Getwell Healthcare Private Limited vs Dr Santosh Sahi & Ors.

$~87
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 20.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010388742026
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 223/2026, CM APPL. 56040/2026, CM
APPL. 56041/2026 and CM APPL. 56042/2026

GETWELL HEALTHCARE PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. K.K. Rai, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Imtiyaz Hussain, Ms. Medha
Tandon, Mr. Shubham Khare,
Ms. Salma and Ms. Jayati
Tandon, Advs.
versus

DR SANTOSH SAHI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
J U D G M E N T (ORAL)
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1. This is a tenant’s Appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) filed against the
judgment dated 22.07.2026 passed in O.M.P. (COMM) 321/2026,
captioned Getwell Healthcare Private Limited v. Dr Santosh Sahi &
1
Ors. . By the Impugned Judgment, the learned Single Judge dismissed
the Appellant’s petition under Section 34 of the Act challenging the
Partial Award dated 20.06.2026.

1
Impugned Judgment
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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2. This Appeal raises a simple question. The Respondents, during
course of the arbitral proceedings had invoked Section 17 of the Act
read with Order XII Rule 6 CPC, but expressly sought a partial award
directing delivery of possession. After the parties had led evidence and
been heard, the Tribunal granted that relief while leaving the monetary
claims and counterclaims open. The question is whether the
determination takes its legal character from provision as cited in the
application or from what the Tribunal actually decided. It is the latter.
For the reasons that follow, the determination by the Tribunal
constitutes an interim arbitral award within the meaning of Section
31(6) of the Act.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The dispute arises from a registered Lease Deed dated
17.12.2015. Under the said instrument, the Respondents leased to the
Appellant premises comprising House Nos. 1 and 2, Jangpura-A,
Mathura Road, New Delhi, admeasuring approximately 2,167 square
yards. The initial term of the lease was nine years. The monthly rent
for the first three years was fixed at ₹27,00,000/-, subject to an agreed
escalation of 20 per cent after every three years.
4. The Lease Deed allocated responsibility for the works to be
carried out at the premises. The Respondents were required to
undertake what the parties described as the “Basic Work”, whereas the
Appellant was to undertake the “Fit-Out Work”. The Lease Deed also
provided for payment of a pre-rent fee and a security deposit.
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5. Of significance is Clause 10.4 of the Lease Deed, which records
that the relationship between the parties was that of lessor and lessee
and that nothing contained in the instrument would constitute a
partnership, joint venture or joint undertaking.
6. The parties subsequently executed a Supplementary Lease Deed
dated 20.12.2019. The said document was not registered. The
Appellant relies upon it, together with the correspondence exchanged
between the parties and the expenditure allegedly incurred upon the
premises, to contend that the commercial arrangement went beyond an
ordinary lease and was, in substance, a collaborative venture.
7. On 02.06.2022, the Respondents issued a notice terminating the
tenancy. Arbitration followed. The Respondents sought, inter alia ,
possession of the premises, arrears and damages. The Appellant
contested the claims and raised counterclaims exceeding ₹65 crore,
principally on account of expenditure allegedly incurred upon the
premises and breaches attributed to the Respondents.
8. During the arbitral proceedings, the Respondents filed an
application under Section 17 of the Act read with Order XII Rule 6
CPC. Significantly, the application itself sought a “partial award” in
respect of possession on the basis of admissions.
9. The Appellant filed a detailed reply contesting the application.
On 18.12.2024, the Tribunal deferred consideration of the application
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NARAYAN
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until the stage of final hearing so as to enable the parties to complete
their evidence. Evidence was thereafter led by both sides. The
application was ultimately heard on 17.04.2026, whereafter the
decision was reserved.
10. By the Partial Award dated 20.06.2026, the Tribunal directed
the Appellant to remove its movable medical equipment, machines
and furniture and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the
premises within thirty days. In the event of failure to do so, the
Appellant was made liable to pay damages for use and occupation
equivalent to the agreed monthly rent of ₹27,00,000/-. The Tribunal
also recorded that the Partial Award could be executed in accordance
with law.
11. The Tribunal held that the registered Lease Deed governed the
jural relationship between the parties and that Clause 10.4 was
inconsistent with the Appellant’s plea of partnership or joint venture.
In reaching its conclusion, the Tribunal considered the pleadings,
answers to interrogatories, cross-examination, contractual documents
and correspondence exchanged between the parties.
12. The Tribunal also considered the termination notice dated
02.06.2022 and returned an express finding that the termination was
legal and valid under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. The monetary claims and counterclaims were left open for
subsequent adjudication.
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NARAYAN
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13. The learned Single Judge noticed the objection that a final relief
could not be granted while exercising power under Section 17 of the
Act. The learned Single Judge nevertheless found no ground for
interference under Section 34, principally on the basis that the
Tribunal had considered the contractual documents, admissions and
evidence placed before it and that the objections raised by the
Appellant would require reappreciation of the material on record.
14. Heard Mr. K.K. Rai, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms.
Medha Tandon, Mr. Imtiyaz Hussain and Ms. Salma appearing for the
Appellant, at length and perused the relevant record placed with the
Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
15. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant submits
that Section 17 of the Act authorises only interim measures and cannot
sustain a final direction for possession. According to him, an
application preferred under Section 17 could not have been converted
into a partial award under Section 31(6), particularly when issues had
been framed concerning the nature of the relationship between the
parties, validity of termination and breaches alleged against each
other.
16. It is further submitted that there was no clear, unequivocal and
unconditional admission which could justify an award on admissions.
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According to the Appellant, its possession formed part of a larger
commercial arrangement and the registered Lease Deed could not be
considered in isolation from the Supplementary Lease Deed, the
expenditure allegedly incurred by the Appellant and its pending
counterclaims.
17. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that separation of the
possessory claim from the remaining disputes causes serious prejudice
to the Appellant. It is stated that approximately ₹20 crore has been
invested in the premises and that the Appellant has counterclaims
exceeding ₹65 crore. In the alternative, learned Senior Counsel
submits that the Appellant is willing to deliver possession if its
monetary claims are secured by an appropriate bank guarantee.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
18. At the outset, the limits of the present Appeal must be kept in
view. An Appeal under Section 37 against an order refusing to set
aside an arbitral award does not enlarge the grounds of interference
available under Section 34 of the Act. The Appellate Court does not
undertake an independent reassessment of the merits of the Award or
substitute its own interpretation merely because another view may also
be possible. The restraint contemplated under Sections 34 and 37
operates cumulatively.

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19. The principal submission of the Appellant requires a distinction
to be drawn between an interim measure under Section 17 and an
interim arbitral award under Section 31(6) of the Act.
20. Section 17 empowers an Arbitral Tribunal to grant interim
measures during the arbitral proceedings. The jurisdiction is
essentially protective or preservative and operates in aid of an
effective arbitral process. What Section 17 does not permit is final
adjudication of a substantive claim merely under the guise of granting
interim protection.
21. Section 31(6) operates differently. It empowers an Arbitral
Tribunal, “at any time during the arbitral proceedings”, to make an
interim arbitral award “on any matter with respect to which it may
make a final arbitral award”. Such an Award is interim because other
disputes remain pending. In respect of the matter finally determined,
however, it possesses the attributes of an arbitral award.
22. In Indian Farmers Fertilizer Cooperative Limited v. Bhadra
2
Products , the Supreme Court explained that the language of Section
31(6) is deliberately wide and extends to “any matter” with respect to
which the Tribunal may make a final award. An interim award may
thus conclusively determine one matter while leaving the remaining
disputes for subsequent adjudication.

2
(2018) 2 SCC 534.
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23. The legal character of a determination must, therefore, be
gathered from its substance. Relevant considerations would include
the relief actually sought before the Tribunal, whether the opposite
party had notice of that relief and an effective opportunity to meet it,
whether the matter formed part of the reference and was capable of
final adjudication by the Tribunal, and whether the determination was
intended to be conclusive upon that matter. The statutory provision
mentioned in the application is relevant, but cannot by itself determine
the character of the resulting adjudication.
24. The present case must be examined on that basis. Although the
Respondents’ application invoked Section 17 of the Act read with
Order XII Rule 6 CPC, the relief expressly sought in the application
was a partial award of possession. Thus, this is not a case where the
Tribunal granted substantive relief which had neither been sought
against the Appellant nor disclosed to it.
25. The Supreme Court in Pruthvirajsinh Nodhubha Jadeja v.
3
Jayeshkumar Chhakaddas Shah reiterated the settled principle that
reference to an incorrect provision does not, by itself, defeat an
application where the power to grant the relief otherwise exists. That
principle cannot confer a jurisdiction which the adjudicating forum
does not possess, nor can it cure absence of notice or procedural
unfairness. It does, however, prevent form from prevailing over

3
(2019) 9 SCC 533.
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substance where the power exists and the relief sought is known to the
opposite party.
26. The decision in Tata Advanced Systems Limited v. Telexcell
4
Information Systems Limited , relied upon by the Appellant,
illustrates the distinction. There, an interim award had been sought.
The Tribunal declined that relief but nevertheless directed furnishing
of a bank guarantee, thereby granting a measure in the nature of
Section 17 without an application or pleadings seeking such relief.
The affected party had consequently not been afforded an opportunity
to meet the requirements for grant of such a measure. The defect was
therefore substantive, and not merely one of nomenclature.
27. The present case is materially different. The Respondents
expressly sought a partial award directing delivery of possession. The
Appellant knew the precise substantive relief sought against it and
filed a detailed reply opposing the same. The Tribunal did not decide
the application summarily when it was filed. It deferred consideration
until the parties had completed their evidence and thereafter heard
both sides before finally determining the possessory claim. There was,
therefore, no disconnect between the case which the Appellant was
called upon to meet and the relief ultimately granted. The Appellant
was neither taken by surprise nor deprived of an opportunity to place
its case before the Tribunal.

4
2020 SCC OnLine Del 1716
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28. The determination itself bears the attributes of an arbitral award.
It is expressly titled “Partial Award”, it contains reasons, it finally
directs delivery of possession, it prescribes the consequence of non-
compliance and it declares itself executable. The Tribunal did not
reserve the question of possessory entitlement for reconsideration at
the stage of the final award. What remained pending were principally
the monetary claims and counterclaims.
29. In substance and effect, therefore, the determination constitutes
an interim arbitral award within the meaning of Section 31(6),
notwithstanding the reference to Section 17 in the application which
occasioned it.
30. The reliance upon Khurana Educational Society (Regd.) v.
5
Smt. Shashi Bala and Evergreen Land Mark Private Limited v.
6
John Tinson and Company Private Limited does not advance the
Appellant’s case. Those decisions emphasise the limits of Section 17
where substantive liability remains seriously disputed and the
direction granted is, in substance, only an interim measure. The
present case concerns a determination made final on a separable claim
and amenable to challenge as an arbitral award.
31. This brings the Court to the second limb of the Appellant’s
challenge, namely, whether the Partial Award could have been

5
2026:DHC:1727
6
(2022) 7 SCC 757
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founded upon principles analogous to Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
32. Section 19 of the Act provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not
bound by the CPC or the law of evidence. This does not prevent the
Tribunal from drawing guidance from the principles underlying those
enactments. In Srei Infrastructure Finance Limited v. Tuff Drilling
7
(P) Limited , the Supreme Court explained that the words “shall not
be bound” in Section 19 are words of amplitude and not of restriction.
33. More directly, in Aspire Investments Private Limited v.
8
Nexgen Edusolutions Private Limited , this Court recognised that
principles analogous to Order XII Rule 6 CPC are applicable in
arbitral proceedings and may form the basis of an interim award
concerning possession. An arbitral tribunal is therefore not compelled
to postpone determination of a separable entitlement merely because
other disputes remain pending. The requirement, however, remains
that the admission relied upon must be sufficiently clear when the
pleadings and material are read as a whole.
34. The Tribunal applied that principle to the material before it. It
did not treat the mere title “Lease Deed” as conclusive. The Tribunal
recorded, inter alia , that the Appellant had admitted execution of the
registered Lease Deed, that its witness accepted that the Lease Deed
contained the mutually agreed terms and conditions, that no other

7
(2018) 11 SCC 470
8
2015:DHC:3967
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written terms governing the alleged collaborative arrangement existed,
that the Appellant had paid the stipulated pre-rent fee and a security
deposit equivalent to six months’ rent, and that it had received
possession of the premises under the contractual arrangement.
35. The Tribunal further relied upon the Appellant’s answers to
interrogatories and the cross-examination of its witness, including the
admission regarding the stipulated monthly rent of ₹27,00,000/-. It
also considered the correspondence exchanged in December 2020
concerning commencement of payment of rent.
36. The Appellant’s defence was not that the registered Lease Deed
had never been executed or that its terms were fabricated. Its case was
that, notwithstanding the instrument and its express terms, the true
commercial relationship was one of collaboration or joint venture. The
Tribunal considered that defence and rejected it, particularly in view
of Clause 10.4, which expressly provides that the relationship between
the parties is that of lessor and lessee and excludes a partnership, joint
venture or joint undertaking.
37. A party does not necessarily efface an otherwise clear
admission of foundational facts merely by proposing a different legal
characterisation of those facts. Whether such a defence is sufficient to
displace the legal effect of the admitted contractual material is itself a
matter which the Tribunal was entitled to determine.
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38. The learned Single Judge has recorded that the Appellant did
not expressly challenge the validity of the termination, which may not
be separately required to be challenged, however, the Appellant has
failed to draw the attention of the Court towards any material flaw in
the termination of its tenancy.
39. The fact that the Tribunal framed an issue concerning the
validity of termination does not alter this position. It shows that the
issue arose before the Tribunal and does not establish that the
Tribunal’s finding on that issue was challenged before the learned
Single Judge under Section 34 of the Act.
40. In any event, the Tribunal returned a finding that the
termination effected by notice dated 02.06.2022 was legal and valid
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In arriving at
that conclusion, it considered the Lease Deed, the Appellant’s
possession, the correspondence concerning commencement and
payment of rent, and the other material placed before it.
41. The Appellant now contends that rent had never validly
commenced, that the Respondents had failed to perform their
reciprocal obligations relating to the Basic Work, and that the
termination consequently could not have been sustained. Examination
of these contentions would require this Court to reassess the
contractual documents, correspondence and evidence considered by
the Tribunal.
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42. Such reassessment is impermissible within the limited
jurisdiction available under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act. The
Tribunal adopted a possible view of the contractual and evidentiary
material. No perversity or patent illegality has been demonstrated in
that determination.
43. The objection founded upon the unregistered Supplementary
Lease Deed also does not warrant interference. The Tribunal noticed
that the said instrument was unregistered and observed that it could be
looked into only for collateral purposes.
44. It is unnecessary, for deciding the present Appeal, to pronounce
upon the precise extent to which individual stipulations contained in
the Supplementary Lease Deed could permissibly be relied upon under
Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908.
45. Even assuming the Appellant’s submission founded upon Paul
9
Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit Chand Mitra to be
applicable, the possessory determination does not rest upon the
Supplementary Lease Deed alone. The registered Lease Deed
independently records the relationship of lessor and lessee and
expressly excludes a joint venture. The Tribunal additionally relied
upon the Appellant’s admissions in the pleadings, interrogatories and
evidence, the payments made under the lease arrangement, its
possession of the premises and the correspondence concerning
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payment of monthly rent.
46. Nor does the pendency of the Appellant’s counterclaims denude
the Tribunal of its power under Section 31(6). In Numero Uno
10
International Limited v. Prasar Bharati , this Court held that the
existence of a counterclaim does not, by itself, preclude an interim
award upon an otherwise separable entitlement. The same principle
was reiterated in Nimbus Communications Limited v. Prasar
11
Bharati , where the counterclaim remained to be established while an
admitted entitlement was separately determined.
47. The caution sounded in Bhadra Products (supra) against
unnecessary fragmentation of arbitral proceedings must nevertheless
be borne in mind. Piecemeal awards may result in additional delay and
expense, and the Tribunal must consider whether a real advantage
exists in separately determining a particular matter. That consideration
pertains to sound arbitral case management and it does not impose an
absolute prohibition upon the power conferred by Section 31(6).
48. In the present case, the Tribunal did not precipitately fragment
the reference. It initially deferred the application, permitted the parties
to complete their evidence and heard the application only thereafter. It
determined the possessory claim while leaving the monetary claims
and counterclaims open. No patent illegality arises merely because the

9
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1216
10
2008 SCC OnLine Del 175
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Tribunal adopted that course.
49. The alternative prayer that the Respondents be directed to
furnish a bank guarantee securing the Appellant’s monetary claims
also cannot be accepted. The counterclaims remain contested and
unadjudicated. They have neither been admitted by the Respondents
nor allowed by the Tribunal.
50. Directing security for those claims as a condition for
enforcement of an adjudicated possessory entitlement would confer
substantive protection upon the Appellant in respect of claims whose
existence and quantum remain to be determined. No contractual or
statutory basis for such a direction has been demonstrated.
51. The distinction which governs this Appeal is ultimately a
narrow one. An Arbitral Tribunal cannot finally determine a
substantive claim merely under the guise of granting an interim
measure under Section 17. It can, however, after notice and an
effective opportunity of hearing, finally adjudicate a matter forming
part of the reference by way of an interim award under Section 31(6).
The legal character of the resulting adjudication depends upon its
substance and effect and not merely upon the statutory provision
mentioned in the application.


11
2016 SCC OnLine Del 6886
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CONCLUSION
52. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, justified in refusing to
set aside the Partial Award. For the reasons recorded above, no ground
for interference under Section 37(1)(c) of the Act is made out.
53. The present Appeal, along with the pending application for stay,
is accordingly dismissed in limine .
54. It is clarified that nothing contained in this Judgment shall be
construed as expressing any opinion on the merits of the monetary
claims or counterclaims which remain pending before the Arbitral
Tribunal. The same shall be adjudicated independently, in accordance
with law, and uninfluenced by any observation contained herein which
is not necessary for determination of the present Appeal.


ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.

SHAIL JAIN, J.
AUGUST 20, 2026
sp/ad
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