. T
simila
of Ind
The s
Articl
petiti
impri
impri
remis
point
liable
Beng
Expla
Corre
of 1
equa
said
hand
the W
going
the d
[(194
PC 6
Bench
600
thus:
SCC
“13.
751(c
4
(2013) 3 SCC 425
The last decision which is directly on the po
ar to the case on hand is Mohd. Munna v. Uni
oint
ion
8] .
dia [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1688
said case arose in a writ petition filed und
le 32 of the Constitution. According to t
ioner therein, the length of duration
isonment for life is equivalent to 20 yea
isonment and that too subject to furth
ssion admissible under law. It was furth
ted out that on completion of this term, he w
e to be released under Rule 751(c) of the We
gal Jail Code. The petitioner relied on t
der
the
of
ars'
her
her
was
est
the
anation to Section 61 of the West Beng
ectional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act
gal
32
992) whereunder imprisonment for life
ted to a term of 20 years' imprisonment.
is
As
on
earlier, it is a case identical to the case
d. Here again, the Explanation to Section 61
of
fter
West Bengal Act was pressed into service. Af
g into the very same provisions and consideri
decision of the Privy Council in Kishori Lal ca
ing
ase
945
44-45) 72 IA 1 : (1945) 58 LW 251 : AIR 19
4] as well as the decision of the Constituti
h in Gopal Vinayak Godse case [AIR 1961
: (1961) 1 Cri LJ 736] , this Court conclud
: (Mohd. Munna case [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 20
ion
SC
ded
005
(Cri) 1688] , SCC pp. 425-27, paras 13-17)
The counsel contended that by virtue of R
c) of the West Bengal Code, the petition
Jail
ule
ner
17
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
was l
twent
Secti
Act,
impri
years
remis
Penal
wher
fourte
forma
Secti
‘ 57.F
calcu
impri
to im
The a
remis
Gove
very
of th
[(194
PC 64
10 : A
‘… As
one o
good
to en
applic
but i
taken
cases
years
remis
14. T
Act a
autho
only
for t
There
or th
speci
15. I
LJ 73
that
liable to be released from jail on completion
ty years. He also relied on the Explanation
ion 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Servic
of
to
ces
the
nty
1992 (W.B. Act 32 of 1992) wherein t
isonment for life is equated to a term of twen
s' simple imprisonment for the purpose
ssion. But there is no provision either in t
of
the
ure
l Code or in the Code of Criminal Procedu
reby life imprisonment could be treated
as
g a
ent.
een years or twenty years without there being
al remission by the appropriate Governme
ion 57 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
Fractions of terms of punishment .—
ulating fractions of terms of punishme
isonment for life shall be reckoned as equivale
mprisonment for twenty years.’
—In
ent,
ent
above section is applicable for the purpose
ssion when the matter is considered by t
ernment under the appropriate provisions. T
of
the
This
plea was placed before the Judicial Committ
e Privy Council in Kishori Lal v. King Empe
44-45) 72 IA 1 : (1945) 58 LW 251 : AIR 19
tee
ror
945
4] and the Privy Council held as under: (IA
AIR p. 67)
ssuming that the sentence is to be regarded
p.
as
for
ent
of twenty years, and subject to remission
conduct, he had not earned remission sufficie
ntitle him to discharge at the time of
cation, and it was therefore rightly dismisse
in saying this, Their Lordships are not to
n as meaning that a life sentence must and in
his
ed,
be
all
nty
s be treated as one of not more than twen
s, or that the convict is necessarily entitled
ssion.’
to
The Prisons Rules are made under the Priso
and the Prisons Act by itself does not confer a
ons
any
ority or power to commute or remit sentence.
. It
and
ein.
provides for the regulation of the prisons a
the terms of the prisoners confined there
efore, the West Bengal Correctional Services A
he West Bengal Jail Code do not confer a
Act
any
ial right on the petitioner herein.
In Godse case [AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961) 1
Cri
eld
36] , the Constitution Bench of this Court h
the sentence of imprisonment for life is not
for
18
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
any
must,
the w
perso
as fol
‘5. …
be de
all pu
subst
“tran
such
trans
prima
impri
of the
16. S
para
‘8. Br
26 of
be u
impri
After
in th
impri
sente
autho
Code
sente
serve
the P
remis
said r
of im
remis
ordin
only
other
life o
one o
do no
possi
death
to en
sente
Proce
includ
quest
definite period and the imprisonment for l
t, prima facie, be treated as imprisonment
whole of the remaining period of the convict
on's natural life. It was also held in AIR para
life
for
ted
a 5
llows: (AIR p. 603 : SCR pp. 444-45)
It does not say that transportation for life sh
eemed to be transportation for twenty years
hall
for
ich
for
any
urposes; nor does the amended section wh
titutes the words “ imprisonment for life”
sportation for life” enable the drawing of a
all-embracing fiction. A sentence
sportation for life or imprisonment for life mu
of
ust
a facie be treated as transportation
isonment for the whole of the remaining peri
e convicted person's natural life.’
Summarising the decision, it was held in A
or
riod
AIR
8 as under: (AIR pp. 603-04 : SCR p. 447)
riefly stated the legal position is this: Before A
f 1955 a sentence of transportation for life cou
undergone by a prisoner by way of rigoro
Act
uld
ous
dia.
with
isonment for life in a designated prison in Ind
r the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt w
e same manner as one sentenced to rigoro
isonment for the same term. Unless the sa
ence is commuted or remitted by appropria
ous
aid
ate
ority under the relevant provisions of the Pen
nal
ner
or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prison
enced to life imprisonment is bound in law
e the life term in prison. The Rules framed und
to
der
arn
the
erm
Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to ea
ssions—ordinary, special and State—and t
remissions will be given credit towards his te
mprisonment. For the purpose of working out t
the
e is
ssions the sentence of transportation for life
narily equated with a definite period, but it
t is
any
for that particular purpose and not for a
r purpose. As the sentence of transportation
for
, is
ned
r its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment,
of indefinite duration, the remissions so earn
ot in practice help such a convict as it is n
ible to predicate (sic predict) the time of
h. That is why the Rules provide for a procedu
nable the appropriate Government to remit t
ence under Section 401 of the Code of Crimin
edure on a consideration of the relevant facto
not
his
ure
the
nal
ors,
ding the period of remissions earned. T
tion of remission is exclusively within t
The
the
19
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
provi
case
Gove
401
remit
the p
releas
We a
Cons
impri
fourte
the p
17. T
fail a
on an
long
appro
clear
expre
entitl
Gove
appro
law.”
ince of the appropriate Government; and in t
this
it is admitted that, though the appropria
ernment made certain remissions under Secti
ate
ion
not
hat
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did n
t the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold th
petitioner has not yet acquired any right
to
se.’
are bound by the above dicta laid down by t
the
titution Bench and we hold that
isonment is not equivalent to imprisonment
life
for
een years or for twenty years as contended
petitioner.
by
Thus, all the contentions raised by the petition
and the petitioner is not entitled to be releas
ner
sed
ny of the grounds urged in the writ petition
so
the
e it
as there is no order of remission passed by t
opriate Government in his favour. We make
that our decision need not be taken
ession of our view that the petitioner is n
as
not
ate
any
with
led to any remission at all. The appropria
ernment would be at liberty to pass a
opriate order of remission in accordance w
”
5.13. By rely
ying upon Bangal @ Khoka @ Pra
asanta
Sen ,
learned Additional Advocate G
General
submit
ts that the legal position is well
settled
that lif
fe imprisonment cannot be equate
ed to a
fixed t
term of fourteen or twenty year
s, and
unless
there is a specific judicial di
rection
limiting
g the sentence or an order of rem
mission
by the
e appropriate Government, a c
convict
underg
going life imprisonment cannot
claim
release
e merely on completion of twenty
y years
of impr
risonment
20
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
5.14. On th
he basis of the aforesaid judg
ments,
learned
d Additional Advocate General s
ubmits
that th
he decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
e Court
in Suk
khdev Yadav would have no appl
lication
to the
facts of the present case, as i
n that
matter
r the sentence of life imprisonme
nt had
been
specifically restricted by the Co
ourt to
twenty
y years of actual imprisonment w
without
remiss
ion.
5.15. In the
e present case, however, the se
ntence
impose
ed upon the petitioner is simp
ple life
impriso
onment without any judicial rest
triction
limiting
g it to a fixed term. Therefore, acc
cording
to him
m, the petitioner cannot clai
m an
automa
atic right of release upon comple
tion of
twenty
y years of imprisonment.
5.16. He wo
ould further submit that the quest
tion of
remiss
ion or premature release lies with
hin the
exclusi
ive domain of the appro
opriate
Govern
nment, to be considered in acco
rdance
with t
he applicable statutory provision
ns and
policy.
Consequently, there can be no qu
uestion
of dire
cting the release of the petitioner
merely
on the
e basis that he has completed
twenty
21
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
years o
of imprisonment, as contended on
behalf
of the
petitioner.
6. Heard Sri.P
Pradeep Patil learned counsel fo
or the
petitioner
and Sri.Pradeep C.S., AAG
G for
respondents
s. Perused papers.
7. The points t
hat would arise for consideration ar
re:
(i) Whe
Cou
whi
life
acc
term
con
life
twe
ether the judgment passed by
urt in Criminal Appeal No.1197/
y this
/2008,
ile commuting the death senten
nce to
imprisonment and directing th
used shall serve the sentenc
ms of Section 57 of the IPC”, c
at the
ce “in
can be
strued as restricting the senten
nce of
rm of
imprisonment to a fixed te
enty years of imprisonment?
(ii) Whe
clai
gro
yea
relia
Pen
Hon
Yad
Del
ether the petitioner is entitl
ed to
on the
m release from prison merely o
und that he has completed tw
wenty
placing
rs of imprisonment, by p
ance on Section 57 of the I
nal Code and the judgment o
Indian
of the
n’ble Supreme Court in Su
dav @ Pehalwan vs. State (N
khdev
NCT of
hi)?
(iii) Whe
judi
of
imp
imp
natu
ether, in the absence of a sp
icial direction restricting the du
pecific
ration
of life
the sentence, a sentence o
prisonment must be understoo
prisonment for the remainder o
od as
of the
ect to
ural life of the convict, subje
22
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
com
with
mmutation or remission in accor
rdance
h law?
(iv) Whe
enfo
upo
imp
of r
with
app
app
poli
ether the petitioner has
orceable legal right to be rel
on completion of twenty yea
prisonment, or whether the qu
any
leased
ars of
estion
se lies
of the
remission or premature releas
hin the exclusive domain o
propriate Government under
plicable statutory provisions
icy?
r the
and
(v) Whe
the
twe
said
issu
dire
ether the continued incarcerat
ion of
on of
an be
nt the
damus
petitioner after completio
enty years of imprisonment ca
d to be illegal, so as to warran
uance of a writ of mand
ecting his release?
(vi) Wha
Cou
Con
to
rele
by t
at is the scope of interference b
urt under Articles 226 and 227
nstitution of India in matters re
by this
of the
elating
mature
sentence remission, prem
ease and executive powers exe
rcised
the appropriate Government?
(vii) Wha
at Order
8. I answer the
above points as follows
9. Answer to
passed by
No.1197/20
sentence to
the accused
of Section 5
restricting t
a fixed term
Point No. (i):Whether the judg
y this Court in Criminal A
008, while commuting the
o life imprisonment and directin
gment
Appeal
death
g that
d shall serve the sentence “in
terms
ued as
57 of the IPC”, can be constru
the sentence of life imprisonm
m of twenty years of imprisonme
ent to
ent?
23
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
9.1. Sri. P
radeep Patil, learned counsel fo
or the
petitio
ner, submits that the petitione
er was
origina
ally convicted and sentenced to de
eath by
the IV
Additional City Civil and Sessions
Court,
Mayo H
Hall Unit, Bengaluru in SC No.463
/2003,
for offe
ences punishable under Sections 30
02 and
364A
of the Indian Penal Code,
1860
(herein
nafter referred to as 'IPC'). He s
ubmits
that o
n appeal, this Court in Criminal
Appeal
No.119
97/2008, vide judgment dated 6.6
6.2013,
commu
uted the death sentence to
o life
impriso
onment, while further directing tha
at: (a)
the ac
ccused 'shall not be given commu
utation
after
completion of fourteen yea
rs of
impriso
onment as a matter of routine'; a
and (b)
'the ac
ccused have to serve the life se
ntence
and th
hey should be in jail in terms of S
Section
57 of I
IPC.'
9.2. The lea
arned counsel submits that the phr
rase 'in
terms
of Section 57 of IPC' is a j
judicial
directio
on that restricts and defines th
he life
senten
nce as a sentence of twenty ye
ears of
actual
imprisonment. He submits that S
Section
57 of
the IPC equates imprisonment f
for life
24
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
with
imprisonment for twenty yea
rs 'in
calcula
ating fractions of terms of punish
hment',
and th
at when the Court expressly direct
ted the
accuse
ed to serve the sentence 'in ter
rms of
Section
n 57 of IPC', the Court judicially fix
xed the
life sen
ntence at twenty years — the equ
ivalent
period
specified by Section 57.
9.3. The le
earned counsel places heavy relian
nce on
the de
ecision of the Hon'ble Supreme Co
ourt in
dev Yadav and submits that the H
Hon'ble
Sukhd
Suprem
me Court held that where a life se
ntence
is exp
pressed as being equivalent to
twenty
years
of actual imprisonment, the se
ntence
stands
s fully completed upon the c
convict
underg
going twenty years, and the con
nvict is
entitled
d to be simply released from jail w
without
any fu
urther application for remission
to the
Senten
nce Review Board.
9.4. Sri. Pr
radeep Patil submits that the pet
titioner
has, as
s on 15.01.2025, completed twenty
y years
of ac
ctual imprisonment with satisf
factory
conduc
ct and no adverse report, as certi
ified in
the Im
mprisonment Certificate dated 15.01
1.2025.
He sub
bmits that the sentence imposed b
by this
25
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
Court
stands fully undergone, and
d the
continu
ued detention of the petitioner is
illegal
and un
nconstitutional, warranting the imm
mediate
issuanc
ce of a writ of mandamus directi
ing his
release
e.
9.5. He reli
es on Section 57 of the IPC, which
reads:
nt.—In
'Fractio
ons of terms of punishme
hment,
calcula
ating fractions of terms of punish
ned as
impriso
onment for life shall be reckon
years.'
equiva
alent to imprisonment for twenty
He sub
bmits that this provision, when r
read in
conjun
nction with the judgment of this Co
ourt in
Crimin
al Appeal No.1197/2008, means th
hat the
petitio
ner's sentence stands satisfied
upon
comple
etion of twenty years, and tha
at any
further
r incarceration is illegal.
9.6. Sri. Pr
radeep C.S., learned Additional Ad
vocate
Genera
al (hereinafter 'AAG'), appearing
along
with S
Smt. K.P. Yashodha, learned Add
ditional
Govern
nment Advocate (hereinafter
'AGA'),
submit
ts that the interpretation placed
by the
petitio
ner on the operative portion o
of the
judgm
ent in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2
2008 is
26
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
wholly
misconceived and contrary to
well-
settled
d law.
9.7. The le
earned AAG submits that the ope
erative
portion
n of Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008
8 does
not f
ix or restrict the sentence o
of life
impriso
onment to twenty years. The subst
tantive
senten
nce awarded is 'life imprisonment',
, these
are th
he exact words used. The subse
equent
directio
on 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC' is
s not a
conver
rsion of the life sentence into a
a fixed
twenty
y-year sentence. It is, at mo
ost, a
specific
cation that the accused must und
ergo a
minimu
um period of actual impriso
onment
equiva
lent to the period under Secti
on 57
before
any question of remissio
on or
commu
utation arises. The expression
n 'life
senten
nce' remains the operative term.
9.8. The lea
arned AAG submits that if this Cou
urt had
intende
ed to restrict the sentence o
of life
impriso
onment to twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment, it would have done so in
n clear
and e
express terms, as the High Co
ourt in
dev Yadav did, using the form
ulation
Sukhd
'Life im
mprisonment which shall be 20 ye
ears of
27
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
actual
imprisonment without considerat
tion of
remiss
sion.' No such language was us
sed in
Crimin
al Appeal No.1197/2008. In the a
bsence
of suc
ch specific language, the directi
ion 'in
terms
of Section 57 of IPC' cannot be con
nstrued
as ha
ving judicially fixed the senten
nce at
twenty
y years.
9.9. The le
earned AAG relies on 'Gopal V
Vinayak
Godse'
', a Constitution Bench decision
of the
Hon'ble
e Supreme Court.which holds th
at the
equatin
ng of life imprisonment with a d
definite
period
for the purpose of working
g out
remiss
sions is 'only for that particular p
urpose
and no
ot for any other purpose.' He submi
its that
this b
binding Constitution Bench pre
cedent
settles
s the scope of Section 57 of the IP
PC and
negate
es the petitioner's interpretation.
9.10. He al
so relies on 'Mohinder Singh
h' and
al @ Khoka' , both of which concl
usively
'Banga
hold t
hat life imprisonment means the
whole
natura
l life and cannot be equated with a
a fixed
term o
of fourteen or twenty years. He s
ubmits
that th
he decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
e Court
in Su
khdev Yadav is factually and
legally
28
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
disting
uishable, being premised on a s
specific
and e
explicit judicial direction fixing th
he life
senten
nce at twenty years, which is e
entirely
absent
t in the judgment of this Court in C
riminal
Appeal
l No.1197/2008.
9.11. I have
e heard learned counsel for both
parties
with
care and have perused the r
record,
includi
ng the judgment in Criminal
Appeal
No.119
97/2008, the relevant paragrap
phs of
dev Yadav , the Constitution
Bench
Sukhd
decisio
on in Gopal Vinayak Godse , an
nd the
decisio
ons in Mohinder Singh and Ban
ngal @
a . The central question arising
under
Khoka
Point (
(i) is one of pure construction: do
oes the
phrase
e 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC'
in the
judgm
ent of Criminal Appeal No.1197
/2008,
read i
n its full context, amount to a j
judicial
restrict
tion of the life sentence to a fixed t
term of
twenty
y years of imprisonment?
9.12. The o
operative portion of the judgme
ent in
Crimin
al Appeal No.1197/2008,
dated
6.6.20
13, reads: 'the death senten
nce is
modifie
ed and accused nos.1 to 3 are sen
tenced
to life
imprisonment. It is further directe
ed that
29
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
accuse
ed nos.1 to 3 shall not be
given
commu
utation after completion of fourteen
n years
of imp
prisonment as a matter of routin
e. The
accuse
ed have to serve the life sentenc
ce and
they sh
hould be in jail in terms of Section
n 57 of
IPC.' T
This is the sentence imposed that m
must be
interpr
reted.
9.13. The fir
rst and foundational observation
is that
the se
entence imposed is expressed a
as 'life
impriso
onment' and then further and sepa
arately
as 'the
e life sentence.' The Court used th
e term
'life se
ntence' as the substantive and gov
verning
term o
of the punishment. The sentence
is not
describ
bed as a sentence 'which shall be
twenty
years'
or 'of twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment.' The use of the term
m 'life
senten
nce' as the operative description
is of
decisiv
ve significance.
9.14. The s
second observation is structural
l. The
judgm
ent in Criminal Appeal No.1197
7/2008
contain
ns two distinct and sequential dire
ctions:
Directi
on (A): The accused shall not be
e given
commu
utation after completion of fourteen
n years
of im
prisonment as a matter of ro
outine.
30
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
Directi
on (B): The accused have to ser
rve the
life sen
ntenceand they should be in jail in
terms
of Sec
ction 57 of IPC. These are two se
eparate
and c
omplementary directions. Directio
on (A)
deals
with the period of fourteen
years,
prohib
iting routine commutation at that
stage.
Directi
on (B) uses the expression 'life sen
ntence'
as the
operative term and adds the Sect
tion 57
referen
nce as the specification of the mi
nimum
period
of actual imprisonment.
9.15. The co
ombined reading of both Directions
is this:
(a) the
e accused must serve a life sentenc
ce; (b)
they m
must be in jail, and their period of
actual
impriso
onment for the purpose of Secti
ion 57
equiva
lent is twenty years, meaning
twenty
years
is the minimum actual impriso
onment
before
any question of remissio
on or
commu
utation can arise, replacing the oth
herwise
applica
able fourteen-year period under S
Section
433-A
CrPC. This reading gives full eff
fect to
both
directions and maintains in
nternal
consist
tency in the judgment. On the co
ntrary,
the pe
etitioner's reading, that the life se
ntence
was f
fixed at twenty years, would
render
Directi
on (A) redundant and unnecessary
y, since
31
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
if the s
sentence was fixed at twenty years
, there
would
be no question of commutation
n even
after fo
ourteen years at all.
9.16. The ru
ule against surplusage in statutor
ry and
judicia
l interpretation is well-established.
. Every
word i
in a judgment or order is presum
med to
have
been used deliberately and to
carry
meanin
ng. Courts are not to be understo
ood as
having
g used words without purpose.
If the
petitio
ner's reading were accepted, Di
rection
(A) wo
ould become meaningless, for why
would
a Cou
rt prohibit commutation after fo
ourteen
years
if the sentence itself was fixed at
twenty
years
and would automatically end a
at that
point?
This internal incongruity is suffic
ient to
demoli
ish the petitioner's interpretation.
9.17. I now
turn to the decision in Sukhdev Y
Yadav ,
upon
which the petitioner strongly reli
ies. In
dev Yadav , the sentence imposed
by the
Sukhd
High C
Court was expressed in the fo
llowing
terms:
'Life imprisonment which shall
be 20
years
of actual imprisonment w
without
conside
eration of remission, and fin
ne of
Rs.10,
000/-.' The Hon'ble Supreme Co
ourt at
32
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
Para 1
15 of the said judgment analyse
ed the
word 'w
which' used after 'Life imprisonmen
nt' and
held th
hat it is 'an interrogative pronoun,
related
pronou
un and determiner, referrin
g to
someth
hing previously mentioned
when
introdu
ucing a clause giving further inform
mation'
that t
the sentence of life imprisonm
ent is
'determ
mined as twenty years which is of
actual
impriso
onment.'
9.18. The cr
ritical and material distinction be
etween
dev Yadav and the present case
e is as
Sukhd
follows
s. In Sukhdev Yadav , the High
Court
specific
cally used the formulation
'Life
impriso
onment which shall be 20 years of
f actual
impriso
onment', here, the word 'which' link
ks 'Life
impriso
onment' directly and definitionally
to '20
years
of actual imprisonment,' converti
ng the
nature
of the sentence from an indeter
minate
one to
o a determinate one. The sentenc
ce was
fixed,
not merely described. In the p
present
case,
no such definitional linkage exist
ts. The
words
used are 'life sentence' and 'in te
erms of
Section
n 57 of IPC', these are not wo
ords of
definiti
ion but words of duration referenc
ce. The
contra
st is stark and unmistakable. Su
khdev
33
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
v is, therefore, clearly distinguisha
able on
Yadav
the lan
nguage and facts.
9.19. I shall
now examine Section 57 of the
IPC in
detail.
Section 57 reads: 'Fractions of te
erms of
punish
hment.—In calculating fractions of
f terms
of pun
nishment, imprisonment for life sh
hall be
reckon
ned as equivalent to imprisonme
ent for
twenty
y years.' The marginal headi
ing is
'Fractio
ons of terms of punishment.
' The
langua
age of Section 57 is clear and its sc
cope is
expres
ssly limited. It applies 'in calc
ulating
fractio
ns of terms of punishment.' It do
oes not
say th
at life imprisonment shall be deem
med to
be twe
enty years for all purposes, or
that a
convict
t sentenced to life imprisonment s
hall be
release
ed after twenty years. It is a speci
fic and
limited
d provision for arithmetic calculation
n.
9.20. This lim
mited scope of Section 57 of the I
PC has
been
definitively established by the H
Hon'ble
Suprem
me Court of India. In Gopal Vi
nayak
e wherein the Hon’ble Constitution
Bench
Godse
held:
'For the purpose of working ou
ut the
remiss
sions the sentence of transportati
ion for
life is
ordinarily equated with a definite p
period,
34
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
but it i
is only for that particular purpose a
and not
for any
y other purpose.' The Constitution
Bench
elabora
ated that the sentence of
f life
impriso
onment 'is one of indefinite duratio
on, the
remiss
sions so earned do not in practic
ce help
such a
a convict as it is not possible to pre
edicate
the tim
me of his death.' This is a binding d
ecision
of a C
onstitution Bench. It cannot be de
eparted
from.
9.21. In Mo
ohinder Singh , the Hon'ble Su
upreme
Court
reiterated, in unambiguous terms
s: 'Life
impriso
onment cannot be equivalen
nt to
impriso
onment for 14 years or 20 years o
or even
30 yea
ars, rather it always means the
whole
natura
l life. ' This statement leaves no ro
om for
the con
ntention that a reference to Section
n 57 of
the IPC
C in a judgment, or that Section 57
7 itself,
fixes
the duration of life imprisonme
ent at
twenty
y years.
9.22. In Ba
ngal @ Khoka , the Hon'ble Su
upreme
Court,
after a comprehensive surv
ey of
preced
dent, concluded: 'We are bound b
by the
above
dicta laid down by the Const
titution
Bench
and we hold that life imprisonment
t is not
35
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
equiva
alent to imprisonment for fourteen
n years
or for
r twenty years as contended b
by the
petition
ner. ' This Court is more bound b
by this
dicta.
9.23. The s
submission of Sri. Pradeep Pati
il that
Section
n 57 of the IPC operates as a sen
ntence-
definin
ng provision, fixing life imprisonm
ment at
twenty
y years, is directly contrary t
to the
consist
tent interpretation of the H
Hon'ble
Suprem
me Court in Gopal Vinayak G
Godse,
nder Singh and Bangal @ Khoka .
These
Mohin
decisio
ons are binding on this Court
t. The
argum
ent must be and is rejected.
9.24. A con
ntextual reading of the judgme
ent in
Crimin
al Appeal No.1197/2008 also su
upports
the ab
ove interpretation. The case involv
ved the
grueso
ome murder of two innocent childre
en. The
origina
al sentence was death. This Court fo
ound it
was n
ot the 'rarest of rare' case warr
ranting
death,
but did not treat it as a routin
e case
either.
The judgment imposed a specif
fic bar
agains
t routine commutation and d
irected
service
e of the life sentence 'in terms of S
Section
57 of I
IPC.' These directions reflect this C
Court's
36
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
intenti
on that the accused must se
erve a
substa
ntial minimum period before even
n being
eligible
e for any remission consideration, t
hey do
not ref
flect an intention to cap the sente
ence at
twenty
y years. Reading the directions as c
apping
the se
ntence at twenty years would be
wholly
incons
istent with the gravity of the offen
ce and
the ev
ident purpose of the directions.
9.25. For the
e foregoing reasons, I answer Poi
int No.
(i) by
holding that the judgment passed
by this
Court
in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008,
, while
commu
uting the death sentence to
o life
impriso
onment and directing that the a
ccused
shall s
erve the sentence 'in terms of Sect
tion 57
of the
IPC', cannot be construed as rest
tricting
the se
entence of life imprisonment to a
a fixed
term o
of twenty years of imprisonmen
t. The
directio
on specifies the minimum period of
f actual
impriso
onment; it does not convert or fix t
the life
senten
nce as a twenty-year sentence.
10. Answer to P
Point No. (ii): Whether the peti
tioner
merely
is entitled t
on the gro
years of im
Section 57
to claim release from prison m
ound that he has completed tw
mprisonment, by placing relian
wenty
nce on
of the Indian Penal Code an
nd the
37
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
judgment o
Sukhdev Ya
Delhi)?
of the Hon'ble Supreme Cou
adav @ Pehalwan vs. State (N
urt in
NCT of
10.1. Sri. P
radeep Patil, learned counsel fo
or the
petitio
ner, submits that the petitione
er has
served
d twenty years of actual imprisonm
ment as
on 1
5.01.2025. He contends that
upon
comple
etion of twenty years, the se
ntence
impose
ed by this Court 'in terms of Section
n 57 of
IPC' st
tands fully served, and the petitio
oner is
entitled
d to be released forthwith, exactly
as the
Hon'ble
e Supreme Court directed in Su
khdev
v .
Yadav
10.2. Learne
ed counsel relies on Para 15.2 of Su
ukhdev
Yadav,
, which holds that 'on completion
of the
twenty
y years of actual imprisonment,
, it is
wholly
unnecessary for the appellant to
o seek
remiss
sion of his sentence on the premis
se that
his sen
ntence is a life imprisonment i.e.
till the
end of
f his natural life.' He submits tha
at this
princip
ple applies directly to the petit
tioner's
case,
since this Court's direction 'in ter
rms of
Section
n 57 of IPC' is, according to him, id
dentical
in subs
stance to the direction 'Life impriso
onment
which
shall be 20 years' in Sukhdev Yad
dav .
38
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
10.3. He sub
bmits that any other interpretation
would
require
e the petitioner to make an appl
lication
for re
emission before the Sentence R
Review
Board,
which would be unreasonable
e and
contra
ry to the spirit of the judgme
ent in
Crimin
al Appeal No.1197/2008. Sinc
e the
senten
nce has been served, the quest
tion of
remiss
sion simply does not arise.
10.4. Sri. Pr
radeep C.S., learned AAG, submit
ts that
the pe
titioner is not entitled to claim aut
tomatic
release
e upon completion of twenty yea
ars. He
submit
ts that Section 57 of the IPC is
not a
provisi
on that mandates the release of
f a life
convict
t after twenty years. Its operat
tion is
confine
ed to calculating fractions of punish
hment.
This
limited purpose of Section
57 is
establi
shed by the Constitution Bench in
Gopal
ak Godse and confirmed in Moh
Vinaya
hinder
and Bangal @ Khoka .
Singh
10.5. The le
earned AAG submits that the re
eliance
placed
by the petitioner on Sukhdev Ya
adav is
mispla
ced, as already submitted under
r Point
(i). He
reiterates that Sukhdev Yadav is
s based
entirely
y on the specific language used
by the
39
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
High
Court in that case, 'Life impriso
onment
which
shall be 20 years of actual impriso
onment
withou
ut consideration of remission ' wh
hich is
materi
ally different from the language u
used in
Crimin
al Appeal No.1197/2008. The ra
atio of
Sukhde
ev Yadav cannot be imported in
to the
presen
nt case by a strained reading
of the
directio
on 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC.'
10.6. The le
arned AAG submits that the ques
tion of
prema
ture release lies within the ex
clusive
domain
n of the appropriate Government
under
Section
n 432/433-A CrPC (now Se
ections
473/47
74 BNSS). In the absence of an o
rder of
remiss
sion by the appropriate Governmen
nt, the
petitio
ner has no legal right to release, a
and no
writ of
f mandamus can be issued.
10.7. Under
Point (ii), I must determine wheth
her the
petitio
ner is entitled to claim release mer
rely on
the gr
round of completion of twenty ye
ears of
impriso
onment, relying on Section 57 of t
the IPC
and S
Sukhdev Yadav . The analysis
must
procee
ed on the foundation already laid
under
Point (
(i), namely, that the judgment in C
riminal
40
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
Appeal
l No.1197/2008 did not fix th
he life
senten
nce at twenty years.
10.8. Section
n 57 of the IPC must be analysed
d first.
The p
rovision reads: 'Fractions of ter
rms of
punish
hment.—In calculating fractions of
f terms
of pun
nishment, imprisonment for life sh
hall be
reckon
ned as equivalent to imprisonme
ent for
twenty
y years.' The marginal note — 'Fra
actions
of term
ms of punishment' — is the key
to the
purpos
se of the provision. It applies only
y when
fractio
ns of terms of punishment are re
equired
to be
calculated, typically for the purp
pose of
compu
uting remissions admissible unde
er the
prison
rules or the relevant sta
atutory
provisi
ons. It does not operate as a pro
ovision
determ
mining when a life sentence
stands
comple
eted.
10.9. The C
Constitution Bench in Gopal Vi
nayak
e (Para 8) specifically addressed th
is. The
Godse
Court
referred to the practice of equati
ng the
life se
entence with a definite period 'f
for the
purpos
se of working out the remission
s' and
held t
that such equating is 'only fo
r that
particu
ular purpose and not for any
other
41
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
purpos
se.' This restriction is plain: Sect
ion 57
operat
es only for calculating remission
ns and
fractio
ns; it does not determine the
actual
duratio
on of the sentence. Reliance on S
Section
57 to
claim that the sentence has
been
comple
eted upon serving twenty yea
ars is,
therefo
ore, contrary to this binding Const
titution
Bench
decision.
10.10. Para
9 of Gopal Vinayak Godse is
s also
instruc
ctive. The petitioner therein ma
de an
'impas
sioned appeal' contending that if
f a life
senten
nce means imprisonment for the
whole
natura
l life, he would be 'at the mercy
of the
approp
priate Government' which 'out of
spite,
might
not remit the balance of his sen
tence.'
The C
Constitution Bench acknowledged
d this
concer
rn but held: 'The Constitution as w
well as
the C
ode of Criminal Procedure confe
er the
power
to remit a sentence on the exe
ecutive
Govern
nment and it is in its exclusive pro
ovince.
We c
cannot assume that the appro
opriate
Govern
nment will not exercise its jurisdic
ction in
a reas
sonable manner.' This reasoning a
applies
with eq
qual force in the present case.
42
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
10.11. In Mo
ohinder Singh (Para 27), the H
Hon'ble
Suprem
me Court specifically addressed
d and
rejecte
ed the claim of a convict servin
ng life
impriso
onment to 'indefeasible right to r
release
on com
mpletion of either 14 years or 20
0 years
impriso
onment.' The Court stated clear
rly: 'A
convict
t undergoing life imprisonme
ent is
expect
ted to remain in custody till the end
d of his
life, su
ubject to any remission granted
by the
approp
priate Government under Section
432 of
the C
Code.' The expectation of natu
ural-life
impriso
onment, subject only to exe
ecutive
remiss
sion, is the settled legal positio
on. No
amoun
nt of reliance on Section 57 of th
he IPC
alters t
this.
10.12. In Ba
ngal @ Khoka (Para 17), the H
Hon'ble
Suprem
me Court, applying the ratio of
Gopal
ak Godse and Mohd. M
Munna ,
Vinaya
catego
orically rejected a similar claim and
d held:
'We h
hold that life imprisonment i
s not
equiva
lent to imprisonment for fourteen
n years
or for
r twenty years as contended b
by the
petitio
ner.' The petitioner therein wa
as not
entitled
d to be released 'on any of the g
rounds
urged
in the writ petition so long as ther
e is no
43
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
order
of remission passed by the appro
opriate
Govern
nment in his favour.'
10.13. On the
e reliance placed on Sukhdev Ya
adav, I
have a
already held, under Point (i), that th
he said
decisio
on is factually distinguishable
e. In
dev Yadav , the sentence
was
Sukhd
definiti
ionally fixed at 'Life imprisonment
t which
shall
be 20 years of actual impriso
onment
withou
ut consideration of remission.'
' The
comple
etion of twenty years in that case w
was the
comple
etion of a judicially-fixed sentence.
In the
presen
nt case, no such judicially-fixed se
ntence
exists.
The petitioner has completed
twenty
years o
of imprisonment pursuant to a cont
tinuing
life se
entence, he has not complete
ed the
senten
nce. The ratio of Sukhdev Yadav
v has,
therefo
ore, no application.
10.14. Para
15.2 of Sukhdev Yadav, whic
ch the
petitio
ner particularly relies upon, must b
be read
in con
ntext. The Hon'ble Supreme Cou
rt was
addres
ssing the specific situation wher
re the
senten
nce had already been judicially fix
xed at
twenty
y years of actual imprisonment a
nd the
convict
t had completed those twenty year
rs. The
44
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
observ
vation that 'it is wholly unnecessa
ary for
the ap
ppellant to seek remission' was
made
becaus
se the sentence had been comple
ted by
judicia
l design. The same observation
cannot
be tran
nsplanted into a case where the se
ntence
is a co
ontinuing life sentence and has no
ot been
fixed a
at twenty years.
10.15. Accord
dingly, I answer Point No. (ii) by h
holding
that t
he petitioner is not entitled to
claim
release
e from prison merely on the groun
nd that
he h
has completed twenty year
rs of
impriso
onment. Section 57 of the IPC do
oes not
manda
ate or authorise release after
twenty
years;
the decision in Sukhdev Yad
dav is
disting
uishable and not applicable to the
e facts
of this
case; and the three binding decis
ions of
the Ho
on'ble Supreme Court in Gopal Vi
nayak
e , Mohinder Singh and Bang
Godse
gal @
a , conclusively negate such a claim.
.
Khoka
11. Answer to
absence
restricting
sentence
understood
of the nat
o Point No. (iii): Whether, i
n the
ection
nce, a
of a specific judicial dir
the duration of the senten
of life imprisonment mus
d as imprisonment for the rema
st be
ainder
ect to
tural life of the convict, subje
45
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
commutati
law?
on or remission in accordance
e with
11.1. Sri. P
radeep Patil, learned counsel fo
or the
petition
ner, does not directly contend th
hat the
genera
al principle, life imprisonment
means
impriso
onment for remainder of natural
life, is
incorre
ect. His contention is that in the p
present
case,
this Court has given a specific j
judicial
directio
on (viz., the direction 'in terms of S
Section
57 of I
IPC') that restricts and fixes the du
uration
of the
sentence. He submits that this s
specific
judicia
l direction takes the case outsid
de the
scope
of the general principle, mak
king it
govern
ned by the Sukhdev Yadav pr
rinciple
instead
d.
11.2. He su
ubmits that Sukhdev Yadav
itself
recogn
nises that courts have the power to
fix the
duratio
on of a life sentence at a specific
c term,
and th
hat where such a direction exist
ts, the
genera
al principle does not apply. He argue
es that
this C
Court's judgment in Criminal
Appeal
No.119
97/2008 contains such a direction.
11.3. Sri. Pra
adeep C.S., learned AAG, submits
that in
the ab
bsence of a specific judicial di
rection
46
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
restrict
ting the duration of a life sentenc
ce to a
fixed t
term, the sentence must be under
rstood,
in ac
ccordance with well-settled law
w, as
impriso
onment for the remainder of the n
natural
life of t
the convict. He submits that this pr
rinciple
is esta
ablished by the Constitution Ben
nch in
Vinayak Godse , reaffirmed b
by the
Gopal
Hon'ble
e Supreme Court in Mohinder
Singh
and Ba
angal@ Khoka , and is not departe
d from
in Suk
khdev Yadav . He submits that
in the
presen
nt case, there is no specific j
judicial
directio
on fixing the sentence at twenty
years.
The ge
eneral principle therefore applies, a
and the
senten
ce is imprisonment for the remain
nder of
natura
l life.
11.4. Point
(iii) raises a question of genera
l legal
princip
ple that has a direct bearing o
on the
outcom
me of this case. The question: m
must a
senten
ce of life imprisonment, in the abse
ence of
a spe
ecific judicial direction restrictin
ng its
duratio
on, be understood as imprisonme
ent for
the rem
mainder of the natural life of the co
nvict?
11.5. The an
nswer is provided by a long, con
sistent
and un
nbroken line of decisions of the H
Hon'ble
47
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
Suprem
me Court of India. The Constitution
Bench
in Gop
pal Vinayak Godse (Para 8) decla
red: 'A
senten
nce of transportation for lif
fe or
impriso
onment for life must prima fac
cie be
treated
d as transportation or imprisonme
ent for
the w
whole of the remaining period o
of the
convict
ted person's natural life.' The use
of the
phrase
e 'must prima facie be treated' esta
blishes
this as
s the default rule — the starting p
oint of
any an
nalysis of life imprisonment.
11.6. The qu
ualification 'unless the said sente
ence is
commu
uted or remitted by appropriate aut
thority'
in Gop
pal Vinayak Godse identifies th
e only
legitim
mate routes by which the sentenc
ce may
end be
efore the natural death of the convi
ict: (a)
commu
utation or remission by the appro
opriate
Govern
nment under the CrPC (now BNSS
S); (b)
commu
utation or remission by the Presid
dent of
India o
or the Governor of the State in exer
rcise of
the pr
erogative powers under Articles 7
72 and
161 of
f the Constitution of India respectiv
vely; or
(c) a
specific judicial direction fixin
ng the
senten
ce at a definite term (as discus
ssed in
dev Yadav ). In the absence of a
any of
Sukhd
48
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
these
routes, the sentence continues f
for the
remain
nder of the convict's natural life.
11.7. In Mo
ohinder Singh (Paras 26 and 27
7), the
Hon'ble
e Supreme Court reaffirmed
this
princip
ple: 'Life imprisonment canno
ot be
equiva
lent to imprisonment for 14 years
s or 20
years o
or even 30 years, rather it always
means
the wh
hole natural life.' The Hon'ble Su
upreme
Court a
also explained the constitutional sc
cheme:
pardon
ns and remissions under Articles 7
72 and
161 of
f the Constitution are prerogative p
powers
of the
e executive, subject to limited j
judicial
review
. The power of remission under S
Section
432 Cr
rPC is also vested in the executiv
ve. The
power
of courts is to impose sentenc
e; the
power
to subsequently alter or rem
mit the
senten
ce (except in specific circumstance
es) lies
with th
he executive.
11.8. In Ban
ngal @ Khoka (Para 17), the pr
rinciple
was r
restated with the same clarity
y: 'life
impriso
onment is not equivalent to impriso
onment
for fou
urteen years or for twenty years
s.' The
Hon'ble
e Supreme Court clarified tha
at the
petition
ner therein would not be entit
tled to
49
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
release
e 'so long as there is no ord
der of
remiss
ion passed by the appro
opriate
Govern
nment in his favour.'
11.9. It is a
lso appropriate to note Article 21
of the
Constit
tution of India, which guarantees t
that no
person
n shall be deprived of his life or pe
ersonal
liberty
except according to pro
cedure
establi
shed by law. The continued incarce
eration
of the
petitioner pursuant to a valid sente
ence of
life im
mprisonment is in full conformity
y with
Article
21 — it is deprivation of
liberty
accord
ing to a procedure established b
by law,
namely
y, the procedure of conviction
n and
senten
cing under the IPC and CrPC
by a
compe
tent court. The general principle th
hat life
impriso
onment means imprisonment fo
or the
whole
natural life is, therefore, constitut
tionally
valid a
and cannot be challenged on the g
ground
of viola
ation of Article 21.
11.10. Regard
ding the petitioner's contention th
at this
case fa
alls outside the general principle by
y virtue
of a sp
pecific judicial direction (the direct
tion 'in
terms
of Section 57 of IPC'), this Cou
urt has
already
y held under Point (i) that the
e said
50
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
directio
on does not restrict or fix the dura
ation of
the se
entence at twenty years. The s
specific
judicia
l direction exception recognis
ed in
dev Yadav (and discussed in the c
context
Sukhd
of se
ntences specifically worded as
s 'Life
impriso
onment which shall be 20 years of
actual
impriso
onment') does not apply in the a
bsence
of such
h specific language. The general pr
rinciple
therefo
ore operates in full force in the p
present
case.
11.11. Accord
ingly, I answer Point no. (iii) by h
holding
that i
n the absence of a specific j
judicial
directio
on restricting the duration o
of the
senten
ce, the sentence of life impriso
onment
impose
ed on the petitioner must be unde
erstood
as im
prisonment for the remainder
of his
natura
l life, subject to commutatio
on or
remiss
ion in accordance with law.
12. Answer to
petitioner h
released u
imprisonme
remission o
exclusive
Governmen
provisions
o Point No. (iv): Whethe
r the
t to be
has any enforceable legal right
upon completion of twenty yea
ars of
on of
ent, or whether the questio
or premature release lies with
in the
opriate
domain of the appro
nt under the applicable stat
tutory
and policy?
51
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
12.1. Sri. P
radeep Patil, learned counsel fo
or the
petitio
ner, submits that the petitioner h
has an
enforce
eable legal right to be released
d upon
comple
etion of twenty years of imprison
nment.
He su
ubmits that this right flows fro
m the
judicia
l direction in Criminal
Appeal
No.119
97/2008, read in conjunction with S
Section
57 of
the IPC and the principle in Su
khdev
v . He submits that the right to r
release
Yadav
upon c
completion of the judicially-fixed pe
eriod is
a judic
cial right, not merely an executive f
favour.
It is n
not a matter of remission or exe
ecutive
discret
tion; it is a matter of the sentence
having
been c
completed.
12.2. Sri. Pr
radeep C.S., learned AAG, submit
ts that
the pe
etitioner has no enforceable legal r
right to
autom
atic release upon completion of
twenty
years.
He submits that the power of rem
mission
and pr
remature release is vested exclusiv
vely in
the ap
propriate Government under Sectio
on 432
of the
CrPC (now Section 473 of the B
BNSS),
subjec
t to the constraints of Section
433-A
CrPC (
now Section 474 BNSS). He extrac
cts and
relies u
upon these provisions.
52
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
12.3. Section
n 473(1) of the BNSS (correspond
ding to
Section
n 432(1) CrPC) reads: 'When any p
person
has b
been sentenced to punishment f
for an
offence
e, the appropriate Government m
may, at
any ti
ime, without conditions or upo
n any
conditi
ions which the person sentenced ac
ccepts,
suspen
nd the execution of his sentence or
r remit
the wh
hole or any part of the punishm
ment to
which
he has been sentenced. '
12.4. The us
se of the word 'may' in Section 473
3(1) of
the BN
NSS makes the exercise of the
power
purely
discretionary with the appro
opriate
Govern
nment. The convict does not ha
ave an
autom
atic or absolute right to remiss
sion or
release
e.
12.5. The lea
arned AAG relies on Para 27 of Moh
hinder
, which states: 'there is a misconc
ception
Singh
that a
a prisoner serving life sentence h
has an
indefea
asible right to release on complet
tion of
either
14 years or 20 years imprisonme
nt.' He
submit
ts that the present case involves pr
recisely
this m
misconception being raised by
y the
petitio
ner. He submits that the Se
ntence
Review
w Board, when it considers
s any
53
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
applica
ation for premature release, must
do so
in acco
ordance with the applicable policy a
and the
statuto
ory provisions, and the Court canno
ot pre-
empt o
or substitute that exercise of discret
tion.
12.6. Point
(iv) requires this Court to dete
ermine
whethe
er the petitioner has an enforceabl
e legal
right t
to automatic release upon comple
tion of
twenty
y years, or whether the quest
ion of
prema
ture release lies within the ex
clusive
domain
n of the appropriate Government.
12.7. As he
ld under Points (i), (ii) and (iii
i), the
petitio
ner has no enforceable legal rig
ght to
autom
atic release, because: (a) the se
ntence
impose
ed is life imprisonment and not a tw
wenty-
year s
entence (Point i); (b) Section 57
of the
IPC do
oes not mandate release after
twenty
years
(Point ii); and (c) life impriso
onment
means
s imprisonment for the remaind
der of
natura
l life (Point iii). These three fi
indings
collect
ively and conclusively exclude
e the
existen
nce of an enforceable legal rig
ght to
autom
atic release.
12.8. The st
atutory scheme governing remissio
on and
prema
ture release of life convicts is Se
ections
54
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
432, 4
433 and 433-A of the CrPC (now Se
ections
473, 4
474 and 475 of the BNSS). The sch
eme is
as follo
ows: Section 432/473 BNSS vests
in the
approp
priate Government the discret
tionary
power
to suspend or remit the sentence,
at any
time,
with or without conditions. S
Section
433/47
74 BNSS vests in the appro
opriate
Govern
nment the power to commut
te life
impriso
onment to rigorous or
simple
impriso
onment for a term not exc
ceeding
fourtee
en years. Section 433-A/474
BNSS
impose
es a restriction: where a senten
nce of
impriso
onment for life has been impos
sed on
convict
tion for an offence for which death
is one
of the
e punishments provided by law
w, the
approp
priate Government shall not exerc
cise its
powers
s of release or commutation unle
ess the
person
n has served at least fourteen ye
ears of
impriso
onment.
12.9. In the
present case, the original convictio
on was
under
Sections 302 and 364A IPC, b
oth of
which
provide for death as one o
of the
punish
ments. Therefore, Section 433-A
CrPC /
Section
n 474 BNSS applies, and the mi
nimum
period
of actual imprisonment before rem
mission
55
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
can e
ven be considered is fourteen
years.
Howev
ver, as held, this Court in Criminal
Appeal
No.119
97/2008 modified this thresho
old to
twenty
y years by its direction 'in ter
rms of
Section
n 57 of IPC.' Thus, the petitioner w
was not
eligible
e for even consideration of remissio
on until
he ha
ad served twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment.
12.10. Having
g now served twenty years, the thr
reshold
for elig
gibility to apply for remission has
s been
crosse
d. The petitioner has crossed
from
ineligib
bility to eligibility. He is now elig
ible to
make
an application for premature rele
ease or
remiss
sion to the appropriate Govern
nment.
Howev
ver, eligibility to apply is differen
t from
having
g an enforceable legal right
to be
release
ed. The appropriate Government
t must
still co
onsider the application on its mer
rits, in
accord
ance with applicable policy, takin
ng into
accoun
nt all relevant factors. The d
ecision
whethe
er to remit the sentence or
grant
prema
ture release remains with the appro
opriate
Govern
nment.
56
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
12.11. The po
ower of remission is constitutional
lly and
statuto
orily vested in the executive. It is a
power
couple
d with a duty to exercise it fair
rly and
reason
nably, as held by the Hon'ble Su
upreme
Court
in Mohinder Singh (Para 27). The
e Court
can en
nsure that this power is exercised
fairly,
reason
nably and in accordance with law,
but it
cannot
t itself exercise the power by di
recting
the re
elease of the convict. This disti
nction,
betwee
en ensuring fair exercise of the
power
and e
exercising the power itself, i
s the
constit
tutional boundary between the ju
udiciary
and th
e executive.
12.12. Accord
dingly, I answer Point No. (iv) by h
holding
that:
(a) The petitioner has no enfor
rceable
legal
right to automatic release
upon
comple
etion of twenty years of imprison
nment.
(b) Th
he question of remission or prem
mature
release
e lies within the exclusive domain
of the
approp
priate Government under the app
plicable
statuto
ory provisions and policy. (c)
) The
petitio
ner, having crossed the mi
nimum
thresh
old of twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment, is now eligible to app
ply for
prema
ture release/remission to the appro
opriate
57
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
Govern
nment, which shall consider
such
applica
ation on its merits in accordance
e with
applica
able law and policy.
13. Answer to
continued
completion
can be said
issuance o
release?
o Point No. (v): Whethe
incarceration of the petitioner
n of twenty years of imprison
r the
r after
nment
d to be illegal, so as to warran
of a writ of mandamus directin
nt the
ng his
13.1. Sri. P
radeep Patil, learned counsel fo
or the
petitio
ner, submits that the con
ntinued
incarce
eration of the petitioner after com
pletion
of twen
nty years of actual imprisonment is
s illegal
and u
unconstitutional. He draws the C
Court's
attenti
on to Para 15.4 of Sukhdev Y
Yadav ,
where
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
'There
cannot
t be any further incarceration
of the
appella
ant herein from 09.03.2025 onw
wards...
the co
ontinuous incarceration of the ap
pellant
from
09.03.2025 onwards was illega
al.' He
submit
ts that the same logic applies
to the
petitio
ner, since he has completed twenty
y years
and th
he sentence was specified 'in ter
rms of
Section
n 57 of IPC', the continued detentio
on post
comple
etion of twenty years is illegal.
58
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
13.2. Learne
ed counsel submits that since
e the
detent
ion is illegal, the writ jurisdiction
of this
Court
under Articles 226 and 227 o
of the
Constit
tution of India is directly attracted,
, and a
writ o
of mandamus must issue directin
ng the
third
respondent to release the pet
titioner
forthw
ith. He relies on the well-estab
blished
princip
ple that a writ of habeas corp
pus or
manda
amus may be issued when a per
rson is
detaine
ed without lawful authority.
13.3. Sri. Pr
radeep C.S., learned AAG, submit
ts that
the co
ntinued incarceration of the petitio
oner is
not ille
egal. The petitioner is detained pu
ursuant
to a v
alid warrant of commitment issued
d by a
compe
etent court, pursuant to a vali
d and
subsist
ting sentence of life imprisonment
. Since
the se
ntence of life imprisonment has no
ot been
comple
eted, commuted, or remitted
, the
continu
ued detention is entirely lawfu
l. The
analog
gy with Sukhdev Yadav is misconc
ceived,
as in
that case the sentence had
been
specific
cally fixed at twenty years and had
d been
fully
undergone. No such completi
on of
senten
nce has occurred in the present case
e.
59
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
13.4. The le
earned AAG submits that a w
writ of
manda
amus can be issued only to comp
pel the
perform
mance of a mandatory public duty.
In the
presen
nt case, there is no mandatory d
uty on
the th
ird respondent to release the peti
itioner.
The du
uty of the third respondent is to ho
old the
petitio
ner in custody pursuant to the
e valid
warran
nt of commitment, and that duty is
s being
lawfully
y performed. No writ of mand
damus,
therefo
ore, can or should issue.
13.5. Point (
(v) requires determination of wheth
her the
continu
ued incarceration is illegal. The ans
swer to
this qu
uestion flows from the answers a
already
given t
to Points (i) through (iv).
13.6. A det
tention is illegal when it lacks
s legal
author
rity, when there is no valid court or
rder or
warran
nt authorising the detention, or wh
hen the
senten
nce pursuant to which the deten
tion is
mainta
ained has been fully undergone, or
r when
the d
detention violates a constitution
nal or
statuto
ory provision. None of these condit
tions is
satisfie
ed in the present case. The petitio
oner is
detaine
ed pursuant to a valid warra
ant of
commi
itment, pursuant to a valid and sub
bsisting
60
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
senten
nce of life imprisonment passed
by a
compe
etent court and affirmed in C
riminal
Appeal
l No.1197/2008. The sentence h
as not
been c
completed, commuted, or remitte
d. The
detent
ion is therefore lawful.
13.7. The re
eliance placed by the learned coun
nsel on
Para 1
5.4 of Sukhdev Yadav is specifica
lly and
expres
ssly addressed and rejected fo
or the
reason
ns elaborately discussed under Poi
ints (i)
and (ii
). In Sukhdev Yadav , the senten
ce had
been
fixed at twenty years of
actual
impriso
onment by a specific judicial dir
rection,
and th
he convict had completed that tw
wenty-
year
sentence. The continued incarce
eration
after th
he sentence was specifically and ju
dicially
fixed a
at twenty years and fully undergon
e, that
was he
eld to be illegal. In the present ca
ase, no
such
twenty-year sentence was fixed
d. The
senten
nce is a continuing life sentence
e. The
twenty
y years served are part of the se
ntence
but do
o not constitute the whole sen
ntence.
Theref
fore, the continued incarceration
is not
illegal.
61
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
13.8. For a w
writ of mandamus to issue, the pet
titioner
must d
demonstrate: (a) a clear legal right
t to the
perform
mance of a specific act; and
(b) a
corresp
ponding legal duty in the respond
dent to
perform
m that act; and (c) the respon
ndent's
failure
to perform that duty. As held
under
Point
(iv), the petitioner has no enfor
rceable
legal
right to automatic release
upon
comple
etion of twenty years. Since th
e first
prereq
uisite legal right is not establishe
ed, the
founda
ation for a writ of mandamus is a
absent.
The wr
rit cannot issue.
13.9. It mus
st also be noted that issuing a w
writ of
manda
amus directing the release of a c
convict
whose
sentence is validly subsisting wo
uld, in
substa
nce and effect, amount to this
Court
exercis
sing the power of remission
n and
commu
utation, a power vested by
y the
Constit
tution and the statutes in the exe
ecutive
Govern
nment and not in the judiciary. Su
uch an
exercis
se would be ultra vires the jurisdic
ction of
this Co
ourt in writ proceedings. This Cou
urt has
no pow
wer to direct the release of a life c
convict
by ass
suming to itself the power of rem
mission
that be
elongs to the appropriate Governme
ent.
62
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
13.10. This C
Court is also guided by the princ
ciple of
judicia
l restraint in matters of c
riminal
senten
ncing and execution of sentences
s. The
Court's
s role, in the context of writ jurisd
diction,
is to e
ensure that the law is applied co
orrectly
and th
hat fundamental rights are protecte
ed, not
to sub
bstitute its discretion for that o
of the
senten
ncing court or the executive. As lo
ong as
the de
etention is pursuant to a valid se
ntence
and th
he prisoner's fundamental rights a
are not
violate
ed, this Court does not interfere w
ith the
continu
ued execution of the sentence.
13.11.
For the
e above reasons, I answer point N
No. (v0
by hol
ding that the continued incarcera
tion of
the pe
titioner after completion of twenty
y years
of imp
risonment is not illegal, and that n
no writ
of ma
andamus can be issued directin
ng his
release
e.
14. Answer to
interferenc
and 227 of
relating to
release and
appropriate
Point No. (vi): What is the sco
ce by this Court under Article
ope of
s 226
matters
f the Constitution of India in m
o sentence remission, prem
d executive powers exercised b
e Government?
mature
by the
63
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
14.1. Sri. P
radeep Patil, learned counsel fo
or the
petitio
ner, submits that this Court has fu
ull and
ample
jurisdiction under Articles 226 an
nd 227
of the
e Constitution of India to examin
ne the
legality
y of the petitioner's detention a
and to
issue
appropriate directions. He submit
ts that
the qu
uestion before the Court is not o
one of
remiss
sion or executive discretion, it
is a
questio
on of interpreting a judicial directio
on and
enforci
ing the legal right flowing from
it. He
submit
ts that this question is squarely with
hin the
writ ju
risdiction of this Court.
14.2. He su
bmits that where a Court has g
iven a
directio
on, whether expressly or by impli
cation,
for rele
ease upon completion of a specific p
period,
the en
nforcement of that direction is a j
judicial
functio
on, not an executive one. The p
present
case, a
according to him, involves enforcin
g such
a direc
ction.
14.3. Sri. Pr
radeep C.S., learned AAG, submit
ts that
while
the High Court's writ jurisdiction
under
Articles
s 226 and 227 is wide, it is not unl
imited.
In m
matters of sentence remission
n and
prema
ture release, the Court's jurisdic
tion is
64
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
superv
visory and review-based, the Cou
urt can
ensure
e that the appropriate Government
acts in
accord
ance with law, but cannot itself ex
xercise
the ex
xecutive power of remission or sub
bstitute
its ju
dgment for that of the appro
opriate
Govern
nment in deciding whether a c
convict
should
be released.
14.4. He sub
bmits that in the present case, the
ere has
been n
no application for remission befo
ore the
approp
priate Government, no order on
n such
applica
ation, and no illegality in the con
ntinued
detent
ion. In such circumstances, th
ere is
nothing
g for this Court's writ jurisdiction
to act
upon.
14.5. The sc
cope of this Court's writ jurisdiction
under
Articles
s 226 and 227 of the Constitut
tion of
India
is unquestionably wide. Article
e 226
empow
wers this Court to issue directions,
orders
or writ
ts, including writs in the nature of h
habeas
corpus
s, mandamus, prohibition, quo wa
arranto
and c
certiorari, to any person or au
thority
includi
ng the Government, for the enforc
cement
of fun
ndamental rights and for any
other
purpos
se. Article 227 vests in this Cou
urt the
65
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
power
of superintendence over all cour
rts and
tribuna
als within its territorial jurisdiction.
14.6. Howev
ver, the breadth of Article 226 juris
sdiction
does n
not mean that this Court is entit
tled to
exercis
se all governmental powers.
The
Constit
tution carefully distributes power
among
the th
hree branches of government, an
nd the
courts
are required to act within the d
domain
assigne
ed to them. In matters of c
riminal
senten
nces, the execution and modificat
tion of
senten
nces are matters governed by s
statute,
and th
he power to remit or commute sen
ntences
is spe
ecifically and exclusively vested
in the
approp
priate Government or
the
Preside
ent/Governor under Articles 72/16
1. This
Court,
in exercise of its writ jurisdiction,
cannot
arroga
te to itself the power of remission.
14.7. In the
context of the present case and m
matters
of this
s nature, this Court's writ juris
sdiction
extend
ds to the following permissible fo
rms of
interfe
rence: (i) examining whethe
r the
continu
ued detention of the convict is pu
ursuant
to a v
alid court order, if not, a writ of h
habeas
corpus
s may issue; (ii) examining wheth
her the
66
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
approp
priate Government has failed or r
refused
to con
nsider an application for remiss
sion in
accord
ance with statutory procedure, if
f so, a
manda
amus may issue directing considera
ation of
the ap
pplication; (iii) examining wheth
her an
order
of the appropriate Government
on a
remiss
sion application is arbitrary, mala f
fide, or
vitiated
d by non-application of mind, if s
so, the
order
may be quashed and fresh conside
eration
directe
ed; (iv) giving effect to the comple
etion of
a judic
cially-fixed sentence by directing re
elease,
as was
s done in Sukhdev Yadav .
14.8. In the
present case, this Court has alread
dy held
that: (
(a) the continued detention is pursu
uant to
a valid
d life sentence (so no habeas
corpus
issue);
; (b) there is no application for rem
mission
before
the appropriate Government (
(so no
questio
on of the Government having fa
iled to
conside
er); (c) no order of remission has
s been
passed
d by the appropriate Government
(so no
questio
on of quashing); and (d) the sente
ence is
not a j
judicially-fixed twenty-year senten
nce (so
dev Yadav category does not a
apply).
Sukhd
None
of the permissible forms of
f writ
interve
ention is attracted in the present ca
ase.
67
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
14.9. This C
Court, however, does take note
of the
directio
on of the Hon'ble Supreme Court i
in Para
16 of
f Sukhdev Yadav, which direc
cted a
circula
tion to all Home Secretaries of
States
and Un
nion Territories to ascertain wheth
er any
convict
t has remained in jail beyond the
period
of his
sentence. This direction was
in the
contex
xt of cases where sentences had
d been
specific
cally fixed by judicial direction. For
r cases
like th
he present, where the sentence
e is a
continu
uing life sentence, the appro
opriate
Govern
nment's power of remission under S
Section
473/47
74 BNSS is the prescribed mechani
ism for
any ea
arly release.
14.10. The sc
cope of this Court's jurisdiction
in the
presen
nt case is, therefore: (a) to examin
ne and
confirm
m the legality of the detention
(b) to
clarify
the legal position regarding
g the
petitio
ner's eligibility to apply for prem
mature
release
e; and (c) to direct that if an appl
lication
for p
remature release is made by
y the
petitio
ner, the appropriate Government
t shall
conside
er it on its merits within a reas
sonable
time,
without being bound by the di
rection
agains
t 'routine commutation at fourteen
years'
68
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
(which
direction has been rendered spe
ent by
the p
assage of twenty years). This
Court
cannot
t, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction,
, direct
the aut
tomatic release of the petitioner.
15. Answer to
Point No. (vii): What Order?
15.1. Having
g answered all Points for Determi
nation,
this Co
ourt must now determine the appro
opriate
order
to be passed in this writ petitio
n. The
finding
gs on all six preceding Points,
taken
togeth
er, clearly indicate that the p
primary
prayer
r, for a writ of mandamus directi
ng the
immed
diate release of the petitioner, can
not be
grante
d.
15.2. This C
ourt has held that: (a) the life se
ntence
was no
ot fixed at twenty years; (b) Sect
tion 57
IPC do
oes not mandate release after
twenty
years;
(c) life imprisonment
means
impriso
onment for the remainder of natur
ral life;
(d) th
here is no enforceable legal rig
ght to
autom
atic release; (e) the con
ntinued
incarce
eration is not illegal; and (f) this C
Court's
writ ju
urisdiction does not extend to di
recting
release
e in these circumstances.
69
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
15.3. In the
result and for the foregoing reas
sons, I
pass th
he following
ORDER
(i) The
writ petition is DISMISSED.
(ii) The
prayer for a writ of mandamus di
recting
Resp
pondent No.3 to release the pet
titioner
from
m prison forthwith is REJECTED .
(iii) It i
is clarified that the direction i
in the
judg
gment of this Court in Criminal
Appeal
No.1
1197/2008, that the accused shall
l serve
the
sentence 'in terms of Section 57 o
of IPC',
does
s not restrict the sentence o
of life
imp
risonment to a period of twenty
years.
The
sentence of life imprisonment im
mposed
on
the petitioner is a sentence fo
or the
rem
ainder of his natural life, and rema
ains so
unle
ess commuted or remitted by
y the
app
ropriate Government or
the
Pres
sident/Governor in accordance with
law.
(iv) The
petitioner, having served twenty
y years
of a
actual imprisonment as stipulated
in the
judg
gment of this Court in Criminal
Appeal
No.1
1197/2008, has crossed the mi
nimum
70
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
thre
eshold specified by this Court for eli
gibility
for r
remission consideration. He is acco
rdingly
enti
tled to submit an applicatio
n for
prem
mature release or remission t
to the
app
ropriate authority in accordance
e with
app
licable statutory provisions an
d the
Stat
te's remission policy.
(v) If a
nd when such application is mad
de, the
app
ropriate Government/Sentence R
Review
Boa
rd shall: (i) consider the same
on its
indiv
vidual and case-specific merits; (i
i) take
into
account all relevant factors includi
ing the
peri
od of actual imprisonment, the c
onduct
of t
he petitioner, the nature of the o
ffence,
the
interests of the victims, an
d the
app
licable policy; (iii) not treat the di
rection
agai
inst 'routine commutation
after
com
mpletion of fourteen years' in C
riminal
App
eal No.1197/2008 as an absolute
bar to
cons
sideration of any application made
e after
com
mpletion of twenty years; and (iv)
pass a
reas
soned order thereon within ninety
y (90)
days
s of receipt of the application.
71
NC: 2026:KHC
WP No. 25250 o
C:15413
of 2025
HC-KAR
(vi) Noth
hing in this judgment constitutes o
or shall
be
construed as an expression of o
opinion
that
t the petitioner's application
n for
prem
mature release, if made, ought to
o be or
shal
ll be granted. The decision on any
y such
app
lication remains entirely within
n the
dom
main of the appropriate Government
t.
(vii) Pend
ding applications, if any,
stand
dism
missed.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDA
ARAJ)
JUDGE
Prs
List No.: 19 Sl No.:
2