Sandeep Raj Katiyar And 2 Ors. vs State Of U.P. And Another
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
A.F.R.
Judgment reserved on. 28.10.2026
Judgment delivered on. 17.11.2026
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:234881
Court No. - 78
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No.37665 of 2014
Applicant(s):- Sandeep Raj Katiyar And 2 Ors.
Opposite Party(s) :- State of UP and Another
Counsel for Applicant(s) :- J.N. Mishra, Jagat Narayan Mishra,
Krishna Dutt Mishra
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) :- Anand Srivastava, G.A., Govt.
Advocate
Hon'ble Sandeep Jain, J.
1. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been
preferred by the accused-applicants with the prayer to quash the order
dated 03.08.2014 issuing bailable warrants as well as entire
proceedings of Criminal Case No.1380 of 2008 (State v. Sandeep Raj
& ors) arising out of Case Crime No.338 of 2008, under Sections
498-A, 323, 504 & 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act,
Police Station Bhognipur, District Kanpur Dehat, pending before
Judicial Magistrate, Bhognipur, District Kanpur Dehat.
2. The factual matrix is that the marriage of the complainant-
respondent No.2’s daughter, Pramila, was solemnized with accused-
applicant Sandeep Raj Katiyar on 27.05.2006, according to Hindu
rites and rituals, and the complainant gave dowry as per his financial
capacity. However, soon after the marriage, the accused-applicants,
who are the husband and relatives of the husband, raised an additional
demand of dowry of Rs.2 lakhs, and when the complainant and his
daughter failed to fulfill the said demand, the complainant’s daughter
was mentally and physically harassed.
3. The complainant also took the matter before a Panchayat, but still
the accused-applicants remained unrelenting. It is the case of the
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complainant that the husband took Pramila to Ghaziabad, where she
was again tormented and assaulted by her brother-in-law and
husband, due to which she sustained injuries on her body. Ultimately,
the complainant’s daughter was assaulted, abused and thrown out of
her matrimonial home and was threatened with dire consequences, if
she returned to her matrimonial home. Pramila returned to her
parental home at village Gurgaon but on 09.10.2008 at 6 PM, the
husband and his brother came, abused, assaulted and threatened
Pramila and her mother with dire consequences.
4. An FIR in this regard was registered on 11.10.2008, being Case
Crime No.338 of 2008, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC
as well as Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at Police Station
Bhognipur, District Kanpur Dehat, in which, after investigation,
charge-sheet was submitted under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506
IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station
Bhognipur, District Kanpur Dehat, upon which cognizance was taken.
When the accused-applicants failed to appear before the trial Court,
by order dated 03.08.2014, bailable warrants were issued against
them, which have been challenged in the present proceedings.
5. Learned counsel for the accused-applicants submitted that there
was matrimonial dispute between the parties and now the marriage of
the complainant’s daughter, Smt. Pramila, with accused-applicant
Sandeep Raj Katiyar has ended in divorce, as the Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Kanpur Dehat by judgment and order dated 29.01.2013,
dissolved the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. He further submitted that the Court also directed the
husband to pay permanent alimony of Rs.2 lakhs, which has also been
paid to the divorced wife.
6. Learned counsel submits that since the marriage of the
complainant’s daughter and the accused-applicant has ended in
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divorce, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the
accused-applicants would amount to an abuse of the process of the
Court. He has relied upon the judgment in the case of Navneesh
Aggarwal & Others vs. State of Haryana & Another 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1680, for the proposition that where the marriage ends in
divorce, the proceedings under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 IPC
cannot be continued against the husband and his relatives.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the complainant/respondent no.2
accepted that the marriage of the complainant’s daughter, Smt.
Pramila, with accused-applicant Sandeep Raj Katiyar has ended in
divorce, but submitted that in the present case, the charge-sheet was
submitted against the accused-applicants way back in the year 2008,
which is prior to the decree of divorce dated 29.01.2013.
8. Learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, the divorce has
neither taken place between the spouses by mutual consent nor there
is any settlement between the erstwhile husband and wife with regard
to the pending disputes. Hence, the decision relied upon by learned
counsel for the applicants is not applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the present case and merely on the basis that the
marriage has ended in divorce, the pending criminal proceedings
cannot be quashed.
9. Learned counsel for the complainant further submits that there is
sufficient evidence available on record in the case diary to summon
the accused-applicants. He further submitted that previously accused-
applicant nos.2 and 3, namely Jai Prakash Katiyar and Amar Raj
Katiyar, had challenged the charge-sheet by filing Application under
Section 482 No.8317 of 2011, (Jai Prakash & anr v. State of UP &
ors), which was dismissed on various grounds by this Court on
12.09.2011. Hence, the accused-applicants cannot raise the same
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issue again in the present application, which amounts to an abuse of
the process of the Court.
10. Learned counsel submits that in view of the aforesaid facts, the
application is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
11. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides and perused the
record.
12. From the perusal of the judgment of the Apex Court in Navneesh
Aggarwal (supra) it is apparent that, in that case a compromise had
been reached between the spouses pursuant to which the wife had
expressed her desire not to pursue the pending criminal proceeding
against the husband and relatives of the husband. Also, divorce took
place between the spouses by mutual consent, which was granted by
the concerned Family Court, subsequent to the registration of FIR by
the estranged wife. The wife also filed reply before the High Court
stating therein that she had no objection if the FIR including the
criminal proceedings are quashed. In such circumstances, the Apex
Court quashed the proceedings of the pending criminal case against
the husband and his relatives.
13. The High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Anoop Gautam vs.
State of Rajasthan and Another (Neutral Citation No.2026:RJ-
JP:30385) in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 5021/2019
decided on 04.08.2026, while considering a petition filed by the
husband seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings pending before
the learned Judicial Magistrate, wherein a charge-sheet had been filed
on 08.05.2019 for the offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC,
and taking note of the fact that a decree of divorce had subsequently
been granted in favour of the petitioner on 10.11.2021, observed that
a subsequent decree of divorce, by itself, is not a ground for quashing
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criminal proceedings under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. The
relevant para is quoted as under:-
“5. The marriage between present petitioner and non-applicant no. 2 were
solemnized on 20.06.2014 at Alwar. The non- applicant no.2 has filed a criminal
complaint before learned Judicial Magistrate no. 4, Alwar, which was sent to
police for registration of FIR under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and on basis of
complaint, FIR no. 362 of 2018 dated 20.12.2018 was registered under Section
498-A and 406 IPC at PS Mahila Thana, District Alwar. A report is received from
police indicate that after investigation, police has filed a charge sheet against
present petitioner under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC on 08-05-2019.
6. The petitioner has filed a matrimonial case under Section 13 of Hindu
Marriage Act in the Family Court, Agra, and learned Additional Principal Judge,
Family Court no. 3 at Agra has allowed Matrimonial Case no. 2422/2018 on 10-
11-2021 and passed a decree of divorce. The decree has been passed after filing
of charge sheet in current case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out
that after filing of a divorce petition and receipt of notice, current FIR has been
lodged. We have considered the fact that the complaint has been filed on 10-12-
2018 and FIR has been registered on 17-12-2018 whereas the divorce case has
been filed in the month of November 2018.
7. *
8. After concluding the investigation, police has already filed a charge sheet and
present petitioner is on bail. After filing of the charge sheet, present petitioner
has procured a decree of divorce from Agra (U.P.), though marriage between the
parties has been solemnized at Alwar (Rajasthan). We have gone through the
content of FIR and also police report as referred by learned Public Prosecutor. No
doubt about the fact that when the allegations are in FIR are vague and no
specific instances of criminal conduct is mentioned, then there is no purpose to
institute and continue a criminal proceeding.
9. In case of Ankul Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 1153, Hon'ble
Supreme Court while referring judgment in case of Md. Allauddin Vs. State of
Bihar and Ors., Criminal Appeal no. 675 of 2019, has observed that at the stage
of charge sheet, factual disputes and appreciation of evidence are beyond the
scope of inquiry under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and the veracity of allegations is a
matter of trial.
10. In case of CBI Vs. Aryan Singh reported in 2023 18 SCC 399, Hon'ble
Supreme Court has emphasized that under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. examination of
the merits of the prosecution case and holding that the charge is not proved is
beyond the jurisdiction, as it is a matter strictly for trial.
11. Having considered the entire material on record, I am of the considered view
that the parties may have differences to live with each other, but when there is a
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matrimonial offense then a solution is provided under the law, and it includes
registration of a criminal case. A criminal case cannot be quashed only on the
ground that one of the spouse has obtained a decree of divorce and now they are
living separately. The FIR contains several instances including allegation for
demand of dowry and cruelty, therefore, the veracity of the allegations are
subject matter of trial and not subject matter to be considered for quashing under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
12. In view of discussion made hereinabove, the petition filed under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. is hereby dismissed, with pending applications, if any.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. The High Court of Kerala in the case of Abdul Sathar vs. Aneesa
2005 SCC OnLine Ker 19, while interpreting the scope and ambit of
Section 498-A IPC and examining the applicability of the said
provision in cases where the matrimonial relationship between the
parties has subsequently come to an end by divorce, held as under:-
“4. To seek answers to the above three questions, a reading of S. 498A IPC is
absolutely necessary. The said section is therefore extracted as hereunder:
“S. 498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.
— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman
subjects such woman to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or
valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand”.
5. From a reading of S. 498A IPC, it is clear that if a person ‘being the husband’
or ‘the relative of the husband’ of a woman subjects her to cruelty, he can be held
guilty of offence under the said section. The relevant expressions used in the
section referring to the accused are, ‘being the husband’ and ‘the relative of the
husband’. ‘Being the husband’ would ordinarily mean, ‘in his capacity as the
husband’, or ‘on account of his being the husband’ or on his being the husband’.
That means, if a person subjects a woman to cruelty on his being her husband ie.,
in his status as the husband, offence under S. 498A will be attracted.
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6. From the above discussion it is clear that what is relevant to establish offence
under S. 498A IPC is the marital status of the accused at the time of commission
of offence. The expression, ‘being the husband’ used in the section relates to the
marital status of the accused at the time of commission of the offence and not
such status at the time of filing of complaint. Emphasis is seen given in S. 498A
IPC to the marital status of the accused at the time of commission of offence and
not to what it was at the time of filing the complaint. In such circumstances,
offence under S. 498A IPC will lie against a person irrespective of whether he
was the husband or former husband of a woman at the time of filing of
complaint. If a former husband had committed the offence in his capacity as the
husband during subsistence of his marriage with the victim, he can be proceeded
against for offence under S. 498A IPC.
7. A reading of S. 498A IPC further reveals that the expression used in S. 498A
IPC to denote ‘the person aggrieved by the offence’ is significantly, ‘woman’ and
not ‘wife’. This in a way, gives an indication that there is no bar for a ‘woman’
— whether she be the wife or the divorced wife— to proceed against the
accused/husband for offence under S. 498A IPC if she is aggrieved by
commission of such offence. But in such case, it has to be established that the
offence was committed by the accused while marriage between the accused and
victim was in existence. It is not necessary that the victim should continue to be
‘the wife’ of the accused at the time of filing of complaint also.
8. The above position is further clear from S. 198A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (the Code, for short) also. The said section reads as follows:
S. 198-A. Prosecution of offences under S. 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860.— No
Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under S. 498-A of the Penal
Code, 1860, except upon a police report of facts which constitute such offence or
upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved by the offence or by her father,
mother, brother, sister or by her father's or mother's brother or sister or, with the
leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or
adoption”.
9. The expression used in S. 198A of the Code, referring to the victim is ‘the
person aggrieved by the offence’ and not wife. Thus, in S. 198A of the Code also,
just as in S. 498A IPC, the expression ‘wife’ is strikingly kept away by the
Legislature. The use of the word ‘wife’ appears to be deliberately avoided in this
section also. Though ‘the person aggrieved by the offence’ under S. 498A IPC is
normally the ‘wife’, the expression used in S. 198A of the Code referring to such
victim is not ‘wife’ but it is, ‘the person aggrieved by the offence’. This also
suggests that there is no bar for the divorced wife from proceeding against the
accused for the offence committed by him during subsistence of marriage
between them.
10. The inclusion of the word ‘woman’, the exclusion of the word ‘wife’ and use
of the expressions ‘being the husband’ in S. 498A IPC and ‘the person aggrieved
by the offence’ in S. 198A of the Code do not appear to be merely accidental.
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There must be certain clear-cut, unmistakable intention behind the same.
Legislature must have intended that even if a victim of offence under S. 498A
IPC ceases to be the wife after commission of offence, such woman shall not be
prevented from proceeding against the accused for the offence which he had
committed during the subsistence of marriage. Legislature must have also
planned that an accused should not be allowed to escape from the liability under
S. 498A IPC, by divorcing his wife after committing the offence during a period
while his marriage with the victim was in existence. Both these intentions are
made workable by the skill of draftsmanship in framing S. 498A IPC as well as
S. 198A of the Code.
11. Otherwise, it will be easy for an offender to defeat a woman and also the very
object of the legislation by pronouncing ‘thalaq’ immediately after commission
of offence under S. 498A IPC and get himself absolved from criminal liability.
This possibility must have been there in the mind of the framers of the section
while introducing the provision and that explains the cautious usage of the
relevant expressions in S. 498A IPC and S. 198A of the Code. Thus, a woman,
whether she be the wife or divorced wife can proceed against the
accused/husband, if she is aggrieved by the offence committed by him during
subsistence of their marriage under S. 498A IPC. The Court can take cognizance
of such offence falling under S. 498A IPC on a complaint filed by a divorced
wife.
12. Another important question also arises in this case. Can a former husband be
held liable under S. 498A IPC for alleged act of ‘cruelty’ committed by him on
his divorced wife, after the divorce? As per the allegations in the complaint,
petitioner who is the former/divorcee husband of the divorced woman continued
to inflict ‘cruelty’ on her even after divorce. But, going by the language of S. 498
IPC, he cannot be held guilty of offence under S. 498A IPC because, as per the
said Section, the act committed by a person will be an offence only if he has
done it in his marital status as ‘the husband’. After divorce, he ceases to be ‘the
husband’ and hence such acts committed by him after divorce will not constitute
offence under S. 498A IPC. If such acts make out any other offence, he can be
proceeded against for such other offence or offences.
13. I shall now sum up : If a former/divorcee husband had subjected a divorced
wife to cruelty in his status as her husband during subsistence of their marriage,
he will be liable for offence under S. 498A of IPC. But, if the alleged act of
cruelty is committed by a former husband on the divorced wife after divorce, no
offence under S. 498A IPC will lie against him. He can however be proceeded
against for such act, if it constitutes any other offence.
14. I would also hold that to constitute offence under S. 498A IPC, existence of
marriage between accused/husband and victim at the time of commission of
offence is what is relevant and not that at the time of filing of complaint There is
also no bar under S. 498A IPC for a divorced wife to file a complaint against her
former husband for the offence committed by him during subsistence of their
marriage under S. 498A IPC.S. 198A of the Code enables a divorced wife also to
9
file such complaint and the Court can make cognizance of offence under S. 498A
IPC if the offence was committed at a time when the marriage between
accused/husband and victim was subsisting.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. Similarly, the High Court of Jharkhand At Ranchi in the case of
Simtaz Khan vs. The State of Jharkhand And Another 2017 SCC
OnLine Jhar 1597 while relying on Abdul Sathar (supra), held as
under:-
“14. Section 498-A I.P.C. envisages that if a person ‘being the husband’ or the
‘relative of the husband’ of a women subjects her to cruelty, he can be held guilty
for the offence under the said section. ‘Being the husband’ obviously means that
the accused is the husband at the time of occurrence. So in order to bring home
the charge for the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C., the prosecution
has to prove subsistence of a valid marriage at the time of commission of the
offence. If at the time of commission of offence, a valid marriage subsists but
subsequently, before institution of the case, marriage dissolves still the offence
punishable under Section 498-A would be made out as because Section 498-A
also envisages that ‘the person aggrieved by the offence’ is ‘women’ but not
‘wife’. From this it is evident that the law requires that, to set the law in motion
for an offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C., it is not a sine-qua-non that
the victim has to be the wife. Again this interpretation also finds force from the
recital of Section 198-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure where also the victim
is referred to as ‘the person aggrieved by the offence’ and not the ‘wife’. So
Section 198-A Cr.P.C. also provides that a divorced wife can also proceed against
her former husband for the offence committed by him during subsistence of the
marriage between them. Thus, conjoint reading of the Section 498-A I.P.C. and
Section 198-A Cr.P.C. reveals that the legislature was clear in its mind that an
accused should not be allowed to escape from the liability under Section 498-A
I.P.C. by divorcing his wife, after committing the offence during the period when
a valid marriage was subsisting between the victim and the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. The High Court of Gujarat in the case of Rameshbhai Danjibhai
Solanki and Others vs. State of Gujarat And Others 2023 SCC
OnLine Guj 2573, considered a case wherein the marriage between
the husband and wife was solemnised on 06.03.2005, a decree of
divorce was granted on 25.02.2014, and an FIR alleging commission
of an offence under Section 498-A and 494 IPC was lodged on
26.12.2015. The Court, upon finding that no specific allegations of
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harassment or cruelty had been levelled against the husband in
respect of the period during which the matrimonial relationship
subsisted, prior to the passing of the decree of divorce, which was
essential for attracting S498A IPC, quashed the FIR and all
consequential proceedings. The Court held as under:
“16. The plain reading of sections 498A of the IPC shows that expression used
therein referred to the accused are “the husband” and “relatives of the husband”.
The expression being “the husband” and “relatives of the husband” in ordinary
parlance would come “in capacity as husband” or “is being husband”. The
expression is reflective for the proposition that for levelling the allegation u/s
498A of the IPC, the status of “the husband” or “relatives of the husband” must
exist. The simple meaning is that for levelling the allegations of offence, the
accused must be “the husband” or “relatives of the husband” or he could be “in
capacity of the husband” or “in capacity of relatives of the husband”. This
expression does not include “former husband” or “ex-husband” or “relative of
the former husband or ex-husband.” The Legislature while using expression “the
husband” or “relatives of the husband” in section 498A of the IPC, used the word
“woman” and not “wife”. Meaning thereby, allegations of the offence u/s 498A
of the IPC even can be maintained at the instance of the divorcee wife, provided
that she alleges the incident of harassment and cruelty which could have been
meted out while marriage was subsisting. However, she cannot file complaint
alleging offence u/s 498A of the IPC putting allegation of an incident, which
could have been taken place subsequent to the divorce. Once the competent
Court passed the decree of divorce, the marital status of the husband and wife is
snapped and the pre-requisite condition of section 498A of the IPC “being the
husband” or “relatives of the husband” disappears. In the present case, when the
FIR was filed alleging offence punishable u/s 498A read with allied offences, the
status of the complainant and the petitioner No. 1 i.e. being husband and wife
was snapped by divorce decree passed by the competent Court. Admittedly, the
petitioner No. 1 was not the husband of the complainant nor other petitioners are
relatives of the husband. On reading the FIR, what emerges that the complainant
has not alleged harassment and cruelty for the time period the marriage was
subsisting. No specific incident of harassment and cruelty has been indicated in
the FIR when the marriage was subsisting. What appears from the bare reading
of the FIR is that the complainant was aggrieved on the ground that the petitioner
No. 1 remarried subsequent to divorce decree. The allegations levelled therein
for harassment and cruelty could be said to have been made for the time period
subsequent to the divorce.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. It is apparent that in the instant case the applicant husband
Sandeep Raj Katiyar instituted O.S.no.567 of 2008 Sandeep Raj
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Katiyar vs. Smt.Pramila for obtaining divorce under Section 13(1)
(1A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which was allowed by the
court of Civil Judge(Senior Division) Kanpur Dehat vide judgment
and order dated 29.01.2013. The suit was contested by the wife and it
is not a case where divorce was granted on the basis of mutual
consent.
18. It is further apparent that the estranged wife had never consented
to a compromise for ending the proceedings of the pending criminal
case against the applicants. In fact, the divorced wife Smt. Pramila
has filed her counter affidavit on 18.12.2014 in the instant
proceedings in which she has stated that she was tormented by the
applicants for bringing less dowry and ultimately she was ousted
from her matrimonial home. She has also stated that on 11.10.2008
she registered FIR against the applicants as Case crime No. 338 of
2008 under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act at police station Bhognipur, District Kanpur
Dehat. She has also filed her injury report dated 11.10.2008 which
discloses that she had suffered several simple injuries on her body
which were caused by hard and blunt object.
19. It was further submitted by the divorced wife in her counter
affidavit that the applicant Sandeep Raj Katiyar filed Habeas Corpus
Petition No. 1237 of 2008 before this Court in which she appeared
and submitted that she does not want to reside with him because she
had been harassed and tortured by him and his family members due to
demand of dowry. In view of this, the above petition was dismissed
by order dated 21.10.2008. She has acknowledged that her marriage
with the applicant Sandeep Raj Katiyar has ended in divorce by order
dated 29.1.2013, which according to her, is arbitrary and illegal. It
was further averred that the alleged offence was committed by the
applicants much prior to the passing of the divorce decree, hence the
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applicants cannot take the benefit of the divorce decree dated
29.1.2013.
20. It is apparent that the estranged divorced wife Smt. Pramila has
tooth and nail opposed the quashing of the instant proceedings and
has specifically stated that the alleged offence was committed by the
applicants much prior to the passing of the divorce decree dated
29.1.2013, hence the pending criminal proceedings cannot be quashed
on the basis of alleged divorce.
21. It is further apparent that the applicant No. 2 and 3 namely Jai
Prakash Katiyar and Amar Raj Katiyar had already challenged the
chargesheet by filing Application under Section 482 No. 8317 of
2011(Jai Prakash and another vs. State of UP and others) which was
dismissed on various grounds by this Court on 12.09.2011. Hence the
applicant No. 2 and 3 are barred from raising the same issue in the
instant application.
22. It is further apparent that Smt. Pramila has alleged that she was
subjected to illegal demand of dowry of 2 Lacs soon after her
₹
marriage and when she failed to fulfil the said demand, she was
subjected to physical and mental harassment, assaulted, abused,
threatened with dire consequences and she was ousted from her
matrimonial home by the applicants. She has also filed a copy of her
injury report dated 11.10.2008 in support of the above submission
that she was assaulted. It is apparent that the above offence took place
between the period 27.05.2006 till 09.10.2008, in which after
investigation, chargesheet was submitted in the year 2008 on which
cognizance has already been taken by the competent criminal court.
23. It is further apparent that the alleged offence took place between
the year 2006 – 2008 which is much prior to the decree of divorce
dated 29.01.2013. It is not a case where the divorced wife has
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instituted criminal proceedings after being divorced by her estranged
husband. It is apparent that the wife duly contested the divorce
proceedings and has also contested the instant case under Section 482
CrPC and she has also not consented to end the proceedings of the
pending criminal case against the applicants by entering into a
compromise with them.
24. Prima facie there is sufficient material on record to conclude that
Smt. Pramila has been subjected to illegal demand of dowry of 2
₹
Lacs and when she failed to fulfil that demand, she was physically
and mentally harassed, assaulted, abused and threatened with dire
consequences by the applicants. It is apparent that the ratio of the case
in Navneesh Aggarwal (supra) is not applicable in the facts and
circumstances of this case. It is further apparent that at the relevant
time when the alleged offence was committed by the applicants, the
matrimonial relationship between Smt. Pramila and applicant
Sandeep Raj Katiyar was subsisting. Accordingly, neither the
investigating officer nor the trial court has committed any error in
submitting and taking cognizance on, respectively, the chargesheet in
Case crime No. 338 of 2008 under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC
and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act police station
Bhognipur, District Kanpur Dehat, warranting any interference by
this Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.
25. For the aforesaid reasons, the instant Criminal Miscellaneous
Application under Section 482 CrPC is hereby dismissed.
26. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
27. The trial court is directed to expedite the trial and conclude it
within a period of 6 months from the date a certified copy of this
order is produced before it, without granting unnecessary
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adjournment to either of the parties, on merits, in accordance with
law.
28. The trial court will not be influenced by any observation or
finding recorded in this order and shall be at liberty to decide the
criminal trial on merits.
Order Date:- 17.11.2026
Jitendra/Himanshu/Mayank
(Sandeep Jain, J.)
Digitally signed by :-
MAYANK KUMAR SHARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad