THE AUMA INDIA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 11 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026

PRESENT


THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR


WRIT APPEAL NO.79 OF 2024 (L-RES)


BETWEEN:

THE AUMA INDIA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION



24, MADHUVANTI

ST
1 FLOOR

ST
1 A CROSS

CHIKKABOMMASANDRA

NEW TOWN

YELAHANKA

BENGALURU 560 065
Digitally
signed by
PAVITHRA N
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka

REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY


…APPELLANT
(BY SRI. VILAS RANGANATH DATAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:

1. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR
VIKASA SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001

2. THE AUMA INDIA

2

PLOT NO.38/A AND 39/B
ND
2 PHASE
PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA
BENGALURU-560 058
REPRESENTED BY ITS HEAD-RESOURCES
SRI. VINAY M.S.

…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. BYREGOWDA N., AGA FOR R1;
SRI. S.N.MURTHY, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SOMASHEKAR, ADV. FOR R2)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO CALL FOR THE
RECORDS IN WP No.3473/2018 AND ON PERUSAL OF THE SAME
BE PLEASED TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED
08.12.2023 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE TO
DISMISS THE SAID WRIT PETITION.

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 06.10.2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.S.BHARATH KUMAR

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CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)

This Writ Appeal is filed challenging the order dated
08.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition No.3473/2018 (L-RES), whereby the order dated
10.01.2018 passed by the Secretary to Government
granting permission to prosecute respondent No.2 under
Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was
quashed.

2. We have heard Shri. Vilas Ranganath Datar,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Shri. S.N.
Murthy, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri.
Somashekar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2
and Shri. Byregowda N, learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for respondent No.1.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submits that the appellant is a registered Trade Union
representing workmen employed in respondent No.2 -
establishment, which is engaged in the manufacture of
electrical actuators and gearboxes. A settlement was

4

entered into between the Management and the workmen
under Section 12(3) read with Section 18(3) of the
Industrial Disputes Act in the year 2010, for the period
ending on 31.03.2015. Before its expiry, the appellant
submitted a Charter of Demands dated 17.02.2014. By
order dated 24.02.2015, the State Government referred the
dispute concerning the Charter of Demands to the Industrial
Tribunal, Bengaluru, for adjudication.
4. The appellant had submitted a complaint dated
28.08.2013 to the State Government alleging unfair labour
practices by the Management and seeking permission to
prosecute respondent No.2. The State Government sought
clarification from the Labour Commissioner, pursuant to
which the Assistant Labour Commissioner called upon the
parties to submit their responses and furnished a report
dated 27.04.2017. Thereafter, a meeting was convened on
15.12.2017 pursuant to a notice dated 07.12.2017. By order
dated 10.01.2018, the State Government granted
permission to prosecute the Management, recording that
discretionary payment of rewards resulted in differentiation

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and violation of the Standing Orders, leading to inducement
of members to leave the Union. The Management challenged
the said order in Writ Petition No.3473/2018.
5. The learned Single Judge held that Section 34 of
the Industrial Disputes Act is intended to prevent frivolous
and harassing prosecutions and requires the appropriate
Government to apply its mind to the relevant material
before making a complaint or authorising its Institution. The
Government must independently satisfy itself that the facts
warranting prosecution exist and that Institution of the
complaint is expedient. On examining the complaint, the
learned Single Judge found that the allegations related to
interference with the workmen’s right to organise,
discrimination affecting trade union membership, contracting
out regular work, transfers, failure to implement an award,
settlement or agreement and refusal to bargain collectively
in good faith. It was found that the complaint did not contain
an allegation concerning payment of rewards to induce
members to leave the Union. However, permission for
prosecution had been granted on the basis of discriminatory

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payment of rewards inducing members to leave the Union,
rather than on the allegations contained in the complaint.
The order also failed to specify the clauses of the Fifth
Schedule allegedly violated.
6. The learned Single Judge further found that the
State Government had acted upon the Labour
Commissioner’s recommendation without independently
considering the material before it. Though the Government
could accept and act upon the report, the statutory
responsibility to decide whether prosecution should be
authorised vested in the Government and could not be
exercised by the Labour Commissioner. Holding that the
order did not disclose independent application of mind or
adequate reasons addressing the substance of the matter,
the learned Single Judge quashed the order dated
10.01.2018.
7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
contends that the learned Single Judge erred in treating the
grant of permission under Section 34 of the Industrial
Disputes Act as a quasi-judicial exercise. It is contended that

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the decision is administrative in nature and requires only
prima facie satisfaction that prosecution is warranted,
without detailed reasons or adjudication of the allegations on
merits. The State Government had independently considered
the complaint, the Management’s objections and the
departmental reports, after affording both parties an
opportunity of hearing . The fact that the authority did not
accept all the allegations, but confined the permission to
discriminatory payment of rewards and the consequent
inducement to leave the Union , demonstrated application of
mind.
8. It is contended that the substance of the order
disclosed the alleged unfair labour practices and that
omission to expressly specify the relevant clauses of the
Fifth Schedule did not justify quashing the permission.
Undue or excessive increments and rewards were alleged to
constitute wage increases intended to induce workmen to
relinquish their Union membership. Whether such payments
amounted to inducement, discrimination or unfair labour
practices was a matter to be established by evidence before

8

the jurisdictional Magistrate. It is therefore contended that
that the learned Single Judge entered into the merits and
failed to properly consider the decisions relied upon
concerning the scope of the power under Section 34 of the
Industrial Disputes Act.
9. It is further contended that the departmental
reports constituted internal administrative assistance
obtained to ascertain the prima facie veracity of the
allegations which were not required to be furnished to the
parties. It is also contended that Section 89 of the Industrial
Relations Code, 2020 does not govern the present
proceedings, which arose from a complaint made in 2013,
before the Code came into force.
10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
has placed reliance on the following decisions:-
•
Raj Kumar Gupta v. Lt. Governor, Delhi
reported in AIR 1997 SC 2680 ;

•
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma reported in 1992
Supp (1) SCC 222 ;

•
Mysore Structurals Ltd. v. State of Karnataka
reported in (2002) 1 SCC 477 , and

9


•

S.N. Hada v. The Binny Limited Staff
Association reported in ILR 1987 KAR 3762
(FB) .
11. The learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for respondent No.1 contends that the
Management had been issued notice and had submitted its
reply to the Union’s complaint. It is submitted that sufficient
opportunities of hearing were afforded and that the order
dated 10.01.2018 granting permission for prosecution was
passed after considering the objections and submissions of
both parties.
12. The learned senior counsel appearing for
respondent No.2 submits that the State Government
granted permission for prosecution solely on the clarification
furnished by the Labour Commissioner without
independently considering the material or specifying the
clauses of the Fifth Schedule allegedly violated. The
clarification issued by the Labour Commissioner was neither
furnished to the Management nor was an opportunity
afforded to controvert its contents. It is therefore contended

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that the order suffered from non-application of mind and
violation of the principles of natural justice and that the
learned Single Judge rightly quashed it.

13. It is further submitted that, in view of the
changed statutory framework under the Industrial Relations
Code, 2020, particularly Section 89 providing for
composition of offences, no purpose would be served by
remanding the matter for fresh consideration. It is further
submitted that the appellant must pursue such remedy as
may be available under the Code.
14. Having considered the contentions advanced, we
notice that the complaint dated 28.08.2013 filed by the
appellant raised several allegations of unfair Labour Practice
against the employer. It was contended that the labourers
are deprived of their fair salary and other benefits, the office
bearers of the Union were suspended for silly reasons and
their increments and other benefits are deducted. It is
further contended that scheduled caste labourers are
targeted. It is also stated that the Management had
threatened the workers requiring them to resign from the

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membership of the Association and has shown discrimination
in granting increments and other benefits of the workmen. It
is further contended that senior employees are deprived of
promotions just because they are members of the
Association and baseless allegations were made against
them. Further, the complaint reveals that allegations are
raised in terms of abolition of regular nature of work by
contracting out such work to break a strike, mala fide
transfers, failure to implement award settlement and refusal
to bargain collectively in good faith.

15. On receipt of the complaint, the State
Government sought a clarification from the Labour
Commissioner. The Assistant Labour Commissioner called
upon the parties to submit their responses and furnish a
report dated 27.04.2017. Thereafter, a notice was issued on
07.12.2017 and requiring parties to attend a meeting
convened by the Labour Commissioner on 15.12.2017. A
detailed report was placed before the State Government by
the Labour Commissioner. Copies of this report are produced
as Exhibit 'R8' in the writ appeal. However, it is the specific

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case of the employer that no copies of this report was
furnished to the parties and its contents were not disclosed.
By order dated 10.01.2018, the State Government granted
the permission to prosecute the Management. It is clear
from the order dated 10.01.2018 that there was no
independent application of mind by the Government on the
complaint raised by the appellant. The Government had
relied entirely on the report submitted by the Labour
Commissioner without any application of mind. The learned
Single Judge considered these aspects and found that the
complaint with regard to unfairly inducing workmen to
relinquish their Union membership had not been made out
even in the report of the Labour Commissioner. After
considering the contentions, the learned Single Judge held
as follows:-
"x x x x x There was no bar for the State
Government to accept the Labor Commissioner’s report
and to act upon it. But the State Government had to
independently consider the matter. A perusal of the
order reveals that the first respondent does not even
bothered to independently consider the material before
it. Instead, the Government simply acts upon the
recommendation of the Labor Commissioner as though

13

it must simply affix the seal to approve the conclusion
reached by the Labor Commissioner. Thus, it must be
concluded that the order passed by the first respondent
is a result of the decision of the Labor Commissioner
and not that of the State Government. Section 34 does
not give such a power to the Labor Commissioner, but,
that the power there under vests with the State
Government. If the accord of sanction for prosecution is
made without application of mind, the same shall be
quashed on judicial review."

16. Having considered the contentions advanced, we
are of the opinion that the power under Section 34 of the
Industrial Disputes Act is to be exercised by the State
Government. It is an independent exercise of jurisdiction at
the hands of the Government that is contemplated under the
provisions of Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which
reads as follows:-
"34. Cognizance of offences.
(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence
punishable under this Act or of the abetment of any
such offence, save on complaint made by or under the
authority of the appropriate Government.

(2) No Court inferior to that of [a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class]
[Substituted by Act 46 of 1982, Section 20, for " a
Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class"

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(w.e.f. 21.8.1984).] shall try any offence punishable
under this Act."

17. It is therefore clear that the power to make a
complaint with regard to an offence punishable under the
Act is specifically vested in the appropriate Government.
The prosecution for offences under the Act is a serious
matter involving consequences to the Management. It is in
the said circumstances that the discretion has been vested
specifically with the Government to make a complaint with
regard to such offences. It is clear that it can be only on a
proper application of mind that an order can be issued by
the State Government seeking the prosecution of the
Management for an offence under the Act.

18. In the instant case, from a reading of the order of
the Government dated 10.01.2018, it is clear that there has
been no independent exercise of discretion by the
Government. The Government has only extracted the
opinion expressed by the Labour Commissioner and granted
permission on the basis of the same.

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19. In the said circumstances, we are of the opinion
that the learned Single Judge was indeed justified in having
set aside the order of the Government. We find no error in
the exercise of jurisdiction which requires a correction under
Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961. The appeal
fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.

All pending interlocutory applications shall stand
disposed of.

Sd/-
(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(K.S.BHARATH KUMAR)
JUDGE

PN