Rohit Kumar Verma And Others vs State Of Haryana And Another
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
CRM-M-65217-2026 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
147 CRM-M-65217-2026
Rohit Kumar Verma and others
....Petitioners
V/s
State of Haryana and another
....Respondent
Date of decision: 17.11.2026
Date of Uploading : 17.11.2026
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Ms. Sakshi Khera, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Deepak Kumar Grewal, DAG Haryana.
Ms. Akshra, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*
SUMEET GOEL , J. (Oral)
1. The petitioners have approached this Court under Section 528
of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as
‘BNSS, 2023’), invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing
of FIR No.22 dated 11.01.2026, registered under Sections 318(4), 61(2) and
238 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (as also the other provisions
mentioned in the petition), at Police Station Cyber Crime NIT, District
Faridabad, Haryana, along with all consequential proceedings, including the
final reports stated to have been filed on 16.07.2026 and 14.10.2026, on the
basis of a compromise dated 13.10.2026 (Annexure P-2) entered into
between the petitioners and respondent No.2-complainant.
2. The gravamen of the impugned FIR is that respondent No.2,
namely, Krishan Bihari Thakur, submitted a complaint alleging that on
23.12.2025, he searched for a customer care number of a company on
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Google and contacted a telephone number displayed therein as the
customer’s care helpline. The person who attended the call informed him
that a service charge of Rs.10/- would be levied, thereafter the call was
disconnected. Subsequently, respondent No.2 received a WhatsApp call
from mobile number 91-8100410617. During the course of conversation,
certain numbers were shared with him, including 2512191265693679 and
83740279030. He was asked that the balance in his PhonePe account could
be ascertained by following the instructions communicated to him. It has
been further alleged that immediately upon respondent No.2 checking the
balance, the screen of his mobile phone went blank and repeated
notifications started appearing on his device. Thereafter, he discovered that
an amount of Rs.98,000/- had been debited from his bank account bearing
No.0512233200. The said amount was transferred through UTR
No.8241738228724 and the name of Imtiyaz Ahmad was reflected as the
beneficiary. Accordingly, the complainant alleged that he had been duped
by an unknown person, who had impersonated himself as a customer care
representative and had fraudulently induced him to follow certain
instructions, which had resulted in unauthorised withdrawal of money from
his bank account. On these set of allegations, the FIR in question came to be
registered.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has iterated that the
petitioners have been falsely implicated into the FIR in question. Learned
counsel has further iterated that the dispute between the parties has now
been amicably resolved with the intervention of respectable persons and
family members. It has been further contended that the relatives of the
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petitioners entered into a compromise (compromise deed dated 13.10.2026
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has been placed on record as Annexure P-2) with respondent No.2 on their
behalf and the entire settled amount of Rs.98,000/- has already been paid to
and received by the complainant. It has been further contended that
respondent No.2 has no grievance or claim against any of the petitioners and
has undertaken not to pursue the criminal proceedings arising out of the
impugned FIR. Learned counsel has emphasized that the compromise has
been arrived at voluntarily, without any force, pressure, coercion or undue
influence and the respondent No.2-complainant has no objection to the
quashing of the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings.
Furthermore, the respondent No.2 is willing to appear before the concerned
Court and make a statement affirming the compromise. Furthermore, the
investigation has already completed and the final report has already been
presented, thus, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the criminal
proceedings alive, particularly when the complainant has already received
the entire amount and does not wish to pursue the matter any further.
Learned counsel has further contended that the FIR in question, which was
got registered on account of a misunderstanding, has since been resolved
between the parties and in order to keep peace as also harmony, the parties
do not wish to continue with proceedings against each other, including the
impugned FIR. Learned counsel has further urged that no useful purpose
would likely be served by allowing the criminal prosecution to continue
against the petitioners. Thus, it has been entreated that the petition in hand
be granted.
4. In oppugnation, learned State counsel has opposed the prayer
made in the present petition. It has been iterated that the impugned FIR was
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registered for serious allegations of cyber fraud involving fraudulent
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transactions. According to learned State counsel, the offence of cyber fraud
not only affects the complainant but also erodes the public confidence in
digital banking transactions. Though the parties have entered into a
compromise and the complainant has expressed no objection to quashing of
the impugned FIR but while considering the compromise, the nature and
gravity of allegations are also to be taken into account as the offence(s) in
question pertains to cyber and financial fraud. Learned State counsel has
emphasized that the power to quash the proceedings lies with this Court
under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 but it has to be exercised sparingly and
cautiously. On the basis of aforesaid submissions, learned State counsel has
prayed for dismissal of the petition in hand.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has submitted that the
parties have amicably settled the matter with the petitioners. The
complainant has executed a compromise-deed dated 13.10.2026 and
categorically stated that he has no objection if the impugned FIR and all
proceedings arising therefrom are quashed against the petitioners.
Furthermore, the compromise has been arrived at voluntarily without any
threat, coercion or undue influence. Thus, in view of the compromise duly
executed between the parties, learned counsel has prayed that the petition in
hand be allowed and the impugned FIR and all consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom be quashed.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the record.
7. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by
this Court tilted as Badri Mandal vs. State of Haryana 2025 Law Finder
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(P&H) 17638 whereinafter; relying upon Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
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and another, 2012(10) SCC303, Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab,
2014(6) SCC 466, Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur
and ors. vs State of Gujarat and anr. AIR 2017 SC 4843 and State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and others AIR 2019 SC 1296; this
Court has held thus:
“ Prime Issue
7. The issue that arises for consideration in the petition in hand is as
to whether the impugned FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom
deserve to be quashed on the basis of compromise/settlement having been
arrived at between the rival private parties.
The seminal legal issue that arises for rumination is as to whether
an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) can be quashed on the
basis of compromise/settlement between the rival parties wherein the FIR
pertains to allegations of cyber fraud.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
Analysis (re law)
10. The conventional outlook, in view of the statutory
framework, was that criminal offence(s) could be settled only by way of
compounding, as per the provisions of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., 1973
(now Section 359 of BNSS, 2023). In ordinary parlance, “compounding”
is known as “compromise” or “settlement”. This expression is,
ordinarily, understood as condoning a felony in exchange for repatriation
received by the victim-complainant from the felon.In other words, no
compounding/compromise of a criminal offence could be permitted by the
Court, except for an offence which met with rigoursof the Section 320 of
Cr.P.C. Therefore; the question arose whether the High Court, by
exercising its plenary/inherent jurisdiction, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,
could quash ongoing FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of
compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the rival parties.
10.1. Before proceeding further, it would be germane to delve
into the nature, scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., 1973.
10.2. Inherent powers of the High Court are those which are
incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be
obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and the Courts
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being abused for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s)
is intrinsic to the High Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its
immanent attribute. Without such power(s), the High Court would have a
form but lack the substance. These powers of the High Court, hence,
deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. These
inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of the High Court
which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to
maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being
obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though the
laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of
circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language
make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every
case, which, in fact, arise. The High Court which exists for the
furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have
unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not expressly
provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the
abuse of the process of law and Courts. The maxim, namely, “quando lex
aliquidalicuiconcedit, concederevidetur et id sine quo res ipsa, esse non
potest” (when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those
things without which the thing itself cannot exist) also signifies that the
inherent powers of the High Court are all such powers which are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of
administration of justice. Further, the maxim “ex debito
justitiae” stipulates that such powers are given to do real and substantial
justice, for which purpose alone,the High Court exists. Hence, the powers
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., are aimed at preserving the inherent
powers of a High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
tosecure the ends of justice. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s)
is the authority; in fact, the seminal duty and responsibility of the High
Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfil the judicial function of
administering justice, in accordance with the law, in a methodical,
orderly and effective manner. In other words; Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
reflects peerless powers, which a High Court may draw upon as
necessary, whenever it is just and equitable to do so; in particular, to
ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or
oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between the parties and to
secure the ends of justice.
10.3 The above principle(s), in context of provisions of Section
482 of Cr.P.C, 1973, would apply with complete vigour, to the provisions
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of Section 528 of BNSS of 2023 as well, since there is no alteration in the
wording of these two provisions.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh
(supra) has enunciated that the powers of the High Court for quashing of
criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement are materially different
from compounding of offence in terms of Section 320 of Cr.P.C., (Now
Section 359 of BNSS, 2023) as a Court while exercising power under
Section 320 of Cr.P.C. (Now Section 359 of BNSS, 2023) is circumscribed
by the statutory provision but the High Court may proceed to quash a
criminal offence/criminal proceedings if the ends of justice justify exercise
of such power. It was thus held that the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil flavour, offences arising out of
matrimonial dispute, offences arising out of family dispute, as also
offences which are basically private or personal in nature, could be
quashed by the High Court in case the parties have resolved their entire
dispute(s). Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder
Singh (supra) has held that the possibility of conviction being remote and
bleak, whereas continuation of the criminal case is putting the accused to
oppression and prejudice & the parties being put to general
inconvenience, as also prejudice could also be considered as contributing
factors by the High Court, while examining a plea for quashing of
criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement/compromise. However a
caution was made that cases involving heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity; offences under
the Prevention of Corruption Act committed by public servants etc., ought
not to be quashed while exercising such plenary jurisdiction. To the same
effect is the dicta of the judgment of three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir case (supra). Further, a
three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment of Laxmi
Narayan case (supra) reiterated the principles laid-down in cases of
Gian Singh (supra) , Narinder Singh (supra) and Parbatbhai Aahir
(supra). The aureate enunciation of law, in above case-law, essentially
points out that the prime factors for consideration of quashing of
FIR/criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise/settlement is that
the dispute/offence is essentially private in nature; continuation of
criminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility as its fait-accompli is
known; pendency of such proceedings would be an undesirable burden on
the police/prosecution as also the Courts, who are already struggling
ardously to manage the ever increasing and unmanageable docket and/or
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such quashing would ensure the ends of justice.
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11.1 It is, thus, unequivocal that the plenary powers vested in a
High Court, by virtue of its very constitution, are to be exercised with
circumspection and in a manner befitting judicial propriety. The
invocation of inherent jurisdiction must serve the ends of justice,
necessitating a holistic evaluation of all the attendant circumstances. The
criminal justice system is not merely a forum for resolving interpersonal
disputes; it embodies the sovereign obligation of the State to safeguard
the fundamental rights of its citizens, including the protection of life,
liberty, and property. In adjudicating petitions seeking quashing of
criminal proceedings on the basis of a purported compromise between the
parties, the court must transcend the immediate assertions of harmony.
While the absence of current grievances between parties may be a
material consideration, it cannot be the determinative criterion. The
court is duty-bound to scrutinize the gravity of the allegations, the nature
of the offences, and their ramifications on the public order and societal
welfare. This judicial responsibility is accentuated in cases involving
heinous or egregious offences, where the broader societal interest
outweighs private settlements. Compromising such cases on the ground of
mutual accord risks undermining the public confidence in the justice
delivery system and jeopardizing the larger interest of law enforcement
and might also imply some kind of impunity being accorded to the erring
party(s).
12. The contemporary felony of cyber fraud presents a
transgression sui generis that mandates its categorical exclusion from the
judicial indulgence for quashing of criminal proceedings solely on the
basis of a compromise/settlement having been arrived at between the
complainant/victim and the accused. Digital economy is the unassailable
locus of modern commerce, sustained entirely by the bedrock of public
trust. Cyber Fraud acts as a corrosive insurgency, causing not merely an
isolated pecuniary loss, but an aggravated systemic damage upon the
public financial exchequer, thereby inflicting profound in rem detriment.
Owing to the anonymity, trans-border expanse and a propensity of
causing substantial adverse impact, a court is compelled to look beyond
the private settlement, lest it may tantamount to granting judicial
imprimatur to an ongoing systemic threat. When such an offender escapes
prosecution simply by offering post facto restitution, the penal measure is
ipso facto converted into a mere calculus of profit and risk. The
perpetrator of such an organized crime is emboldened to treat the
compromise/settlement as a predictable expense, creating a deleterious
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lacuna in the law and gravely impacting the sanctity of criminal justice
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system. When a cyber fraud is perpetrated, the immediate and visible
financial deceit/loss is only the tip of the spear; the real victim is the
digital ecosystem itself. A private compromise/settlement between the
rival private parties, i.e. the accused and the complainant/victim, is
merely an ineffectual repudiation of individual liability, lacking utterly in
addressing the cascading and unquantifiable institutional injury.
Pertinently, this Court is abundantly cognizant of the fact that the
sine qua non behind a complainant/victim’s assent to a
compromise/settlement in cases of financial fraud remains the assured
restitution of the monies of which she has been duped/criminally divested.
This assurance of monetary indemnification acts as a sole allurement
motivating her to participate in compromise/settlement proceedings.
Nevertheless, such a compromise/settlement, having been arrived under
the allurement of monetary restitution, is inherently incapable of
ameliorating the inherent gravity and egregious nature of the offence of
cyber fraud, which has the propensity of causing extensive public
detriment and imparting a pernicious impact on the foundational trust,
underpinning any commercial activity.
12.1. Another aspect nay vital aspect of the lisin hand craves
attention.
The legal landscape is replete with cases where invocation of
serious/grievous allegations pertaining to the stringent penal provisions
(such as those relating to the offence of cyber fraud), constitute an
instrument of premeditated hyperbole, scrupulously invoked to artificially
inflate the gravity of allegations, otherwise rooted in pecuniary bilateral
transactions. However, a more ruminated scrutiny reflects the inherent
nature of transgression to be that of simpliciter cheating, conspicuously
devoid of the ingredient of public detriment required of an offence
pertaining to cyber fraud. In such a factual milieu, the rigid denial to
exercise inherent powers as saved by way of Section 528 of the BNSS,
2023, to sanction an otherwise bona fide compromise/settlement of
dispute(s), solely, because the FIR/Criminal Complaint is ridden with the
allegations of cyber fraud, would tantamount to abdication of judicial
duty, defeating the cause of substantial justice. For, it is an irrevocable
judicial principle that a court, in its transcendent duty to ensure complete
justice, must unflinchingly be cognizant of practical exigencies and social
verities.
12.2. To determine as to whether offence(s) in question pertains
to a situation where the allegations of cyber fraud have been made merely
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to lend severity or it is inherently a case of cyber fraud simplicter, the
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Court is, essentially, required to look into the entire factual milieu of the
particular case in hand. No exhaustive set of guideline(s) to govern, the
exercise of this aspect by the High Court, can possibly be laid down,
however illecebrous this aspect may be. It is neither fathomable nor
desirable to lay down any straightjacket formula in this regard. To do so
would be to crystallize into a rigid definition, a judicial discretion, which
for best of all reasons deserve to be left undetermined. Any attempt in this
regard would be, to say the least, a quixoticendeavour. Circumstantial
flexibility, one additional or different fact, may make a sea of difference
between conclusions of two cases. Ergo, such exercise would thus,
indubitably, be dependent upon the factual matrix of the particular case
which the High Court is in seisin of, since every case has its own peculiar
factual conspectus.
13. As a sequitur of the above rumination, the following
postulates emerge:
I. The inherent jurisdiction vested in the High Court ought
not be exercised for quashing of an FIR/Criminal Complaint, pertaining
to the allegations of cyber fraud, solely on the basis of
compromise/settlement. The pervasive public detriment and the systemic
erosion of trust, irrevocably, supersedes, the purely private remedial
adjustment, achieved between the complainant/victim and the accused.
II. Where a meticulous judicial appraisal of facts reflects that
the cyber fraud allegations have been strategically invoked to lend
unwarranted gravity and seriousness to otherwise simpliciter pecuniary
transaction inter-se the Complainant/victim and the accused, the Court
must not permit the rigidity of law to defeat the ends of justice and may
sanction the bona fide compromise/settlement to putan endto the lis.
III. To effectually determine as to whether the case in hand
falls within the ambit and scope of postulate (I) or postulate (II) (supra),
the Court must undertake a scrupulous and granular scrutiny of the entire
factual milieu of the case at hand.
No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid-down for exercise of
aforesaid judicial discretion by a Court as every case has its own unique
factual conspectus. There is no gainsaying that an order passed by the
Court, while exercising such discretion, must be a speaking order clearly
giving out reasons therein & must be in consonance with the basic canons
of Justice, good conscience and equity.”
8. It is well settled that the power of this Court to quash criminal
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proceedings on the basis of a compromise is distinct from the statutory
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power of compounding an offence. Even in cases involving non-
compoundable offences, this Court may, in an appropriate case, exercise its
inherent jurisdiction where the dispute is predominantly private in nature
and the continuation of criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose.
However, such power cannot be exercised mechanically merely upon
noticing that the parties have entered into a compromise. The nature of the
allegations, the manner in which the offence is alleged to have been
committed and its impact upon society are equally relevant considerations.
The allegations of cyber fraud cannot be treated at par with ordinary private
disputes merely because the complainant has received monetary restitution.
Cyber fraud is capable of causing harm beyond the immediate financial loss
suffered by an individual. It also affects public confidence in digital
transactions and the systems through which such transactions are being
carried out.
9. A perusal of the impugned FIR reveals that the allegations are
not confined to a pre-existing monetary transaction or a contractual dispute
between the complainant and the petitioners. The complainant has
specifically alleged that he searched for a customer care number through
Google whereinafter he was contacted by persons who allegedly
impersonated as customer care representatives. The complainant was
induced to follow certain instructions under the pretext of checking the
balance in his PhonePe account. Immediately thereafter, an amount of
Rs.98,000/- was debited from his bank account. The complainant has
allegedly approached through a digital means of communication and was
made to believe that he was interacting with a customer care representative.
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Thus, the allegations disclose a method of deception involving
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impersonation, digital communication and unauthorized transfer of money.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the pleadings or the material placed before
this Court to indicate that the complainant and the petitioners were
previously known to each other or the alleged transaction arose out of any
pre-existing commercial, contractual or other private dealing between them.
Another important circumstance which cannot be overlooked is that the
amount was allegedly transferred to an account in the name of petitioner
No.4-Imtiyaz Ahmad. The complainant has specifically referred to the UTR
number of the transaction and the name of the beneficiary. The
circumstances surrounding the alleged transfer, including the use of the
beneficiary account and the respective roles attributed to the petitioners, are
matters which require consideration in the criminal proceedings. This Court,
at this stage, cannot presume that the alleged transaction was merely an
isolated private monetary dispute between the complainant and the
petitioners.
10. The compromise deed dated 13.10.2026, though voluntary and
duly acted upon by the parties cannot, by itself, be a sufficient ground for
exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. Thus, keeping in view the
nature of the allegations, the petition in hand ought not to be entreated and
deserves rejection.
11. In view of prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
(i) The petition; seeking quashing of FIR No.22 dated 11.01.2026,
registered at Police Station Cyber Crime NIT, District Faridabad, Haryana,
along with all consequential proceedings, including the final reports stated
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to have been filed on 16.07.2026 and 14.10.2026, on the basis of
compromise dated 13.10.2026, is hereby dismissed.
(ii) Any observations made hereinabove shall not have any effect
on the merits of the case and the trial Court/police shall proceed further, in
accordance with law without being influence with the same.
(iii) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
November 17, 2026
Ajay
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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