Kiran Santosh Soni And Anr. vs Ramchandra Waman Erande And Anr.

Court
Bombay High Court

CNR No : HCBM010343512023

SA12-2026&136-2026.DOC
Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 12 OF 2026
1. Kiran Santosh Soni
...Appellants
2. Santosh Fattu Soni
Versus
1. Ramchandra Waman Erande
2. Rekha Ramchandra Erande …Respondents
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO. 136 OF 2026
1. Prism Johnson Ltd.
2. Associate Vice President of Prism ...Appellants
Johnson Ltd.
SANTOSH
SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Versus
Ramchandra Waman Erande …Respondent
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2083 OF 2026
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.11.18
18:31:32 +0530
Mr. Nikhil Patil, a/w Ms. Apurva Mahadik, i/b Mr. Shrijit
Gaikwad, for the Appellants in SA/12/2026.
Mr. Suyash Sule, for the Appellants in SA/136/2026.
Mr. Jayesh Joshi, for the Respondents in both matters.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
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RESERVED ON: 21 OCTOBER, 2026
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PRONOUNCED ON: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
JUDGMENT-
1. Though these second appeals are directed against distinct
judgments and decrees passed by the First Appellate Court, yet,
there is an element of commonality in the underlying lis in these
two appeals in as much as they pertain to the very property
which was the subject matter of both the suits. Therefore, these
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appeals were heard together and are being decided by this
common judgment.
Facts in SA/12/2026
2. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties
are hereinafter referred to in the capacity in which they were
arrayed before the trial court in SCS No.15/2010.
3. Plaintiff No.1 Kiran and Defendant No.2 Rekha are the real
sisters. Santosh, plaintiff No.2, is the husband of plaintiff No.1.
Ramchandra, defendant No.1, is the husband of defendant
No.2. Santosh (P2) and Ramchandra (D1) are the prima donna
in the dispute, revolving around the Municipal House
No.13/103, situated at Survey No. 97, Hissa No.2B, NA Plot
No.4, admeasuring 217 square meters with two constructed
units thereon (‘the suit property’).
4. The plaintiffs claim, in the year 1999, plaintiff No.2 was
employed at Pen. The plaintiffs contemplated constructing a
house at Pen and settle thereat. The defendants represented to
the plaintiffs that they will jointly purchase the plot and
construct a house thereon. Defendant No.1 volunteered that
housing loan might be availed in his name. The defendants
agreed that, after the construction of the house, half portion of
the property would be transferred in the name of the plaintiffs
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by way of a sale deed. Thus, verbal agreements were arrived at
between the parties.
5. In pursuance of the aforesaid verbal agreements, the
plaintiffs claim, the suit plot came to be purchased in the name
of defendant No.1 in August 2004. Two separate residential
units were constructed on the suit plot in the year 2006. The
plaintiffs further asserted that they had paid a sum of
Rs.2,41,989/- to defendant No.1 in cash and to Mr. Prakash
Zaware, who was the contractor, for the construction of the said
residential units. The plaintiffs shifted to the northern side
residential unit in the month of January 2006. An electricity
connection for the said residential unit was obtained in the
name of plaintiff No.2.
6. The said northern side residential unit, belonging to the
plaintiffs, was given on licence to H. and R. Johnson (India). The
monthly licence fee of Rs.2,500/- per month plus a sum of
Rs.900/- to make up the EMI was deposited by the plaintiffs in
the loan account of defendant No.1. In that fashion, a sum of
Rs.65,000/- was deposited by the plaintiffs in the said loan
account. The plaintiffs claimed to have thus paid a sum of
Rs.3,06,989/-, to the defendants and were also ready to pay the
balance amount of Rs.88,001/- out of the amount falling to the
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share of the plaintiffs, to the defendants. However, the
defendants resiled from their promise and started to project that
the plaintiffs were the licencees and called upon the plaintiffs to
vacate the northern side suit unit. Therefore, the plaintiffs were
constrained to institute the suit for specific performance of oral
agreement for the sale of half portion of the suit plot and the
suit unit constructed thereon.
7. The defendants contested the claim of the plaintiffs. It was
categorically denied that there was any verbal agreement for
either acquisition of the suit plot or construction of the
residential units thereon and the subsequent transfer of one
residential unit in favour of the plaintiffs by way of a sale deed.
The suit plot was purchased by defendant No.1 under a
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registered sale deed dated 18 August, 2004 and the building
was constructed thereon out of the independent income of
defendant No.1. The plaintiffs had no semblance of right, title or
interest in the suit property. In fact, plaintiff No.2 was an
employee of H. and R. Johnson (India) and the defendants had
given the said unit on leave and licence basis to the said
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company under an agreement dated 23 January, 2006. The
said company had, in turn, allotted the suit unit for residence to
plaintiff No.2 as he was their employee. After the expiry of the
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term of licence on 30 November, 2007, the said company had
neither renewed the term of licence nor paid licence fee/charges
for occupation of the suit unit. It was falsely claimed that, the
plaintiff No.2 was residing in the suit unit as a owner thereof.
8. After appraisal of the evidence led by the parties and the
material on record, the learned Civil Judge dismissed the suit
holding, inter alia , that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the suit
plot was purchased in the name of defendant No.1 for the
plaintiffs and the defendants, and that the residential units
were constructed on the suit plot out of the joint funds of the
plaintiffs and the defendants.
9. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal before
the District Court. By the impugned judgment and order in Reg-
ular Civil Appeal No.10/2013, the learned District Judge
dismissed the appeal observing, inter alia, that the case of oral
agreement for sale was vague and the plaintiffs failed to prove
the oral agreement for sale and, thus, the learned Civil Judge
was justified in dismissing the suit. The learned District Judge
rejected an application preferred by the plaintiffs for production
of additional evidence at the appellate stage.
10. Being aggrieved, the plaintiffs have preferred this second
appeal.
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Facts in SA/136/2026
11. Ramchandra [Defendant No.1 in SCS/15/2010] instituted
a suit being RCS/28/2010 against M/s H and R Johnson
(India), seeking recovery of possession of the northern side unit
which was given on a licence to the latter under the Leave and
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Licence Agreement dated 23 January, 2006. The plaintiff
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asserted, after the expiry of the term of licence on 30 November
2007, the defendant company neither renewed the licence nor
delivered the possession of the licensed premises back to the
plaintiff. The defendant company was also in arrears of the
licence fee.
12. The defendant company contended that, Santosh Soni (P2
in SCS/15/2010), who was the employee of the defendant
company, was the co-brother of the plaintiff and was in the
occupation of the suit unit as a co-owner thereof, after the
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expiry of the term of licence on 30 November, 2007.
13. The learned Civil Judge, after appraisal of the evidence
and material on record, was persuaded to decree the suit and
direct the defendants to put the plaintiffs in possession of the
suit unit and also pay to the plaintiffs a sum of Rs.67,500/-,
alongwith interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of
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institution of the suit till realization, towards the arrears of
licence fee.
14. Being aggrieved, the appellants-defendants preferred an
appeal before the District Court. By the impugned judgment and
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decree dated 10 April, 2025, the learned Principal District
Judge was persuaded to dismiss the appeal observing, inter
alia, that the defendants failed to establish that Santosh Soni
was in the occupation of the suit unit in the capacity of a
co-owner, with the consent of the plaintiff Ramchandra, and in
view of the lawful termination of the licence and indisputable
position that the possession of the licensed premises was not
delivered back by the defendant company to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the licenced
premises and the arrears of licence fee.
15. Being further aggrieved, the defendant company is in
second appeal.
16. I have heard Mr. Nikhil Patil, the learned Counsel for the
appellants in SA/12/2026, and Mr. Suyash Sule, the learned
Counsel for the appellants in SA/136/2026 and, Mr. Jayesh
Joshi, the learned Counsel for the respondents in both the
appeals.
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17. Mr. Nikhil Patil, the learned Counsel for the appellants,
submitted that the courts below were in error in returning the
finding that the plaintiffs in SCS/15/2010 failed to prove the
oral agreement for sale. There was a clear misreading of
evidence and misconstruction of documents which gave rise to
substantial questions of law, submitted Mr. Patil.
18. Amplifying the aforesaid submission, Mr. Patil would urge
both courts have categorically recorded that both the parties
have not brought the best evidence on record. And, yet, when
the appellants sought to tender the documents which would
substantiate their claims in the suit, by way of additional
evidence, the learned District Judge unjustifiably rejected the
said application. When the courts have categorically recorded
that the parties withheld the best evidence, it was incumbent
upon the Appellate Court to allow the plaintiffs to adduce
additional evidence which would have thrown light over the
controversy between the parties. The failure to exercise the
jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (‘the Code’) though the documents sought to be
produced were necessary for the just decision of the case,
renders the impugned judgment and order passed by the
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District Court vulnerable and that also gives rise to a substan-
tial question of law.
19. In opposition to this, Mr. Joshi, the learned Counsel for
the respondents, submitted that the courts below have, upon
appreciation of evidence, recorded findings of fact that the
plaintiffs failed to prove the oral agreement for joint acquisition
of the plot and construction of the buildings thereon. Such
concurrent findings of fact are not open for interference in the
second appeal. Secondly, Mr. Joshi submitted that, the learned
District Judge was fully justified in rejecting the application for
adducing additional evidence as an endeavour was made on
behalf of the plaintiffs to fill in the lacunae in their case. Once
the existence of the agreement as such was not duly proved no
amount of evidence can breath life into the suit for specific
performance, urged Mr. Joshi.
20. Incontrovertibly, the suit plot was purchased in the name
of Ramchandra (D1). The case of the plaintiffs was that they
had contributed the amount for acquisition of the suit plot and
even for the construction of the residential units thereon. Upon
appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence, the courts
below have recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiffs
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failed to prove the verbal agreement between the plaintiffs and
the defendants.
21. The relationship between the parties might have provided
a platform for such an agreement between the parties. However
the averments in the plaint in regard to the said agreement were
as vague as possible. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to
substantiate the case of such agreement by adducing cogent
evidence.
22. The observations by the courts below that, the best
evidence was withheld by both the parties were primarily in the
context of the non-examination of Santosh (P2) and
Ramchandra (D1) as witnesses, though they were the prime
characters in the purported transaction between the parties. In
that context, the courts observed that the parties did not lead
the best evidence. In any event, on account of the failure on the
part of the plaintiffs to prove the subsistence of a verbal
agreement for the transfer of half portion of the suit property,
the suit for specific performance was bound to fail.
23. The fact that the electricity connection in respect of the
suit unit was obtained in the name of plaintiff No.2 Kiran, or for
that matter, that there were certain entries regarding payment
of the amount in the account of defendant No.1 by the plaintiffs,
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even if taken at par, does not advance the case of the plaintiffs.
An indisputable fact that Santosh (P2) came into the possession
of the suit unit in the capacity of an employee of the licensee - H
and R Johnson (India) erodes the case of the plaintiffs
that the plaintiffs have been in occupation of the suit unit in the
capacity of co-owners of the suit property since inception.
24. The submission of Mr. Patil that the learned District Judge
has committed a gross error in law in rejecting the application
for adducing additional evidence also does not merit
countenance. The learned District Judge has, in terms,
observed that it was not the case that the plaintiffs were not in
possession of the documents which were sought to be produced
at the appellate stage.
25. Mr. Patil attempted to salvage the position by canvassing
the submission that the documents were necessary to enable
the District Court to pronounce the judgment. The learned
District Judge did not consider the admissibility of the
documents from the perspective of clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of
Rule 27 of Order XLI of the Code. To this end, reliance was
placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Wadi
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1
vs. Amilal and Others . In the said case, the Supreme Court
observed as under:
“5. Now it is clear that Rule 27 deals with production of
additional evidence in the appellate court. The general princi-
ple incorporated in Sub-rule (1) is that the parties to an ap-
peal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or
documentary) in the appellate court to cure a lacuna or fill
up a gap in a case. The exceptions to that principle are enu-
merated thereunder in Clauses (a), (a) and (b). We are con-
cerned here with Clause (b) which is an enabling provision. It
says that if the appellate court requires any document to be
produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pro-
nounce judgment, it may allow such document to be pro-
duced or witness to be examined. The requirement or need is
that of the appellate court bearing in mind that the interest
of justice is paramount. If it feels that pronouncing a judg-
ment in the absence of such evidence would result in a defec-
tive decision and to pronounce an effective judgment admis-
sion of such evidence is necessary, Clause (b) enables it to
adopt that course. Invocation of Clause (b) does not depend
upon the vigilance or negligence of the parties for it is not
meant for them. It is for the appellant to resort to it when on
a consideration of material on record it feels that admission
of additional evidence is necessary to pronounce a satisfac-
tory judgment in the case.”
26. I am afraid the aforesaid pronouncement advances the
cause of the submission on behalf of the appellants. The
requirement or need of additional evidence under clause (b) has
to be that of the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court, can re-
sort to the said enabling provision if it is of the view that upon
consideration of the material on record, the admission of
additional evidence is necessary to pronounce a satisfactory
judgment. In the case at hand, as the courts below have
recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs failed to
1 (2015) 1 SCC 677.
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prove the existence of an agreement of the nature pleaded by
them, the Appellate Court did not consider it necessary that the
additional evidence, sought to be tendered by the plaintiffs-
appellants, was required for a satisfactory disposition of the
appeal. Such a finding of the Appellate Court, in the totality of
the circumstances of the case, does not seem to be
unsustainable.
27. For the foregoing reasons, no question of law, much less a
substantial question of law, arises for consideration in SA/
12/2026.
SA/136/2026
28. Mr. Sule, the learned Counsel for the appellants, made a
strenuous effort to drive home the point that, the appellants-
defendants are not in a position to comply with the decree to
put the plaintiffs in possession of the suit property.
29. Mr. Sule further submitted that since the defendant com-
pany was represented by Santosh, who was in occupation of the
suit property as a co-owner and, eventually, Santosh ceased to
be an employee of the defendant company, the latter is not now
in a position to deliver back the possession of the suit property.
Mr. Sule would urge that, the courts below did not correctly
appreciate the testimony of Santosh Soni (DW2), and the letter
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dated 28 November, 2007 (Exhibit 69) and that led to
miscarriage of justice.
30. I find it difficult to accede to the submissions of Mr. Sule.
As noted above, the following facts are incontrovertible. First,
the letting out of the suit property to the defendant in the
month of January 2006, on a leave and licence basis. Second,
the allotment of the suit property by the defendant company to
Santosh Soni (DW2), as an employee of the company. Third, the
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expiry of the said licence on 30 November, 2007. Fourth, non-
delivery of the possession of the suit property by the defendant
company to the plaintiff. Fifth, non-payment of the licence fee/
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occupation charges after 30 November, 2007 by the defendant
company to the plaintiff. Sixth, the termination of the licence
and repeated demands for delivery of possession of the licensed
premises by the plaintiff.
31. The endeavour of the defendants to cling to the letter
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dated 28 November, 2007 (Exhibit 69), in support of their
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defence that after 30 November, 2007, Santosh Soni (DW2)
continued to occupy the property as a co-owner thereof is
fraught with insurmountable infirmities. Firstly, the jural
relationship between the parties was purportedly altered.
However, indisputably, the licensor was not a party to the said
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alteration in contract. Arvind Joshi (DW1) and Santosh Soni
(DW2) have categorically admitted that the said letter (Exhibit-
69) bears the signature of Santosh Soni (DW2) only, and it does
not bear the signature of the plaintiff.
32. Secondly, the intrinsic evidence of the said document
betrays an inherent improbability of the case of the defendants
that when the said letter was given the plaintiff Mr.
Ramchandra had accompanied Santosh Soni (DW2) and they
both represented to the manager of the defendant company that
thenceforth Santosh Soni (DW2) would occupy the suit property
as a co-ower thereof and there was no need to renew the licence.
In the said letter, Santosh Soni (DW2) has categorically asserted
that Mr. Ramchandra Erande, the plaintiff, had started a
dispute with him. If that was the case, it defies comprehension
that Mr. Ramchandra, the plaintiff, would have accompanied
Santosh Soni and made representation against his interest.
33. Thirdly, there is not an iota of material to indicate that the
defendant company ever intimated Santosh Soni (DW2) that he
ceased to occupy the suit property in the capacity of its
employee, even after Santosh Soni (DW2) allegedly ceased to be
an employee of the defendant company.
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34. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the courts below were
fully justified in passing the judgment for delivery of possession
qua the defendants as the defendants had obtained possession
of the suit property in the capacity of licensee and it was for the
defendants to re-deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiff
after the said jural relationship came to an end. Thus, no
substantial question of law arises for consideration.
35. The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that, both
the appeals deserve to be dismissed.
36. Hence, the following order:
: O R D E R :
(i) Second Appeal No.12 of 2026 stands dismissed with costs.
(ii) Second Appeal No.136 of 2026 also stands dismissed with
costs.
(iii) In view of dismissal of the appeals, IA/2083/2026 in SA/
136/2026 does not survive and, accordingly, stands
dismissed.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
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