JASILA THITHIYO vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Court
- Chhattisgarh High Court
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CGHC010435262025 2026:CGHC:39116
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 5343 of 2025
Order Reserved on 05/08/2026
Order Pronounced on 07/09/ 2026
SHYNA
AJAY
Digitally signed
by SHYNA AJAY
Date:
2026.09.07
17:58:07 +0530
Jasila Thithiyo W/o Ranjeet Das Aged About 23 Years R/o Ward No. 10,
Village- Krishnanagar, Post- Bardar, Police Station And Tehsil-
Balrampur, District- Balrampur-Ramanujganj, C.G.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Panchayat And Rural
Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District
Raipur C.G.
2 - Collector District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G.
3 - Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)/Election Tribunal Balrampur,
District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G.
4 - Returning Officer Panchayat Nirvachan, Gram Panchayat
Krishnanagar Janpad Panchayat, Balrampur, District Balrampur-
Ramanujganj C.G.
5 - Tahsildar Balrampur, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G.
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6 - Surajpati Ram W/o Ramdas Ram, Aged 46 Years R/o Village-
Krishnanagar, Post- Bardar, Police Station and Tehsil- Balrampur,
District Balrampur-Ramanujganj C.G.
7 - Nirmala Devi W/o Shailendra Ram R/o Village- Krishananagar, Post-
Bardar, Police Station and Tehsil- Balrampur, District Balrampur-
Ramanujganj C.G.
... Respondent(s)
(Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ishan Verma, Advocate and Mr. Aditya
Kumar Mishra, Advocate
For Respondent
Mr Ashok Kumar Shukla, Mr. Ravi Singh and
No.6
Mr. Shivam Mishra, Advocates
For Respondent
:
Mr. Anand Dadariya, Dy. AG
/State
SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. The petitioner herein assails the legality and propriety of the
impugned order dated 25.9.2025 passed by the Election Tribunal
(Sub-Divisional Officer), Balrampur, District Balrampur-
Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh in an Election Petition RCN
No.202503272200017/A-89/2024-25), instituted under Section
122 of the CG Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Adhiniyam”) by respondent No.6. By the said
order, the Election Tribunal declared the election of the petitioner
to the post of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Krishna Nagar, under
the concerned Janpad Panchayat, as null and void, holding that
the petitioner had not attained 21 years of age on the date of
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submission of her nomination papers and consequently, her
election to the said office was void ab initio. The petitioner, being
aggrieved by the impugned order, has preferred the instant writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, contending
that the Election Petition was adjudicated in manifest non-
compliance with the mandatory procedural requirements
enshrined in Rule 11 & 12 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat
(Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for
Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Election
Petition Rules, 1995”). The petitioner contends that the Election
Tribunal committed a grave procedural illegality by omitting to
frame issues necessary for adjudication of the dispute and by
proceeding to pass the impugned order without recording the
evidence of the witnesses. Thus, in absence of framed issues and
a proper record of witnesses’ testimony, the impugned order
stands vitiated in the eyes of law and is, therefore, liable to be
quashed at the very threshold.
2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following
reliefs in this petition :
10.1. Quash and set aside the order dated
25.09.2025, passed by the Sub-Divisional
Officer (Revenue), Balrampur, District
Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh, in
R.C.N. No. 202503272200017/A- 89/2024-
25, whereby the learned authority allowed
the election petition filed under Section 122
of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj
Adhiniyam, 1993 (ANNEXURE P-1)
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10.2. Declare the petitioner as the duly
elected Sarpanch of Village Panchayat
Krishnanagar, District Balrampur,
Chhattisgarh;
10.3. Pass any other order(s) or direction(s)
as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case.
3. The succinct facts of the case, as averred by the petitioner, are
that pursuant to the election notification issued by the State
Government through the competent authority, the petitioner
tendered her nomination papers for the post of Sarpanch, Gram
Panchayat, Krishna Nagar, under the concerned Janpad
Panchayat. Upon scrutiny by the Returning Officer, the
nomination of the petitioner was found to be in order and was duly
accepted, without any objection being raised from any quarter at
the relevant time. Ultimately, a total of three candidates, including
the petitioner, contested the election for the said office. All
contesting candidates duly submitted the requisite Form 4-B in
accordance with the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam,
1995 (hereinafter referred to as “the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995”).
Further, the petitioner submitted Form 4-B-1 as mandated under
Rule 31-A of the said Niyam. At the ensuing election conducted
on 22.2.2025, the petitioner secured the highest number of valid
votes and was, accordingly, duly declared the returned candidate.
Accordingly, a Certificate of Election in Form-25 was issued in
her favour under Rule 81 of the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995.
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Subsequently, the election of the petitioner was notified in Form
26-A pursuant to Rule 90 of the said Niyam, whereupon the
petitioner was formally recognized as the duly elected Sarpanch,
Krishna Nagar, with effect from 27.2.2021. After the official
notification of the election result, respondent No.6 filed an Election
Petition under Section 122 of the Adhiniyam before the Specified
Officer/Election Tribunal (SDO, Revenue), Balrampur on
11.3.2025, assailing the election of the petitioner to the office of
Sarpanch. The primary ground of challenge was that the petitioner
stood statutorily disqualified on account of being underage, having
not attained the mandatory age of 21 years on the date of
submission of her nomination papers. It was alleged that her true
date of birth is ‘12.4.2004’, according to which she was only 19
years of age at the material time. Respondent No.6 further
alleged that the petitioner fraudulently secured the recording of
her date of birth as ‘12.4.2002’ on the strength of forged and
fabricated documents, including her Voter ID and Aadhar Card, to
project that she had attained the statutory age of 21 years. In
consequence whereof, respondent No.6 contended that the
petitioner’s election is void ab initio and claimed that having
secured the second highest number of valid votes, respondent
No.6 be declared the duly elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat,
Krishna Nagar. The concerned Election Tribunal issued notice to
the petitioner and other non-applicants. In response thereto, the
petitioner entered an appearance before the Tribunal and filed
her reply, controverting and denying the allegations raised in the
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Election Petition regarding her age. The petitioner categorically
pleaded that she fulfilled all eligibility criteria to contest the
election for the post of Sarpanch and contended that her
nomination paper had been duly accepted upon scrutiny without
any objection being raised by any party at the time of filing
nomination papers. Hence, the Election Petition preferred by
respondent No.6 is unsustainable and liable to be dismissed.
Though statements/affidavits under Order 18 Rule 4 of the CPC
were submitted before the Election Tribunal and the petitioner
raised a preliminary objection asserting her eligibility and that she
had attained 21 years of age on the date of filing her nomination
papers, but the Tribunal did not frame any issues on the disputed
questions of fact regarding her age. Significantly, without
recording evidence of the parties or formulating issues , the
Tribunal passed the impugned order declaring the election of the
petitioner as null and void on the premise that she had not
attained 21 years of age at the material time and was thus
ineligible to contest the election for the concerned Gram
Panchayat. In doing so, the Tribunal erroneously relied solely on
the High School Marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of
Secondary Education (reflecting the date of birth as 12.4.2004),
while discarding the Aadhar Card and Electoral Roll (reflecting the
date of birth as 12.4.2002) without a full-fledged trial. On the
basis of this unproven finding, the petitioner was declared
disqualified and removed from the office of Sarpanch, Gram
Panchayat Krishna Nagar, under Section 122(3) of the Adhiniyam.
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4. Mr. Ishan Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently
argued that the findings recorded by the Election Tribunal are
illegal, arbitrary and vitiated. The Tribunal committed a grave
procedural illegality by failing to act in accordance with Rule 11
and 12 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 along with the
governing provisions of Section 122 of the Adhiniyam. Under this
statutory scheme, the Tribunal was under a legal obligation to
frame specific issues on the disputed questions of fact and record
the evidence of the parties before arriving at any conclusion
regarding the allegations made in the election petition or
declaring the petitioner ineligible to contest the election. He further
submits arriving at a finding of disqualification against the
petitioner without framing issues or recording evidence renders
the order unsustainable in the eyes of the law. He further submits
that the Election Petition suffered from a fatal defect of non-joinder
of parties, amounting to a direct violation of Rule 4 of the Election
Petition Rules, 1995. Since the election petitioner did not implead
all the contesting candidates as respondents, the Election Petition
ought to have been dismissed at the threshold under Rule 8 of the
Election Petition Rules, 1995, which mandates summary rejection
for non-compliance with Rule 4. . He also submits that under Rule
16 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995, the provisions of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1972 are strictly applicable to an enquiry into
an election petition. However, in absence of oral and documentary
evidence being recorded in accordance with law, the findings
arrived at in the impugned order is per se illegal, unsustainable
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and liable to be quashed/set-aside. He further submits that the
Tribunal further committed a material irregularity by failing to
appreciate the stark discrepancies in the documentary evidence
placed on record. While the petitioner’s Voter ID reflects a
downloaded date of 30.01.2025, the document tendered by the
election petitioner bears a downloaded date of 5.3.2025. He
submits that in absence of proper proof or cross-examination, the
Tribunal erred in placing reliance upon an unproven and disputed
document. He submits that though the Voter ID purports to
emanate from a competent authority of the Election Commission
of India, but no official witness was summoned or examined to
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authenticate the record In the absence of primary evidence or
proper verification, declaring the date of birth of the petitioner as
‘12.4.2004’ only on the basis of a Voter ID is impermissible. He
further submits that the present petitioner, in her written statement
before the Tribunal, specifically denied the adverse factual
assertions made in the Election Petition and pleaded that her
date of birth had been wrongly stated. The petitioner produced
reliable documents, including Aadhar Card and Voter ID card, both
showing her date of birth as ‘12.4.2002’. However, the Election
Tribunal ignored this documentary evidence. Learned counsel
further submits that though guidelines issued by the Election
Tribunal require a candidate to state their true date of birth, even
where an incorrect entry appears in supporting documents and
to possess valid documents to address potential objections, Form
4-B of the Nirvachan Niyam, 1995, contains no statutory
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requirement to annex supporting documents to the declaration
form. He submits that in a consistent line of precedents, this
Court as well as the Supreme Court have categorically held that
the framing of specific issues on disputed questions of fact is
mandatory legal requirement in an Election Petition. He submits
that Rule 11 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 clearly prescribe
the framing of issues and recording of evidence. Any deviation
from this prescribed procedure is impermissible in the eyes of
law. Thus, the manner in which the present election petition has
been decided is unsustainable and not in accordance with law. In
support of these contentions, learned counsel relies upon the
judgments rendered in the matters of Babloo Pasi Vs. State of
Jharkhand and others reported in (2008) 13 SCC 133 and
Umesh Kumar Kanwar Vs. Suman Singh Wakre reported in
2015 SCC OnLine Chh 1311.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Mr Ravi Singh and
Mr. Shivam Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No.6, submit
that the Election Tribunal has rightly passed the impugned order
declaring the election of the petitioner as Sarpanch of Krishna
Nagar as null and void. They submit that the petitioner had not
completed 21 years of age at the time of filing her nomination
paper, thereby violated Article 243F(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India read with the relevant provisions of the Panchayat Raj
Adhiniyam, wherein attaining of 21 years of age is a condition
precedent for contesting any Panchayat election. They also
submit that the recorded date of birth of the petitioner is 12.4.2004
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and as such, she had attained only 19 years on the date of filing
her nomination paper for contesting the election for the post of
Sarpanch. They further submit that against the order passed by
the Election Tribunal/the SDO, Balrampur, there is an efficacious
alternative remedy available before the concerned Collector under
the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam. Hence, the petitioner
having directly filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India without exhausting the statutory remedy, the
writ petition itself is not maintainable. They submit that the
petitioner’s contention regarding non-framing of issues and non-
recording of evidence by the Tribunal is devoid of merit. They
submit that where the dispute pertains to the petitioner’s date of
birth and age, facts peculiarly within her personal knowledge,
there was no requirement to frame issues. Furthermore, a perusal
of the order sheets as well as the impugned order clearly shows
that the petitioner was afforded ample opportunities to adduce
evidence. However, as reflected in the record, the petitioner failed
to lead to any evidence whatsoever to rebut the documentary
proof establishing her date of birth as 12.4.2004. They submit that
having failed to adduce evidence before the Election Tribunal, the
petitioner cannot now turn around and allege violation of the
principles of natural justice or a denial of an opportunity of
hearing. In a full fledged inquiry into the election petition, the
petitioner was afforded due opportunity at every stage of the
proceedings, however, in absence of any evidence in rebuttal,
she chose not to lead evidence to controvert the case against her.
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This is not a case where the petitioner was denied an opportunity
to adduce evidence, but rather one where, despite being granted
ample opportunities, she failed to do so. They also submit that
the petitioner relies upon the date of birth recorded in her Aadhar
Card and Voter ID Card, both of which reflect her date of birth as
‘12.04.2002’. However, her actual date of birth, as proved by her
Class X marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of
Secondary Education, is ’12.4.2004’, which constitutes primary
documentary evidence overriding secondary identity cards. They
further submit that for determining the authenticity of a date of
birth, primary reliance must be placed on the Birth Certificate,
Class X Certificate or Class XII Certificate. In the present matter,
the Class X Marksheet/Certificate of the Chhattisgarh Board of
Secondary Education was produced, according to which, the date
of birth of the petitioner was found to be 12.4.2004. They submit
that it is a well-settled statutory requirement that a candidate
must have attained the age of 21 years to contest an election.
This condition is a statutory imperative and no candidate can
plead ignorance of the law. The relevant provisions of the
Adhiniyam and the rules framed thereunder prescribe this
minimum age qualification as a condition precedent. Furthermore,
Article 243-F(1)(a) of the Constitution of India mandates 21 years
as the minimum age to contest a Panchayat election. With
respect to the leading of evidence, learned counsel for the
election petitioner/respondent No.6 submits that the petitioner has
been afforded due opportunities by the Election Tribunal to lead
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evidence, however, she declined to adduce any evidence, which
is evident from the order sheet filed along with the present
petition. They further submit that there is a categorical finding by
the Election Tribunal in the order sheet to the effect that the
petitioner was afforded due opportunities to cross-examine
witnesses and adduce evidence. Although a perusal of the order
sheet dated 8.9.2025 shows that the petitioner was denied the
opportunity to lead evidence on that specific date, the record
demonstrates that she had been granted such opportunities on
numerous prior occasions. Thus, the grounds raised by the
petitioner are not available to her. It was argued that where the
matters in dispute are well known to the parties, the framing of
issues is not mandatory in every case, as the parties proceed to
trial fully aware of their respective rival contentions. Learned
counsel submit that the documentary evidence produced by the
election petitioner/respondent No.6 was never rebutted by the
present petitioner. In such an eventuality, the failure to frame
issues would not be fatal and it is not open to a party to contend
that the entire proceeding is vitiated on this ground alone. The
Class X Certificate issued by the Chhaitisgarh Board of
Secondary Education in respect of the petitioner constitutes valid
and conclusive proof of her date of birth establishing her age,
which remains undisputed. Consequently, the Election Tribunal
was fully justified in holding that on the date of filing of nomination
papers, the petitioner had not attained 21 years of age.
Notwithstanding the absence of dispute on this point, the Tribunal
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acted well within its jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue in the
election petition and rightly declared the election of the petitioner
to be null and void. They submit that the Election Tribunal rightly
held that since the petitioner contested the election without
having attained 21 years of age, she could not be permitted to
hold office and was accordingly directed to be removed under
Section 122(3) of the Adhiniyam, which is in accordance with
law. Additionally, it was argued that in the absence of any interim
stay granted by this Court, the concerned authorities initiated
fresh election proceedings for the post of Sarpanch, Gram
Panchayat, Krishna Nagar. Pursuant to the notification dated
8.5.2026 issued by the State Election Commission, a fresh
election was conducted wherein respondent No.6 contested, was
declared elected and subsequently received the Certificate of
Election on 4.6.2026. In view of these supervening events, the
present petition has been rendered infructuous and is liable to be
dismissed. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel
relied upon the judgments rendered in the matters of Authrorized
Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs . Mathew
K.C . reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85, Kalyan Singh Chouhan Vs.
C.P. Joshi reported in (2011) 11 SCC 786, Meghwal Samaj
Shiksha Samiti Vs. Lakh Singh and others reported in (2011)
11 SCC 800, Sushil Kumar Vs. Rakesh Kumar reported in 2003
AIR SCW 6005, and Santosh Kumar Nishad Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and others reported in 2016 AIR Chhattisgarh
164 {Division Bench of this Court})
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6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents
annexed with the petition as well as the preliminary objection
raised regarding maintainability.
7. At the outset, the preliminary objection regarding the
maintainability of this writ petition deserves to be addressed.
8. According to learned counsel for respondent No.6, the petitioner
ought to have exhausted the alternative statutory remedy of filing
an appeal before the concerned Collector against the impugned
order passed by the Election Tribunal. However, in my considered
view, the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is maintainable in light of the law laid down by this Court in
the matter of Cheti Bai Yadav Vs. Smt. Bhupeshwari Sahu ,
reported in 2016 SCC OnLine Chh 921 , wherein, it was held that
the procedure for presentation and trial of election petition has
been prescribed under the Election Petition Rules, 1995. Rule 25
of the Rules, 1995 attaches finality to the order passed by the
Specified Officer. It uses the term decision of the Specified Officer.
Rule 23 deals with the decision which may be taken by the
Specified Officer while trying the election petition and thus
includes any final order passed in the election petition. Thus, the
law prescribes and attaches finality to the order passed in the
election petition. Therefore, remedy of preferring an appeal or
revision under Section 91 read with Appeal and Revision Rules is
not available to aggrieved party. Para 2 of the aforesaid order
reads as under :
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2. The remedy of filing election petition is provided under
Section 122 of the Adhiniyam providing that an election
petition can be preferred within a period of 30 days from the
date when the election in question was notified and that
such petition shall be enquired into or disposed of according
to such procedures as may be prescribed. The procedure
for presentation and trial of election petition has been
prescribed under the Rules known as the Chhattisgarh
Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and
Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 (for short ‘the
Rules, 1995’). Rule 25 of the Rules, 1995 attaches finality to
the order passed by the Specified Officer. It uses the term
decision of the Specified Officer. Rule 23 deals with the
decision which may be taken by the Specified Officer while
trying the election petition and thus includes any final order
passed in the election petition. Thus, the law prescribes and
attaches finality to the order passed in the election petition.
Therefore, remedy of preferring an appeal or revision under
Section 91 read with Appeal and Revision Rules is not
available to aggrieved party. The only remedy available to
such party is to prefer a petition under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India.
9.
Rule 25 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 speaks about the
"25. Finality of decision.— The decision of the specified
officer shall be final
10. Considering Rule 25 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995 as well
as law laid down by this Court in Cheti Bai Yadav (supra), this
Court has no hesitation in holding that against the final order
passed by the Election Tribunal, a Writ Petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India is maintainable, as it is the only remedy
available to an aggrieved party.
11.
So far as the second point regarding the framing of issues is
concerned, the same has been raised by the petitioner relying on
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various judgments rendered by this Court.
12.
Order 14 Rule 1 of the CPC deals with the framing of issues, the
provisions of which are made applicable to election petitions by
virtue of Rule 11 of the Election Petition Rules, 1995. Although
Election Tribunals are required under Order 14 Rule 2 of the CPC
to frame issues to clearly define the dispute and guide the
adducing of evidence, the non-framing of issues is not fatal where
the parties are fully aware of the real points in dispute and have
proceeded to trial with knowledge of each others’ case.
13. A Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Santosh Kumar
Nishad (supra) , considered this aspect in a similar matter where
the Election Tribunal had decided an election petition without
framing issues. Relying upon the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Arikala Narasa Reddy
Vs. Venkata Ram Reddy Reddygari and another reported in
( 2014) 5 SCC 312 , the Division Bench held in paragraphs 13 to 15
as under :
13. In (2011) 11 SCC 786 : (AIR 2011 SC 1127) paras 21 &
23) (Kalyan Singh Chouhan v. C.P. Joshi), the main dispute
was whether one lady had cast her vote twice under two
different names and whether the tendered votes cast in the
election must be counted and whether six votes polled
against the tendered votes must be rejected. In that case
also the margin of victory was only one vote. A prayer was
made to summon certain documents with regard to the
tendered votes. This prayer was rejected on the ground that
these facts were not opleaded and no issue had been
framed in respect of those tendered votes. An appeal was
filed before the Apex Court wherein the elected candidate
urged that the election petition has to be adjudicated strictly
adhering to the statutory provisions and the Court cannot
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permit a party to lead evidence unless an issue has been
framed on the controversy and an issue cannot be framed
unless there are actual pleadings in respect thereof. We are
not concerned with the second part because there is no
allegation in the present case that the pleadings are lacking
material particulars. The only allegation is that no issue was
framed. With regard to non-framing of issues, the Apex Court
in the said judgment held as follows:—
“25. The object of framing issues is to
ascertain/shorten the area of dispute and pinpoint the
points required to be determined by the Court. The
issues are framed so that no party at the trial is taken
by surprise. It is the issues fixed and not the pleadings
that guide he parties in the matter of adducing
evidence,
xxxxxxxxx
27. There may be an exceptional case wherein the
parties proceed to trial fully knowing the rival case and
lead all the evidence not only in support of their
contentions but in refutation thereof by the other side.
In such an eventuality, absence of an issue would not
be fatal and it would not be permissible for a party to
submit that there has been a mistrial and the
proceedings stood vitiated.”
14. This view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in
(2014) 5 SCC 312 : (AIR 2014 SC 1290, para 10)
(Arikala Narasa Reddy v. Venkata Ram Reddy
Reddygari) as follows:
“16. There may be an exceptional case where the
parties proceed to trial fully knowing the rival case and
lead all the evidence not only in support of their
contentions but in refutation of the case set up by the
other side. Only in such circumstances, absence of an
issue may not be fatal and a party may not be permitted
to submit that there has been a mistrial and the
proceedings stood vitiated.”
15. What we have to decide is whether the present
case falls within the exception carved out by the Apex
Court. As pointed out before, the dispute in the election
petition was very short. Detailed allegation had been
made challenging the correctness of the counting of
the votes and specific allegations were made with
regard to alleged wrong counting of votes of particular
booths. These allegations were specific and were
denied by the elected candidate. On these specific
pleadings, evidence was led by the Election Petitioner
and the Election Petitioner and his witnesses were
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cross-examined on these aspects of the matter by the
elected candidate and thereafter the elected candidate
also led evidence and he examined himself and other
witnesses with regard to these very allegations and
counter-allegations. Therefore, this clearly shows that
the elected candidate was clearly aware of what was
the dispute between the parties. In this case there was
only one dispute and that was whether the votes have
been properly counted or not and even with regard to
that there was specific allegation and it was not a
general plea of recounting. Since evidence has been
led by both the parties on these specific pleadings
knowing fully well what was the case set up by the
election petitioner and what was the defence of the
elected candidate. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
non-framing of issue(s) has caused prejudice to the
elected candidate. As such, in the facts of this case we
hold that the non-framing of issue (s) is not fatal the
decision of the case and therefore we find no merit in
the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
14. When the facts of the case at hand are examined in light of the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the
Division Bench of this Court, it is evident that the sole point in
controversy pertains as to whether the petitioner had attained 21
years of age, a question of which both parties were cognizant
throughout the proceedings.
15. The petitioner was well aware of the fact that the central point in
dispute pertained to her date of birth, which according to her is
12.4.2002, whereas according to respondent No.6, based on
reliable documentary evidence, it is 12.4.2004. Applying the
settled principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
as well as this Court, it cannot be said that the parties were
unaware of the actual issue in dispute that fell for adjudication
before the Tribunal. As such, in my view, non-framing of a specific
issue regarding the date of birth of the petitioner was not fatal.
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The petitioner is the person whose date of birth is in question and
respondent No.6 had already adduced cogent documentary
evidence in support of her contention. Consequently, in the facts
and circumstances of the present case, framing of a specific issue
was not necessary in the present matter and its non-framing is
not fatal to the proceedings.
16.
Now, coming to the third point for determination, which pertains to
the alleged denial of an opportunity to lead evidence, the
petitioner challenges the legality and propriety of the impugned
order on the ground that she was not afforded a reasonable
opportunity to adduce evidence. Conversely, respondent No.6
(election petitioner before the Tribunal) submits that adequate
opportunities were indeed granted to the petitioner, however, she
declined to lead evidence regarding her date of birth, which
constitutes the pivotal point in controversy.
17. This Court has carefully examined the records and order sheets
of the Election Tribunal placed on record. A perusal of the order
sheet shows that the election petition was filed on 11.3.2025,
whereupon notices were issued on the very same day. Thereafter,
the matter was adjourned on various dates for one reason or the
other. On 16.7.2025, the petitioner (who was the respondent
before the Election Tribunal) entered appearance and sought time
to file her written statement. The matter was subsequently listed
for evidence on 23.7.2025, 30.7.2025, 6.8.2025, 14.8.2025 and
21.8.2025. On each of these scheduled dates, the petitioner
sought time to file objections or to cross-examine the election
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petitioner. On 28.8.2025, when time was sought yet again, a
final opportunity was granted to the petitioner. However, on
8.9.2025, the petitioner declined to cross-examine the election
petitioner or adduce any rebuttal evidence, after which the matter
was fixed for final orders. Thereafter, the case was listed on
11.9.2025, 18.9.2025 and 25.9.2025, and ultimately, upon the
petitioner’s repeated failure to lead evidence, the final order dated
28.9.2025 was passed. Consequently, the ground raised by the
petitioner that she was denied an opportunity to lead evidence is
belied by the record and is factually incorrect. Adequate
opportunities were afforded to the petitioner, which she failed to
avail herself of, leading to passing of the impugned order.
18.
Now, adverting to the next point for determination regarding which
documents must be taken into consideration to ascertain a
persons’ date of birth when the same is in dispute, the Supreme
Court in Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 7
SCC 263 , extensively examined this aspect. The Supreme Court
held in order to determine the correct date of birth of an individual,
the relevant documents to be examined are : the matriculation or
equivalent certificate issued by the concerned Board, the date of
birth recorded in the school admission register and the birth
certificate issued by a Corporation, municipal authority or
panchayat. These documents are considered the primary
documentary evidence for determining a person’s date of birth.
19. A valid proof of date of birth can be established through official
documents issued by Government authorities, educational
21
institutions attended by the person or a declaration by a
competent Court of law. The primary and most widely accepted
document for determining a person’s age is a Birth Certificate
issued by a competent Municipal Corporation, local Municipality or
similar statutory authorities. The second most reliable form of
proof is Class X passing Certificate or XII passing Certificate or
School Leaving Certificate bearing the recorded date of birth.
While supporting documents such as PAN card, Driving License
or official Government service records may serve as secondary
evidence, they are not generally considered primary proof for
establishing a person’s date of birth.
20.
Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in the
absence of a Birth Certificate issued by competent authorities, the
Class X or XII Certificate issued by a recognized Examination
Board serves as a primary document for determining a person’s
date of birth in official records. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has clarified that an Aadhar Card is not conclusive proof of date of
birth. A person’s date of birth can only be definitively established
on the basis of a Birth Certificate issued by the competent
authorities, an Educational Board Certificate bearing the date of
birth, or a decree passed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction
rather than through an Aadhar Card or Voter ID Card.
21. In Ram Kripal alias Chirkut v. Deputy Director of
Consolidation & Others, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13286 of
1981 (decided on 25.11.2011) , All. HC, the Allahabad High Court
ruled that the informal nature of the date of birth recorded in the
22
voter list and voter ID card render it unreliable for determining the
actual date of birth. The relevant excerpt is reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ 22. The evidence being insignificant would not shift the
burden on shoulders of the petitioners. There appears
to be no reason as to why Smt. Gulabi did not examine
any of her relatives in support of her case. The
evidentiary value of voter list of the year 1966 and 1973
is also of inconsequential nature. The voter-list is
prepared on the statement and particulars furnished by
such person. It is in the nature of self serving evidence.
It is not safe to place much reliance upon it, in such
matters. However, our legal system has always
emphasis on value, weight and quality rather than
quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witness. Nothing has
come on record to connect Smt. Gulabi with the said
birth entry.
23. Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of
evidence to show on what material the entry in the
Voters List in the name of the accused was made, a
mere production of a copy of the Voters List, though a
public document, in terms of Section 35, was not
sufficient to prove the age of the accused.”
22. Furthermore, the issue is no longer res integra in view of the
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
matter of Saroj & Ors. Vs. Iffco-Tokio General Insurance Co.
& Ors. reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3038 wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court categorically held as under:
“9.6 We find that the Unique Identification Authority
of India, by way of its Circular No.08 of 2023, has
23
stated, in reference to an Office Memorandum issued
by the Ministry of Electronics and Information
Technology dated 20th December 2018, that an
Aadhar Card, while can be used to establish identity,
it is not per se proof of date of birth. This office
th
memorandum dated 20 December, 2018 was taken
note of by a learned Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court in State of Maharashtra v. Unique
Identification Authority of India And Ors in its order
th
dated 28 July, 2023….”
23. In the matter of P. Yuvaprakash Vs, State, 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 846 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:
“13 . It is evident from conjoint reading of the above
provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the
age of a person arises in the context of her or him
being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have
to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of
the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the
Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the
concerned court has to determine the age by
considering the following documents:
“(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
matriculation or equivalent certificate from the
concerned examination Board, if available; and in the
absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age
shall be determined by an ossification test or any other
latest medical age determination test conducted on the
orders of the Committee or the Board”.’
(Emphasis supplied)
24
24. In Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that an entry relating to
date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible
under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a
person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to
prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on
which the age was recorded.
25. In Jabar Singh v. Dinesh , (2010) 3 SCC 757 , Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that any documents which are not maintained in
discharge of official duty, such documents cannot be relevant
under Section 35 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of
determination of age of the person.
26.
In many cases, Hon'ble Supreme Court has relied upon
matriculation or equivalent certificates, including the school-
leaving certificates as valid proof in determining the age of an
accused person. (Refer to Parag Bhati v. State of U.P. , (2016) 12
SCC 744, Nawaz v. State of U.P. , (2011) 13 SCC 751 and Raju v.
State of Haryana , (2010) 3 SCC 235).
27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the petitioner
possesses a Birth Certificate (Annexure P/8) wherein her
recorded date of birth is 12.04.2002. Under Article 243 F(1)(a) of
the Constitution of India, attaining the age of 21 years is a
mandatory pre-condition and an essential qualification for
contesting a Panchayat election. A candidate who intends to
contest the election for the post of Sarpanch is required to strictly
satisfy the age criteria during the scrutiny of nomination papers.
25
The petitioner herein cannot be granted relief or deemed eligible
solely on the basis of the Aadhar Card and Voter ID Card where
date of birth is recorded as ‘12.04.2002’, as these secondary
identity documents cannot override or supersede the Birth
Certificate. The Birth Certificate constitutes the primary statutory
proof of date of birth and brushing it aside during the scrutiny of
documents is contrary to established legal principles. However, in
the present matter, the Birth Certificate cannot be relied upon as it
was updated and issued on 5.7.2025 and the said document was
obtained after institution of the Election Petition. Further, the said
Birth Certificate was neither relied upon by the petitioner nor was
any evidence adduced to substantiate the entries contained
therein. On the contrary, in all educational documents from Class-I
up to Matriculation, the date of birth of the petitioner is mentioned
as 12.4.2004, which appears to be authentic.
28. As held in the matter of Ram Kripal alias Chirkut (supra), the
date of birth mentioned in Voter ID and Aadhar are not reliable
evidence for the purpose of ascertaining date of birth. The view is
reasonable and as such, the date of birth mentioned in Voter ID
and Aadar cannot be taken under consideration.
29. The petitioner submitted her Aadhar Card and Voter ID Card,
wherein her date of birth is recorded as 12.4.2002, to contest the
election for the post of Sarpanch. Under the relevant provisions of
the Panchayati Raj Adhiniyam, where an election petition is filed
against a returned candidate on the ground of underage
disqualification pursuant to Article 243F of the Constitution of
26
India, an unqualified person cannot be permitted to occupy or hold
office to the detriment of a qualified candidate. Hence, any
person, who has not completed 21 years of age, at the time of
filing nomination paper, is ineligible to contest the election for the
post of Sarpanch.
30. Under Article 243F of the Constitution of India, inserted via the
Constitution, (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, the text reads
as follows :
243F. Disqualifications for membership.—
(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as,
and for being, a member of a Panchayat—
(a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the
time being in force for the purposes of elections to the
Legislature of the State concerned:
Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the
ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if
he has attained the age of twenty-one years;
(b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made
by the Legislature of the State.
(2) If any question arises as to whether a member of
a Panchayat has become subject to any of the
disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the
question shall be referred for the decision of such
authority and in such manner as the Legislature of a
State may, by law, provide.”
31. Though the Birth Certificate of the petitioner records her date of
birth as 12.4.2002 but, as discussed above, the same cannot be
relied upon as it was updated and issued on 5.7.2025 i.e. after
filing of the Election Petition. All School Records from Class I to
Class XII state the date of birth of the petitioner as 12.4.2004. The
27
Matriculation Certificate issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of
Secondary Education in the month of March 2021 also records the
same date of birth i.e. 12.4.2004. Since the entry with regard to
date of birth in the Birth Certificate was updated and subsequently
issued on 5.7.2025 i.e. after filing of the Election Petition and the
petitioner has failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate that
her actual date of birth is 12.4.2002, the Matriculation Certificate
issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education
remains the reliable and admissible document for determining her
date of birth (12.4.2004) under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence
Act. This position is further supported by the petitioner’s earlier
educational certificates, which consistently record the same date
of birth. Had the petitioner adduced any credible evidence to
establish the authenticity of the date of birth recorded in the
updated Birth Certificate, the situation would have been different.
32. This Court cannot ignore the Class X Marksheet issued by the
Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary Education in the year 2021,
wherein the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as
12.4.2004. It is also important to note that the petitioner, at the
time of filing her nomination papers, did not submit the Birth
Certificate to substantiate her claim that her date of birth is
12.4.2002. It also raises serious doubt before this Court that if the
petitioner was already in possession of the Birth Certificate, she
ought to have filed the same along with her nomination papers.
However, for reasons best known to her, it was not filed at the
relevant time. Instead, the Birth Certificate was subsequently
28
updated and issued on 5.7.2025 i.e. about three months before
passing of the impunged order dated 25.9.2025 by the SDO (R ),
Balrampur.
33. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that
the date of birth recorded in the updated Birth Certificate cannot
be relied upon. Consequently, the date of birth recorded in Class
X Marksheet issued by the Chhattisgarh Board of Secondary
Education, wherein her date of birth is mentioned as ‘12.4.2004’ is
held to be the correct date of birth of the petitioner.
34. Under the governing statutory provisions, a person is disqualified
from being chosen as a member of a Panchayat if he/she has not
attained the minimum age of 21 years. Since the petitioner had
not attained the age of 21 years at the relevant time, her election
stands legally invalid.
35. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in this petition and
confirms the impugned order passed by the Election Tribunal,
whereby the Election Petition was allowed.
36. Further, it has been stated at the Bar that a Notification for fresh
election has subsequently been issued.
37. Resultantly, the Writ Petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Shyna Ajay