Central Government Employee S Welfare Housing Organization Cgewho vs Inderjit Singh Ahuja
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~54
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 6720/2026 and CM APPL. 33000/2026
Date of Decision: 15.05.2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE S WELFARE HOUSING
ORGANIZATION CGEWHO .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Apoorv Agarwal, Mr. Gaurav
Singh, Ms. Muskaan Goel Advocates.
versus
INDERJIT SINGH AHUJA .....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
J U D G E M E N T
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)
CM APPL. 33001-33002/2026 (for exemption)
1. Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The applications stand disposed of.
W.P.(C) 6720/2026 and CM APPL. 33000/2026
1. The petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 23.02.2026
(“ Impugned Order ”) passed by the National Commission for Disputes
Redressal Commission (“ National Commission ”), whereby, the first appeal
preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 16.01.2026 passed by the
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KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:30.05.2026
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State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“ State Commission ”),
was dismissed. The State Commission in terms of the order dated
16.01.2026 has directed as under:-
“26. All these facts of the case show that the Opposite Party was
deficient in providing its services to Complainant and had adopted unfair
trade practice. Further, we are of the considered view that the Opposite
Party does not have any right to deduct the amount of Rs.3,83,406/- even
when the delay was on its part.”
2. National Commission in paragraph no. 3 of the Impugned Order has
observed as under:-
“3. Receipt of Rs.3,83,406/- from the complainant-respondent is not in
dispute. The complainant booked the flat in the project of the Opposite
Party and Opposite Party issued the allotment letter dated 16.08.2011.
Although, counsel for the appellant claims that offer of possession was
made on 15.02.2017, he fairly admits that as on that date, no valid
Occupation Certificate from the competent authority was available.
Hence, such offer of possession which was also issued beyond the
committed date of possession as per the allotment, cannot be treated as
valid offer of possession. It emerges from the contention of the appellant
herein that they have possibly forfeited 20% of the booking amount. On
account of not giving the possession within the committed date of
possession with valid OC, they were not entitled to forfeit any amount.”
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has taken the Court’s attention to
the Scheme Brochure and points out that the Occupation Certificate was not
stated to be a condition precedent for the booking of the unit. He further
contends that the deduction of Rs.2,06,220/- towards cancellation charges
was in strict conformity with Rule 26 of the Scheme Brochure, and that the
deduction of Rs.1,77,186/- towards service tax cannot be directed to be
refunded as the same had already been deposited with the Government
exchequer.
4. The Petitioner seeks to challenge concurrent findings of the State
Commission and the National Commission, both of which have returned
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KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
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findings of deficiency of service and directed refund of the deducted
amounts.
5. Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 over orders of
tribunals and statutory commissions is supervisory in character and is
not appellate. Before examining whether the specific findings on
cancellation charges and the service tax component can be said to be
perverse or contrary to law, the only basis on which interference can be
warranted, it is necessary to clearly set out the scope and limits of this
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227.
1
6. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath , the Supreme Court has held as
under:
“13. This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as
pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar
Mukherjee [Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, 1950 SCC
OnLine Cal 88 : AIR 1951 Cal 193] , to be exercised most sparingly and
only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within
the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. As
rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us
the lower Courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted
arbitrarily. The lower Courts realised the legal position but in effect
declined to do what was by Section 13(2)(i) incumbent on them to do and
thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was,
therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the
Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so. In our
opinion there is no ground on which in an appeal by special leave under
Article 136 we should interfere. The appeal, therefore, must stand
dismissed with costs.
7. Further the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra
2
Shankar Patil , summarised the principles applicable to the exercise of
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution in the following words:
1
(1954) 1 SCC 51.
2
(2010) 8 SCC 329.
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Signed By:NEHA CHOPRA
Signing Date:30.05.2026
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“ 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following
principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution may be formulated:
(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from
a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the
High Court under these two articles is also different.
(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a
writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on
High Courts is substantially different from the history of
conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts
under Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its
power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution,
interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor
can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the
orders of the Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an
alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that
would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by
the High Court.
(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of
their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by
this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam
Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly followed by
subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of
this Court.
(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] ,
followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep
the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of
their authority”.
(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and
Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by
not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.
(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can
interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there
has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and
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Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and
manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice
have been flouted.
(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot
interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because
another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction
has to be very sparingly exercised.
(i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227
cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of
the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC
261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and therefore abridgment by a
constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.
(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate
provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil
Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut
down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the
same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment
does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of
superintendence under Article 227.
(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable
principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo
motu.
(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of
the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object
of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control
by the High Court on the administration of justice within its
territory.
(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and
judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning
of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring
it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is
to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does
not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and
unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the
functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High
Court.
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(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is
not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but
should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the
administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas
Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance.
Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its
exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out
above.
(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be
counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its
strength and vitality. ”
3
8. In Deepak Tandon v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta , while setting aside the
order of the High Court whereby interference was made with concurrent
findings of two authorities, the Supreme Court held:
“ 15. In our considered opinion, the High Court committed jurisdictional
error in setting aside the concurrent findings of the two Courts below
and thereby erred in allowing the respondent's writ appeal and
dismissing the appellants' application under Section 21(1)(a) of the 1972
Act as not maintainable. This we say for the following reasons
15.4. Fourth, it is a settled law that if the plea is not taken in the
pleadings by the parties and no issue on such plea was, therefore, framed
and no finding was recorded either way by the trial Court or the first
appellate Court, such plea cannot be allowed to be raised by the party
for the first time in third Court whether in appeal, revision or writ, as
the case may be, for want of any factual foundation and finding.
15.5. Fifth, it is more so when such plea is founded on factual
pleadings and requires evidence to prove i.e. it is a mixed question of
law and fact and not pure jurisdictional legal issue requiring no facts
to probe . ”
[Emphasis Supplied]
4
9. Further in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel , the Court
clarified that in exercise of powers under Article 227, not every error of fact
3
(2019) 5 SCC 537.
4
(2022) 4 SCC 181.
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or law is to be remedied, paragraph 15 of the said decision reads as under:
“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view
that the impugned order [Prakash Chand Goel v. Garment Craft, 2019
SCC OnLine Del 11943] is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for
several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act
as a Court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts
upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory
jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw
when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court
is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of
the inferior Court or tribunal . [Celina Coelho Pereira v. Ulhas
Mahabaleshwar Kholkar, (2010) 1 SCC 217 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 69]
The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to
set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is
exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence
at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person
can possibly come to such a conclusion that the Court or tribunal has
come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised
to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
10. The above principles make it abundantly clear that interference under
Article 227 is not to be made merely because a different view on the facts is
possible or because the High Court would have arrived at a different
conclusion on the same material. The power is reserved for cases of patent
perversity, grave dereliction of duty, or flagrant violation of fundamental
principles of law or justice.
11. The principal submission on behalf of the Petitioner is that the
deduction of Rs.2,06,220/- as cancellation charges under Rule 26 of the
Scheme Brochure was contractually valid, and that the consumer fora erred
in directing its refund. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to
briefly trace the established legal position on the obligations of a housing
organisation qua an allottee in the matter of possession and the
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consequences of default.
12. The Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K.
5
Gupta , held that housing construction and the services attendant thereto fall
squarely within the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and that inordinate delay
in handing over possession of a flat to an allottee who has made full
payment constitutes a clear deficiency of service within the meaning of
Section 2(1)(g) of the said Act.
13. Reiterating this position, the Supreme Court in Fortune
6
Infrastructure v. Trevor D’Lima , held that a home-buyer cannot be made
to wait indefinitely for possession of the flat allotted to him and is entitled to
seek refund of the amounts paid, along with appropriate compensation. In
7
Kolkata West International City Pvt. Ltd. v. Devasis Rudra , the Supreme
Court reiterated that a buyer could not be expected to wait endlessly without
any substantive reason for possession, where construction had not been
completed even after several years from the date of signing the buyer’s
agreement. The Court upheld the right of the allottee to seek refund with
interest in such circumstances.
14. The Supreme Court in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd.
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v. Govindan Raghavan , further clarified that a flat purchaser cannot be
compelled to take possession of a flat even when it is offered, if the offer is
made after significant delay beyond the grace period under the agreement
and if, crucially, the offer is made without a valid Occupation Certificate. In
that case, the Occupancy Certificate was obtained more than two years after
5
(1994) 1 SCC 243.
6
(2018) 5 SCC 442.
7
(2019) CPJ 29 (SC).
8
(2019) 5 SCC 725.
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the agreed deadline for possession. The Supreme Court upheld the finding of
the NCDRC that the flat purchaser was justified in seeking refund and could
not be compelled to accept the belated and defective offer of possession. The
relevant portion of paragraph 6 of the judgment reads as under:-
“6.1. The inordinate delay in handing over possession of the flat clearly
amounts to deficiency of service. In Fortune Infrastructure & Anr. v.
Trevor D’Lima & Ors., (2018) 5 SCC 442 this Court held that a person
cannot be made to wait indefinitely for possession of the flat allotted to
him, and is entitled to seek refund of the amount paid by him, along with
compensation.
6.2. The Respondent-Flat Purchaser has made out a clear case of
deficiency of service on the part of the Appellant-Builder. The Respondent-
Flat Purchaser was justified in terminating the Apartment Buyer's
Agreement by filing the Consumer Complaint, and cannot be compelled to
accept the possession whenever it is offered by the Builder. The
Respondent-Purchaser was legally entitled to seek refund of the money
deposited by him along with appropriate compensation.”
15. From the above line of authorities, the following legal propositions
emerge as settled law: first, that a housing organisation which fails to deliver
possession within a reasonable time is guilty of deficiency of service;
second, that an offer of possession without a valid Occupation Certificate is
not a valid offer of possession in law and does not satisfy the housing
organisation’s fundamental contractual and statutory obligation; and third,
that a housing organisation which is itself in default in fulfilling its primary
obligation of delivering possession with a valid Occupation Certificate
cannot invoke a forfeiture or cancellation clause against the allottee who
seeks refund on account of such default.
16. Petitioner’s grievance relates to the alleged violation of natural justice
arising out of the striking off of its Written Statement by the State
Commission. The Petitioner contends that the Written Statement was taken
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on record, the proceedings continued, and only at the stage of final
arguments was the Written Statement treated as unavailable, without notice,
and relying on an order that was never communicated or uploaded on the
Confonet portal.
17. This Court notes that the Petitioner’s grievance on this score has
already received full and complete consideration at multiple levels. The
Petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 11625/2024 before this Court challenging the
order dated 20.02.2024 of the State Commission, which was dismissed on
23.08.2024 with liberty to approach the National Commission. The
Petitioner then filed LPA/1190/2024, which was dismissed by the Division
Bench of this Court on 09.12.2024, again reiterating that the Petitioner had a
remedy before the National Commission against the final order. The
Petitioner then availed that remedy by filing FA/42/2025 before the National
Commission, which was also dismissed on 24.02.2025.
18. Three separate forums, including a Division Bench of this Court, have
considered and declined to interfere with the Written Statement issue. The
present petition, insofar as it seeks to reagitate this ground, is therefore not
available. It is well settled that a plea that has been considered and rejected
by a Court, cannot be permitted to be raised again in a subsequent petition as
a ground for challenge. This would amount to impermissible forum
shopping and would be contrary to the finality that judicial decisions must
carry.
19. As the Division Bench clarified on 09.12.2024, the Petitioner’s
remedy lay in challenging the final order on merits before the National
Commission. The Petitioner availed that remedy, and the National
Commission decided the matter on its merits.
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20. Both the State Commission and the National Commission have
returned concurrent findings of deficiency of service and have directed
refund of the amount deducted. The power under Article 227 is to be
exercised with even greater restraint when concurrent findings of two
tribunals on facts are under challenge. As the Supreme Court observed in
Deepak Tandon v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra), the High Court commits a
jurisdictional error in setting aside concurrent findings of two Courts or
tribunals.
21. The findings in the present case, that the Petitioner was in default in
providing valid possession, that it had no OC on the date of the alleged
possession offer, and that in such circumstances it was not entitled to forfeit
any amount, are concurrent findings supported by undisputed material on
record.
22. It is well established that the scope of interference under Article 227
with concurrent findings of fact by inferior Courts or tribunals is extremely
narrow. Interference is warranted only if the findings are based on no
evidence whatsoever, or are so perverse that no reasonable tribunal could
possibly have arrived at them. As the Supreme Court held in Garment Craft
v. Prakash Chand Goel (supra), the power under Article 227 is reserved for
cases where “there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so
perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion
that the Court or tribunal has come to.” This threshold is clearly not met in
the present case.
23. The Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate any patent
jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest illegality in the orders under
challenge. The findings of the consumer fora are grounded in undisputed
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facts, the allotment in 2011, the payment of the full consideration, the
absence of a valid Occupation Certificate at the time of the alleged
possession offer in 2017, and the Petitioner’s own admission of this fact
before the National Commission.
24. The conclusions drawn from these facts, that the delay was on
CGEWHO’s part and that it was accordingly disentitled from invoking the
forfeiture clause, are consistent with the binding decisions of the Supreme
Court in Pioneer Urban Land v. Govindan Raghavan (supra) and Ireo
Grace Realtech v. Abhishek Khanna (supra).
25. Accordingly, there is no reason to interfere with the Impugned Order.
The instant petition is dismissed along with all pending applications.
(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
JUDGE
MAY 15, 2026
Nc/Ksr
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